A final resolution to the peasant burden problem the politics of fee to tax reform in rural china

Chapter Introduction In February 2004, shortly after the celebration of Chinese New Year, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC) and the State Council (SC) jointly issued the “No. Document”1 of the year. Described as a big “New Year gift” to peasants from the central government, the document not only prescribed a number of measures to increase peasants’ income, but also shed light on peasant burden reduction, promising to gradually cut down the agricultural tax before annulling it entirely. And as a first step, the overall tax rate would be lowered by one percent. As the majority of the measures proposed in this document would be secured with financial support, it was regarded as a document with a high content of “gold”.2 It was not the first time that the center released “No. Document” on rural issues. For five successive years from 1982 to 1986, the central leadership issued five "No. Documents" on agriculture, the countryside and peasants. These documents helped to legalize many initiatives of the Chinese peasants and the local governments in rural reforms. However, for eighteen years after 1986, the central government put its emphasis on urban reforms and not a single “No. Document” was issued specifically on rural issues. Given this, the document was hailed as an indication that The full name of the document is “Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan guanyu Cujin Nongmin Zhengjia Shouru Ruogan Zhengce de Yijian” (“CCPCC and State Council’s Opinions on Policies Promoting the Increase of Peasants’ Income”). At the press conference after the release of the document, Chen Xiwen, deputy director of the office of the Central Financial Work Leading Group, revealed that the central government's fiscal budget for rural development would increase by nearly 30 billion yuan (around 3.61 billion USD) to more than 150 billion yuan (around 18.07 billion US dollars) in 2004. “Zhongyang Caijingban Fuzhuren Chen Xiwen Jiexi Zhongyang Yihao Wenjian” (“Analyzing the No. Document by Deputy Director of the Office of the Central Financial Work Leading Group Chen Xiwen”), February 2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-02/09/content_1304919.htm, accessed December 2004. -1- China's new central leadership would give top priority to issues of agriculture, the countryside and peasants.3 This move is by no means isolated in the central state’s agenda. As early as in 2000, Changping Li, a township Party Secretary in Hubei, wrote a letter to Premier Zhu Rongji, in which he appealed: “the life of the peasants is extremely hard, the rural areas extremely poverty-stricken and the prospect of agriculture extremely precarious!”4 Although Li later resigned from his post, this appeal, however, became a slogan and he himself became a symbol of speaking-out for peasants.5 The central government finally came to realize that rural issues are so deep-rooted and complicated that fundamental and concerted efforts must be made to resolve them. A core issue raised by Li in his letter was the peasant burden problem. This problem is believed to be a major source of discontent in agricultural China and directly threatens the social and political stability in these areas. Given the low For details, please refer to “Xinhua News Agency Commentator: No. Document Being the Priority of the Priorities” (“Xinhuashe Pinglunyuan: Zhongzhongzhizhong de Yihaowenjian”), February 2004, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1037/2325998.html, accessed December 2004. The letter was first published in the popular Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend) and has been widely cited since then. Changping Li, “Xiang Dangwei Shuji Hanlei Shangshu” (“A letter with Tears from a Township Party Secretary”), Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), 24 August 2000. Despite Li’s resignation, his letter as well as the book he then published has been well received among not only governmental officials and the scholars, but also common people. He was later recruited by the China Reform Journal. Li himself was elected “Person of the Year” with the highest votes by readers of Southern Weekend, beating out other influential figures in many areas. There are different definitions of the term and they will be discussed in the first section of Chapter 2. To have a general idea about peasants’ resistance in rural China, please see Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lü, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China (Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 116-165; Tangbiao Xiao, “Er Shi yu Nian lai Dalu Nongcun de Zhengzhi Wending Qingkuang: Yi Nongmin Xingdong de Bianhua wei Shijiao” (“Political Stability of Rural Mainland China in the Past Two Decades: A Perspective from Peasants’ Actions”), Er Shi Yi Shiji (Twenty-First Century), No. (April 2003), pp. 51-60; Lianjiang Li and O'Brien, “Villagers and Popular Resistance,” Modern China, Vol. 22, No.1 (January 1996), pp. 28-61; Jianrong Yu, “Nongmin Youzuzhi Kangzheng jiqi Zhengzhi Fengxian: Hunan Sheng H Xian Diaocha” (“Organizational Struggle of Rural Residents and Its Political Risk: A Survey of County H in Hunan Province”), Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management), No. (2003), pp. 1-16. -2- income rate, unpredictable and open-ended financial exactions have driven peasants to protest in the agricultural areas in the country. Since no statistics on type, frequency of rural protests have been disclosed, it is not possible to directly evaluate at the national level how much the burden problem has contributed to the instability of rural areas.8 However, evidence can be found in a lot of researches. A survey conducted in 1999 in ten counties of Zhejiang Province revealed that among the 300 peasants responding, 34.33% believed that agricultural taxes were too heavy, and in one county, the figure went up to as high as 75%.9 An article by Weihua Chen asserted that in 1995 and 1996, peasant burden was the largest source of rural complaints, accounting for over 30% of the complaints lodged at all levels from the county up, and over a third of all collective visits. Meanwhile, the second most important source, violations of laws and CCP disciplines by grassroots level cadres, was also related to the problem.10 Shukai Zhao analyzed 196 letters received by Farmers’ Daily (Nongmin Ribao) in 1998 and 1999 and found that 63 of them reflected the burden problem, topping the list of problems. Reasons ranking from 2nd to 4th were land problems, retaliation from the cadres and corruption, Sometimes it is even impossible to categorize the reasons for peasants’ protests because such reasons are usually correlated and contribute together to the complaints. For instance, in a fieldwork conducted in 2002, the author found that peasants in an Inner-Mongolia village appealed to higher (from county to prefecture, then the autonomous region and finally the center) authorities for the corruption of the village head. But when talking about his corruption deeds, land appropriation, heavy financial burdens as well as violation of village self-government policies were all involved. Pengshuo Chai and Jiehong Zhou, “Yanhai Fada Diqu Nongmin dui Shuifei Fudan de Xintai” (“Peasants’ Attitude towards Financial Burdens in Coastal Developed Regions”), Zhongguo Nongcun Jingji (Chinese Rural Economy), No. (2000), pp. 62-68. Figures presented here are especially impressive given that Zhejiang is among the richest provinces in China. 10 Weihua Chen, “Cong Xinfang Gongzuo Jiaodu dui Dangqian Jianqing Nongmin Fudan Wenti de zai Sikao” (“Reexamining the Question of Lightening Peasants’ Burden from the Vantage Point of Letters and Visits”), Renmin Xinfang (People’s Letters and Visits), No. (1998), pp. 28-31. -3- respectively, each receiving 51, 30 and 24 letters.11 Further, by analyzing the records of voice messages to a central level media during the first half of 2004, researchers found out that among 22304 messages on rural issues, 1195 (5.4%) were about peasant burden problem, ranking No. among the problems revealed.12 This figure was very significant given that the fee-to-tax reform, which was reported to have effectively reduced the burden, had been carried out for two years. It is not surprising then that some sources claim that the ten years between 1992 and 2002 has been a time when the Chinese countryside suffered most from the peasant burden problem.13 Observing the correlation between peasant burden and rural social-political stability, the Chinese central government has tried very hard to solve the problem ever since it came into prominence in the mid-1980s. According to a research group under CCPCC Organization Department, seventy-six regulations and policy circulars were issued between 1991 and 1999 by CCPCC, the State Council and the central ministries, jointly or separately. 14 The sub-regulations and circulars created by the local authorities (from provincial level to township level) to go with the central decrees are not counted. Table 1.1 shows the major decrees issued by the central government from 1990 to 1999 before the fee-to-tax reform was introduced. 11 Shukai Zhao, “Shangfang Shijian he Xinfang Tixi--guanyu Nongmin Jinjing Shangfang Wenti de Diaocha Fenxi” (“Appealing to Higher Authorities and the Letters and Visits System--An Analysis on Peasants Appealing to Beijing”), Sannong Zhongguo (Sannong China), Vol. (Winter 2003), p. 118. 12 Jianrong Yu, “Tudi Wenti yi Chengwei Nongmin Weiquan Kangzheng Jiaodian-guanyu Dangqian Woguo Nongcun Shehui Xingshi de Yixiang Zhuanti Yanjiu” (“Land Issue has Become the Focus of Peasants’ Rights Defending Resistance-A Special Research on Rural Social Situation in Contemporary China”), http://www.weiquan.org.cn/data/detail.php?id=3980, accessed 20 December 2004. The project was jointly launched by the National Social Sciences Foundation Research Group and National Soft Sciences Research Group, China Academy of Social Science (CASS). 13 Ling Zhao, “Nongmin Weiquan Zhongxin Chuxian Zhongda Bianhua” (“Great Shift in Focus Appeared in Peasants’ Rights Defending”), Southern Weekend, September 2004. 14 Zhonggong Zhongyang Zuzhibu Ketizu, Zhongguo Diaocha Baogao, 2000-2001: Xin Xingshi Xia Renmin Neibu Maodun Yanjiu (China Investigation Report, 2000-2001: Study of Contradictions among the People in the New Situation) (Beijing: Zhongyang Bianyi Chubanshe, 2001), p. 84. -4- Table 1.1: Major Decrees Issued by the Central State Year Issuer 1990 State Council 1991 State Council 1993 CCPCC and State Council 1993 CCPCC Office and State Council Office 1996 CCPCC and State Council 1998 Third Session of CCPCC 15th Conference State Council Office 1999 Policies, Regulations, Circulars etc. “Circular on Earnestly Alleviating the Peasant Burden” “Administrative Regulations on Fees and Labor Services Borne by Peasants” (This document introduced the famous 5% limit on township and village levies). “Emergency Circular Concerning Earnestly Reducing Peasant Burdens” (The notice requires all documents and fee collection programs be suspended and liquidated). “Notice of Opinion Concerning the Management of the Examination of the Peasant Burden” “Decisions on Earnestly Alleviating the Peasant Burden” “Decisions on Key Problems Concerning Agriculture and Rural Work by CCPCC” “State Council Office Circular of Forwarding Opinions Concerning Current Peasant Reduction Work by MOA, MOS, MOF, SDPC and LAO” Source: Zhongguo Nongye Nianjian (China Agricultural Yearbook), 1991, 1992, 1994, 1997, 1999 and 2000. Besides issuing numerous decrees and decisions, the central government also made institutional efforts to resolve the problem. The State Council set up the Leading Team on Burden Reduction (jianfu lingdao xiaozu) in the early 1990s. Provinces and counties throughout the country set up leading teams or burden reduction offices (jianfuban) to match the center. These offices were to monitor the implementation of relevant laws and regulations, to assist peasants in burden-related litigation or in appeals and to approve local governmental decrees relevant to burdens. However, they were endowed with little real power independent from the local authorities. -5- Campaigns were launched by the central government from time to time, especially when top leaders were cautioned by signals of rural unrest.15 For instance, a nationwide comprehensive campaign was carried out in 1993 when rural riots16 shocked the central leaders.17 In March, an “Emergency Circular”18 was issued followed by the summer directives mentioned earlier19 that ordered the wholesale slashing of burden, all amidst a great deal of publicity. Intense pressure was generated on local officials as central and provincial inspection teams descended on the countryside. Local officials could not ignore or evade the pressures from above to reduce burdens, and in fact, unauthorized collections, especially those that exceeded the percent T and V levies, did decline in 1993 in many places. In the autumn of that year, MOA claimed that peasants had saved 10 billion yuan, a substantial amount since one estimate of burden resulting from fees, fines and apportionments put them at 13.9 billion.20 15 In fact, campaigns are frequently adopted by almost all levels of the hierarchy to create pressure for implementing policies, which is to a certain extent a heritage from the pre-reform era. But today’s campaigns are significantly different because they are much less intensive and usually limited to the bureaucratic hierarchy. As a lot of resources and administrative strengths are poured in, achievements, sometimes impressive, can be made, although the sustainability of such achievements is doubtable. Kevin J. O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, “Campaign Nostalgia in the Chinese Countryside,” Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. (1999), pp. 375-393; Lianjiang Li, “Support for Anti-corruption Campaigns in Rural China,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 29 (2001), pp. 573-586. 16 Riots in Renshou County, Sichuan were among the most widely publicized examples of the collective protests in that year. Some scholars view it as an indicator when rural conflicts began to receive wide public attention. Shukai Zhao, “Xiangcun Zhili: Zuzhi he Chongtu” (“Rural Governance: Organization and Conflicts”), Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and management), No. (2003), p.1. 17 Peasant burden may not be the only reason why the central government launched the campaign. The problem of IOUs also suffered the central state at that time. For information on the IOU crisis, please see: Andrew Wedeman, “Stealing from the Farmers: Institutional Corruption and the 1992 IOU Crisis,” The China Quarterly, No.152 (1997), pp. 805–831. 18 Referring to the “Emergency Circular Concerning Earnestly Reducing Peasant Burdens” issued by CCPCC and the State Council in May 1993. 19 Referring to the “Notice of Opinion Concerning the Management of the Examination of the Peasant Burden” issued by CCPCC Office and the State Council Office in July 1993. 20 Bernstein and Lü, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China, p. 172. Some researchers have overemphasized the influence of Renshou riot by taking it as the direct reason for the campaign. “The earthquake provoked by the peasants’ riot in Renshou was not limited to the county. The ‘victory’ by peasants was almost nationwide one. On 19 March, CCPCC and the State Council issued ‘The Emergency Circular on Earnestly Alleviating the Peasant Burden’….” See: Bai Shazhou, From Slave to Citizen: The Peasants of Modern China (Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 2001), p. 301. Although being one of the major riots, it was not the only reason why the central state launched the campaign because the key documents in that campaign had already been issued and were utilized by peasants in Renshou to legalize their actions in their protest. -6- RESEARCH QUESTIONS Despite all the efforts made by the central government, the problem persisted, and might have deteriorated. Since the beginning of the new millennium, especially after the 16th Party Congress, China’s top leaders finally determined to address rural problems in a serious and concerted way. The fee-to-tax reform21 thus emerged as a new approach that the center resorted to in order to alleviate the burden on peasants. Many researchers identify, among others, the fiscal system as the most important factor that led to arbitrary extractions from peasants. They concluded that it was the imbalance between financial resources (caiquan) and task implementation (shiquan) that had caused the county and township governments to rely on extractions from peasants to fund target-setting programs (dabiao) as well as routine expenditure.22 Thus, the fee-to-tax reform was designed to address some of the institutional roots of the burden problem in the financial and bureaucratic system by simplifying the tax categories, providing transfer payments as well as a set of complementary reforms. The reform has reportedly made great achievements, with an average 30% reduction among the 20 pilot provinces in 2002. 23 Scholars who conducted fieldwork have 21 The basic logic is that, by converting all non-tax levies into one major tax, the reform will eliminate the irregularity and enhance the predictability of local extractions. The remaining taxes are the agricultural tax, agricultural specialty tax and additional tax. See PRC Yearbook 2003, Vol. 23 (2004), p. 409. 22 Xiaobo Lü, “The Politics of Peasant Burden in Reform China,” The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 25, No. (1997), pp. 113-138; Qiucheng Tan, “Difang Fenquan yu Xiangzhen Caizheng Zhineng” (“Fiscal Decentralization and Functions of the Township Government”), Zhongguo Nongcun Guancha (China Rural Survey), No. (2002), pp. 2-12; Jun Zhang, “Xiangzhen Caizheng Zhidu Quexian yu Nongmin Fudan” (“The Drawback of the Financial System of Township and Farmer’s Burden”), Zhongguo Nongcun Guancha (China Rural Survey), No. (2002), pp. 2-12; Yang Zhao and Feizhou Zhou, “Peasant Burdens and Rural Finance,” Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences, No. 17 (Autumn 2000), pp. 67-85. 23 Different figures can be obtained from different sources and this specific number is from the Ministry of Agriculture, People’s Republic of China, 2003 China Agricultural Development Report (Beijing: China Agriculture Press, 2003), p. 65. What’s more, the results varied widely across the country, and generally coastal provinces and those minority regions enjoyed a higher reduction than the central belt. -7- confirmed the reduction. 24 And the No. Document of 2004 was among the continuous efforts to solve the problem and can be viewed as a policy to solidify and magnify the achievements of the fee-to-tax reform. Encouraged by the document, the fee-to-tax reform was pushed to a new stage. By August 2004, 30 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities had either lowered the agricultural tax rate or even cancelled it.25 Regarded as the “third rural revolution”26 since the foundation of P. R. China in 1949, the reform has by far gained great success in terms of burden reduction and it seems that it is a real blessing to Chinese peasants. No wonder some researchers believe that such a reform has “shown greatest promise of making a dent in the (burden) problem”. 27 Unfortunately, it is not yet a happy ending. Many observers have found that the reform actually deteriorated the fiscal situation at the county and township levels since the allocation of new financial resources from the center is far from sufficient to make up for the deficit created by the reform.28 Hui Qin summarized the “Huang 24 Xiujuan Tian and Feizhou Zhou, “Shuifei Gaige yu Nongmin Fudan: Xiaoguo, Fenbu he Zhengshou Fangshi” (“Fee-to-Tax Reform and Peasant Burden: Effects, Distribution and Collection Moods”), Zhongguo Nongcun Jingji (Chinese Rural Economy), No. (2003), pp. 12-18. Hubei Sheng Nongmin Jianfu Diaochazu, “Hubei Sheng Liu Xianshi Nongcun Shuifei Gaige hou Nongmin Jianfu Qingkuang Diaocha”(“Investigation of Peasant Burden Reduction in Six Counties (Cities) of Hubei Province after Fee-to-Tax Reform”), Hubei Shehui Kexue (Hubei Social Sciences), No. 10 (2003), pp. 25-28. 25 “Woguo 30 Sheng Shishi Nongyeshui Jianmian, Nongcun Shuifei Gaige Jin Xinjieduan” (“30 Provinces in Our Country Cut down Agricultural Tax and Rural Fee-to-tax Reform Enters a New Phase”), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2004-08/20/content_1835407.htm, accessed 22 December 2004. The report says, by then eight provincial level units had annulled the agricultural tax. They are Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Tibet, Beijing, Tianjin, Zhejiang and Fujian. 11 provincial units lowered down the tax rate by percent and the rest 11 provincial units cut the tax rate by percent. 26 The first two revolutions are the land reform from 1949 to early 1950s and the reform of the household contract responsibility system from 1978 to the early 1980s. 27 Bernstein and Lü, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China, p. 166. 28 Shouyin Zhu et al., “Nongcun Shuifei Gaige Shidian he Xiangcun Guanli Tizhi Gaige Genzong Yanjiu Baogao” (“Research Report on Rural Pilot Fee-to-tax Reform and Rural Administrative System Reform”), Jingji Yanjiu Cankao (Economics Research Review), No. 40 (2003), pp. 2-24; Licai Wu, “The Political Consequences of the Rural Fee-to-Tax Reform in Mainland China: A Case Study of -8- Zongxi Law”29 from burden reduction efforts in Chinese history, raising concerns on the feasibility of converting all fees into a unified tax. In addition to that, researchers have also noticed that the reform has more or less been carried out in a campaign manner and thus adds to the uncertainty of its sustainability.30 Scholars like Licai Wu even suggested that the fee-to-tax reform not only made the township governments more dependent on upper level state and thus bureaucratized, but also pushed the township governments into a dilemma of fiscal constraints and their responsibilities for local public goods provision. 31 Given all the contradictory phenomena stated above, several interesting questions emerge: how could the current fee-to-tax reform achieve such a high percentage of burden reduction despite the financial shortage it created at the county and township level? In other words, how did counties and townships manage to survive the revenue losses as a result of the burden-cutting reform? This is the central question in this research. To answer it, we must assess the burden reduction on peasants, the revenue loss of local authorities, especially township governments and further to disclose the mechanism that has helped townships to manage the crisis. Besides, another question Anhui Province,” Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences, No. 24 (Winter 2002), pp. 85-113; Thomas P. Bernstein, “Can the Peasant Burden Problem Finally Be Resolved? A Preliminary Assessment of Recent Policy Innovations,” Paper prepared for 40th Anniversary Reunion Conference of the Universities Service Centre for Chinese Studies, ‘The State of Contemporary China’, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. 29 He pointed out that although such reforms might make some achievements in the short run by converting all fees and taxes into one single levy, they were deemed to fail as people and especially the local authorities would forget (or at least pretend to have forgotten) that the single levy had already included all those miscellaneous fees and taxes, and began to extract new fees or taxes. Qin Hui, Nongmin Zhongguo: Lishi Fansi yu Xianshi Xuanze (Peasantry China: Historical Reflections and Current Choice), (Zhengzhou: Henan Renmin Chubanshe, 2003), pp. 17-23. 30 Bernstein, “Can the Peasant Burden Problem Finally Be Resolved? A Preliminary Assessment of Recent Policy Innovations.” 31 Licai Wu, “Nongcun Shuifei Gaige dui Xiangzhen Caizheng de Yingxiang jiqi Houguo: Yi Anhui Sheng Weili” (“The Impact of the Rural Fee-to-tax Reform on Township Finance and Its Consequences: Case Study on Anhui”), Bijiao (Comparative Studies), Vol. (2003), p. 156. -9- we may raise in our mind is: how does the fee-to-tax reform affect state power at the grassroots level? Obviously clear and logically consistent explanations to these questions will provide policy implications to the peasant burden problem and maintenance of rural social and political stability, especially in agricultural areas. By examining the process of the fee-to-tax reform and its complementary reforms, the author also endeavors to analyze the changing role of the state in the Chinese countryside. A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE BROADER THEORECTICAL BODY As Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lü have put it, “The burden issue was part and parcel of the underlying challenge of how to make the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic, responsive regime”.32 And it was also perceived as a result of the decentralization and de-concentration of state power caused by economic reform.33 Therefore, answers to the questions raised in the paper not only have significant policy implications, but also provide good opportunities to make contributions to the theoretical body of transitional regimes and the state-society relationship. To a great extent, most theoretical endeavors on peasant issues can be viewed as part of the consistent concern with the state-peasantry relationship among China Studies students, which in turn is linked to the profound methodological tradition of applying state-society model to political transitions. Philip Huang studied peasant Bernstein and Lü, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China, p. xvi. Xiaobo Lü, “The Politics of Peasant Burden in Reform China”; Qiucheng Tan, “Fiscal Decentralization and Functions of the Township Government”; Jun Zhang, “The Drawback of the Financial System of Township and Farmer’s Burden”; Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lü, “Taxation without Representation: Peasants, the Central and the Local States in Reform China,” The China Quarterly, No. 163 (2000), pp. 742-763. 32 33 - 10 - reforms. Instead, they need a system to form a village government which is free from corruption or at least is able to provide some basic public goods. CONCLUSION: PUT REINS ON THE STATE When examining its role in economic development, researchers tend to categorize the Chinese state as developmental. But when studying the peasant burden issue, they tend to reach the opposite conclusion, suggesting the predatory side of the regime. Furthermore, researchers also discovered that there are state activities that cannot be captured within the developmental-predatory spectrum, and such activities were described as “irresponsible”. 267 All such findings contribute greatly to our understanding of the Chinese state in the reform period. Yet, this research suggests that the state can be developmental and predatory while at the same irresponsible. The peasant burden issue is the best example to illustrate this point. On one hand, local development and public goods provision served as the best justification for the predatory actions of those corrupt agents and promotion-seeking cadres. On the other hand, though termed as predatory, the purpose of heavy extractions in most agriculutrual areas was to develop local economies and to provide basic public goods. At the same time, all such activities can be seen as irresponsible because the peasants, the potential beneficiaries or victims have been left out in the whole process. All such state activities share the same logic behind, which has been summarized in the previous section: the internal conflict of the state between the decentralizing mechanism and the pressure transferring mechanism and the fundamental conflict between the state and the peasantry. To resovlve these two conflicts, reins must be put 267 Yongshun Cai, “Irresponsible State: Local Cadres and Image-Building in China.” - 138 - on the state, i.e. to held the state responsible and accountable to the peasantry rather than the other way round. This can be achieved either by extending the decentralization of the state into the society and turn the direction of pressure transferring mechanism upside down, i.e. democracy, or by establishing the internal check-and-balance system among governmental sections both horizontally and vertically, namely the rule of law. In fact, both approaches are being advocated and tried out in China, not necessarily in the rural areas.268 However, no matter which approach is taken, or perhaps both, we will be able to witness one of the greatest transformations in the world. 268 In fact, there was a heated debate on which approach China should take in the future. See: Wei Pan, “Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 34 (February 2003), pp. 3–43. Edward Friedman, “A Comparative Politics of Democratization in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 34 (February 2003), pp. 103–123. - 139 - BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS (In English) Bernstein, Thomas P., and Xiaobo Lü. Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Bianco, Lucien. Peasants without the Party: Grass-roots Movements in TwentiethCentury China. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001. Cao, Jinqing. China along the Yellow River: Reflections on Rural Society. Translated by Nicky Harman and Huang Ruhua. New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. Duara, Prasenjit. Culture, Power and State: Rural North China, 1900-1942. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988. Huang, Philip C. C. The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University of Press, 1985. Huang, Philip C. C. The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350-1988. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990. Kelliher, Daniel. Peasant Power in China. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992. Ku, Hok Bun. Moral Politics in a South Chinese Village: Responsibility, Reciprocity and Resistance. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Rong, Jingben, and et al. Transformation from the Pressurized System to a Democratic System of Cooperation: Reform of the Political System at the County and Township Levels. Translated by Xiaohua Tong. 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(In Chinese) Bai, Shazhou. From Slave to Citizen: The Peasants of Modern China. Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 2001. - 140 - Chen, Xiwen. Zhongguo Xianxiang Caizheng yu Nongmin Zengshou Wenti Yanjiu (Study on Issues of Chinese County and Township Finance and Increasing Peasants’ Income). Taiyuan: Shanxi Jingji Chubanshe, 2003. Li, Changping. Wo Xiang Zongli Shuo Shihua (I Told the Truth to the Premier). Beijing: Guangmingribao Chubanshe, 2002. Ma, Xiaohe. Woguo Nongcun Shuifei Gaige Yanjiu (Study on China’s Rural Fee-intotax Reform). Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe, 2002. Ministry of Agriculture, People’s Republic of China. 2003 China Agricultural Development Report. Beijing: China Agriculture Press, 2003. Pan, Wei. Politics of Marketization in Rural China: The Coalition between Grassroots Authorities and Rural Industries. Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2003. Qin, Hui. Nongmin Zhongguo: Lishi Fansi yu Xianshi Xuanze (Peasantry China: Historical Reflections and Current Choice). 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JOURNAL ARTICLES/ CONFERENCE PAPERS (In English) Aubert, Claude, and Xiande Li. “Peasant Burden: Taxes and Levies Imposed on Chinese Farmers.” In Agricultural Policies in China after WTO Accession, OECD, 160-179. Paris 2002. Bernstein, Thomas P. “Can the Peasant Burden Problem Finally Be Resolved? A Preliminary Assessment of Recent Policy Innovations.” Paper presented at the 40th Anniversary Reunion Conference of the Universities Service Centre for Chinese Studies: The State of Contemporary China. Chinese University of Hong Kong, 5-7 January 2003. Bernstein, Thomas P., and Xiaobo Lü. “Taxation without Representation: Peasants, the Central and the Local States in Reform China.” The China Quarterly, no. 163 (2000): 742-763. 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Jiang, Tingsong, and Zhiyun Zhao. “Government Transfer Payments and Regional Development in China.” Paper presented at the 15th Annual Conference of the Association for Chinese Economics Studies Australia (ACESA), Melbourne, 23 October 2003. Li, Lianjiang. “The Politics of Introducing Direct Township Elections in China.” The China Quarterly, no. 171 (2002): 704-723. Li, Lianjiang. “Support for Anti-corruption Campaigns in Rural China.” Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 29 (2001): 573-586. Li, Lianjiang, and Kevin J. O’Brien. “Villagers and Popular Resistance in Contemporary China.” Modern China 22, no.1 (Janurary 1996): 28-61. Lü, Xiaobo. “The Politics of Peasant Burden in Reform China.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 25, no. (1997): 113-138. Migdal, Joel S. “The State in Society: An Approach to Struggles for Domination.” In State Power and Social Forces, edited by Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue, 7-36. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 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(accessed December 2004). “Woguo 30 Sheng Shishi Nongyeshui Jianmian, Nongcun Shuifei Gaige Jin Xinjieduan” (“30 Provinces in Our Country Cut down Agricultural Tax and Rural Fee-to-tax Reform Enters a New Phase”). http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2004-08/20/content_1835407.htm. (accessed 22 December 2004). “2004 Nian Nongcun Shuifei Gaige Gongzuo Jingzhan Qingkuang he 2005 Nian Gongzuo Dongtai” (“Progress of Rural Fee-to-tax Reform in 2004 and Temporary Status of the Work in 2005”). http://www.mof.gov.cn /news/z20050302_1862_4745.htm. (accessed 23 June 2005). GOVERNMENTAL DOCUMENTS State Council. “Circular on Earnestly Alleviating the Peasant Burden.” February 1990. State Council. “Administrative Regulations on Fees and Labor Services Borne by Peasants.” December 1991. CCPCC and State Council. “Emergency Circular Concerning Earnestly Reducing Peasant Burdens.” 19 March 1993. 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YEARBOOKS AND ALMANACS Anhui Almanac, 2000-2004. Finance Year Book of China, 2000-2004. Jiangsu Almanac, 2002-2004. PRC Yearbook, 1990-2004. Zhongguo Nongye Nianjian (China Agricultural Yearbook), 1991-2000 - 153 - [...]... This chapter also endeavors to explore the peasant burden problem in a broader view by relating it to the grassroots democracy in rural China - 24 - Chapter 2 Peasant Burden and Fee -to- tax Reform: Historical Background Peasant burden was a common problem in Chinese history as China was an agrarian economy and land taxes were the major source of revenue for the imperial government as well as the successive... extractions in many areas heavier than before? A lot of other factors should be taken into consideration in order to explain the variance across time and across areas Among the rest, a clear fact is that China s rural areas have developed unevenly in the past 26 years of reform While peasant burden was not distributed according to the benefits of reform, burden rates vary in different parts As a result, peasant. .. Republican regime In the Maoist era, the agricultural sector contributed greatly to China s rapid industrialization and “peasants became residual claimants to the harvest, after the collectives and the state had taken their share” Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lü have made a splendid historical comparison of the burden problem in their Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China, so the author... grassroots politics in rural China The chapters are organized as follows In Chapter 2, the historical background of the fee -to- tax reform, i.e the evolution of the peasant burden problem will be introduced in the first section After that, the fee -to- tax reform at national level will be introduced, from its origin to the demise of the agricultural tax Finally, the dilemma confronting the grassroots authorities,... grain The second is fee -to- tax reform, as was carried out in Wugang, Hunan Province In Wugang, the township unified planned fees and village retained fees were turned into a new rural public welfare tax and collected in cash while the agricultural tax, the agricultural specialty tax and the slaughter tax were untouched The rate of the new public welfare tax was strictly restricted to 5% of the peasants’... fines, administrative fees and apportions These exactions might add great variances to the final result of their findings 73 Lianjiang Li and Kevin J O’Brien, “Villagers and Popular Resistance in Contemporary China, ” Modern China, Vol 22, No 1 (January 1996), pp 28-61 74 One primary goal of the introduction of the tax- sharing system was to enhance the central state’s capacity to balance the regional... worse in the 1990s Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lü were among the first to study the predatory aspect of the local state by investigating the peasant burden problem in agricultural areas of China They suggested that the central state lacked the ability to control local officials from above since it failed to lighten the burden on peasants.39 But Maria Edin offered a different explanation She studied the. .. was a shift from fixing the total amount of public grain due and collection in kind to setting the total amount of cash due and collecting money Second, the total amount of the burden due varied each year in the second phase rather than remaining constant for three years once the amount was settled Third, there was a change in the content of the total amount included In the first phase, only legal taxes... the famous advocator, Kaimeng He, who was then a consultant of Anhui Province, proposed to regulate the fee and tax collection in rural China And in 1992 the first attempt was witnessed in Woyang County, Anhui Province, where the peasant burden problem was most acute See Bo Ren, “Nongcun Shuifei Zhibian” (“Transformation in Rural Taxation”), Caijing Magazine, No 15 (August 2002), p 49 - 32 - that various... 26 - peasant burden includes state taxes (agricultural tax, agricultural specialty tax, etc.), land contract fee, township unified planned fees and village retained fees, monetary equivalent of corvee labor services, fees, assessments and fundraising, fines as well as “hidden burdens.”63 The evolution of peasant burden can be divided into three major phases during the reform era The first phase lasted . implications to the peasant burden problem and maintenance of rural social and political stability, especially in agricultural areas. By examining the process of the fee -to- tax reform and its. Representation: Peasants, the Central and the Local States in Reform China ; Bernstein and Lü, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China. 40 Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent. local state by investigating the peasant burden problem in agricultural areas of China. They suggested that the central state lacked the ability to control local officials from above since it failed