The diplomatic worldviews of siam and vietnam in the pre colonial period (1780s 1850s 2

The diplomatic relationship between Siam under the Chakri dynasty and Vietnam under the Nguyễn dynasty illustrate the shift of bilateral relations from friendship to antagonism, especial

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This work is a political and cultural history of the bilateral relations between the Siamese and Vietnamese courts from the 1780s to the 1850s Through the examination of the diplomatic worldviews and outlooks of the respective courts, this work demonstrates how the Siamese and Vietnamese’s similar views towards interstate relations affected their interactions Their approach to diplomatic relations with other countries largely followed a culturally hierarchical pattern - between a superior and an inferior Both courts defined themselves as a central and powerful state dominating other small surrounding states However, their diplomatic relationship was the only exception to this conceptualization of their geopolitical centrality, as Siam and Vietnam both regarded and approached each other as equal great kingdoms This was contemplatable in principle, but hardly realizable in practice Siam and Vietnam struggled with this special arrangement because they both had never treated any other foreign states as their equal Siam and Vietnam maintained this diplomatic relationship and understanding with great difficulty, especially when it came to issues pertaining to the Cambodian and Lao kingdoms that became the peripheries to the two states competing to be the center of the region

The rise of powerful dynasties in Southeast Asia brought about interactions among different societies with different kinds of politics and cultures, each desiring to

expand its territory to guarantee its overlordship of its region The prosperious dynasties established states and strengthened their claims to authority and sovereignty These states tried to demonstrate their power and grandeur through establishing formal politics and luxurious court ceremonies; as Clifford Geertz commented, “Power serves pomp, not pomp power.”1 Due to their contrasting levels

of political and economic power, the states in Southeast Asia developed different interstate relationships, between the big states seeking to counter-balance one another, and between suzerainties and tributaries

The diplomatic relationship between Siam under the Chakri dynasty and Vietnam under the Nguyễn dynasty illustrate the shift of bilateral relations from friendship to antagonism, especially between the 1780s and the 1850s Diplomatically, the relations between Bangkok and Huế were not only affected by their direct interaction but also

by the competition to gain influence over neighboring states, in particular the Cambodian and Lao kingdoms, through different political and cultural policies The two states were competitors striving to be the overlord of the region

A people’s worldview, as a collectively-held set of understandings and beliefs, was a vital factor in shaping interstate diplomacy and determining the shifts in the character

of the relationship between Siam and Vietnam The two societies hailed from different cultural backgrounds – Indian cultural influences shaped Siamese worldviews while China was a powerful influence on Vietnam These divergent influences contributed to the Siamese and Vietnamese conceptualization of their identities and became the basis of each state’s cultural expansion and political

1 Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton,

N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), p 13

formation However, their worldviews were similar in spite of their differing cultural backgrounds and this similarity in turn led to diplomatic conflicts, which escalated to military confrontation in some instances Despite the cultural differences, both thought that they were the center and the most powerful state in the region Additionally, they saw themselves as more superior to others They acted like a superior and treated others like inferiors; these were fundamentally based on their own cultural identities

The Siamese and Vietnamese concepts of statehood and kingship

The conceptions of statehood fundamentally affected the relationship between the Siamese and Vietnamese courts Politically, both Siam and Vietnam held cosmological beliefs that defined their respective states as the center of the region Stanley Tambiah’s concept of “galactic polity” aptly explains how the Siamese state managed itself and the other cities that were directly and indirectly under its control.2Within this conception, Siam formed the center to which the other states related to as

satellites The layout of the state consisted of the center (ratchathani or muang

luang), the different layers of encircling provinces (muang or hua-muang), and

vassals (muang prathetsarat) In the case of Vietnam, the Nguyễn court held Sinic

culture as paramount and readily adopted and applied the imperial system, institutional practices and arrangements modeled after the Chinese court and the Lê court of Vietnam.3 Vietnam as was conceived as a culturally civilized state and central

2 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of

Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1976), p 48

3 Alexander B Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of

Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century

kingdom surrounded by barbarians who had to send periodic royal tribute and envoys

in acknowledgement of and homage of Vietnamese power.4 Domestically, both the Chakri and the Nguyễn courts established formal court rituals, social systems, political adminstrations, and luxurious ceremonies and performances to demonstrate their power and greatness With respect to external affairs, they exercised tributary expansionism towards the neighboring states

Geopolitically, Siam and Vietnam did not consider their vassals as directly controlled parts of their kingdoms but rather construed them less tangibly as territories under their “sphere of influence”, to use a modern-day concept Both countries counted

Cambodia and Lao kingdoms as their dependent vassals, “muang khun” (in Thai) and

“thuộc quốc” (in Vietnamese) However, neither Siam nor Vietnam could claim to be

the single supreme power in the region and exercise absolute dominance over the other territories that could absolutely control expanded territories This led to the complex balancing of the influence of the two powers over the region and consequently affected their diplomacy.5

The conception of kingship centered on the correlation between the ideology of the state and the status of the ruler A ruler with charisma was required for the existence

of a prosperous state Both Siam and Vietnam considered their ruler as the embodiment of the state The ruler was the state and vice versa The Siamese Chakri

Kings were imagined as the “Universal sovereign (Cakravartin)”, and the“Righteous

(Cambridge (Massachusetts): Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1988), p 253

4 Ibid., p 235

5

Klaus Wenk, The Restoration of Thailand under Rama I, 1782-1890 (Tucson: The

University of Arizona Press, 1968), p 110

King (Dhammaracha)”, the latter a concept from Theravada Buddhism The Nguyễn

Emperors of Vietnam were seen as “the charismatic Sino-Vietnamese Son of Heaven

(Thiên tử).’6 These conceptions of state and kingship in turn informed their diplomatic

worldviews and approaches, and their relationship with their perceived vassals

In the early Bangkok period, the King of Siam seriously focused on perpetuating and

welding together the concepts of Cakravartin and Bodhisattva in order to legitimize

the court’s authority, and expand the circle of vassalages As the founder of the Chakri Dynasty, Rama I adopted institutional and kingship concepts from Ayudhaya

The concept of universal sovereign or “Cakravartin” originates from Hindu and

Theravada Buddhist teachings which also contain a body of thought about the idea of the greatest king of all kings.7 The Siamese king, as a bodhisattva, blesses his peoples

and subjects with peace, happiness and fertility The teachings encompassed the code

of righteous kingship in conducting world affairs.8 To attaining the dignity of the universal sovereign, the king needs to be the King of Righteousness, and adhere to the ten virtues, including alms giving, morality, liberality, rectitude, gentleness, self-restriction, non-anger, non-violence, forbearance, and non-obstruction.9 Although the king had supreme authority over the life and death of his peoples and subjects, the Buddhist kingly virtues prescribed the manner in which he was to exercise his power

6

Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, p 255

7 Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer, pp 102-111

8

George Coedès, The Making of South East Asia (London: Routledge & K Paul,

1966), pp 220-221 and Sunait Chutintaranond, “Cakravartin: The Ideology of Traditional Warfare in Siam and Burma, 1548-1605” (Cornell University, Ph.D thesis, 1990), p 7

9 Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period,

1782-1873 (New York: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies,

Cornell University, 1969), pp 41-42

In Vietnam, the Nguyễn emperors adopted of the Confucian ideologies that posited the great ruler as the Son of Heaven with a divine mandate to govern Gia Long, as founder of the Nguyễn Dynasty, sought to model the glorious Lê dynasty of the fifteenth century in using the Chinese model of administrative management The

Nguyễn emperor idealized the emperor’s “passive moral rectitude (vô vi nhi trị)” as

the basis of his legitimacy to rule.10 Similar to the other previous Vietnamese dynasties, the Huế court adopted Confucianism in the Vietnamese court and society

by extolling three cardinal bonds (tam cương) – ruler and subject, father and son, and husband and wife It also promoted the five constant virtues (ngũ thường) of

Confucian ethics – benevolence, righteousness, proprieties, wisdom, and fidelity – as

a basis for living.11 These ideas were not unique to the Nguyễn court According to Confucian ethics, subjects had to obey the king just as children had to obey their father The Vietnamese emperor had, in theory, absolute power over his state However, no emperor really forced these values completely on his subjects In practice, he had to engage or contend with the opinions of others like his court officials or subjects, especially since he portayed himself as a compassionate and benevolent ruler

Genearally speaking, Siamese kings and Vietnamese emperors, therefore, possessed the right and power to make major state decisions The rulers took on roles as a father and a protector to the people, as well as the most powerful person in the kingdom They claimed overlordship over the people of their states, and their vassals who were under their protection Thus, both courts actively exerted a paternalistic sphere of

10

Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, p 253

11 Trần Trọng Kim, Việt Nam Sử Lược (A Historical Summary of Vietnam) (Hanoi:

Culture and Information Publishing House, 2008), p 461

influence over their vassals

Worldviews: the creation of ‘selfness’ and the differentiation of ‘otherness’

“Weltanschauung”, or worldview, signifies ideas and beliefs, a singular interpretation

of the internal and external world, shaping notions of the ‘self’ and ‘other’ and the interactions of these two.12 Worldview defines the self, determining the boundaries of

“who and what I am.”13 It also shapes the ‘non-self’ or the ‘other’, as things which are not the self The worldview is expressed and manifested through cultural ideas such as cosmology, philosophy, ethics, religion, ritual, customs and cultural practice.14 It influences the response of ‘self’ to ‘others’ and prescribes behaviors The ruler and

ruling elite’s worldview effectively become the worldview of the whole state and

influence its diplomatic relationship with other states The ruling elite played the main role in creating hegemony over other states This study approaches Siam-Vietnam relations from the lens of their “diplomatic worldviews”, encapsulated in the ways the two states, based on their cosmological and ideological backgrounds, defined their own identity, in order to show and exert supremacy, while differentiating the other as

dissimilar or inferior

The Siamese and Vietnamese courts’ conceptions of their identities mainly depended upon political and cultural elements that originated from their ideological and

April 1, 1989), 2

14

Ibid., 1-3

cosmological background Cultural influences from India and China formed and

evolved different cultures in Siam and Vietnam The Siamese state was Indianized

while the Vietnamese state was Sinicized The Indianization of Siam was only indirect, as the Siamese never had direct contact with India Instead, they received

Indian culture through Angkor, and even the Mon and Burmese peoples

Chinese and Indian influences shaped various facets of Siamese and Vietnamese politics, culture and society, including religion, language, self-knowledge and identity, rituals and cultural practices, and political and cultural policies These facets were crucial to the formation of relationships and understandings between the two

courts, and between each court and their respective vassal states

The cultural dimension of how states interpreted their position and identity vis-à-vis other states deserves highlighting It shaped and guided the foreign policy worldviews

of the two powerful states Hevia's study about the differences in court rituals and cultural practices between China and England is applicable to the case of Siam and Vietnam Hevia argues the courts’ ritual practices served as their own customary ways

to assert superior-inferior relations between the Chinese Emperor and the King of

England’s representative.15 These cultural productions, therefore, may well explain Siamese and Vietnamese relations too

The court ceremony, rituals and protocol that were followed during Vietnamese diplomatic encounters were meaningful as they indicated the status the two states accorded each other As Hevia notes, “the ceremonial encounters between

15

James L Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney

Embassy of 1793 (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995), pp 169-170

the head of one state and the ambassador of another became the primary site for the mutual recognition of sovereign equality.”16 Even as the Siamese and Vietnamese courts interacted with each others as equals, it was scarcely possible to manifest this conceived equality in practice as the traditional rituals of the two courts were designed solely to perform superior-inferior hierarichal relationship

The different ritual processes involved in the audiences between the Siamese and Vietnamese court and their respective ambassadors is also a crucial issue to be discussed in terms of the problem of the different interpretation of cultural practices These included the exchange of gifts and tribute from the royal courts, which held significant political and diplomatic meanings and symbolisms For instance, as part of the ritual process to prepare for an audience with the Vietnamese emperor, the Siamese embassy had to check the royal letters and wrap the presents in accordance to the correct protocol and form for three days, and also wear Vietnamese dress Similarly, for the Vietnamese envoys’ audiences with the Siamese King, they had to follow the Siamese ritual process

Furthermore, the cultural diplomacy practiced by both the Siamese and Vietnamese courts illustrated their changing worldviews and diplomatic relationships with other states Their rites were a powerful method of crystallizing the status and nature of a relationship with a foreign state.17 While the two suzerain states treated each other equally, they did not treat their subject states with similar protocol In his study on the British Empire, David Cannadine suggests the term “ornamentalism”.18 Although this

concept was applied within the context of colonialism, it also applies to the old form

of overlords-vassals relations in Southeast Asia The suzerain states claimed their mastery over the vassal states or tributaries through various kinds of practices and rituals that symbolized overlordship, for example the conferment of decorations, insignia, regalia, and the organization of coronation ceremonies, and court ritual practices Both of the Bangkok and Huế courts practiced these with their tributaries or their supporters, for example by organizing the coronations of the Cambodian and Laotian kings, establishing a king’s succession, and conferring titles on princes or ruling families The courts required the representatives of subordinate states to perform the ‘kowtow’ or prostration They received tributes from the Cambodia and Lao kingdoms These tributes symbolized the vassals’ declaration of fealty and signified their acknowledgement of their subordinate status

Religion also played an important role in the courts’ differentiation of themselves from the outside world The Siamese differentiated themselves from the other peoples

by evaluating the latter via the yardstick of Theravada Buddhism They portrayed other religions as wrong because these religions did not follow the laws of Dharma In the same way, the Vietnamese court considered itself a civilized Sino-Vietnamese

kingdom that followed Confucianism Other religions, therefore, were heterodox (tà

giáo, tà đạo) in the eyes of the Vietnamese court.19

When Siam and Vietnam competed for overlordship over Cambodia, the influence of their worldviews led to different diplomatic strategies, particularly pertaining to cultural policy and propaganda such as propaganda letters or messages The Chakri Oxford University Press, 2001)

19 This perception did not apply to all Buddhists, but specifically to Theravada Buddhists because they were not Confucianized or Sinicized

court preferred to use cultural strategies to ensure that their tributaries’ Indianized local culture, in particular Buddhism, was preserved The Nguyễn court conversely tried to integrate Vietnamese cultural practices into Cambodian royal culture For instance, the Vietnamese mandated that the Cambodian court should follow the

Vietnamese dressing style and model its court ceremonies after the Vietnamese

These worldviews and cultural perceptions of both states might raise the question of how we could compare the Siamese and the Vietnamese’s mentalities with regards to their bilateral relations with each other and with their Cambodian and Lao vassals The Siamese and the Vietnamese conceived of and imagined their empire hierarchically They viewed their own system as superior and dominant, and that of the other states as inferior and subordinate.20 The cultural differences and the different interpretation of court rituals, therefore, were part of the main factors leading to

clashes between the two courts

Tributary expansionism in the Cambodia and Lao kingdoms

Both the Chakri and the Nguyễn courts resorted to the tributary system as a major political mechanism to assert supremacy The Cambodia and Lao kingdoms had always posed important diplomatic issues The two territories were obstacles in the relationship between Bangkok and Huế The bilateral relations between Siam and Vietnam were initially troubled by their respective interest in territorial expansion The internal situations in Cambodia and Lao kingdoms further complicated the intense competition between Siam and Vietnam

20 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, p 5

From the eighteenth century however, Siam and Vietnam expanded their influence over the territory of the Lao kingdoms, when the kingdom of Lan Xang (Millions of elephants) broke up into three states, Louang Phrabang, Vientiane and Champasak When the Ayudhya dynasty of Siam was weakened by an invasion from Burma in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Nguyễn lords took the opportunity to claim their supremacy over these states In 1768, Taksin was able to restore Siam’s independence from Burma, and he went on to recover all of the vassals from the Ayudhya period, including the three states that previously made up the Lan Xang kingdom, which was then officially a Siamese vassal under the Ayudhya dynasty In

1776, Taksin sent troops to Champasak to compel it to acknowledge Siamese suzerainty and the southern Lao kingdom finally came under Siamese influence In

1778, another Siamese expedition was sent to take Vientiane Because of the conflict with Vientiane, Luang Phrabang also pledged loyalty to the Siamese monarchs, and Siam was able to reclaim overlordship over the two kingdoms From 1770, the Nguyễn lords in Vietnam lost their power after the Tây Sơn uprising and Siam was able to succeed in re-asserting their dominance over Laos again

From the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, Cambodia too became a hostage in the power struggles between its two increasingly powerful neighbors Siam and Vietnam each established and supported pro-Siamese and pro-Vietnamese factions in Cambodia During the seventeenth century, the Nguyễn lords finally annexed sizable areas to the west and the south of their territory They continued their expansion through acquiring territorial concessions from marriages between Vietnamese princes and Cambodian princesses The Vietnamese expansion aimed at absorbing Cambodian territory and forcing the indigenous people to accept Vietnamese culture

After its liberation from Burma, Siam under the Taksin regime was able to reassert their dominion over Cambodia Siam quietly annexed Cambodia's provinces (Battambang and Siemreap) and installed Ang Eng (1779-1796) as the Cambodian King From that time onwards, Cambodia became a vassal of both Siam and Vietnam

at the same time

Siam and Vietnam aimed to expand their territories to guarantee their dominance over Cambodia and Laos Both courts saw themselves as an overlord and a protector The result of Siamese and Vietnamese ambitions of regional expansionism led them to view each other as competitors and rivals for supremacy in the region Cambodia and Laos were the victims of the contestation between Siam and Vietnam As David P Chandler, who had studied the history of Cambodia during this period, notes, it was a dark age for Cambodia.21 The Cambodian’s Siamese patrons imposed Theravada Buddhism to “protect” Cambodia from the Vietnamese’s “wrong views” The Vietnamese overlord, similarily, aimed to extend patronage to the Cambodian king and nobility and expand their occupation of Cambodian land, in hope of cultivating Cambodia as a buffer between south Vietnam and Siam.22

In Laos, the revolt by the Vientiane ruler, Anouvong, against Bangkok between 1827 and 1828 troubled the relationship between Siam and Vietnam During the reign of Rama I, Vientiane was under the vassalage of Siam However, when Anouvong started to send tribute to Huế in 1826, his kingdom came under the spheres of influence of both overlords When Anouvong lost to the Siamese troops, he sought

Vietnamese protection As an overlord, the Vietnamese became involved with these developments by claiming that Vientiane was a dependency of the Nguyễn court However, even as Anouvong sought asylum in Vietnam, the Nguyễn court was more interested in preserving peace with Bangkok than in interceding on Anouvong’s behalf.23 This war led to the decline of Vientiane in 1828, which was annexed by Siam because no ruling family could govern it.24

The cultural imperialism that the Bangkok and Huế courts practiced with the Cambodian and Laotian vassals guaranteed their dominant status and preserved their

power Both states imposed their cultural policies over Cambodia and Laos in

different patterns over various periods Their expansion of state sovereignty relied not only on military power, but also, more interestingly, on the idea and belief in cultural supremacy The diplomatic history of Siam and Vietnam reveals that, beyond the conventional understanding that culture serves as an indicator of the stability of existing foreign relations, culture and politics were actually symbiotically inter-

woven This is a fundamental but often ignored dimension

Thai and Vietnamese historiographical perspectives

Within modern Thai and Vietnamese historiography, studies about the relations between Siam and Vietnam have mainly focused on examining the political and diplomatic policies, and military strategies, that mostly related to the problem of Cambodia and Laos On both sides, the deterioration of good relations between the

23

Mayoury Ngaosyvathn and Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn, Paths to Conflagration: Fifty

Years of Diplomacy and Warfare in Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, 1778-1828 (Ithaca,

New York: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 1998), pp

26-29

24

Ibid., p 14

Bangkok and Huế courts resulted from their desire to preserve or expand their dominance over Cambodia and Laos The national historiography of both countries today however tells this story from a nationalistic perspective to serve the respective government’s political purposes – mainly to legitimatize past expansionism

History was important for the Thai government in the stimulation of Thai nationalism Writers produced historical accounts to serve various political needs During Rama V’s reign (1868-1910), the threat of colonialism and the influence of the West, led the government to retro actively map present territory onto the Thai’s historical dominion and commission the creation of national narratives to strengthen the power of the state and monarchy.25 From then on, Thai historical works concentrated on exalting the greatness of the Thai Kingdom in the past They argued that neighboring countries accepted Thai overlordship and, somehow, were geographically a part of the kingdom Particularlly, they emphasized that Cambodia and Laos were dependencies

(muang khun) or protectorates (muang prathetsarat) of the Thai kingdom.26 At the same time, Thai scholarship legitimised the Siamese invasions over Cambodia and Laos as just retribution for their vassals’ betrayal

The Thai textbooks produced between the 1940 and 1960s exemplified the historiography that defended the diplomatic activities of the Thai state A whole generation absorbed the idea that Thailand was just in its inter-states relations The

25 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation

(Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), pp 110-118

26 Chot Mahakhan et al., Tamrakhumue Prawattisat Rieprieng tam Laksut khong

Krasuang Thammakan samrap Matthayom Plai: Buraphaprathet, ton Yuan Khamen Mon Phama (The Historical Textbook following the Course of Ministry of Education for Secondary School: Orient Countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, Mon, Burma)

(Bangkok: Thaikhasem, 1931)

Social Studies (Sangkhom suksa) textbooks for the primary school level students27,

and the history of neighboring countries (Prawatsat Prathet Phuenban) for secondary

schools28, and especially a critical study of textbooks edicted by Warunee Osatharom29 portrayed the history of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam with a strong political bias Furthermore, Manich Jumsai’s work, which is one of the accepted books in the study of Thai history and relevant issues related to Thailand’s interactions with its neighbors, was also written from a strong nationalistic standpoint.30 The narratives about Siam and Vietnam were primarily based on Thai sources and focused on Siamese diplomacy and the relations between Gia Long (called in Thai, Ong Chiang Su) and Rama I For instance, these works argue that the close relationship between Siam and Vietnam deteriorated because of the indecisiveness of the Vietnamese ruler.31 The Vietnamese ruler was obdurate as he interfered with Siamese internal affairs during the Anouvong rebellion and tried to uproot Siamese influence over Cambodia The Cambodian and Lao rulers were purportedly instigated and supported by the Vietnamese court to be disloyal to, and betray, the Siamese kings The Lao kingdoms were also depicted as close relatives of Thailand, in terms of language, religion, and culture The destruction of Vientiane was

27 Krasuang Suksathikan (Ministry of Education), Baeprien Sangkhomsuksa, ton thi 1

thung 2: Raw lae Phuenban khong Raw (Social Studies Textbook, Volume 1-2: We and Our Neighbors (Bangkok: Khrurusapha, 1963)

28 Krasuang Suksathikan(Ministry of Education), Baeprien Sangkhomsuksa Wicha

Prawattisat Chan Matthayomsuksa Pi thi 1 (Social Studies Textbook in History, Secondary School Grade 7) (Bangkok: Khrurusapha, 1961)

29 Warunee Osatharom and Kanchanee La-ongsri (Ed), Lao Hu Yang-Thai Ru Araj:

Wikhraw Beaprean Sangkhom Suksa (Laos and Thailand: What do we learn?: Analysis of Social Historical Textbook) (Bangkok: Five Area Studies Project, 2001)

30 Manich Jumsai, History of Thailand & Cambodia, from the Days of Angkor to the

Present (Bangkok: Chalermnit, 1970)

31 Warunee Osatharom, ‘Beabrean Thai kap Asia Tawan-ok Chieng Tai “Phuenban Khong Raw”, Phapsathon Chetakhati Udomkarn Chatniyom Thai (Thai Textbooks and Southeast Asia “Our Neighbors”, The Reflection of Ideology of Thai

Nationalism)’, in Lao Hu Yang-Thai Ru Araj, pp 6-8

due punishment for the betrayal, as Rama III had already offered a chance for negotiations, but Anouvong, again, used traps to attack Siam.32

Thai academicians, such as Thanom Anamwat33 and Veeranant Vareevichanont34, are more objective with regards to the historiography about the inter-state relations among Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam They attempt to to be unshackled by existing conventional viewpoints, and begin to seek more nuanced and more comprehensive explanations.They claim that Siam, during the reigns of Rama I and Rama II, attempted to compromise with Vietnam on the issue of their overlapping territorial boundaries on many occasions Thanom suggests that Rama III believed that the Huế court attempted to overpower Cambodia with its “silent encroachment policy” Because Siam did not retaliate with physical force, Vietnam’s concern over Siam’s reaction to its effort to expand its power over Cambodia was reduced Veeranant gives a more objective account of the protracted war between Siam and Vietnam from 1833 to 1845 From the viewpoints of both sides, he argues that Siam and Vietnam provoked the war over Cambodia because they aimed to obtain absolute suzerain rights over Cambodia, as well as to secure a buffer state Puangthong Rungswasdisap’s new study35 explains the conflicts through the lens of politics and economics She believes that the ultimate motivation behind the rivalry was the desire

to control the local trade networks in this area Trade and human resources were the basis of Siam’s power and led to Siam’s intervention in Cambodia from 1767 and

32 Ibid., pp 34-35

33 Thanom Anamwat, Khwam Samphan rawang Thai Kamen lae Yuan nai Samai

Rattankosin torn ton (Relations Between Siam, Cambodia, and Vietnam during the

First Part of the Rattanakosin Period) (Bangkok: Khrurusapha Publishing, 1973)

34 Veeranant Vareechanont, “The Importance of the Annamese-Siamese War to Siam, Cambodia and Annam” (Graduate School, Chulalongkorn University, 1970)

35 Rungswasdisab, Puangthong, “War and Trade: Siamese Interventions in Cambodia, 1767-1851” (University of Wollongong, Ph.D thesis, 1995)

1851 Currently, Thai scholarship is on the trend of becoming open, and of taking into account not only Thai primary sources, but also Vietnamese and Cambodian ones These authors suggest that Siamese-Vietnamese relations essentially functioned on a basis of equals, in terms of dimensions such as military strength and authority over their vassals

Vietnamese scholars, similarly, study the issue through their own ideological perspectives The perceptions of the Nguyễn are a heated topic in Vietnamese scholarship Two different schools of historiography emerged in the north and south

of Vietnam The different sides held divergent attitudes and feelings towards the Nguyễn dynasty, especially since the country was divided into two parts Serving a socialist government, the Hànội scholars preferred to make criticisms about the Nguyễn rulers Huế and Sàigòn scholars were more positive in accepting the Nguyễn rulers The historiography about neighboring countries such as Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, consequently developed into different narratives The Hànội version, produced in the 1960s, combined the account of Siam-Vietnam relations with criticisms of the Nguyễn family The Communist party scholars produced a national history by creating a national hero, Nguyễn Huệ (or Emperor Quang Trung) of the Tây Sơn dynasty, and depicting Nguyễn Ánh as the one who invited enemies into the homeland

The official history that was promoted through the textbooks and represented the government’s standpoint had the most far-reaching influence on the society In the history textbooks by the Ministry of Education and Training,36 the strong sense of

36 Bộ Giáo dục và Đào tạo (Ministry of Education and Training), Lịch sử 7 (History 7)

(Đồng Tháp: Education Publishing House, 2003) and Bộ Giáo dục và Đào tạo

national pride pervades When Hànội writers referred to the relationship between Siam and Vietnam in the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries, they highlighted the battle at the Rạch Gầm Xoài Mứt battlefield as one of the finest victories in Vietnam’s history This discourse is completely different from that in the Thai version Nguyễn Ánh had sought military support from Siam in his bid to restore his family’s power When Siam first won the first rounds of combat and expanded into the southern area of Vietnam, the Siamese were brutal Without restraint, they burnt and destroyed all the property and killed countless people However, Siam finally lost the battle to Vietnam and was forced back

Some textbooks even titled this event as “the subversion of the yoke under the Nguyễn family rule and the victory over the Siamese troops.”37 The writers depicted the Siamese enemy in such ways: “[when they] speak, their words are boastful but in their mind they are really afraid of the Tây Sơn troops like they are afraid of a tiger.”38 They thought that Nguyễn Ánh and Siam suffered a big defeat because they were overwhelmed by Nguyễn Huệ’s strategy The battle was portrayed in an exaggerated fashion - in only one night the Vietnamese troops totally defeated and completely annihilated the Siamese troops This Communist party historian exalted the role of the Vietnamese peasants and saw the battle as a grand show of peasant resistance It was greatly emphasized that the sovereignty and independence of the country was preserved through Vietnamese solidarity Nguyễn Khắc Viện saw

(Ministry of Education and Training), Lịch sử 8, tập 2 (History 8, Volume 2)( Hànội:

Education Publishing House, 2003a)

37 Nguyễn Quang Ngọc (Ed), Tiến trình lịch sử Việt Nam (The Process of Vietnam

History) (Hànội: Education Publishing House, 2007) and Trương Hữu Quýnh, et.al., Đại cương lịch sử Việt Nam toàn tập (General History of Vietnam - Complete work)

(Hànội: Education Publishing House, 2008) and Nguyễn Khắc Viện, Vietnam: A Long

History (Hànội: Thế Giới Publishing House, 2007)

38 Nguyễn Quang Ngọc, Tiến trình lịch sử, p 180

Nguyễn Ánh’s request for support from Siam as “the classic tactic of feudal lords in distress – calling in foreigners.”39 He also compared the Tây Sơn and the Nguyễn rulers and felt that “Nguyễn Huệ emerged as a brilliant strategist and national hero in contrast to Nguyễn Ánh, who had tried to win back his throne by relying on foreign troops.”40 Thus, the Hànội narratives mainly tried to show the the complicity of the Nguyễn dynasty in sanctioning and causing an invasion of Vietnam They concluded that the victory of Nguyễn Ánh later on was because of the death of Quang Trung

For the Huế and Sàigòn scholarship, their historiography of Thailand reveals similar prejudices These historians tried to show the Nguyễn court as a great imperial

kingdom They suggested that the dominance of the Huế court and the weakness of

Siam, led the Siamese king to attempt to maintain cordial relations with Vietnam As

in the discourse of the northern historians, Siam was the depicted enemy of the region,

an invader that oppressed Cambodians and Laotians This led to both Cambodia and Laos to seek Vietnamese protection

Đặng Văn Chương’s recent version of the relations between the Chakri and the Nguyễn courts41 attibutes the cause of the broken relationship between Siam and Vietnam to the territorial expansionism of Siam, and their political ideology of “A big

fish nurtures a small fish (Cá lớn nuôi cá bé)” and “The strong wins, the weak loses (Mạnh được yếu thua).” They were the policies and ideas that guided the incursion of

Siam into Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam He concludes that Siam always used a

faced policy: being overtly friendly and helpful to neighbors but covertly waiting for her chance to reduce Vietnamese influence in Cambodia and Laos In contrast, the Nguyễn's diplomatic policies were friendly and the Vietnamese never ignored neighboring states.42 He also emphasizes in his article that the invasion by Siamese troops of Hà Tiên and Châu Đốc was due to their desire to be the overlord over Cambodia and Vietnam.43

Đinh Xuân Lâm presents a different perspective from other Vietnamese historians by examining and articulating the broad course of Vietnamese expansionism over Cambodia from the reign of Gia Long to Thiệu Trị.44 Seeing the uprising by Anouvong in positive terms as a great struggle for the independence of his country, Vietnam was portrayed as having acted as an invaluable ally in supporting this revolution Subsequently the Huế court successfully expanded their territory in Cambodia because of the weakness of the Siamese court He notes, however, that the Cambodians had actually seen Vietnamese expansion into Cambodia as an incursion into their land The Nguyễn court wanted Cambodians to become ‘Vietnamese’, and seized Cambodian resources and property

Regarding Cambodia and Laos, politics affected the way historiography was written The Indochinese Communist Party attempted to maintain solidarity with the two

First Half of Nineteenth Century)”, in Tạp chí Nghiên cứư Đông Nam Á (Journal of

Southeast Asian Research), 6(2002)

countries However, there are different versions between Hànội and Sàigòn The Hànội version scarcely mentions, or even attempts to silence the Nguyễn court’s invasions of other states in the nineteenth century, especially into Cambodia.45Similarly, the history of Vietnamese aggression towards the Lao kingdoms during the

Nguyễn period is “virtually a taboo subject for Party-sanctioned history.”46 However,

in recent years, the Hanoi scholars have been active in conferences on the Nguyễn’s expansionism towards Cambodia and Laos Although Hanoi scholars had never wanted to talk about these issues for a long time, such discussion is now becoming widely accepted and common within academic circles.47 Topics such as Vietnamese military expeditions into Cambodia and Laos could now be more openly discussed Nonetheless, there is little change in how these historians see Siam Rather than portray Siam as a competitor and rival equal to Vietnam, these historians still strongly focused on highlighting Siamese aggression towards Cambodia and Lao kingdoms

With regards to the study of Siam-Vietnam relations, a piece of classical work needs

to be mentioned - Michael Dent Eiland’s dissertation, completed in 1989, entitled

45 See also Bruce M Lockhart, “Competing Narratives of the Nam Tiến”, Unpublished paper presented at a workshop organized by the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2003

46 Bruce Lockhart, “The Historical Laos-Vietnamese Relationship: Seen from the

Laos PDR,” in New Research on Laos (Recherches nouvelles sur le Laos), edited by

Yves Goudineau and Michel Lorrillard (Bangkok: Amarin Printing and Publishing Public Company, 2008), p 269 Italics mine This article discusses the Lao perspectives on national history which reflect the influences of the Communist Party

47 Kỷ yếu Hội thảo Nam Bộ và Nam Trung Bộ những vấn đề lịch sử thế kỷ XVII-XIX

(Proceedings of a Conference Southern Vietnam and Central Vietnam on the issues of history from the 17 th to 19 th century in Hanoi, 2002; Kỷ yếu Hội thảo khoa học Những vấn đề lịch sử dân tộc và thế giới (Proceedings of a Conference on the issues of national and world history, Đại học Huế, 2002); Kỷ yếu Hội thảo Khoa học Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh (Proceedings of a Conference of Science Ho Chi Minh city), 4&5 –

4 – 2006 (Hanoi: Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, 2009)

“Dragon and Elephant: Relations between Vietnam and Siam, 1782-1847.”48 Eiland’s approach to the topic was based on the premise that Siam and Vietnam possessed completely different worldviews His main argument centered on the dissimilar leadership styles and ideologies of the Chakri kings and the Nguyễn emperors that led

to diplomatic clashes and conflicts.49 Furthermore, he argued that the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and Laos was due to security concerns while the Siamese needed to preserve their prestige by opposing Vietnam.50 He concluded that the Siamese saw states in terms of Mandalas, whereas the Vietnamese had a more tangible sense of territorial expansion and acquisition This concept, however, could not totally explain the foreign relations between the two powerful states and their vassals For example, Vietnam did employ the idea of Mandalas to conceptualize their relationship with various Tai groups in Mường Thanh and Mường Lai, currently located in the northwestern Vietnam.51 Even though the Vietnamese utilized different geopolitical imaginings to discursively justify and explain the expansion of their influence or occupation of other territory, the final result was the same – the

successful expansion of Vietnam’s territory and sphere of influence

Considering all the previous studies on Siam-Vietnam diplomatic relations, this study aims to address the limitations of those studies and examine the above-mentioned themes and topics in Siam-Vietnam foreign policies from a more nuanced, balanced and less predisposed standpoint This study principally uses both Siamese and Vietnamese primary sources to examine the historical evolution of bilateral relations

48 Michael D Eiland, “Dragon and Elephant: Relations between Vietnam and Siam, 1782-1847” (The George Washington University, 1989)

49Eiland, “Dragon and Elephant: Relations between Vietnam and Siam, 1782-1847”,

p 1

50 Ibid

51 I am grateful to a thesis marker for pointing this out

between Siam and Vietnam, in particular their perceptions towards each other, and their entanglements over Cambodia and Laos

The Siamese and Vietnamese courts’ diplomatic records

The diplomatic correspondence that was transmitted between Bangkok and Huế is a rich reservoir of information on foreign relations between Siam and Vietnam The royal messages contain an account of their political negotiations and interactions and therefore reveal their relationship, as well as their perceptions of each other The court records of both states, including official documents, chronicles and annals in both Thai and Vietnamese languages, therefore constitute one main set of sources for this

study By utilizing both Thai and Vietnamese court sources, this work effectively

avoids bias that had often been caused by the usage of sources from only one side

The Thai documents used in this work are, chiefly, the royal correspondence, the

Chotmajhet (records) and the Phraratchaphongsawadan (chronicle) that were

exchanged during the first three reigns of the Chakri dynasty Most of the letters between the Chakri kings and the Nguyễn emperors have been translated into Thai because the royal messages sent between the two courts were always required to be

translated into both Thai and Chinese Han script For the Vietnamese sources, the letters from Vietnamese emperors that are found in Thai annals have been utilized Furthermore, “modes of visual representation”52 and “cultural artifacts” contribute another way of viewing history, and this study utilizes poetry, inscriptions and paintings as another group of useful source material For example, the “University in

52

Stephen Bann, The Inventions of History: Essays on the Representation of the Past

(New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp 122-130

stone” at Wat Pho (Phra Chettuphon Wimon Mangkhlaram Ratchaworamahawihan temple), where the cultural life of races and poems are painted, could be employed to uncover the worldview of Siam court vis-a-vis other states

The main Vietnamese primary sources of this work are the court correspondence in

the Han Chinese script or Nôm, as well as the Đại Nam Thực lục (Veritable Records

of Đại Nam)53 They record the diplomatic interactions between Bangkok and Huế from the Vietnamese perspective According to the protocol about the official language of the Vietnamese royal correspondences, these letters must be written or translated into Sino-Vietnamese or Han script, and the distinctive Vietnamese script

or Nôm The Nguyễn court strictly followed the forms and formats of writing letter that were borrowed from the Chinese court The other sources from the Nguyễn court

such as Khâm Định Đại Nam hội điển sự lệ (Administrative catalogue of the Đại Nam established by imperial order), Đại Nam Nhất Thống chí (Geography of the Unified Đại Nam), and Đại Nam liệt truyện (The Đại Nam Court Biography)54 are recorded

by the Vietnamese mandarins who worked under the Nguyễn government These primary sources are beneficial to this work because they present the Vietnamese perspective about their own state, and illuminate how they perceived Siam politically and culturally through the incidents and missions between the two courts The

53 Viện Sử học, Viện Khoa học Xã Hội Việt Nam (Institute of History Studies,

Department of Social Sciences of Vietnam), Đại Nam Thực lục (Veritable Records of

Đại Nam) (Hànội: Education Publishing House, 2007);

54 Viện Sử học, Trung tâm Khoa học Xã hội và Nhân văn Quốc gia (Institute of

History Studies, The National Center of Social Sciences and Humanities), Khâm Định

Đại Nam hội điển sự lệ (Administrative catalogue of the Đại Nam established by imperial order) (Huế: Thuận Hóa Publishing House, 2005); Đại Nam Nhất Thống chí: Quốc sứ quán Triều Nguyễn (Geography of the Unified Đại Nam, The missions of the Nguyễn Dynasty), Unpublished paper; Viện Sử học, Viện Khoa học Xã Hội Việt Nam

(Institute of History Studies, Department of Social Sciences of Vietnam), Đại Nam

liệt truyện (The Đại Nam Court Biography) (Huế: Thuận Hoá Publishing House,

1993)

Vietnamese residents in Bangkok also compiled historical records called

“Phongsawadan Yuan”.55 This is an interesting source because Thai historiography often employed it as a crucial Vietnamese source However, this record has to be regarded as both a Thai and Vietnamese source, since the author was a Vietnamese

official in the Thai context

Furthermore, the sources relating to Cambodia and Laos provide information on the interaction of the two states and their tributaries These tributary states functioned as

buffers between the Bangkok and the Huế courts The accounts of warfare between

Vietnam and Siam (Anam-Sayaam Yuth)56, recorded by the General of Siamese army – Chaophraya Bodindecha - and later compiled by Kulab Saipradit, is a significant source about the warfare between the four countries – Cambodia, the Lao kingdoms, Siam and Vietnam This source contains description of battles, military strategies, agendas and worldviews of commanders-in-chief The Vietnamese source about the

1827 conflict between Siam and Lao kingdom of (Vientiane) titled “Journal of our

imperial court's actions with regards to Quốc triều xử trị Vạn Tượng sự nghi lục (the

incident involving the Kingdom of Vientiane)”57 by Ngô Cao Lang remarkably supplies other points of view on this incident The Vietnamese administrators recorded it when Anouvong fled to ask for Vietnamese protection in Nghệ An

55 Yong, Phongsawadan Yuan (Vietnamese Historical Records) (Bangkok:

Mahamakut Ratchawitthayalai Publishing House, 1966)

56 Kulab, Anam-Sayam Yuth (The Vietnamese-Siamese War) (Bangkok: Khosit,

2007)

57 Mayouri Ngaosyvathn and Phueiphanh Ngaosyvathn, Vietnamese Source Materials

concerning the 1827 Conflict between the Court of Siam and the Lao Principalities: Journal of Our Imperial Court's Actions with regard to the Incident Involving the Kingdom of Ten Thousand Elephants (Tokyo: The Centre for East Asian Cultural

Studies for Unesco, The Toyo Bundo, 2001)

The comparison of the original documents in Thai and Vietnamese, and later translations and compilations of these documents reveal interesting differences When the original letters were sent from Huế, Vietnamese translators in Bangkok would translate the official letters from Nôm into Thai However, there were two versions of the exchanged letters in Thai and Chinese sent from Bangkok Before the letters from Bangkok were sent to Huế, the translator would translate them from Thai to Sino-Vietnamese (Han) When the letters arrived to Gia Định, the Ministry of Rites examined the letters and gifts to prove their authenticiy again before sent them on to Huế The doctored sources comprises Thai and Vietnamese chronicles — i.e., Đại Nam Thực Lục and Phraratchaphongsawadan, and the compilations of records, such as the

Anam-Siam Yuth (“The War Between Vietnam-Siam) and the Phongsawadan Yuan

(“Yuan Chronicles”) contain accounts by the later scribes of what those documents said Interestingly, the language in the actual documents which were exchanged between the two courts was obviously either polite or neutral Conversely, the language used in the doctored sources was very hierarchical and still mirror the language of a tributary relationship, even if the Chakri and the Nguyễn courts did not define each other as a vassal The records of communications between the Siamese and Vietnamese which were later compiled by each court do not reflect the original correspondence In the process, a different perspective was invented or probably added (at least in some cases) from persons who compiled the orginal sources We can see this by comparing what was written in the original and rewritten sources, especially in terms of terminology In chapter three will elaborate on this in more detail

The study, therefore, aims to demonstrate how a wide range of individuals and groups interpreted the diplomatic relationship between Siam and Vietnam, and reinterpreted and represented this relationship in different ways in the diplomatic correspondence and court records These sources could be approached in two different ways — first, from the points of view of both Siam and Vietnam, in terms of the continuity of local institutions such as kingship, patronage, warfare, domestic and inter-state policy; and second, through the history of Cambodia and Laos as clients, the image of an overlord over a tributary

In chapter two, I analyze the evolution of Siam-Vietnam relationship from the 1780s

to the 1850s Chronologically, I reveal how each significant event affected the bilateral relations between Siam and Vietnam At the same time, the inter-state relations between Siam and Vietnam were more complicated than the direct interaction, and involved the competition over the vassals, Cambodia and Laos

Chapter three studies the Siamese and Vietnamese’s reciprocal perceptions and court rhetoric, from the beginning until the changes in their relationship Principally, the discourse of the Siamese court from Thai sources and the Vietnamese court from Vietnamese sources display the political and cultural perceptions that both courts had towards each other through a body of knowledge, thought and culture In addition, I examine cultural aspects such as the rituals of the courts and the ceremonies between the two courts as indicative of the forms of relationship

Chapter four concentrates on the tributary expansionism of Siam and Vietnam and the response of Cambodia and Laos Both states adopted tributary expansionism in competing for domination over Cambodia and Laos Through a paternalistic combination of royal patronage, military strategies, cultural policies, and propaganda campaigns, Siamese and Vietnamese courts claimed their status over Cambodia and Laos

Chapter five draws the conclusion by highlighting the different cultural foundations that indirectly but significantly influenced the perceptions of Siam and Vietnam towards each other and their tributaries

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SIAMESE AND VIETNAMESE

RELATIONS FROM THE 1780s TO THE 1850s

It is vital to historicize the changing foreign relations between the courts of Siam and Vietnam within its evolving historical contexts Each incident that took place between both courts and their vassals was meaningful in understanding the historical evolution

of their foreign relations These events play a crucial role in explaining how the two courts altered their relationship and how these transformations affected their tributaries By considering the important events that affected their relationships, this chapter lays the groundwork for the following chapters which will look at the reciprocal Siamese and Vietnamese perceptions

By the turn of the 19th century, the rise of a new dynasty and the decline of an old kingdom in mainland Southeast Asia resulted in a shift in the balance of power The Chakri Dynasty of Siam and the Nguyễn Dynasty of Vietnam became the new powerful ruling families Throughout the seventy years of diplomacy in the reigns of the first three Chakri kings and Nguyễn emperors, the two courts’ relationship changed from amity to enmity The reign of Rama I (1872-1809) and Gia Long (1802-1820) represented the most cordial period in the relationship, while the reigns

of Rama II (1809-1824) and Rama III (1824-1851) in Siam, and Minh Mạng 1840) and Thiệu Trị (1841-1847) in Vietnam, was the period when there was a reevaluation of their relations Their diplomatic relations depended on the direct

(1820-interaction between the two courts and also the vacillating loyalties of the Lao and

Cambodian ruling elites

Siam58

From 1715 onwards, the Siamese kingdom of Ayudhaya attempted to contend with the Nguyễn lords for control over Cambodia, although it had not yet become a powerful kingdom by the time While the Siamese fought with the Vietnamese, there was also the Burmese threat In 1765, the Burmese troops invaded the territories of Ayudhaya In 1767, the Burmese troops laid a short siege to the cities under Ayudhaya’s dominance These Siamese cities capitulated and the capital was sacked and burnt Accompanied by the internal problems inside the kingdom, the Ayudhaya period met its end The Burmese invasion completely devastated the kingdom

Fortunately, the Burmese subjugation did not last long and the Thonburi Kingdom soon proclaimed an independent Siamese state again The former governor of Tak, Phraya Taksin, was able to count on the support of many Ayudhaya’s former vassals and defeated the Burmese Phraya Taksin founded the Thonburi Kingdom and established the new capital opposite the Chaophraya River, and ascended the throne

as King Taksin in 1768 During the Thonburi period (1768-1782), Taksin began to extend Siam’s power and began a policy of expansionism He sent troops to subjugate

the muang surrounding Siam as tributaries under Siamese control

Because of the focus on territorial expansionism, internal problems concerning

58 For more details, please see: Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of

Thailand (Cambridge ; Port Melbourne, Vic : Cambridge University Press, 2009) and

B J Terwiel, A History of Modern Thailand (St Lucia: University of Queensland

Press, 1984)

political and economic issues were sidelined and this eventually affected the power of the Thonburi kingdom In 1782, when Thonburi’s troops went away to invade the Cambodia and Lao principalities, a powerful official — Phraya San led a rebellion in Thonburi The rebels ultimately took control of the capital and forced Taksin to abdicate Later, the Siamese officers supported Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk, the commander-in-chief of the Siamese army to ascend the throne, as he was the highest ranked official He eventually succeeded the throne as king Rama I and established a new dynasty at a new capital, known as the Rattanakosin kingdom, and a new Chakri dynasty King Taksin was executed shortly after.

After the restoration of the state and the founding of the Chakri dynasty in 1782 by Rama I, Siam sought to be a power center in mainland Southeast Asia The Bangkok court aimed to expand its supremacy and successfully enlarge its territory into the most extensive ever in its history In order to be a prosperous state, Rama I reshaped and revived its political system, court ceremonies, laws, literature and social organization, basing these on the model of Ayudhaya The pomp of the Siamese court signified the status of the state and its power over vassals and challenged other states,

in particular Vietnam, which was a major competitor striving to claim overlordship over small neighboring kingdoms in the first half of the nineteenth century

Vietnam 59

Vietnam in the sixteenth century was divided into two dynasties, the southern and

northern dynasties (known as Nam Triều Bắc Triều) between the Lê and the Mạc

rulers The Lê Dynasty had initially controlled the whole of Vietnam, but the Lê emperor was overthrown by its general, Mạc Đăng Dung, in 1527 After that, Mạc Đăng Dung founded the Mạc Dynasty and succeeded to be the emperor A mandarin

of the former Lê court, Nguyễn Kim, restored the Lê heir to the throne and established

a ‘resistance zone’ opposed to the Mạc, in the southern part of the Vietnamese kingdom It led to the division of the country The resulting civil war in Vietnam between the northern court under the control of the Mạc dynasty and the southern court under the control of the Lê dynasty led to turmoil and strife However, in 1545, Nguyễn Kim, who was the actual power behind the puppet Lê emperor, was assassinated, and his son-in-law, Trịnh Kiểm, usurped power and raised troops to fight with the Mạc court The southern court came under the power of the Trịnh and the Nguyễn families, while the Lê kings functioned as figureheads

After sixty years of fighting, the war between the southern and northern courts finally ended in 1592.60 The southern court under the control of the Trịnh and the Nguyễn families had defeated the Mạc ruler However, Vietnam remained divided The Lê successor was again theoretically in control of the whole country, but he was considered a figurehead The Trịnh family assumed power over the former northern court while the Nguyễn family asserted its influence and dominance in the south

59 For more details, please see: Oscar Chapuis, A History of Vietnam: from Hong

Bang to Tu Duc (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), and David Chandler et

al., In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History (Hawaii: University of Hawaii

Press, 1987)

60 Chapuis, A History of Vietnam, p 116

Vietnam under the separate administration of two families gradually declined In the seventeenth century, the Trịnh government gradually weakened, and the north encountered many political and administrative problems, and much corruption among the ruling mandarins Similarly, in the south, the farmers and peasants in Vietnam faced numerous difficulties under the administration of the Nguyễn lords Political uncertainty and peasant uprisings shook the authority of the Trịnh and the Nguyễn courts This finally culminated in the revolt in southern Vietnam led by the three brothers, Nguyễn Nhạc, Nguyễn Huệ, and Nguyễn Lũ in Bình Định, in 1770 This became known as the Tây Sơn movement Between 1773 and 1786, a peasant insurgency had emerged, led by the leaders of the Tây Sơn, with the objective of overthrowing both the Trịnh and the Nguyễn governments.61

The decline of the power of the Nguyễn ruling family caused Nguyễn Phúc Ánh, or Nguyễn Ánh, the last heir of the Nguyễn family, to move to Gia Định in 1777 Nguyễn Ánh sought asylum in Siam in 1784 and attempted to restore the Nguyễn family’s power many times, for instance, through the Battle of Rạch Gầm – Xoài Mút which will be discussed later In 1802, Nguyễn Ánh managed to defeat the Tây Sơn movement He restored Nguyễn power and unified Vietnam at the same time He proclaimed himself Emperor Gia Long The power of the Huế court spread throughout the region Gia Long revived Vietnam as a state following the Chinese model of governance, like the glorious Lê dynasty This included the establishment of the administrative procedures, structures and systems of the new government, and, like Siam, establishing the court’s customs and projecting its pomp In the first half of

61 For more details on the history of the Tây Sơn era, please see George Edson

Dutton, The Tây Sơn Uprising: Society and Rebellion in Late Eighteenth-Century

Vietnam, 1771-1802 (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006)

the nineteenth century, Vietnam became one of the most powerful states in the region

Nguyễn Ánh’s solicitations of Siamese support

Nguyễn Ánh began the close relations between the Chakri dynasty of Siam and the Nguyễn dynasty of Vietnam After the Trịnh family seized Phú Xuân (Huế) in 1774, the defeated Nguyễn lords moved to southern Vietnam and eventually settled down in Gia Định (Sàigòn) The Tây Sơn movement took this opportunity to attack and exterminate the Nguyễn clan, but Nguyễn Ánh survived He successfully sought asylum and protection from Siam in order to battle against the Tây Sơn

As a prince of the ruling family of Vietnam, Nguyễn Ánh tried to contact Siam for support twice, during the reign of Taksin of Thonburi, and during the reign of Rama I

of Bangkok The first attempt failed because the relations between the two states deteriorated in 1780 Taksin did not respond to Nguyễn Ánh’s request, and even executed Nguyễn Ánh’s uncle, Tôn Thất Xuân, who had sought asylum in Thonburi, along with Tôn Thất Xuân’s 53 retinues.62 Thai and Vietnamese sources provide different explanations of this incident Thai sources from the Chakri dynasty attributed the cause to Taksin’s madness, as he had thought that Tôn Thất Xuân stole his diamond and would escape from Thonburi.63 However, Vietnamese sources suggested that Taksin was infuriated when Vietnamese robbed a Siamese ship, and killed the traders on board, at Gia Định Furthermore, the Vietnamese sources indicated that Cambodian noblemen had framed Tôn Thất Xuân by sending a letter to

62 ĐNTL(Volume 1), pp 206, 209 and P.R.R.I, p 38

63 Ibid

Thonburi accusing Tôn Thất Xuân to be spying for the Nguyễn ruler in Gia Định.64The execution of Tôn Thất Xuân caused the banishment of Vietnamese in Thonburi from the Siamese capital to an unidentified location.65

Nguyễn Ánh’s second attempt in 1782 was successful He was able to contact Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk (soon to become Rama I) and gained the support of the Bangkok court From 1771 to 1782, as part of Taksin’s expansion policy, general Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk, and his brother Surasi managed to subjugate the Laotian kingdoms that included Vientiane, Luang Phrabang and Champasak, and almost the regions of Cambodia that was composed of Phnom Penh, Phutthaimat (Hà Tiên in Vietnam today) and Siem Reap.66 In 1781, Taksin sent troops to Cambodia as he thought the Cambodian ruler was about to rebel.67 When Siamese troops arrived in Siem Reap, the Cambodian king asked for military aid from Gia Định

Interestingly, only Vietnamese sources documented the negotiation for peace between the Vietnamese and Siamese Generals No Thai source mentions this incident Nguyễn Ánh ordered Nguyễn Hữu Thụy, General in charge of the Nguyễn army, to send troops to Cambodia in 1782 in response to the Cambodian king’s request.68Although the Vietnamese essentially sent these troops to fight, Nguyễn Hữu Thụy sought to negotiate peace with Siam instead Nguyễn Hữu Thụy believed that Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk and his brother suffered by serving Taksin He initiated friendly relations with the Siamese generals by giving them a knife, a sword and a

flag.69 Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk saw this as a great opportunity for a coup amidst the chaotic domestic circumstances of Siam during the late Taksin reign where numerous uprisings were taking place.70 Vietnamese sources reported that Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk agreed to be an ally of Gia Định

In a letter that Nguyễn Hữu Thụy wrote to Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk, Nguyễn Hữu Thụy suggested that the two sides maintain amicable relations To enable the arrangement to materialize, he proposed that the two states consider Cambodia as a

buffer state between Siam and Vietnam, and place Cambodia under the joint

protection of Siam and Vietnam He suggested that an amicable relationship between Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk and him was to their mutual advantage in the future, as they could seek assistance from one another He pledged to Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk his willingness to “share happiness and sorrow” If Taksin was to pose any problem to Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk, the Nguyễn would also consider it their problem.71

Rama I also demonstrated his friendship Eventually after the foundation of the Chakri dynasty in 1782, Rama I expressed his good will to the Nguyễn family He granted support to Nguyễn Ánh and his retinues.72 He allowed the Vietnamese, who were exiled during the Taksin period, to move back to Bangkok, and bestowed upon them money, clothes and other provisions.73

Nguyễn Ánh takes refuge in Bangkok

Nguyễn Ánh’s successful flight could be attributed to the Siamese Nguyễn Ánh had escaped from Gia Định to Krabue Island (currently in Chonburi province, Thailand) after the Tây Sơn’s conquest over Gia Định between 1782 and 1783 According to the Thai records, he met two Siamese noblemen, Phraya Chonburi and Phra Rayong, on the island The two suggested that he sought refuge with the Bangkok court and attempted to convince him of the humaneness and benevolence of Rama I.74 Phraya Chonburi, according to the Bangkok court records, was an intelligent and reputable man Nguyễn Ánh accepted his advice and became the adopted son of Phraya Chonburi.75 Thai records suggested that Phraya Chonburi generously supportedNguyễn Ánh, and his family and retinues Vietnamese records reported that Nguyễn Ánh was very glad when he received a promise of support from Rama I Furthermore, when Phraya Chonburi tried to invite Nguyễn Ánh to seek asylum in Siam, Nguyễn Ánh was without fear and headed to Bangkok along with Phraya Chonburi.76

When Nguyễn Ánh arrived in Bangkok in 1784, Rama I gave him a warm welcome

by arranging a royal procession, in the same manner the Siam king would treat a foreign prince.77 Rama I bestowed upon Nguyễn Ánh’s family and his retinues pensions and land He also kept his promise to Nguyễn Hữu Thụy, a General of Gia Định, at Phnom Penh and pledged to help Nguyễn Ánh restore Nguyễn power.78Rama I invited him to attend the royal court and provided Vietnamese translators

74 Ibid., p 220 and P.R.R.I, pp 33-34

Rama I also permitted him to follow Vietnamese customs, for example squatting in the Vietnamese way.79

Rama I’s kindness towards Nguyễn Ánh was understandable Rama I and Nguyễn Ánh were acquainted with each other before the former became the ruler of Siam Furthermore, the Tây Sơn rulers that caused the flight of Nguyễn Ánh were a more imminent threat to Siam The Tây Sơn court was invading Vientiane, a Siamese vassal, and was thus the immediate rival of Siam then Granting asylum to a refugee Vietnamese prince would enable Siam to negate the threat of the ambitious Tây Sơn,

by restoring a friendlier neighboring ruler

Siamese refusal of the Tây Sơn’s offer

In the rivalry between the Nguyễn family and the Tây Sơn, Rama I sympathized with the former When the Tây Sơn court, in 1789, sent an emissary to Siam asking for its cooperation in apprehending Nguyễn Ánh, Rama I refused this request.80 Rama I decided to support Nguyễn Ánh as a Vietnamese prince, providing the rationale that the two states depended on each other, and that people deserved to live happily and peacefully under Siamese protection.81 Rama I clearly treated Nguyễn Ánh as a subordinate because Nguyễn Ánh was truly under his protection He declared that enemies of Nguyễn Ánh were also enemies of Bangkok.82

The Bangkok court often took advantage of the internal conflicts of the other states by supporting one side against the others The divisions within Vietnam also constituted

an advantage for Siam, since it would decrease the Tây Sơn's power.83 Although Siam successfully invaded and asserted its supremacy over Cambodian and Lao peripheries, the Tây Sơn’s power was still growing The Tây Sơn disrupted the balance of power

between Siam and southern Vietnam that had already been established The Bangkok

court saw Nguyễn Ánh as a better neighbor for Siam in the long run Rejecting the request from the Tây Sơn was a strategic and rational decision It actually benefited Siam by allowing it to preserve and expand its overlordship over Cambodia and Lao kingdoms

Nguyễn Ánh’s departure from Bangkok

While Nguyễn Ánh was living in Bangkok, he assisted the Siamese court, and learnt about Siamese customs, political and military administration Only Vietnamese sources suggested that Nguyễn Ánh even volunteered to serve in the vanguard in the war with Burma, and won in battle His victory made Rama I very satisfied Rama I praised his bravery in the battle and bestowed many presents on him and his soldiers.84 The Thai side did not mention any relevant information on the other hand

However, after the battle with Burma, Nguyễn Ánh decided to leave Bangkok in

1784, and went to Gia Đình without first acquiring Rama I’s approval.85 He aimed to fight against the Tây Sơn in order to regain the power of the Nguyễn family According to the Thai chronicles, he explained in a letter to Rama I that he was

83

P.R.R.2(Dam-1), p 68 and Anamwat, Khwamsamphan, pp 19, 22-23

84 ĐNTL (Volume 1), p 225

85 P.R.R.I, pp 90-91