Making democracy work the crafting and manipulation of chinese village democracy by political elites 4

Chapter A Multifaceted Role: Political Elites at the County and Township Levels Classical elite democratic theory mainly focuses on the roles of national elites, and says very little about local elites. Local elites and local democracy are perceived as part of the small picture from the point of view of elite theory. Moreover, the media tends to focus on the big picture, paying very little attention to what it sees as the relatively minor issues of local elites and local democracy. This chapter attempts to fill in this research gap through an examination of the important role played by local elites in the context of Chinese village elections. This chapter examines the role of county and township authorities in Chinese village elections: how local leaders craft or manipulate village elections for their utilitarian purposes, and how they perceive village elections. It will explore the strategies and attitudes of local leaders toward village elections in terms of active or passive support, resistance, and strategies of manipulation. The chapter comprises four sections and a conclusion. The first discusses the various roles played by local leaders in implementing village election law. The second discusses their different attitudes towards village elections. The third discusses the corresponding strategies. The fourth discusses how some local officials intervene, influence and even manipulate village elections. And finally there is a conclusion. The township or town government is at the lowest administrative unit of the Chinese governmental pyramid. Township (xiang) and town (zhen) are administratively of equal rank. For simplicity, township is hereafter used to refer to both of township and town. In addition, we use the term ‘township authorities’ in a general way. It includes both party and government leaders at the township level. And county and countycity (xian ji shi) are administratively of equal rank, and for administrative purpose a county-city is organized as a city in China. 135 4. A Multifaceted Role Generally speaking, “village self-governance model counties” (cunmin zizhi shifanxian) in where village self-governance conduct and develop more successfully are those that have got leading officials’ strong support and their success is inseparable from key actors’ efforts. Fei Yongcheng, deputy secretary of Lishu County’s Party Committee, Zhou Lianjun, director of Lishu’s Bureau of Civil Affairs, Liu Zhenlong, secretary of Linyi County’s Party Committee and Zhang Zonghu, director of Linyi Bureau of Civil Affaires, are typical supporters and political actors at the county’s level.2 4.1.1 A Connecting Link between Leadership Above and the Mass Down Below As an authority of a locality, county and township governments have responsibilities for practically every aspects of local life. In the current political system, they are described as a key linkage between governments and villages, particularly township leading officials are considered critical for policy implementation. Provinces have traditionally been important political and administrative units in the Chinese bureaucratic state. There are some differences in roles between province and county. Provincial elites mainly offer rules and regulations, the policy setting, and investigation of enforcing the laws, while a county is a unit that directly organizes the implementation of village elections and self-governance. And the county civil affairs system and in particular, its section of grassroots governance construction, is designated to be in charge of the routine work on the construction of the grassroots governance and guide the work of village self-governance. Compared with township government, county government has Wang Zhenyao, Bai Gang and Wang Zhongtiao eds., Zhongguo cunmin zizhi qianyan (The Frontier of China’s Village Self-governance) (Beijing: China’s Social Sciences Press, 2000), 289-290. 136 more governmental functions as well as power to assign township leaders. With the county’s effective administrative control, county, as a direct participant, is thus a major force to launch village self-governance.3 On the other hand, since county government has more scope for action than township government, the county may take a more detached attitude towards village self-governance. As the lowest level of the state administration, township authority is responsible for implementing national, provincial, and county level policies and specific directives. Their intentions, working style and methods, understanding, and attitudes towards village self-governance naturally have a direct bearing on village elections. Obviously, local authorities, namely county and township governments, play a role of a link between the authorities above, the national and provincial governments, and the masses down in the villages (cheng shang qi xia). They are an important link in political elites’ chain of crafting village democracy, operating as a “hinge” at the meeting point of state and society. If the national and provincial elites are the makers and providers of the laws and institutions concerned, the officials at county and township levels are the carriers. As carriers, they pass around the instructions, policies, and laws from higher authorities. 4.1.2 Coordinators, Arbitrators and Troubleshooters The village election is sometimes accompanied by the rise of the clan forces, which may account for some of the irregularities in vote seeking. When conflicts occur among villagers, a timely intervention by the township is necessary. Take for example Ibid., 445. 137 what happened in Zhejiang province. The vote seeking once led to violence in the election in Xijie Village of Hongqiao Township, Wenzhou municipality. The township government, with the help of police force, came out and put an end to the conflict. Only then was a village committee elected.4 In some villages of Shangyu city, clan forces were so strong that the government there felt it necessary to merge these villages with their neighbors, so as to weaken the clan forces.5 On the eve of the 1999 village election, the party secretary of Laofanqiao Township, Yuyao city, Zhejiang province, warned that he would not allow any disruption to the election. To ensure a smooth election, the township election committee, with assistance from the township general office of social order and security and the police, kept an eye on a number of influential local religious, factional, clan or business leaders. This close scrutiny effectively prevented any disorder that might have come from any of the above sectors.6 Peasants also need the township government to act as an arbiter. As we will see, the township authorities’ role of coordination and arbitration is also important in the dismissal of village committee members. According to Article 16 of the Organic Law, when a village head has proved to be unfit for the post, “village committee should at the earliest stage hold a meeting of villagers and vote for the dismissal proposal”. This means that the village committee should chair the dismissal meeting. But when the charged village head refuses to hold such a meeting, who will then be responsible for holding the Dept. of Civil Affairs of Wenzhou Municipality, “Guanyu dangqian Wenzhou nongcun shehui zhian zhuangkuang de diaocha baogao” (“A Report on Current Social Order and Security in Rural Wenzhou”) (May 1994). Investigation Team from the Ministry of Civil Affairs, “Zhejiangsheng cunji zhidu zhangkuang diaocha” (“Investigation on Village Institutions in Zhejiang Province”) (June 1994). Party Committee and Government of Laofangqiao Township, “Laofangqiaozhen diwujie cunweihui huanjie gongzhuo de shishi yijian” (“Directives on the 5th Village Election in Laofangqiao”) (Feb.1999). 138 meeting? According to Article of the electoral law, the township government should “direct, support and assist the work of the village committee.” In the implementation of the national law, the provinces have made more concrete regulations. The 1999 “Regulations for the Village Election in Zhejiang Province” stipulates that “When village committee has received the dismissal proposal for a month but has not hold the villagers’ meeting for voting, township government should help to hold the meeting for voting”. Without township’s support, it would have been impossible to remove the heads of Bailian villages of Ruian city, Zhejiang province, which happened in 1999 and it is said that this was a first dismissal case. In the dismissal cases, township authorities would try to give the impression of fairness and impartiality, which serves to strengthen their leadership. Moreover, the role of township government in the dismissal process once again points to the feasibility of Chinese rural democratization through a combination of authority and democracy. When some liberal intellectuals reject the role of authority in democracy, their appeal for democracy seems to be unrealistic and of little avail. Villagers need local authorities to create favorable conditions for a fair and democratic election to be conducted. However, as a troubleshooter, the county authority is more crucial in handling some troubles than township government is. Because under the current political system, villagers usually not trust township government to deal with some illegal cases happening in village elections, while the People’s court does not accept those cases.7 Indeed, local officials are often required to play a role of final arbiter because of the lack of an independent judiciary in Chinese cultural traditions. By contrast, in Australia, for example, local government elections are conducted under the auspices of an electoral commissioner and a deputy, both of whom hold independent statutory appointments, and are responsible for the impartial administration of electoral law. Such a system prevents local government from intervening in and manipulating the electoral process. 139 Additionally, according to national laws and local regulations, although People’s Congresses at different levels bear the responsibilities for accepting cases of petition and accusation from villagers, there are still some obstacles, either legislatively or operatively, for them to deal with the cases. As a result, villagers or villager leaders choose appealing to the higher authorities for help as means to solve them, and then some agencies of provincial government and county government and particularly departments of civil affairs become major agencies for villagers’ petitions. Consequently, civil affairs organs play an important role in handling villagers’ petitions and conducts detailed investigations into the allegations, correcting violations. 4.1.3 Institutional Crafters We cannot ignore the role of local political elites as institutional crafters. With the devolution of real authority to lower levels, local political elites can initiate policy reform. Some reform-minded local leaders have actively done some important institutional innovations for village self-governance. Particularly, since 1998, more and more local officials have displayed their interest in institutional innovation and made some tests on how to develop village democracy. Since the passing of the New Organic Law in 1998, more and more villages have presented the cases of dismissing their village committee members. However, due to the ambiguousness and over-simplicity of either the national Organic law or provincial laws, many problems have appeared. For example, when one village committee is not willing to launch the dismissal procedure, what to then is not clear in the relevant laws. If an attempted dismissal is not successful, after how long an interval the villagers can launch another dismissal is not clear, either. In the face of these problems, Xinxiang County of 140 Henan province especially makes a basic procedure of dismissing village committee members. This procedure offers very specific and detailed ways for villagers to dismiss village committee members. It is composed of six parts: (a) putting forward a dismissal motion; (b) accepting the motion; (c) rescinding the motion; (d) confirming the dismissal meeting and holding it; (e) passing the motion, and (f) supplementary articles. This procedure design enables villagers to dismiss those corrupted or incompetent cadres smoothly. Li Guomin, a director of Ruian City Justice Bureau, Zhejiang province, crafted a so-called “village head’s responsibility system”. To him, the crux of village selfgovernance is on the elected village leaders’ responsibility. Therefore, he designed a detailed institution named “village head’s civil compensation system” at the beginning of 2002 just before the city would conduct the village elections. This institution makes it possible to taking legal proceedings against the wrongdoings committed by village committee leaders during their term of office. During the term of village committee, if the head of the village committee commit a serious mistake, resulting in the loss of village property, the head of village financial affairs surveillance group, a legal representative empowered by the village self-governance Charter, will appeal to People’s court for legal proceedings against the faults; if other members of the committee commit wrong-doings, resulting in the loss of village property, the head of village committee as a legal representative empowered by the village self-governance Charter will appeal to People’s See the detail of this procedure in “Henansheng Xinxiangxian bai mian cunmin wei yuan hui cheng yuan di jiben chengxu” (“Xinxiang County’s Basic Procedure of Dismissing Village Committee Members”), in 2001 zhongguo nongcun jiceng minzhu zhengzi jianshe nianjian (Yearbook 2001 of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China), ed. Editorial Board of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China (Beijing: China Society Press, 2002) (Beijing: China Society Press, 2002), 406-407. 141 court for legal proceedings against the faults. This is completely a new model of village self-governance with some new contents. There are several hundred such “contract village committee heads” who are bound by such contracts during the 2002 village elections of Ruian city.9 Local officials’ innovation has been proved as a main way or channel for further promoting and deepening village democracy. Of course, many inspirations of local elites’ crafting new political mechanism came from the masses’ practices, and these elites only summarized and absorbed the village elites and masses’ initiative to improve the quality of village elections and self-governance. But the role of the officials is important. For instance, although Lishu villagers originally invented “sea election” or haixuan, it was Lishu county officials as well as Jilin provincial officials that refined this method and finally spread it nationwide as a model for village elections. Furthermore, when kinds of innovations prove to be feasible, they are not simply adopted by more localities, but will encourage more local political elites to innovate in rural democratic institutions. 4.1.4 Manipulators Local leaders, particularly township leaders, often have an “ill reputation” for controlling or manipulating village elections. Higher authorities like the Ministry of Civil Affairs criticize local leaders for any manipulation, while villagers complain of it. Many studies have dealt with the issue of how local leaders controlled and manipulated village elections. In China, state policies are transmitted through documents and normally only Ruian City Justice Bureau, “Shenhua yifa zhicun, qianghua cunguan zeren” (“Deepen Governing Villages according to Law, Strengthen Village Officials’ Duties”) (July 20, 2003). 142 local bureaucrats have access to these documents and the authority to interpret. 10 Therefore, local officials can often manipulate state policies to serve their own interests. The overwhelming roles and powers of local governments often provide county officials and particularly township leaders with many opportunities to control and manipulate elections. In practice, it is easy for a craftsman to turn into a manipulator in village election, whereas control or manipulation is obviously a negative act. This issue will be discussed in the fourth section of this chapter. These four roles, outlined above, demonstrate the power of local governments and the penetration by local administrative authorities into the process. They have played a multi-faceted role in village democracy development. 4.2 Attitudes towards Village Elections11 Local leadership is usually regarded as an obstacle to rural democratization, being always imaged to manipulate, interfere and control village election through various ways and measures. However, the story is not completely true. The roles and functions of local political elites are much complicated. As a whole, the local leader’s attitude towards village self-governance usually is dependent on three factors: position in political system, personal interest, and personal idea. Each coin has two sides. Local authorities are no exception. 10 Michel Oksenberg, “Methods of Communication within the Chinese Bureaucracy,” China Quarterly 91(1974): 1-39. 11 The county’s authorities share similar attitudes with township authorities. And in view of the latter’s more direct interaction with villagers, we mainly focus here on township leaders’ attitudes toward village elections and self-governance. 143 4.2.1 Opposition The first attitude is opposition. Those who hold such an attitude think village elections and the notion of autonomy make the implementation of party policies in rural areas more difficult and they fear these may intensify or trigger clan conflicts in the village thereby causing chaos. Also some leaders give priority to economic development and treat local democracy as a “soft task”. In this case, it has been difficult to get the issue of village committees on the agenda. There are conceptual as well as practical reasons for the opposition to elections among local leaders. In conceptual terms, two views are common among the opposition group. First, they think it is too early to conduct elections at this stage. Most township leaders whom I have interviewed thought the electorate law was premature and would not bring about the desired results. They even thought the laws unnecessary, because as local organizers of previous elections they were familiar with the former ways of holding elections and the peasants seemed to have no objection.12 My own survey indicates that 20.9 per cent of the respondents (township leaders) held such a view (see Table 4.1). Table 4.1 Is It Too Early to Hold the Election? Answer No. of respondents Percentage (%) Yes 24 20.9 No 80 69.6 Not sure No response 2.6 Total 115 100.0 12 Party Committee and Government of Laofangqiao Township, “Laofangqiaozhen diwujie cunweihui huanjie qingkuang de zongjie” (“A summary of the 5th Village Election in Laofangqiao”) (June 1999). 144 Table 4.6 Fifth Round of Ningbo Municipality Village Elections’ Expenditures Items Expenditures for village elections (unit: ten thousands) Village’s Total County’s Township’s Village allocation financial financial County numbers allocation allocation Cixi 811 32.3 222.4 262.7 Yuyao 770 30 47.2 257.9523 335.1523 Fenghua 590 17.6 140.7 164.3 Ninghai 832 10 57.5 271 338.5 Xiangshan 732 18.5 39 26 83.5 Ningxian 659 42.7 287.2 333.9 Haishu 16 10 18 Jiangdong 29 6.1 13.1 Jiangbei 110 4.15 4.2 20.7 29.05 Zhenhai 151 4.5 38 46.5 Beilun 262 16.8 177.8 201.6 Daxie 21 19.35 23.35 Total 4983 98.15 274.3 1477.2033 1849.6523 Source: Yearbook 2001 of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China, ed. Editorial Board of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China, Beijing: China Society Press (2002), 568. professionals with pensions and other benefits. Those who have been awarded the title of ‘good cadre’ for three successive years get the prospective of being promoted to be township cadres. 51 4.4 Control and Manipulation Political manipulation means that political players attempt to alter the rules of a game to their own benefit. Local elites have various motivations to interfere and try to control village elections, particularly the candidate nomination procedure. They need trusted people to perform the various tasks that have been set for the village. These tasks sometimes take the form of extended “governmental work”. The governments intervene 51 Dept. of Civil Affairs of Ningbo Municipality, “Guanyu cunweihui jiangshe qingkuang de diaocha baogao” (“A Report on the Building-up of Village Committee”) (27/05/1994). 171 to make sure that its functions will be carried out. “They will always be concerned with who the candidates are, and whenever they feel necessary, they will interfere, unless the township government changes its nature and functions or there is a law that forbids interference.”52 Government affairs and particularly tax collection and family planning and social order impose the responsibility upon the villages for their execution. Usually, village committee leaders are held responsible for the government affairs. In view of this situation, local governments often treat village leaders as state representatives. Recruitment to the villagers’ committee office naturally becomes the main concern of local governments and particularly township government in process of village elections. Hence, it is likely that township government will attempt either direct or indirect control of village elections, e.g., by manipulating candidates’ nomination. An electoral manipulation may involve these four variables: manipulators or players, the actual electoral law, players’ preferences, and players’ payoffs. Besides, success or failure in manipulation is to a great extent dependent on the resources players possess and the tools and skills players employ. Back to village elections in China, the manipulators or players are usually township government officials, while the important components of the Organic Law for manipulators, namely, local officials, include the nomination procedure and voting rule. The preferences mainly involve a player’s attitude towards the Organic Law. The players’ payoffs are here interpreted as the election results favored by the local officials, such as the election of their handpicked persons into the village committee. 52 Ren Yiqiu, An official of Provincial People’s Congress of Zhejiang, interviewed by the author, Hangzhou, Aug. 1999. 172 Village electoral manipulation can take place both during and after the elections, for there are both the control of the electoral procedure and the control of the elected village committee members. There are a number of ways of control and intervention by the local governments. However, before we discuss them, it is necessary to point out that it is township officials among local elites that usually the interference and control acts, which look quite “negative”. 4.4.1 Putting Emphasis on Local Rules and Regulations and Information Control First of all, local governments make local rules and regulations supplementary to provincial laws and regulations. The difference between local and provincial laws can be used to make intervention subtle and indirect rather than crude. As stipulated by both the national and provincial electoral laws, local governments have the right to make local electoral regulations. For example on the eve of the 1997 election in Fangcun Township, Zhejiang Province, two documents were issued: “Implementing Regulations for Village Election in Fangcun Township” and “Essential Qualifications for Village Committee Members”. Both documents were issued by the township’s leading group running for the village election, and were in some way different from the provincial laws. This was the result of the township government’s efforts to exercise control over the regulation of the election. Item of the “Qualifications”, for instance, states that a candidate should “be active in carrying out all tasks set by the township party committee and government”; therefore, cooperation with the authorities becomes a key requirement for the candidate.53 53 Zhu Genhua, postgraduate student of the Class 96, the Department of Political Science, Zhejiang University, “Minzhu fengxian yu zhili: 1997 nian Zhejiangsheng Changshanxian xuanju” (“The Risk of 173 In the meantime, local officials also selectively reveal, or control and even monopolize the information, rules and regulations on the village elections. Therefore, voters and candidates not know them well, which is favorable for local officials to manipulate village elections. Some township leaders never actively propagated the Organic Law and relevant rules and regulations, even blocked the passage of information concerned. Some county and township authorities did not organize the elected village cadres and village party branch members to learn the Organic law. For example, of the training courses, only 10% concerns village self-governance in a train for the elected village committee heads offered by Xuchang county of Henan province in May 1998, whereas Xuchang is even a village self-governance demonstration county.54 As a result, the township authorities can easily manipulate village elections due to the villagers’ lack of this kind of information and the knowledge. For example, some old villagers thought they did not have the right to vote for the aged. According to Yu Jianyong’s survey, in a Hunan’s village, around 73.07% villagers knew the existence of the named Organic Law, but did not know the detailed contents. 55 My own survey conducted in OctoberNovember in Zhejiang demonstrates the similar situation (see Table 4.7). 499 voters (around 40 %) did not know the Organic Law. In view of this situation, some Chinese scholars regard this situation as “insufficiency of policy supply”.56 Democracy and Governance - a Case Study of the 1997’ Elections in Fangcun Township of Changshan County, Zhejinag Province”)(October, 1997). 54 Wang Zhenyao et al., Zhongguo cunmin zizhi qianyan (The Frontier of China’s Village Self-governance), 538. 55 Yu Jianrong, Yuecun Zhengzhi (Yue Village’s Politics) (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2001), 417. 56 See Xiao Tangbiao et al, Duowei shijiao zhong de cunmin zhixuan: dui 13 cunweihui xuanju de yanju (Direct Village Elections: a Multi-perspectives) (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 2001), Ch. 1. 174 Table 4.7 Do you know the Organic Law? Answers Voter Numbers Know very much 67 Know 277 Just a few 370 Do not know 499 No answer 32 Total 1245 4.4.2 Setting up Leading Organizations Another way of control is through the setting up of leading groups for the village election. According to Regulations for the Operations of Village Election of Changshan County of Zhejiang province, “The election should be presided over by the village leading committee of election, whose 5-7 members should be recommended by the village party branch and village committee, and with approval from the township leading committee for election.” This is a revision of the provincial electoral law of Zhejiang, which changes the role of the township government from one of giving directions to one of leadership. The leading group of Fangcun Township was made up of 10 people, with the secretary of the township party committee acting as group leader, the township head and the chairman of the township people’s congress serving as deputy leaders, and all the party committee members and Deputy Township heads as members. In terms of decision-making, the group is effectively just another version of the township government. At the village level, all the 19 villages of Fangcun had the party secretary as head of the leading group running for election. There is no doubt, therefore, about the extent to which village elections are subject to the leadership and control of the township government.57 175 The situation in Fuyang City and Yuyao City of Zhejiang Province is similar. In Fuyang, a directive on village elections requires that “a directing group for election should be established in each township, with the party secretary as group head, and teams for specific work should be set up accordingly.” It also requires that “each village should set up a village election committee, with the village party secretary as its head.” 58 In the 1999 election in Laofangqiao, a township leading group was set up, with Xie Guican, the party secretary, as head, and Jiang Meijun, the township head, as his deputy. Each of the villages was required to produce an election committee via the village representatives’ assembly. The committee was made up of people from the village party branch, the outgoing village committee and mass organizations in the village. All its members were required to be registered at the township working group for the village election.59 The setting up of leading bodies for the election was meant to ensure more effective control over the village elections. 4.4.3 Holding Meetings Prior to election, township authorities usually hold meetings of village leaders, particularly village party secretaries. In most cases, in-village township cadres (zhucun xiangzhen ganbu) also attend the meetings. The meetings usually have three purposes. One is to check on the incumbent village cadres’ performances and the masses’ 57 Zhu Genhua, “Minzhu fengxian yu zhili: 1997 nian Zhejiangsheng Changshanxian xuanju”. 58 Fuyang City Government, “Fuyangshi cunmin weiyuanhui xuangju gongzhuo yijian” (“Directives on Village Election in Fuyang Municipality”) in Fuyangshi cunmin weiyuanhui xuangju xuexi ziliao huibian (A Collection of Study Materials on Village Election, Fuyang (Sept. 1997). 59 Party Committee and Government of Laofangqiao Township, “Guanyu wozhen diwujie cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie gongzuo de shishi yijian” (“Directives on the 5th Village Election in Laofangqiao” (June 1999). 176 assessment. Another is to brief directives from higher authorities on village elections and find out the will of the people, knowing the persons intended for village committee candidates. A third is to let village cadres know the intention of township authorities: who are the suitable persons for the committee in the mind of the township government, although the township does not directly convey it to village leaders. As a matter of fact, all the efforts are concentrated on achieving that consensus. Take some examples. Prior to the election conducted in 1998, Shiping Township of Jiande City of Zhejiang had held a meeting of party secretaries from its 11 villages. The purpose of the meeting was to reach consensus with the secretaries on the candidates for village heads and villagers generally thought it had a significant impact on the outcome of the elections. In June 1997, prior to the election, all villages in Fangcun Township of Changshan County of Zhejiang had held joint meetings between the village committee and the party branch. In-village township cadres or township leaders attended some of these meetings. Their aim was to produce provisionary candidates and then submit them for approval to township authorities. During the nomination process, invillage cadres and township leaders were able to influence the participants because of their special positions. Take the meeting in Jiehu village for example. At the beginning of the meeting, the attending township leader, who had responsibility for that village, proposed a study of the document entitled “Essential Qualifications for Village Committee Members” and asked each nominee to measure himself against those qualifications. Those who did not meet the requirements were advised to withdraw from the election. As a result five people withdrew. Those who wished to nominate were also advised to consider the qualifications in advance. As a result, six other people gave up their nominations. Then the meeting began to comment on the remaining candidates, 177 finally deciding that 11 of them should be referred to the township authorities for approval. During these discussions, the township leaders were able to convey the intentions of the authorities by saying “I think Comrade So-And-So is well qualified for a candidate.” Such comments carried much weight. Five of the 11 candidates submitted by Jiehu village to the township authorities were decided in this way, and all were approved. 60 The most important of these meetings is to let the village know and understand the intentions of the higher organization. 4.4.4 Influencing Villagers’ Attitudes and Behaviors Local leaders and particularly township officials their best to influence the attitude and behavior of the villagers through their authority and personal prestige. Some township leaders present themselves as the embodiment of power and ability in order to win the trust of the people, who will then vote according to the authorities’ desire. A study of Fangcun Township by Zhu Genghua shows that 67% of respondents would take into account, when voting, of the relationship between the candidate and the township government and 73% would vote for candidates recommended by the government.61 4.4.5 Directly Interfering with the Candidates’ Nomination Another manifestation of local governments control is direct interference with the nomination of candidates. Such interference is of great consequence because the nomination is crucially important to any election. It is the case the township leaders will 60 Zhu Genhua, “Minzhu fengxian yu zhili: 1997 nian Zhejiangsheng Changshanxian xuanju”. 61 Ibid. 178 try by whatever means to influence and interfere with the nomination procedure. In Hefu Village of Hefu Township, Huzhou municipality of Zhejinag province, candidates for the village committee had to go through four stages: nomination, recommendation, consultation and affirmation. (Similarly, in Indonesia, to become a village head, candidates must pass through a selection process. An examination of the records of 40 village elections between 1979 and 1981 shows that on average nearly 40% of prospective candidates were disqualified during the selection process.62) The township election regulations stipulate that the township government has the veto power. Those who have passed the consultation stage still need to get approval from the township government before they can become full candidates. 63 Other township governments likewise have directives and regulations concerned to ensure that they have the veto power over candidacy. In the summers of 1998 and 1999, Bao Xiaofeng conducted two studies on village elections and village autonomy in Hexi Village of Xiapu Township, Ningbo municipality. He found that in that village any of the eligible voters could nominate a candidate. Following this the village committee would gather all the subvillage heads, household representatives and party member representatives together to comment on the nominee. Then five of the nominees would be submitted to the township governments. This was the extent of the villagers’ power. According to the regulations in that township, the village should then send the nominees’ resumes to the government to be checked. Once approved, the resumes were to be returned to the village. Only then 62 Jim Schiller, Developing Jepara: State and Society in New Order Indonesia (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), 174. 63 Wang Ying (enrolled in 1997, School of Political Science, Zhejiang Univ.), “Hehucun cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju diaocha” (Study on the Election of Village Committee in Hehu Village) (1998 summer study). 179 would the nominees become candidates.64 A study by Wang Liu in Ningjiang Township, Ning County of Zhejinag, indicates that with the only exception of Xuanci village, candidates in all villages needed to be nominated by the village party branch and approved by township party committee. Again we see that the township authorities possess the veto power.65 A literacy test is another effective means of control. During the 1997 election in a Xincheng Town village of Ruian City of Zhejiang province, the Town leaders asked the three candidates to sit a literacy test so that two of them could be selected as formal candidates. Ultimately, the two candidates with primary education qualifications passed while the one with junior high school education failed. This caused widespread skepticism and criticism among the villagers and the town leaders were compelled to make the candidate with secondary education a formal candidate. He won 85% of the votes. 66 Some local authorities violated the villagers’ rights to nominate candidates. In Liuao Township, Sanmen County of Zhejiang province, the number of candidates in all previous village elections was the same as the number of available posts and candidates were all nominated by the village party branch and approved by township authorities before being presented for election to the villagers. In other words, the villagers were 64 Bao Xiaofeng (enrolled in 1997, School of Political Science, Zhejiang Univ.), “Guanyu cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju diaocha” (“Study on Election of Village Committee”) (1998 summer study). 65 Wang Liu (enrolled in 1997, School of Political Science, Zhejiang Univ.), “Gaohao cunweihui huanjie xuanju, tuijin cunmin zizhi gongzuo” (“Do a Good Job in the Village Election and Promote Village Selfgovernance”) (1998 summer study). 66 Li Guomin, director of Xinmin Branch of the Xincheng Township, Ruian City, Zhejiang Province, Interview by the author, 19 Nov. 98. 180 actually deprived of their right and opportunity to nominate candidates. 67 Villagers in Chengzhou put it this way, “We have no more rights than the one to tick those handpicked by the leadership.” My own survey of township leaders also indicates that up to 42.6% of the respondents think it better for the leadership to nominate candidates than for the villagers to so (See Table 4.8). Table 4.8 Do You Think Nomination by Leadership Better Than by Villagers? Response No. of respondents Percentage (%) Yes 49 42.6 No 58 50.4 No response 7.0 Total 115 100.0 Another item in the same questionnaire (see Table 4.9) indicated that 50.4% of Table 4.9 Which Type of Nomination is more Democratic? Response No. of respondents Percentage (%) Directly nominated by voters 56 48.7 58 50.4 Recommended by villagers, but approved by the organization concerned nominated by the village party 0.9 branch Appointed by township leaders 58 50.4 Others 0.9 Note: This question is a multi-choice one. 67 In 61.7% of the villages surveyed, members of the village committees were nominated by the township leadership and then put to a symbolic vote by a small number of villagers selected by the leadership. See Department of Grassroots Government and Community Construction of the Ministry of Civil Affairs Bureau, “Quanguo cunmin xuanju baogao” (“A Report on the Village Elections across the Country”) (August 28, 1994). 181 the respondents thought it more democratic for the villagers to nominate candidates for approval by the leadership. Another 50.4% expressed a preference for candidates to be appointed by township leaders, while 0.9% thought it more democratic for the party organizations to nominate candidates. In recent years, particularly since the Organic Law of Village Committee came into effect in November 1998, interference from the leadership in the nomination process has declined. In the meantime, local authorities also employ other indirect interference tactics. Of them, three tactics are often used. One is a system of job responsibility, which means that every village cadre is put in charge of several village teams and then every team head is in charge of his or her own team so as to grantee the candidates approved by the township government can be elected or at least win in the preliminary election. Secondly, if the township government is not quite sure whether the favored candidate of the government can be elected, the government usually tries to persuade another candidate to withdraw from the election. Thirdly, on the excuse of the existence of clan forces, election by bribery, even mafia-like organizations known in Chinese as heishehui, and peasants’ low literacy, local officials interfere and manipulate village elections. Furthermore, they employ some tactics such as warning, advice, and adjustment of work division of village committee members to control village committees. 4.4.6 Financial Means The sixth point to note is that during the post-election, many township governments control village committees with financial means. Firstly, many township governments run village account books. All villages turn over their account books to township governments, gathering village accountants to render accounts. Secondly, 182 townships decide village cadres’ salaries or payment according to the performance of fulfilling the job quota signed by both sides. Thirdly, they “subsidize” village administrators. As an example, since 1994 Jiangyou City in Sichuan Province has been paying annual subsidies of up to 120 Yuan to village Party secretaries, village heads and the village committee members. 68 Through these financial means, local officials hope they can firmly put the elected village committees under the township governments’ leadership. 4.4.7 Peasants’ Resistance Peasants and particularly village elites have been resisting the manipulation of elections by local leaders, particularly, the direct appointment of a village head. In 1998, the government of Qianshuo township, Taizhou municipality of Zhejiang province bypassed the election and appointed someone as head of a Qianshuo village.69 Naturally the villagers were angered by the appointment and resisted it. In July 1998, official Chinese central television reported the incident in its popular program “Issues in Focus”. In the end, under pressure from the media, the township authorities revoked the appointment and let the villagers elect the new village committee.70 68 Sheng Yansheng, “Cunzheng de xingshuai yu chongjian” (“The Rise and fall of Rural Governance and Its Reconstruction”), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), no. (1998): 17-18. 69 According to a survey in Jiangxi Province, the Township Party Committees or governments appointed 19.3% of the province’s village committees. See Department of Grassroots Government and Community Construction of the Ministry of Civil Affairs Bureau, “Quanguo cunmin xuanju baogao” (“A Report on the Village Elections across the Country”) (28, Aug. 1994). 70 In June 1998, when discussing the amendments to the “Laws Regarding the Organization of Village Committees” at the 9th plenary session of the People's Congress, Ruan Chongwu mentioned that many village heads in Hainan Province were appointed from other regions. Xu Xingguan said that in a considerable number of villages in Zhejiang Province, township officials hold positions on the village committees, either as heads or assistants to the heads. See Sheng Yansheng, “Cunzheng de xingshuai yu 183 Sometimes township leaders fail to manipulate village elections. In the 1995 election in Songlin Village of Chengdong Township, Shaoxing Municipality of Zhejiang, for example, the township leaders were surprised by the result because someone else beat their handpicked candidate. The township authorities’ efforts to control the election had come to nothing. Unable to dismiss the unwanted elected village head, township leaders had to tolerate him for three years before the next election in 1998. Then to the dismay of the authorities, the village head got re-elected. 71 In the 1997 election of Xiacun Village of Tangxia Towns, Ruian city, the town government supported the reelection of the village head. Their partiality towards this course of action was revealed by the double standard the government adopted with the two candidates. To vote on behalf of others, a written form of trust was needed in the case of Xie Zhuoyan the other candidate, but the sitting village head did not need it. Many villagers were so angered by the double standard that they refused to attend the ballot. There were hard feeling among the villagers and between villagers and the township government. At one stage the government even sent the police force into the village. But eventually, the government gave way to the angry villagers and treated both candidates equally.72 In general, interference and control from local leaders varies according to different circumstances. Some ways of interfering are more direct, such as appointing a village head and vetoing a candidate, some are less direct, such as stipulating election rules and chongjian” (“The Rise and Fall of Rural Governance and Its Reconstruction”), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), no. (1998): 19. 71 Several cadres of Chengdong Township, interviewed by the author, Chengdong, Nov. 1998. 72 Xie Zhuoyan, the village head, interviewed by the author, Nov. 1998. 184 regulations, and others are even subtler, such as cultivating a positive image of the leadership as a potential source of influence. All these ways of interfering and control are open to local leaders who can option when necessary. But the history of the development of village elections seems to indicate that the style of interference has moved from the direct to the less direct. This change of strategy corresponds to the change in the leadership’s perception of and attitude toward elections, which have moved from opposition to passivity and then to active support. 4.5 Conclusion The political elites at county and township levels are crucial to any progress towards a deepening of democratization in rural China. Any linkage between the national, provincial governments and the masses occurs through the local cadres. Their attitudes and behaviors have a strong influence on village election and self-governance. However, they have played complex and diverse roles. They not only make village elections possible, but they also contribute to their development. In fact, at the local level, political elites’ response to village self-governance is a process of redistributing this policy. Some local leaders can actively implemented village selfgovernance, creatively crafting village democracy and then promoting rural democratization. Other leaders just simply kept the policy off the agenda. Of them, when pressured is applied or the implementation context has been changed, some raise the policy but change its content, and in some cases, some seek to control and manipulate elections. 185 Actually this chapter revolves around the idea of “democratic Machiavellianism”. Crafting and manipulating are two main performances of the elites at county or township level when faced with implementing village elections and self-governance. Of particular significance is the genesis of a new figure – the democratic Machiavellian - who discovers democratic procedure such as haixuan to be a more effective way to reduce costs and exercise political control. When democracy meets the Chinese Machiavellian, rural village democracy has a rosy future. Equally, when the Chinese Machiavellian manipulates village elections, village democracy is seriously challenged. To sum up, a prominent role of the political elites at county and township levels is to implement the central and provincial governments’ policies concerned in their administrative area. Whether they can actively and effectively implement village selfgovernance reflects not only their loyalty to the higher authorities, but also local economic, political, and social situations. In this sense, their crafting of village democracy represents a loyal politics and a local politics. 186 [...]... elections They seem to understand and sympathise with the villagers’ demands for democracy A democratic election, democratic management of village affairs and effective supervision are some of the things they want Realizing a villager may not know the system at the national level, they nevertheless believe that the villager is certainly capable of understanding the essentials of rural grassroots democracy They... law and related regulations pre-nominate members of the new village committee and new village head and deputy head The pre-nomination should be made public five days before the Election Day The village election committee then will decide about the candidates on the basis of public opinions Names of the candidates then will be published two days before the election in the order of the strokes of their... leaders then went on to develop a work plan for the election, specifying the timetable and procedures The plan says, “In terms of procedures, meetings of villagers’ representatives and sub village heads should be held The present village committees should make a report of their work to the representatives, who then will review and comment on the report Then the representatives will in the spirit of the. .. summed up and later spread to other parts of the 31 Editorial Board of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China, 40 3 -40 4 155 province.32 Gutian County of Fujian province consciously set up various kinds of typical cases and then extend them to other places: Xixi Village of Fengpu Township and Xisan Village of Hubin Township for villagers’ representative assembly, Songtai Village of Songjin... respecting the legal status of village committees, instructing and supporting village committees’ to do their duties In the meantime, these officials educate and guide village cadres and villagers to actively fulfill tasks assigned by higher authorities and meet their 34 See the detail of Sixth Section of Yearbook 2001 of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China, 45 1 -49 3 157 obligations,... local officials, either county or township, can play an important role for offering kinds of samples, thereby further promoting the standardization of village elections in their administrative zones 43 The source is from Jinyun County Working Group for Village Elections, Jinyun Xian cunliangwei huanjie xuanju shidian ziliao huibian (The Corpus of Data of a Pilot Villages for Village Party Branches and Village. .. nomination procedure and the form of ballots, including election schedule; 41 (C) Train township officials who are responsible for village elections, and handle petitions and complaints by villagers during the course of the village elections The following will be given the detail on these issues; (D) Summarize experiences and conduct exchange, file all village elections documents and data; (E) Others All township... and better-educated officials in China are much more supportive of reform than the old and uneducated,26 which greatly help the implementation of village self-governance and the promotion of village democracy 24 Ren Yiqiu, an official of Provincial People’s Congress of Zhejiang, interviewed by the author, Hangzhou, Aug 1999 25 Several cadres of Chengdong Township interviewed by the author, Chengdong,... kinds of obstructions to effectively implement village self-governance, namely the relationships between township and village, between implementation of government affairs and autonomy, and between the party leadership and village self-governance or village party branch and village committee Only by properly handling these relationships can villagers stick up for their democratic voting rights and their... They forget that the manipulation should be best studied under the framework of current Chinese political system 4. 3.1 Strategies How did local elites craft village democracy? The question largely depends on the strategies and measures adopted (1) Putting the Laws and Regulations into Effect As mentioned above, implementing the relevant laws, rules and regulations is one of the roles of local leaders . during their term of office. During the term of village committee, if the head of the village committee commit a serious mistake, resulting in the loss of village property, the head of village. chain of crafting village democracy, operating as a “hinge” at the meeting point of state and society. If the national and provincial elites are the makers and providers of the laws and institutions. and educated than the rank -and file villagers, therefore they should have a better understanding of the worth and significance of democracy. In reality, however, the role of local leaders and