Moral Status Phần 8 doc

Our capacity for empathy with non-human beings, and even with non-sentient organisms, prohibits the cruel treatment of any sen- tient being, or the needless destruction of any life form—even a plant or microbe. Works of art and other human artefacts, along with such natural objects as crystals and unusual rock formations, may be protected for their aesthetic, historical, or cultural value; but to do this is not necessarily to grant them moral status. We may, however, sometimes reasonably decide to grant such status, for in- stance out of respect for the spiritual or religious beliefs of a par- ticular group of people. Species, ecosystems, and the biosphere can reasonably be accorded moral status, and organisms of species that are endangered or especially important to the ecosystem ought to be accorded a stronger status than their intrinsic properties would in- dicate. Finally, families, cities, and countries are communities to which members may have moral obligations, based upon respect for co-members of the community, and upon morally justified institu- tional arrangements. 6.4. The Limited Role of Cultural and Personal Relativity The multi-criterial account leaves room for some legitimate cultural and personal variations in judgements of moral status. However, it is incompatible with both (1) the ethical relativist view, i.e. that moral truth is entirely determined by what is accepted by a majority of people within a given culture or group; and (2) the ethical sub- jectivist view, i.e. that moral truth is entirely a matter of individual opinion. Individuals can be mistaken in their judgements of moral status, and so can cultural and religious traditions. The principles I have proposed are not universally accepted; yet each is a viable can- didate for general acceptance among reasonable people who share the aim of reaching an uncoerced consensus. There is, nevertheless, an important grain of truth in both the cul- tural relativist and the subjectivist views. We need to be cautious in evaluating judgements about moral status made by people whose cultures are unfamiliar to us, because judgements that initially strike us as odd or even perverse may make excellent sense, once the con- text is better understood. The term ‘sacred cow’ is used in the West to refer to something that is accorded more respect than is appro- A Multi-Criterial Analysis of Moral Status 175 chap. 6 4/30/97 3:44 PM Page 175 176 An Account of Moral Status priate. Yet the refusal of many Indian people to kill cattle is not only an important religious tenet, but arguably also an economically and ecologically sound policy. Individuals within the same society may also make different judgements of moral status. If the ethical subjectivist view were true, any judgement that any person made about moral status would be true for that person. The multi-criterial account disallows that ex- treme form of subjectivism, while allowing individuals sometimes to differ legitimately in their judgements of moral status. For instance, moral obligations towards particular animals depend in part upon human social relationships with those animals, which are not the same in all cases, or for all human beings. If I am fond of cats, then it is not absurd for me to feel obliged to feed the stray cat at my door, even though not all persons would be similarly obliged. If my neigh- bours abhor cats, they are entitled to ignore the passing stray—but not to shoot it for target practice. The Anti-Cruelty principle ap- plies, regardless of our individual attitudes or emotional responses. 6.5. Conclusions In making judgements about moral status, we must balance a num- ber of considerations. That something is a living organism is a prima facie reason for not harming it, but one that is easily overridden when it has no other claim to moral status. Pathogenic microbes may normally be destroyed without guilt. That an organism is sen- tient provides a reason not to kill it or cause it pain, unless an im- portant human or ecological need is at stake. That it is a moral agent is enough to establish that it has basic moral rights—whatever its race, sex, age, species, or planetary origin. That it is a sentient human being and a member of a human social community is also sufficient to establish that it has basic rights. Social or ecological re- lationships can enhance moral status, but may not depress the status of any entity below that specified in the Respect for Life, Anti- Cruelty, Agent’s Rights, and Human Rights principles. Similarly, re- ligious or spiritual beliefs can enhance the moral status of particular entities, but not in ways that are incompatible with these principles. Each of the uni-criterial theories fails, not because it selects a cri- terion of moral status that has no validity, but because no single cri- chap. 6 4/30/97 3:44 PM Page 176 terion can represent all of the relevant considerations. Only a multi- criterial account of moral status can incorporate the sound ethical considerations that underlie each of the uni-criterial accounts, while avoiding the distortions of moral common sense that result from the attempt to make all valid judgements about moral status follow from a single principle. A Multi-Criterial Analysis of Moral Status 177 chap. 6 4/30/97 3:44 PM Page 177 chap. 6 4/30/97 3:44 PM Page 178 Selected Applications PART II chap. 7 4/30/97 3:46 PM Page 179 chap. 7 4/30/97 3:46 PM Page 180 The multi-criterial account explains why many common-sense judgements about moral status are more reasonable than they ap- pear from the vantage-point of any of the uni-criterial theories. It explains, for instance, why it is appropriate to accord full moral status to infants and other sentient human beings who are not moral agents, while denying it to most non-human animals—including many whose mental capacities are more impressive than those of a human infant. It does this by giving due weight to the fact that many sentient human beings who are not moral agents are nevertheless members of human social communities. Thus, it is important to the well-being of the community, and in conformance with our natural social sentiments, that their interests be accorded the same impor- tance as those of moral agents. In contrast, most animals are not members of our social communities, and we do not have that reason for according them full moral status. The multi-criterial account also explains why it is sometimes rea- sonable to accord a stronger moral status to some animals than to others that are probably just as highly sentient. Some animals are members of our mixed social communities, and have established trusting and affectionate relationships with human beings. Others belong to species that are endangered by human activities, and vital to the integrity, stability, and beauty of the ecosystems of which they are part. Still others may reasonably be accorded an enhanced moral status out of respect for their special religious or spiritual im- portance to some people. Each of these factors can justify the recog- nition of stronger moral obligations towards animals of certain species than could be based solely upon their intrinsic properties. But a theory of moral status must not only agree reasonably well with moral judgements about which there is a strong consensus; it must also help to illuminate issues that are more contentious. In the 7 Applying the Principles chap. 7 4/30/97 3:46 PM Page 181 following chapters I comment on three controversial topics in ap- plied ethics: euthanasia, abortion, and human uses of animals. My purpose is not to present completely supported solutions to these complex problems, but to illustrate the ways in which the principles presented in Chapter 6 can contribute to these discussions. Moral principles expressed in abstract terms are inevitably subject to mul- tiple interpretations. (Think, for instance, of the lack of agreement among those in the Judaeo-Christian tradition about whether the Sixth Commandment, ‘Thou shalt not kill’, is meant to prohibit capital punishment, suicide, abortion, violent self-defence, or mili- tary war.) These chapters will at least help to clarify some of the am- biguities in the principles that I have formulated. 7.1. Review of the Principles Because the principles presented in Chapter 6 will be frequently re- ferred to in the next three chapters, it will be useful to list them at the outset. Notice that the first three principles refer to nested classes of entities: living organisms, sentient beings, and moral agents. Beings of each class have some moral status based upon their intrinsic properties. Organic life confers only a modest moral status; sentience confers a stronger moral status; and moral agency is sufficient (but not necessary) for full moral status. The fourth principle expands the community of moral equals to include sen- tient human beings who are not moral agents. Finally, the last three principles require the acceptance of special obligations to plants and animals of ecosystemically important species, and animal members of our social communities; and permit the acceptance of obligations to some non-living things that have ecosystemic importance, or that have special religious or spiritual value to some people. 1. The Respect for Life Principle Living organisms are not to be killed or otherwise harmed, without good reasons that do not violate principles 2–7. 2. The Anti-Cruelty Principle Sentient beings are not to be killed or subjected to pain or suffering, unless there is no other feasible way of furthering goals that are 182 Selected Applications chap. 7 4/30/97 3:46 PM Page 182 (1) consistent with principles 3–7; and (2) important to human be- ings, or other entities that have a stronger moral status than could be based upon sentience alone. 3. The Agent’s Rights Principle Moral agents have full and equal basic moral rights, including the rights to life and liberty. 4. The Human Rights Principle Within the limits of their own capacities and of principle 3, human beings who are capable of sentience but not of moral agency have the same moral rights as do moral agents. 5. The Ecological Principle Living things that are not moral agents, but that are important to the ecosystems of which they are part, have, within the limits of principles 1‒4, a stronger moral status than could be based upon their intrinsic properties alone; ecologically important entities that are not themselves alive, such as species and habitats, may legiti- mately be accorded a stronger moral status than their intrinsic prop- erties would indicate. 6. The Interspecific Principle Within the limits of principles 1‒5, non-human members of mixed social communities have a stronger moral status than could be based upon their intrinsic properties alone. 7. The Transitivity of Respect Principle Within the limits of principles 1‒6, and to the extent that is feasible and morally permissible, moral agents should respect one another’s attributions of moral status. 7.2. Preview of Chapters 8, 9, and 10 The moral questions raised by euthanasia, abortion, and human uses of animals force us to clarify both what it means to have the rights to life and liberty, and to whom those rights should be as- cribed. Each of these issues has complexities that cannot be well ad- Applying the Principles 183 chap. 7 4/30/97 3:46 PM Page 183 dressed on any of the uni-criterial theories. Chapter 8 deals with questions surrounding some controversial forms of euthanasia. Some of these questions involve the boundaries of the right to life. For instance, should persons who are permanently comatose, or in- fants who will never become sentient, have the same moral and legal right to life as other human beings? Other questions involve the con- tent of the rights to life and liberty, and the relative weight of these rights when they appear to be in conflict. Does one, for instance, violate an obligation to oneself by deciding to hasten one’s own death when illness or injury lead one to judge that continued life is no longer a benefit? How much may others legitimately do to assist in carrying out such a decision? How much, if anything, may they do in the absence of a fully voluntary request from the afflicted in- dividual? In Chapter 9, I consider the morality of abortion. Here too, ques- tions arise concerning who or what has the right to life, and about what having rights to life and liberty entails. When, in the course of its development, does a human individual begin to have a right to life equal to that of older human beings? Should the line be drawn at conception, at birth, or at some point between? Should it some- times be drawn shortly after birth? Are early abortions morally dif- ferent from late abortions, or are all voluntary abortions equally justifiable—or unjustifiable? Finally, in Chapter 10 I consider questions involving the moral status of animals. Do non-human animals have moral rights? Are we morally obliged to abandon some practices that have long been widely accepted, such as hunting animals, rearing them for food and other consumptive uses, or employing them as ‘guinea pigs’ in com- mercial, scientific, or medical research? If not all such uses of an- imals are objectionable, then how can we distinguish those that are? 184 Selected Applications chap. 7 4/30/97 3:46 PM Page 184 [...]... consciousness 8. 7 Conclusions The moral problems surrounding the diverse forms of euthanasia require for their solution a plurality of principles of moral status chap 8 4/30/97 3:50 PM Page 199 Euthanasia and the Moral Status of Human Beings 199 The Agent’s Rights principle supports the right of moral agents to hasten their own death, and of others to help them do this, when there are reasonable and morally... Bioethics, 419–30 8 James Rachels argues for this view in ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia’, in Mappes and Zembaty (eds.), Biomedical Ethics, 374 81 ; also see Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 981 ); and Helga Kuhse, The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine: A Critique (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 987 ) chap 8 4/30/97... Rhoden, ‘Cesareans and Samaritans’, in Tom L Beauchamp and LeRoy chap 8 4/30/97 3:50 PM Page 188 188 Selected Applications routinely inflicted upon competent adults who have made an informed and voluntary decision to refuse it The primary basis for this consensus can be found in the right to liberty that the Agent’s Rights principle accords to moral agents The authority to control what is done to one’s body... preferences, and can experience no benefit from life Consequently, their moral status is largely determined by the emotional, familial, and other relationships that others have to them, and by the moral judgements that are reasonably made in the light of those relationships Yet to be addressed is the moral status of human individuals that chap 8 4/30/97 3:50 PM Page 200 200 Selected Applications have never... to begin another course of chemotherapy for a young child in the final stages of leukaemia, may be justifiable even on the presumption that the child has full moral status When the only prob- chap 8 4/30/97 3:50 PM Page 193 Euthanasia and the Moral Status of Human Beings 193 able result of more intensive medical treatment is a longer period of suffering prior to an inevitable death, many caring parents... person’s interest to be killed or allowed to die against their will Moreover, even if it were reasonable to believe this in a particular case, it would still chap 8 4/30/97 3:50 PM Page 187 Euthanasia and the Moral Status of Human Beings 187 be a violation of the right to life to kill a person who does not wish to be killed, or needlessly to let such a person die The right to life protects individuals... John Arras and Nancy Rhoden (eds.), Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine (Mountain View, Calif.: Mayfield, 1 989 ), 220–30 (Robertson uses the term ‘involuntary euthanasia’ to refer to what I call ‘non-voluntary euthanasia’.) chap 8 4/30/97 3:50 PM Page 195 Euthanasia and the Moral Status of Human Beings 195 8. 6 Euthanasia and Permanently Non-sentient Humans Some human infants are born with no capacity for consciousness,... functioning central nervous system this is only a simulation of life.10 10 This is a point made by Charles M Culver and Bernard Gert, in ‘The Definition and Criterion of Death’, 388 –9 chap 8 4/30/97 3:50 PM Page 197 Euthanasia and the Moral Status of Human Beings 197 To terminate life support in such cases is only marginally a form of euthanasia, since death has in essence already occurred Nor is it a violation...chap 8 4/30/97 3:50 PM Page 185 8 Euthanasia and the Moral Status of Human Beings The term ‘euthanasia’ derives from Greek words meaning ‘a good death’ It normally refers to the act of intentionally causing or helping to bring about... At the time of writing, this statute has just come into effect, alWalters (eds.), Contemporary Issues in Bioethics (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1994), 337–42 chap 8 4/30/97 3:50 PM Page 189 Euthanasia and the Moral Status of Human Beings 189 though there are legal challenges pending The other is the Netherlands There, active euthanasia remains technically illegal, but it is not prosecuted when voluntary . beings, and moral agents. Beings of each class have some moral status based upon their intrinsic properties. Organic life confers only a modest moral status; sentience confers a stronger moral status; . judgements about moral status follow from a single principle. A Multi-Criterial Analysis of Moral Status 177 chap. 6 4/30/97 3:44 PM Page 177 chap. 6 4/30/97 3:44 PM Page 1 78 Selected Applications PART. status; and moral agency is sufficient (but not necessary) for full moral status. The fourth principle expands the community of moral equals to include sen- tient human beings who are not moral agents.