Making democracy work the crafting and manipulation of chinese village democracy by political elites 2

Chapter Reforming: the Roles and Strategies of National Political Elites The trials of establishing villagers’ committee and conducting village elections were first practiced in some villages in Luocheng County of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in the beginning of the 1980s with the approval from some national top leaders and particularly Peng Zhen. In about the same period the reformoriented officials at the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) were empowered to administer the village elections and self-governance with the support of national top leaders. Among those in the MCA, Wang Zhenyao and his colleagues played a crucial role. This thesis argues that village elections and self-governance in rural China represent a deliberate effort of the reformers to solve the crisis in rural areas after the collapse of the People’s Commune system. The aims of village elections and selfgovernance, at least during the initial stage of village self-governance, were to increase rural stability, reduce lawlessness, promote better compliance with official policies, develop rural economy, and improve the relationship between rural cadres and the masses and fight corruption. Anyway, they did not have much to with bringing democratic rights to the peasants. After several years of the implementation, however, village elections were regarded as an important part of “socialist democracy construction with Chinese characteristic”. The questions are: Who supported this rural political reform, and how important was their support? And who actually carried out the reform and how? According to some officials at MCA interviewed by the author, it seems that the Ministry of Civil Affairs had not been fully aware of the core of village self-governance as village elections until around 1990. 36 This chapter aims to examine the roles and functions of national political elites in the process of village elections. In the first section, it tries to trace how village selfgovernment emerged, and why national political elites were willing to implement village election and replace the People’s Commune with this democratic vehicle. In the second section, this chapter attempts to explore how reform-oriented political elites won through all difficulties to get the Organic Law of villagers’ Committee passed, an important result of elites’ crafting. In the following two sections, I will respectively discuss the roles of senior political elites and particularly Peng Zhen, and the officials at the MCA, in particular Wang Zhenyao and his elite network. I will then show how the officials at the MCA promoted village elections through building a sound macro environment, designing laws, rules and regulations, making institutional arrangements, and three co-operation projects. Finally I will draw a conclusion. 2.1 Social Crisis and the Reconstructing of Social Order: the Background of Political Elites’ Crafting Village Elections When studying the transition to democracy, some scholars have presented explanations to the questions of why and when political elites or actors choose democracy. With regard to village elections in rural China, the question is: Why were Chinese political elites willing to choose rural instead of urban communities as a starting point for China’s democratization? Before we come to this question, however, we need to first address two other closely-linked questions: Why did Chinese government initiate village elections at the beginning of 1980s? And why did Chinese Refer to Giuseppe Did Palma, To Craft Democracies: an Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Robert D.Grey, Democratic Theory and Post-Communist Change (Prentice Hall, 1997); Gorge Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998). 37 Government choose village election and self-governance instead of other forms as substitutes for the People’s Commune? The emergence of village elections and self-governance has a profound historical background. Most importantly, it is the rural economic reform that had thoroughly changed the rural economic, political and social relationships. The fundamental changes in the rural economic and political relationships were a basic background. First, the household production responsibility system had led to profound changes such as the emergence of new pattern of economic relationships in the rural economic system that would provide a fitting economic basis for village selfgovernment and village elections. Second, since the reform and opening-up to the world, the rural social structure and rural politics had changed greatly. For example, the household production responsibility system had enabled the peasants to win a status with more freedom. Third, many social problems had emerged that presented challenges to social security and law and order. Indeed, then it was common to see in the rural areas conflicts between the village cadres and villagers, gambling, fighting, theft, and even murder. The problems in rural society became the central government’s major concerns, as made clear at the CCP’s national conference on rural work (1982), “Recently some rural organizations are lax, their work is completely at a standstill or partly so, with the result that many affairs are left neglected.” In many cases the moral among villagers was so low that they simply did not care about village affairs. The central government was concerned with the situation and thought about how to rebuild the rural organizational system after the dissolution of the People’s Commune and the establishment of new economic system. Naturally, the village Party Literature Research Centre of the CCP Central Committee, Shiyi jie sanzhong quanhui yilai chongyao wenxian xuandu (Selected Important Literature from since the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee) (Beijing: the People’s Press, 1982), 1061. 38 committee that had emerged at the beginning of 1980s in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region quickly came into Central government’s view. However, the problems of widespread rural unrest alone did not give sufficient reasons for the implementation of village elections and self-governance. The questions are then: Why did the central government choose the form of village elections and village self-governance instead of other forms? Was it because the government had no other choices? In the wake of the dissolution of the People’s Commune, the CCP actually had several alternatives. One would be to maintain its authoritarian rule, only changing the names of the local administrative system. Another choice would be just let nature take its course without any active actions and measures. A third choice was to establish a new political system that would be different from the People’s Commune and Production Brigade. Neither the first nor the second choice seemed feasible. The first choice would directly run into conflict with the new economic system of household responsibility, definitely resulting in terminating the rural economic reform. The second choice of nature taking its own course did not seem to be a wise choice. In fact, at that time both the peasants’ demand and the top leaders’ concern about loosing rural control had exerted pressure upon the government to look for a new alternative. There are good reasons why the CCP chose village self-governance as replacement for the People’s Commune. One is the lesson drawn from the People’s Commune system, under which peasants had little freedom and few democratic rights. The Commune was a result of the planned economy supported by an authoritarian polity. The new rural economic system would offer a possibility to change local power structure for a new one. 39 Another reason is the restoration of the People’s Congress system, which would be an incentive for peasants to have more freedom and rights in dealing with their own affairs. Ending the Cultural Revolution (CR), the CCP decided to restore the People’s Congress system. The resolution by the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party instructed to strengthen the people congress system and gradually exercise the people’s direct democracy at grassroots governance and in social life. In his report to the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Deng Xiaoping pointed out, “At this moment, we specially need to emphasize democracy. Because in long past, democratic centralism had not really been implemented, if we stress centralism to the neglect of democracy, there will be few democratic factors.” He further suggested guaranteeing the democratic rights conscientiously for workers and peasants. In 1979 China held the election of representatives to the People’s Congress at local level, the first after the CR.5 Furthermore, the new village organization, which first emerged in Guangxi at the beginning of the 1980s, offered a model for the Central Government leaders who were eager to design an organization as a substitute for the dissoluted People’s Commune and Brigade system. Yan Minfu, a former vice minister of MCA, who was directly responsible for the department of Basic-Level Governance and Community Development, revealed that the central government made the decision to have village committee as a substitute for the People’s Commune on the base of the MCA’s summary report on local experiences such as village committee, the agency for motion (yi shi hui), or management committee (gui wei hui), public security group (zhi an Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected Works from Deng Xiaoping), Volume (Beijing: the People’s Press, 1984), 144 &146. 40 xiao zu).6 At that time village committee and village elections accorded with the real situation and needs: there was a new rural economic system as well as more freedom and democratic rights among the peasants, and the old economy of planning and ordering from above was gone. Despite the reasons mentioned above, however, village elections and selfgovernance would not necessarily and automatically emerge, because more crucial to the matter was the incumbent elites’ choice. As Amy B. Epstein pointed out, the democratic seeds are being planted in China’s villages not by dissidents or even by the masses, but by reformers in the Chinese government.7 The benefits of implementing village elections such as improvement of the relationship between the cadres and mass gave political elites and in particular central leaders sufficient confidence to see that the CCP's legitimacy in rural China would be built most effectively through village elections. For example, one reason for the Party’s support to village elections is that the Party hoped village self-governance might be an answer to the worsening relations between the Party and the peasantry. In short, the implementation of village elections was a result of a series of the policies made by the national leaders who went in quest of how to better organize rural government and maintain village’ social stability after the agricultural reform. Wang Zhenyao, interviewed by the author, Beijing, China, September of 2001. Yan Minfu, interviewed by He Baogang, Beijing, China, July of 1998. Amy B. Epstein, “Village Elections in China: Experimenting with Democracy,” in Crisis and Reform in China, ed. E. Bliney (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 1997), 152. 41 2.2 Political Elites’ Game and the Process of the Passage of the People’s Republic of China Organic Law on Village Committees According to the game theory, a game is composed of five elements: the actors that play the game; the sequence of choices actors face; the information actors have about the game; all the logically possible outcomes of the game; and preference over all outcomes of all actors.8 However, besides the five elements, the kinds of resources available to the actors are also very important in the process of a game. The process of the Organic Law on the Village Committee of the People's Republic of China enacted is an interesting case. Regarding the game players, there are two characteristics in the case of the Organic Law. First, mass public’s influence on the Organic Law formulation and enactment was very weak. At the beginning of the reform, pressure from peasants could scarcely influence the choices of political elites: “When elections were first introduced into rural China, peasants hardly had any say in the process.” Second, the defender was not opposite to challenger. Both of them are situated inside the system (ti zhi nei). In a sense, they share the same motive, namely, both of them wanted to enhance the party control over the rural China. The information about the game is also important, which mainly covers two dimensions: whether there is adequate information available and whether there is accurate or appropriate information available on the game to the players. The players rely on information to make their judgments on which alternative should be taken. Regarding village elections and self-governance, more important is what information the reformers and the opponents had respectively. Actually most of the disputes about Gerardo L.Munck, “Game Theory and Comparative Politics: New Perspective and Old Concerns,” World Politics 53 (January 2001): 192. Shi Tianjian, “Village Committee Elections in China: Institutionalist Tactics for Democracy,” World Politics 51 (April 1999): 389 & 394. 42 village self-governance involve the truth of the information the disputers had. For example, whether or not village elections are helpful to rural social stability is to an extent dependent on the information. Because rural China is so huge and complicated that anyone can easily find a case to support his or her own stand. There were some groups and political elites at the central government who supported and wanted to embark village elections. Peng Zhen was one of the few CCP senior veterans who strongly supported the implementation of village self-governance. A number of others came from the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee was the major representative at the power center who opposed village election. Let me first remove the mass public and then simply presume that there were two players: the reformer and the opponent. Here the letters “ND”, “OD”, “RG”, “OG”, “RC”, and “OC” will be used as main symbols for the principal alternatives in preference ordering. Village election and self-governance should replace the appointment system after the commune’s end; the higher authorities and village branch of the Party not control or manipulate the village election. This alternative is a new model, we here will denote as “ND”. “OD” represents the unchanged, namely, the maintenance of appointment model usually existed in Maoist era, an old model. “RG” represents this situation: facing the strong opposition the reformer gives in, giving up his endeavor to conduct political reform in rural China. “OG”, on the contrary, represents the opponent’s giving in. “RC” and “OC” represent the compromises made by the reformer and the opponent respectively. Theoretically 12 possible outcomes can be derived from the combinations of pairs of alternatives, but four possible outcomes are significant: NDOD, NDOG, RGOD, and RCOC. 43 (1) NDOD: The choice of new model by the reformers and maintenance of Maoist Era model by the opponents. The NDOD means the outcome is in a stalemate and no action. (2) NDOG: The choice of new model by the reformers and giving in by the opponents. The outcome “NDOG” means that the opposition finds him in a marginal position, he has to agree with the reform without any conditions attached, while the reformer can implement the village election according to his desires. (3) RGOD: Giving in by the reformers and maintenance of Maoist Era model by the opponents. The outcome “RGOD” means rural China remain the status quo of the appointment way, namely, village head is appointed by higher authorities but not elected by villagers. (4) RCOC: The choice of compromise by both of the reformers and the opponents. “RCOC” means the reformer has encountered opposition and has to make some necessary concessions, while equally the opponent cannot absolutely oppose village self-governance. The result is just a compromise. However, this can be divided into two types: one is “RDC”, meaning although the reformer encountered the opposition and had to make a concession to the opponent, he can embark village self-governance under his dominance, another is “ODC”, meaning that there would be a limited reform under the opponent control. Obviously, NDOG is the most preferred by the reformer and the worst for the opponent. If this outcome could not be pursued completely, the reformer would by all means try to avoid the outcome of RGOD. Thus, the second best for the reform player would be opting for RDC. NDOD is a worse outcome for both the reformer and the 44 opponent, because the most anxious of both sides were the chaos that could result from the crisis of local level leadership. Theoretically, RGOD and RDOG are the worst for the reformer and the opponent respectively. Thus, the reform player prefers alternatives from greater to lesser: NDOG>RDC>ODC>NDOD>RGOD. Equally, the opposition player orders his preference in this way: RGOD>ODC>RDC>NDOD>RDOG. To the reformer and the opponent, crucial is how to avoid the worst outcome and win the most preferred one. The dilemma is that the worst of the reformers is probably the most preferred of the opposition and conversely the worst of the opponent is the most preferred of the reformers. The possible outcomes of bargaining are to a great extent dependent on four aspects: players’ position and the relation to the issue under bargaining, players’ capabilities, the players’ strategies and tactics, and the context the issue under bargaining located in. Shi Tianjian argues that the intelligence, skill and sophistication of political actors are key factors in their understanding of institutional constraints, their formulations of preference, and their design of strategies to pursue their goals.10 The position is defined not only in terms of the player’s position in the governmental hierarchy, but also in terms of specific organizations, for example, the Ministry of Civil Affairs or the Organizational Department of CCP Central Committee or National People’s Congress (NPC). The capabilities are defined not only in the players’ formal authority to take decisions, but also on some informal resources such as seniority. The alternative in the course of action is called “tactics”. NDOD is one of the possible outcomes. This outcome means that the reformer hoped to conduct political reform to adapt to the changing countryside with the 10 Ibid., 411. 45 Chapter Delivery1: Roles and Strategies of Provincial Elites2 Regarding policy implementation in China, a common practice is that once the law, rules and regulations, policies of village elections and self-governance were established and publicized, they should become effective in all the provinces at roughly the same time. However, the implementation of village self-governance did not occur at the same time all provinces at. This chronological disparity poses an interesting question: What are the causes for this phenomenon? There are three factors that could be decisive as to whether or not a locality would adopt a policy, and how it should be implemented: intrinsic properties of the policy, a local politics, and the pressures from upper and low levels of the Chinese government. The diffusion or implementation of policy among provinces in China is naturally a complicated phenomenon3, and one factor alone cannot offer a complete explanation. This chapter focuses on the role of political elites at the provincial level, an intermediate level of government in China4, on their networks in the process of village Frederick Teiwes has noticed the importance of province level elites as the critical point of interface between policy-makers and policy-implementers. See Frederik Teiwes, “Provincial Politics in China: Themes and Variations,” in China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, ed. John Lindbeck (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), 116-192. Provincial level here includes provinces (sheng), autonomous regions (zizhi qu), and the centrally administered municipalities (zhixiashi). For simplicity, province is used to signify province, autonomous regions, and the centrally administered municipalities. Regarding diffusion, it is a naturally useful conceptual framework for demonstrating how the central laws and relevant institutions of village democracy have been implemented via local governments. So-called diffusion refers to the process by which institutions, policies, practices, behaviors, or norms are transmitted between individuals and/or between social systems. Diffusion naturally takes time. The Organic Law (Provisional) passed in 1987 was in effect for ten years before all the provinces fully accepted the concept of village self-governance. Political elites at the intermediate play a role of diffusing, but diffusion would encounter some difficulties as it proceeds. “Local” does not always refer to a small area. This term can be applied to anywhere outside the political 84 democracy, and particularly on their crafting strategies. Provincial elites play an important role in conditioning institutional environment of village self-governance, which is crucial to the spread of the central government’s policy. The key point is whether these actors can succeed in activating some vital governmental agencies within their own administrative zone to put village self-governance mechanism in action. Therefore, they must adopt village elections, which may become models for the other provinces and then major political elites in charge of village self-governance affair can craft and supply more democratic institutions and policies for village democracy. 3.1 Disparity in Democratic Quality of Village Elections among Provinces 3.1.1. Key Questions It is not difficult for people to find that the implementation of village selfgovernance is different among provinces and the democratic quality of village elections varies from place to place. In one report, the International Republican Institute (IRI) has also found that the quality of village elections can vary greatly in different provinces and argues that the differences are due largely to widely varying provincial interpretations of the Provisional Organic Law of Village Committee.5 Before putting forward and explaning key questions, it is necessary for us to weigh the democratic quality of village elections by some measures. However, it is center and below the national level of interaction. In Chinese political terms, “local” political units include all subdivisions of a political system hierarchically inferior to the national state and party, usually referring to the township, county (city), and the provincial levels. Further, as Goodman said, although provinces are often referred to as “local” in China, “they are more accurately regarded as an intermediate level of government”. See David S.G. Goodman, “Structuring Local Identity: Nation, Province and County in Shanxi during the 1990s,” The China Quarterly 172 (2002): 839-840. International Republic Institute, “China’s Village Elections Law Improved,” IRI Working Paper (Winter 1998), at (accessed: 20/12/2003). 85 somewhat difficult to measure the degree of democracy. The Ministry of Civil Affairs introduced four criteria for democratic elections at the village level: (a) that the chairman, vice chairman, and members of village committees be directly elected by the villager themselves, (b) that the number of candidates exceeds the number of positions, (c) that voting be conducted by secret ballot, and (d) that the winning candidates receive more than half the votes.6 Yet some questions naturally arise here. Why in terms of village elections are some provinces more democratic than others? Why can the institution of village selfgovernance and village elections be successfully implemented in some areas whereas in others areas it can’t? A further question can be asked in view of the fact that 30 provinces in China were granted equal rights to establish village self-government by the Chinese Constitution of 1982 and the Organic Law of 1987. One may ask why some village elections have won praise and approval from the central government, foreign observers as well, from the villagers, while others elections have not. Can this new institution really grow and develop at various paces in different areas with similar political background? In Robert D. Putnam’ words, what makes democracy work? Larry Diamond and Ramon H. Myers assert that to be democratic, elections must not only be regular, competitive and meaningful, they must be also free and fair. See Larry Diamond and Ramon H. Myers, “Introduction: Elections and Democracy in Greater China,” in Elections and Democracy in Greater China, eds. Larry Diamond and Ramon H. Myers (Oxford University Press, 2000), 2-3. Robert A. Pastor and Qingshan Tan assess the democratic quality of village elections by three objective criteria: openness of nomination and selection of candidates, choice among candidates, and secret ballot. They further pointed out that one should judge an election within the context of a country’s history. See Robert A. Pastor and Qingshan Tan, “ The Meaning of China’s Village Elections,” in Elections and Democracy in Greater China, eds. Larry Diamond and Ramon H. Myers (Oxford University Press, 2000), 142-143. Wang Zhenyao et al once present seven criteria: (1) the harmonious extent between township governments and village committees; (2) the standardization of township governmental guidance to village committee’s work; (3) enlargement and institutional insurance of villager’s democratic voting (4) the development and institutional insurance of democratic policy-making; (5) fulfillment and institutional insurance of democratic management; (7) self-governance and democratic culture. See Wang Zhenyao, Bai Gang and Wang Zhongtiao eds., Zhongguo cunmin zizhi qianyan (The Frontier of China’s Village Self-governance) (Beijing: China’s Social Sciences Press, 2000), 291. 86 Using the above criteria, it seems that Fujian, Jilin, Liaoning, Sichuan, Hebei, Shanxi, Hunan, and Yunan (after 2000) are ranked as top eight, while Guangxi (before 2000), Guangdong, Yunan(before 2000), Shanghai, Zhejiang, Anhui etc. are ranked as the bottom ones in village self-governance at provincial level.7 Additionally, Lishu County of Jilin Province, Qianxi County of Hebei Province, Linyi County of Shanxi Province, Xuchang County of Hennan Province, Linli County of Hunan Province, and LongyanSystems: Theoretical Problems and Cross-national Experiences, eds. Gary D. Wekkin, Donald E. Whistler, Michael A. Kelley, and Michael A. Maggiotto (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers,1993), 9. 53 Geoffrey Pridham, The Dynamics of Democratization: a Comparative Approach (London, New York: Continuum, 2000), 93. 54 A. Lijphart, “The Southern European Examples of Democratization: Six Lessons for Latin America,” Government and Opposition 27 (winter 1990): 72. 55 S. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics 18 (April 1965): 394. 73 in every province, cultivating close ties with local authorities who were receptive to the program and attempting to win over those who were not. The MCA knew the importance of institutional construction very well. Just after the passage of the provisional Organic Law, the first thing the MCA did was to select “demonstration sites” and sum up the experiences, attempting to extend village selfgovernance in wider areas and let the law officially pass. The Ministry of Civil Affairs designated some locations as “demonstration sites”, giving them special attention and guidance. The criteria for setting up demonstration villages for village elections included a high voter turnout in village committee election, high level of economic development, and effective implementation of state policies in the village. By 2000, China had in total 587 counties/cities, 14067 townships, and 265730 villages as village self-governance demonstration units (see Table 2.2). It is necessary to point out that the elites from MCA have actively summed up and improved the local experiences and tried to institutionalize them too. Probably the best-known cases are the introductions of “sea-election” (haixuan) and villagers’ representative assembly system. The process of experimentation led to the standardization of the practices as stipulated in the new Organic Law passed in 1998. Take for example the case of villagers’ representative assembly system. The system refers to the assemblies of village representatives to discuss and decide important affairs of a village and supervise the work of village committee. This institution was first created by peasants and then supported and improved by the government. Around 1983, in some villages of Hebei, Fujian, Jiangsu, and Liaoning provinces, appeared several initial forms of village representative assembly system. Article of Hubei Provincial Implementation Methods of “Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees” (1989) stipulates that the large or more-populated villages can establish villagers’ 74 representative assembly system (yi shi hui) to supervise and assess the work of village committees and discuss and decide the village affairs involving in villagers’ interests. A report entitled “On the Establishment of Villagers’ Representative Assemblies” written at the end of 1989 by the Nanchong Prefecture’s Bureau of Civil Affairs of Table 2.2 Basic Data on the Numbers of Villager’s Committees and Village Selfgovernance Demonstration Units Regions Villagers’ Village self-governance demonstration units committees Counties/cities Townships/towns Villages Total 731659 587 14067 265730 Anhui 29735 21 728 11697 Beijing 4039 77 1354 Fujian 14834 22 493 9986 Guangdong 21942 23 339 2799 Guangxi 14750 31 397 3923 Guizhou 25696 657 12627 Hainan 2568 44 509 Hebei 49433 52 1172 24524 Heilongjiang 17285 36 445 6814 Henan 48206 23 939 23341 Hubei 32001 21 569 14251 Hunan 47525 24 636 13328 Inner 13498 34 598 5753 Monolia Jiangsu 32573 39 834 19219 Jiangxi 20518 16 540 4717 Jilin 10054 14 424 4295 Liaoning 15924 19 440 7151 Ningxia 2718 159 1102 Qinghai 18034 13 526 6327 Sha’anxi 32253 29 456 6126 Shandong 87504 27 723 31380 Shanghai 2771 60 1407 Shanxi 31355 321 3518 Sichuan 54996 19 1412 25611 Tianjin 3834 70 1126 Tibet 6354 54 76 795 Xinjiang 9556 133 2209 Yunnan 14968 79 795 Zhejiang 42037 18 325 11322 Source: Editorial Board of Yearbook of Democratic and Political Grassroots Construction in China, 2001 zhongguo nongcun jiceng minzhu zhengzhi jianshe nianjian (2001’ Yearbook of Democratic and Political Grassroots Construction in China) (Beijing: China Society Press, 2002), 560. 75 Sichuan Province brought to MCA’s attention. Since 1990, the Ministry of Civil Affairs began to engage itself in promoting the system. MCA summarized up local experiences, and began to revise the “Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees”, with the intention to write the villagers’ representative assembly into the law. At last this system was approved by the 1998’ Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees and became an important democratic institution at village level, making village selfgovernance better and more perfect. The supply of the institutions concerning village elections and self-governance is a major task or area of the political elites’ crafting at national level. (IV) Relying on the China Council for the Promotion of Basic- Level Governments and Mass Organizations To carry out political reform with any degree of success, the officials at MCA knew they had to find a new basis of solidarity, cohesion, and identification, and a new organizational form – something that could bring a large group of leaders to act together in performing the task of crafting and implementing village elections and in responding to the demands of the times in a more productive and effective manner. Established in 1989, the China Council for the Promotion of Basic- Level Governments and Mass Organizations (CCPBGMO), a semi-official organization under MCA’s leadership, was an organizational basis for the ministry to unite relevant officials to promote self-governance. Its aim is to “unite scholars who study on grassroots power construction, local leaders, and prevalent governmental agencies and institutions” to promote China’s grassroots power construction. The ministry tried to construct a working network, which can communicate between the higher and lower 76 levels, contact crosswise. CCPBGMO has also contributed to rural democratic construction. In November 1995, MCA established the China Society for the Development of Townships and Towns (CSDTT) based on CCPBGMO. In 1998, CSDTT merged into the China Council for the Promotion of Development of Urban Communities, and was under the China Social Work Association. The Council has been an organizational basis of MCA and particularly Wang’s network, while many of its members became the core of this network. The members of the council were the core of MCA’s network. For example, among the executive members of the second term of the council, Fey Yongcheng of Lishui County Party Committee of Jilin Province, Liu Guodong of Jilin Department of Civil Affairs, Zhang Zhenlang and Zhang Xiaogan of Fujian Department of Civil Affairs, Yu Weiliang of Sha’anxi Department of Civil Affairs and many others have made great contributions to village democracy. They were crucial actors in promoting their local village selfgovernance. The second term of the Rural Work Committee under the council led by Wang Zhenyao had total 105 township/town units. Comparatively speaking, the MCA lacks organizational resources to administer township. However, this council has contacted the MCA and some township leading officials. In view of the fact that many local leaders opposed or boycotted village elections particularly in the initial stage, MCA hoped that more and more local leaders and in particular township leading officials would be more likely to be partners with MCA, rather than the adversaries of village elections, through recruiting these leaders into CSDTT. Wang Zhenyao once said he had many local friends who gave him assistances with his work. 56 These members became MCA’s human resource to implement village self-governance, while local leaders embedded in his network can get some resources such as information, for 56 Wang Zhenyao, interviewed by the author, Beijing, China, September 2001. 77 example, we can guess, those embedded in the network (CCPBGMO) more probably become village self-governance demonstration units. (V) Three Co-operation Projects Although macro circumstances, law and institutions are important, the talented operators are indispensable too. According to Alexis De Tocqueville, American democracy model is deeply ingrained in the American psyche, which means democracy is natural state of affairs, people will naturally set up electoral system like their own if they are given one choice. China did not have a democratic tradition, however. The past experiences show that the details of village election procedures must be taught, learned, and supervised. The village self-governance could not effectively be implemented without relevant qualified election officials. Hence, training is a main way to achieve this goal. The MCA brings provincial, county, township levels’ officials and even village leaders together for workshop and training classes, through which they can learn from the advanced or successful experiments of other areas on village elections and self-governance. However, training is one of the major challenges currently facing the MCA. According to the MCA, around 1.5 million township-level officials need to be trained in order to better implement village democracy nationwide. For this, the MCA has opened one training centre in Beijing and cooperated with foreigners to carry out three projects focusing on training. Chinese Rural Cadres Training Center Programme China Rural Official Training Centre (CROTC) is a project jointly approved by the United Nations Development Programme and the Chinese government. The recipient agency is the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The original duration is years 78 (1996-1999). With additional funding from the Government of Finland since 1998, the Project is able to extend to the end of 2000. The goal is to promote Chinese rural democracy by providing training in villager’s self-governance. In this project, the trainees include officials with provincial to county Bureau of Civil Affairs who are in charge of promoting villagers selfgovernance, chief leaders of township/ town governments, and part of elected villagers’ committee members. From 1996 to 2000, CROTC had run a total of 17 classes in Beijing, Hebei, Fujian, Yunnan, Hunan, Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Jilin respectively, over two thousands being trained. Up to now, CROTC has developed three sets of textbooks for trainees at different levels: a series of rural basic-level power construction books for the staff of the Civil Affairs, a series of village self-governance knowledge books for township, village cadres and villagers, and a series of village self-governance knowledge books for village cadres; five sets of videotapes, one set of CD-ROM, and some posters. In 2000, the main tasks of CROTC organised the pilot training courses for case studies and preparing the materials for them. Textbooks (a) offer the basic knowledge on elections; (b) convey political elites’ ideas or strategies to local cadres. Furthermore, trainees learn about the foreign countries’ elections and local governance through the textbooks by CROTC.57 Members of the Project team believe the Project will have a sustainable impact on promoting rural democracy at the grass-roots level even after its completion. According to the MCA, the Project has achieved a great deal effect since it went into 57 Editorial Board of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China, ed., 2001 zhongguo nongcun jiceng minzhu zhengzi jianshe nianjian (Yearbook 2001 of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China), 542. 79 operation two years ago, and has been well-received by all target groups. It will also enhance self-governance at the grass-roots level. Chinese Village Affairs Management Training Programs: the Co-operation between MCA and EU 58 The EU-China Training Program on Village Governance is an intergovernmental project between the European Union and the People's Republic of China. On 22 May 2001, the Commission of the European Union and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation, acting on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, started this project by signing a program-financing agreement. The agreement provided for a contribution from the European Union of more than 10.6 million euros. A contribution in cash and kind from the Chinese Government was set for an amount totaling more than million euros. The program is expected to run for five years, ending on 28 May 2006. On the Chinese side, the Ministry of Civil Affairs is responsible for implementing the program. The program’s objectives are to (a) contribute to long-term co-operation and understanding between the People's Republic of China and the European Union; (b) enhance understanding and observance of the laws and regulations governing village elections on the part of villagers, their elected representatives and rural officials in their administrative and managerial functions; and (c) promote the development of village self-governance by raising the level of awareness for democratic elections at the village level, support democratic management, and improve transparency in 58 See Editorial Board of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China, ed., Yearbook 2001 of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China, 543. The Ministry of Civil 80 respect to election procedures as well as the duties of elected representatives within the framework of existing Chinese laws and regulations. In order to achieve these goals, the EU-China Training Program on Village Governance conducts training programs and develops information campaigns for rural officials, elected village representatives, and the villagers themselves. Its main activities include training trainers, producing teaching materials and carrying out research to support these activities. Standardization of Villagers’ Committee Election Procedures On March 14, 1998, the Carter Center and the Ministry of Civil Affairs signed a Memorandum of Understanding, officially launching The Carter Center's China Village Elections Project. On April 26, 2000, both sides signed “The Cooperative Agreement between The Ministry of Civil Affairs and The Carter Center to Standardize Villager Committee Election Procedures”. This agreement is designed to develop model and replicable electoral practices through the following activities: (1) establish a complete data collection system in Fujian and Jilin provinces and in one third of the counties in Sha’anxi province; (2) conduct academic research on standardizing election procedures; (3) print and distribute voter education materials; (4) train provincial and county level election officials in electoral laws, procedures and information delivery techniques; (5) continue dialogue, share experiences and publicize village level election information; and (6) conduct bilateral exchanges between the MCA and The Carter Center.59 Affairs has established a program homepage to offer the detail of the project activities and other data. See also . 59 Editorial Board of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China, ed., Yearbook 2001 of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China, 543. See also, the Carter Center, “Project Chronology of 26/04/2000”, the Carter Center Web site, 81 6. Conclusion At national level, there is a core of political elites with reform-minded who cluster round the Ministry of Civil Affairs, while some key people at the highest reaches of the party publicly and strongly supported the ministry’s officials and their goals. This chapter traces back to the process of the passage of the People’s Republic of China Organic Law on Villagers’ Committees, and the roles of Pen Zhen and the reform-oriented official at the Ministry of Civil Affairs and particularly Wang Zhenyao in the process of implementing village elections and self-governance. This study illustrates the importance of strategies. Three kinds of resources the elites employed have been identified and analyzed: empowerment and top leaders’ support, the expectation and pressures from peasants, and their own interest pursuit. Thereby they can and have effectively constructed a sound environment, formulated the law, rules and regulations, and policies, built institutions, and trained the executors for village elections and self-governance. These elites have fully used various means, methods, and strategies to build up a momentum for village self-governance, and then force the issue onto the local agendas. In brief, one outstanding role of national political elites is to launch village self-governance, design and improve institutions, and formulate policies concerned to push village democracy forward. In this sense, their crafting of village democracy represents a reform politics. It is necessary to point out that many Chinese people and particularly peasants think that the central policies are good, but the “Buddhist monks” (lower level cadres) not accurately recite the scriptures. From this standpoint, even in cases where the central policy and institutional design are the best, these policies and institutions may . 83 [...]... needs to operate with some official within his elite chain Actually, the officials of China’s political systems have certainly long aware of the workings of network, informal or formal The officials at the MCA also employ network to perform their task of promoting village self-governance This network is more vertical and based on Wang’s position and personal relations The elites clustered around Wang... draft Villagers’ Committee Organic Rules, and in April of 1987, in the view of the importance of this law, the fifth session of the sixth Peoples’ National Congress suggested to change the title of Villagers’ Committee Organic Rules into The Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees of People’s Republic Of China.15 The first round of the debate/struggle ended with the reformers’ 13 Ma Mingjie, “Zhe yibu laizhibuyi:... Law and political Authority in the PRC, USC Seminar no.10 of The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995, 14 Second, the first generation revolutionaries of the Chinese Communist Party such as Mao Zedong had strong faith and were hungry for national independence, glory, and democracy Peng Zhen had the ideas and faith in legalization, democratization, the mass line of the CCP, and a firm belief in the. .. ordering the NPC and the MCA to make an investigation and summarize Yishan’s experience, and promote it In April of 19 82, in the speech for the draft of the new Chinese constitution, he suggested that villagers’ committees should become a mass autonomous organization, and the NPC should list it in an article of the new constitution He urged NPC to work out the regulations for villagers’ committees after the. .. a result of his great efforts, on November 24 of 1987 just before Peng Zhen’s resignation from the post of chairman of the Sixth NPC Standing Committee, the NPC officially issued the Organic Law on Villagers’ Committees of the People’s Republic of China (for trial implementation) After the Tian An Men crackdown, the opposition criticized the village elections, regarding it as an example of the “bourgeois... maintain the appointment way without any change.11 The symbolic event was that the revised Chinese Constitution (19 82) affirms the legal position of villagers’ committee and village elections Furthermore, the Commune system collapsed in 1983, never to return However, it was difficult to approach the outcome of NDOG, because China was just at the initial stage of the reform and opening to the world, and the. .. his colleagues, the officials from the Civil Affairs, and local official and even village heads Wang’s cluster is the main 59 carrier of rural democratization of China, while he was a leading player of this cluster 35 Given the “soft” task of village self-governance as well as the MCA’s weak position in power structure and hierarchy, and to broaden their base of support for implementing village self-governance,... China At national level, there is a three-tiered structure of laws and rules and regulations of village election consisting of the Constitution, the Organic Law, and Department rules and regulations The top one is the 19 82 Chinese Constitution, article 111 of which stipulates that the neighborhood committees and villagers’ committees established in residential areas in cities and villages in rural areas... block the rural democratic progress Wang guards against the radical thoughts that expect a democratic system to be perfect A gradual policy to promote village elections adopted by the MCA has been proved to be correct 2. 4 .2 The Core Members of the Elites Network: Wang, Zhan and Their Colleagues at the MCA Why could Wang Zhenyao succeed in the process of implementing village elections? Of course, there... rural political change: bargaining or negotiating on the Organic Law between the reformist advocators and the conservative opposition forces This characteristic shaped the manner and extent of the implementation of village self-governance in rural China 2. 3 Senior Political Elites and Village Elections Adam Przeworski makes an in-depth analysis of the important choices made by actors in moving their . discuss the roles of senior political elites and particularly Peng Zhen, and the officials at the MCA, in particular Wang Zhenyao and his elite network. I will then show how the officials at the. 1 52. 41 2. 2 Political Elites Game and the Process of the Passage of the People’s Republic of China Organic Law on Village Committees According to the game theory, a game is composed of five. model by the reformers and maintenance of Maoist Era model by the opponents. The NDOD means the outcome is in a stalemate and no action. (2) NDOG: The choice of new model by the reformers and