money can be considered an unlawful assign- ment of wages. WAGE EARNER’S PLAN An arrangement under federal BANKRUPTCY law whereby an individual retains his or her property and pays off a debt over a period of time, as determined by a court and subject to supervision by the court. Under Chapter Thirteen of the federal BANKRUPTCY statutes (11 U.S.C.A. § 1301 et seq.), individuals who are unable to repay their debts when due may develop a plan for full or partial repayment of their creditors. This procedure is called a wage earner’s plan because it originally was available only to persons who earned a regular wage. Changes in the law now permit the owners of unincorporated small businesses to participate in this procedure. As a result, this arrangement can also be called a “Chapter Thirteen proceeding” or “rehabilitation.” Areha- bilitation process enables the debtor to regain good credit and financial standing. To qualify, an individual must have unse- cured debts (those not backed by collateral to guarantee their repayment) of less than $100,000 and secured debts (backed by collat- eral) of less than $350,000. A debtor files a Chapter Thirteen petition listing all of his or her debts. Upon the filing, the debtor’s creditors must suspend their efforts to collect or enforce their claims, pending the outcome of the proceeding. The debtor has the exclusive right to propose a plan for repayment to the bankruptcy court. No matter how many creditors may exist, they cannot force a plan upon the debtor. A Chapter Thirteen petition might include a repayment plan that lasts five years and lists wage earnings and the sale of a portion of the debtor’s property as sources for the repayment. The plan, which is overseen by a bankruptcy trustee, must treat equally all creditors who have comparable claims. The repayment plan may entail paying off only a portion of each debt, which is called a “composition”; receiving extra time to pay the debts, called an “extension”;or both. All repayment plans must be completed within three to five years, depending on the income of the debtor. Howe ver, a judge may extend the repayment period for good cause. The debtor’s plan can be approved on ly by the court, unlike a Chapter Eleven REORGANIZATION PLAN, which requires both ac- ceptance by the creditors and confirmation by the court. After the debtor has completed payments pursuant to the plan, he or she is discharged from liability. A Chapter Thirteen plan does not, however, relieve a debtor from liability for ALIMONY and CHILD SUPPORT, federal student loans, or taxes. CROSS REFERENCES Composition with Creditors. WAGER OF BATTEL A type of trial by combat between accuser and accused that was introduced into England by William the Conqueror (King William I) and his Norman followers after the Norman Conquest of 1066. Wager of battel was founded on the belief that God would give victory to the party who was in the right. The kings maintained control over the practice, and it came to be reserved for cases affecting royal interests, such as serious criminal cases or disputes over land. King William and his successors had distributed much land to their loyal supporters, but a century after the conquest it was impossible to produce witnesses who had seen the symbolic delive ry of a clod of dirt or a twig representing title to the land. A party could, therefore, hire someone, a champion, to swear that the champion’s father had told him on his deathbed that the party was the true owner of the land. The other party also produced a champion who swore just the opposite. The defendant’s champion came forward and threw down his glove as a pledge. The plaintiff’s champion accepted the challenge by picking up the glove, and the two waged battle or set a time to do so. The winner was held to have good tit le to the land. It was said that many monasteries, which owned vast tracts of land, had virtual stables of champions in waiting to settle disputes that might arise. In the early twelfth century King Henry I specifically recognized the right to defend by battel, but the party accused might elect wager of battel or trial by jury. If he chose the wager of battel, he answered the charge before the court by saying that he would be tried by God; if he chose a trial by jury, his plea was that he would be tried by the country. The last demand for wager of battel occurred in 1818. The practice GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 278 WAGE EARNER’ SPLAN was abolished by statute during the reign of George III (1760–1820). CROSS REFERENCE Feudalism. WAGER OF LAW A procedure for defending oneself that could be used in a trial before one of the ancient courts of England. A defendant who elected to “make his law” was permitted to make a statement before the tribunal, swear an oath that it was true, and present one or more individuals who swore that they believed he had told the truth under oath. This was the predominant form of defense in the feudal courts, and it persisted for a time in the common-law courts. It had originated in Anglo-Saxon England in the ties of kinship that bound people together in the period before the year 1000, a time when each man was respon sible for the acts of his blood relatives. Later, kinship gave way to a more tribal affiliation and a loyalty to the place of one’s birth. When disputes more often than not led to violence, it seemed natural that neighbors would band together. They aligned themselves with a neighbor who was accused in court and swore that in good conscience they believed he was telling the truth. The number of oath-helpers required depended on the defen- dant’s rank and the character of the lawsuit. Eventually it became standard practice to bring eleven neighbors into court to swear for the defendant. The oathhelpers were called com- purgators, and the wager of law was called compurgation. As the kings consolidated their power, suppressing violence and increasing the author- ity of the courts, the wager of law lost some of its ancient power and became a NUISANCE to litigants, who suspected that it frequently opened the door to false swearing. Different FORMS OF ACTION developed that did not permit the wager of law as a defense, and plaintiffs used them as much as possible. The procedure of wager of law had long since been obsolete when it was abolished during the reign of Henry IV (1399–1413). CROSS REFERENCES Feudalism; Henry II of England. WAGNER ACT The Wagner Act, also known as the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.), is the most significant piece of federal labor legislation enacted in U.S. history. It made the federal government the arbiter of employer-employee relations through the crea- tion of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB) and recognized for the first time the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively with their employers. The act over- turned decades of court decisions that asserted that LABOR UNIONS violated an employee’s liberty of contract. Senator ROBERT F. WAGNER, a Democrat from New York, introduced the legislation in 1935, when the United States was in the midst of the Great Depression. President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT initially opposed the legislation out of fear that labor organizing might interfere with economic recovery, but he gave his support when passage became inevitable. Congress based its right to pass national labor-management legislation on the U.S. Constitution’s COMMERCE CLAUSE. The act states that unequal bargaining power between em- ployees and employers leads to economic instability, whereas the refusal of employers to recognize the right to bargain collectively leads to strikes. Because these disturbances impede the flow of interstate commerce, Congress may take steps to continue the free flow of commerce by encouraging COLLECTIVE BARGAIN- ING and unionizing. The Wagner Act established the rights of employees to organize, join, or aid labor unions and to participate in collective bargainin g through their representatives. The act also authorized unions to take “concerted action” for these purposes. This meant that workers could lawfully strike and take other peaceful action as a way of placing pressure on an employer. This provision was coupled with another that prohibited employers from engag- ing in UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES that interfere with the union rights of employees. Unfair labor practices include prohibiting employees from joining unions, firing employees because of their union membership, or establishing a company-dominated union. In addi tion to requiring employers to ba rgain collectively with the union duly selected by the employees, the act set up procedures for establishing GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WAGNER ACT 279 appropriate bargaining units (homogeneous groups of employees) where employees can elect a BARGAINING AGENT (a representative for labor negotiations) by a secret ballot. The act also created the NLRB, a federal ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, to administer and en- force its UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE and representa- tion provisions. The NLRB hears cases involving unfair labor pract ices and makes decisions that the federal courts of appeals may review. At the time of its enactment, some observers doubted that the Wagner Act would be found constitutional by the U.S. SUPREME COURT. The Court had struck down numerous NEW DEAL statutes on the basis that business and LABOR LAWS were matters that should be left to the marketplace or to state legislatures. In NLRB V. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORP., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937), however, the Court reversed course and held that the Wagner Act was constitutional. The Wagner Act was one of the most dramatic legislative measures of the New Deal. Not only did the legislation indicate that the federal government was prepared to move against employers to enforce the rights of labor to unionize and to bargain collectively, but it imposed no reciprocal obligations on unions. The law was amended by the TAFT-HARTLEY ACT of 1947, also known as the Labor Manage- ment Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.), which balanced some of the advantages given to unions under the Wagner Act by imposing corresponding duties upon unions to deal fairly with management. The act was further modified by the LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT of 1959 (29 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.), which sought to end abuses of power by union officials in handling union funds and internal affairs. FURTHER READINGS Higgins, John E. et al., eds. 2006. The Developing Labor Law: The Board, the Courts, and the National Labor Relations Act. 5th ed. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs. National Labor Relations Board. 1997. Basic Guide to the National Labor Relations Act. Rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: GPO. (Also available online at www.nlrb. gov/ nlrb/shared_files/brochures/basicguide.asp; accessed February 24, 2004.) CROSS REFERENCES Administrative Law; Labor Law; Labor Union. v WAGNER, ROBERT FERDINAND Robert Ferdinand Wagne r served as a U.S. senator from New York from 1927 to 1949. Wagner was a strong believer in the social WELFARE state and sponsored many federal laws that have shaped U.S. law and society. In the 1930s he worked closely with President FRANKLIN D . ROOSEVELT and helped to implement mu ch of Roosevelt’s NEW DEAL agenda. Wagner was born on June 8, 1877, in Nastätten, Germany. With his family he immi- grated to the United States in 1885, settling in a New York City tenement neighborhood. He graduated from City College in New York in 1898 and studied law at New York Law School, where he earned his degree in 1900. Wagner was admitted to the New York bar in 1900 and practiced law on his own for a short time. He then abandoned his law practice to enter DEMOCRATIC PARTY politics. Wagner worked his way up the party ladder and won a seat in the state legislature in 1904. In 1908 he was elected to the New York State Senate, where he soon established himself as a socially progressive leader, investigating industrial working condi- tions and introducing legislation that sought to Robert Ferdinand Wagner 1877–1953 ▼▼ ▼▼ 1875 1950 1925 1900 ◆◆◆◆◆ ❖ ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆◆ 1953 Died, New York City 1877 Born, Nastätten, Germany 1898 Graduated from City College in New York 1904 Elected to New York Legislature 1908 Elected to New York Senate 1914–18 World War I 1939–45 World War II 1919 Appointed New York Supreme Court judge 1929 Stock market crashed; Great Depression began 1926–49 Served in U.S. Senate 1937 U.S. Supreme Court upheld Wagner Act (NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.) 1935 Sponsored Social Security Act legislation; sponsored Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act) 1885 Immigrated to United States 1900 Admitted to New York bar IT IS SIMPLY ABSURD TO SAY THAT AN INDIVIDUAL , ONE OF 10,000 WORKERS, IS ON AN EQUALITY WITH HIS EMPLOYER IN BARGAINING FOR HIS WAGES . —ROBERT F. WAGNER GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 280 WAGNER, ROBERT FERDINAND use the power of government to improve the lives of blue-collar workers and the poor. Wagner became a judge of the New York Supreme Court in 1919 but resigned in 1926 to run as the Democratic Party candidate for the U.S. Senate. He won the election and took office in 1927 during the heyday of the “Roaring Twenties.” The U.S. economy was at its post war zenith, and the REPUBLICAN PARTY controlled Congress. Wagner introduced legislation to help organized labor and the unemployed, but his proposals were unsuccessful. Wagner’s political fortunes changed dra- matically with the Great Depression of the 1930s and the election of President Roosevelt in 1932. Like Wagner, Roosevelt believed that the federal government needed to play a larger role in the activities of the national economy and in the lives of U.S. citizens. Wagner helped draft and sponsor the NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT (NIRA) of 1933 (48 Stat. 195), which established the NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION to admin- ister codes of fair practice within each industry. Under these codes, labor and management negotiated minimum wages, maximum hours, and fair trade practices for each industry. The Roosevelt administration sought to use these codes to stabilize production, raise prices, and protect labor and consumers. In SCHECHTER POULTRY CORP . V. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935), however, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the NIRA. Wagner also sponsored the SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (42 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.), the bedrock of U.S. social welfare law. He is best remembered for the WAGNER ACT, also known as the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.). The Wagner Act recognized for the first time the right of workers to organize unions and to collectively bargain with employers. The statute also established the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to enforce labor-management relations in the United States. Wagner sponsored numerous New Deal programs, including the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Federal Emergency Relief Adminis- tration, and the U.S. Housing Authority, which provided loans for low-cost public housing. When WORLD WAR II began, the country’s attention shifted to international issues, and Wagner’s social welfare agenda fell out of favor. He lobbied unsuccessfully for a NATIONAL HEALTH CARE system and for antilynching legislation. Wagner resigned from the Senate for health reasons in 1949. He died on May 5, 1953, in New York City. In 1954 his son, Robert F. Wagner Jr., was elected mayor of New York City and served until 1965. WAIT-AND-SEE DOCTRINE A rule that permits consideration of events occurring subsequent to the inception of an instrument that pertains to the vesting of a future interest. If the specified contingency on which the creation of the interest depends actually occurs within the period of the RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, the interest is legally enforceable. Under the COMMON LAW, the Rule Against Perpetuities provides that no interest in prop- erty is valid unless it becomes fixed, if at all, not later than 21 years, plus the period of gestation, after some life or lives in being at the time of the creation of the interest. The period of gestation is included to cover cases of posthumous birth. A property interest vests when it is given to a person in being, and when the interest is not subject to a condition precedent. The courts developed the Rule Against Perpetuities during the seventeenth century in order to restrict a person’s power to control the ownership and possession of his or her property after his or her death, and to ensure the transferability of property. Robert F. Wagner. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WAIT-AND-SEE DOCTRINE 281 In order to mitigate the harshness of the Rule Against Perpetuities, some states have embodied the wait-and-see doctrine in statutes. The general concept of wait-and-see is that a perpetuity violation should occur only if an interest actually fails to vest within the perpetu- ity period. In contrast to the traditional view, which prescribes that the situation is examined as it exists when the interests are created, thereby invalidating the interests if a possibility exists that they will fail to vest in due time, one must wait and see whether, in fact, the possibility turns out to be an actuality. The wait-and-see doctrine is also deemed to be an extension of the SECOND LOOK DOCTRINE. CROSS REFERENCE Estate. v WAITE, MORRISON REMICK Morrison Remick Waite served as chief justice of the U.S. Supre me Court from 1874 to 1888. Waite’s rise to national prominence came unexpectedly. Although a distinguished lawyer in Ohio, he had never argued before the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, in 1871 he was asked to represen t the United States in post- Civil War claims against Great Britain, and his success brought him widespread acclaim. On the strength of this reputation, President ULYSSES S. GRANT nominated Waite to lead the U.S. Supreme Court. His performance there, however, never won him the same praise. Waite’s business decisions provoked the ire of powerful interests, and twentieth-century critics have condemned his limited view of CIVIL RIGHTS . Born on November 29, 1816, in Lyme, Connecticut, Waite was the son of a successful attorney and jurist who was the state court’s chief justice. Educated at Yale University, Wa ite graduated in 1837, studied law under his father, and then was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1839. Over the next decade, he split his time between legal practice and politics. He was elected to the Ohio legislature in 1849 as a member of the WHIG PARTY, and later helped to form the state’s branch of the REPUBLICAN PARTY. By the late 1800s, Waite was quite success- ful. He had built two law firms and enjoyed prominence within Ohio. Yet because he had no significant national reputation, he was surprised when in 1871 he was chosen for a task of national importance: representing the United States in its post-Civil War ARBITRATION with Great Britain, better known as the Alabama claims. The United States charged that Great Britain had aided the CONFEDERACY by supplying warships during the U.S. CIVIL WAR, and it sought to recover damages at the 1871 Geneva Arbitration Council. Waite and his two colleagues succeeded spectacularly, winning a $15 million settlement. At home, they were showered with acclaim. Two years later, Waite added to his growing reputation by serving as president of the Ohio Constitutional Convention. Upon the sudden death of Chief Justice SALMON P. CHASE , President Grant looked un- successfully for a replacement before turning to Waite. Grant’s administration had not fared well; choosing one of the heroes of the Geneva victory appeared fortuitous. Although Waite had no experience before the Supreme Court, he accepted the appointment and overcame long odds against success. His status as an outsider and the presence of a strong-minded group of associate justices did not deter him from administering the Court effectively. Morrison Remick Waite 1816–1888 ❖ ❖ ◆ 1816 Born, Lyme, Conn. ◆ 1839 Admitted to Ohio bar 1861–65 U.S. Civil War ▼▼ ▼▼ 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 18251825 1871 Served as U.S. counsel to the Geneva Arbitration Council for the Alabama claims 1840 Established private law practice in Toledo, Ohio 1888 Died, Washington, D.C. ◆◆◆ 1873 Served as president of the Ohio Constitutional Convention 1874 Appointed chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court by President Grant 1812–14 War of 1812 1846–48 Mexican War 1849–50 Served in Ohio legislature FOR PROTECTION AGAINST ABUSERS BY LEGISLATURES THE PEOPLE MUST RESORT TO THE POLLS , NOT TO THE COURTS . —MORRISON R. WAITE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 282 WAITE, MORRISON REMICK In outlook, Waite was a supporter of STATES’ RIGHTS. He usually favored state power to regulate business and determine civil rights. Yet both in his time and afterward, his decisions have drawn cond emnation. In MUNN V. ILLINOIS, 94 U.S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1876), he upheld an Illinois law that imposed charges on the owners of grain elevators, assertin g that such regulation was proper in areas “affected with a public interest.” This positio n provoked fierce criti - cism from powerful business interes ts. Waite’s reputation also suffered posthumously in the wake of the twentieth century’s embrace of civil rights. His decision in Minor v. Happersett,88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 22 L. Ed. 627 (1874), allowed states to deny women the right to vote. Waite held that voting privileges were a right of U.S. citizenship and stated that the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution did not confer additional PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES upon citizens. In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875), Waite set aside the convictions of white men who had taken part in the killing of more than one hundred black men in the 1873 Colfax Massacre, which followed a disputed election. Always concerned about the encroachment of federal power, Waite ruled that their INDICTMENT under federal law was faulty; such cases, he said, belonged in STATE COURTS . But state courts in the post-Civil War South were unlikely to prosecute such cases, and rather than leading to prosecutions, the decision only encouraged more bloodshed while dealing a blow to Congress’s plan for RECON- STRUCTION in the South. In appraising Waite’s JURISPRUDENCE, twentieth-century critics have been harsh. They have criticized his narrow interp retation of the Fourteenth Amendment as a repudiation of the intent of the amendment’s framers. In defense, some observers have noted his valuation of state power to regulate the economy. He died on March 23, 1888, in Washington, D.C. FURTHER READINGS Aynes, Richard L. 1993. “On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment.” Yale Law Journal 103 (October). Magrath, C. Peter. 1963. Morrison R. Waite: The Triumph of Character. New York: Macmillan. Stephenson, D. Grier, Jr. 2003. The Waite Court: Justices, Rulings, and Legacy. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO. WAIVE To intentionally or voluntarily relinquish a known right or engage in conduct warranting an inference that a right has been surrendered. For example, an individual is said to waive the right to bring a tort action when he or she renounces the remedy provided by law for such a wrong. WAIVER The voluntary surrender of a known right; conduct supporting an inference that a particular right has been relinquished. The term waiver is used in many legal contexts. A waiver is essentially a unilateral act ofonepersonthatresultsinthesurrenderofa legal right. The legal right may be constitutional, statutory, or contractual, but the key issue for a court reviewing a claim of waiver is whether the person voluntarily gave up the right. If voluntarily surrendered, it is considered an express w aiver. In CRIMINAL LAW the PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF- INCRIMINATION is guaranteed by the FIFTH AMEND- MENT to the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court, in MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), held that the police must inform arrested persons that they need not answer questions and that they may have an attorney present during questioning. These requirements are known as the Miranda Morrison Waite. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WAIVER 283 warning. A criminal defendant may waive the right to remain silent and make a confession, but the law enforcement officials must demon- strate to the court that the waiver was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than a decision based on intimidation, coercion, or deception. They must also convince the court that the defendant was fully aware of the rights being abandoned and the consequences that would result from the ABANDONMENT. Based on the totality of these circumstances, a court may conclude that the defendant waived his Miranda rights. A waiver may be shown by a person’s actions. For example, a criminal defendant waives the privilege against SELF-INCRIMINATION merely by going on the witness stand. Such an action is called an implied waiver. In insurance law waiver is used in numerous contexts. For example, under the doctrine of waiver, if the insurer has knowledge of facts that would bar its primary liability for a policy it has written but proceeds to treat the policy as being in force, it will not be allowed to plead such facts in court to avoid its primary liability. A waiver of premium clause is a provision in an insurance policy that permits the waiver of premium payments upon the disability of the insured. Commonly such waivers take effect only after a certain time of disability. Various waiver provisions are inserted into contracts. The parties may agree to surrender a substantive right granted by statute, such as a limitation on the amount of property that may be exempted from debt collection, or a proce- dural right that requires a certain number of days notice before an action can be taken. CROSS REFERENCES Custodial Interrogatio n. WAIVING TIME The process whereby an individual permits a court to take longer than usual in trying him or her on a criminal charge. This allows a defendant, for example, to bypass their right to a speedy trial in order to obtain more time to prepare their case before trial. v WALD, PATRICIA MCGOWAN In July 1999 UNITED NATIONS Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Judge Patricia M. Wald to serve on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Wald, who had served as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for 20 years and as vice president of the American Law Institute for ten years, had the necessary background and experience to tackle the difficult task of deter- mining the guilt or innocence of those accused of crimes committed during the war between Serbians and Croatians in the early 1990s. Born Patricia McGowan on September 16, 1928, and raised in the manufacturing town of Torrington, Connecticut, Wald spent her sum- mers working in the brass mills. Through this experience, she became in volved in her first cause—the protection of working class people. Later, after graduating first in her class from Connecticut College for Women, she decided she could better help people if she obtained a law degree. She enrolled in Yale University’s Law School. At a time when female law students were rare, she was among fewer than a dozen other women in her class. After graduating from Yale in 1951, Wald accepted a clerkship with Judge JEROME N. FRANK of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. She was the first female clerk in the circuit court. In 1952 she marr ied Robert Wald, a U.S. Navy reservist stationed in Norfolk, Virginia, and moved to Washington, D.C., to be closer to her new husband. Wald went to work as an associate attorney with the firm of Arnold, Fortas, and Porter. She took leave of the firm in 1953, however, when she was eight-m onths pregnant. While the firm told her that she could return when she was ready, she chose to stay home to care for her child. Ten years and four more children later, Wald returned to the PRACTICE OF LAW.She quickly became involved in several research projects, including the Kerner Commission Report on the cause and prevention of violence, as well as the President’s Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia. In 1963 Wald gave a presentation at the National Conference of Bail and Criminal Justice challenging the bail system of the time. She argued for additional factors to be considered in determining bail, apart from the mere ability of the accused to pay the amount set by the court. One factor Wald suggested was ties the accused had to the community. One year later her ideas became a book, Bail in the United States (1964), and the bail system was reformed. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 284 WAIVING TIME That same year, Wald became an attorney with the Justice Department’s Office of Crimi- nal Justice, but soon thereafter she left to join the innovative Neighborhood Legal Services Program in Washingto n, D.C. This position exposed her for the first time to LITIGATION, which she would later say was helpful in making her a more understanding judge. In 1972 she became an attorney for the Mental Health Law Project where, between 1975 and 1977, she served as director. In 1977 JIMMY CARTER took office as U.S. president and appointed Wald to the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT position of assistant attorney gen- eral for legal affairs. Only two years later, Wald made it to the top of President Carter’s list again and was appointed to a judgeship on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. She was the first woman to serve as a judge on a U.S . Court of Appeals. The D.C. Circuit is often referred to as the country’s second-most important court—the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES being the first— because it hears many issues of national importance due to its location in the nation’s capital. Wald served as chief judge of the court between 1986 and 1991. In 1997 Wald sat on a three-judge panel to hear part of the Justice Department’s antitrust case against Microsoft. The panel was to review a lower court order that prohibited Microsoft from forcing computer makers to purchase the Microsoft Internet Exp lorer browser as a condition of buying Microsoft Windows, which was a necessary standard for most computers. Microsoft argued that the two prod ucts were integrated, therefore, they were not in violation of the order. The pane l decided 2–1 in favor of Microsoft. Wald gave the dissenting opinion, arguing that the products were not integrated. Her opinion was later echoed by Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, who ruled that Microsoft did indeed violate the ANTITRUST LAWS. By the end of her career on the court of appeals, Wald had authored more than 800 opinions. In 1999, Judge Wald left the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to join the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The tribunal was created by the United Nations in 1993 to judge those accused of crimes against humanity during the massacres in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia. This new position would entail her leaving behind her family and moving Patricia McGowan Wald 1928– 1928 Born, Torrington, Conn. 1951 Received LL.B. from Yale Law School 1977–79 Assistant attorney general for legal affairs in Justice Dept. ◆ 1979 Appointed to U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 1986–91 Chief judge of U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 1997 One of three judges hearing antitrust case against Microsoft 1999 Appointed to two-year term on International Criminal Tribunal 1939-45 World War II 1961-73 Vietnam War 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks ▼▼ ▼▼ 1925 2000 1975 1950 2007 Named one of the 50 most influential women lawyers in America 2004 Appointed to Iraq Intelligence Commission ❖ ◆ ◆◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ Patricia Wald. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WALD, PATRICIA MCGOWAN 285 to The Hague, The Netherlands, in order to serve a two-year term on the bench. The position meant a great deal to W ald, however, because she had served for the past five years on the Executive Board of the American Bar Association’s Central and Eastern European Law Initiative and had aided in the monitoring of elections and the creation of new constitu- tions in Eastern Europe. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is made up of 16 judges from various nations. The process is based on two legal systems: British COMMON LAW and European CIVIL LAW. Ther e are two official languages: French and English. Wald faced a large and complex caseload, much of which involved such disturbing acts as MURDER, RAPE, and torture. In addition to presiding over trials, she sat in on a number of appeals including a reversal of the convictions of three Bosnian Croats due to a dearth of reliable evidence. In 2002, when Wald looked back on the work of the tribunal, she comment ed that despite the fact that there were several judges with diverse cultural backgrounds and languages, she gener- ally was satisfied with the work that was accomplished during her two-year appointment. In April 2002, because of her lifelong commitment to HUMAN RIGHTS, Judge Wald was honored by the International Human Rights Law Group. Wald continues her work as a human rights advocate as a speaker and panelist, and she serves on the steering committee of Human Rights Watch’s Europe and Cen tral Asia Division. She also is chair of the Open Society Justice Initiative, an interna- tional coalition that designs and impleme nts legal initiatives to guarantee human rights in countries outside the United States, and is a member of the board of directors for Mental Disability Rights International. In 2004 Wald was appointed to the Iraq Intelligence Commis- sion, an independent panel assembled to investigate the validity of U.S. intelligence regarding the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the assertion that Iraq was housing WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. Wald’s awards and honors include receiving the Lifetime Achievement award from American Lawyer magazine in 2004; being named one of 100 Most Influential Lawyers in America by the National Law Jou rnal in 2006; and being named one of the 50 Most Influential Women Lawyers in America in 2007. FURTHER READINGS “From the Circuit to the Hague.” Interview with Judge Patricia M. Wald. 2002. In The Third Branch (March). Available online at www.uscourts.gov/ttb/mar02ttb/ interview.html (accessed September 16, 2009). Schwartz, Herman, and Patricia M. Wald. 2002. The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. v WALLACE, GEORGE CORLEY As the governor of Alabama and a presidential aspirant, George Corley Wallace did battle with the CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT and defied federal efforts to desegregate schools in his state. His fight against school INTEGRATION pitted him against federal courts, troops, and the adminis- tration of President JOHN F. KENNEDY in a showdown over federal authority. Such stalwa rt convictions lionized Wallace in the hearts and minds of southerners and helped launch an increasingly successful national political career. While scoring victories in the 1972 Democratic presidential primaries, however, he was left partially paralyzed by gunshots from a would-be assassin—an incident that precipitated a politi- cal metamorphosis in Wallace. Though he failed to gain the presidency, he continued to serve the state of Alabama until 1987, when poor health forced him to leave the office after four terms and 17-and-a-half years. Wallace was born August 25, 1919, the first of four children of George Wallace Sr. and Mozelle Smith Wallace. Only a few hundred people lived in his birthplace, the small town of Clio, Alabama. His father weathered the De- pression by leasing land to sharecroppers, although the family never had much money. Wallace was encouraged by his father in two areas: politics and boxing. At the age of 15, he became a page in the Alabama state legislature. A good student, athletic and popular, he finished high school as his senior class presi- dent. His punch served him well, too, and in 1936 and 1937, he won the Alabama Golden Gloves Championship. In 1937 Wallace entered the University of Alabama, with only two shirts and the desire to have a career in politics. He took four jobs, finished his degree, and remained at the university to study law. He earned his law degree in 1942, and enlisted in the U.S. Army Air Corps for pilot training. Soon after, a near- fatal case of spinal meningitis ended his dreams of being a pilot, but in WORLD WAR II, he went to GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 286 WALLACE, GEORGE CORLEY the Pacific as a flight engineer on a B-29 bomber called The Sentimental Education. After the war, Wallace’s political career quickly took off. His first appointment was as state assistant attorney general. Then in 1946, at the age of 27, Wallace won election to the Alabama House of Representatives. He soon established a high profile, twice being voted an outstanding member of the house. Wallac e sponsored a number of liberal bills. He supported legislation that provided SOCIAL SECURITY for county and municipal employees, created junior colleges and trade schools, and offered free tuition to the widows and children of men who had died at war. Drawing on his name recognition as a legislator, Wallace ran for a judgeship in 1952, winning election to Alabama’s Third Circuit Court. In 1958 Walla ce launched his first guber- natorial campaign. This election would be a turning point in his politics. Wallace’s chief opponent in the Democratic primary was state attorney general John Patterson. Both candi- dates favored SEGREGATION, but Patterson’s campaign had an edge: It was backed by the KU KLUX KLAN. When Wallace lost the election by nearly 65,000 votes, he vo wed publicly never again to be “out-segged.” After spending four years in private law practice with his brother Gerald, Wallace returned to politics in 1962 to run for governor again. This time, his opponent was former governor James Folsom. Wallace won the election and took office just as the CIVIL RI GHTS movement was gaining momentum. Wallace and other segregationists were deter- mined to keep the civil rights movement out of Alabama. When MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. and his fellow activists set out to integrate the city of Birmingham in 1963, violence met them repeat- edly. Birmingham police officers unleashed water hoses, dogs, and clubs on the demonstrators and then Wallace dispatched the state tro opers. Wearing stee l helmets painted with Confederate flags, this force entered Birmingham with shot- guns to crush the demonstration. Throughout the summer, while Ku Klux Klan members visited the governor’s mansion to offer their services, George Corley Wallace 1919–1998 ❖ 1919 Born, Clio, Ala. 1914–18 World War I 1939–45 World War II ▼▼ ▼▼ 19501950 19251925 19751975 20002000 ◆ 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆ ◆ ◆ ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1943–45 Served in U.S. armed forces 1946 Appointed assistant state's attorney 1948–52 Served in Ala. legislature 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decided by Supreme Court 1953–59 Served as judge in Third Judicial Circuit of Ala. 1958 Defeated in race for governor 1962–66 Served as governor of Ala. 1987 Retired from politics 1982–86 Served as Ala. governor for third time 1976 Ran for president 1970–78 Served as Ala. governor 1972 Shot and paralyzed 1968 Ran for president as an indepen- dent 1965 Martin Luther King led march to Selma 1964 Civil Rights Act of 1964 enacted 1963 Blocked doors at Univ. of Alabama 1998 Died, Montgomery, Ala. 1996 Apologized publicly to Vivian Malone Jones George C. Wallace. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WALLACE, GEORGE CORLEY 287 . and possession of his or her property after his or her death, and to ensure the transferability of property. Robert F. Wagner. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WAIT-AND-SEE. Waite. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WAIVER 283 warning. A criminal defendant may waive the right to remain silent and make a confession, but the law enforcement officials. last demand for wager of battel occurred in 1818. The practice GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 278 WAGE EARNER’ SPLAN was abolished by statute during the reign of George III (1760–1820). CROSS