This page intentionally left blank The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is Missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion of the value of knowledge In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely, that knowledge is always more valuable than its subparts Taking Plato’s Meno as the starting point of his discussion, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that knowledge is less valuable than is generally assumed Instead, there should be more theorizing in epistemology on other cognitive successes, such as understanding, whose value is easier to explain Clearly written and well argued, the book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology Jonathan L Kvanvig is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Missouri, Columbia cambridge studies in philosophy General editor ernest sosa (Brown University) Advisory editors jonathan dancy (University of Reading) j o h n h a l d a n e (University of St Andrews) g i l b e r t h a r m a n (Princeton University) f r a n k j a c k s o n (Australian National University) w i l l i a m g l y c a n (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) s y d n e y s h o e m a k e r (Cornell University) j u d i t h j t h o m s o n (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) recent titles d m a r m s t r o n g A World of States of Affairs p i e r r e j a c o b What Minds Can Do a n d r e g a l l o i s The World Without the Mind Within f r e d f e l d m a n Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert l a u r e n c e b o n j o u r In Defense of Pure Reason d a v i d l e w i s Papers in Philosophical Logic w a y n e d a v i s Implicature d a v i d c o c k b u r n Other Times d a v i d l e w i s Papers on Metaphysics and Epistemology r a y m o n d m a r t i n Self-Concern a n n e t t e b a r n e s Seeing Through Self-Deception m i c h a e l b r a t m a n Faces of Intention a m i e t h o m a s s o n Fiction and Metaphysics d a v i d l e w i s Papers on Ethics and Social Philosophy f r e d d r e t s k e Perception, Knowledge and Belief l y n n e r u d d e r b a k e r Persons and Bodies j o h n g r e c o Putting Skeptics in Their Place d e r k p e r e b o o m Living Without Free Will b r i a n e l l i s Scientific Essentialism j u l i a d r i v e r Uneasy Virtue a l a n h g o l d m a n Practical Rules: When We Need Them and When We Don’t i s h t i y a q u e h a j i Deontic Morality and Control a n d r e w n e w m a n The Correspondence Theory of Truth j a n e h e a l Mind, Reason, and Imagination p e t e r r a i l t o n Facts, Values, and Norms c h r i s t o p h e r s h i l l Thought and World w a y n e d a v i s Meaning, Expression, and Thought a n d r e w m e l n y k A Physicalist Manifesto The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding JONATHAN L KVANVIG University of Missouri, Columbia Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge , United Kingdom Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridgte.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521827133 © Jonathan L Kvanvig 2003 This book is in copyright Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press First published in print format 2003 - isbn-13 978-0-511-06266-7 eBook (NetLibrary) - isbn-10 0-511-06266-4 eBook (NetLibrary) - isbn-13 978-0-521-82713-3 hardback - isbn-10 0-521-82713-2 hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of s for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate Contents Introduction page ix The Value of Knowledge Is External to It The Pragmatic Theory Plato and the Tethering of True Belief Knowledge and Action 12 21 The Value of True Belief The Value of Belief The Value of Truth Conclusion 28 29 38 42 The Value of Justification Externalist Accounts Justificationist Accounts Two Kinds of Means to a Goal 44 44 52 60 Reliabilism, Normativity, and the Special Promise of Virtue Epistemology Zagzebski’s Virtue Theory Virtue Epistemology and Credit for True Belief A Further Benefit of Virtue Epistemology? Conclusion 76 79 81 99 106 The Gettier Problem and the Value of Knowledge The Gettier Problem Gettier-like Cases 108 109 110 vii The Appeal to Accidentality and a General Concern Approaches to the Gettier Problem Counterfactual and Defeasibility Approaches to the Gettier Problem Conclusion 113 117 Knowledge as Irreducibly Valuable Curiosity and the Intrinsic Value of Knowledge The Desire to Know Conclusion 140 143 150 155 Epistemic Attitudinalism: Semantic and Pragmatic Approaches Semantic and Pragmatic Versions of Epistemic Attitudinalism Epistemic Attitudinalism and the Value of Knowledge The Failure of Epistemic Attitudinalism Conclusion 157 158 170 173 184 Knowledge and Understanding Understanding, Knowledge, and Logical Form Understanding Is Not a Species of Knowledge The Value of Understanding Conclusion 185 188 196 200 202 Conclusion 204 References Index 125 139 207 213 viii ... page ix The Value of Knowledge Is External to It The Pragmatic Theory Plato and the Tethering of True Belief Knowledge and Action 12 21 The Value of True Belief The Value of Belief The Value of Truth... knowledge is possible and how much of it there is Missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion of the value of knowledge In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig... Attitudinalism and the Value of Knowledge The Failure of Epistemic Attitudinalism Conclusion 157 158 170 173 184 Knowledge and Understanding Understanding, Knowledge, and Logical Form Understanding Is