Extending past research in extra role behavior unleasing a new paradigm from the prism of knowledge sharing and whistleblowing

EXTENDING PAST RESEARCH IN EXTRA-ROLE BEHAVIOR THROUGH THE PRISM OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING AND WHISTLEBLOWING KAMDAR DISHAN (BBA.(Hons.), NUS) (MSc.(Mgt.), NUS) A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (MANAGEMENT) SCHOOL OF BUSINESS NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 2004 Acknowledgements The process of doing this dissertation has been extremely arduous and its completion would have been impossible if not for the following special people. Firstly and foremost, I would like to thank My Family, for their love, blessings, encouragement and prayer for my success. “Hope I’ve done you proud.” To my “little partners,” Dhruv (Munna), Jitisha (Roshan), Shiv (Chattaan), and Jai (Ishu) for being my source of inspiration and determination! To my wife Sejal for her unfailing support, love and understanding. I am extremely grateful to Dr Chia Ho Beng, who has been a very helpful person to me in the process of doing this dissertation. He has been not only my supervisor, but also my mentor (for his right guidance and sound advice), my teacher (for imparting his research skills to me) and my friend (for being very approachable and for being a good listener). I would also like to express my profound gratitude to Dr Glenn Nosworthy for his help and support through out this academic exercise. Dr Glenn, your contributions to this study really made a big difference and I am very grateful to your untiring efforts and vital advises. Not to mention, your untiring efforts in proofreading my dissertation several times. A special thanks to Mr B.R. Mehta and his team, who participated in my surveys and, despite many pressures on their time, filled in the questionnaire and provided the information that formed the basis of this study. Mr Mehta, I thank you for patiently allowing me to “disrupt” your subordinates’ work schedule, and encouraging them to respond to my questionnaires. I am also very grateful to the following people, who had helped me in getting appointments with various companies in Mumbai, vide their contacts. I take this opportunity to specially thank “Kakukaka”, Prashant, Kalpesh, Jyotiben, Yogita, Nikita, Harshit, Hemali, Kajal and Viral for all their untiring efforts in getting companies to participate in my survey. All and above, I thank God for His Blessings. Hereby, I dedicate my Dissertation to all these people mentioned above. i Table of Contents Topics Page No. INTRODUCTION 01 BIBLIOGRAPHY 10 Study 18 ABSRACT 19 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 20 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 Introduction Sharing knowledge Rewards and knowledge sharing Closeness of ties and rewards Personal orientation and motives 1.5.1 Impression Management 1.5.2 Machiavellianism CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Sample Procedure Treatment conditions and dependent variables Impression management motive and Machiavellianism measures 2.4.1 Confirmatory factor analysis CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 3.1 Hypotheses testing CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 4.1 4.2 4.3 Discussion Managerial implications Limitations and directions for future research 20 22 24 29 31 33 35 39 39 39 40 42 43 45 45 60 60 64 65 BIBLIOGRAPHY 71 APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE SCENARIOS 86 ANNEX 1: BRIEF PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES 89 ii Table of Contents Topics Page No. ANNEX 2: ANALYTICAL CONCEPTS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF EXCHANGE THEORIES 90 Study 91 ABSRACT 92 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 93 1.1 1.2 1.3 Purpose for this study Salience of knowledge sharing in the knowledge management equation Background 1.3.1 Obstacles to knowledge sharing 1.3.2 Knowledge sharing and expectations of rewards 1.3.3 Economic exchange, motivation and incentives 1.3.4 Ties and knowledge sharing 1.3.5 The role of impression management personality- self-monitoring CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 2.1 2.2 Sample Design, procedure and measures CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 3.1 3.2 Contextual variables Hypotheses testing CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 4.1 4.2 4.3 Discussion Conclusions and implications Limitations 93 95 97 97 97 99 101 103 107 107 108 112 112 115 129 129 132 133 BILBLIOGRAPHY 136 APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE SCENARIOS 149 iii Table of Contents Topics Page No. Study 151 ABSTRACT 152 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 153 1.1 1.2 1.3 Whistleblowing Situational factors (assurance of anonymity) and whistleblowing Motives and whistleblowing 1.3.1 Organizational concern motive 1.3.2 Prosocial values motive CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Sample Experimental design Procedure and materials Exploratory factor analysis for motives scales CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 3.1 3.2 3.3 Demographics and descriptive statistics Manipulation checks Hypotheses testing CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 4.1 4.2 Discussion Limitation and future research 153 157 160 161 163 167 167 167 169 170 171 171 171 173 181 181 184 BIBLIOGRAPHY 188 APPENDIX 1: FACTOR STRUCTURE OF MOTIVE ITEMS 197 ANNEX 1: SAMPLE SCENARIOS 198 CONCLUSION 200 BIBLIOGRAPHY 204 iv List of Tables – Study Table Table 1: Pearson’s Correlation, Cronbach's Alpha, Means, Page No. 45 and Standard Deviation. Table 2: Repeated Measures ANOVA: Intention to Share 46 Information. Table 3: Means, Standard Deviations and Confidence 48 Intervals for the –way Interaction Between Appraisal and Bonus. Table 4: Sheffe’s Post Hoc Comparisons: Sharing 49 Information with Close Friends Table 5: Sheffe’s Post Hoc Comparisons – Sharing 50 Information with Coworkers. Table 6: Interaction Effects Between Appraisal and Person 53 Variables (Centered on Their Means) on Sharing Intentions with Co-workers. Table 7: Interaction Effects Between Appraisal and Person 54 Variables (Centered on Their Means) on Sharing Intentions with Close-Friends. Table 8: Standardize Beta for Regression of Appraisal 55 Condition, Predictors, and Interaction Terms on Sharing Intentions v List of Tables – Study Table Page No. Table 1: Responses Across Incentive Conditions 113 Table 2: Contextual Variables Across Incentive Conditions 114 Table 3: Univariate Analyses of Incentives on Knowledge 116 Sharing Table 4: Standardized Beta for Regression of Self- 122 monitoring, and Inducements, and Interaction Terms on Willingness to Share Knowledge with Coworker-Friends, Coworkers in Unit and Coworkers in Other Units. Table 5: Unstandardized Betas for Simple Slope Analyses 126 Exploring Inducement conditions x Self-Monitoring (SM) Interactions. vi List of Tables – Study Table Table 1: Pearson’s Correlation, Cronbach's Alpha, Means, Page No. 172 and Standard Deviation. Table 2: Manipulation Checks Across Anonymous 173 Conditions Table 3: ANCOVA: Dependent Variable: Whistleblowing 174 Intentions Table 4: Interaction Effects of Anonymity Condition on the 177 Relationship Between Motives (centered on means) and Whistleblowing Intentions Table 5: Unstandardized Beta for Regression of 178 Anonymous Condition, Predictors (centered on means), and Interaction Terms on Whistleblowing Intentions Table 6: Simple Slope Analysis for Interactions Between 180 Motive Variables and Anonymity Factor in Predicting Whistleblowing Intentions. vii List of Figures – Study Figure Figure 1: Two-way Interaction Effects Between Appraisal Page No. 48 and Bonus on Sharing Intention. Figure 2: Interaction Between Appraisal, Bonuses and 51 Knowledge Sharing with Close Friends Figure 3: Interaction Between Appraisal, Bonuses and 51 Knowledge Sharing with Coworkers Figure 4: Interaction Between Appraisal Condition and 56 Impression Management in Predicting Knowledge Sharing with Coworkers Figure 5: Interaction Between Appraisal Condition and 56 Machiavellianism in Predicting Knowledge Sharing with Coworkers viii List of Figures – Study Figure Figure 1: Effects of Incentives on Knowledge Sharing with Page No. 118 Various Organizational Recipients. Figure 2: Knowledge Sharing with Close Friends, 118 Coworkers in Ones’ Unit, and Coworkers in Other Units Across Incentive Conditions. Figure 3a: Moderating Effect of Self-Monitoring (SM) on 123 Relation Between Incentives and Knowledge Sharing With Close Friends. Figure 3b: Moderating Effect of Self-Monitoring (SM) on 123 Relation Between Incentives and Knowledge Sharing With Coworkers in Other Units. Figure 3c: Moderating Effect of Self-Monitoring (SM) on 124 Relation Between Incentives and Knowledge Sharing With Coworkers in Unit. Figure 4: Summary Graph: Comparison of Low and High 125 Self-Monitors on Knowledge Sharing Under Different Incentive Conditions ix Bibliography Brief, A.P., & Motowidlo, S.J. (1986). Prosocial organizational behaviors. Academy of Management Review, 11, 710-725. Cohen, J., Cohen P., West, S.G., & Aiken, L. S. (2003). Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. CostaClarke, R.J. (1994). The costly implications of terminating whistleblowers. Employement Relations Today, 447-454. Dunkin, A. (1991). Blowing the whistle without paying the piper. Business Week, June, 138-139. Dworkin, T.M., & Near, J.P. (1987). Whistleblowing statutes: Are they working? American Business Law Journal, 25, 241-264. Eisenberger, R., Fasolo, P., Davis-LaMastro, V. (1990). 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Job satisfaction and organizational commitment as predictors of organizational citizenship and in role behaviors. Journal of Management, 7, 601-617. Good Organizational Citizens Vs. Good Social Citizens: The Impact of Motives and Anonymity on Whistleblowing Intentions 196 Appendix Appendix FACTOR STRUCTURE OF MOTIVE ITEMS Factors 2, and were combined to form the overall measure of prosocial values motive Factors and were combined to form the overall measure of organizational concern motive Because I care what happens to the company. (OC) .92 Because the organization treats me fairly. (OC) Factors* .92 Because I want to be a well-informed employee. (OC) .91 Because I want to understand how the organization works. (OC) To keep up with the latest developments in the organization. (OC) To get to know my co-workers better. (PV) Because I am concerned about other people’s feelings. (PV) Because I want to help my co-workers in any way I can. (PV) To be friendly with others. (PV) * .91 .91 .91 .89 .89 .88 Because the organization values my work. (OC) .93 Because I have a genuine interest in my work. (OC) .92 Because I feel pride in the organization. (OC) .92 Because I am committed to the company. (OC) .92 Because I like interacting with my co-workers. (PV) .89 Because I feel it is important to help those in need. (PV) Because I believe in being courteous to others. (PV) .88 .86 Because it is easy for me to be helpful. (PV) .92 To have leisure time with my co-workers. (PV) .91 Because I can put myself in other people’s shoes. (PV) .82 One item from organizational concern scale (“Because I want to be fully involved in the company”) was removed due to low factor loading. Good Organizational Citizens Vs. Good Social Citizens: The Impact of Motives and Anonymity 197 on Whistleblowing Intentions Annex Annex SAMPLE SCENARIOS Each participant responded to versions of the three scenarios that reflected a single incentive condition. 1. Due to intense competition, your refinery is under pressure to reduce its operation costs and to cut down on unwarranted overheads. As a result, you find out that the management are now using substandard raw material in the refining process. The byproduct of this material is lead monoxide. This hazardous byproduct in injurious to plant growth and may cause health problems to rural dwellers in the nearby villages in the long run. 2. Your refinery is facing intense competition from competitors and heightened demand for its products. As a result, the management is under pressure to expand its present premise. For this, they have to buy over farmlands from neighboring villagers. One day you find out that the management has hired real estate agents who are known to use strong-armed tactics to force these farmers to sell their land to them. 3. You have a friend who is working in an overseas firm that supplies raw materials to your refinery. You learn from him that his company is preparing sets of invoices for raw materials procured by your refinery. One invoice is of a lower value of the original purchased price. He says that this will help your refinery save on import duties Good Organizational Citizens Vs. Good Social Citizens: The Impact of Motives and Anonymity on Whistleblowing Intentions 198 Annex 4. Due to intense competition, your refinery is under pressure to reduce operation costs. As a result your company, had re-formulated auto petrol to make production cheaper. In fact this re-formulation has lead to a 15% savings on production costs. One day you find out that this new formulation will damage car engines over a period of time, and that the management are well aware of this! The anonymous condition included this additional paragraph at the end of each scenario: The legal system in your State assures employees of strict anonymity for reporting company wrongdoings. The non-anonymous condition did not have the above paragraph at the end of each scenario: Note: Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the conditions above. From the 102 respondents, 52 and 50 respondents each responded to the scenarios reflecting either the anonymous or non-anonymous condition respectively. Good Organizational Citizens Vs. Good Social Citizens: The Impact of Motives and Anonymity on Whistleblowing Intentions 199 Conclusion Findings across the three independent studies above support the interactionist approach towards understanding extra-role behaviors where the focus is neither strictly on inter-situational (e.g., Kogan & Wallach, 1964; Mischel, 1968) nor on cross-situational consistency (e.g., Alker, 1972; Epstein, 1977), but rather, the aim is to explore circumstances under which such consistencies may occur (Hettema & Kenrick, 1992) and explain explicitly the connection between the situation and the personality dimension of interest. Results across the three independent studies clearly demonstrate the utility of such an approach in the study of extra role behavior (where past work on extra-role behavior has typically focused on main, rather than the interactive effects), where I have been able to show that individuals with varying personalities and motives react differently across situational (inducements in studies and and legal assurance of anonymity in study 3) contingencies. Consistent with the contention of Mischel and Shoda (Mischel & Shoda, 1998; Shoda & Mischel 2000), I have demonstrated that person-by-situation interaction effects can explain a substantial amount of variance over and above either personality or situational variance taken separately. In study 1, results showed that different forms of tangible rewards had differential effects in motivating knowledge sharing when sharing with coworkers vs. close friends. In particular, specifically appraising employees for sharing knowledge was found to be most effective in creating a knowledge sharing environment. This was followed by providing performance bonuses (that are not explicitly tied to knowledge sharing) and subsequently by developing close ties. However, results showed that the use of appraisals jointly with developing close ties was as effective as the use of performance bonus in 200 motivating employees to share knowledge. Furthermore, in this study, as in study 1, results showed that enhancing knowledge sharing may not be a simple matter of providing tangible rewards or forming close ties among employees, there are vital dispositional variations as well. While Machiavellians appeared to be instrumental when sharing with coworkers, hi impression managers appeared to be unaffected by appraisals, in their desire to maintain a positive public image. In study 2, results showed that explicit inducements are critical in facilitating knowledge sharing among employees. I also found that recognition inducements can be as effective as pay inducements in facilitating sharing, even though the pay inducement represented one-week’s pay, a significant sum for an engineer. This is consistent with the assertions of Kohn (1993), Herzberg (1966) and others that monetary rewards may not be the most cost-effective way to motivate employees. Clearly, recognition as a form of inducement would entail much lower costs for an organization. However, facilitating knowledge sharing is not a simple matter of providing inducements. While inducements accounted for substantial explanatory variance (28%), joint effects among dispositional factors, social ties with recipients, and inducements contributed substantially more explanatory variance (35%). In the absence of inducements, employees are most willing to share knowledge with close friends, no doubt as part of the broader exchange that characterizes close relationships. However, there are important dispositional variations. Low self-monitors tend not to differentiate between close friends and more distal coworkers when there are either no inducements for sharing or recognition inducements. However, high self-monitors’ willingness to share knowledge appears to be more variable across recipients. For this group, recognition was more effective than monetary 201 inducements regardless of recipient, and this was especially the case when the recipients of the knowledge were more distal coworkers. In study 3, I found that individuals were generally not willing to whistleblow. However, situational interventions such as legal guarantees of whistleblower anonymity greatly enhanced whistleblowing intentions. This effect was however moderated by individual motives. Individuals high on organizational concern motive were more willing to whistleblow when there were legal assurance of anonymity than in the absence of such interventions. On the other hand, individuals high in prosocial motives reported low willingness to whistleblow in either conditions, in contrast to their low counterparts whos’ intentions to whistleblow rose dramatically from non-anonymous to anonymous conditions. This study highlights the importance of examining the joint effects of both situational and person factors in whistleblowing research. From a theoretical perspective, the studies reported in this dissertation provides further support for the proposition of Mischel and Shoda (Mischel & Shoda, 1998, Shoda & Mischel 2000) that personality / disposition should be conceptualized in terms of patterns of cognition, affect, and behavior that a person accesses for a particular situation rather than across situations. Indeed, across the first studies, much more variance was accounted for by joint effects among dispositional, situational, and relational variables than each individually. While relational variables were not explored in the third study, it is obvious that the joint effects of person and situational variables accounted for additional variance than by either individually. 202 With the maturation of various research streams, it is perhaps appropriate that we relax our simplifying assumptions and begin to consider the complex social environment in which behavior occurs. While this dissertation provides evidence for the need to account for joint effects, it was not designed to investigate the cognitive/affective mechanism that presumably underlies the interactions observed. Clearly, this presents exciting opportunities for theory development as well as investigation into specific domains of extra role behaviors such as whistleblowing, principled organizational dissent, organizational citizenship behavior, prosocial behavior, knowledge sharing, and other helping domains. Based on these results, I encourage researchers to adopt an interactionist approach in future extra-role behavior research. . 203 Bibliography Alker, H.A. (1972). Is personality situationally specific or intra-psychically consistent? Journal of Personality, 40, 1-16. Epstein, S. (1977). Traits are alive and well. In D. Magnusson & N.S. Endler (Eds.), Personality at the Crossroads: Current Issues in Interactional Psychology (pp. 83-98). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Hettema, J. & Kenrick, D.T. (1992). Models of person-situation interactions. In G. Caprara & G.L. Van Heck (Eds.), Modern personality psychology: Critical reviews and new direction (pp. 393-417). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 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European Journal of Personality, 14, 407-428. 204 [...]... underpinnings of these behaviors are analogous to other dimensions of extra- role behavior Both knowledge sharing and whistleblowing have deep roots in social exchange (Organ, 1988; Moorman, 1991) as well as classical organizational theory (Barnard, 1938; Katz & Kahn, 1966) In an attempt to relate knowledge sharing and whistleblowing to other similar extra- role behavior constructs, there appears to... conceptual overlap between knowledge sharing and organizational citizenship behavior/ prosocial behavior and between whistleblowing and voice/principled organizational dissent While knowledge sharing and organizational citizenship behavior may be very much similar conceptually, the main difference between these two forms of promotive extra- role behavior lies in that knowledge sharing entails a clear personal... et al., 2002; Van Dyne et al., 1995) Secondly, I 7 adopt an interactionist approach towards studying knowledge sharing and whistleblowing, where my focal thrusts has been on investigating the interaction between situational factors and individual differences as antecedents of these behaviors A major gap in past research is the general dearth of empirical work that invokes an interactionist approach... Knowledge sharing is an important element in knowledge management and refers to the dissemination of job-relevant information to coworkers in a firm (Cummings, 2001) Knowledge sharing is especially important today because knowledge is supplanting land, labor, and capital as the primary source of competitive advantage, and as such the ability to create new knowledge as well as to share existing knowledge. .. & Drasgow, 2000) also highlight the importance of cooperative, discretionary behavior at all levels of the organization (LePine & Van Dyne, 2001; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998) Given the clear importance of extra- role behavior to an organization, there has been great proliferation of research in this domain Researchers have suggested and found important relationships between extra- role behavior and other... Prohibitive behaviors are protective and preventative; they include interceding to protect those with less power as well as speaking out to stop inappropriate or unethical behavior Behaviors such as helping, sharing work and knowledge and cooperating with coworkers are primarily ‘promotive’ behaviors (e.g., organizational citizenship behavior and prosocial behavior) Although ‘promotive’ extra- role behaviors are... Introduction and Literature Review CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 1.1 Introduction New knowledge is created when people transfer and share what they know, internalize it and apply what they learned The value and worth of individual, group and corporate intellectual assets grow exponentially when shared and increases in value with use Human inertia is the biggest obstacle to knowledge management... (such as ‘promotive’ vs ‘prohibitive’) rather than a more global extra- role behavior construct Based on their proposition, I attempt to extend the work on extra- role behaviors by empirically exploring unique antecedents of knowledge sharing (classified as a ‘promotive’ extra- role behavior) and whistleblowing (classified as ‘prohibitive’ extrarole behavior) not previously explored in past extra- role behavior. .. Discretionary behaviors are fundamental when we investigate work behaviors The paradigm of ‘discretionary work behavior is conceivably one of the most significant behavioral constructs in organizational science (Katz, 1964; Katz & Kahn, 1966) As a result, there has been growing emphasis in the organizational behavior literature on discretionary behavior, or employee behavior that goes beyond role expectations... organization; the behavior must be directed towards or be seen as benefiting the organization With the initial articulation of extra- role behavior by Barnard (1938), Katz (1964) and Katz and Kahn (1966), researchers have progressively recognized the importance of such behaviors as it hold promise for long term organizational success Moreover, extrarole behavior is becoming increasing important to organizations . impression management, Machiavellianism, and the potential beneficiaries of the knowledge sharing. Including knowledge sharing in the appraisal system had a stronger impact on whether employees. a sample of 295 engineers, investigates and compares the effectiveness of performance appraisal vs. performance bonuses in facilitating knowledge sharing as well as the moderating roles of. knowledge sharing and whistleblowing have deep roots in social exchange (Organ, 1988; Moorman, 1991) as well as classical organizational theory (Barnard, 1938; Katz & Kahn, 1966). In an attempt