Making democracy work the crafting and manipulation of chinese village democracy by political elites 3

to alter the situation.Since 1997, however, the provincial organization department has actively co-operated with the Civil Affairs Bureau for village elections and basic-level governance construction.40 To village democracy, from contradiction to concession and then co-operation among political elites is an important advancement. 3.3.2 Law and Procedures Design Legislative Enterprise Going Ahead Crafting rural democracy must be embedded in the rule of law. Many scholars have pointed out that institutions and rules of the game, once established, are indeed difficult to change. Thelen and Steinmo put it, “Particularly institutional arrangements, once put into place, create privileged positions for individuals and groups whose interests may lie in perpetuating these arrangements”.41 The Ministry of Civil Affairs argues that if there were shortage of specific laws and regulations at the provincial level on this issue, it would be difficulty to improve village democracy there. 42 In fact, provincial legislative power43 can facilitate the creation of a favorable legal environment for village democracy in the localities. 40 Mr. Yao and Lin at Fujian Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs, interviewed by the author, Fuzhou, December, 2001. 41 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Structuring Politics, eds. Kathleen Thelen, Sven Steinmo, and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1-32. 42 Department of Basic-Level Governance of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Bulletin, no.15 (Beijing: Ministry of Civil Affairs, 10 September 1996). 43 China’s local laws are mainly concerned with three areas: (1) implementing central laws and central administrative regulations within its jurisdictional area; (2) governing local affairs; and (3) initiating new laws for experimental implementation. 119 The rule of law can be a weapon for crafting village democracy. Like the term of democracy, no regime is openly against democracy, and no leader is openly against the rule of law. As Sylvia Chan pointed out, “Actors have to agree to play to a certain rule of the game and this requires pact(s). There are procedural (about rules of policy-making) or substantive (about the main tenets of policy), or both.”44 The political elites who advocate village elections know that law is one of the important resources to defend and promote rural democracy. And they also know once a law on village election is passed and some institutions then established, for it is not easy to move back to the former system. Once village self-governance has gained the stamp of legitimacy, it has a momentum of its own. This is one reason why political elites have tries to enact laws and regulations. Legislative enterprises going ahead are an important example of Fujian’s experiences with village elections. Fujian’s officials understand the importance of drawing up the laws and regulations concerned: “To implement village self-governance and construct grassroots socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics in rural China, which has never existed before, is a very difficult task. This task could not be easily done without the protection or imperfection of the laws.”45 Fujian Provincial People’s Congress passed the Implementation Methods of the Organic Law (experimental) in September of 1988 just after three months of the passing of the Organic Law, and the Methods of Fujian’s village committee election in December of 1990 respectively. Further, from 1993 to 1996, the Congress modified the Methods focusing on election methods and vote 44 Sylvia Chan, Liberalism, Democracy and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 71. 45 Branch of Basic-Level Governance of Fujian Department of Civil Affairs, “The Present Condition and Way of Village Self-governance Work Situation in Fujian Province,” FDCA Working Paper (March 1998). 120 counting method for several times. 46 All the endeavors are helpful to normalize and legalize village elections and then improve the quality of the elections. The International Republic Institute in an election observation report points out that the Fujian electoral system is “effective and comprehensive” and “electoral regulations are clear”, and “the basic electoral framework in place, from procedures for candidate nomination to voter registration to ballot tabulation”. 47 However, because those elites’ chose legislation and institutional construction as a tactic to promote village democracy does not mean they naturally had a clear idea of constitutionism or institutionalism, conversely, most of them realized the importance of those institutions or laws just from their own work experiences, which may belong to the experimentalist approach.48 Legislation The legal framework for village election procedures is not yet standardized and unified. Specific election methods somewhat vary from place to place. Article 29 of the Organic Law enacted in 1998 empowers the standing committees of the People’s Congress of provinces, autonomous regions and centrally administrated municipalities to “formulate implementation methods of this law according to their regional conditions”, 46 Branch of Basic-Level Governance of Fujian Department of Civil Affairs, “One Decade’s Achievements of Village Self-governance Work Situation in Fujian Province,” FDCA Working Paper (August 2001): 3840. 47 International Republic Institute, “Election Observation Report: Fujian Province, People’s Republic of China” (October 2000): 22. 48 From so-called “Institutionalist Tactics”, Shi Tianjian analyses how the officials at MCA employed incrementalism strategies to introduce some institutions and policies concerned. See Shi Tianjian, “Village Committee Elections in China: Institutionalist Tactics for Democracy,” 396-410. In fact, local leading officials also pay much attention to local legislation on village elections. 121 which leaves ample room for provinces to draft more specific laws, regulations, and guidelines of village election procedures, and in the meantime may result in considerable variation in interpretation and implementation. Since the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People’s Congress adopted “the Organic Law of Village Committees”, the Standing Committee of People’s Congress of Fujian, Zhejiang, Gansu, Hubei, and Hunan had first adopted “Implementation Methods” on “the Organic Law of Village Committees” for their own provinces by the end of 1989. Then, there had been total of 24 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities where had formulated implementation methods by the end of 1994 (see Table 3.5). Table 3.5 Provincial Implementation Methods for the Organic Law on the Village Committee of the People’s Republic China (Provisional) Order Province The time when passed and by which organization Fujian Adopted on September 2, 1988 at 6th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Fujian Provincial People’s Congress Zhejiang Adopted on November 28, 1988 at 6th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Zhejiang Provincial People’s Congress Gansu Adopted on July 20, 1989 at 9th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Gansu Provincial People’s Congress Guizhou Adopted on July 26, 1989 at 9th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Guizhou Provincial People’s Congress Hubei Adopted on August 26, 1989 at 9th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Hubei Provincial People’s Congress Hunan Adopted on December 3, 1989 at 12th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Hunan Provincial People’s Congress Hebei Adopted on June 20, 1990 at 10th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Hebei Provincial People’s Congress Heilongjiang Adopted on August 24, 1990 at 16th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Heilongjiang Provincial People’s Congress Liaoning Adopted on September 21, 1990 at 18th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Liaoning Provincial People’s Congress 10 Qinghai Adopted on November 3, 1990 at 17th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Qinghai Provincial People’s Congress 122 11 Sha’anxi 12 Tianjin 13 Shanxi 14 Sichuan 15 Jilin 16 Xinjiang 17 Ningxia 18 Shandong 19 Henan 20 Inner Mongolia 21 Anhui 22 Tibet 23 Jiangsu 24 Jiangxi Adopted on December 28, 1990 at 18th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Sha’anxi Provincial People’s Congress Adopted on Jnuary 29, 1991 at 23th Session of the Standing Committee of the 11th Tianjin Provincial People’s Congress Adopted on May 12, 1991 at 22th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Shanxi Provincial People’s Congress Adopted on May 28, 1991 at 23th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Sichuan Provincial People’s Congress Adopted on July 13, 1991 at 23th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Jilin Provincial People’s Congress Adopted on August 31, 1991 at 22th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Xinjiang Provincial People’s Congress Adopted on May 10, 1992 at 23th Session of the Standing Committee of the 6th Ningxai Provincial People’s Congress Adopted on May 10, 1992 at 28th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Shandong Provincial People’s Congress Adopted on August 25, 1992 at 29th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Henan Provincial People’s Congress Adopted on October 30, 1992 at 29th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Inner Mongolia Provincial People’s Congress Adopted on December 19, 1992 at 34th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th Anhui Provincial People’s Congress Adopted on December 26, 1993 at 11th Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th Tibet Provincial People’s Congress Adopted on June 25, 1994 at 7th Session of the Standing Committee of the 6th Jiangsu Provincial People’s Congress Adopted on October 24, 1994 at 11th Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th Jiangxi Provincial People’s Congress Note: Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Chongqing, Beijing, Hainan, and Shanghai did not work out their implementation methods for the Organic Law (provisional). The laws and regulations governing village elections at provincial level usually include Provincial Methods for the Implementation of the Organic Law of Village Committee and Provincial Village Election Methods. Provincial regulations closely follow the national law, but usually provide greater details in certain key articles. While the Shanxi Provincial Methods include both the regulations for the administration of elections and the election procedures, other provinces have opted to pass separate laws for election administration and procedures. Further, many provinces edit the so-called 123 Provincial Villagers’ Committee Election Handbook to instruct the coming elections. This handbook usually summarizes the laws, provides the elections officials the answers to the questions faced by them during village elections. It is also usually used for training election staff and newly elected village leaders. For example, earlier in 1999, for the 2000 village elections, the Fujian Bureau of Civil Affairs edited one village election handbook composing of four sections: the laws and regulations, election procedures, questions and answers, and attachments of files. In 2001, the Zhejiang Bureau of Civil Affairs edited one village election handbook preparing for the 2002 village elections. The main contents of the book include the laws and regulations and documents concerning village elections, questions and answers, and selective files respectively. Designing Basic Electoral Procedures and Rules Furthermore, because rural China is without democratic tradition and particularly procedural democracy, it is absolutely significant to offer villagers a basic rule for elections. Summarizing some places’ experiences, this kind of rule is composed of two parts: one is the procedures of election work, another regulation concerning the process of electing such as how to design ballots and how to count votes. Presented here are several cases for illustrating how political elite designed the basic rule for village elections. In 1997, Jilin Bureau of Civil Affairs formulated a provincial basic rule of village election as a means to unite and promote village democracy. This rule divides the village election into four stages. The first stage is “ideological mobilization and making preparations for election”, which includes six steps: (1) convening mobilization meetings so as to be ideologically prepared, and doing propaganda well; (2) investigating incumbent villagers’ committee members and concluding the village committee’s past 124 year of work; (3) electing new terms for villagers’ representatives; (4) electing and organizing village election work leadership group; (5) working out election work plan and fixing the date of the election; (6) voter registration. Second is “election implementation”, which includes six steps: (7) nominating initial candidates; (8) the determination of formal candidates; (9) the preparations for voting such as producing ballots and ballot boxes; (10) voting; (11) issuing certificates; (12) electing village team heads. The third stage is “strengthening organizations and perfecting institutions”, which includes five fields: (13) division of village committee work among members; (14) strengthening organizations; (15) working out the work plan for new village committees; (16) improving institutions; (17) training the elected village committee cadres. Finally, the fourth stage is “checking and accepting, and concluding”, which includes three steps: (18) checking and accepting; (19) filing all documents and materials; (20) making a conclusion. Obviously, this rule offers very detailed explanations to every stage.49 Hebei Province even designed a very detailed procedure of how to conduct a village election meeting. This procedure includes all items from the beginning to the end of the meeting, 17stepts in total (see Table 3.6).50 Many counties/cities formulate more detailed procedures and rules on the base of provincial models. One question arising here is the relationship between the national law and provincial laws and regulations. As far as the laws on village election are concerned, what is important is not whether the relationship is harmonious or conflicting, but 49 Rural Desk of Department of Basic-Level Governance of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1997 du nongcun jiceng minzhu zhengzhi jiashe ziliao huibian (1997’ Excerpts of Important Documents on Construction of Rural Grassroots Democracy) (Beijing, March 1998), 61-70. 50 Journal of Township Forum and Department of Basic-Level Governance of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1999 du nongcun jiceng minzhu zhengzhi jiashe ziliao huibian (1999’ Excerpts of Important Documents on Construction of Rural Grassroots Democracy) (Beijing, February 2000), 612-616. 125 whether the provincial laws and regulations can specify the central law, and whether provinces can creatively make the laws and regulations relevant in terms of the space offered by the national laws. 3.3.3 Engineering through the Responsibility System In China, policy implementation is a process involving many governmental departments and actors, which constitute a policy network. One policy could not be successfully or effectively carried out without cooperation among the departments concerned. Thus we Table 3.6 the Steps of the Village Election Meeting A. Declaring beginning of the election meeting; B. Playing the Chinese national anthem (Everyone keeps a standing position while the playing goes on.); C. Counting the people attending the election meeting: D. Choosing chief scrutineers, tellers, and reporters; E. Checking and sealing up ballot boxes; F. Sorting and counting the printed ballot numbers; G. Introducing and explaining ballots, then making campaigning speeches; H. Voters successively receiving ballots, filling and voting; I. Making a sign on the rest of the ballots as the invalid; J. Opening the ballot boxes; K. Counting collected ballots and Checking; L. Telling and counting; M. Declaring the result; N. Sealing the ballots and filling the result report form; O. Issuing certifications; P. The new elected head of villagers’ committee speaking; Q. Declaring the end of the election meeting. can easily understand why Wang Zhenyao et al once urged the official of local civil affairs to let local chief leaders devote significant attention to village self-governance, which is an index to measure the civil affairs achievements. One mechanism that compels local leaders to implement village self-governance is the use of “responsibility system 126 tactics”. Since the mid 1980s onwards, provincial governments introduce the cadre responsibility system down (ganbu gangwei mubiao guanli zerenzhi), which is a set of rules governing job assignment, performance appraisal, and remuneration51, while cadres’ performance is tied to both personal income and promotion. This mechanism is obviously a mixture of “threat tactics” and “reciprocation tactics”. This system has been applied to the village elections and self-governance. The higher-level governments did try to count the success of the village elections as an indicator of local leader and particularly township leader’s performance evaluation. Under the currently pressure of a bureaucratic regime, adopting a political responsibility system is a relatively effective means to implement village elections and self-governance.52 In some provinces, political elites work the village elections and self-governance as a “political engineering” and exercise a political responsibility system. Hebei Province mapped out “Hebei Province Programme for Promotion of Rural Grassroots Democratic Politics Construction” in February 1998. This programme not only outlined the goals, but also brought the grassroots democratic politics construction into the scope of methods to check on cadres. Zhongqin Municipality mapped out “Zhongqin Municipality Program for Rural Grassroots Democratic Politics Construction (1998-2000)” in May 1998. This programme brought the grassroots democratic politics construction into township government’s year target management, and requires the grassroots democratic politics 51 Kevin O’Brien and Jianjiang Li, “Selective Policy Implementation,” Comparative Politics 31, no.2 (January 1999): 172. 52 China’s case is not exceptional. The European Union (EU) introduced some coercive instruments as well as some positive instruments to promote foreign and particularly the Eastern European democracies. When the democratic principles were abused in one country, for example, the EU would suspend or abrogate its contractual relations with that country. See Richard Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2001), 34-41. 127 construction being a main way to check on cadres at county, township, and village’s levels.53 In December of 1997, Jilin Bureau of Civil Affairs drew up “The Standard for Checking the Fourth Round of Villagers’ Committee Elections in Jinlin Province”, through which the province attempted to evaluate local governments’ works of village elections. This standard is composed of four parts, total 27 items. 54 In 1997, Fujian formulated “The Score of Checking Villagers’ Committee Elections Work”, through which the province attempted to supervise county and township leaders to further and better implement village self-governance. This score system is composed of six parts and in total 39 items.55 Those counties or townships with high scores will be praised, while those with low scores will be at the least criticized. In 1997, Liaoning Province issued a detailed check system to examine local governments’ work on grassroots power construction, while village self-governance is an important part of examining local leaders’ work. The work (total 100 scores) is divided into four parts: principal work (64 scores), basic work (25 scores), temporary work (11 scores), and creative work (5 scores). The province will arrange the cities/counties in the order of their scores, with the implication that higher ranked leaders can win praise or be promoted while the low ones are subject to criticisim or punishment.56 53 Department of Basic-Level Governance of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Bulletin, no.9 (Beijing: Ministry of Civil Affairs, May 19, 1998). 54 Department of Basic-Level Governance of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1997’ Excerpts of Important Documents on Construction of Rural Grassroots Democracy (Beijing, March 1998), 73-74. 55 Department of Basic-Level Governance of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, 372-373. 56 Ibid., 257-258 & 383-384. 128 Many cases well illustrate a locality promotes village self-governance as a political engineering or makes some coercive instruments such as a political responsibility system, where the democratic quality of village elections is relatively higher. 3.3.4 Programming: the Demonstration Model of Village Self-governance It is common knowledge that making a program or launching a pilot project is a Chinese Communist State’s habitual practice to check on the possibilities of one policy or program before spreading it across the country. Mapping out a program and then choosing some places to conduct it becomes then an important task for political elites, which means that they regard village democracy as political engineering. Crafting village democracy through these practices is an act with Chinese characteristics. In order to further strengthen village committee construction, deepen village selfgovernance model activities, push grassroots democratic politics construction forward, realize provincial village self-governance according to the plan and step by step, Fujiang Province worked out “The Program for Fujian Village Committee Construction (19972000)”. This program puts forth the village committee’s construction’s target: all villages in Fujian Province would join the second round activity of village self-governance demonstration by 2000, and over 60% of them can attain the second round provincial criteria.57 Zhongqing Municipality’s Program for Rural Grassroots Democratic Politics Construction (1998-2000) mapped out Zhongqin’s rural grassroots democratic politics 57 Ibid., 236. 129 construction for years (1998-2000) as the followings: (1) perfecting village power structure around the core of the party leadership and strengthening functions of masses’ autonomous organizations; (2) making villagers’ representative assembly universal in all villages, and strengthening its functions on policy-making so that important policies concerning major village affairs will be made by villagers’ assembly or villagers’ representative assembly; (3) making village affairs open to the public, and thereby enlarging democratic channels for villagers participation; (4) perfecting rules and regulations and thus village cadres and villagers acting in accordance with them; (5) reducing village cadres’ illegal activities or breach of rules and regulations, and then strengthening the close relationship between the masses and cadres; (6) developing and strengthening township and village collective economy, and political stability and communal harmony; (7) adding to the power and strength and popularity of the village party branch, and then the party construction going into a new stage.58 Village self-governance demonstration activity is usually an important part or item of the programming. Actually, earlier in 1990, the Ministry of Civil Affairs disposed the nation-wide demonstration of village self-governance to promote healthy development of village self-governance and develop multi-level demonstration places and then direct it toward a faster and better development. As said earlier, in 1997, Fujian Province formulated “The Score System of Evaluating Village Self-governance Model County”, which is composed of six parts and in total 49 items. There had been 800 demonstration places across Fujian Province by 1999. In 1999, Hunan Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs 58 Department of Basic-Level Governance of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Bulletin, no.9 (Beijing: Ministry of Civil Affairs, May 19, 1998). 130 worked out three types of scores (10, and 32 items separately) to assess village selfgovernance Model County, Township, and Village.59 In To Craft Democracy, Giuseppe Di Palma analyzed the role of demonstration effects, as one type of diffusion, during one country democratization.60 When regarding rural democracy in China, the demonstration effects exist too, for development of selfgovernance is in a state of imbalance across China, within one province, in a county or even in a township. These models or “prototypes” can exhibit certain behavior patterns and the would-be followers can watch these patterns. Actually, test points (shi dian) and models are useful “only when people in other localities learn from them”.61 In April of 1992, for example, Jilin provincial government held an on-the spot meeting (xian chang hui) in Lishu county, a demonstration county on village self-governance. Many people came to Lishu to learn about its practice of haixuan, which soon became well-known in China and abroad. Even Fujian, a provincial pioneer in village self-governance, sent a delegation to Lishu, with the view of revising its own provincial laws on village elections.62 Therefore, demonstration activities of village self-governance can be regarded as a process of democracy diffusion, through which the village democracy can be 59 Rural Desk of Department of Basic-Level Governance of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1997 du nongcun jiceng minzhu zhengzhi jiashe ziliao huibian (1997’ Excerpts of Important Documents on Construction of Rural Grassroots Democracy), 388-389; Journal of Township Forum and Rural Desk of Department of Grassroots Administration of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1999 niandu nongcun jiceng minzhu zhengzhi jaishe ziliao huibian (1999’ Excerpts of Important Documents on Construction of Rural Grassroots Democracy), 155, 501-504, 515-517. 60 See Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracy: an Essay on Democratic Transition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), Chapter II, IX, 14-26 & 183-199. 61 David Zweig, “Strategies of Policy Implementation: Policy ‘Winds’ and Brigade Accounting in Rural China, 1968-1978,” World Politics 37, no. (Jan., 1985): 274. 62 Mr. Zhang Xiaogan, the former director of Branch of Grassroots Power, Fujian Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, interview by the author, Fuzhou, December 25, 2001. 131 gradually expanded into the vast countryside and the democratic quality of village elections then promoted. 3.3.5 Balancing Village Self-governance and Party Leadership in Rural China As a reform, village self-governance is more likely to be accepted and to succeed in situations in which the power of the party-state remain unchallenged and will consolidate despite the increase of villagers’ democratic rights. Without guarantee of party-state leadership in rural China, political elites could not launch village selfgovernance, and could not consolidate it even if they could launch it; conversely, without increased power on the part of the villagers, village self-governance could not win the peasants’ strong support, and consequently the political elites’ reform program would fail. Therefore, the key is whether and how political elites maintain a balance of democracy and the party’s control of rural China. In other words, the challenging test for the political elites at provincial level is how to maintain the balance between democracy and the party leadership in rural China. In fact, uncertainty or the fear of losing leadership in rural China has always been a main barrier to any active implementation of village self-governance. Therefore, it seems important to dispel this fear by reassuring the grassroots leaders concerned that village self-governance will not impair the leadership position of the party, and on the contrary the party can control the rural areas effectively and skillfully through village elections. So how to balance the relationship between village self-governance and party leadership in rural China obviously takes good strategy and political arts. Persuasive information is a pact, which helps to decrease the resistance and then implement village self-governance smoothly. In this sense, rural democracy in China is a 132 “deceived” democracy. The advocates of village elections have tried to alleviate various worries by convincing people that village self-government is helpful for the maintenance of social order, improvement of the relationship between cadres and the masses, policy implementation, and economic development, all of which, in turn, would make villages more governable. 3.4 Conclusion In this chapter we began by noting the phenomenon that the process of village self-governance in the past two decades has been characterized by the uneven democratic quality of village elections among provinces. Perhaps the most influential model in the relevant literature to explain the transition to democracy during the third wave of world democratization is the one of modernization. Unfortunately the modernization approach cannot effectively explain this uneveness, and we had to turn to political elites’ roles for an answer. The local political elites can be so important that the democratic quality of village elections varies by geographic region. In other words, the geographic basis of the village self-governance situation is tied to a great extent to which provincial political elites are supportive of it and how they craft village democracy. This study finds that the leading officials at provincial bureaus of Civil Affairs and their networks including their allies play a vital role in implementing village selfgovernance. With decentralization, the local provincial governments have been presented with some institutional space to deal with relevant affairs autonomously, either creatively implementing or refusing the central policies. A core group of provincial officials worked 133 together to develop election practices, and their capacity became a crucial factor in implementing village self-governance. Finally, this study’s emphasis on strategies is meant to highlight the ways political elites at the provincial level “sell” their craft in their administrative province. This chapter has identified six strategies employed by the political elites at provincial level. These strategies include elite cooperation, local legislature, political responsibility, political programming, and the art of creating balance between the party leadership and village elections. Of course, different provincial political elites have turned to different strategies under different contexts, but as a whole these strategies have invariously helped implement village self-governance and promote the democratic quality of village elections. In one light, a major role of provincial political elites is to implement and deliver the central government’s institutions and policies concerning their administrative area. In this sense, their crafting of village democracy represents distributive politics. 134 [...]... particular, the willingness of political elites toward this and the costs and benefits of the implementation of village self-governance In a 102 sense we can say that the endeavors of these elites to implement village self-governance and promote village democracy are completely a by- product of their own motive, which is to attain the divisions’ interest By differentiating organizations or agencies in power and. .. generally recognized achievement in village democracy. 32 3. 3 Crafting Strategies Given the reluctance of some grassroots officials to move ahead with the village self-government policy and evidence of their interference and manipulation, provincial 31 Journal of Township Forum and Rural Desk of Department of Grassroots Administration of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, eds 1998 niandu nongcun jiceng minzhu zhengzhi... at the forefront in village democracy, becoming the model counties of village self-governance is an inseparable part of the role of main local political elites Among them at the provincial level, Yu Weiliang, director of the department of grassroots government of the Shanxi Bureau of Civil Affairs, Li Xiwen, director of the department of grassroots government of the Henan Bureau of Civil Affairs, Zhang... 2000),162-1 63 95 democratization will change or be affected with alternations in the leadership or in the views or focus of the attention of any leader.17 3. 2 Key Actors and Networking It is evident that the crafting of political elites matters for the elections’ success Then, we find that there are three aspects to consider when we examine what has shaped the political elites crafting: the key political elites, ... with the People’s Congress and its standing Committee at their administrative zone and actively and timely report to them about the work of the civil affairs so that the laws, rules and regulations can be enacted through the legislative departments The MCA also hoped by doing this the local departments of Civil Affairs would gain the support of the deputies to the People’s Congresses and let them regularly... promoter of village elections and self-governance, but they are craftsmen too Based on their opportunities and willingness, we can use crafting model” to illustrate how some elites can creatively or skillfully implement and promote village democracy and offer more democratic institutions and relevant policies for villagers They are possibly the most significant craftsmen of village democracy Of course, these... course, these elites also have some opportunities to manipulate village elections The provincial civil affairs system is designated to be in charge of the routine work on the construction of the grassroots governance and guide the work of village selfgovernance The civil affairs’ organ therefore plays a crucial role in promoting village democracy The functions of the Civil Affairs Department at the provincial... three attitudes and the ideas of political elites at the intermediate level In another word, elites attitudes and ideas are an important catalyst for their choices: pioneering pattern, resisting pattern, or bandwagon pattern There is no doubt that the governing elites values and attitudes are of importance to village democracy, but it seems that their position is of more importance The following topic... director of the department of grassroots government of the Fujian Bureau of Civil Affairs, are the representative figures, 109 who have played a key and irreplaceable role for their regional village self-governance.27 These leaders are the core members of their own networks This study chooses Zhang Xiaogan’s work in Fujian to further demonstrate how and what key network members have done for crafting village. .. that the key to democratic development lies on the values and attitudes of ruling elites, thus paying attention to cultural orientation of political elites and particularly the key roles in the transitional process played by them.21 The attitude towards grassroots elections of local bureaucrats at the provincial level can be different, and the attitudes of the same bureaucrats may shift over time The . 1998 11247 4 10066 6 38 15 3 2946 7 1999 12 037 4 10797 6 39 48 3 3091 7 2000 134 61 4 11601 7 4254 3 3 230 7 2001 14655 4 1 236 2 7 4582 3 338 1 7 2002 16 838 4 134 97 7 4940 3 3 539 7 ZJ: Zhejiang. 6 435 9982 16001 4648 5048 738 1 34 20 4641 80 63 437 7 139 35 38 18 4 638 6 238 11145 4774 4279 25022 5760 4498 4 038 13 7 11 6 23 27 10 5 2 17 15 9 26 18 8 21 3 25. (2) 32 23. 65 (2) 4226.59 (2) 4604.55 (2) 5025.50 (2) Zhejiang 548.60 (4) 1099.04 (3) 2966.19 (3) 39 48 .39 (3) 42 53. 67 (3) 4582 .34 (3) Guangd- ong 495 .31 (5) 10 43. 03 (5)