Trong quá trình thực hiện đề tài, theo nhận định chủ quan của tác giả vẫn chưa có nhiều nghiên cứu đi sâu vào phân tích cơ cấu sở hữu và các nhân tố ảnh hưởng đến
cơ cấu sở hữu, cũng như là nội sinh cơ cấu sở hữu. Thiết nghĩ đây cũng là một khía cạnh cần đầu tư tìm hiểu vì theo hầu hết kết quả thực nghiệm đã minh chứng rằng cơ cấu sở hữu có tác động trực tiếp đến kết quả hoạt động kinh doanh.
Bên cạnh đó, thực hiện nghiên cứu về cơ cấu sở hữu giữa công ty tăng trưởng cao và công ty tăng trưởng thấp: tăng quy mơ mẫu và thời gian nghiên cứu để có nhận định tồn diện hơn, hỗ trợ cho quyết định của nhà đầu tư.
10 TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO
Tiếng Việt:
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ty Việt Nam.Tạp chí KHPL,số 4(41)/2007.
3. Hồng Trọng và Chu Nguyễn Mộng Ngọc, 2008. Thống kê ứng dụng trongkinh
tế - xã hội. Hà Nội: Nhà xuất bản Thống kê.
4. Trần Ngọc Thơ và cộng sự, 2007. Tài chính Doanh nghiệp hiện đại. Hà Nội:
Nhà xuấtbản Thống kê.
Tiếng Anh:
1. Chen et al.’s ,2012. Do state and foreign ownership affect investment efficiency? Evidence from privatizations.
2. Clifford G. Holderness, 2003. A survey of blockholders and corporate control.
FRBNY Economic Policy Review, April 2003.
3. Daniel Ferreira Caixe&Elizabeth Krauter, 2013. The Influence of the Ownership and Control Structure on Corporate Market Value in Brazil. ISSN
1808-057X
4. Daqing Qi, Woody Wu & Hua Zhang, 1999. Shareholding Structure and Corporate Performance of Partially Privatized Firms: Evidence from Listed Chinese Companies.
5. Éric Séverin, 2001. Ownership structure and the performance of firms: Evidence from France.European Journal of Economic and Social Systems, 15N° 2 (2001) 85-107.
6. Genc Alimehmeti & Angelo Paletta, 2012. Ownership concentration and Effects over firm performance evidences from Italy.European Scientific
Journal, vol. 8, pp 39-49.
7. Harold Demsetz & Belén Villalonga, 2001. Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 209- 233.
8. Himmelberg, Hubbard&Palia, 1999. Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance.
Journal of Financial Economics 53, 353–384.
9. James S. Ang, Rebel A. Cole, and James Wuh Lin.Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.
10. John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, 1990.Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value.Journal of Financial Economics 27 (1990) 595- 612. North-Holland
11. Mejbel Al-Saidi & Bader Al-Shammari, 2014.The Relationship between a Firm’s Value and Ownership Structure in Kuwait: Simultaneous Analyses Approach. International Business Research; Vol. 7, No. 5.
12. Michael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure.Journal of Financial Economics
3 (1976), 305-360.
13. Mohammad Namazi & Ehsan Kermani, 2013.An empirical investigation of the relationship between corporate ownership structures and their performances (Evidence from Tehran Stock Exchange. Journal of Finance and Accounting,
Vol. 1, No. 1, 13-26
14. Mohun Prasadsing Odit & Hemant B. Chittoo, 2008.Does Financial Leverage Influence Investment Decisions? The Case Of Mauritian Firms.Journal of
Business Case Studies – September 2008, Volume 4, Number 9.
15. Ozcan Isik & M. Erkan Soykan, 2013.Large shareholders and firm performance: evidence from Turkey. European Scientific Journal; Edition
vol.9, No.25.
16. Panayotis Kapopoulos&Sophia Lazaretou, 2006. Corporate ownership structure and firm performance: Evidence from Greek firms. Bank of Greece, No. 37. 17. Pavel Kuznetsov, Alexander Muravyev,2001. Ownership structure and firm
performance in Russia: The case of blue chips of the stock market. Eurasia Foundation'sEconomics Education and Research Consortium - Russia Program
18. Roodman, D., 2006. How to do xtabond2: an introduction to “Difference” and “System” GMM in Stata. Center for Global Development Working Paper, N.
19. Roodman, D., 2009. A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bulletin of Economic and Statistics, 71 (1), 135-158.
20. Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, 2008. Corporate governance and firm performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 257–273.
21. Stijin Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Gerhard Pohl, 1997. Ownership and Corporate governance. Policy research working paper 1737.
22. Syste Douma, Rejie Goerge & Rezaul Kabir, 2002. Foreign and domestic ownership, business groups and firm performance: Evidence from a large emerging market.
23. Windmeijer, 2005. A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators. Journal of Econometrics, 126 (1), 25-51.
24. Yabei Hu & Shigemi Izumida, 2008. Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance: A Causal Analysis with Japanese Panel Data. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 16, Issue 4, pp. 342-358.
25. Zhong Qin, Vinod Mishra and Russell Smyth, 2012. An Empirical examination of endogenous ownership in Chinese Private Enterprises. Department of Economics ISSN 1441-5429, Discussion Paper 38/12.
theo phương pháp mơ hình bình phương tối thiểu thông thường (POOL OLS)
Bảng 4.12: Bảng kết quả kiểm định hồi quy biến Q theo phương pháp mơ hình ảnh hưởng cố định (Fixed Effect Model)
F test that all u_i=0: F(124, 492) = 2.00 Prob > F = 0.0000 : kiểm định Likelihood Ratio
Test (H0: Nên dùng Pooled regression)
_cons 1.172517 .0858626 13.66 0.000 1.003898 1.341136 cr4 .047862 .0272073 1.76 0.079 -.0055684 .1012923 fix_s -.0038464 .009134 -0.42 0.674 -.0217839 .0140911 debt_a .0799792 .0363553 2.20 0.028 .0085838 .1513745 se_s -.2676249 .152276 -1.76 0.079 -.566668 .0314181 gae_s -.6601921 .1441124 -4.58 0.000 -.9432033 -.3771809 lsh5 .0118807 .0140203 0.85 0.397 -.0156526 .0394141 lmsh2 .0238073 .0053259 4.47 0.000 .0133482 .0342665 lmsh .1598795 .043763 3.65 0.000 .0739367 .2458223 q Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Total 17.4858449 624 .028022187 Root MSE = .1555 Adj R-squared = 0.1371 Residual 14.8944678 616 .024179331 R-squared = 0.1482 Model 2.59137709 8 .323922136 Prob > F = 0.0000 F( 8, 616) = 13.40 Source SS df MS Number of obs = 625 . reg q lmsh lmsh2 lsh5 gae_s se_s debt_a fix_s cr4
F test that all u_i=0: F(124, 492) = 2.00 Prob > F = 0.0000 rho .310901 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
sigma_e .14188082 sigma_u .09530023 _cons 1.413552 .1332153 10.61 0.000 1.151811 1.675294 cr4 .0315456 .0399672 0.79 0.430 -.0469818 .1100731 fix_s .0025936 .0274839 0.09 0.925 -.0514066 .0565939 debt_a .0512841 .0900159 0.57 0.569 -.125579 .2281472 se_s .152376 .5885012 0.26 0.796 -1.003909 1.308662 gae_s -.9504609 .2934465 -3.24 0.001 -1.527024 -.3738979 lsh5 .0032559 .0193926 0.17 0.867 -.0348466 .0413585 lmsh2 .0414468 .0075941 5.46 0.000 .0265258 .0563677 lmsh .3023831 .0643681 4.70 0.000 .1759127 .4288535 q Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.2142 Prob > F = 0.0000 F(8,492) = 14.71 overall = 0.1263 max = 5 between = 0.0423 avg = 5.0 R-sq: within = 0.1930 Obs per group: min = 5 Group variable: id Number of groups = 125 Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 625 . xtreg q lmsh lmsh2 lsh5 gae_s se_s debt_a fix_s cr4,fe
Bảng 4.14: Bảng kết quả kiểm định Hausman test – Biến Q
rho .15387066 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
sigma_e .14188082 sigma_u .06050388 _cons 1.239762 .0944407 13.13 0.000 1.054661 1.424862 cr4 .0443485 .0296951 1.49 0.135 -.0138528 .1025498 fix_s -.0041626 .0111111 -0.37 0.708 -.0259399 .0176146 debt_a .0760591 .043322 1.76 0.079 -.0088504 .1609686 se_s -.2526865 .1875252 -1.35 0.178 -.6202292 .1148561 gae_s -.7159203 .1671007 -4.28 0.000 -1.043432 -.3884089 lsh5 .0080144 .0149844 0.53 0.593 -.0213546 .0373834 lmsh2 .0292972 .0056957 5.14 0.000 .0181338 .0404605 lmsh .2026488 .0473259 4.28 0.000 .1098918 .2954057 q Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(8) = 118.60 overall = 0.1472 max = 5 between = 0.0905 avg = 5.0 R-sq: within = 0.1885 Obs per group: min = 5 Group variable: id Number of groups = 125 Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 625 . xtreg q lmsh lmsh2 lsh5 gae_s se_s debt_a fix_s cr4,re
Prob>chi2 = 0.0208 = 18.06
chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg cr4 .0315456 .0443485 -.0128029 .0267503 fix_s .0025936 -.0041626 .0067563 .0251378 debt_a .0512841 .0760591 -.024775 .0789055 se_s .152376 -.2526865 .4050626 .5578243 gae_s -.9504609 -.7159203 -.2345406 .2412223 lsh5 .0032559 .0080144 -.0047585 .0123102 lmsh2 .0414468 .0292972 .0121496 .005023 lmsh .3023831 .2026488 .0997343 .0436294 fem rem Difference S.E.
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) Coefficients
Bảng 4.16: Bảng kết quả kiểm định hồi quy biến LMSH theo phương pháp mơ hình bình phương tối thiểu thông thường (POOL OLS)
_cons 1.1556 .0690902 16.73 0.000 1.020186 1.291014 cr4 .0496247 .0167787 2.96 0.003 .0167391 .0825102 fix_s -.0018935 .0084617 -0.22 0.823 -.0184781 .0146911 debt_a .1320893 .0327226 4.04 0.000 .0679542 .1962244 se_s -.1557946 .1186694 -1.31 0.189 -.3883824 .0767932 gae_s -.581411 .1242338 -4.68 0.000 -.8249047 -.3379173 lsh5 .0019643 .012238 0.16 0.872 -.0220218 .0259504 lmsh2 .027058 .0038241 7.08 0.000 .0195628 .0345531 lmsh .188352 .0319499 5.90 0.000 .1257314 .2509727 q Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Wald chi2(8) = 236.47 Estimated coefficients = 9 Time periods = 5 Estimated autocorrelations = 1 Number of groups = 125 Estimated covariances = 125 Number of obs = 625 Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels (0.3696)
Panels: heteroskedastic
Coefficients: generalized least squares Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls q lmsh lmsh2 lsh5 gae_s se_s debt_a fix_s cr4, panels(h) corr(ar1)
_cons -1.628075 .3110797 -5.23 0.000 -2.238981 -1.01717 tm .2180152 .1627507 1.34 0.181 -.1015984 .5376288 bds .0666132 .2528915 0.26 0.792 -.4300209 .5632473 cn .4573516 .1104479 4.14 0.000 .2404515 .6742517 debt_a .6121014 .2695526 2.27 0.024 .0827479 1.141455 asset 2.12e-14 1.41e-14 1.50 0.134 -6.55e-15 4.90e-14 fr -.1147451 .0523526 -2.19 0.029 -.2175562 -.011934 beta -.6182141 .1311875 -4.71 0.000 -.875843 -.3605851 q -1.776853 .2854809 -6.22 0.000 -2.337487 -1.216219 lmsh Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Total 986.12095 624 1.58032204 Root MSE = 1.1757 Adj R-squared = 0.1253 Residual 851.530193 616 1.38235421 R-squared = 0.1365 Model 134.590758 8 16.8238447 Prob > F = 0.0000 F( 8, 616) = 12.17 Source SS df MS Number of obs = 625 . reg lmsh q beta fr asset debt_a cn bds tm
F test that all u_i=0: F(124, 495) = 3.35 Prob > F = 0.0000: kiểm định
Likelihood Ratio Test (H0: Nên dùng Pooled regression)
F test that all u_i=0: F(124, 495) = 3.35 Prob > F = 0.0000 rho .55529833 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
sigma_e .96715697 sigma_u 1.0807513 _cons -.6757413 .4400456 -1.54 0.125 -1.540329 .1888463 tm (omitted) bds (omitted) cn (omitted) debt_a -1.217135 .6107821 -1.99 0.047 -2.41718 -.01709 asset 2.11e-13 6.36e-14 3.32 0.001 8.59e-14 3.36e-13 fr -.1517865 .0549428 -2.76 0.006 -.2597362 -.0438367 beta -.612808 .1636484 -3.74 0.000 -.9343391 -.291277 q -1.672742 .2973085 -5.63 0.000 -2.256884 -1.088599 lmsh Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.5577 Prob > F = 0.0000 F(5,495) = 21.38 overall = 0.0245 max = 5 between = 0.0000 avg = 5.0 R-sq: within = 0.1776 Obs per group: min = 5 Group variable: id Number of groups = 125 Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 625 note: tm omitted because of collinearity
note: bds omitted because of collinearity note: cn omitted because of collinearity
theo phương pháp mơ hình ảnh hưởng ngẫu nhiên (Random Effect Model)
rho .32492063 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
sigma_e .96715697 sigma_u .67097786 _cons -1.364046 .3421836 -3.99 0.000 -2.034714 -.6933786 tm .2290067 .2484794 0.92 0.357 -.258004 .7160174 bds .0374583 .3862329 0.10 0.923 -.7195442 .7944608 cn .4601875 .1676793 2.74 0.006 .1315421 .788833 debt_a .2178847 .357249 0.61 0.542 -.4823104 .9180799 asset 3.67e-14 2.06e-14 1.78 0.074 -3.60e-15 7.70e-14 fr -.1443556 .0508346 -2.84 0.005 -.2439895 -.0447217 beta -.6222252 .1394303 -4.46 0.000 -.8955035 -.3489469 q -1.826888 .2706544 -6.75 0.000 -2.357361 -1.296415 lmsh Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = . Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(7) = . overall = 0.1321 max = 5 between = 0.0999 avg = 5.0 R-sq: within = 0.1592 Obs per group: min = 5 Group variable: id Number of groups = 125 Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 625 . xtreg lmsh q beta fr asset debt_a cn bds tm, re
Bảng 4.20: Bảng kết quả hồi quy biến LMSH khắc phục phương sai thay đổi và tự tương quan
_cons -2.637008 .1966059 -13.41 0.000 -3.022348 -2.251667 tm .3357199 .1337 2.51 0.012 .0736727 .597767 bds -.0720162 .3318461 -0.22 0.828 -.7224227 .5783902 cn .5212107 .1050968 4.96 0.000 .3152247 .7271967 debt_a .1179872 .1369663 0.86 0.389 -.1504619 .3864362 asset 3.55e-14 1.49e-14 2.39 0.017 6.34e-15 6.46e-14 fr -.0754125 .0459286 -1.64 0.101 -.165431 .014606 beta -.2352653 .0733841 -3.21 0.001 -.3790955 -.091435 q -.5551979 .160069 -3.47 0.001 -.8689273 -.2414685 lmsh Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Wald chi2(7) = 69.91 Estimated coefficients = 8 Time periods = 5 Estimated autocorrelations = 1 Number of groups = 125 Estimated covariances = 125 Number of obs = 625 Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels (0.4825)
Panels: heteroskedastic
Coefficients: generalized least squares Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls lmsh q beta fr asset debt_a cn bds tm, panels(h) corr(ar1)
Prob>chi2 = 0.0363
= 10.26
chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
debt_a -1.217135 .2178847 -1.43502 .4954068
asset 2.11e-13 3.67e-14 1.74e-13 6.02e-14
fr -.1517865 -.1443556 -.0074308 .020846
beta -.612808 -.6222252 .0094171 .0856737
q -1.672742 -1.826888 .1541465 .1230389
fem rem Difference S.E.
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
Coefficients
unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coeffi
what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test. Examine the
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (4) does not equal the number of
Bảng 4.22: Bảng kết quả kiểm định hồi quy biến Q – công ty tăng trưởng cao theo phương pháp mơ hình ảnh hưởng cố định (Fixed Effect Model)
F test that all u_i=0: F(96, 63) = 0.96 Prob > F = 0.5818: kiểm định
Likelihood Ratio Test (H0: Nên dùng Pooled regression)
_cons 1.389899 .1350164 10.29 0.000 1.123242 1.656556 cr4 -.0369441 .0321436 -1.15 0.252 -.1004277 .0265394 fix_s .0065151 .0134519 0.48 0.629 -.0200523 .0330826 debt_a -.1380038 .0493579 -2.80 0.006 -.2354856 -.0405221 se_s .2538447 .3208732 0.79 0.430 -.3798787 .887568 gae_s -.1039802 .2445901 -0.43 0.671 -.5870447 .3790843 lsh5 .0329601 .0182714 1.80 0.073 -.0031258 .069046 lmsh2 .0101249 .0082006 1.23 0.219 -.0060713 .0263212 lmsh .0706303 .068334 1.03 0.303 -.0643292 .2055897 q Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Total 2.38759305 167 .014296964 Root MSE = .11751 Adj R-squared = 0.0341 Residual 2.19574832 159 .013809738 R-squared = 0.0804 Model .191844726 8 .023980591 Prob > F = 0.0938 F( 8, 159) = 1.74 Source SS df MS Number of obs = 168 . reg q lmsh lmsh2 lsh5 gae_s se_s debt_a fix_s cr4 if q>1
F test that all u_i=0: F(96, 63) = 0.96 Prob > F = 0.5818 rho .62976214 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
sigma_e .11906439 sigma_u .15528509 _cons 1.333485 .380759 3.50 0.001 .5725993 2.094371 cr4 .0009817 .0980223 0.01 0.992 -.1949001 .1968635 fix_s .1086941 .09818 1.11 0.272 -.0875029 .3048911 debt_a -.4302166 .1827758 -2.35 0.022 -.7954649 -.0649683 se_s .1476734 1.707592 0.09 0.931 -3.264677 3.560023 gae_s 1.527268 1.366715 1.12 0.268 -1.203894 4.25843 lsh5 .0286485 .1002063 0.29 0.776 -.1715978 .2288948 lmsh2 .0060639 .0151314 0.40 0.690 -.0241739 .0363016 lmsh .0257021 .1269518 0.20 0.840 -.2279908 .279395 q Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.7770 Prob > F = 0.1538 F(8,63) = 1.56 overall = 0.0197 max = 5 between = 0.0204 avg = 1.7 R-sq: within = 0.1657 Obs per group: min = 1 Group variable: id Number of groups = 97 Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 168 . xtreg q lmsh lmsh2 lsh5 gae_s se_s debt_a fix_s cr4 if q>1, fe
Bảng 4.24: Bảng kết quả kiểm Hausman test – biến Q - công ty tăng trưởng cao
rho 0 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
sigma_e .11906439 sigma_u 0 _cons 1.389899 .1350164 10.29 0.000 1.125272 1.654526 cr4 -.0369441 .0321436 -1.15 0.250 -.0999445 .0260562 fix_s .0065151 .0134519 0.48 0.628 -.0198501 .0328804 debt_a -.1380038 .0493579 -2.80 0.005 -.2347436 -.041264 se_s .2538447 .3208732 0.79 0.429 -.3750552 .8827446 gae_s -.1039802 .2445901 -0.43 0.671 -.583368 .3754075 lsh5 .0329601 .0182714 1.80 0.071 -.0028511 .0687714 lmsh2 .0101249 .0082006 1.23 0.217 -.005948 .0261979 lmsh .0706303 .068334 1.03 0.301 -.063302 .2045625 q Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0846 Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(8) = 13.89 overall = 0.0804 max = 5 between = 0.1006 avg = 1.7 R-sq: within = 0.1010 Obs per group: min = 1 Group variable: id Number of groups = 97 Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 168 . xtreg q lmsh lmsh2 lsh5 gae_s se_s debt_a fix_s cr4 if q>1, re
Prob>chi2 = 0.4685 = 7.65
chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg