Human rights diplomacy in australian foreign policy

HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY IN AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY ANBARASU BALRASAN (B.A.(Hons.) , Murdoch University) A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 2004 Acknowledgement There are three key people I am extremely thankful for in the production of this thesis. First, my mother who has endured great sacrifices to see me through my education and my father who I wish saw me through this. It is my supervisor, Associate Professor Bilveer Singh, who I owe the greatest debt for his patience, kindness, support and mostly his ability to present the most difficult things in a simple and lucid manner. Without his help and grace, this thesis would not have been possible. I am also grateful to the staff of the Department of Political Science who made it possible for research and technical help. I am also grateful to my friend Paul who discussed world politics and philosophical issues to sharpen my thesis and who helped me collate my thoughts on the difficult issues of morality and survival in foreign policy. Despite facing numerous hurdles to finish this thesis, I thank God for blessing me with wonderful parents and an exceptional teacher who I will never forget. Table of Contents Page Abbreviations i Summary ii Introduction 1 Chapter 1: International Human Rights and Foreign Policy: 9 Narrating Theory and Negotiating Practice Chapter 2: Projecting the Wilsonian Vision: Australia’s 40 Neo-idealist Self-image on Human Rights Chapter 3: Realism and its Limits to Australian Human 62 Rights Diplomacy: Structural Impediments And Cultural Capabilities Chapter 4: Howard and Human Rights: Hard-Headed 86 Realism or Bleeding Liberalism? Chapter 5: Traditionalism, Internationalism and 108 Seclusionism: Currents of Thought in Analysing Australian Foreign Policy Conclusion 134 Appendix 138 Selected Bibliography 145 Abbreviations AI Amnesty International AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area AHRC Asian Human Rights Commission APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations AusAID Australian Agency for International Development CAT Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CERD Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination CHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting CROC Convention on the Rights of the Child DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia DIMA Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Australia DOD Department of Defence, Australia HRCA Human Rights Council of Australia HREOC Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission HRW Human Rights Watch ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICESR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights INTERFET UN Sanctioned International Force In East Timor UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN United Nations UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor US United States i Summary Human rights have become an important global issue since the end of the Second World War and its impact has been increasing in world politics. With the evolving United Nations, there has been a steady growth of human rights norms incorporated in international law. During the Cold War years human rights issues became political ploys between the superpowers and idealists lamented the fact that human rights became embroiled in power politics. However, the spectacular growth of international human rights organisations with their ability to build local networks across regions sustained the human rights discourse in international politics that became a source of irritation to the realists. At the end of the Cold War, the idealists were reinvigorated by the victory of the United States (US) and hoped that the international system would allow greater space for human rights issues. The literature during this period reflected a tendency for idealists and neoidealists to stake claim that their worldview was accurate and more inclusive of issues of human rights and democracy. It was in this context that the then Australian Foreign Affairs Minister, Gareth Evans, promoted the idea of Australia being a ‘good international citizen’ and that it was in Australia’s interest to promote human rights and democracy. Yet, at that time, Australia supported the Indonesian annexation of East Timor and even signed a secret military pact with the Indonesian government. Much of the literature on human rights in Australian foreign policy attempts to analyse the issues by using the theories of international relations and most of the times they fall neatly between the realist and idealist paradigms. In essence, a particular issue of human rights in foreign policy can have both a realist and idealist explanation without analysing the context and the specific domestic impact such human rights issues can have on Australian society. This does not mean that their accounts are irrelevant but they do not satisfy a sense of completeness when looking at a specific issue. This dissatisfaction manifests itself in the production of this thesis searching for a more wholesome and less rigid way of analysing human rights in Australian foreign policy. In this thesis it is argued that the realist/idealist dichotomy of describing human rights diplomacy in Australian foreign policy has its limitations, as it does not sufficiently explain the reasons why certain decisions were made. On the other hand, employing a “currents of thought” process of mapping three distinct values flowing from Australian society namely, ‘Traditionalism’, ‘Internationalism’ and ‘Seclusionism’, this study has been able to locate the underlying motivation for intent and actions and at the same time identify supporters and detractors of human rights. Through a qualitative study, this thesis shows that by adding the analytical tool kit of identifying and understanding the three distinct domestic forces, that shape human rights discourse, it provides a superior range of understanding and analysing human rights in Australian foreign policy. ii Introduction We cannot rely upon the silenced to tell us that they are suffering. —Hanan Ashrawi, Palestinian leader1 Wole Soyinka, the African playwright, wrote a powerful article commending human rights as the best idea of the millennium in the New York Times Special Collection to celebrate the last millennium. 2 He articulates that the human condition, together with the different social structures that they are set in, are constantly in search of a universal idea that ‘is poised to liberate billions’. 3 He argues that human rights remains the largest bulwark to the potential rise of tyranny, dictatorship and totalitarianism. The idea of human rights eventually forces all governments to devolve power to the people and at the same time maintain a social justice program that has freedom at its core. He concludes his eloquent narrative on an optimistic note claiming that the idea of human rights ‘translates humanity as one’s own self’.4 The more I have researched on human rights and embarked on writing this thesis, the more I am envious of Soyinka. His superb allegorical devices, witty writing style and grasp of human emotions allows him the liberty to sustain an argument on human rights without questioning the ontological and epistemological aspects of the subject matter or the vast difference in the pedagogic prescriptions of the human rights regime and the lack of performative vigour on the part of state agencies. Soyinka’s literary and artistic licence provide optimism and a temporary respite from the realities of the world but does not account for the operations of the practice of human rights in world politics. 1 While human rights have a long history in theory and practice, it was the American and French revolutions of the eighteenth century tha t sought to create national politics based on broadly shared human rights. Despite the rhetoric of universality, however, human rights remained essentially a national matter, to be accepted or not, until 1945 when they were recognised in global international law through the construction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 5 Since then the growth of human rights in international relations has progressed steadily where even realists like Kissinger admit that one of the consequences of Americ an power is the spectacular growth of the human rights regime which the United States (US) has to support in principle.6 The growing literature on human rights, together with the various human rights constituencies, has meant that liberal democratic states are expected to chart a path in their foreign policies for human rights practice. They have departments in the foreign ministries to look into human rights issues, laws and mechanisms and most of them take their commitments to the United Nations (UN) ve ry seriously. Australia, a liberal democratic country, takes its responsibilities on human rights seriously and is conscious of its self- image in the international arena on the issue of human rights. The Coalition government of John Howard makes for an interesting study primarily because it had taken over from a Labor government which had uninterrupted rule for thirteen years. The Labor government, especially of the late 1980s and early 1990s, propelled Australia into the international arena with its claim for ‘middle power’ diplomacy where Australia can be a ‘good international citizen’ by undertaking an activist policy. Yet it was the Howard 2 government that practiced what many in Labor and the Coalition government of Fraser had preached through its intervention in East Timor. Human rights has an inescapable tension with foreign policy primarily because the former is based on the membership of humanity whereas foreign policy has to delve into the interest of the state and its citizens first. Within this tension, practitioners of foreign policy have to take into account their responsibilities to the interests of their states and at the same time their moral obligations to humanity. It is not an easy task but it has to be done especially if a nation-state projects itself as a liberal democratic state where the rights of the individual are paramount. However, in the academic realm, the observation of such a tension is quickly labelled in terms of two competing theories that exist in international relations, namely Realism and Idealism. Practitioners of human rights and diplomats find that the labels or theories created by academics have no resemblance to their daily affairs and labels like Realism and Idealism provide no guide as to how to conduct foreign policy or how to find solutions to daily problems of human rights in foreign policy. 7 In this sense, viewing human rights in Australian foreign policy with the lenses of realism and idealism might not provide the range of understanding why certain decisions were made. Therefore, there must be a way to contextualise the conduct of human rights in foreign affairs without reference to ‘big theories’ of international relations. However, this is not a total rejection of those theories but an attempt to add to those theories a search for a superior range of understanding human rights. 3 For example, when viewing Australia’s foreign policy, human rights issues can be analysed as realist and idealist. They do provide key reference points to the role human rights play in the grand theories. However, do the labels provide us with the specific reasons as to how and why the policy was made? In the case of human rights issues in Australian foreign policy under Howard there is a need to study the issues beyond the realist/idealist dichotomy and to conceptualise the mechanics of human rights in the interplay between domestic and international forces. This establishes the context and also the factors that drive the human rights policy and help identify the supporters and detractors of that specific policy. In employing the currents of thought process, promoted by Wesley and Warren8 , where by identifying Traditionalism, Internationalism and Seclusionism as currents of Australian society, I attempt to utilise these features and analyse three human rights issues in contemporary Australian foreign policy under the Howard regime. I examine the East Timor issue, the asylum seeker issue made prominent by the media through the Tampa incident, and then move to look at the measures Australia has taken with regard to Myanmar and Zimbabwe. Methodology In this thesis, I have employed the qualitative technique for my research where I have extensively used participant observation of Australian and international actors of human 4 rights as the main source for my thesis. I have also interviewed through the e- mail several members from international NGOs. However, it is also important to note that several government officials I attempted to interview declined the offer and re-directed me to their websites for official positions and my attempts to interview detainees in Port Hedland and Woomera were also not successful. I was also fortunate to be invited by the US State Department for a program on “Human Rights and US Foreign Policy” 9 which gave me the opportunity to observe the human rights mechanism of the US State Department and at the same time provided me a network of consulting US based human rights groups that had both a national and international outlook and it also provided me an opportunity to discuss human rights issues with Professor Jack Donnelly at the University of Denver. The reason why I chose the qualitative approach was based on the subject matter I was researching. Human rights in Australian foreign policy and understanding its mechanics meant that I had to study and observe the actors who make, influence and study those policies. At the same time, I had to study the impact those policies had on the people on both the domestic and international fronts. At the same time, all of the material I was assessing and studying on human rights and foreign policy was based on the qualitative approach. I ensured great care that the qualitative materials that I researched were not ad hoc opinions but made sure that the materials found were within the context of my study and at the same time corroborated with other evidence. 5 The value of the qualitative approach I have found in my research for this thesis especially when employing the “currents of thought” framework in analysing human rights in Australian foreign policy was the ability to focus on contextual issues, placing an actor’s attitudes and behaviour in the context of his/her individual biography and wider social setting. In this sense, the qualitative approach helped me to capture meaning, process and context of human rights in Australian foreign policy. In chapter 1 of this thesis, I examine the contemporary theoretical human rights issues and also discuss the ontological and epistemological issues of human rights. I will then move on to discuss the nature of human rights in foreign policy and then analyse the various types of human rights logics and their functions in the arena of world politics. By analysing the above issues, I have covered most of the relevant and contemporary human rights literature which is a useful starting base for the thesis. In chapter 2, I attempt to identify the origins and role of idealism in Australian foreign policy and then move on to discuss how human rights issues are being propagated by the neo- idealists in Australian foreign policy. After the Cold War, the neo- idealists were eager to establish its vision of human rights in Australian foreign policy and I will show how they attempt to paint their human rights outcomes as idealist in nature without explaining the process itself. In chapter 3, from a realist perspective, I will explain why Australia’s human rights diplomacy in world politics remains problematic. It will demonstrate that the analysis of 6 the idealists does not portray an accurate picture of Australian human rights diplomacy in the international system. This chapter will then identify the realist literature to show that the end of the bi-polar system did not radically alter the structure of interactions between states. Power relations, according to the realists, will continue to be counted in terms of military and economic capabilities. However, the realists, despite being able to negate the idealists’ construction of human rights in Australian foreign policy, do not sufficiently explain why Australia still continues with human rights diplomacy. It is in the next two chapters underlying motivations of human rights in Australian foreign policy are discussed. In chapter 4, the main aim is to study the worldview of John Howard and his relationship with the US after September 11. It is argued that John Howard’s worldview and how he practises human rights provide another window of understanding human rights in Australian foreign policy. This chapter analyses the realist/idealist dichotomy by studying the East Timor issue, the human rights issues associated with the asylum seekers, and lastly observes how Australia reacts to human rights abuses in both Myanmar and Zimbabwe. In examining these issues and with Howard’s worldview in the background, the results can be analysed in the “currents of thought” approach in the next chapter. In the final chapter, I highlight the importance of using the “currents of thought” process in analysing Australian foreign policy and show how it can help in understanding the motivations that influence policy outcomes, and show why certain decisions were made. 7 In highlighting the Traditionalist, Internationalist and Seclusionist currents of thought in Australian foreign policy we are able to cut across time and place to analyse human rights without being too rigid in terms of labels. The importance of this approach is that it allows us to identify a context and see how the different currents interact with one another to produce a policy outcome. In analysing the same issues in chapter 4, we are able to locate the meaning, process and context of human rights and also see the outcome of the interplay between domestic and international forces having an impact in the understanding of human rights in Australian foreign policy. The process offers us a superior range of understanding human rights. Nevertheless, such analysis might not give victims of human rights abuses joy as what they need is urgent and practical help. However, the project of human rights imposes on anyone who studies it the hope that his/her work might in some way provide a practical way of improving people’s lives—and more importantly to tell abusers of human rights, especially representatives of the state, that the academic wo rld can be a useful check even though they are termed as “arm chair” activists. The world would be a better place if there were more of them. 1 Schulz, W., In Our Own Best Interest, Beacon Press, Boston, 2001, p.135. Soyinka, W., ‘Every Dictator’s Nightmare, The New York Times Magazine, The New York Times Company, 1999, accessed on www.nytimes.com on 1 August 1999. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 See Appendix for the complete UDHR 6 Kissinger, H., Does America need a foreign policy?, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2001, p.95. 7 Wesley, M., ‘Australia’s International Relations and the (IR)relevance of Theory’ in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.55, No.3, p.460. 8 Wesley, M., and Warren, T., ‘Wild Colonial Ploys? Currents of Thought in Australian Foreign Policy’ in Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol.35, No.1, 2000, pp.9-26. 9 “Human Rights and US Foreign Policy”, International Visitor Program, US State Department, Washington D.C., from 14 November 2000-8 December 2000. 2 8 Chapter 1 International Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Narrating Theory and Negotiating Practice A right in this sense can be thought of as consisting of five main elements: a right holder (the subject of a right) has a claim to some substance (the object of a right), which he or she might assert, or demand, or enjoy, or enforce (exercising a right) against some individual or group (the bearer of the correlative duty), citing in support his or her claim some particular ground (the justification of a right).1 Introduction This chapter is divided into two parts. The first section will visit briefly the debate of the theories of international human rights and extract the core contentions of that debate by human rights scholars. In doing so, the themes of ontology and epistemology of human rights, universalism versus relativism and the political consensus of human rights would be explored. The second section will focus on the mechanics of human rights in international relations and foreign policy. Issues of security, sovereignty and the role of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) will be discussed in this section. However, it is important at the outset, to understand that the topic of human rights in both theory and practice is a contentious and at times an emotionally sapping subject. Therefore, it is quite impractical to visit all the theories and practices in this thesis primarily not because of a lack of will but rather a lack of space. Those theories pertinent to this thesis will be discussed here. 9 Nature and Scope of Human Rights In 1948, the United Nations (UN) created the most important human rights document in world politics: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).2 This document was expanded in 1966 to encompass the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Collectively these three instruments are known as the International Bill of Rights. Following this development in 1966, the evolution of rights in world politics has also taken the form of many specialised conventions. These specialised conventions are: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatments or Punishments (CAT), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Adding to these conventions there are also optional protocols to the ICCPR, which can be adopted by the states which have ratified the Covenant. The first allows individuals or groups which have exhausted their state’s internal processes to bring complaints of alleged violations directly to the United Nations Commission for Human Rights (UNHCR). The second option enables the state signatories to abolish the death penalty.3 These ten treaties form the framework of the politics of human rights in international relations and foreign policy. They are part of 10 global international law. Simultaneously, they provide the hopes and tensions in the web of relationships between states, NGOs, groups and individuals. The norms and values of the international society have evolved with changing times as Hedley Bull predicted. 4 Within this scope the nature of human rights has evolved consistently, most of the times, surprising doubting politicians, diplomats, academics and even the human rights activists themselves. However, this development should not be read that the practice of human rights in international relations is without tensions or difficulties or that all states readily accept the ‘naturalist’5 logic of the current body of international law. Some states challenge the validity of some aspects of international human rights, others argue for adding relative interpretations and others reject them outright as ‘nonsense on stilts’. Other commentators conclude that the development of human rights is not a natural evolution of international society but a consequence of the dominance of the Western, liberal states. In short, those states that did not share the experiences of the Western states see human rights as a manifesto of the Western world to dominate international society. On the other hand, the plethora of human rights groups in the nonWestern world seems to underline that the language of human rights is not necessarily a monolithic discourse coming out of the West.6 The foundations of human rights need to be explored primarily to decipher its influence in world politics. Any foreign policy study of a state’s human rights diplomacy cannot 11 escape the theoretical foundations of the evolution of human rights. Analysing the literature of human rights experts like Falk, Booth, Donnelly, Brown and Forsythe provides a sound framework for the rest of this thesis for two reasons. First, it allows for a negotiation of a working definition of human rights. Second, with the constant flux of foreign policy initiatives with the Howard government in the past six years, it is important that the human rights dimension does not get lost by propaganda, either by government establishments, lobby groups or NGOs. The literature review would provide a referent point for the mechanics of human rights in Australian Foreign Policy. Narrating the Human Rights Discourse The idea of human rights is not only a subject that chases controversy but is encompassed by it. It is a term scrutinised not only in the disciplines of the social sciences but also in law, medicine and business studies. As much as having an emancipating effect for seekers of justice it also possesses a shaming element that proves irksome to the state and its institutions. Despite enjoying huge international media attention and entrenching its place in international norms and values, human rights as a notion comes under constant criticism as a smokescreen for other political or economic objectives.7 For some political theorists, the foundations and ambiguities of the term human rights itself lends to more confusion and problems.8 In this sense, they question the foundations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Liberal natural rights thinking and philosophy have underpinned the development of the international human rights regime. This development is premised on the idea that all human beings have rights by virtue of our common humanity. Individuals do possess 12 certain types of moral and legal rights as members of particular communities but human rights belong to the common humanity. Therefore, even when individuals are denied their rights by laws of a state or community, they can be claimed by virtue of membership to the common humanity. It is by subscribing to these human rights that makes the concept universally encompassing to all human beings. The UDHR is the manifestation of this belief. Chris Brown, however, argues that applicability and enforcement of the universality of the UDHR and the subsequent covenants do not reflect the cultural9 realities of a world dominated by major powers whose strategic concerns accord low priority to human rights.10 His contention is that human rights have developed from the experience of the western liberal community. Rights, according to Dunne and Wheeler, are a ‘consequence of the civilised practices of liberal polities and not the causes of these’.11 Subscribing to a communitarian perspective he further argues that human beings have rights only through the inextricable network of their community and not through some abstract notion of a ‘common humanity’. 12 In this sense, he pessimistically asserts that compliance of the UDHR is a near impossible task. The gaps within the international human rights regime make it difficult to enforce the UDHR on states and regions who use cultural relativism as a defence and question whether human rights are universally applicable. Ken Booth, on the other hand, contends that the question of whether human rights are universal is unhelpful because it is too soon in human history to give a definite answer.13 13 A fixed theory of human nature disallows the possibilities for thinking about humanity and restricts the development of the theory and practice of human rights. ‘Culturalism’the belief that cultures can be black boxed in the same way realists in International Relations black box states impedes any constructive development of human rights in world politics. Cultural exclusivity provides state elites to promote traditional values as opposed to emancipatory ones and unnecessarily creates a closure for seeking a human rights discourse for world security.14 Sensitivity to cultural values should not regress into a belief of the dogma of culturalism, and the norms and values of international human rights should be given the opportunity to run its course in history. Donnelly, using history as a guide, argues for the entrenchment of international human rights norms and values in international politics. He believes that focussing too deeply on the epistemological foundations of human rights is a distraction and points to the overwhelming number of states that are signatories to the UDHR as evidence of the stature of the international human rights regime.15 He also points to the great lengths governments and statesmen go in trying to justify their human rights policies in terms of the universal standards of the UDHR. However, Donnelly is quick to admit that it is the states themselves that are the sources of human rights abuses.16 Yet the states, being the only bearers of the correlative duties, constantly fail in their duties to the individuals. It is the discrepancy of the human rights commitment and the actual practice that Donnelly finds as the central problem in the human rights regime and this is the rectification that statesmen, scholars, bureaucrats, 14 human rights activists and the victims themselves must strive for. Whatever the forms, the standards of human rights law are enshrined in the UDHR which will continue to evolve with time. The UDHR has become one of the most important instruments for the international human rights regime. According to Louis Henkin, its significance lies in four achievements: 1. 2. 3. 4. It helped convert a discredited philosophical idea (“natural rights”) into a dominant political ideology It defined a vague colloquialism (“human rights”) in an authoritative code, a triple “decalogue” of thirty articles of fundamental rights. It universalised human rights, promoting a constitutional ideology accepted in a few countries into a standard of constitutionalism for all countries. It internationalised human rights, transforming matters that had been subject to exclusive domestic jurisdictions−sovereignty−into matters of international concern, putting them permanently on the international political agenda, and providing the foundation for a sturdy edifice of international norms and institutions. 17 It is with these achievements that the international human rights regime hopes to build on and extend to regions, states and of course communities for the benefit of the common humanity. The philosophical foundations of human rights will continue to be debated and should continue to be debated. However, the debate itself should not stall the project of emancipating human beings and helping the victims of human rights abuses gain their right to human dignity. At the same time, one must also acknowledge the resilience of the realist paradigm that constantly attempts to play down the importance of human rights in world politics. 15 Falk’s Logic Falk provides a base to discuss the issues of human rights in world politics by presenting a series of “logics” 18 or approaches that show how states and other actors have constructed human rights platforms. In his analysis, he outlines six logics that would be discussed here. The reason for Falk to analyse human rights in this way is to understand the tension between normative aspiration of human rights enforcement laws and political constraints in relation to the actual protection of human rights in world politics vis-à-vis foreign policies. In depicting this tension, Falk intends to project the image of the overall system of world order defining the main patterns and principles by which sovereign states and other actors interact with one another, which inevitably has an impact on foreign policy objectives. Presenting these logics or normative approaches, Falk argues that these logics are of unequal political weight. Falk asks us to appreciate the logics he proposes in their proper context when he says: These several complementary ordering logics are of great unequal political weight. Each logic generates a distinctive normative approach. The assessment of these distinct logics determines the relationship of human rights to the world legal order at a given period in international history… It should be emphasised that the protection of human rights is…an outcome of struggle between opposed social forces and cannot be understood primarily as an exercise in law-creation or rational persuasion. Similarly, the ordering logics specified below are arenas of struggle, as well as foundations of authority.19 Therefore, Falk’s normative labels show that each normative logic can be read as an independent line of ethical or legal argument about how to relate values or societal goals to behaviour, given the reality of sovereign states. It is the competing factors between and among these logics that set the agenda of human rights diplomacy and provide any sense of the outcomes of foreign policy directives. 16 Statist Logic The dominant ordering logic since the Peace of Westphalia is founded on the premises of the “will” of the territorial sovereign state. The government of the state has the exclusive right to formulate foreign policy and acts as the paramount agent in external relations with other states. The historical experience of the West with its juridical framework has been gradually applied throughout the globe. 20 The international legal structure has evolved from the predominance of the state and of the states system. Competing notions of rights evolved from the context of domestic political struggles. However, from the traditions of Greek, Stoic and Christian roots, ideas of humane governance became a central feature of the relations between the ruler and the ruled. Despite the influence of such ideas, theorists of the emergent states were ambivalent about the issues of resistance, tyranny, and humanitarian intervention. In this sense, the prerogatives of the state were balanced against notions of “higher law.”21 Jean Bodin, writing in the sixteenth century, puts forth the decisive argument in favour of the state. He argues that secularised centralised authority prefigures the actual emergence of strong governments enjoying the realities of sovereign control over domestic society.22 Vattel, the eighteenth century Swiss jurist, extends Bodin’s views on sovereignty to external relations of states, establishing a statist logic to the conduct of inter-state or international relations accepted as authoritative even till present times. In separating natural law from positive law, Vattel emphasised the requirement of government consent as vital to the formulation of international law obligations. He also underscored the importance of the government’s own interpretation of its obligation, especially to is own citizenry, or those present within its territory. In his argument, external actors had no 17 standing to complain unless there were substantive treaties to afford protection to aliens.23 In the statist logic, human rights were not a fit subject for global concern unless a state or a group of states so agreed. Sovereignty, the positivist idea, shielded abuses of rights committed within state territory. There were tensions during the colonial period between states regarding the status of aliens abused by the territorial government especially when the abuse was committed outside of the European centre of the world political system. Flowing out of the colonial period, powerful governments continued to maintain the claim that they had the duty to protect their nationals in a situation of jeopardy.24 The Third World considered this as a continuation of colonialist behaviour. Historical experience has provided the basis for two main ideas for the statist logic. One has been the anti-interventionary argument and the other has been the anti-imperial argument.25 The anti-intervention principle derives from the experience of the Treaty of Westphalia where the main driving force was to end the carnage caused by war where domestic and foreign policies merged. The European experience in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with nation-states evolving put great emphasis on non-intervention together with doctrines of sovereignty and international law. This did not necessarily prevent wars but it limited their scope. In essence, the Treaty Of Westphalia found an answer for the problem between states but it offered no solution to violence within states arising from civil wars, ethnic conflicts 18 and the entire range of what are today termed as human rights violations.26 Injustices had to be remedied by domestic institutions and not by agencies working outside the purview of the state. Any intervention whatever the intention had in itself to create possible chaos and inevitably would lead to war. As Kissinger points out, the Treaty of Westphalia was developed in response to the human rights slogan of the day where ‘restoring peace and tranquillity was its purpose, not legitimising domestic oppression’. However, domestic oppression was a problem of the state or its improper form or system of government. Political theorists as different as Kant and Lenin have argued that human rights cannot be imposed from the outside but it would be automatically realised from adopting the proper form of domestic government. In the case of Kant it was a liberal republic and for Lenin it was the radical, socialist state. Therefore, the achievements of human rights are a matter primarily for domestic reform and global pressures are neither necessary nor effective. The idea of anti-intervention helped keep the peace and ensured stability while individuals attempted to search the best form of government that would ensure that all its citizens were protected. Anti-imperialism as an idea is based on the distrust of the imperial powers. It is generally accepted that imperial actors have the greatest capabilities and will to act on human rights abuses. However, it is these actors that are least trustworthy because of their wider, selfish interests. R J Vincent upholds the morality of non-intervention even if a state performs outrageous acts against its own citizens.27 This is because there are insufficient grounds on balance to trust the impartiality of the intervenor and there are reasons to suppose that the consequences of intervention will extend beyond the correction of the 19 perceived evil.28 Over the years, developing countries have cleverly utilised the antiimperial arguments to suggest that human rights concerns of Western countries are part of a wide agenda to dominate and subjugate developing states. In effect, even groups and individuals within developing states who promote human rights are perceived to be agents of western powers and at the same time seen as threats to the sovereignty of the developing state. Therefore, the state has two tools to deflect human rights criticisms. One, it utilises the non-intervention clause if a state comments or tries to influence a human rights situation. The other is to claim that human rights is a subversive tool used by certain internal actors who are under the influence of imperial actors.29 So for example Amnesty International is seen by certain developing states as promoting a western agenda which subverts the internal order by recruiting local actors as “human rights activists” and who impugn on the sovereignty of the state. Human rights becomes a project for the state to present from within and that any challenge to the state conception of human rights and its practices are seen as interfering with the internal affairs of the state but also challenges the notion of juridical equality among states in the international system. Attempts to interfere would ultimately mean that chaos replaces order and therefore human rights emanating from an external agent would destabilise the status quo of order among states. In essence, the statist logic puts a premium on non-interference and order. However, this does not mean that it discounts human rights. Human rights are important but it has to come from within and not pressured by external agents where it has the potential to create problems to regional and 20 international order. Yet in insisting that order be maintained one has to ask the question of how such an order can be maintained without a hierarchy of power in the international system where it contradicts the juridical equality of states. Falk explains this by analysing the hegemonial logic. Hegemonial Logic The juridical equality of states has to contend against the reality of the international political system where there exists the gross inequality of power between states since the inception of the states system. Consequently, some states are more penetrated in their polities than others due to the patterns of control by the colonial powers. These controls were justified by humanitarian and civilising claims which were formalised in such legal doctrines such as state responsibility, diplomatic protection and extraterritoriality. However, with the end of colonialism the overt language of hegemony through humanitarian rationalisations and their doctrinal embodiment was discredited. Both international law and morality are based to some extent on a consensus among actors; if that consensus is eroded or shattered, the norms it had earlier supported are weakened or destroyed.30 With the end of the Cold War, the norms and values of the international system changed but the hegemonial relationships still persisted in informal and covert patterns. The hegemonial logic was renounced as a valid ordering logic except for humanitarian intervention undertaken by states with the United States (US) taking the lead. With the US implementing human rights diplomacy in its foreign policy, it entailed a hegemonial attitude where the US uses its powers to exert diplomatic pressure, withhold 21 aid or credit to states that it feels have not complied with its human rights standards. The yearly publication of human rights reports, started during the Carter administration, on all states for review by the US Congress is seen as part of that hegemonial attitude. Consequently, this has resulted in with the US bargaining concessions in human rights for economic assets with foreign states with equivalent power and at times used the human rights rhetoric to provide it with a strategic advantage over lesser powers. Human rights activists and countries that have been pressured by the US on human rights abuses claim that the US is manipulating the subject of human rights for its own wider and selfish interests. Even though the US omits the hegemonial features in its justification for acting on human rights abuses, the overwhelming power of its capabilities shows that there are insufficient constraints on it to alter its behaviour.31 The normative position for the hegemonial logic supposes that there is leadership by a powerful state with the implicit correlation between power and virtue which gives it the mandate to impose its will on weaker states. On balance, the belief is that the outcome for such an arrangement would work out positively for all states. In this sense, the US sees its human rights exertions as a selfless undertaking to overcome societal evil and in the bigger picture to maintain order. However, the reality is that during the Cold War and even after it, the US has mainly highlighted and put pressure on states that are neither its allies nor in its sphere of immediate interest. It has also used its big power status to protect its allies who themselves are repressive regimes and give scant regard to human rights. Herein lies the mistrust of the big powers when they claim to pursue human rights 22 for its own ends when in reality human rights becomes a useful rhetoric for wider strategic and economic considerations.32 Despite this mistrust, smaller and middle powers do submit themselves or form “alliances” with big powers willingly for their own survival. The value in this for the lesser powers is that it provides a balance of power against regional powers and grants them favourable access to the markets of the big powers. When seen through the prism of human rights, this has contradictory consequences. On the one hand, with the patronage of a big power like the US, the state has to open up its human practices to scrutiny and has the effect of emboldening the human rights activists within the country. However, at the same time, the states knowing that they have big power patronage can undertake token measures for human rights implementation without substantial changes in bad human rights practices.33 US support for military dictatorships in Latin America in the 1970s is indicative of this pattern of behaviour. The current Bush administration with its invasion or liberation of Iraq depending on the lenses one uses has given the hegemonial logic a new dimension. As the sole superpower, the US has carried on with unilateral policies that have shown scant respect for international law and for the mechanics of customary diplomatic practice. There were a variety of reasons put forward by the US for the military action in Iraq and one of them was the emancipation of the Iraqi people and to give back to them their rights and dignity. Even though the US has demolished the Saddam Hussein regime and taken over Iraq, neighbouring Arab countries, the international community and human rights NGOs 23 do not believe that the US will act selflessly in the rebuilding of Iraq. Falk succinctly puts this point across when he says: In one central respect “hegemonial logic” is nothing more than an exemption for the strong from the constraints of “statist logic”. Its “justifications” based on benevolent motivation have not been validated by patterns of great power practice through history and seem flawed by the difficulty of separating the pursuit of interests at the expense of a weaker foreign society from the promotion of its well being.34 Even though logically human rights can be transported efficiently through the hegemonial process, in reality the statist logic of self-interest compounded by the need to balance that interest with regional and global hegemons relegates the human rights issues to the non-critical section of discussions between states.35 Despite this strong resistance by the states system, human rights issues have become more prominent in both bilateral and multilateral ties between states. To understand how the human rights project sustains itself in world politics, Falk’s naturalist logic provides a sound analysis. Naturalist Logic Naturalist logic begins with the notion that certain rights are inherent in human nature and should be respected by all organised societies. In the naturalist logic, the basis of human rights is prior to politics; the absence of a sovereign power in authority is not an excuse for non-observance. Since human rights rest on a moral imperative, their status is both prior to and independent of their formal acceptance by a government. When a legal imperative is asserted, jurists require some form of acceptance of norms to occur although the process can be an implied one as through the formation of customary international law. In essence, the naturalist case is an appeal to the conscience of the ruling governments and all other political actors. The ultimate appeal in the naturalist 24 case is for all to become “political” in their actions with regard to rights and this underpins the claim that human rights are essentially universally valid.36 Unlike the statist logic which gives primacy to jurisdictional principles, the naturalist logic is premised on normative standards. In an ideal world, the state machinery would use its power to act within the guidelines of natural rights. However, the difficulty in the naturalist logic is the vagueness of the norms and the ambiguity of the mandate.37 Those who lay down the power do so with self-serving interpretations of what natural law requires are non-naturalist, that is, they rest on statist or hegemonial analysis. Policymakers see absolute adherence to a naturalist logic as being sentimental and moralistic.38 On the other hand, an active policy of naturalist logic would be read by other states with different cultural and political values as an attempt to impose an alien set of values with the aim of domination. The normative standards of human rights are usually compromised by the policymakers because of statist and hegemonial principles. On its own, the naturalist logic lacks the strength of implementing normative human rights standards. Historically, the confluence of statist and hegemonial concerns together with a naturalist justification has resulted in the intervention to topple regimes that had shockingly bad human rights records. Naturalist considerations did exert some influence but not necessarily decisive influence that might have been sufficient on its own to explain an interventionary act.39 For example, seeking to aid the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo was highlighted as one of the justifications for North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) nations to intervene in Kosovo. However, to demolish a rogue 25 regime and to support a regime that would co-operate with NATO for regional order in the Balkans were far more important reasons.40 With the growth of the media industry together with advances of technology, the naturalist logic does have a bearing on public opinion and does in some ways inhibit repressive policies. 41 Transnational groups active in highlighting gross violations of human rights have been successful in censuring countries by publishing and publicising comprehensive reports. Countries try to avoid such censures even if the criticisms are not from another government or international institution primarily because transnational groups have an intricate and extensive network for disseminating information and display greater media savvy with their press releases and reports. Besides the bad international image portrayed, developing countries do not want their human rights issues linked to either trade or aid. Therefore, concessions are sometimes made to rectify policies or free political dissidents. Even though most of the time the changes made are transient and do not mark a significant change in attitude of the offending government, for proponents of human rights it nevertheless points to some measure of success for the transnational groups who want a system of governance based on the naturalist logic. Human rights activists or purists are dissatisfied with incremental changes and blame the constraints imposed on governance based on the naturalist logic for the slow pace. Due to the dynamics of power and economic scarcity, the existing governing systems protect the rich and attempt to deter the poor which exacerbates the human rights situation. The bureaucratic character of the modern state makes the naturalist logic less relevant to the 26 decisional process. With the pressures of competition between government agencies and political leadership in the modern state, governments are more ready to use the rhetoric of high ideals while ignoring them in practice. This constrains any spirit of doing right by doing good and such an atmosphere cannot support the naturalist logic.42 Governments act on human rights when their actions have minimal impact on other competing interests. Governments, however, still use the language of the naturalist logic primarily as it is the underpinning of human rights and it validates a certain minimum standard of human behaviour. In all societies an active moral force is present that is sensitive to patterns of abuse which is contrary to human nature and societies expect their governments not to be an agent of such abuses. States too understand that whatever their system of government they cannot ignore the claims of the naturalist logic; the attraction of the logic is that it appeals to the human condition that as individuals they are empowered by virtue of being part of the human race and is prior to any legislative law. States would find it difficult to dismiss such a notion which is why all states subscribe to the UDHR. Even though in practice the naturalist logic has found constraints in implementation, the rhetoric together with media and transnational groups highlighting the major issues, have enabled it to remain in the public imagination, and has the potential to become an influential aspect of public policy. It is this potential that drives and sustains the naturalist logic. For some it means creating an international public policy with a supranational institution. 27 Supranational Logic When sovereign states are unable to deal with human rights issues there is a desire for a supranational logic as act of will by national governments where the traditional language of diplomacy is complemented by a metalanguage of supranationalism. This is different from the statist, hegemonial and naturalist logic as these logics are based on a horizontal order of separate states whereas the supranational logic aspires to a vertical ordering from above. For human rights to be implemented the hope arising from this logic is the imposition of values from a central world authority and at the same time with the authority and ability to make sure states do comply with such values.43 That hope was realised with the establishment of the United Nations (UN). Human rights have been sufficiently institutionalised at the level of the United Nations as highlighted at the start of this chapter with the setting up of treaties and the establishment of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights (UNHCHR).44 With Security Council resolution 1503, individuals and NGOs can make submissions to the Commission to look into human rights abuses. Even though the Commission can send special rapporteurs for fact-finding missions or to negotiate reforms, the Commission however does not have powers that can force change. This shows the weak sense of supranational community at work at the regional and global level with regard to human rights where the best the supranational authority can offer is by shaming offending regimes or censuring them. 28 The limits of the supranational logic arise from the ‘inability of the United Nations to escape from its womb of hegemonial and statist logic’. 45 During the Cold War the activities of the UN were deeply constrained by the two superpowers and by deference to a statist concept of the structure of world order. After the Cold War during the 1990s human rights activists were disappointed that the remaining superpower, the US, and the UN could not play an active role in turning human rights rhetoric into reality. The massacres in the Balkans and Rwanda clearly showed the inability of the UN to act decisively when it faced regimes that callously murdered innocent civilians. Even if the UN has problems in acting on human rights issues, it nevertheless has shown that it has the ability to codify a broad range of human rights laws and has attempted to infuse such laws as norms in the international system. That process has culminated in the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Its jurisdiction commenced on 1 July 2002. The ICC has the power to investigate and prosecute individuals accused of crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes of war. However, the US has objected to this and seeks to immunise its leaders and military from the ICC. 46 This action shows the failure of the supranational logic and how it becomes subservient to the hegemonial and statist logic. The power of the UN remains limited and in the realm of human rights very little can be enforced by the UN without some form of approval or aid from the US. At the same time, the action of the US frustrates the UN primarily because states with terrible records of human rights point to the US example and claim that their sovereign right is compromised when they accept the powers of the ICC.47 Thus the UN becomes 29 an example of an international institution where it cannot consistently or uniformly sanction against a member state which is guilty of human rights abuses. Both members on the Left and Right of the ideological divide consistently use this view. Former US Senator Jesse Helms, who has been characterised as a right wing ideologue in US politics, addressed the UN Security Council and said: When the oppressed people of the world cry out for help, the free peoples of the world have a fundamental right to respond. As we watch the United Nations struggle with this question at the turn of the millennium, many Americans are left exceedingly puzzled. Intervening in cases of widespread oppression and massive human rights abuses is not a new concept for the United States. The American people have a long history of coming to the aid of those struggling for freedom. In the United States during the 1980s, we called this the Reagan Doctrine.48 Even though one can agree with Helms’ sentiments in the abstract, the US during the period of the Reagan Doctrine had also supported murderous governments and insurgents who had violated human rights. Saddam Hussein was a main benefactor of that doctrine and the most important point is that the UN together with its member states were unable to censure the US then for supporting a dictator and was unable to do anything as well when the US invaded Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein. It is with this static position of the UN that Falk argues that the supranational logic provides a template for the discourse of human rights with limited practical success and is highly dependent on the interests of the hegemon in a regional context or in the case of a superpower, the international context.49 The interesting aspect of the UN and the saving grace for the supranational logic stems from the fact that a multitude of states and transnational actors had openly endorsed the UN, evoking the language of humanitarianism and human rights, as the appropriate institution to handle the question of using force in Iraq. In spite of the criticisms that the credibility of the UN and its secretariat were severely tested during the Iraq crisis, the fact 30 remains that those states opposed to US unilateralism supported the mechanism of the UN as the just alternative. In this sense, the normative values of the supranational logic have a certain measure of legitimacy even if that legitimacy is of little concern for a superpower with its own paramount interest. The human rights purists would, on the other hand, argue that the supranational logic has in its own set of rules an inextricable way of not setting forth a positive direction for action. Therefore, human rights abuses can be checked and dictators can be overthrown only by the will of the superpower and only the superpower has the means to undertake the project without being tied up to the ‘politics’ of the supranational logic. The raging debate among human rights activists today is between the Kantian concept of making sure the means justify the ends and the utilitarian position of making sure the end game has brought the greatest good to the greatest number irrespective of the means undertaken. Transnational Logic When Amnesty International received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977, it confirmed the contribution of the transnational approach to the promotion of human rights. According to Falk, the growth of transnational actors meant that foreign policy formulators had to take into account another level of actors who were not only well funded in some instances but also had expertise within their ranks that were better if not equal to those in the government bureaucracies.50 This meant that transnational actors and groups were able to research, document, publish and articulate human rights abuses with a high level of competency that they built their own credibility and at the same time diminished the international standing of a particular state or a group of states where such human rights abuses took place. In other words, the transnational groups were able to affect public 31 opinion with their actions. For example, they are able to influence large companies from investing in a state where there are rampant human rights abuses and are able to show injustices that occur in certain states. Transnational actors produce accurate and reliable evidence that bureaucrats might want to hide.51 The operations of the transnational actors have become more sophisticated when they are able to build a network of contacts around the world which also meant an increase in funding their activities for the desired goals. This meant transcending territorial boundaries and building an international civil society without the constraints of the supranational logic. 52 With the forces of globalisation and the rapid increase of technology where information could be spread to a worldwide audience in an instance, transnational actors have become important players in the international human rights regime. International media companies are interested in their works and provide these actors sufficient media coverage that fit neatly into the plans of the transnational actors.53 However, one has to keep in mind that transnational actors have no desire to replace government or its authority. They accept the statist position that the state is the paramount actor and that the role of the transnational group is to ensure that the state performs its correlative duties towards its citizens. 54 Weak states do face a problem because transnational agencies perform de facto government duties but this is not the case where states have firm control of their governmental arms. At the same time, transnational groups do not see themselves as taking over global institutions but to work 32 together with such institutions aiming to strengthen international civil society so as to achieve an acceptable standard of human rights.55 In their pursuit of engaging the state, transnational actors are also in turn pro-actively engaged by the state. Liberal democratic states and their foreign policy arms have open channels of communications with transnational actors inviting them to provide feedback on global, regional or local human rights issues. The positive aspect of this is that transnational actors do have an input in foreign policy making and are able to democratically dissent if they are disagreeable with any aspect of foreign policy making. For example, Amnesty International Parliamentary Group in Australia is consulted on human rights issues by the government. However, the negative aspect is that consultation is dependent on whether the government includes transnational actors. Arbitrary inclusion in discussions would mean that governments could exclude transnational actors which had been overtly critical of government policies.56 In addition, if transnational actors are seen to be working too closely with governments then the credibility of the group could diminish in the public eye. In this sense, transnational actors have to be careful in dealing with governments because the reverse could happen where government spin doctoring could test the credibility of the groups themselves. In illiberal states, laws have been passed so as to stop funds reaching NGOs or if funds do come from overseas they have to go through a government agency. In effect, that means the government has control of the content coming out from transnational groups. In such situations, transnational groups are relegated to pseudo arms of the government. Brutal 33 regimes do not pursue sophisticated plans to curb the influence of prominent transnational actors but instead use raw force to eliminate them which in turn produces a climate that is inimical to the development of civil society.57 Despite such ‘government’ terror transnational actors continue to pursue human rights without fear or favour. The growth of transnational actors has meant the transformation of sovereignty, as it is no longer absolute.58 The state has to share the international stage with these actors and thereby as Forsythe argues we see a ‘subtle interplay of two types of influence between two types of actors on behalf of human rights, relief and sustainable development.’59 However, this does not mean that power is equally shared because it is heavily tilted in favour of the state. The ordering logic of transnational groups as argued before is vulnerable depending on statist indulgence and voluntary private funding. However, these groups enjoy a space in democratic politics, are well established, enjoy a large amount of autonomy and maintain an extensive global network that can check government behaviour.60 Populist Logic The weakest and most subversive of ordering logics is that of the ‘people’ taken in Rousseau’s sense of being the ultimate repository of sovereign rights.61 It propounds that governments and their institutions—whether governmental or non-governmental—are corrupting to the extent that they give in to promote general interests instead of particular ones. Also all political institutions are imperfectly representative, whatever their claim. 34 They also point to the overwhelming power of the state to resist all challenges except for revolutionary groups that seek power for themselves.62 The populist logic derives its strength from those individuals and loosely organised groups at the margins of power. They distrust the capacity of any government to uphold basic well-being, including individual and group rights. They also deny that government and non-governmental organisations possess a monopoly on substantive human rights issues and they see their existence to agitate against government when it fails to follow through its promises. In drawing inspiration from the naturalist logic, they do not stop in just highlighting government wrongs but are willing to mobilise people to show to governments that they are the power. Examples of such movements were seen when there were mass anti-globalisation demonstrations during the World Trade Organisation talks and also when the US was about to attack Iraq.63 The populist logic is distinguished from the transnational approach by its rejection of statist legitimacy. They see the state as inherently prone to abuse its power and feel that the state must submit to popular sovereignty and be fully accountable to it. Whereas transnational actors are willing to accept the legitimacy of the overall world system, populists on the other hand, reject any structured arrangements seeing them as the sources of why human rights abuses cannot be stopped or curtailed. However, the sustainability of the populist logic is short and because it is loosely organised, states have the means to resist their demonstrations and mobilising actions; in 35 authoritarian states force is used to quell popular uprisings. This in turn has meant that the populist logic has to transform itself into a transnational logic to remain relevant to the issues they want to espouse or change. If not, they are sidelined at the margins of power with little influence. The flux can also be reversed when transnational actors find difficulty in influencing the government they proceed to the populist mode to exact a different type of action. As Falk points out: In effect, populism is a protean logic that can act either independently or to reinforce the thrust of any of the other logics in a wide variety of respects. It also can act to oppose other logics, as in the case of revolutionary populism, with its antecedents in movements associated with philosophical anarchism, and statism. 64 In this sense, populism has to be properly conceived and one must scrutinise the actors carefully before making a judgement. Populism, when mobilised, is based on an emotional pull, on most occasions on a single issue platform but it cannot be sustained because after the emotional mobilisation, disparate individuals or groups cannot agree upon the next point of action. Nevertheless, the mobilising act itself does put governments under pressure because their legitimacy is put to the test and in case of democratic societies they would have to face the ‘people’ during elections. Even though the populist logic has minimal influence on government policy it does spectacularly highlight the major human rights problems of the day albeit briefly.65 Conclusion This chapter has highlighted the main philosophical underpinnings of human rights and its mechanics in the foreign policy of states in international relations. The first part charted the course of why human rights are important in international relations and in turn showed how they became important. The 36 second part focused on the interplay of human rights between states in international relations. It also focused on the different levels of how human rights can be analysed in the international system and highlighted the practice, tensions and contradictions of governmental and non-governmental forces with regard to human rights. 1 Vincent, R., Human Rights and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p.8. Vincent has acknowledged his debt to Alan Gewirth for this definition. This is the standard definition for human rights in most human rights texts. At the same time, it is not a definition cast in stone. 2 See Appendix 1 3 Eldridge, P., The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia, Routledge, London, 2002, p.12. 4 Bull, H., The Anarchical Society, MacMillan, London, 1977, 2nd edition, p.94. 5 Falk, R., ‘Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights’, in Richard Pierre Claude and Burns H. Weston(ed), Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1992, p.35. 6 Ibid. 7 T. Dunne and N.J. Wheeler, ‘Introduction’ in T. Dunne and N.J. Wheeler (ed), Human Rights in Global Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p.3. 8 Baehr, P., ‘Controversies in the Current International Human Rights Debate’ in Human Rights Working Papers, http://www.du.edu/humanrights/workingpapers/index.html, Number 3, Posted 20 January 2000, pp.1-2. 9 Brown is quick to point out that differences in interpretations exist not only between cultures but also within one culture itself. 10 Brown, C., ‘Universal human rights: a critique’ in Human Rights in Global Politics, pp.114-115 11 T. Dunne and N. Wheeler, ‘Introduction’, p.8. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid, p.6. 14 Ibid. 15 Donnelly, J., ‘The social construction of international human rights’, in Human Rights in Global Politics, p.85. 16 Ibid, p.86. 17 Henkin, L., ‘Human Rights: Ideology and Aspiration, Reality and Prospect’, in Samantha Power and Graham Allison (eds), Realizing human rights: moving from inspiration to impact, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2000, p.11. 18 Falk argues that the word logic is an over rigorous image of the relationships between premises and application. The words approaches or perspectives seems preferable because the main intention is to suggest that a line of analysis follows from (in a logical sense) the adoption of an initial premise about the foundation of political authority in the world system. 19 Falk, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights’, p.32. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid, p.33. 25 Ibid. 26 Kissinger, H., Does America need a Foreign Policy: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2001, p.237. 37 27 R.J. Vincent, “Western Conceptions of a Universal Moral Order”, in Moral Claims in World Affairs, Ralph Pettmann (ed), St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1979, pp.52-78. 28 At the time of writing this thesis the Bush administration of the US together with the Blair government of the UK had taken military action against Iraq in contravention of UN Security Council resolution 1441. This was done without the approval of the UN Security Council where permanent members like France, China and Russia disapproved of the actions of the US and the UK. This establishes a new era of US unilateral power and raises the question of how successive US governments would view human rights in international relations. 29 Falk, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights’, p.34. Also see Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Asian Practice of Security: Key Features and Explanations’ in Muthiah Alagappa (ed), Asian Security Practice, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998, p.623. 30 Falk, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights’, p.34. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid, p.35. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid, p.36. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Kissinger, H., Does America Need a Foreign Policy? , Simon and Schuster, New York, 2001, p.261. 41 Falk, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights’, p.36. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 For a comprehensive study of the human rights treaties please see A.H. Robertson and J.G. Merrills, Human Rights in the World: An introduction to the study of the international protection of human rights, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992, Third Edition. For a comprehensive discussion of UN Human Rights Treaties see the website www.bayefsky.com. For a summary of the UN human rights treaties see the website www.hrweb.org/legal/undocs.html 45 Falk, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights’, p.37. 46 Please see Jamie Mayerfeld, ‘Who Shall Be Judge’ in Human Rights Quarterly 25.1,2003, pp.93-129. 47 Hoffman, S., ‘Clash of Globalizations’ in Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug 2002, New York, p.111. 48 Cited in Mayerfeld, J., ‘Who shall be judge?: The United States, the International Criminal Court, and the Global Enforcement of Human Rights’ in Human Rights Quarterly No. 25 Vol. 1, 2003, p.104. Former Senator Jesse Helms addressed the Security Council on 20 January 2000 at the invitation of the then President of the US, Bill Clinton. 49 Falk, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights’, p.37. 50 Ibid, p.39. 51 Schulz, W., In Our Own Best Interests, Beacon Press, Boston, 2001, pp.6-7. 52 Falk, Human Rights in World Community, p.39. 53 Forsythe, D., Human Rights in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p.175. 54 Falk, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights’, p.39. 55 Ibid. 56 Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, p.176. 57 Ibid, p.177. 58 Ibid, p.188. 59 Ibid. 60 Falk, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights’, p.39. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Iggy Kim and Nick Everett, ‘November 14: Protest against WTO & war!’, www.greenleft.org.au, September 18, 2002, accessed on 26/6/2003 64 Falk, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights’, p.40. 38 65 Ibid. 39 Chapter 2 Projecting the Wilsonian Vision: Australia’s neo-idealist self-image on human rights. So far as foreign policy is concerned, trade, security and human rights issues all need to rank as the three primary components of foreign affairs, on an equal footing and with inter-reactions amongst the three which require a great deal of subtlety in the work that needs to be undertaken. Chris Sidoti (former Australian Human Rights Commissioner) 1 Introduction This chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part focuses on a general discussion of idealist principles, security and human rights. The historical trajectory of idealism and its relation to international security and human rights will also be illuminated. The focus will then shift to the rise of neo-idealism in post-Cold War world politics and its vision for human rights. The second part will demonstrate the specificity of the idealist selfimage of human rights within Australian Foreign Policy from Evatt to Evans. I will then show how this idealist vision has been actively rekindled and propagated in the rhetoric of Australia’s human rights diplomacy in the post-Cold War era. Idealism, Security and Human Rights Idealist principles in international relations can be traced to the ideas of Grotius,2 Kant3 and Wilson.4 Even though there are subtle differences in their worldviews, their ontological and epistemological assumptions are very similar. They claim that human nature is essentially “good” and that people are capable of mutual aid and collaboration. This leads to a concern for the collective welfare of others so that progress can be attained. Bad human behaviour is caused not by evil people but by institutional and structural arrangements that cause peop le to act selfishly, which eventually leads to war. 40 The conditions of war are also caused by the anarchical conditions of the international system. Idealists argue that collective or multilateral rather than national efforts can eliminate war. In this sense, there is a call for the reorganization of the international system within multilateral institutions by respecting international law. These criteria can only be fulfilled if states strive for democracy, a fair international trading system5 and peace6 . Idealist principles were shaped after Europe suffered the devastation of the First World War from 1914-18. A variety of thinkers, politicians and philanthropists gave thought as to how to change the international system to prevent any recurrence of crippling wars. 7 There was a general consensus that the causes of the war were generated by the failure of secret diplomacy and a lack of multilateral effort by the big powers to reduce the risks of wars. Woodrow Wilson, in his Fourteen Points speech of January 1918, diagnosed the causes of the First World War and also the idealist prescriptions to alter the international system.8 Wilson’s idealism offered a two -part diagnosis of what went wrong in 1914 and a corresponding two-part prescription for avoiding similar disasters in the future.9 The first element of this diagnosis and prescription concerned domestic politics. Wilson firmly believed that ‘the people’ do not want war; war comes about because the people are led into it by militarists or autocrats, or because their legitimate aspirations to nationhood are blocked by undemocratic, multinational, imperial systems. Wilson argued that the answer to this was to promote democratic political systems, that is, liberal-democratic, 41 constitutional regimes, and the principle of self-determination. The rationale behind this thinking was that if all regimes were national and liberal- democratic, there would be no war.10 Wilson links this to the second component of idealism that is the critique of pre-1914 international institutional structures. He claimed that the anarchic pre-1914 system of international relations undermined the prospects for peace. Secret diplomacy led to an alliance system that fuelled mutual suspicion that consequently triggered the outbreak of war. There was no mechanism in 1914 to prevent war, except for the ‘balance of power’ – a notion that was associated with unprincipled power politics.11 Wilson saw the serious need for a restructuring of the international system. The League of Nations was designed to institutionalize and structure the international system to maintain peace. The aim of the League of Nations, according to Wilson, was to provide the security that did not resort to the balance of power system. This also meant that states could discus s their security in an open, multilateral forum without fear of any secret bilateral arrangement. In this sense, Wilson envisioned the League of Nations as offering public assurances of security backed by the collective will of all nations. Each country wo uld guarantee the security of every other country, and thus there would be no need for nations to resort to expedients such as military alliances or the balance of power. Wilson termed this collective security and heralded that law would replace war as the underlying principle of the international system. 12 42 These reforms were to revamp both the domestic and international structures by the liberal belief for constitutional government and the rule of law. The argument put forward was that when domestic regimes were committed to democratic practices it would lead to similar behaviour in the international arena. Wilson argued that when clashes of interests in the domestic scene were peacefully resolved by democracy this could equally apply to all states in world politics. This belief rested on the assumption that democratic nations will not go to war with each other and that each sovereign state’s security would be assured.13 The hope was that all nations would progress towards a liberal system of governance. The notion of security is a contested concept that is difficult to define. Realists, idealists and critical theorists have different and competing definitions of security. Therefore, Arnold Wolfers’ conclusion that security is ‘an ambiguous symbol’ is valid in the study of international relations.14 It is important to understand that from the standpoint of international relations, the notion of security and its scope for definition becomes synonymous with the prevailing ideas and norms of the international system. In this sense, the notion of human rights is not only a discussion of a state’s obligation to its citizens but also associates itself with national, regional and international peace. The problem arises where sometimes in the interests of peace and stability certain aspects of human rights abuses are tolerated. However, for the purpose of this study it is important to outline the idealist concept of security and its link to human rights. 43 At the heart of the idealist worldview of security is the belief in democracy, respect for international institutions and international law. Even though security is seen as important, idealists see the state as the active agent in promoting peace and democracy. Unlike the realists who emphasise military security, idealists put great emphasis on economic security. The idealists claim that states that are domestically secure in the economic realm will be less likely to experience domestic turmoil, which might cause wars between neighbours. They point to the historical experiences of economic problems in Europe before the First World War and the Great Depression as illustrations of how economic problems can lead to war.15 In this sense, idealism argues for the nexus between a liberal concept of politics to be mixed with an open trading system between states. Therefore, idealists argue that the security of an individual is a combination of political rights and socio-economic rights.16 If these fundamental human rights were to be respected then there would be a stronger commitment for peace within and amongst nation-states.17 In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was embraced in the shadows of Auschwitz and Nagasaki. People were shocked at the atrocities caused by the consequences of war and saw a real need for a concerted and multilateral effort to prevent such inhumane actions from occurring again. 18 The idealists saw the Declaration as a progressive step for humanity in comparison to the failure of the League of Nations. They also saw two important factors that were consistent with their worldview. The first factor was that the Declaration was hailed as the first articulation of the rights and freedoms of all members of the human family. This was seen to be following the 44 Kantian notion of the ‘categorical imperative’ – where human rights were not seen as a means to an end, but an end in themselves.19 The emphasis throughout the Declaration was on rights and freedoms applicable to every person everywhere. Idealists noted that the construction of the Decla ration respected human dignity, which in their worldview claimed a close connection between violation of human rights, and national and international peace.20 The second factor was that the Declaration – the ‘common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’ – treated human rights not only as universal but also indivisible.21 This meant that civil and political rights, on one hand, and social, economic and cultural rights, on the other, demanded state protection on the same plane. The rights in the Declaration were both indivisible and interrelated. This led to the conceptual framework for the foundations of the international law of human rights, which was consistent with idealists’ vision of trying to bring about a progressive order and replace the anarchical international system. Idealists supported the maintenance of an international order where the rights of human beings were protected by an ‘international constitutional’ document. It was seen as not only guaranteeing human rights but also ensuring a peaceful international order.22 The vision of the idealists did not materialise as the international system saw the emergence of the Cold War rivalry between the United States of America (USA) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). International relations were seen through the prisms of power politics, military alliances and the possibility of nuclear 45 warfare. Human rights did not concern the superpowers and even if they were concerned, it was to undermine each other’s ideolo gical positions. Both USA and the USSR were guilty of supporting regimes that were the worst violators of human rights. Human rights, during this Cold War era, had very little significance in the relations between states. Even though the United Nations (UN) had made commendable gains in trying to highlight the human rights agenda, the issue of human rights, however, depended on the strategic concerns of the big powers.23 The end of the Cold War heralded a sense of relief and hope.24 There was a sense of re lief because the threat of a devastating nuclear war had greatly diminished. Also the break up of the USSR changed the configuration of power in the international system and there was hope that low politics issues like the environment and human rights would take a more central stage. Idealists saw this as the perfect opportunity to rekindle the Wilsonian vision in the post-Cold War era. The Neo-Idealist Agenda and Human Rights Neo-Idealist arguments have proliferated since the end of the Cold War. There are different strands within this school of thought especially in their prescriptions for viewing international relations. Fukuyama 25 , Doyle26 , and Kegley27 who draw their arguments historically from idealism articulate that the time has come for a revision in analysing international relations. Using different assumptions and methodologies they derive different conclusions. However, the similarity that can be seen in the literature of neoidealism has been the seething attacks on realism. The claim, by the neo- idealists, has been that the realist framework of analyzing world politics has been seriously inadequate. 46 Realism has been the dominant paradigm in international relations during the Cold War. With a pessimistic image of human nature, realists claim that states are self- seeking entities in an environment where there exists the potential for conflict. Survival is the ultimate aim of all states and foreign policy making is geared towards attempting to protect the sovereignty of the respective states.28 In this sense, ‘self- help’ is the cornerstone of each state where it uses its own resources to promote its interests and protect itself. Therefore, for each state the means of acquiring power is essential. The realists view the international system as being in permanent anarchy which revolves around the pursuit of power; acquiring it, increasing it, projecting it, and using it to bend others to one’s will. In this worldview, respect for moral principles is a wasteful and dangerous interference in the rational pursuit of power.29 Morgenthau30, Carr31 , Kissinger32 and Waltz33 have been influential figures in promoting the discourse of realism. Within this school of thought there have been serious debates about traditional realism, behaviouralism and neo-realism. The difference lies in methodology. Yet all have been very influential in international relations literature in analysing events and ideas. Cold War politics fitted neatly into the contextual paradigm of realism. That is why during this era nuclear and military issues were highly prioritised on the foreign policy agenda of most states. The main aim of all states was to maintain a balance of power to stabilize the international system so that the risks of war would be minimal. Human rights were residual issues and warranted attention only if it somehow 47 served to maintain the balance of power or if one state saw a potential in undermining the legitimacy of another state. Realists were attacked on two fronts at the abrupt end to the Cold War. First, they were chastised for not being able to predict the collapse of communism and subsequently the break up of the USSR. 34 The irony was that the critics themselves were unable to accurately predict the outcome. Second, the constant attention paid to high political issues like that of military capabilities, alliances, nuclear warfare meant that the realist framework was ill prepared to analyse a world where the issues of world trade, human rights and the environment would be important to security considerations. Idea lists argue that the pressure of the changes in the post Cold War international system will be too much for realism to account for. 35 In this sense, idealists ask for an enforcement of its tenets in world politics to account for the immense changes in the global order. Kegley encapsulates this vision when he argues: Idealism draws on the Enlightenment belief that maladaptive behaviour is a product of counterproductive institutions and practices that can be changed by reforming the system that produces it, and that human nature-classical realism to the contrary-is subject to modification and not permanently governed by an ineradicable lust for power.36 This challenge to realism demands that international relations be viewed through a Wilsonian lens. The neo-idealists point to the end of the Cold War, growth of telecommunications and growing worldwide social movements as evidence that it is best equipped to describe and prescribe international relations. Their agenda rests on three important premises. First, the beckoning of the ‘New World Order’. This, in turn, leads to the second point where this New Order leads to a liberal future for nation-states and human beings. Last, the combination of the two factors will ensure a ‘democratic peace.’ 48 George Bush Senior claimed at the end of the Gulf War, that the international system was entering a New World Order. This belief was concomitant with Wilson’s vision. The essence of Bush’s New World Order was to be: the sovereign state as the key unit of international rela tions; respect for the norms of non-aggression and non- intervention; support for international law and institutions, and crucially, a willingness of the international community to act, forcefully if need be, in support of these positions. Bush contended that the manner with which the UN functioned during the Gulf War showed that the international system could function with more idealistic principles.37 The neoidealists agreed with Bush’s predictions and their belief was further entrenched with the publication of Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man. Fukuyama’s thesis was that the collapse of communism signalled the victory of capitalism and liberal democratic ideas. Using a Hegelian analysis of the consequences of the Cold War, he argues that liberal democratic ideas had vanquished communism and will go on to be the system of governance for all nations where capitalist markets will be the norm. Liberalism will be the global ideology, which in turn will guarantee human freedom, state sovereignty and international peace.38 This is because if all states share universal ideals the likelihood of war and abuse of human freedom will be minimal. This blends comfortably with the idealist worldview that democracy will be the singular form of governance, which will eventually lead to a UN built on the foundations of law, order and peace. 49 In seeing the emergence of the New World Order and the triumph of liberalism, neoidealists point to the ‘democratic peace’ thesis as crucial evidence of their prescriptive prowess. Following Doyle’s argument that constitutionally stable democracies will not fight each other, neo- idealists are confident that liberalism will ensure multilateral efforts to protect individual freedom, the environment and the fight against poverty, disease and tyranny. The neo- idealists point to the growing power of globalisation to argue that liberal ideas will be more established in the New World Order. Liberalism is seen as the guarantor of human emancipation.39 In the context of the neo-idealist agenda, human rights is a realm where great inroads will be made. Human rights activists are not the only ones taking this position, so too are certain statesmen, bureaucrats and academics. They outline two important factors to justify their op timism. First, the Asian challenge to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in Vienna was diffused, albeit indefinitely, and the universal appeal of the document remained intact. Second, the legitimacy of the modern state in the post Cold War era is to a certain degree dependent on its domestic human rights record. The Bangkok Inter-Governmental Declaration on Human Rights, adopted in March 1993 at the regional conference of official representatives of countries of Asia and the Pacific region (one of the preparatory conferences for the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna), called for a revision of the UDHR. 40 They argued for national and cultural specificities to be included into the Declaration that they claimed reflected a Western concept of human rights. This seemed to deal a severe blow to the neo- idealists whose 50 individual position on human rights was challenged at a period where they felt rights would have had a more universal appeal. However, the neo-idealist position was vindicated at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna when it was argued: While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.41 The neo- idealists celebrated the Vienna Declaration as a victory for the universalism of human rights and went on to argue that modern states in the post Cold War era could ill afford to ignore human rights. They argue that the legitimacy of the state in the international community depends largely on how justly the state protects its citizens. The neo- idealists point to states like Nigeria, Myanmar and Saudi Arabia who have poor human rights records that have serious difficulty in constructive engagement with the international community. These states are also seen as potentially disruptive of regional stability. In this sense, states which violate human rights not only abuse the rights of their citizens but are also a threat to peace within their respective regions. Therefore, the neoidealists claim that in the post Cold War era the conditions for human rights remain optimistic because the security of states begins with the security of the individual.42 Australian Foreign Policy and Idealism Idealism in Australian foreign policy can be traced to British idealism. Australian foreign policy right up to the Second World War was heavily influenced by British foreign policy. 43 This idealism in Australian foreign policy can also be traced to the historical legacy of the nature of Australia’s birth as a nation. With a strong sense of nationalism and with a commitment to class compromise to enable all Australians to have a ‘fair go’, idealism was firmly entrenched in the Australian character.44 However, the most striking 51 example of Australia’s idealism was the role H.V. Evatt played at the UN. Australia’s Minister for External Affairs was an important actor in the crucial formative years of the UN. Evatt played an instrumental role in the formation of the UN at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. The Labor party tradition of social justice was present in the manner in which Evatt envisaged the role of the UN.45 He wanted the middle and smaller nations to be able to balance the big powers and wanted the scope of the Economic and Social Council of the UN to incorporate full employment as a UN objective. He was involved in the drafting of the UDHR. In recognition of his role in the formation of the UN, Evatt was elected President of the General Assembly for 1948–1949.46 Gareth Evans succinctly points to Evatt’s idealism when he argues: [Evatt’s] contribution to the founding of the United Nations is the stuff of which legends are made, and rightly so-especially in his fight for the rights of the smaller powers against the great powers in their respective roles of the General Assembly and the Security Council, and in his faith in the UN as an agent for social and economic reform and as a protector of human rights. No previous Australian leader had anything like Evatt’s passion for cooperative internationalism, nor anything like his success in creating practical foundations.47 Evatt’s idealist principles were somewhat curtailed by concern for domestic issues. Evatt was very insistent that the domestic jurisdiction principle was inserted in the UDHR so that the UN could not intervene in a state that was thought to be a violator of human rights. He was definitely worried that Third World countries would criticise Australia for its policies on the native Aboriginal population. This showed the difficulty of trying to reconcile the idealist principles of human rights with the reality of the internal political system within Australia. 52 However, the Labor party lost the 1949 elections and Robert Menzies became Prime Minister of Australia. Labor was to stay in opposition till 1972 and idealist thought in Australian foreign policy took a back seat.48 The fear of a resurgent militarist Japan forced the Menzies government to form the Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) alliance to secure itself against the threat of an Asian power. This characterized the nature of foreign policy in Australia where military security was paramount and policy making was closely tied with the USA. This alliance was soon to be a safeguard against communism. The deployment of Australian troops to the Korean and Vietnam Wars was proof of this policy. When Whitlam came into power in 1972, the USA and China established diplomatic ties with each other. The balance of power in international relations had significantly changed because of the new relationship between China and the USA. Simultaneously, most Western liberal democracies were go ing through economic decline. The world economy, at the same time, was going through tumultuous changes. Whitlam was quick to recognize China and continue the Labor tradition of internationalism in foreign policy. He also saw an important need to restructure the Australian economy to fit global trends. There was a strengthening of ties with Asian nations with an emphasis on developmental and humanitarian aid as well as economic ties. Human rights abuses were significantly highlighted during this period as well. South Africa’s apartheid regime came under heavy criticism from Australia. However, the Australian government remained remarkably subdued in its criticisms when Indonesian troops invaded East Timor. 49 53 The Fraser government’s foreign policy was not markedly different from that of Whitlam’s. In fact, some commentators argue that from 1972 Australia’s Foreign Policy was bi-partisan in nature. 50 Even though there might have been slight differences in opinion, by and large the two major parties had similar standpoints on broader security issues. One good example was the resettlement of the Vietnamese refugees in Australia on humanitarian grounds where both parties unanimously agreed that it was part of their international duty to do so. In chapter 4, I will show how the Howard government has departed from this duty. When Bob Hawke won the election of 1983, it was the beginning of thirteen years of Labor rule. Even though Keating replaced Hawke as Prime Minister in 1991, the essence of Labor rule was to gear Australia towards changing trends in the political and economic realms of international relations. Economic rationalism was seen as an important component in charting Australia’s future.51 Engagement with Japan and the spectacular economic growth of East Asian states was seen as vital to Australia’s economic security. The merging of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Trade into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) exemplified this notion of economic rationalism.52 However, this belief of economic engagement extended into a vision of Australia playing a pivotal role in the democratization of Asian states. In this sense, Australia believed and still continues to believe that multilateral economic engagement will result in a regional consensus on democracy that will ultimately safeguard human rights. Gareth Evans’ ‘Good International Citizenship’ is built on this premise. 54 ‘Good International Citizenship’: The neo-idealist impetus on human rights In 1989, Gareth Evans introduced the concept of ‘good international citizenship’ as representing Australia’s national interest in the changing international system.53 Even though it did not directly relate to geopolitical, strategic and trade interests, Evans thought that the timing was right to highlight ethical concerns in Australian Foreign Policy. He argued that it was in Australia’s interest, from the point of view of its reputation and its national self- respect, ‘in being—and being seen to be—a good international citizen.’54 This was very similar to the neo- idealists in introducing ethics into foreign policy. Evans rejected the idea of ‘good international citizenship’ as being the foreign policy equivalent of boy scout good deeds. On the contrary, he argued that the concept is a true reflection of the international interdependence and emerging globalism in the post-Cold War era.55 He claimed that Australia’s middle power status, coupled with its firm belief in multilateral diplomacy and international law, would give Australia distinct advantages in formulating and enacting ethical foreign policies. Human rights, according to Evans, will be strongly pursued in its own right and will be given a greater consideration in the new international system. Evans strongly argued for his vision when he pointed out: Of all the strands of good international citizenship, we give special emphasis to human rights. This reflects a national–and a philosophical–interest in defending and extending international standards of human rights and the observance of international law.56 This vision must be seen in the context of the growing dominance of the international capitalist system and Evans affirms this point when he argues: Our objective is to affirm values which in the United Nations Charter and elsewhere, have been recognized as being genuinely universal, and which are at the core of our sense of human dignity. Not only does this endeavour have intrinsic merit; but the pursuit of human rights, including the freeing up of political institutions and economic and social 55 controls, is arguably essential to successful modern economies, which place a premium on adaptability; free flows of information, dissent and debate; unfettered scientific research and technological change. Persistence in all this does, moreover, bring results, in individual cases and more generally. 57 In this sense, Australia’s human rights agenda is tightly tied up with the growing economies of the Asian region and worldwide international free trade. The Howard government has for the sake of free trade bypassed multilateral arrangements to sign bilateral free trade treaties with other states. The belief is that both free bilateral trade and multilateral trade would eventually influence authoritarian states on the benefits of democracy and human rights. In the context of engaging with the Asian region, Australia has made strenuous efforts in promoting free trade in the Asia Pacific region. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), an Australian diplomatic initiative, has been an important arena for Australian integration into the region. In pursuing multilateral diplomacy for economic and trade benefits within a multilateral framework, Australia also argues that there are political benefits in this engagement. The claim is that Australia has the benefit of experiencing democratic ideas and human rights initiatives.58 Through APEC, Australia will be able to help fledgling states to harness democracy and establish instruments for the protection of human rights. Alice Erh-Soon Tay, an academic from the University of Sydney and retired commissioner of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, confirms this position when she states: Helping societies in transition from one form of economy to another to build new legal systems, form legal professional associations, make suitable laws for commercial activities, adopt principles of public accountability, establish judicial processes as foundations for more democratic, participatory, more stable and economically more viable institutions–these are some of the ways Australia forwards its human rights policy.59 56 This neo- idealist perspective on human rights is strongly articulated within Australian Foreign Policy. That this linear progression of democratic ideas will eventually bring about the necessary human rights in the Asian region is indeed a strongly held view. Gareth Evans, in addressing the Asia-Australia Institute in March 1995, claims that he is very sympathetic with Fukuyama’s analysis. Even though he acknowledges that Fukuyama’s thesis has been vigorously criticised, he defends the neo- idealist position by arguing that there is no ‘coherent competitor to liberal democracy.’60 Building on this premise the universality of human rights will be realised with the growing impact of liberal democratic ideas and the dominance of capitalism. Australia, in this sense, will be able to play a more dominant role in the area of human rights. There has been no radical shift in the Howard Liberal/National Coalition government’s human rights agenda both in portraying its self- image and rhetoric. Australia, according to Downer and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), remains committed to its human rights obligations to the UN and still adheres to multilateral diplomacy in human rights issues.61 Even though the new Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Alexander Downer, has a more subdued style than his predecessor, Gareth Evans, he shares, however, the same idealistic notion of human rights. His speech to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Consultations with Human Rights NonGovernmental Organisations highlights this idealism as he remarks: The Government views human rights as an inseparable part of Australia’s overall foreign affairs approach, both because the treatment of human beings is a matter of concern to Australians and because promoting and protecting human rights underpins our broader security and economic interests. For too long human rights diplomacy was quarantined from the mainstream of the international poli cy agenda. We have set about ensuring that human rights discussions take place in the context of overall policy. The important area of human rights should not be an unproductive battleground or an environment for 57 sloganeering. What we seek is results, not rhetoric, with the outcome being genuine and real improvements in human rights.62 This claim has been consistent for the Howard government and DFAT from 1996 to the present. Despite a change in modality from the previous Labor government, the Howard government see itself as promoting and applying an idealist human rights program. 63 In pointing to the role Australia played in gaining independence for East Timor and with annually increasing its budget for the Human Rights Fund for supporting small scale NGOs in developing countries, Downer continues the self proclamation that Australia is committed to the idealist notions of human rights. 64 In providing a clearer anti-poverty focus, compared to the former Labor government, in Australia’s aid program, Downer claims that it is fulfilling its role as a good international citizen.65 Some commentators argue that there is evidence of Australia’s idealist strand for human rights and show how the Australian government has taken a strong stand against Zimbabwe’s abject violation of human rights. 66 Australia’s ratification of the International Criminal Court (ICC) despite a clause of reaffirming the primacy of Australian domestic law is also seen as part of projecting Australia’s idealist image in the arena of human rights in world politics. 67 However, in being selective of certain Australian practices without looking at them in the proper context or why such actions were undertaken in the first place means that these commentators have not analysed the actions and motives of the Australian government carefully. In chapters 4 and 5, there would be a more detailed discussion of the Howard’s government’s actions in its proper context. 58 Conclusion The post Cold War climate has seen a resurgence of idealist thought in international politics. Human rights, according to the idealists, were seriously neglected during the Cold War years. They seek to repair the damage by implementing multilateral institutions that would promote human rights. In this sense, international law is given high priority in the relations between states on human rights issues. Australia’s liberal democratic tradition has common strands with idealist thought and in the post Cold War environment is trying to pursue the idealist human rights platform in its foreign policy. The next chapter will investigate whether this idealism has been translated into results in Australia’s relations with ASEAN in the post-Cold War era. 1 Chris Sidoti, Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Council, Transcript, p.44 cited in Improving but….Australia’s regional dialogue on human rights, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, June 1998, p.21. 2 See his treatise “The Law of War and Peace” in Howard Williams, Moorhead Wright and Tony Evans (eds), A Reader in International Relations and Political Theory, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1993, pp. 81-90. 3 See Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace’ in Howard Williams, Moorhead Wright and Tony Evans (eds), A Reader in International Relations and Political Theory, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1993, pp. 112-121 4 See Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points speech which he made to both houses of Congress in January 1918. Also see Jurg Martin Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories of International Relations, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1994, pp. 71-80. 5 Ibid. This follows Wilson’s point 3 which was inspired by Immanuel Kant, that peace be fostered by the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. 6 Kegley Jr, C., ‘The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World Politics: An Introduction’ in Charles Kegley Jr (ed), Controversies in International Relations Theory, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1995, p. 4. 7 Brown, C., Understanding International Relations, Macmillan, London, 1997, p. 22. 8 See Jurg Martin Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories of International Relations, pp. 71-80. Also see Kegley, C., ‘The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities’ in International Studies Quarterly, Vol.37, June 1993, pp. 131-146. 9 This analysis is following Chris Brown’s interpretation of Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech in Brown, C., Understanding International Relations, pp. 23-24. I have done this for two reasons. First, due to a lack of space I am forced to find a good summary of Wilson’s speech. Second, Brown’s analysis provides an excellent summary by retaining all the essential idealist principles in Wilson’s thought. 10 Brown, C., Understanding International Relations, p. 75. 11 Ibid. 12 Jurg Martin Gabriel, Worldview and Theories of International Relations, p. 75. 13 Ibid, p. 76. 59 14 Wolfers, A., Discord and Collaboration, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1962, pp. 147 -165. Also see Makinda, S.M., ‘Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges for the United Nations’ in Global Governance, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1996, p.149. 15 Kegley, C., ‘The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies?’, p. 136. 16 Security has different meanings between idealists themselves and this in turn has different conceptions among idealists of what human rights should constitute. 17 Cranston, M., What Are Human Rights?, Taplinger Publishing Co., New York, 1973, pp. 12-15. 18 Robinson, M., ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Living Document’ inAustralian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.52, No.2, 1998, p.117. This was a keynote address made by Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, at the Symposium on Human Rights in the AsiaPacific Region, United Nations University, Tokyo, 27 January 1998. Also see Mullerson, R., Human Rights Diplomacy, Routledge, London, 1997, pp. 15-36. 19 Kant, I., Kant’s Political Writings in H. Reiss (ed), trans. H. Nisbett, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, p.100. 20 Robinson, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, 1998, p.16. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Mullerson, R., Human Rights Diplomacy, p. 102. 24 Gaddis, J. L., ‘Towards the Post Cold War World’ in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70 No.2, Spring 1991, p.103. 25 Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man, Avon Books, New York, 1992. 26 Doyle, M., ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, American Political Science Review , Vol.80, No.4, 1986, pp.1151-1169. 27 Kegley, C., ‘The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies?’, pp.131-146. 28 See Burchill, S., ‘Realism and Neo-realism’ in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, Theories in International Relations, Macmillan, London, pp. 67-92. 29 Burchill, S., ‘Realism and Neo Realism’, p.69. 30 Morgenthau, H., Politics Among Nations, 6th Edition, New York, 1985. 31 Carr, E.H., The Twenty Years Crisis, London, 1939. I must add here that critical theorists or rationalists have different historical interpretations of Carr’s worldviews. I am, however, through my analysis of Carr, going to continue to classify him as a traditional realist. 32 Kissinger, H., The Necessity of Choice: Prospects for American Foreign Policy, Doubleday Anchor, New York, 1962. 33 Waltz, K.N., ‘Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory’ in Journal of International Affairs, Vol.44, No.1, 1990 34 Kegley, C., ‘The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies?’, p.138. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid, p.141. 37 Merry, R., ‘New World Order: Bush’s Challenge’ in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol.48, Sept 22 1991, p.3074. 38 Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man, pp. 50-51. 39 Doyle, M., ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, p. 1160. 40 See Bangkok Inter-Governmental Declaration on Human Rights in James Tang (ed) Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia Pacific, Pinter, London, 1995. A copy of this can be founding in Appendix 1 of the book. 41 World Conference on Human Rights. The Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action, New York United Nations, 1993, p.30. 42 Mullerson, R. Human Rights Diplomacy, p. 68. 43 Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2nd Edition, 1995, p. 152. 44 Gary Smith, Dave Cox and Scott Burchill, Australia in the World: An Introduction, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, p. 32. 45 Ibid, p.33. 46 Ibid. 47 Evans, G., ‘The Labor Tradition: A View from the 1990s’ in David Lee and Christopher Waters (eds) Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy, Allen and Unwin, NSW, 1997,p.13. 60 48 Ibid, p.14. Ibid, pp.14-15. Also see Burchill, S., ‘East Timor, Australia and Indonesia’ in Damien Kingsbury (ed), Guns and ballot boxes, Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, Australia, 2000. 50 Smith, Cox and Burchill, Australia in the World, pp.38-39 51 Ibid, p. 170-171. 52 Ibid, pp. 169-170. 53 Evans, G., ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy’, Keynote Address to the Na tional Annual Meeting of Amnesty International, 19 May 1989, Sydney. 54 Evans, G., ‘Australian Foreign Policy: Priorities in a Changing World’ in The Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.43, No.2, 1989, p.12. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Alice Erh-Soon Tay, ‘A Policy for Human Rights in the Asia Pacific’ in Brian Galligan and Charles Stamford (eds) Rethinking Human Rights, The Federation Press, NSW, 1997, p.95. 60 Evans, G., ‘Australia in East Asia and the Asia Pacific: Beyond the Looking Glass’ in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.49, No.1, 1995, p.106. 61 Downer, A., Human Rights – A Record of Achievement, Speech by the Hon Alexander Downer, MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Consultations with Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisations, Canberra, 19 August 1998. 62 Ibid. 63 http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/foreign/1999/990818_arc.html accessed on 17/11/2002. 64 Ibid. 65 Eldridge, P., The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia, Routledge, London, 2002, p.167. 66 Mason, C., ‘Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: January to June 2002’ in Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol.48, No. 4, 2002, p.528. 67 Ibid, p.538. 49 61 Chapter 3 Realism and its limits to Australian human rights diplomacy: Structural impediments and cultural capabilities In defining international-political structures we take states with whatever traditions, habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government they may have. We do not ask whether states are revolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic. We abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities. Nor in thinking about structure do we ask about the relations of states-their feelings of friendship and hostility, their diplomatic exchanges, the alliances they form, and the extent of the contacts and exchanges among them. We ask what range of expectations arises merely from looking at the type of order that prevails among them and at the distribution of capabilities within that order. We abstract from any particular qualities of states and from all of their concrete connections. What emerges is a positional picture, a general description of the ordered overall arrangement of a society written in terms of the placement of units rather than in terms of their qualities. Kenneth N. Waltz1 Introduction This chapter, from a realist perspective, will explain why Australia’s human rights diplomacy in world politics remains problematic. It will demonstrate that the analysis of the idealists, according to realists, does not portray an accurate picture of Australian human rights diplomacy in the international system. The first part will analyse the structural impediments of the international system that continuously place human rights ranking below other considerations in foreign policy calculations. The interaction of anarchy in the international structure with security maintained by power politics means that human rights diplomacy is constantly impeded by systemic constraints. This chapter will identify the realist literature that show that the end of the bi-polar system did not radically alter the structure of interactions between states. Power relations, according to the realists, will continue to be counted in terms of military and economic capabilities. Human rights, unless disrupting the structure or affecting a state’s immediate security, will be relegated to a secondary issue. Realists argue that Australia as a middle power cannot be an effective manager of human rights with regional units that are still in the developing phase. 62 Idealists, as the realists observe, overstate the case for effective middle power diplomacy in human rights. The second part of the chapter will show that developing countries have successfully built up a cultural capability that inhibits Australia from making any foreign policy judgements about human rights. The concern here is not the legitimacy of culture but the power differential it offers to non Judeo-Christian states in the context of the international structure. The irony is that Australia, from a fear of invasion by Asia to a fear of being excluded from the regional coalition, plays down its cultural assertiveness in human rights diplomacy with its Asian neighbours. Anarchy, Power and Security According to the realists, the study of human rights in international relations has to be approached in the context of the international system. This system has different meanings to different commentators who base their arguments on different ontological and epistemological assumptions. 2 However, realists argue that definitions of anarchy, power and security are leitmotifs that have to be discussed to analyse human rights in the international system. It also has to be mentioned that different perspectives of international relations attach varying degrees of importance to anarchy, power and security. In discussing anarchy, power and security and connecting these ideas with the structural impediments of the international structure to human rights, realists attempt to show the failure of human rights in overcoming the international state structure. This in turn will explain within the microcosm of Australian-Asian relations, the failure of suitably negotiating a human rights platform. Within the international structure, the hierarchical placement of Australia’s military and economic capabilities relative to Asian states means human rights diplomacy must be jettisoned for rational outcomes. ‘Rational’ here means 63 making necessary policy choices for state survival dictated by the international structure.3 Anarchy in the international system means the absence of a central government. This does not necessarily mean that there is an absence of government per se. Rather the authority of governments resides in the units of the system. If those states are units, then they will claim sovereignty. This means that states have the right to treat themselves as the ultimate source of governing authority within the territorial limits of their jurisdiction. 4 Sovereignty automatically denies the recognition of any higher political authority. Therefore, the system of sovereign states is by definition politically structured as ana rchy. 5 The anarchic context as Buzan asserts, ‘sets the elemental political conditions in which all meanings of international security have to be constructed.’ 6 In this sense, anarchy is seen as a product of history as states endeavour to stabilise relations in the international structure and also simultaneously attempt to find political expression or order within differing constructs of ethnicity, culture and ideology. 7 Thus, states, in stabilising and cooperating with each other are also constantly in competition with each other. In this anarchic structure, states take action to preserve their independence and sovereignty. This automatically preserves the anarchic system. In turn, this international anarchic structure generates system- wide effects on relations among states. 8 The structure imposes competitive, self-help conditions of existence on the states within the system. Therefore, competition among states is pervasive and takes political, economic and societal forms as well as military ones.9 There is also a link between anarchic political structures and capitalist economic ones.10 The condition for the emergence of a capitalist system and the natural political expression 64 of an operating capitalist world economy is the fragmentation of political authority in a system of states. Historical evidence highlights this view when contrasting the fragmented, anarchical political experience of Europe, which generated capitalism, and the much more centralised, hierarchical tradition of China, which did not, despite having similar or even superior levels of science and technology.11 Anarchy when viewed from this link between political and economic structure shows how competition is a double-edged sword. On one hand, the anarchical political structure supports the competition of the market.12 Producers are forced to compete with each other to maintain and enhance their economic well-being. Because the anarchic political structure creates an autonomous space for economic actors, they are free to move between governments who provide favourable resources for their competition with other economic actors. Some states see great power advantages in hosting these producers. On the other hand, since economic prowess is seen by other states as strength threatening their own security, the anarchical system provides for the ‘unease in the power-security dilemma.’ 13 This is because states hold on to the view that wealth produced in economic competition can be potentially channelled to bolster defence and technological capabilities that might directly or indirectly threaten other states. Therefore, any analysis of anarchy has to take into account that the competition for strength in the qualities for survival is coupled with competition in the market. Waltz argues that competition under anarchy tends to produce units that are similar in function. 14 He claims that states will exhibit common characteristics and their foreign policy objectives will be based on survival in the competitive anarchical international 65 structure. He develops this point when he argues: Since the theory depicts international politics as a competitive system, one predicts more specifically that states will display characteristics to competition: namely, that they will imitate each other and become socialised to their system. 15 In this sense, successful states have a demonstration effect on those seeking to emulate their success. However, the differential of power will mean that states will behave in such a way as to prevent threats from one expansionist centre of power from dominating the system or subsystem. 16 This behaviour from states preserves the international anarchic structure. Within this anarchical structure the notion of power has to be analysed in order to recognise the different ways different states relate to each other and the hierarchical placement of states within this structure. Power is a contested concept but in international relations it is important to reject a definition of power that equates with control. Power is then measured by the ability to get people to do what one wants them to do when otherwise they would not do it.17 This confuses process with outcome, as power does not have a direct causal effect. If this was true, then why would there be the need for strategists and diplomats in the field of international relations? The USA, which has immense control over military and economic resources, cannot claim that it has control over every aspect of the behaviour of other states. Thus, power has to be defined in terms of the distribution of capabilities of the different states.18 In this sense, whether X, in applying its capabilities gains the wanted compliance from Y is dependent on X’s capabilities and strategy, and Y’s capabilities and counter strategies. 19 It is also dependent on all the factors of the situation or issue at hand to determine the impact of power. 20 Therefore, the nature of power in the anarchic international structure is a 66 complex matrix of capabilities, strategies and diplomacy to maximise a state’s standing in the international order. However, this standing too is always dependent on the issue at hand. This highlights the nature of the anarchic structure where power is in constant flux because states are on one hand, trying to survive and on the other attempting to maintain dominance in relation with other states. Since states are constantly in competition with each other and utilising their capabilities to out-perform one another, the international structure imposes a balance of power among states. This is not to say that the balance is uniformly maintained all the time as outbreak of wars among states occurs during some periods. However, in terms of rivalry between the USA and USSR during the Cold War where the outbreak of nuclear war would have meant mutually assured destruction, the balance of power was critical. 21 This meant that the international structure imposed similar foreign policy objectives and behaviour on the two superpowers to maintain balance. 22 This rivalry positioned the military, econo mic and technological capabilities of both the USA and USSR highly in the international structure. Hence, we witness the bipolar system. However, it did not mean that their actions were independent of power relations of other units or states whose capabilities were classified as medium or small in comparison to the superpowers. In fact, the balance of power caused the superpowers to influence middle and small powers on certain issues and in turn were influenced by them on other issues. Therefore, power of influencing or power politics becomes an essential component of relationships between states. Holsti succinctly points this out when he argues: The act of influencing becomes a central focus for the study of international politics, and it is from this act we can best deduce a definition of power. If we observe the act of influencing, we can see that power is a process, a relationship, a means to an end, and even a quantity. Moreover, we can make an analytical distinction among the act of influencing, 67 the basis, or resources, upon which the act relies, and the response to the act. Resources are an important determinant of how successful the wielding of influence will be, but they are by no means the only determinant. The nature of a country’s foreign policy objectives, the skill with which a state mobilises its capabilities for foreign policy purposes, its needs, responsiveness, costs and commitments are equally important.23 Within this anarchical structure, power politics is generated among states in the quest for survival. Military and economic capabilities of states are of prime importance in the structure. The state is always in competition with other states in the international structure and the interdependence of military and economic capabilities hierarchically rank states in order. Big powers have greater capabilities, greater influence and greater access to resources. Middle and small powers are constrained in promoting change because the structure impedes them from doing so. At the same time, in the quest for survival middle and small powers are more likely to follow the behaviour of the big powers. 24 Realists see Australia maximising its security by allying with the US as a more important function than to promote concrete changes in human rights in its region. The post-Cold War world has not necessarily meant that the anarchic structure has dramatically altered. The disintegration of the former USSR has meant that predictability in international relations becomes essentially difficult with a multi-polar world. As Waltz contends, “two great powers can deal with each other better than more can.” 25 In this sense, the post-Cold War era makes it difficult for policy makers or strategists to calculate the actions and intentions of other states in a multi-polar world. Therefore, the ideas of military and economic capabilities remain at the heart of security for states. Security in both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras is not absolute for states but relative.26 It is relative because the issues and factors affecting a state’s security are always 68 in constant flux. However, states find that defining security in terms of military and economic capabilities ensures that it will ward off potential threats from other actors or agencies. Even though the post-Cold War era has witnessed a call for stretching the definition of security 27 , military and economic security issues continue to dominate international relations. The unchanging anarchic structure of international relations means that states, especially medium and small powers in the post-Cold War era will place greater emphasis on military and economic capabilities rather than issues associated with low politics. Human Rights in the Anarchic Structure Human rights become a very problematic concept to introduce in the realm of the anarchic international structure. This is because states claim the outright authority of conferring rights on members constituting their nation. However, the conceptualisation of human rights clearly transcends the j urisdictional boundaries of individual states. Therefore, there exists a tension between citizenship of a particular state and recognition of membership to humanity. Yet enjoyment of these rights are bound up in the political, social, economic, legal, and cultural structures of individual states. In turn, human rights are further complicated when states have to respond to the competitive anarchic structure of international politics. This complication is seen, as discussed in chapter 1, in international politics where the UN, which is the principal legislature of human rights, cannot intervene in the manner in which a particular state practises human rights. As R.J. Vincent argues, “the principle of non- intervention which stands at the centre of the morality of states, allows the wronged 69 individual no international recourse.” 28 This is due to the anarchic features of international relations which help desensitise states to each other’s internal wrongdoing. Even Western democratic states have to acknowledge that they themselves have been violators of human rights at certain stages of their history. At present no democratic state can claim that it guarantees human rights in absolute terms in its national structure. Sometimes, certain states do not strongly criticise human rights abuses in other countries lest they themselves are subjected to the same criticisms. In other words, human rights become a highly political exercise where the issues are linked in a complex web of other foreign policy objectives. 29 This was best exemplified during the Cold War when both the USA and USSR pointed to human rights abuses in each other’s countries and also to states under their respective spheres of influence. However, the anarchic structure prioritises states to be the ultimate protectors of rights of its citizens. The rights of citizens trump the rights of human beings. This tension of human rights in international relations is best captured by Vincent when he argues: There is an inescapable tension between human rights and foreign policy. Their constituencies are different. The society of all humankind stands opposed to the club of states, and one of the primary rules of the latter has been to deny membership to the former. Foreign policy, according to these rules, should be conducted among states. It should not involve itself either with the communities endorsed by states, or with the notional global community reformers, revolutionaries and other trouble makers called up to justify their enthusiasms. The society of states should and does concern itself with rights, but they are not the rights of individuals, or even of nations, but of states.30 Vincent’s characterisations of human rights makes it possible for states to be able to guard against threats from other states where human rights abuses might threaten global or regional balances of power and also cause refugee crises. In this sense, human rights become a source of high political value because it destabilises the security of states. This shows that unless human rights abuses become a threat to regional order or economic well being of other states, the dialogue of human rights will be restricted to the realm of the 70 governing authority of a state in its territorial jurisdiction. 31 Therefore, human rights in international relations are a mechanism to secure peace between competing states.32 International action is sought only if human rights abuses escalate into war between neighbouring states or become a source of refugee problems among states. In sum, human rights in the anarchic international structure do not hold a high stake in the foreign policy objectives of states unless they directly threaten their sovereignty or economic well being. Otherwise, human rights are left out in the periphery of foreign policy interactions among states. The management of human rights is left to the big powers which have the necessary influence and capabilities but then again this is always dependent on the issues affecting human rights in the anarchic structure.33 Human rights, how unfortunate or immoral it may be in the international structure, put the survival of states before the security of individuals. This chapter will now turn to the specific case of Australia’s human rights diplomacy with Asia which will critique the idealist notions of human rights in the post Cold war era. A Realist Australian Foreign Policy: A Critique of the Idealist Perspective on Human Rights In the context of Australia’s foreign policy the question of human rights is inextricably linked with the liberal democratic tradition. This tradition places importance on protecting civil and political rights of its citizens. In the case of Australia there is also a history of protecting social and economic rights of its citizens through democratic socialism. However, these rights are subordinate to civil and political rights. Yet the notion of individual rights has been part of the democratic legacy of Australia’s political, economic 71 and cultural history. These notions have evolved from the period of Renaissance and continue to evolve within the polity of Australia. The concept of human rights within the national structure itself is an evolving process. However, the rhetoric of translating these notions of human rights in its foreign policy is in part to satisfy the democratic constituencies within the homeland. Proponents of human rights believe that the western model of democracy safeguards the security of individuals throughout the world. Gareth Evans puts across this notion when he argues: We are idealistic because it is the nature of men and women who live by the precepts of democracy to believe that they can change the world for the better. But in Australia’s case there are some additional special reasons. Established as we were as a gaol for the discards of British society, and with a significant proportion of our present population derived from those fleeing persecution or seeking a better life, at least part of the national psyche is profoundly committed to notions of reform and improvement. And being the size and weight that we are, it is in Australia’s interest that the world should be governed by principles of justice, equality, talent and achievement, rather than status and power.34 The essence of this thought claims that the nature of world politics was shifting to place human rights at a more central level in foreign policy making. Idealists claim that human rights in the post-Cold War era would play a significant part in a state’s foreign policy judgement. They point to a conscio us effort on the part of states to establish human rights as an important foreign policy agenda in the post Cold War era. Idealists, according to the realists, misconstrue higher coverage on human rights abuses, constructive dialogues and multilateral p latforms in the post-Cold war era as signs of a new period for establishing human ethics in the international structure. The international structure of competing states, however, cannot respond to these calls for changes as security of states is based on military and economic supremacy rather than a moral stand. This does not completely relegate human rights as a hopeless concept in international relations. Within the gaps and spaces of the anarchic structure there are certain 72 implementations and mechanisms that allow for some scope for human rights. 35 But the idealists see these actions within these gaps as a sign that the structure will endure international cooperation on human rights. However, the idealists fail to admit the fact that cooperation itself is highly political as it takes into account other military and economic factors which can be utilised to decrease another state’s relative capability. Joseph Grieco points this out succinctly when he argues: States seek to prevent increases in others’ relative capabilities. As a result, states always assess their performances in any relationship in terms of the performance of others. Thus, I suggest that the states are positional, not atomistic, in character. Most significant, state positionality ma y constrain the willingness of states to cooperate. States fear that their partners will achieve relative greater gains; that, as a result, the partners will surge ahead of them in relative capabilities; and, finally, that their increasingly powerful partners in the present could become all the more formidable foes at some point in the future. 36 Australia’s apparently quiet diplomacy with Myanmar, China and Indonesia with regard to serious human rights abuses has shown that Australia’s foreign policy beha viour is congruous with the international anarchic order. In both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, Australia’s foreign policy has shown that security primarily is concerned with military and economic issues. Even though the post-Cold War era heralded a hope of a ‘New World Order’ of human rights, Australia has continued to maintain and improve its military and economic relations with Asia. East Asia’s tremendous economic growth from the 1980s till 1997 and its increasing military capabilities forced Australia to react accordingly in the international structure. Likewise Asian states are against any sort of human rights dialogue with Australia. It is not in the interests of the Asian states to engage in human rights dialogue which they claim is skewed towards a western understanding of the term. Therefore, in engaging with 73 Australia on human rights issues, Asian states inevitably offer the power leverage towards Australia. Asian states will not in the scheme of events in the international structure offer Australia an upper hand in their relations with respect to human rights. There will always be rhetoric and counter rhetoric by both sides on human rights. However, relationships between Asian states and Australia will continue in the traditional mi litary and economic arenas, unless, of course, human rights abuses threaten to break out into war as the case of East Timor’s independence which will be discussed in chapter 4. Australia, in emulating the behaviour of the USA during the Cold War was selective in human rights criticisms. Even though the USA made human rights as an important foreign policy objective under the Clinton administration as part of Clinton’s promise for an ethical foreign policy, Australia could not respond to the superpower’s objectives. Australia tacitly agreed in principle with the USA’s goals of preferring to continue excellent military and economic relationships. However, the anarchic structure also forced Australia to serve its national interests by making sure that human rights issues did not antagonise China which is an emerging superpower and a heavy weight regional player in the Asia Pacific region. China’s adroit diplomatic manoeuvring with other Asian states makes it imperative that Australia’s human rights emphasis differs from that of the USA. 37 Without any doubt Australia’s actions reflect the need to balance the power relationships so that it achieves the military and economic security that is sought after.38 The emphasis idealists put on middle power diplomacy changing the behaviour of states 74 that abuse human rights is overstated.39 Idealists celebrate the middle power roles of Canada, Australia and the Netherlands in promoting human rights at the UN and offering humanitarian aid to civilian populations in countries which are in political turmoil. 40 The case of East Timor and Australia’s INTERFET forces are a case in point. However, there has been no concrete evidence that their middle power status have released them from the anarchic structure to pursue human rights independently from other foreign policy objectives. The rhetoric articulated about human rights brings about embarrassment for certain governments. Middle powers have been in the forefront of international norm building for human rights. However, in real terms middle powers do not have enough political muscle to bring about the necessary changes in other countries. China and the rest of Asia are also not too worried about these charges because they understand the quotient of power in international affairs and know that middle powers have limitations in exacting changes. China and the rest of Asia, according to the realists, know that middle powers will not breach the unwritten rules in the international anarchic structure. In the case of Australia, unlike Canada or the Netherlands, its geographic location puts it seriously at a disadvantage in articulating human rights abuses in Asia. Canada and the Netherlands are strategically placed in an area that would be defined as human rights ‘friendly’ regions. Australia, on the other hand, is placed in an area where the civil and political liberties of its Asian neighbours are not as open as those that are in the region of the Netherlands and Canada. Its middle power status has not produced the necessar y results to match its idealist notions of human rights in Asia. The structural constraints of military and economic security inhibit human rights diplomacy with Asia. The reality of 75 the international structure in any case halts Australia’s middle power role in human rights vis-à-vis Asia. It is in this sense, that Andrew Mack’s 1993 paper can be said to have appropriately conceptualised the reality of Australia’s relations with the external world with regards to human rights. 41 He asserts that there are ‘good reasons for keeping human rights and security-as-prevention-of-war agendas separate for analytic and policy purposes.’ 42 This issue will be further explored in the East Timor issue in the next chapter. He also contends that the concept of security which embraces human rights would be rejected by many governments as unwarranted interference in their domestic affairs. 43 It is important, as the realists contend, for Australian policy makers to concentrate on reducing the risks of interstate wars rather than allow human rights to complicate the real issues which are military and economic security. In the international structure, there is no analytic or policy utility of redefining security to include human rights as there already exists numerous complications. Mack’s contribution has certainly shown that Australia will not be able to reconcile human rights with its other more pressing military and economic objectives with Asia. Human rights have to be on a different track so as to not disturb the balance of power. However, it is a track that will also find it difficult to yield results. This can be seen when we read between the lines of Gareth Evans’ remarks who understands the power of realism in world politics when he argues that, “we must take into account the full range of Australia’s national interests when deciding to approach a particular human rights issue-but the choice is not whether to act, but how to act.’44 In deciding how to act, Australia ultimately acts to guarantee that human rights is sues do not undermine its 76 military and economic objectives. Idealists have underestimated the anarchic structure of world politics. Human rights as a concept is still a contested idea in the international system and cannot override the traditional paradigms of military and economic power for states. In the case of Australia’s relationship with Asia the structure inhibits any discourse on human rights. The power of realism in the international system prevails over the security of the individual. Australia is limited by the international anarchic structure and in ending this part of the chapter, Ann Kent’s thoughts are an excellent point of departure. She argues: Thus, the selectivity and particularistic interpretation of human rights in international practice is demonstrated in relation to choice of issue and choice of targets, and is reflected in the priority of states over those of individuals. It is also clear that the decision of individual states to take a stand on human rights abuses elsewhere depends very much on domestic strategic and economic considerations, and on whether support for multilateral action can be mobilised from within the international community to remove from states the moral onus of unilateral response. As the Australian government’s differential treatment of recent civil rights abuses in Myanmar, China and East Timor would suggest, official concern with human rights is normally translated into government action when all other considerations are equal, or when a strategic consideration gives weight to the ethical argument. And despite the general belief that human, or at least civil, rights issues are becoming more important in world affairs, the comprehensive peace settlement for Cambodia which includes continued representation of the Khmer Rouge, is hardly suggestive of the triumph of human rights over realpolitik.45 Kent’s argument highlights the triumph of realism where wise policy makers or diplomats are not moved by sentiment but as Forsythe opines, ‘by hard headed calculations of power and security.’ 46 Wise foreign policy making for a middle power like Australia must put security interests above any sentimental reaction to human sufferings. If diplomats are not careful and put too much emphasis on their sentiments then the policy outcomes would be distorted and not reach their maximum utility. For the realists, an overemphasis on human rights creates distortions and tensions between states. 77 Cultural Capabilities and the Power of Exclusion A defining feature of world politics in the post-Cold War era, especially after September 11, is the rise of cultural identities in shaping the way nation-states interact with each other. The manner in which states define their cultural commonalities and differences shapes the interests, antagonisms, and associations of states. 47 The bloody conflict in Yugoslavia and Rwanda are examples of how cultural identities and differences have resulted in wars. This is not to claim that culture is the determining factor in relations between states in the post-Cold War era. However, the ability of elites to mobilise culture as an instrument of power politics must be identified as a growing significance in world politics. Vaclav Havel reinforces this point when he claims that, “cultural conflicts are increasing and are more dangerous today than at any time in history.”48 The cultural capabilities of states are beginning to be of significance in the international anarchic structure. The USA is the sole superpower in post-Cold War international affairs. Its military and economic capabilities still warrant the status it beholds. However, the modernisation of non-western economies means that they are able to expand their military and economic power. They are also able to mobilise cultural nationa lism as a resistance to the USA’s or to the West’s attempts to assert their values to protect their own interests. In this sense, the interaction of power and culture as a central axis in post-Cold war politics locates the nature of relationships between states on the basis of cultural commonalties and differences. 49 In fact, non-western states are using culture as a means to ward off the influence of soft power utilised by western states. 78 In this context, human rights are seen by non-western countries as an agent for the West to maintain a cultural hegemony. 50 The Asian states have in part reasserted their ‘Asian values’ as a counter strategy to the West, specifically the USA, which reflects the growing confidence of their economic security. 51 This phenomenon resulted due to the intensification of competition between China and the USA that has resulted in the polarisation of human rights between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’.52 Asia has seen the practical value in deploying cultural relativist arguments in human rights as a sound defence against Western assertions of human rights abuses.53 The claim that Western human rights perspectives are a neo-colonialist project to thwart the development of Asian states has popular appeal within the domestic constituencies. 54 Even Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) within Asia admit the importance of cultural relativism of human rights and the NGOs are also critical of Western standards of human rights.55 At this point, it is important to note that the cultural arguments put up by the Asian states to defend their position does not mean that human rights abuses are non-existent in these states. I agree with commentators that argue that the ‘Asian values’ debate masks human rights abuses in the Southeast Asian region. 56 I also concur with the argument that the ‘Asian values debate’ is ideologically a conservative apparatus to counter the effects of liberalism. 57 However, what these commentators fail to see is that in terms of power politics, the value of cultural arguments tilts the balance of power towards Asia. However, this power differential evaporated with the onset of the Asian financial crisis where too much deference to the state and its apparatus had created corruption and 79 cronyism. The gatekeepers of ‘Asian Values’ were deafening in their silence but they avoided the issue of democracy and human rights preferring to substitute ‘good governance’ for ‘Asian Values’. 58 However, as the Asian states were able to control information through the media, the power to control culture as a tool for political mobilisation and enhancing positive public opinion remained entirely within state purview. “Power”, according to Huntington, “is shifting from the long predominant West to non-Western civilisations.” 59 Within the international anarchic structure, governing elites of the state have the legitimacy and apparatus to control the cultural discourse within their territory. In this sense, the question is not whether the values are real, rather the power it harnesses in defending its sovereignty. When Western nations criticise human rights abuses in Asia, three responses are made by the Asian states. First, the memory of colonialism is reactivated to use history as a source to affirm the possibility that Western nations want to continue dominating the region. Human rights are, according to Asian elites, a recipe for stagnation and poverty. Second, human rights undermine the religious and cultural affinities of the Asian states whose sovereignty is dependent on culture and religion. 60 Third, Western nations are hypocritical because they do not practice what they preach in their home countries. All these have the effect of mobilising majority support within the territory against any outside interference of its cultural system. Michael Wesley clearly indicates the power of culture when he argues: The manner in which cultural similarity and difference is raised and the characteristics emphasised is often determined by the political goals set; most often culture is used as a powerful social mobiliser for chauvinistic unity against outsiders. Culture is also a powerful means of asserting the legitimacy of a particular political order against contending internal definitions because other definitions do not appear to resonate with certain cultural “givens.”61 80 Australia has found Asia’s politicisation of cultural discourses problematic. This is because the Australians fear that Asian states might not want to include Australia as an important regional partner in the internal decision making process of APEC and ASEM. Australia was not invited to the first ASEM. 62 Also the history of diplomatic friction between Malaysia and Australia has meant that Malaysia will be eager to use its veto powers to exclude Australia from the internal decision making process of military and economic engagement. Mahathir has not hidden his displeasure with Australia and claims that the cultural heritage of Australia is reason enough for it to be excluded from the region. 63 Even prior to his retirement in October 2003, Mahathir has attacked John Howard as an American “sheriff” of the region and believes Australia has no place in Asia and ASEAN.64 There is an inescapable tension in relations between Australia and Asia. On one hand, Asian states view Australia as an important strategic and economic partner. On the other hand, it is less attracted to Australia’s different cultural system. Asian leaders and policy makers believe that eventually cultural differences will complicate decision-making processes and human rights will be a difficult issue to resolve. In this sense, Asia’s suspicion of Australia is very similar to its suspicion of modernity. It wants to reap the economic benefits and the technology modernity has to offer. However, Asia rejects the philosophical and intellectual values, such as individualism, universalism and equality, which are equally the heritage of modernity. 65 These values are closely associated with Australia’s conceptualisation of human rights. Hence, the difficulty for Australia to debate and discuss the subject of human rights with the Asian states. 81 The resources Australia has put into its military and economic engagement with Asia over the past thirty years means that there is no room for regression. Australia understands that within the structure of the international system its military and economic security is tied up with its closest geographic neighbours. Being excluded from any serious decision making process from the region would prove disastrous for Australia. In this sense, Australia must be seen to be a ‘cultural ally’ of Asia. Australia must be sensitive to the political systems in the region and must adopt the ‘Asian way’ of consensus and accommodation. This means that human rights issues are under the jurisdiction of national governments and that Australia should follow the same behaviour as other Asian states of not interfering in another country’s domestic affairs. Even though Fitzgerald argues that human rights are non-negotiable in its engagement with Asia, the combination of the anarchic structure and Asia’s cultural capabilities limits Australia’s human rights diplomacy with the region. 66 Australia definitely wants to be a ‘good international citizen’ but the reality of the situation with regards to Asia forces it to adjust to being a ‘good neighbour’. Conclusion The nature of the international anarchic structure forces states to compete with each other for survival. This phenomenon continues in the post-Cold war era and states try to empower themselves by improving their military and economic capabilities. In trying to balance power among competing states, the international structure maintains security in terms of the military and economic paradigm. The security of the individual, even though 82 protected by the UDHR, is in reality, subservient to the security of the state. Australia, as a middle power, cannot be an effective manager of human rights in world politics and has serious limitations in its human rights diplomacy with Asia. The rise of cultural relativist arguments within Asia further impedes any Australian initiative to bring about changes in human rights abuses. Waltz, K.N., Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Philippines, 1979, p.99. For an idealist viewpoint see Haftendorn, H., ‘The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline Building in International Security’ in International Studies Quarterly, Vol.35 No. 1, March 1991, pp.3-17. Also see Makinda, S., ‘Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges for the United Nations’ in Global Governance, 1996, pp.149-168. Also see Rothschild, E., ‘What is Security?’ in Daedalus, Vol.124, No.2, Summer 1995, pp.55-98. For a realist account see Buzan, B., ‘Is international security possible?’, in Ken Booth (ed) New Thinking about Strategy and International Security, Harper Collins, London, 1991, pp. 31-55. 3 Mack, A., Concepts of Security in the Post-Cold War, Working Paper 1993/8, Department of International Relations, RSPAS, Australian National University, Canberra, 1993. 4 Buzan, B., ‘Is international security possible?’, p.31. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid, p.32. 7 Ibid. 8 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, p. 128. 9 Buzan, B., ‘Is international security possible?’, p.32. 10 Wallerstein, I., ‘The rise and future demise of the world capitalist system’ in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.16, No.4, pp.387-415. 11 Buzan, B., ‘Is international security possible?’, p.33. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, pp.76, 128. 15 Ibid. 16 Buzan, B., ‘Is international security possible?’, p.33. 17 Dahl, R., ‘The concept of power’ in Behavioral Science, Vol.2, July, 1957. 18 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, p.190. Also see Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, pp.53-90. 19 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, p.190. 20 Ibid. 21 Levy, J.S., ‘Long Cycles, Hegemonic Transitions, and the Long Peace’ in Charles W. Kegley (ed), The Long Postwar Peace, Harper Collins, New York, 1991, p.148. 22 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, p.76. 23 Holsti, K.J., ‘Power, Capability and Influence in International Politics’ in Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf (eds) The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives, McGraw Hill, New York, 1995, 4th edition, p. 23. 24 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, p.122. 25 Ibid, p.193. 26 Buzan, B., ‘Is international security possible?’, p.34. 27 Makinda, S., ‘Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges for the United Nations’, p.155. 1 2 83 28 Vincent, R.J., ‘Introduction’ in R.J. Vincent (ed), Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Issues and Responses, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.1. 29 Ibid, p.2. 30 Vincent, R.J., Human Rights and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p.129. 31 Forsythe, D., Human Rights and Peace, p.7. 32 Ibid. 33 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, p.210. 34 Evans, G., Australia’s Foreign Relations, p.42. 35 Vincent, R.J., Human Rights and International Relations, p.25. 36 Grieco, J.M., ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’ in Controversies in International Relations, p. 161. 37 Cheng, E., ‘What's behind Howard's drive for an FTA with China’ in Green Left Weekly, Issue No. 559, 29 Oct. 2003 accessed at http://www.greenleft.org.au/ on 2 Nov. 2003 38 Ibid. 39 See A.F. Cooper, R.A. Higgot and K. R. Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1993. Also see Baehr, P.R., The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy, Macmillan, London, 1994. 40 Keenleyside, T., “The Western approach to Human Rights In Foreign Policy with Special reference to Canada’ in Hasan, A., (ed), Human Rights Dilemmas in Contemporary Times, Austin and Winfield, Boston, 1998, pp.135-170. 41 Mack, A., Concepts of Security in the Post-Cold War, Working Paper 1993/8, Department to International relations, RSPAS, Australian National University, Canberra, 1993. 42 Ibid, p.2. 43 Ibid. 44 Evans, G., Australia’s Foreign Relations, p. 43. 45 Kent, A., ‘The limits of ethics in international politics: the international human rights regime’ in Asian Studies Review, Vol. 16, No.1, July 1992, p. 34. 46 Forsythe, D., Human Rights in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p.48. 47 Huntington, S., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996, p.29. 48 Cited in Huntington, S., The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, p.28. 49 Ibid, p. 29. 50 Chan, J., ‘The Asian Challenge to Universal Human Rights: A Philosophical Appraisal’ in Human Rights and International Relations, pp.25-26. 51 Mauzy, D., ‘The huma n rights and Asian values debate in Southeast Asia: trying to clarify the key issues’, in The Pacific Review, Vol.10, No.2, 1997, p.212. 52 Ming Wan, ‘Human Rights and Sino-US relations: policies and changing realities’ in The Pacific Review, Vol.10, No. 2, 1997, p.238. 53 See Mahbubani, K., ‘The Pacific Way’ in Foreign Affairs, Vol.74, No.1, Jan/Feb 1995. Also see Zakaria, F., ‘Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew’ in Foreign Affairs, Vol.73, No.2, Mar/Apr 1994. 54 Mauzy, D., ‘The human rights and Asian values debate’, p. 215. 55 Muzaffar, C., Human Rights and the New World Order , Just World Trust, Penang, 1993, p.15. 56 Mendes, E.P., Asian Values and Human Rights: Letting the Tigers Free, Human Rights Research and Education Centre, University of Ottawa, Canada, 1996. 57 Garry Rodan and Kevin Hewison, ‘A clash of cultures or the convergence of political ideology?’ in Richard Robison (ed), Pathways to Asia: The Politics of Engagement , Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, NSW, 1996. Also see Jayasuriya, K., ‘Asian Values as Reactionary Modernisation’ in NIASnytt, December 1997. 58 Thompson, M., ‘Whatever Happened to “Asian Values”?’ in Journal of Democracy , Vol.12, No.4, October 2001, pp.154-165. 59 Huntington, S., The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, p.29. 60 Vatikiotis, M.R., Political Change in Southeast Asia, Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 56-81. 61 Wesley, M., ‘The Politics of Exclusion: Australia, Turkey and definitions of regionalism’ in The Pacific 84 Review, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1997, p.535. 62 Ibid, p.541. 63 Ibid, p.539. 64 Kearney, S., and Silmalis, L., ‘Mahathir slams ‘sheriff’ Howard’ in The Mercury News, Queensland, 19 October 2003 accessed on www.news.com.au on 20 October 2003. 65 Jayasuriya, K., ‘Asian Values as Reactionary Modernisation’, p.26. 66 Fitzgerald, S., Is Australia an Asian Country?, p. 176. 85 [...]... human rights in Australian foreign policy In chapter 1 of this thesis, I examine the contemporary theoretical human rights issues and also discuss the ontological and epistemological issues of human rights I will then move on to discuss the nature of human rights in foreign policy and then analyse the various types of human rights logics and their functions in the arena of world politics By analysing... contemporary human rights literature which is a useful starting base for the thesis In chapter 2, I attempt to identify the origins and role of idealism in Australian foreign policy and then move on to discuss how human rights issues are being propagated by the neo- idealists in Australian foreign policy After the Cold War, the neo- idealists were eager to establish its vision of human rights in Australian foreign. .. realists, despite being able to negate the idealists’ construction of human rights in Australian foreign policy, do not sufficiently explain why Australia still continues with human rights diplomacy It is in the next two chapters underlying motivations of human rights in Australian foreign policy are discussed In chapter 4, the main aim is to study the worldview of John Howard and his relationship with... practises human rights provide another window of understanding human rights in Australian foreign policy This chapter analyses the realist/idealist dichotomy by studying the East Timor issue, the human rights issues associated with the asylum seekers, and lastly observes how Australia reacts to human rights abuses in both Myanmar and Zimbabwe In examining these issues and with Howard’s worldview in the... would provide a referent point for the mechanics of human rights in Australian Foreign Policy Narrating the Human Rights Discourse The idea of human rights is not only a subject that chases controversy but is encompassed by it It is a term scrutinised not only in the disciplines of the social sciences but also in law, medicine and business studies As much as having an emancipating effect for seekers of... of human rights and also see the outcome of the interplay between domestic and international forces having an impact in the understanding of human rights in Australian foreign policy The process offers us a superior range of understanding human rights Nevertheless, such analysis might not give victims of human rights abuses joy as what they need is urgent and practical help However, the project of human. .. foreign policy and I will show how they attempt to paint their human rights outcomes as idealist in nature without explaining the process itself In chapter 3, from a realist perspective, I will explain why Australia’s human rights diplomacy in world politics remains problematic It will demonstrate that the analysis of 6 the idealists does not portray an accurate picture of Australian human rights diplomacy. .. world to dominate international society On the other hand, the plethora of human rights groups in the nonWestern world seems to underline that the language of human rights is not necessarily a monolithic discourse coming out of the West.6 The foundations of human rights need to be explored primarily to decipher its influence in world politics Any foreign policy study of a state’s human rights diplomacy. .. results can be analysed in the “currents of thought” approach in the next chapter In the final chapter, I highlight the importance of using the “currents of thought” process in analysing Australian foreign policy and show how it can help in understanding the motivations that influence policy outcomes, and show why certain decisions were made 7 In highlighting the Traditionalist, Internationalist and Seclusionist... constructed human rights platforms In his analysis, he outlines six logics that would be discussed here The reason for Falk to analyse human rights in this way is to understand the tension between normative aspiration of human rights enforcement laws and political constraints in relation to the actual protection of human rights in world politics vis-à-vis foreign policies In depicting this tension, Falk intends ... as to how to conduct foreign policy or how to find solutions to daily problems of human rights in foreign policy In this sense, viewing human rights in Australian foreign policy with the lenses... rights in Australian foreign policy, not sufficiently explain why Australia still continues with human rights diplomacy It is in the next two chapters underlying motivations of human rights in Australian. .. searching for a more wholesome and less rigid way of analysing human rights in Australian foreign policy In this thesis it is argued that the realist/idealist dichotomy of describing human rights diplomacy