Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 9 P49 docx

interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres- sion; and if the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Applying this test to the statute involved in O’Brien, the Court found the law consti- tutional. A less defiant form of symbolic speech was extended constitutional protection during the Vietnam War. In Tinker v. Des Moines Indepen- dent Community School District (393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 [1969]), high school officials in Des Moines, Iowa, had suspended students for wearing black armbands to school to protest U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Justice ABE FORTAS, in his majority opinion, rejected the idea that the school’s response was “reasonable” because it was based on the fear that the wearing of the armbands would create a disturbance. Fortas ruled that the wearing of the armbands was “closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment ” Public school officials could not ban expression out of the “mere desire to avoid discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” Flag Burning Political protesters have often used the U.S. flag as a vehicle to express opposition to govern- ment policies. During the Vietnam War era, the mutilation or burning of the flag became commonplace. Such actions angered many people, and legislation was passed at the state level to prohibit this conduct. In Street v. New York (394 U.S. 576, 89 S. Ct. 1354, 22 L. Ed. 2d 572 [1969]), the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the question of whether flag burning is entitled to constitutional protec- tion as symbolic speech. However, the Court focused on the element of verbal expression also presented in this case an d effectively avoided the symbolic speech issue. In a 1974 cas e, the C ourt did strike down a Washington s tate law that prohibited thedisplayoftheU.S.flagwith“extraneous material” attached to it (Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 94 S. Ct. 2727, 41 L. Ed. 2 d 842). The Street decision left open the question of whether flag burning per se was a form of symbolic speech protected by the First Amend- ment. In 1989 , in the highly publicized case of Texas v. Johnson (491 U.S. 397, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342) the Court surprised many observers by ruling that flag burning was protected. After publicly burning the U.S. flag outside the 1984 Republican National Conven- tion in Dallas, Texas, Gregory Lee Johnson was charged with violating a Texas law prohibiting flag desecration. Johnson was convicted at trial, but his conviction was reversed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which held that the law violated the First Amendment. On a 5-4 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed. Writing for the majority, Justice William J. Brennan Jr. noted that “[t]he expressive, overtly political nature of [Johnson’s] conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent.” It was clear that “Johnson was convicted for engaging in expressive conduct.” Rejecting the assertion by Texas that the law prevented breaches of the peace, the Court concluded that “Johnson’s conduct did not threaten to disturb the peace. Nor does the State’s interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity justify his criminal convic- tion for engaging in political expression.” Chief Justice WILLIAM H. R EHNQUIST, in a dissent- ing opinion, dismissed the idea that flag burning was a form of symbolic speech. On the contrary, he stated, “flag burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar that is most likely to be indulged in not to expr ess any particular idea, but to antagonize others. ” Rehnquist argued that the flag “as the symbol of our Nation, [has] a uniqueness that justifies a governmental PROHIBITION against flag bur ning. ” The Johnson decision angered conservatives, who called for a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT to place flag burning beyond the First Amend- ment’s protection. When the amendment proposal failed to gain support, Congress passed the federal Flag Protection Act of 1989 (Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777), which made flag burning a federal crime. In United States v. Eichman (496 U.S. 310, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 110 L. Ed. 2d 287 [1990]), the Court struck down the Flag Protection Act as applied to flag burning as a means of political protest. Exotic Dancing Ordinances regulating exotic dancing and adult cabaret entertainment in premises licensed to serve alcoholic beverages do not generally violate free speech rights of either the bar owners or the exotic dancers. Cities typically regulate this form of adult entertainment under GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 468 SYMBOLIC SPEECH Flag Burning: Desecration or Free Expression? T he Supreme Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989), striking down a Texas law that made burning the U.S. flag a crime, was endorsed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and other groups that seek to preserve freedom of expression under the First Amendment. Other groups and individuals, however, were dismayed that the Court would strike down a law that protected the symbol of the United States. Congress responded by passing the federal Flag Protection Act of 1989, 103 Stat. 777, which made flag burning a federal crime. When the Supreme Court struck down the federal law in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 110 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1990), opponents of flag burning began to campaign for a constitutional amend- ment that would make such a law constitutional. The proponents of a flag protection amendment have been led by the Citizens Flag Alliance (CFA), a nonpartisan, non- profit national coalition that includes more than one hundred organizations and is funded, in large part, by the American Legion. The proposed amend- ment states that “Congress shall have power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United States.” The House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the amendment in June 1995, but the Senate defeated the amendment by three votes in December 1995. Despite this defeat, the CFA has continued to campaign for the amend- ment, noting that opinion polls consis- tently show that 80 percent of U.S. citizens support the amendment. In addition, 49 state legislatures have passed resolutions asking Congress to pass a flag protection amendment—eleven more states than are needed to ratify an amendment. The amendment was rein- troduced in Congress in 1997. The House passed the measure by a vote of 310–114, but a vote in the Senate was delayed. Proponents of the amendment con- tend that it does not restrict freedom of expression or limit the First Amendment. They note that there have always been limits on free speech and that the Supreme Court has never regarded the guarantees of the First Amendment as absolute. Proponents point to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's dissent in Johnson, in which he characterized flag burning as “the equivalent of an inartic- ulate grunt or roar” and the flag as a national symbol deserving of protection. In addition, supporters of the amendment deny that flag burning is symbolic speech. They argue that the act of flag desecration is conduct rather than speech and is thus outside the First Amendment's protection. The Supreme Court's decisions have regarded flag burning as protected symbolic speech, however, so this argument can only prevail if the Court's interpretation is overridden by an amendment to the Constitution. Supporters of the amendment con- tend that the flag has a special place in U.S. society and culture and serves as a unifying symbol for a heterogeneous nation. Because of its unique status, the flag must be honored and respected. They argue that the freedom to desecrate the flag is not a fundamental freedom deeply rooted in the First Amendment. Therefore, they conclude, it is reasonable for a balance to be struck between the rights of the individual and her responsi- bility to society. In this instance societal values should prevail over individual interests. Proponents of the amendment stren- uously object to the charge that they are restricting freedom of speech. The amendment does not prevent a person from criticizing, in speech or writing, the government, government officials, or even the flag itself. The amendment simply gives Congress the authority to pass legislation that prohibits the dese- cration of the U.S. flag. Opponents of the amendment, led by the ACLU, insist that the passage of the flag amendment would limit freedom of expression and restrict the First Amendment. They point out that the word desecration is a religious concept that means to profane or violate the sanctity of something. According to opponents, the flag amendment would implicitly constitutionalize the flag as the sacred or divine object of the United States. Such an action would run counter to the Bill of Rights. Opponents of the amendment con- tend that flag burning is a rare event that does not merit the amending of the Constitution. No more than five or six persons were prosecuted annually for flag burning before the Johnson decision. Opponents worry that once a flag desecration amendment is passed, it will open the door to the revocation of other individual freedoms. The Constitution and the Bill of Rights were designed to prevent the tyranny of the majority. Just because a flag desecration amendment has broad support does not make it right. Once flag burning is banned, legislators and pressure groups will seek to restrict other freedoms. Those opposed to the amendment also argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson contained the best reason for rejecting it. As Justice William J. Brennan Jr. stated, “We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.” Opponents see the toleration of actions such as flag burning as a sign and source of national strength. In their view the flag stands for the freedoms each U.S. citizen enjoys, including the right to burn that very symbol. FURTHER READINGS Goldstein, Robert Justin. 1996. Burning the Flag: The Great 1989–1990 American Flag Desecration Controversy. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SYMBOLIC SPEECH 469 a legitimate governmental power and pursuant to zoning guidelines that require bar owners to locate their establishments in certain rural or urban areas. Regulations limiting dancers from having contact with patrons or from performing certain kinds of dances have also been ruled a constitutional means of combating the negative secondary effects of adult entertainment and not a form of illegal suppression of speech (McCrothers Corp. v. City of Mandan, 2007 ND 28, 728 N.W.2d 124 [N.D. 2007]). Many commentators have criticized the way the Supreme Court has developed the First Amendment JURISPRUDENCE of symbolic speech. In particular, observers have noted that the line between “speech” and nonverbal “conduct” is impossible to draw and that the real emphasis should be placed on the motive behind the government regulation. This approach would determine whether the regulation was intended to censor certain ideas or whether it was directed at the noncommunicative impact of the behavior. FURTHER READINGS Barron, Jerome.2008. First Amendment in a Nutshell. 4th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West. Citizens Flag Alliance Website. Available online at http:// www.cfa-inc.org (accessed February 4, 2010). Goldman, T. R. 1999. “Flag Law on Front Burner; Close Vote Generates Intense Lobbying.” Legal Times (May 10). Goldstein, Robert Justin. 2000. Flag Burning and Free Speech: The Case of Texas v. Johnson. Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press. Hilden, Julie. “Do Americans Have a Legal Right to Become Human Shields?” CNN.com: Law Center. Available online at http://edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/08/14/ findlaw.analysis.hilden.human.shield (accessed Febru- ary 4, 2010). Waldman, Joshua. 1997. “Symbolic Speech and Social Meaning.” Columbia Law Review 97 (October). Welch, Michael. 2000. Flag Burning: Moral Panic and the Criminalization of Protest. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. CROSS REFERENCES Censorship; Flag; Flag Salute Cases. Freedom of Speech; Texas v. Johnson. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. SYNDICATE An association of individuals formed for the purpose of conducting a particular business; a joint venture. A syndicate is a general term describing any group that is formed to conduct some type of business. For example, a syndicate may be formed by a group of investment bankers who underwrite and distribute new issues of SECURITIES or blocks of outstanding issues. Syndicates can be organized as corporations or partnerships. News Syndicates Newspaper or press syndicates came into existence after the Civil War. A press syndicate sells the exclusive rights to entertainment features, such as gossip and advice columns, comic strips, and serialized books, to a sub- scribing newspaper in each territory. These “syndicated” features, which appear simulta- neously around the United States, can generate large sums for the creators of the features and for the syndicate that sells them. Similarly, when television programs are syndicated, one station in each television market is allowed to broadcast or rebroadcast it. A syndicated show may be televised at different times, depending on the schedule of the local station. In contrast, on network television, a program is televised nationally at one scheduled time. Crime Syndicates The term syndicate is also associated with ORGANIZED CRIME. In the 1930s, the term crime syndicate was often used to describe a loose association of racketeers in control of organized crime throughout the United States. For exam- ple, the infamous “Murder, Inc.” of the 1930s, which was part of a national crime syndicate, was founded to threaten, ASSAULT,orMURDER designated victims for a price. A member of the crime syndicate anywhere in the United States could contract with Murder, Inc., to hire a “hit man” to kill a person. Real Estate Syndicates A REAL ESTATE syndicate is a group of investors who pool their money for the buying and selling of real property. Most real-estate syndicates operate as limited partnerships or real-estate investment trusts. SYNDICATED CRIME See ORGANIZED CRIME. SYNOPSIS A summary; a brief statement, less than the whole. A synopsis is a condensation of some- thing—for example, a synopsis of a trial record. Publishers draft synopses of cases and statutes as well. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 470 SYNDICATE TABLE OF CASES An alphabetized list of the judicial decisions that are cited, referred to, or explained in a book with references to the sections, pages, or paragraphs where they are cited. A table of cases is commonly found in either the prefix or appendix of the book. TACIT Implied, inferred, understood without being ex- pressly stated. Tacit refers to something done or made in silence, as in a tacit agreement. A tacit understanding is manifested by the fact that no contradiction or objection is made and is thus inferred from the situation and the circumstances. In 2008, reports emerged that the U.S. and Pakistan had a tacit agreement to allow the U.S. to engage in airstrikes with unmanned aircraft within Pakistan territories, meaning that no treaty or other public discussion existed on the topic. TACKING The process whereby an individual who is in ADVERSE POSSESSION of real property adds his or her period of possession to that of a prior adverse possessor. In order for title to property to vest in an adverse possessor, occupancy must be continu- ous, regular, and uninterrupted for the full statutory period. If privity exists between the parties, such that one possessor gives possession of the land to the next, the time periods that the successive occupants have had possession of the property may be added or tacked together to meet the continuity requirement. Tacking is allowed only when no time lapses between the end of one occupant’s possession and the beginning of another’s occupancy. In addition, possession by the prior occupant must have been adverse or under color of title. TAFT-HARTLEY ACT The Labor-Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.), informally known as the Taft- Hartley Act, or just Taft-Hartley, is a federal law that regulates the activities and power of labor unions. The act, still effective, was sponsored by Robert Taft, a Republican Sena tor from Ohio, and Fred A. Hartley, Jr., a Republican Congress- man from New Jersey. Taft-Hartley amended the National Labor Relations Act, which Con- gress passed in 1935. The Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947 over President Harry S. Truman’s VETO to establish remedies for unfair labor practices committed by unions. It included amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, also known as the WAGNER ACT of 1935 (29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.), which were crafted to counteract the advantage that labor unions had gained under the original legislation by imposing corresponding duties on unions. Prior to the amendments, the National Labor Relations Act had proscribed unfair labor practices committed by management. T 471 The principal changes imposed by the act encompass the following: prohibiting secondary boycotts; abolishing the closed shop but allow- ing the union shop to exist under conditions specified in the act; exempting supervisors from coverage under the act; requiring the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to accord equal treatment to both independent and affiliated unions; permitting the employer to file a representation petition even though only one union seeks to represent the employees; grant- ing employees the right not only to organize and bargain collectively but also to refrain from such activities; allowing employees to file decerti- fication petitions for elections to determine whether employees want to revoke the designa- tion of a union as their bargaining agent; declaring certain union activities to constitute unfair labor practices; affording to employers, employees, and unions new guarantees of the right of free speech; proscribing strikes to compel an employer to discharge an employee due to his or her union affiliation, or lack of it; and providing for settlement by the NLRB of certain jurisdictional disputes. The act also makes COLLECTIVE BARGAINING agreements enforc eable in federal district court, and it provides a civil remedy for damages to private parties injured by secondary boycotts. The statute thereby marks a shift away from a federal policy encouraging unionization, em- bodied in the Wagner Act, to a more neutral stance, which maintains the right of employees to be free from employer coercio n. CROSS REFERENCES Labor Law; Labor Union. v TAFT, ALPHONSO Alphonso Taft served as attorney general of the United States from 1876 to 1877, under President ULYSSES S. GRANT. Taft was born November 5, 1810, in Town- send, Vermont, to pioneers Peter Rawson Taft and Sylvia Howard Taft. He was well aware of his family’s long history and tradition of public service in the American colonies. His father was a descendant of Edward Rawson, a 1636 settler who had served as secretary of the Massachusetts Province. Other Taft family members held positions of responsibility and influence in communities all along the eastern seaboard. Although Taft’s parents were of modest financial means, they had a strong commitment to education, and Taft was well schooled. Taft left Vermont to attend Yale University in 1829, where he received a bachelor of arts degree in 1833 and his law degree in 1836. Like many young men of his day, Taft saw his future in the West. In 1839 Taft moved to Cincinnati, Ohio, and opened his law practice. On August 29, 1841, he married Fanny Phelps, the daughter of family friends Charles Phelps and Eliza Houghton Phelps. Fanny died in 1852, and Taft remarried in 1853, to Louise Maria Torret. They had three sons and one daughter, including WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, who became the 27th president of the United States and the tenth chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Taft playe d an important role in organizing his influential friends to support the nation al Republican effort, and he is personally credited with the birth of the REPUBLICAN PARTY in Cincinnati. He was chosen to represent Hamil- ton County at the first Republican National Convention, in 1856. He later sought to ▼▼ ▼▼ Alphonso Taft 1810–1891 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 18251825 ❖ ❖ ◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆ 1810 Born, Townsend, Vt. 1836 Graduated from Yale Law School 1856 Attended the first Republican National Convention 1857 Son, William Howard Taft, future president and chief justice, born 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1865 Elected to Cincinnati superior court 1876 Appointed secretary of war by President Grant 1872 Elected first president of the Cincinnati Bar Association 1876–77 Served as U.S. attorney general 1879 Defeated in run for governor of Ohio 1882 Named U.S. ambassador to Austro-Hungarian Empire 1884–85 Served as ambassador to Russia 1891 Died, San Diego, Calif. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 472 TAFT, ALPHONSO represent Ohio’s first district in the 35th Congress. He ran as a Republican candidate, but was defeated. He remained active in Republican party politics for most of his life. In 1865 Taft was appointed to fill the remaining term of a Cincinnati superior court judge. Later that year, he was elected in his own right, and he served as a judge of the Superior Court of Cincinnati from 1865 to 1872. In 1872 Taft left the bench to practice law with his grown sons. He took an active role in the establishment and organization of the Cincinnati Bar Association, and he was elected the first president of the new organization in March 1872. Taft’s political, judicial, and legal activities during the late 1860s and early 1870s elevated him to national attention, so few were surprised when President Grant appointed him secretary of war in March 1876. (It was a position his son William Howard Taft would also hol d thirty years later, under President THEODORE ROOSEVELT.) Only two months later, Grant named Taft to be attorney general. Taft served as attorney general from May 1876 to January 1877. In November 1876, the government’s policy of suspending pay to sailors who were jailed or removed from duty was challenged. Taft rendered an opinion finding “nothing in the law of the naval service which justifies the view that confinement or suspension from duty under sentence of COURT- MARTIAL is attended by FORFEITURE or loss of pay” (15 Op. Att’y Gen. 175, 176). Following his term as attorney general, Taft made several unsuccessful bids for elected office. He was defeated in his run for a U.S. Senate seat in 1878, and he was defeated in two attempts at the Ohio governor’s seat, in 1877 and 1879. In April 1882 he was named U.S. ambassa- dor to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1884 Taft was offered the ambassadorship to Russia. He accepted, and served until August 1885. At the close of his foreign service, Taft settled in Californ ia. In retirement, he devoted his time to a number of educational institutions, including Yale University, where he was a fellow of the college, and the University of Cincinnati, where he was a charter trustee. After his death on May 21, 1891, in San Diego, the University of Cincin nati’s Alphonso Taft School of Law was named in his honor. FURTHER READINGS Brown, Gloria. 1992. “The Tafts: The Cleveland Branch of Ohio’s Famous Political Family.” Cleveland Plain Dealer (April 12). Pollak, Louis H. 1989. “‘Original Intention’ and the Crucible of Litigation.” University of Cincinnati Law Review 57. Rhodes, Irwin S. 1972. “The Founding of the Cincinnati Bar Association.” Cincinnati Historical Society Bulletin 30. v TAFT, WILLIAM HOWARD William Howard Taft is the only person to serve as both president and Supreme Court chief justice of the United States. A gifted judge and administra- tor, Taft helped modernize the way the U.S. Supreme Court conducted its business and was the driving force behind the construction of the Supreme Court Building in Washington, D.C. Taft was born on September 15, 1857, in Cincinnati, Ohio. His father, ALPHONSO TAFT, served as secretary of war and attorney general in President Ulysses S. Grant’s administration. Taft graduated from Yale University in 1878 and earned a law degree from Cincinnati Law College (now University of Cincinnati College of Law) in 1880. He established a law practice in Cincinnati and served as assistant prosecuting attorney for Hamilton County, Ohio, from 1881 to 1883. Taft was assistant county solicitor from 1885 to 1887 and a superior court judge from 1887 to 1890. Though only 33 years old, Taft lobbied President BENJAMIN HARRISON for a seat on the U.S. Supreme Court in 1890. Although Harri- son demurred, he did make Taft U.S. SOLICITOR GENERAL , the person who argues on behalf of the Alphonso Taft. GETTY IMAGES THE GOVERNMENT IS NEUTRAL , AND, WHILE PROTECTING ALL , IT PREFERS NONE AND DISPARAGES NONE . —ALPHONSO TAFT GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TAFT, WILLIAM HOWARD 473 federal government befor e the Supreme Court. Taft won sixteen of the eighteen cases he argued before 1892, when Harrison appointed him to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit in- cluded Chicago and other industrialized cities of the Midwest, which were the scenes of conflict between LABOR UNIONS and large manufacturing companies. Taft, like most conservative judges of his time, upheld the use of the labor INJUNCTION to prevent labor strikes and violence. The use of the injunction removed an impor- tant bargaining tool and seriously weakened labor unions. Taft, however, did believe workers had a right to organize and could legally strike, if the strike was peacefu l. Taft left the court in 1900 at the request of President WILLIAM MCKINLEY. In the aftermath of the SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898), the United States had taken possession of the Philippine Islands. Taft was chosen to lead a commission that would help establish a civil government in the islands and end military rule. In 1901 he became the first civilian governor of the Philippines and drew praise from the Philippine people for his administration. Taft reluctantly returned to Washington in 1904 at the request of President THEODORE ROOSEVELT to become secretary of war. As secretary, Taft supervi sed the construction of the Panama Canal, estab- lished the U.S. Canal Zone, and helped negoti- ate a treaty that ended the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. When Roosevelt declined to run for another term in 1908, Taft was nominated as the Republican candidate. He easily defeated the Democratic candidate, WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN,in the general election and assumed office in 1909 as Roosevelt’s political heir. Taft’s administration proved to be lackluster at best, however. Though he was an able administrator, he lacked the political skills necessary to succeed in Washington. He alienated Roosevelt and other liberal Repub- licans by appeasing conservative Republicans, splitting the party in the process. Taft also failed to retain Roosevelt’s cabinet, despite previoulsly implying the contrary. Taft did carry on Roosevelt’s “trust-busting” initiatives, attacking business trusts under the SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT (15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.) and supporting the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 (49 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.), which gave more power to the INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. He also established the LABOR DEPARTMENT.In ▼▼ ▼▼ William Howard Taft 1857–1930 1850 1900 1925 1950 1875 ❖ ◆ 1857 Born, Cincinnati, Ohio 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1878 Graduated from Yale University 1881–83 Served as prosecutor for Hamilton County, Ohio 1887–90 Served as superior court judge for Hamilton County, Ohio 1904–08 Served as secretary of war under President Roosevelt 1909–13 Served as U.S. president 1914–18 World War I 1898 Spanish- American War 1901–04 Served as first civilian governor to the Philippines 1928–35 Design and construction of U.S. Supreme Court Building 1939–45 World War II 1930 Died, Washington, D.C. 1925 Developed the Judiciary Act of 1925, which gave the Court greater discretion over its docket ◆ 1890 Appointed U.S. solicitor general ◆ ◆ 1892–1900 Served on U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ❖ 1921–30 Served as chief justice of the Supreme Court William Howard Taft. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 474 TAFT, WILLIAM HOWARD foreign affairs, Taft adopt ed a policy of “dollar diplomacy” as an economic substitute for military aid to underdeveloped countries. The most critical domestic problems facing Taft were the obtaining of an INCOME TAX that would raise revenue but also serve as a redistributor of the national wealth; the control of big business, so as to provide free competi- tion; reform of the tariff and currency and of the banking systems; the conservation of natural resources; and the improvement of democratic government by the admission of more demo- cratic methods, so as to improve its organiza- tion and operations. In 1909, durin g a debate over tariffs, Taft proposed taxing corporations and adding an amendment to the Constitution removing the apportionment requirement on income tax. The corporate income tax was legitimized by the Supreme Court in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co (1911), when the Court held that the tax was an excise on doing business in corporate form and not a tax on property. In July 1909, the proposed amendment to remove the apportion- ment requirement was passed unanimously in the Senate and by a vote of 318 to 14 in the House. It was then quickly ratified by the state s, and in February 3, 1913, the proposal became the SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT, just as Taft was leaving office. Taft’s political downfall began in 1910 with his support of Speaker of the House of Representatives Joseph Cannon, a conservative Republican who ran the House with an iron fist. Liberals had counted on Taft to help them break Cannon’s power, but he refused. When Taft approved the development of Alaskan coal resources, he drew public criticism from Gifford A. Pinchot of the Forestry Service, a promoter of conservation and Roosevelt’s close ally. In 1912 Roosevelt ran against Taft for the Republican presidential nomination. When Taft won the end orsement, Roose velt formed the PROGRESSIVE PARTY, effectively guaranteeing that Democrat WOODROW WILSON would be elected president. Taft carried only Utah and Vermont and split the Republican vote with Roosevelt, allowing Wilson to win handily. After leaving the presidency, Taft became a law professor at Yale University. During WORLD WAR I he served on the National War Labor Board and advocated the establishment of the LEAGUE OF NATIONS and U.S. participation in that world organization. In 1921 President WARREN G. HARDING appointed Taft chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. On a Court dominated by conservatives, Taft usually went along with his brethren in striking down laws that sought to regulate business and labor practices. Taft distinguished himself more as an administrator than as a judge. He developed and lobbied for the JUDICIARY ACT OF 1925, 43 Stat. 936, which gave the Court almost complete discretion over its docket. Under Taft, the Court developed the writ of CERTIORARI process, whereby a party files a petition seeking review by the Court. Because only a small fraction of these petitions are granted, the process has dramatically reduced the work of the Court. Taft also lobbied Congress for funds to con- struct a separate building for the Court. Although he did not live to see its completion, the Supreme Court Building, which was designed by CASS GILBERT , proved to be a lasting monument to Taft’s administrative talents. Taft’s health began to fail in 1928, and he was forced to resign from the Court in February 1930. He died on March 8, 1930, in Washington, D.C. FURTHER READINGS Anderson, Donald F. 2000. “Building National Consensus: The Career of William Howard Taft. Univ. of Cincinnati Law Review 68 (winter). Burton, David H. 1998. Taft, Holmes, and the 1920s Court: An Appraisal. Madison, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press. Taft, William H. 2001. The Collected Works of William Howard Taft. Ed. by David H. Burton. Athens: Ohio Univ. Press. TAIL Limited, abridged, reduced, or curtailed. An estate in tail is a legally recognizable interest of inheritance that goes to the heirs of the donee’s body instead of descending to the donee’s heirs generally. The heirs of the donee’s body are his or her lawful issue (children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and so on, in a direct line for as long as the descendants endure in a regular order and course of descent). Upon the death of the first owner to die without issue, the estate tail ends. CROSS REFERENCE Entail. THE ORDINARY RESULT OF HUMAN PUNISHMENT IS THAT THOSE NEAR TO THE CRIMINAL , OR DEPENDENT UPON HIM , SUFFER IN MANY CASES MORE THAN HE DOES . —WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TAIL 475 TAKEOVER To assume contro l or management of a corpora- tion without necessarily obtaining actual title to it. A takeover bid or tender offer is a proposal made by one company to purchase shares of stock of another company, in order to acquire control thereof. CROSS REFERENCES Mergers and Acquisitions. TAKINGS CLAUSE See EMINENT DOMAIN; FIFTH AMENDMENT. TALESMAN An individual called to act as a juror from among the bystanders in a court. A talesman refers to a person who is summoned as an additional juror to make up for a deficiency in a jury panel. v TAMM, EDWARD ALLEN Edward Allen Tamm served the federal bench with distinction for almost 40 years, as a district and appellate court judge. For much of his life, he was a guiding force in the field of judicial ethics. His committee work for the U.S. Judicial Conference helped to set the standards for judicial conduct throughout the nation and to instill public confidence in the fair administra- tion of justice. (The Judicial Conference is the principal machinery through which the federal court system operates. This group establi shes the standards and shapes the policies governing the federal judiciary.) Tamm was born April 21, 1906, in St. Paul, Minnesota. Shortly afterward, his family moved to Washington State. Tamm attended Mount Saint Charles College, in Helena, Montana, and the University of Montana. In 1928 he moved to Washington, D.C., and he earned his doctor of JURISPRUDENCE degree from Georgetown Univer- sity Law School in 1930. After graduating from law school, Tamm joined the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI). There, he advanced quickly, achieving a pro- motion to assistant director in 1934. From 1940 to 1948 he w orked closely with Director J. EDGAR HOOVER as a special assistant and, as such, traveled around the world. In 1945 Tamm served as special adviser to the U.S. dele gation to the U.N. Conference on International Organizations. During the WORLD WAR II years, Tamm also served his country in the Navy Reserve, attaining the rank of lieutenant com- mander. In 1948 Tamm was appointed U.S. district judge for the District of Columbia by President HARRY S. TRUMAN. Because of Tamm’s back- ground with the FBI and his lack of trial experience, the appointment was met with mixed reaction. Eventually confirmed, Tamm served the district court for the next seventeen years. At the time of his appointment, the district court not only handled federal cases but also was a court of general jurisdiction for the District of Columbia. This meant that Tamm handled local cases, including traffic and small claims issues, as well as federal issues. Therefore, Tamm had ample opportunity to develop his skills as a trial judge. He heard a wide variety of cases that normally would have been tried before state courts. As a district judge, Tamm cultivated an inter- est in JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. He established a ▼▼ ▼▼ Edward Allen Tamm 1906–1985 1900 1950 1975 2000 1925 ❖ ◆ 1906 Born, St. Paul, Minn. 1914–18 World War I 1934 Became assistant director of FBI 1939–45 World War II 1940–48 Worked as special assistant to J. Edgar Hoover 1950–53 Korean War 1949–65 Served on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 1961–73 Vietnam War 1985 Died, Washington, D.C. 1978–85 Served as chair of Judicial Ethics Committee 1977 Ruled against FCC censorship in the Seven Dirty Words case—Pacifica Foundation v. FCC ❖ 1972–79 Served as co-chair of the Joint Committee on the Code of Judicial Conduct 1965–85 Served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 1969–78 Served as chair of the Judicial Conference Ethics Review Committee ◆ TO THE OLD ADAGE THAT DEATH AND TAXES SHARE A CERTAIN INEVITABLE CHARACTER , FEDERAL JUDGES MAY BE EXCUSED FOR ADDING ATTORNEY ’S FEES CASES . —EDWARD ALLEN TAMM GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 476 TAKEOVER reputation for knowing how to move cases through the court. In the late 1950s Tamm chaired a district courts committee to explore the use of electronic equipment for court reporting. He also pioneered the use of six- member juries for civil cases. His vision was a long time coming, but in the mid-1990s electronic court reporting methods were widely used, and six-member jury panels for civil matters were the rule in most of the nation’s federal courts. Tamm was elevated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 1965, by President LYNDON B. JOHNSON. Tamm’s work on the trial bench deeply influe nced his opinion writing as an appellate judge. His opinions were usually short and to the point; they were written to provide trial courts with a clear guide to the proper application of the law—and not to impress the reader with the judge’s literary skill. The case for which Tamm is best known is often called the Seven Dirty Words case— Pacifica Fou ndation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 181 U.S. App. D.C. 132 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 16, 1977). In it, Tamm set aside a FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (FCC) ruling that a recording containing seven specific words (referring to such things as sexual acts and portions of human anatomy) could not be aired on the radio. He wrote that the FCC order banning air play of the explicit excerpts from George Carlin’s Occupation Foole album carried the agency into the “forbidden realm of censor- ship.” Tamm’s decision was ultimately over- turned by the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5–4 ruling concluding that neither the FIRST AMEND- MENT guarantee of free speech nor federal law against broadcast CENSORSHIP barred the FCC from revoking the license of any station that aired explicit material during the daytime or early evening hours (Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1073 [1978]). As an appellate judge, Tamm continued his commitment to improving the administration of justice and increased his participation on Judicial Conference committees. During these years, Tamm also took up the cause of monitoring judicial ethics. He served as chair- man of the Judicial Conference Ethics Rev iew Committee (1969–78), chairman of the Judicial Ethics Committee (1978–85), member of the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration (1970–85), cochairman of the Joint Committee on the Code of Judicial Conduct (1972–79), and member of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (1979–85). As chairman of the committee responsible for administering both self-imposed Judicial Conference ethical standards and, later, congressionally mandated financial reporting, Tamm personally examined or reviewed the thousands of financial state- ments submitted by federal judges and employ- ees each year. Tamm died on Septemb er 22, 1985, at his home in Washington, D.C. He was survived by his wife of 50 years, Grace Monica Sullivan Tamm. In the spring of 1986 Tamm was post- humously awarded the Devitt Distinguished Service to Justice Award, which is administered by the American Judicature Society. This award is named for Edward J. Devitt, a former chief U.S. district judge for Minnesota. It acknowl- edges the dedication and contributions to justice made by all federal judges, by recogniz- ing the specific achievements of one judge who has contributed significantly to the profession. Tamm was acknowledged for administrative innovations that improved the performance of the courts and for his work in promoting and monitoring judicial ethics. FURTHER READINGS Burger, Warren E. 1986. “Tribute to Edward Allen Tamm.” Georgetown Law Journal 74 (August). “Tamm, Edward Allen.” 2009. Biographical Directory of Judges. Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial Center. Available online at http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetInfo? jid=2335; website home page: http://www.fjc.gov (accessed September 7, 2009). “Tamm, Edward Allen” (obituary). 1985. Washington Post (September 23). CROSS REFERENCES Judicial Conference of the United States. TAMMANY HALL Political machines have traditionally wielded influence in U.S. society, and one of the most notorious was Tammany Hall in New York. Controlled by the DEMOCRATIC PARTY, the power of Tammany Hall grew to such an extent that its members dominated New York governme nt for nearly two centuries. Founded by William Mooney in 1789, Tammany Hall was originally a fraternal and GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TAMMANY HALL 477 . Justin. 199 6. Burning the Flag: The Great 198 9– 199 0 American Flag Desecration Controversy. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SYMBOLIC SPEECH 4 69 a. a ▼▼ ▼▼ Edward Allen Tamm 190 6– 198 5 190 0 195 0 197 5 2000 192 5 ❖ ◆ 190 6 Born, St. Paul, Minn. 191 4–18 World War I 193 4 Became assistant director of FBI 193 9–45 World War II 194 0–48 Worked as special assistant. condensation of some- thing—for example, a synopsis of a trial record. Publishers draft synopses of cases and statutes as well. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 470 SYNDICATE TABLE OF CASES An