Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 10 P49 docx

the omission or failure to act if a child is attracted to the pool and subsequently drowns. Wrongful death statutes do not apply to an unborn fetus, as an individual does not have a distinct legal status until he is born alive. If an infant is born alive and later dies as a result of an injury that occurred prior to birth, an action may be brought for wrongful death. Who May Sue The individuals entitled to sue for wrongful death are enumerated in each state statute. Many statutes provide for recovery by a surviving spouse, NEXT OF KIN, or children. Some states permit a surviving spouse to bring an action even in the event of a separation, but not if the surviving spouse was guilty of desertion or failure to provide support. Ordinarily, children m ay BRING SUIT for the wrongful death of their parents, and parents may sue for the wrongful death of their children. In some states, only minor children are allowed to sue for the death of a parent. Similarly, some state statutes preclude a parent from recovery for the death of an adult child who is financially independent or married. In a2008Illinois SUPREME COURT ruling, Williams v. Manchester , 228 Ill.2d 404, 888 N.E.2d 1 (Ill.2008), the court d ealt with a pregnant women whose injuries in an auto accident led her, for the sake of her own health, to abort her fetus. She had sue d the drive r of the other vehicle f or the wrongful death of her fetus but the court ruled that she could not assert this claim. Because the un born fetus could not have maintained an claim for PERSONAL INJURY against the driver had the fetus survived the accident, the mother had no RIGHT OF ACTION against driver under the state’s wrongful death statute. Immunity from Suit In the absence of a legal exception, the surviving beneficiaries may sue any person who caused the injuries that precipitated the death. A traditional exception to this rule has been applied to family members. This doctrine is known as family immunity and means that an individual is protected from suit by any member of his family. This rule was intended to promote family harmony and to prevent family members from conspiring to DEFRAUD an insurance com- pany. However, its strict application prevented children from legitimately collecting insurance money. Therefore, many states have discarded the strict rule of family immunity. Some limita- tions have been retained, such as allowing an adult child to sue a parent but not allowing a minor child to do so. Wrongful death actions filed against state or local government will be allowed to go forward only if the state has waived its SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY , a doctrine that bars lawsuits against the government. Since the 1960s, a majority of states have relinquished the right to clai m sovereign immunity in many instances. There- fore, if a child drowns in a municipal swimming pool, the parents may be able to sue the city for wrongful death based on negligence. In states that allow wrongful death actions to be brought against government, there is generally a strict notice requirement. The PLAINTIFF must promptly notify the government that a lawsuit is contemplated in order to give the government an opportunity to estimate the potential losses to its budget. The time period for filing a notice may be as short as 30, 60, or 90 days. Failure to fil e a notice of claim precludes the possibility of a lawsuit. In one of the most widely followed wrongful death suits involving a governmental entity, a federal judge in Texas allowed a suit to be brought against the federal government by family members of the Branch Davidians, a religious sect based near Waco, Texas. About one hundred plaintiffs sought $675 million in damages from the federal government, alleging that the government had used excessive force in a standoff with the group at its compound. The standoff ended on April 19, 1993, when the sect’s compound, which was believed to contain a hoard of weapons, burst into flames, killing everyone inside. Included among the deceased were leader David Koresh and 17 children. The judge, Walter Smith, later found that the federal government bore no responsibility for the incident and was not liable. The Defendant’s Responsibility In order to sue for wrongful death, it must be proven that the acts or omissions of the defendant were the PROXIMATE CAUSE of the decedent’s injuries and death. This means that the defendant’s wrongful conduct must have created a natural, direct series of events that led to the injury. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 468 WRONGFUL DEATH Damages The law of each state governs the amount of damages recoverable by statutory beneficiaries. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, which are intended to make restitution for the amount of money lost, are the most common damages awarded in wrongful death actions. Plaintiffs who prevail in a wrongful death lawsuit may recover medical and funeral expenses in addition to the amount of economic supp ort they could have received if the decedent had lived and, in some instances, a sum of money to compensate for grief or LOSS OF SERVICES or companionship. Determining the amount of damages in a wrongful death action requires the taking into account of many variables. To compute com- pensation, the salary that the decedent could have earned may be multiplied by the number of years he most likely would have lived and can be adjusted for various factors, including inflation. Standard actuarial tables serve as guides for the life expectancy of particular groups identified by age or gender. The decedent’smentaland physical health, along with the nature of his work, may also be taken into consideration by ajury. Damages cannot always be calculated on the basis of potential earnings, because not every- one is employed. Courts have set minimum yearly dollar amounts for the worth of an individual’s housekeeping and for CHILD CARE services. A study by Jury Verdict Research of wrongful death verdicts involving women between 2000 and 2008 disclosed that the average award was $2.9 million. PUNITIVE DAMAGES may be awarded in a wrongful death case if the defendant’s actions were particularly reckless or heinous. Punitive damages are a means of punishing the defen- dant for his action and are awarded at the discretion of the jury. Any damages recovered are distributed among the survivors, subje ct to the statutes of each state. Courts frequently divide an award based on the extent of each beneficiary’s loss. However, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a series of rulings between 2000 and 2009, made clear that excessive punitive damages awards must be struck down or greatly reduced. In 1997 in the wrongful death actio n brought against O. J. SIMPSON by the families of Ron Goldman and Nicole Brown Simpson, the former football star was required to pay a total of $33.5 million in punitive and compensatory damages. Although he was acquitted in 1995 of murdering his ex-wife and Goldman, a Superior Court jury in Santa Monica, California, found him liable for their deaths. As a result, Nicole Brown Simpson’s estate received an award of $12.5 million, while Goldman’s estate received $13.475 million, and Sharon Rufo, Goldman’s mother, received $7.525 million. However, the plaintiffs were unable to collect most of these awards. Simpson’s conviction and imprison- ment in 2009 for a Nevada ROBBERY made collection even more unlikely. Limitations on Recovery of Damages Some states limit the amount of money that can be recovered in a wrongful death action. For example, many state and local governments that waive sovereign immunity set a maximum amount of damages that can be recovered for a wrongful death. However, a number of states do not limit the amount of damages for wrongful death. International treaties limit the amount recoverable for the death of passengers on international airlines. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION laws, which exist in some form in every state, place limits upon an employer’s liability. Employers must carry insurance for their employees that compensates workers based on a legal schedule for each type of injury or for death. In return for carrying such insuran ce, employers are immune from negligence suits. The result is that the amount workers can recover is limited, but recovery is guarante ed for injury or death susta ined in the COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT . FURTHER READINGS Dombroff, Mark A. 2000. Evaluating and Reserving Wrongful Death and Personal Injury Cases. Tucson, Az.: Lawyers & Judges Publishing. Kionka, Edward. 2005. Torts in a Nutshell. St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson West. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE An at-will employee’s CAUSE OF ACTION against his former employer, alleging that his discharge was in violation of state or federal antidiscrim ination statutes, public policy, an implied contract, or an implied COVENANT of GOOD FAITH and fair dealing. At COMMON LAW,anemploymentcontractof indefinite duration can be terminated by either party at any time for any reason. The United GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 469 States is the only major industrial power that maintains a general employment-at-will rule. Since the 1950s, however, many courts have allowed discharged at-will employees to bring suits alleging wrongful discharge from employment. An at-will employee may allege that her discharge is based on illegal discrimination. The CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq., contains broad prohibitions against dis- crimination in employment based on race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. Discrimination against persons forty years old and over is banned by the Age Discrimination in Employ- ment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. (1967). In addition, an at-will employee may use state antidiscrimination statutes to contest a discharge. A majority of states allow an at-will employee to proceed with a wrongful-discharge action that is based on public policy. This means that an employer may not legally discharge an employee if the employee refused the employer’s request to violate a specific federal or state statute or a professional code of ethics. In addition, it is against public policy to discharge an employee who exercises a statutory right, such as the right to apply for worker’s compensation benefits for an on-the-job injury. An employee is also protected if his WHISTLEBLOWING activity or other conduct exposing the employer’s wrongdoing resulted in a retaliatory discharge. However, not all discharges for whistleblowing are wrongful. In a 2008 decision, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected a wrongful discharge suit, holding that the employee had reported alleged illegal conduct to his employer rather than to a government agency. Lamson v. Crater Lake Motors, Inc., 344 Or 390 (2008). Employees may sue for wrongful discharge in almost half of the states on the basis of an express or implied promise by the employer, which constitutes a unilateral contract. In a unilateral contract, one party makes a promise and receives performance from the other party. Typically, this type of wrongful discharge action will be based on a statement by the employer that expressly or implicitly promises employees a degree of job security. Ordinarily, such statements are found in employee handbooks or in policy statements given to employees when they are hired. Some courts have interpreted such statements as unilateral contracts in which the employer promises not to discharge the employees except for JUST CAUSE and in accordance with certain procedures. The difficulty with suits based on the employer’s promise from the employee’sper- spective is that the employer may eliminate the possibility of a suit by issuing a policy statement that expressly disclaims any right to continuing employment. Some at-will employees have based their suits on an implied covenant (promise) of good faith and fair dealing. The discharged employee typically contends that the employer has indi- cated in various ways that the employee has job security and will be treated fairly. For example, long-time employees who have consistently received favorable evaluations might claim that their length of service and positive performance reviews were signs that their jobs would be secure as long as they performed satisfactorily. However, few jurisdictions have recognized any good-faith-and-fair-dealing exceptions to the employment-at-will practice. FURTHER READINGS Covington, Robert and Decker, Kurt. 2002. Employment Law in a Nutshell. 2d ed. St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson West. Handling Wrongful Termination Claims. 2001. New York: Practising Law Institute. CROSS REFERENCE Employment Law. WRONGFUL LIFE A type of MEDICAL MALPRACTICE claim brought on behalf of a child born with birth defects, alleging that the child would not have been born but for negligent advice to, or treatment of, the parents. Since the early 1970s, TORT actions for wrongful life have been filed in U.S. courts. In a typical wrongful life action, the parents of a child born with birth defects sue on behalf of the child. Generally, the parents sue their doctor or a medical testing company for NEGLIGENCE, claiming that the failure to diagnose an illness in the mother—for example, rubella in the early stages of pregnancy—prevented the opportunity for the mother to have an ABORTION. As a resu lt, the child is born with impaired health. Essentially, the child alleges that, because of the defect, he or she would have been better off not being born at all. To brin g a wrongful life action, the defect must be one that could only have been averted by preventing the birth of the child; otherwise, the child would bring an GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 470 WRONGFUL LIFE ordinary negligence action. Other types of defects that can be diagnosed early in pregnancy include Tay-Sachs disease, sickle cell anemia, neurofibromatosis, and Down’s syndrome. Only a small number of states permit wrongful life actions, including California, New Jersey, Washington, and Colorado. More than half the states have rejected the claims outright. The many courts that have rejected wrongful life claims have cited two general reasons. First, they are reluctant to hold that a PLAINTIFF can recover damages for being alive when the law and civilization in general have placed a high value on the presence of human life, not on its absence. Second, the basic rule of tort compensation is that the plaintiff is to be put in the position that he or she would have been in if the DEFENDANT had not been negligent. This is impossible in wrongful life actions because the contention is not that in the absence of negligence by the defendant, the plaintiff would have had a healthy, unimpaired life, but rather that if the defendant had not been negligent, the plaintiff would not have been born. The computation of damages in a wrongful life action is based on the claim that the value of the life of the disabled child is less than the value of never having been born. The California Supreme Court, in Turpin v. Sort ini, 31 Cal.3d 220, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 643 P.2d 954 (1982), stated that the wrongful life actio n is another form of a medical MALPRACTICE action and that recovery should not be allowed for pain and suffering and other general damages, but rather only for those extraordinary medical and other expenses incurred during the child’s lifetime. FURTHER READINGS Prenatal Injuries and Wrongful Life: Practice Guide. 1993. Rochester, N.Y.: Lawyers Cooperative. CROSS REFERENCES Wrongful Birth; Wrongful Pregnancy. WRONGFUL PREGNANCY A claim by parents for damages arising from the negligent performance of a sterilization procedure or abortion, and the subsequent birth of a child. In wrongful pregnancy cases (also known as “wrongful conception”), parents file a NEGLI- GENCE action against the medical provider for failing to perform a sterilization or ABORTION correctly, which results in the birth of a healthy but unwanted child. Wrongful pregnancy cases are different from WRONGFUL BIRTH cases. In wrongful birth actions, the provi der is charged with negligence in failing to diagnose a birth defect, which would have allowed the mother to choose to have an abortion instead of giving birth to a child with birth defects. Parents in wrongful pregnancy actions may be able to sue for damages on the basis of the cost of the unsuccessful procedure and any pain or suffering associated with the sterilization or abortion. The parents may also recover damages for the medical expenses, pain, and suffering attributable to the pregnancy, the mother’s lost wages due to the pregnancy, the husban d’s loss of consortium during the pregnancy, and the economic and emotional costs of rearing the child to maturity. Of these, the claims for the costs of rearing the child have presented the most difficulty for the courts. Some courts have taken the position that the costs of raising a child are not recoverable damages. Another objection that has been raised is that allowing damages for the cost of rearing a healthy child requires the parents to deny the worth of the child, which may cause considerable emotional harm to the child when he eventually learns of the lawsuit. However, the plaintiffs may still be able to recover damages for the costs of the pregnancy and the birth if they can prove negligence. Other courts have allowed recovery for the expenses of rearing the child, but have insisted that they be offset by the benefits of having a normal, healthy child. Nine state have barred claims for wrongful pregnancy entirely, including Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah. These statutes have been upheld under both state and federal law. In states where wrongful birth litigation is not banned by statute, a majority of courts allow recovery for damages for medical expenses and lost wages related to pre-natal care, delivery, and post-natal care, as well as compensation for pain and suffering incurred during the pre-natal through post-natal periods. Only a handful of states allow recovery for the costs of rearing the child. CROSS REFERENCES Tort Law; Wrongful Life. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WRONGFUL PREGNANCY 471 v WYATT, WALTER Walter Wyatt served as reporter of decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1946 to 1963. Prior to becoming reporter, Wyatt spent almost 30 years working for the FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD as an attorney. Wyatt’s tenure was marked by a series of important decisions, including BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954), which struck down state-sponsored, racially segregated schools. Wyatt was born on July 20, 1893, in Savannah, Georgia. He attended the University of Virginia Law School and served as editor in chief of the Virginia Law Review, graduatin g in 1917. During WORLD WAR I, he was a member of the Legal Advisory Board of the Selective Service. In 1922 Wyatt took a position as law clerk with the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, D.C. He rose from assistant to counsel to general counsel of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. From 1936 to 1946, Wyatt also served as general counsel to the federal Open Market Commission. The Supreme Court appointed Wyatt its reporter in 1946. Because the position had been vacant for more than two years, Wyatt edited volumes 322 to 325 of the United States Reports, which had been previously published without editorial review. During his 17 years as reporter, Wyatt edited or coedited 123 volumes of decisions, writing a syllabus for each opini on that highlights the important points of each case. Wyatt also published numerous works on banking law throughout his career. Wyatt retired from his position in 1963. He died in Washington, D.C., on February 26, 1978. WYGANT V. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION The U.S. Supreme Court has held that an employer may grant preferential treatment to racial minorities under a private, voluntary AFFIRMATIVE ACTION program. Affirmative action is a concerted effort by an employer to rectify past discrimination against specific classes of individuals by giving temporary preferential treatment to the hiring and promoting of individuals from these classes until such time as true equal opportunity is achieved. The use of affirmative action is based on Title VII of the Walter Wyatt. COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Walter Wyatt 1893–1978 ❖ 1893 Born, Savannah, Ga. ◆ 1917 Graduated from University of Va. Law School 1922 Joined the Federal Reserve Board as a law clerk 1978 Died, Washington, D.C. 1946–63 Served as reporter of decisions for the U.S. Supreme Court 1914–18 World War I 1961–73 Vietnam War 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War ▼▼ ▼▼ 19001900 19501950 19751975 20002000 19251925 ❖ 1936–46 Served as general counsel to the federal Open Market Commission 1954 U.S. Supreme Court outlawed "separate but equal" education in Brown v. Board of Education ◆ ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 472 WYATT, WALTER CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (42 U.S.C.A . § 2000e et seq.). It has proved controversial, with many white persons claiming that affirmative action is in fact “reverse discrimination.” The case of Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 90 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1986), involved minority prefer- ences in teacher layoffs. In the face of a budget crisis, the Jackson, Mississippi, Board of Educa- tion was forced to cut teaching positions. Under the terms of the contract with the teachers’ union, the board laid off more senior white teachers in order to retain fewer senior minority teachers. The white teachers who were laid off fought the decision, arguing that the minority preference plan unfairly discriminated against them on the basis of race, thus violating Title VII and the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution. Though there was no majority opinion, the Supreme Court agreed that the school board had violated the Constitution. Writing for a plurality, Justice LEWIS F. POWELL found that race- based preferences must be subjected to the STRICT SCRUTINY standard of equal protection review. Strict scrutiny reverses the ordinary presumption of constitutionality, with the government carrying the BURDEN OF PROOF that its challenged policy is constitutional. To withstand strict scrutiny, the government must show that its policy is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. If this is proved, the state must then demonstrate that the legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve the intended result. Strict scrutiny is far more stringent than the traditional RATIONAL BASIS TEST, which only requires the government to offer a reasonable ground for the legislation. Applying strict scrutiny, the plurality con- cluded that the school board had no compelling interest in remedying “societal discrimination” and suggested that prior institutional discrimi- nation supplied the only permissible justifica- tion for “race-based remedies.” However, even if the school board had discriminated in the past, “the burden that a preferential-layoffs scheme imposes on innocent parties” would be too great to be constitutionally acceptable. Powell noted that while minority hiring goals “impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives.” That burden was too intrusive and therefore failed the strict scrutiny requirement that a race-based remedy be narrowly tailored to achieve its ends. The Wygant decision imposed a higher burden on government to justify affirmative action programs, especially when white employ- ees are laid off in order to retain minority employees. However, the Court left open the possibility that it would find other governmen- tal interests to be sufficiently important or compelling to sustain the use of affirmative action policies. At least two federal district courts, however, have applied the language and spirit of Wygant to reject racial-disparity studies composed by experts after the implementation of the affirmative action programs in question. These studies were designed to show a compel- ling government interest for the affirmative action programs. Associated Utility Contractors of Maryland, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore,83F. Supp.2d 613 (D. Md. 2000); West Tennessee Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors v. Board of Education, 64 F. Supp.2d 714 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). FURTHER READINGS Bernhardt, Herbert N. 1993. “Affirmative Action in Employment: Considering Group Interests While Protecting Individual Rights.” Stetson Law Review 23 (fall). Chang, David. 1991. “Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?” Columbia Law Review 91 (May). “The Nonperpetuation of Discrimination in Public Con- tracting: A Justification for State and Local Minority Business Set-asides after Wygant.” 1988. Harvard Law Review 101 (June). Woodside, Steven M., and Jan Howell Marx. 1988. “Walking the Tightrope between Title VII and Equal Protection: Public Sector Voluntary Affirmative Action after Johnson and Wygant.” Urban Lawyer 20 (spring). CROSS REFERENCES Civil Rights; Employment Law; Equal Employment Oppor- tunity Commission; United Steelworkers v. Weber. v WYTHE, GEORGE George Wythe was an attorney, judge, signer of the DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, and first professor of law in the United States. A mentor to THOMAS JEFFERSON, Wythe educated a number of men who went on to achieve prominence in law and politics. Wythe was born in 1726 in Elizabeth City, Virginia. After his admission to the Virginia bar THERE IS NO COUNTRY IN THE WORLD SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES ITSELF —IN WHICH CAPITAL , MANAGEMENT, LABOR AND RESOURCES MAY BE JOINED TOGETHER FOR MORE PRODUCTION , TO THE MUTUAL ADVANTAGE OF ALL CONCERNED . —GEORGE WYTHE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WYTHE, GEORGE 473 in 1746, Wythe settle d in Williamsburg, then the seat of government in the colony. He became active in politics, serving as a member of the House of Burgesses from 1754 to 1755 and from 1758 to 1768. Wythe served as mayor of Williamsburg, Virginia from 1768 to 1769. He later served as clerk of the house from 1769 to 1775. An ardent supporter of independence, Wythe drafted a fiery motion opposing the STAMP ACT of 1764. However, the house was compelled to rewrite the motion and adopt a softer tone. Wythe attended the CONTINENTAL CONGRESS in 1775 and 1776 and signed the DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. During these years of politics and revolu- tion, Wythe maintained a successful law practice. Many students sought his counsel, including Jefferson, who studied law with Wythe in the 1760s and viewed him as his mentor. As Jefferson rose in stature and power, Wythe became part of his circle. In 1776 Wythe, Jefferson, GEORGE MASON, and Edmund Pendle- ton revised the Virginia Code. Jefferson used his influence to have Wythe appointed the first law professor in the United States. Wythe taught at the College of William and Mary from 1779 to 1789. One of his first students was JOHN MARSHALL, later chief justice of the United States. While teach ing, Wythe also pursued a judicial career and presided as a judge in the Virginia Chancery Court from 1778 to 1788. In 1789 he was appointed chancellor of Virginia, which required him to move to Richmond. Wythe established a PRIVATE LAW school there and had as one of his pupils the future U.S. senator from Kentucky, HENRY CLAY. Wythe resigned as chancellor in 1792. He published a selection of his court decisions in Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery in 1795. Wythe died on June 8, 1806, in Richmond, Virginia, of poisoning. His grandnephew and heir, George Wythe Sweeney, was acquitted of the MURDER. A slaveholder, Wythe had become an abolitionist, freeing his slaves and providing for their support. Wythe provided for his slaves, Lydia Broadnax and her son Michael Brown, in his will. George Wythe Sweeney decided to prevent the disolution of his fortune by poisoning the slaves with arsenic. In the process, he killed Wythe as well, though Wythe survived George Wythe. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS George Wythe 1726–1806 ❖ ❖ 1726 Born, Elizabeth City, Va. 1769–75 Served as clerk of the House of Burgesses 1806 Died, Richmond, Va. 1746 Admitted to Va. bar ◆ 1789–92 Served as chancellor of Virginia 1775 Attended First Continental Congress 1775–83 American Revolution 1779–89 Taught at the College of William and Mary 1778–88 Presided as judge in the Virginia Chancery Court ▼▼ ▼▼ 17751775 18001800 18251825 17251725 17501750 1754–55 Served in Va. House of Burgesses 1758–68 Served in Va. House of Burgesses ◆◆ 1776 Signed the Declaration of Independence 1795 Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery published 1812–14 War of 1812 ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 474 WYTHE, GEORGE long enough to change his will to eliminate his bequest to his murderer. At trial, the only witness was an African American, who was disqualified from testifying under the laws of Virginia. FURTHER READINGS Brown, Imogene E. 1981. American Aristides: A Biography of George Wythe. Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press. Callahan, Dennis J. 2003. “America’s First Law Professor Played Unsung Role in Marbury.” Student Lawyer 31 (February). Carrington, Paul D. 1997. “A Tale of Two Lawyers.” Northwestern Univ. Law Review 91 (winter). Kirtland, Robert Bevier. 1986. George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge . New York: Garland. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WYTHE, GEORGE 475 “X” AS A SIGNATURE “X” as a signature refers to a cross that is printed in lieu of an individual’s signature. A signature is required to authenticate wills, deeds, and certain commercial instruments. Typically, individuals sign their full names when executing legal documents. Sometimes, however, individuals use only their initials or other identifying mark. For illiterate, incompe- tent, or disabled people, this mark is often the letter X. Documents signed with an X some- times raise questions as to their validity and enforceability. For example, wills must be signed by the testator in order to be valid and enforceable. A testator’s signature may take the form of his full name, nickname, initials, or other identify- ing mark, including a thumbprint or blood splotch, depending on the jurisdiction. In many jurisdictions, testators may authenticate their last will and testament with the letter X. Before an X may be treated as a binding signature during a proceeding to contest a will, courts commonly require the testimony of two people who witnessed the signature. The witnesses may also be questioned by the court to determine whether the testator declared his or her intention of completing the will by signing it in this fashion. In other states, the law requires courts to invalidate wills that are signed with an X unless the testator was physically or mentally incapable of signing her full name. Courts apply similar rules when evaluating the enforceability of real estate deeds that are signed with an X. Signatures also form the legal basis of negotiable instruments. Section 3-401(2) of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC) provides that “[n]o person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears thereon.” The UCC defines the term signature as any name, TRADE NAME , assumed name, word, or other identifying mark used in lieu of a signature (§ 3-401(2)). The term signed is defined by the UCC as any symbol executed or adopted by a party with the “present intention of authenticating a writing” (§ 1-201(39)). Thus, commercial instruments, such as checks and promissory notes, may be signed by affixing any symbol that an individual intends to represent his signature. Conse- quently, courts will enforce commercial con- tracts signed with an X without regard to an individual’s mental or physical ability to sign his or her full name, though mental or physical incapacity may be relevant if a particular contract is alleged to be the product of overreaching, UNDUE INFLUENCE, or coercion. In some jurisdictions, courts require proof that a person attempting to execute a document using an X as his or her signature showed a consistent pattern of signing in that manner. For example, the New York Surrogate’s Court ruled that a Durable General POWER OF ATTORNEY was invalid when the principal executing the document did so by signing with an X, even though the document was also signed by the X 477 . House of Burgesses ◆◆ 1776 Signed the Declaration of Independence 1795 Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery published 1812–14 War of 1812 ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, . post-natal periods. Only a handful of states allow recovery for the costs of rearing the child. CROSS REFERENCES Tort Law; Wrongful Life. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WRONGFUL PREGNANCY. Supreme Court outlawed "separate but equal" education in Brown v. Board of Education ◆ ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 472 WYATT, WALTER CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (42 U.S.C.A