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A study of experimental frus- tration. Psychological Monographs, 54(3, Whole No. 256). 327 24 Wisdom Its Structure and Function in Regulating Successful Life Span Development Paul B. Baltes, Judith Glu¨ ck, & Ute Kunzmann Toward a Positive Psychology of Optimal Development In the history of the humanities and the social sciences, questions of perfection and optimality in human behavior and human development al- ways have been part of the intellectual agenda. Fueled by philosophers and theologists, many proponents participated in the search for truth criteria of perfection and optimality (Brandt- sta¨dter & Schneewind, 1977; Lerner, 1986; Te- tens, 1777). Since the times of secularization and subsequently the advent of evolutionary bi- ology, however, the answers to questions of perfection and optimality became more and more relative and uncertain. Perfection and Optimality: A Dilemma for Psychology Aside from analytical philosophy and scholar- ship on ethics (e.g., Kekes, 1995), it is now un- common for behavioral scientists and scholars to argue the case of absolute perfection or sin- gular optimality. With a growing interest in promoting a tolerant conception of human rights and also the recognition of contextual variations in form and function, as well as cul- turally based differences in criteria of adaptive fitness, behavioral and social scientists have de- veloped a preference for emphasizing particu- larities and the importance of flexibility in mak- ing decisions about what is right and wrong (Shweder, 1991). There are exceptions to this reluctance in the psychological research com- munity to specify the foundation of optimality. Note, for instance, the theoretical orientation of some scholars in moral development and human motivation, such as Kohlberg (1971) or Maslow (1970). In this work, strong a priori assump- tions are made regarding the structure and hi- erarchy of values and motivational dispositions. We will return to this line of scholarship later and outline some of its connections with our work on wisdom. Our main point, however, is that such value- and morality-oriented work in psychology is the exception and often is evaluated as being of 328 PART IV. COGNITIVE-FOCUSED APPROACHES doubtful significance. Indeed, one can conclude that psychologists have proceeded to focus their studies on “secondary” virtues rather than on “primary” virtues. With secondary virtues we mean attributes or processes that are relevant for any goal attainment (e.g., traits like persis- tence, conscientiousness, or agreeableness mea- sured by personality questionnaires) without evaluating these in terms of moral or ethical principles. Primary virtues, on the other hand, are cognitive and motivational dispositions that in themselves designate not only adaptive fit- ness for individuals’ achievements but also the idea of convergence of individual goal achieve- ments with becoming and being a good person from a communal and social-ethical point of view. Such a communal goods view of primary virtues would suggest, for instance, that indi- viduals consider only those goals and means as ways of self-development that do not violate the rights of others and, in addition, coproduce re- sources for others to develop. On Positive Psychology For psychology to be an empirical science, ab- stinence regarding the question of a priori def- initions of values and goals is understandable. However, this relative abstinence has its costs (see also Kendler, 1999), and therefore the re- cently growing search for a positive psychology has its well-founded raison d’eˆtre (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). The argument of pro- ponents of positive psychology is that the pri- mary focus of 20th-century psychology was too much on treating the dysfunctional and that this emphasis resulted in a neglect of the search for optimality and the conditions of excellence, individually and collectively. The call for changes in emphases of psycho- logical inquiry has a long tradition, and when those changes are propagated with force and seemingly missionary zeal, it is typically worth- while to explore ways to modulate the radicality of the position taken. This is true for the pres- ent situation as well. Therefore, and to prevent a possible misunderstanding of our intellectual perspective on this topic, we first offer some modulating observations. On the one hand, we suggest that the inter- pretation by Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) of 20th-century psychology as largely void of a spirit of positive psychology is over- stated, if not misleading. In its radicality, it ig- nores, for instance, the fundamental positivity associated with several fields of psychology— including developmental psychology, the one in which much of our own work is cast. By the very nature of the concept of development (growth), this field considers itself as a propo- nent of positivity (Harris, 1957; Lerner, 1998) and “perfection-oriented intervention” (Tetens, 1777) in psychological functioning. In recent psychology, there are also other lines of serious and cogent inquiry that highlight positivity. Consider, as a further example, the positivity emphasis of one of the most powerful theories of modern psychology, that is, self-efficacy the- ory (Bandura, 1986, 1995; see also Maddux, this volume). Bandura’s work, while perhaps ema- nating from questions of dysfunctionality, is in- herently oriented toward improvement and op- timal functioning. The radical conclusion by proponents of positive psychology about the lack of positivity in past psychological work, therefore, surely is an overstatement, and it seems primarily informed by past research in that branch of psychology that is explicitly de- voted to the regulation of the dysfunctional, that is, clinical psychology. On the other hand, taking a radical position on the need for a positive psychology, as Selig- man and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) do, can be de- fended if one treats it as a contribution to strengthening lines of scholarship whose pri- mary interest is in improving our understand- ing of three contributors to a good life: positive subjective experiences, desirable individual traits, and civic virtues. Such a view on psy- chology as theory- and practice-oriented enter- prise toward the betterment of human behavior is well-grounded in the history of sciences in general and psychology in particular. Positive Psychology and the Study of Wisdom Indeed, the emergence of our work on wisdom during the recent decades fits well with the con- tinuous dynamic between understanding the positive and efforts to compensate for a domi- nance of concerns for understanding and re- pairing deficits in human behavior. Our interest in the concept of wisdom emerged because of a one-sided focus on the negative in gerontolog- ical research in the 1960s and 1970s (Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000). The CHAPTER 24. WISDOM 329 dominant focus of aging research during that period was on counting “the wrinkles and fail- ures” of humans as they grow older. There were very few instances in which aging was ex- amined in its potentially positive manifesta- tions. Perhaps the best known exception was Erik Erikson’s (1968) theoretical work focused on generativity and wisdom as central tasks of adult life (see also M. Baltes & Baltes, 1977; Baltes & Labouvie-Vief, 1973; Clayton & Bir- ren, 1980; Labouvie-Vief, 1982; McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998; Perlmutter, 1990; Ryff, 1987, 1995). A major reason for our efforts to articulate a psychological theory of wisdom, therefore, was the explicit commitment to understand what might be positive in adult development and ag- ing. There were not many domains on which we could orient our microscope. One was wis- dom. In research on subjective beliefs about ag- ing, wisdom turned out to be one of the very few characteristics for which people expect a positive trajectory in late adulthood (Heckhau- sen, Dixon, & Baltes, 1989). Actually, our first exploration into the posi- tivity of old age involved cognitive training studies to understand the role of practice deficits and the latent learning potential of the older population in the sense of plasticity (Baltes & Lindenberger, 1988; Baltes & Willis, 1982; Wil- lis & Baltes, 1980). In this research, we dem- onstrated that at least up to age 80 or so, many older adults possess more cognitive reserves (plasticity or learning potential) than we typi- cally expect, although we need to acknowledge that we also observed definite losses in plasticity with advancing old age. Greatly influenced by the work of Vivian Clayton (Clayton & Birren, 1980), the concept of wisdom became the ral- lying point for our subsequent search for the hidden treasure of old age (Baltes, Dittmann- Kohli, & Dixon, 1984; Baltes, Smith, & Stau- dinger, 1992; Dixon & Baltes, 1986). Meanwhile, our work on wisdom is not only informed by the study of positive aspects of hu- man aging. On the contrary, we presently con- ceptualize wisdom as an instantiation of a con- struct that, for all phases and contexts of life, offers the potential for defining the means and ends toward a good or even optimal life. Based primarily on philosophical work, our challenge has been to extract statements about the means and goals of life that imply a value position (Kekes, 1995). From such extrapsychological analyses, we specified a psychological theory of wisdom. Accordingly, it is the intermarriage of philosophical and psychological perspectives around the concept of wisdom that permits us to revisit the century-old question of optimal human development. Wisdom as a Topic of Scientific Discourse About the Good Life Wisdom has been discussed and studied in phi- losophy and religion for thousands of years (for an overview, see Assmann, 1994; Kekes, 1995; Rice, 1958). More recently, scholars from other disciplines such as cultural anthropology, polit- ical science, education, and psychology also have shown interest in wisdom. Indeed, one can ar- gue that wisdom is becoming a center of trans- disciplinary discourse (e.g., Agazzi, 1991; Arlin, 1990; Assmann, 1994; Baltes, 1993; Lehrer, Lum, Slichta, & Smith, 1996; Maxwell, 1984; Nichols, 1996; Nozick, 1993; Oelmu¨ller, 1989; Smith & Baltes, 1990; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996b; Sternberg, 1990; Welsch, 1995). In defining and studying wisdom from a psy- chological point of view, we attempt to pay care- ful attention to what philosophers offer regard- ing the nature of the structure and function of wisdom. Without such attention, we would lose the special strength that the concept of wisdom holds for specifying the content and form of the primary virtues and behaviors that individuals aspire to as they attempt to regulate their lives toward an “universal canon of a good life.” To prevent a possible misunderstanding, we acknowledge the scientific limits of our work on wisdom. Specifically, any empirical manifesta- tion of wisdom falls short of the theoretical as- piration. In this spirit, we do not maintain that a psychological theory will ever capture wisdom in its full-blown cultural complexity. Our hope, however, is that this intermarriage of philoso- phy and psychology results in lines of psycho- logical inquiry where virtues, values, and the mind can meet in a new and productive collab- oration. We believe that this may be possible because, at a high level of analysis, the concept of wisdom appears to be culturally universal. To illustrate, Table 24.1 summarizes characteristics that in our historical studies of wisdom we have found in Asian, African, and Western traditions (Baltes, 1993; Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000). 330 PART IV. COGNITIVE-FOCUSED APPROACHES Table 24.1 General Criteria Derived from an Analysis of Cultural-Historical and Philosophical Accounts of Wisdom Wisdom addresses important and difficult questions and strategies about the conduct and meaning of life. Wisdom includes knowledge about the limits of knowledge and the uncertainties of the world. Wisdom represents a truly superior level of knowledge, judgment, and advice. Wisdom constitutes knowledge with extraordinary scope, depth, measure, and balance. Wisdom involves a perfect synergy of mind and character, that is, an orchestration of knowledge and virtues. Wisdom represents knowledge used for the good or well-being of oneself and that of others. Wisdom, though difficult to achieve and to specify, is easily recognized when manifested. Psychological Theories of Wisdom: From Implicit to Explicit Theories Because of its enormous cultural and historical heritage, a psychological definition and opera- tionalization of wisdom is extremely difficult. This could be why many wisdom researchers have restricted their research efforts to lay- persons’ implicit theories of wisdom and wise persons (Clayton & Birren, 1980; Holliday & Chandler, 1986; Kramer, 2000; Sowarka, 1989; Staudinger, Sowarka, Maciel, & Baltes, 1997; Sternberg, 1985, 1990). Empirical research based on explicit theories of wisdom-related be- havior is relatively rare. Implicit Theories With implicit theories, we mean the beliefs or mental representations that people have about wisdom and the characteristics of wise persons. In studies on implicit beliefs about wisdom and wise persons, one finds quite a high degree of overlap in the core aspects of wisdom, even though authors have focused on slightly differ- ent aspects and named their components dif- ferently. All conceptions include cognitive as well as social, motivational, and emotional components (e.g., Birren & Fisher, 1990; Kramer, 2000). The cognitive components usually include strong in- tellectual abilities, rich knowledge and experi- ence in matters of the human condition, and an ability to apply one’s theoretical knowledge practically. A second basic component refers to reflective judgment that is based on knowledge about the world and the self, an openness for new experiences, and the ability to learn from mistakes. Socioemotional components generally include good social skills, such as sensitivity and concern for others and the ability to give good advice. A fourth motivational component refers to the good intentions that usually are associ- ated with wisdom. That is, wisdom aims at so- lutions that optimize the benefit of others and oneself. Sternberg’s (1998) effort at specifying a com- prehensive theory of wisdom is in the tradi- tion of these implicit lines of inquiry. In his theory, consisting so far of a coordinated set of characterizations rather than empirical work, Sternberg emphasizes the role of “balance.” Specifically, wisdom is conceptualized as the ap- plication of tacit knowledge toward the achieve- ment of a common good achieved through a bal- ance among multiple interests, including one’s own interests and those of others. A factor-analytic study conducted by Stau- dinger, Sowarka, et al. (1997) illustrates the im- plicit theories tradition of wisdom. One hun- dred and two participants rated 131 attributes regarding the degree to which each represents the notion of an ideally wise person. The at- tributes were selected from past work on im- plicit theories and work generated by the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm (see subsequently). As shown in Table 24.2 a four-dimensional struc- ture of an ideally wise person was obtained. Consistent with past research, these dimensions refer to (a) exceptional knowledge concerning the acquisition of wisdom; (b) exceptional knowledge concerning its application; (c) excep- tional knowledge about contextual and temporal variations of life; and (d) person-related com- petencies. Explicit Theories The second cluster of wisdom theories repre- sents explicit psychological theories (Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger, 1993; Pasu- pathi & Baltes, in press; Sternberg, 1990). They CHAPTER 24. WISDOM 331 Table 24.2 Implicit Beliefs about Wise People: Four Dimensions Factor 1 Exceptional knowledge about wisdom acquisition • comprehends the nature of human existence • tries to learn from his or her own mistakes Factor 2 Exceptional knowledge about use of wisdom • knows when to give/withhold advice • is a person whose advice one would solicit for life problems Factor 3 Exceptional knowledge about context of life • knows that life priorities may change during the life course • knows about possible conflicts among different life domains Factor 4 Exceptional personality and social functioning • is a good listener • is a very humane person are meant to focus on cognitive and behavioral expressions of wisdom and the processes in- volved in the joining of cognition with behav- ior. One main objective of such theories is to develop theoretical models of wisdom that allow for empirical inquiry—by means of quantitative operationalization of wisdom-related thought and behavior—as well as for the derivation of hypotheses that can be tested empirically (e.g., about predictors of behavioral expressions of wisdom). To date, the theoretical and empirical work on explicit psychological conceptions of wisdom can be divided roughly into three groups: (a) the conceptualization of wisdom as a personal char- acteristic or a personality disposition (e.g., Er- ikson, 1959; McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998); (b) the conceptualization of wisdom in the neo- Piagetian tradition of postformal and dialectical thinking (e.g., Alexander & Langer, 1990; Kra- mer, 1986, 2000; Labouvie-Vief, 1990; Peng & Nisbett, 1999); and (c) the conceptualization of wisdom as an expert system dealing with the meaning and conduct of life, as advocated in the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm (e.g., Baltes & Smith, 1990; Dittmann-Kohli & Baltes, 1990; Stau- dinger & Baltes, 1994). The latter is the focus of the remainder of this chapter. The Berlin Wisdom Project: Wisdom as Expertise in the Fundamental Pragmatics of Life In this section, we shall describe the conception of wisdom upon which the Berlin Wisdom Proj- ect is based. Thereafter, we will discuss some general considerations concerning the develop- ment of wisdom across the life span. The Content Domain of Wisdom Proceeding from the notion that wisdom in- volves some form of excellence (see Table 24.1), the Berlin Wisdom Project conceptualizes wis- dom as an expertise in the meaning and conduct of life. Our conceptualization of wisdom as ex- pertise signals that we expect most people not to be wise. What we expect, however, is that the behavioral expressions we observe in indi- viduals can be ordered on a “wisdom scale.” In general, wisdom is foremost a cultural product deposited in books of wisdom rather than in in- dividuals. The contents to which this expertise of wis- dom refers are the “fundamental pragmatics of life,” that is, knowledge about the essence of the human condition and the ways and means of planning, managing, and understanding a good life (cf. Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes & Stau- dinger, 1993, 2000). Examples of the fundamen- tal pragmatics of life include knowledge and skills about the conditions, variability, ontoge- netic changes, and historicity of human devel- opment; insight into obligations and goals in life; knowledge and skills about the social and situational influences on human life; as well as knowledge and skills about the finitude of life and the inherent limits of human knowledge. As these examples reveal, the contents to which wisdom refers are markedly different from those of other domains that have been re- ported in the traditional expertise literature (Er- icsson & Smith, 1991). Most research on ex- [...]... Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53 , 55 0 56 2 Schwartz, S H., & Bilsky, W (1990) Toward a theory of the universal content and structure of values: Extensions and cross-cultural replications Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56 , 878–891 Seligman, M E P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M (2000) Positive psychology: An introduction American Psychologist, 55 , 5 14 Shweder, R A (1991) Thinking... (1999) Lifespan psychology: Theory and application to intellectual functioning Annual Review of Psychology, 50 , 471 50 7 Baltes, P B., Staudinger, U M., Maercker, A., & Smith, J (19 95) People nominated as wise: A comparative study of wisdom-related knowledge Psychology and Aging, 10, 155 –166 344 PART IV COGNITIVE-FOCUSED APPROACHES Baltes, P B., & Willis, S L (1982) Plasticity and enhancement of intellectual... 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Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 21, 139– 157 Schwartz, S H (1992) Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries In M P Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol 25, pp 1– 65) San Diego, CA: Academic Press Schwartz, S H., & Bilsky, W (1987) Toward a universal psychological structure of human values Journal of Personality... the same profession? To investigate whether our assessment procedure might be biased in this direction, we conducted a study in which we compared the performance of clinical psychologists with that of people who had been nominated as wise, independently of our definition of wisdom (Baltes et al., 19 95) The 21 wisdom nominees of this study were persons of public distinction selected by a panel of nonpsychologists... representations of the judgments of important others Epstein (1980), for example, has argued that the self “develops out of the desire of the child to gain approval and avoid disapproval” (p 86) A sense of personal causal agency and an ability to judge the valence of one’s actions in the eyes of others are fundamental not only for the individual’s ability to stay on the positive side of the approval-disapproval... propositions of life-span developmental psychology: On the dynamics between growth and decline Developmental Psychology, 23, 611–626 Baltes, P B (1993) The aging mind: Potential and limits Gerontologist, 33, 58 0 59 4 *Baltes, P B (1997) On the incomplete architecture of human ontogeny: Selection, optimization, and compensation as foundation of developmental theory American Psychologist, 52 , 366–380 343... profession-related experiences Rather, members of a profession may represent a selective group of people in terms of personality, motivation, and intellectual abilities However, a communality analysis with professional specialization and multiple intellectual and personality dispositions as independent variables revealed professional specialization as the strongest unique predictor, accounting for 15% ... 15 and 25 years) but, on average, remains relatively stable during middle adulthood and young old age (i.e., between 25 and 75 years) Peak performances, however, seem to be more likely in the 50 s and 60s (Baltes, Staudinger, Maercker, & Smith, 19 95) Tentatively, our data also suggest that wisdom-related performance may decline in very old age, beginning in current cohorts, at the average age of 75 . of Genetic Psychology, 39, 479–492. McCabe, A., & Peterson, C. (19 85) . A naturalistic study of the production of causal connectives by children. Journal of Child Language, 12, 1 45 159 . McCarty,. positive psychology has its well-founded raison d’eˆtre (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). The argument of pro- ponents of positive psychology is that the pri- mary focus of 20th-century psychology. betterment of human behavior is well-grounded in the history of sciences in general and psychology in particular. Positive Psychology and the Study of Wisdom Indeed, the emergence of our work