A critical defense of animal liberation

CHAPTER ONE Animal Liberation In the preface to his 1990 edition of Animal Liberation, Singer recollects that just 15 years ago, notions such as ‘‘animal liberation’’ and ‘‘animal rights’’ would have been ridiculed and dismissed with immediate skepticism. 15 years later in 1990 and even more so now because of the progressive development of the animal liberation movement, that kind of attitude towards animals belongs to ‘‘a world half-forgotten’’.1 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to dig up antiquarian ideas in order to appreciate what has happened as a result of a period of development for those very same ideas. More importantly, the effort might help us to appreciate Singer’s views on a concept that is so crucial to his case for animal liberation – the principle of equality. This is so especially when we are aware of what he is responding to in the first place. Singer is responding to two things. The first is cruelty. This is the cruelty that happens to animals on an everyday basis. It occurs on an unbelievably large scale because of modern-day practices of intensive factory-farming, scientific experimentation, hunting, the slaughtering of animals to feed the fashion and fur trade, and capturing and imprisoning them in zoos and circuses to entertain us. The list goes on. It is the kind of cruelty that continues to happen because most of us not see that the interests of animals are important enough for us to take any serious stand on what we have to to stop such cruelty. Secondly, Singer responds to the way the principle of equality has been understood, especially in the way that equality between different races or gender groups has been argued for and against. In order to correct our present treatment of animals, he has to correct our commonly-held conceptions of equality. Such a move is both reasonable and necessary since present cruelty to Singer, P. Animal Liberation. New York: Harper Collins Publishers 2002 p.xv animals is largely due to the belief that it is morally permissible for us to witness and ignore such cruelty as its victims are not worthy of our concern and have no real interests. In other words, one finds that he or she has no reason to believe that the principle of equality, as it rightly applies to human beings, should be extended to apply to non-human animals too. That is the explanation for the lack of awareness and moral obligation to prevent cruelty to animals on the part of a majority of the human race. The first chapter of Animal Liberation is aptly entitled ‘‘All Animals Are Equal…or why the ethical principle on which human equality rests requires us to extend equal consideration to animals too.’’ Quite a mouthful for a chapter heading but a rather concise formulation of Singer’s entire case. In Animal Liberation and almost all of Singer’s publications on animal ethics, he mentions reasons why one would normally consider social ills such as racism and sexism to be wrong. The point made from these references is that racism and sexism are forms of inequality and the basis upon which this is argued for requires us to recognize that our treatment of animals is also a kind of gross inequality. To be racist or sexist is to be wrong in the same way that being speciesist is wrong: Racists violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of their own race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Sexists violate the principle of equality by favoring the interests of their own sex. Similarly, speciesists allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is identical in each case. Hence, the human equality that is absent in racism and sexism rests on a similar ethical principle as the equality that is violated when speciesism is Ibid. p.9 prevalent. At this point, one may ask: but what justifies this equation made between the three –isms especially when the two parties concerned in speciesism involve beings of such divergent biological, emotional and intellectual characteristics? On the other hand, racism and sexism are clear cases of prejudice made on the basis of race or gender membership. No matter what race or gender one belongs to, the tyrants or the victims of inequality are both similar in several ways (emotionally, intellectually, biologically etc.) and it is this similarity which entitles everyone to similar rights and similar treatment. This appears to be one prevalent view of why equality is upheld and why forms of inequality like racism and sexism are condemned. Another commonly-held view of equality assumes a factual equality that exists among individuals. This says that all individuals should be treated equally because they are all equally endowed with abilities like those to with communication, being charitable, possessing certain talents and so on. If one were to discriminate against a person on the basis of gender or race, that would be disregarding his abilities. Such a form of discrimination fails to recognize that both race and gender are not true indications of a person’s abilities. In response to these two notions of equality, Singer presents his challenge to them by pointing out the flaws with each and offers a more consistent and adequate account. We shall begin by discussing the first. Equality does not imply equal rights and equal treatment but equal consideration If one were to consider a typical defense made on behalf of the view that the equality between men and women cannot be validly extended to non-human animals, the rationale of this would be that there are many ways in which men and women are similar. In contrast, human beings and animals differ greatly. Hence, the implication is that men and women, as similar beings, should have similar rights and this warrants similar treatment. On the other hand, human beings and animals as different beings, should not have similar rights and this would not necessitate similar treatment.3 For example, this makes sense when voting rights are attributed to those who have the capability to make rational decisions about the future. Both men and women possess this capability and all regardless of gender difference should have the equal right to vote. Since animals not have this capability, they cannot have the right to vote – an offspring of the seemingly sensible notion that similar beings should be entitled to similar rights and similar treatment. As Singer rightly points out, this kind of reasoning on which equality is based seems to present a huge obstacle to extending the basic principle of equality to non-human animals. But Singer argues that even purportedly similar beings (like men and women) will have ‘‘slight differences’’, and this suggests that it does not make sense to accord both groups identical treatment. Even feminists would be willing to concede the undeniable differences between men and women. These differences would then have to ensure that different rights and treatment be given. Granting women the equal right with men to, say, volitional circumcision (assuming a society in which circumcision was enforced upon all men) would be no cause for celebration in the progressive development of the feminist movement. The same goes for granting men the equal right with An upholder of this view is Thomas Taylor and such a notion of equality is reflected in his comments to Mary Wollstonecraft after the latter’s publication of Vindication of the Rights of Women. Ibid. p.1 women to abort on request. Hence, it is as futile to speak of an animal’s right to vote as it is to consider men’s right to abortion since both rights obviously not apply to animals and men respectively. What this shows is that extending the principle of equality ‘‘does not imply that we treat both groups in exactly the same way or grant exactly the same rights to both groups.’’4 It only shows that equality does not warrant that all individuals be entitled to the same treatment, but it does acknowledge that all concerned are attributed a consideration of interests in exactly the same way: The basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration. Equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights.5 And so, this way of conceptualizing equality manages to firstly acknowledge the undeniable differences between human beings and non-human beings, and secondly, to lift the barrier that prohibits the extension of the principle of equality to non-human animals. The latter makes sense since even though animals not get the same rights or treatment as human beings, they can certainly enjoy equal consideration with human beings. This means that their interests are given equal weight to those of human beings. The Principle of Equality is a Prescription, not a Description. Singer considers that forms of inequality such as racism and sexism are also often defended on the basis of factual equality. A common egalitarian argument is that there is factual equality in the form of attributes like the ability to communicate effectively, to be charitable or sensitive to the needs of others. Ibid. p.2 Ibid. Every person would at least possess some of such abilities. Yet, neither a person’s sex nor race is truly indicative of these abilities. Hence, it would be unjustifiable to discriminate on the basis of sex or race. Singer wants to challenge this idea of equality as it is inadequate for two reasons. First of all, it fails to provide a good reason for rejecting another kind of discrimination – where the interests of the stupid count for less than the interests of the intelligent. People may be endowed with different abilities and attributes. When it comes to intelligence, it is a fact that everyone possesses different I.Q. levels. To posit factual equality as the foundation for the principle of equality would not protect those who fall in the former category of less intelligent people and it is reasonable to assume that a society based on such a structure would not be desirable at all. Secondly, positing this strong link between the principle of equality and this kind of factual equality incorrectly assumes that all concerned are endowed with the same abilities to the same extent. Abilities and talents are not present in all individuals equally. Would we then be forced to conclude that those who are more well endowed with such abilities have interests which are more highly regarded than those who possess them to a lesser extent? Singer thinks not and I believe most of us working towards an egalitarian world would be inclined to agree. Hence, against the commonly held belief that it is factual equality that constitutes the principle of equality, Singer rightly points out that ‘‘the principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings.’’ [Emphasis mine.] In stating what sort of a prescription this is exactly, Singer makes a Ibid. p.5 reference to Jeremy Bentham’s main utilitarian contention, that each individual is to count for one and none for more than one.7 This is the principle of the equal consideration of interests and it means that when an action or moral decision takes place, firstly, that the interests of all beings affected are to be taken into consideration. Secondly, the interest of each being is attributed the same degree of importance as the like interest of any other being.8 The implication we can draw from this, says Singer, is that: [The] taking into account of the interests of the being…must, according to the principle of equality, be extended to all beings, black or white, masculine or feminine, human or nonhuman.9 In the same school of thought as people like Thomas Jefferson, who included the principle of equality of men in the American Declaration of Independence, and Sojourner Truth, a black feminist from the 1850’s, Singer asserts that neither intelligence nor any ‘‘degree of talent’’ constitutes a barometer for the recognition of equal rights and treatment. Just as cases of racism and sexism fail to acknowledge that the interests of all beings concerned are to be considered equally, speciesism commits the same violation of moral equality by attributing greater importance to the interests of members of one species (namely, the human species) than to the interests of members of other species (other nonhuman animals). This phenomenon has been a shameful feature of the long history of human civilization when one calls to mind ancient Roman games, the extensive hunting of animals for sport and the capture and Ibid. p.5 Singer concedes that even though this requirement for a moral theory is mostly agreed upon in contemporary philosophy, many writers still cannot agree on ‘‘how this requirement is best formulated.’’ For the purposes of Animal Liberation and this thesis however, I shall assume Bentham’s formulation of the principle of the equal consideration of interests to be accurate and general. Singer, P. Animal Liberation. New York: Harper Collins Publishers 2002 p. sale of ‘‘exotic’’ pets. Speciesism has not ceased to prevail in modern society. When it comes to the killing of animals for food – and the technology of this has far surpassed the more primitive days of hunting and gathering – factory farming and the unimaginable amount of suffering inflicted upon them can only point out to us that it is indeed time to recognize how some of their most important interests are explicitly considered for much less that ours. All this is being done on the basis of our prioritized human species membership. Sadly, this bias we take in favour of our own interests runs even deeper, not just in the way we eat, but also in the way we buy our products, wear our clothes and pass on our flawed attitudes to the next generation – all in support of the cruelty that happens everyday and extensively to animals. Once again, Singer questions this violation of moral equality committed because we attribute greater importance to our interests over the interests of nonhuman animals: If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his or her own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the same purpose?10 Hence, to summarize, Singer’s case rests on two main aspects of Bentham’s moral philosophy. The first is the latter’s formulation of the principle of the equal consideration of interests. The second is that this principle should rightfully be extended to apply to members of nonhuman species. In other words, it cuts across all race-defined, gender-defined and species-defined boundaries. Instead, what does define a being – human or nonhuman – as one to which the principle of equal consideration of interests applies is the being’s capacity to suffer. What follows is the passage from Bentham’s Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation that Singer constantly refers to: 10 Ibid. p.6 The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognised that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? [Emphasis in original]11 The capacity for suffering or for enjoyment, says Bentham, is what determines a being’s eligibility for the principle of equality. It is the ‘‘vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration.’’ The reason why this characteristic is so different from others like intelligence, rationality or capacities for activities such as language or mathematics, is because the capacity to suffer is ‘‘the pre-requisite for having interests at all.’’12 It is a necessary and sufficient condition for the attribution of interests, and hence the rights to specific kinds of treatment to any being. To illustrate the point, Singer gives the example of a stone of which it is ridiculous to speak of having an interest not to be kicked or crumbled to bits. In the first place, the stone cannot suffer and cannot have interests. By contrast, both a human being and a horse are vulnerable to suffering and pain. At the very least, both would have interests in 11 12 Ibid. p.7 Ibid. 10 (e) Farm animals are the legal property of farmers. The owners of factory farms have the right to whatever they like with their property. Vegetarianism is an attempt to compromise this right. Hence, arguing for morally obligatory vegetarianism would make farmers worse-off for having their rights withheld. Before examining the issue of farmers having their property rights compromised, Regan wants to first of all question the notion that animals can be treated as legal property. Doing so would mean that they are not understood and respected as individuals with inherent value and basic moral rights. To treat animals as legal property would be to treat them as things that can be bought or sold, or simply for their utility. And according to the rights view, this is a form of injustice. In addition, the property rights of farmers are “not absolute.” 84 For a defense of factory farming to base itself on such a premise is for it to ignore that animals have basic moral rights too. More significantly, this neglect of animals’ rights constitutes a form of injustice more grave than that resulting from farmers having their property rights curtailed should agribusinesses be disallowed to continue. One problem with this argument is that property rights typically apply to only non-sentient beings such as cars, houses, belongings and not to human beings or non-human animals. Secondly, granting the notion that farm animals can be considered as “property”, what exactly justifies the assertion that the basic moral rights of human or non-human animals are more important than and supersede property rights? Intuitively, the former probably are more important and if given a choice between the two, we should reasonably want to choose to 84 Ibid. p. 347. 89 observe and respect basic moral rights rather than property rights. Yet, Regan needs to go beyond common sense intuition to explain the priority of basic moral rights. My point is that he does not. He simply takes it for granted that it is acceptable to understand basic moral rights as more important than other rights such that those to property. This ignores the possibility of the following scenario: Individual A owns a rare, one-of-a-kind-of-its-species animal. It has great emotional value to A as a pet, companion and almost as a close family member. Individual B is a research medical scientist who has just found out that the flesh of an animal such as that belonging to A is the only cure for a fatal disease that has long plagued the human race. B has requested on behalf of the entire medical community and people threatened by this disease to obtain A’s pet for it to be used as a revolutionary cure. Given the assumption that the basic moral rights to life and respectful treatment of any individual afflicted with this disease is given priority over property rights and that A will have to compromise his right over what to with his own “property” (ie, A’s pet), is it justified to sacrifice A’s property rights (which are very precious to him since they secure his possession of something very important to him)? I not believe the rights view, according to Regan, has any rational provisions for this. It says nothing about what justifies one type of right being more important than another when both come into conflict. Utilitarianism on the other hand, is based on comparing the consequences of each decision made and avoiding the decision that would result in the greatest quantified loss, disadvantage or unhappiness. In the case of A and his pet, utilitarianism would attempt to come to the best possible decision by weighing up the harm done to A should he have to give up his pet and the harm done to people who would die because of the disease. This calculation 90 would give rational justifications for us to accept that it is right that A give up his pet for the sake of saving the many people dying of the disease. The rights view according to Regan would simply say that A has to give up his pet because his property right over it is not as important as the right to life and respectful treatment for the people suffering from the disease. Yet, there is a big gap of explanation to be made: “Why are property rights not as important as the right to life?” or for that matter, “What makes any one right more important than another?” ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ After the above examination of Regan’s case for morally obligatory vegetarianism, I think it fair to assert that the arguments offered are not completely sound. There are some inconsistencies and problems present in Regan’s case. These are that he uses the same aggregative approach (which assumes that individuals not possess equal inherent value) that he accuses utilitarianism of, and that his rights view does not fully explain what exactly justifies prioritizing one right over another especially when both are in conflict. Given these, Regan would still want to insist on the merits of the rights view based on the following three reasons. I will argue against each one in turn. Firstly, for the utilitarian, it remains an “open moral question whether or not the harm done to farm animals, even the harm they are made to bear in factory farms, is justifiable.” 85 This is because the wrongness of factory farming is determined by whether or not the aggregated amount of suffering outweighs the 85 Ibid. p. 350. 91 gains in utility brought about by the farming industry. Hence, utilitarianism can only assert that the practice of factory farming is wrong and should be discontinued if doing so is optimific in terms of utility. However, it cannot say why it is wrong or why discontinuing the practice of factory farming is morally obligatory. If it should be the case that it is more optimific in terms of utility to continue factory farming (and this cannot be ruled out as an impossibility), then the right position to support would be to go on with the current practice of meat-eating and supporting the meat industry. Animal suffering on factory farms would still exist. Utilitarianism is worthless as an ethical approach to ease the plight of farm animals. The rights view on the other hand, clearly stipulates that factory farming and meat-eating are wrong regardless of the consequences of discontinuing them because these two practices violate justice by disrespecting animals’ rights to respectful treatment and not to be harmed. Such practices ignore the fact that animals possess equal inherent value and have claims upon all moral agents to respectful treatment. Utilitarianism lacks such a moral force and is inadequate in comparison to the rights view as an ethical approach that argues for animal liberation. However, I believe this objection to Singer’s utilitarian case is unfounded. Utilitarianism uses as its starting point a particular understanding of what constitutes the good life. This is one of the most contended issues in moral philosophy and this thesis is not the right forum of discussion for this, but it is worth mentioning that utilitarianism assumes that human beings seek a world free of suffering and cruelty and one where equality is in place. As a result of the fact that cruelty to animals and the suffering that is due to animals are prevalent in modern society and particularly in the phenomenon of large-scale factory 92 farming, utilitarianism recognizes that this is wrong. More significantly, utilitarianism recognizes that animal suffering is caused by our unjustified, excessive and misinformed consumer needs. This recognition is supported by reference to all the calculated evils that are generated because of this phenomenon and to all the calculated goods that can result if we are to put a stop to this phenomenon. So Regan is mistaken in his belief that utilitarianism leaves the issue of the harm done to farm animals as an “open question”. Instead, Singer asserts that utilitarianism assumes that in order for all these calculations to be carried out in a proper manner, there is to be an equal consideration of the interests of all individuals affected. And because the interests of farm animals are not equally considered with that of human beings in the way they are viewed and treated, this is wrong. Hence, utilitarianism does have a fairly clear idea of what it is about factory farming that is wrong. For Regan, it is the violation of rights and justice resulting from harm done to animals that is wrong. For Singer and utilitarianism, it is the actual harm and the cruelty inflicted upon animals that is the primary moral bad which is wrong and should be prevented. The calculations simply aid in supporting moral actions that lead to the rectification of this moral bad. It is not an “open moral question” as Regan says it is for utilitarianism. Secondly, utilitarianism will have problems generating all the relevant facts necessary to aggregate the consequent goods that could result from the closure of factory farms. Regan lists down all the different kinds of facts the utilitarian would need in order to make the correct and informed moral decision: (1) what the consequences are, all considered, for all those affected by the outcome of the harm done to farm animals, as well as what the balance of goods over evils are; (2) what the consequences would be, 93 all considered, for all those affected by the outcome, if we were all to become vegetarians, either all at once or gradually; (3) whether, when everything is taken into account, these latter consequences would be better than the former. [Emphasis in original] 86 Regan is confident in asserting that such facts are not possible to generate. Hence, the utilitarian will find that he has no way of supporting his case since he cannot get hold of the relevant facts needed for an accurate calculation of the gains in utility should factory farming cease to operate as an industry. The case would be most uncompelling. I mentioned in an earlier chapter that Singer does indeed provide utilitarian calculations in Animal Liberation and his other publications that show the consequent goods of vegetarianism and the closure of factory farms. Some listed included the release of food supply normally due to farm animals being channeled to “hungry and malnourished humans” in third world nations, less health risks for human beings and of course, a great reduction in physical and psychological suffering of farm animals. This means that all these meet criterion (2) in Regan’s own list of requirements as stated in the above quotation. They are basically what the positive consequences would be “for all those affected by the outcome, if we were to become vegetarians.” Regan’s criterion (1) is also fulfilled by Singer’s consideration of all those gainfully employed in the agribusiness industry who will lose their jobs or suffer financially should factory farms close. (3) is similarly met when Singer balances these losses suffered by employees of agribusinesses with the positive consequences that accrue to both animals and human beings should factory farms close, (ie. less health risks, reduction in animal suffering, alleviating world hunger). Hence, Regan is wrong 86 Ibid. 94 to say that the relevant facts are “simply not at hand.” 87 They are in fact at hand and Singer has already carefully considered them upon reaching his conclusion. A third merit Regan affords to his rights-based case in comparison to utilitarianism is that the utilitarian case depends on how many others will the same in going vegetarian. This is because “it is only if enough others abstain, and only if this number reduces how many farm animals are harmed … [that] I what is right.” 88 In contrast, the rights view does not have such a great dependence on the numbers who will commit to vegetarianism in order to make it something right that one ought to do: The case against the animal industry does not stand or fall, according to the rights view, on that individual’s knowing, the aggregate balance of goods over evil for all those affected by allowing factory farming or by not allowing it. 89 I believe that Regan is wrong here again. Although from the utilitarian perspective, the best consequences of ending or minimizing animals suffering depend on a sufficient number of people becoming vegetarians in order to undermine the practice of factory farming, each of us can still make a difference. For every person who becomes a vegetarian, a certain number of animals will be spared of cruel suffering. After the above analysis of Regan’s case and his reasons for why he believes the rights-base case for animal liberation to be more effective and less problematic than Singer’s utilitarian argument, it has been revealed that Regan’s own case falls short of coherence. In addition, the reasons he brings to bear on Singer for presenting an inadequate utilitarian case for animal liberation are unwarranted. 87 88 Ibid. p.350. Ibid. 95 The Lifeboat Dilemma Before closing this chapter, I would like to provide one more illumination on why I believe Singer’s case to be stronger and more sensible than Regan’s. One can recall Regan’s discussion on equal rights possessed by all and how there are certain excusing conditions which allow those rights to be overridden in special circumstances. In line with this discussion, he gives the example of a lifeboat. This lifeboat is stranded out at sea after a shipwreck and it contains four normal adult human beings and a normal adult dog. The boat only has enough room and supplies for four, not five individuals and if one individual does not get off the boat and hence die, then all will perish. Regan thinks the solution lies in letting the dog die so that the four human beings can live. Now, a utilitarian like Singer would agree with this but let us examine each camp’s justifications. For Regan, all four human beings and the dog have equal inherent value and all possess the equal right not to be harmed. Death is a harm because it means that future opportunities cannot be satisfied. However, the death of any one of the four human beings would constitute a greater harm than the harm done in the death of the dog. The harm done to the dog, says Regan, is “not comparable” 90 to the harm done to any of the human beings.91 If any of the human beings died, he would be made worse-off than the dog, if the dog were to die instead. The worse-off principle here justifies that the right of any one human being is given precedence over the right of the dog not to be harmed. To 89 Ibid, p.351. Regan, Tom. The Case For Animal Rights. p. 324 91 Regan does not explain why this is so. 90 96 allow the dog to live in this situation is to give the dog “more than is [its] due.” 92 Regan insists at the end of his argument that this approach to justifying the solution to this lifeboat dilemma does not compromise the recognition that the human beings and the dog have equal inherent value and the equal right not to be harmed. This is because in deciding to let the dog die, the harm done to either the human being or the dog is not aggregated and compared. Instead it is based on evaluating the losses each individual faces and evaluating them impartially. My first objection to this approach is that as much as Regan wants to maintain that he will not partake in any utilitarian application of aggregative calculations to moral dilemmas such as the one described above, he really does commit the same crime he accuses his opponent of. In saying that the harm done to the dog is “not comparable” with the harm done to any of the human beings, Regan is literally calculating that the former is worth less than the latter. He continues in the same way to assert that such a comparison does not mean that the dog’s equal inherent value is devalued but this is obviously not true given his justification for allowing the dog’s death. Secondly, in trying to decide whether or not the human being is made worse-off should he be left to die inadvertently involves evaluating if he is worse-off relative to someone or something else. Does Regan mean that the human being will be made worse-off dead than before while alive? Or that the human being is made worse-off dead compared to the dog being dead? If it is the former, then this consideration should be made to apply for the dog as well since both human beings and dogs possess equal inherent value. Both human 92 Ibid. 97 being and dog will be made equally worse-off dead than before while alive since killing either destroys the equal inherent value of each. If Regan’s understanding of being made worse-off refers to the dead human being made worse than if the dog died, then this does not make sense either because this would mean that the dog’s supposed equal inherent value is not truly equal with the inherent value of the human being. For Regan, inherent value refers not to the sum of intrinsic values of an individual’s experiences. Neither does it refer to the individual being the object of another’s interest. It is only determined by the individual satisfying the subject-of-a-life criterion and both the human beings and the dog fulfill this requirement. It is thus not justifiable to base killing the dog on it not being made as worse-off as the human being if the latter died. If Regan’s definition of inherent value included other characteristics such as the ability to plan for the future, to have worthwhile relationships with others or of self-awareness, then he would at least have been justified in saying that the human being’s value of life is greater than the dog’s. Hence, the human beings should be saved. Unfortunately, this is not Regan’s idea and it is in fact Singer’s approach. Lastly, Regan claims that to let the dog live and kill one of the human beings is to give the dog “more than is [its] due”. This contradicts with the notion that the dog and the human beings have the equal right or claim on others not to be harmed by them. There is no justification provided on Regan’s part as to why the dog is not just given its proper due, but more than its due, if it were to die. In sum, I think Regan’s case is not adequate because the equal rights and equal inherent value supposedly held by all are too easily compromised with excusing conditions. And as we have seen in the lifeboat example, it is the 98 animals’ rights which would be compromised first in any similar moral dilemma. Worse still, he does not give an explanation for how this is justified. Regan’s rights view simply does not enough for animal liberation. He may have found justifications to ascribe rights to animals but these rights are apparently not wholly protective or all-encompassing. What about Singer’s utilitarian response to the lifeboat problem? As mentioned, he agrees with Regan’s conclusion that the dog and not any of the four human beings should be allowed to die. His justification is however, different from the latter’s. For Singer, killing a living being has to with affecting that being’s value of life. This value of life refers to the value a living person has in terms of characteristics such as one’s ability to look forward and plan for the future, to hold meaningful relationships with others and to have self-awareness. When faced with a choice of killing the human being or the dog, the determining factor for who should die lies in who possesses a value of life to a lesser degree. The answer is the dog because the dog invariably has a less acute sense of self-awareness and reflexivity than a normal adult human being. It would also not be able to purposefully plan for its future in the way a human being would, to gain a college degree, to obtain a meaningful job, to get married and have children, and so on. And even though dogs are known to be able to generate close relationships with their own kind or their human owners, such relationships are not as complex, and are less instinct-based than those that prevail among human beings. All these reasons justify the dog being sacrificed for the sake of the human beings. More significantly, such a move is not speciesist in that killing the dog is based on the characteristics listed above and not on species-membership. By the same token, when faced with the choice to 99 kill a perfectly normal, adult, possibly more intelligent dog or a retarded human being, we should be prepared to sacrifice the latter who possesses a less worthy value of life compared to the dog. The utilitarian approach avoids the confusion caused by applying the rights view to this lifeboat dilemma and gives a more sensible and coherent response. This is another reason why Singer’s case for animal liberation is stronger than Regan’s rights-based one as the former can justify choosing to kill an animal over a human being without compromising the animal’s supposed right or without committing any act of speciesism. Together with the rest of the objections I have pointed out to Regan’s rights view and his case for morally obligatory vegetarianism as well as the comparison between this and Singer’s approach, one can conclude that the utilitarian case for animal liberation and morally obligatory vegetarianism wins hands down. 100 CHAPTER FIVE Conclusion 101 It has been my hope that this thesis has adequately provided the relevant facts and arguments needed to generate a defensive and convincing case for animal liberation. In this concluding chapter, I call to mind the initial motivation that led to the germination of the central ideas that form the backbone of this thesis. This motivation was fuelled by my first reading of Peter Singer’s book, Animal Liberation. The effect the book had on me was characterized by much illumination, enlightenment and sympathy for an issue that had received far too little attention. After giving some serious thought to some of the practical implications of Singer’s case, I decided to commit myself to the cause of animal liberation and became vegetarian. It was a commitment that received mixed responses from different people. Some disapproved, some were doubtful and unconvinced by my ethical reasons, and yet others were supportive and respectful. Of those who disagreed, the main reasons cited were lack of nutrition in a vegetarian diet, that animals did not deserve such ethical provisions or that animals were meant to be exploited for human consumption by decree of some vague idea of the Great Chain of Being. In other words, what I thought had made so much sense to me when I read Singer’s book was not apparent at all to a majority of our society who relied on so many industries capitalizing on and exploiting animals for their survival and profit. Hence, this thesis is a humble attempt to put Singer’s ideas in my own words and to give his case greater credibility by building a strong fortress of defense against the misconceptions, long-established, flawed attitudes, and the arguments (and excuses) many make to avoid making an ethical stand on behalf of animals. Any weakness of this fortress must be attributed to myself alone and there is always the possibility of better alternatives and stronger arguments for the case of animal liberation one 102 can make on behalf of Singer. Having said that, it was pointed out earlier that this thesis cannot be an absolute defense of Singer’s case. It is the very essence of philosophy that the truth to be learnt from dialogue, exchanging arguments and examining opposing or alternative viewpoints, always remain open and hence transcendent above any fixed idea or argument made about an issue. In line with this attitude, Singer’s case is admittedly not completely infallible. Still, it makes for a fairly strong case, against selected “internal enemies”, “external enemies” and common objections to it. The relevant arguments have been addressed in this thesis. To end off, I have chosen to let Singer have the last say since much of this work, apart from my own arguments and expression of his ideas, is his say in the matter of animal liberation. May Singer’s and my effort hopefully combined in this thesis, invite us to be motivated to something, big or small for the future of animals, of human beings and the world… Animal Liberation will require greater altruism on the part of human beings than any other liberation movement. The animals themselves are incapable of demanding their own liberation, or of protesting against their condition with votes, demonstrations, or boycotts. Human beings have the power to continue to oppress other species forever, or until we make this planet unsuitable for living beings. Will our tyranny continue, proving that morality counts for nothing when it clashes with self-interest, as the most cynical of poets and philosophers have always said? Or will we rise to the challenge and prove our capacity for genuine altruism by ending our ruthless exploitation of the species in our power, not because we are forced to so by rebels or terrorists, but because we recognize that our position is morally indefensible? The way in which we answer this question depends on the way in which each one of us, individually, answers it. 93 93 Singer, P. Animal Liberation. p. 247-8. 103 The End 104 [...]... way of thinking many of us subscribe to, sometimes even without being aware of it We must not disregard the pain of an animal just because it is an animal Pain and suffering, be it to a human being or an animal, is equally bad If the same amount of pain were to be administered to both a human infant and an adult horse, it would be reasonable to suppose that the baby would be adversely affected to a. .. to save the life of a normal adult nonhuman animal over an incapacitated human vegetable I believe that is as far as Singer can go in applying the principle of equality to the killing of animals However, as I have mentioned above, he has no need to go further in order to argue in favour of animal liberation Animal suffering is, so to speak, ‘‘bad enough.’’ 25 CHAPTER TWO The External Enemies 26 Carruthers... creatures from non-human animals With regard to rationality, this is the 33 distinctive feature of our mental life as compared to animals To say that human beings are rational means that we have the capacity to make choices, judgments about the past, present and future and to engage in long-term planning We also participate in highly complex social relations, in which mutual practical reasoning and... part to recognize and be reminded of the very real and profound differences between human and non-human animals As a result, Singer makes the false conclusion that non-human animals belong to the same sphere of moral consideration as human beings – a sphere in which moral concepts such as equality apply Scruton is firm in his belief that we, as human beings, are moral beings, and non-human animals are... animal interests Having the belief that animals do not deserve equal consideration of interests is likely to result in not doing anything to improve animal welfare and would lead to support for the continuation of practices that go towards animal cruelty The progressive growth of the animal liberation movement can be largely accounted for by our changing attitudes towards animals Human beings are probably... are not To establish this, he asserts that an analysis of the features unique to human beings is paramount – an analysis of great philosophical importance that Singer has lost sight of Human beings are metaphysically different from non-human animals Scruton lists rationality, self-consciousness and the ability to use language as the core features human beings possess which set them apart as higher-functioning... sought to provide a presentation of Peter Singer’s pro -animal liberation case This has included the initial impetus for Singer’s case, his definition of equality, what it demands of us and the basis of that definition of equality on Benthamite ulititarianism This was followed by a discussion of the utilitarian principle of the equal consideration of interests and a coverage of the reasons why this principle... ethical decision-making as the social contract is established on the assumption that all contracting parties rationally agree upon the stipulated rights and obligations within the invisible contract The extension of the principle of the equal consideration of interests is thus not valid as it is in utilitarianism and in Singer’ case when it comes to contractarianism Animals are not rational, they cannot... the animals have to live in His intuitive common sense response would have been that it was clear that animal suffering to this degree was unacceptable The point is, 31 different people may intuitively react to animal suffering differently and Carruthers is wrong to assume that prevalent moral attitudes go towards an acceptance of processes contributing to animal suffering In fact, many people who have... against animals sharing equal moral standing with human beings, and not that it supports animal cruelty My reply is that many people may sympathize with the plight of animals, and that is as far as they would go However, to continue holding on to “common sense” beliefs of animal interests being counted for less than ours is what contributes to such minimal human efforts devoted to the promotion of animal . lack of awareness and moral obligation to prevent cruelty to animals on the part of a majority of the human race. The first chapter of Animal Liberation is aptly entitled ‘‘All Animals Are. CHAPTER ONE Animal Liberation In the preface to his 1990 edition of Animal Liberation, Singer recollects that just 15 years ago, notions such as ‘ animal liberation ’ and ‘ animal rights’’. purposes of Animal Liberation and this thesis however, I shall assume Bentham’s formulation of the principle of the equal consideration of interests to be accurate and general. 9 Singer, P. Animal