v PARKS, ROSA LOUISE MCCAULEY Rosa Louise McCauley Parks sparked a year- long boycott of buses in Montgomery, Alabama, by the city’s black community, when she refused to give up her seat to a white passenger on a segregated bus. Her arrest and trial on charges of violating SEGREGATION laws led to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision that segregation on the city’s buses was unconstitutional, the rise of the MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.asaCIVIL RIGHTS leader, and the emergence of the CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT as a national cause. Parks was born February 4, 1913, in Tuskegee, Alabama. She attended a one-room school in Pine Level, Alabama. There, one teacher taught 50 to 60 students, who were separated into rows by age. The students were responsible for cutting wood to heat the school, and occasionally a parent would deliver a load of wood to the school by wagon. Whereas the black community had to heat and even build its own schools, a new brick school for white children was constructed near Parks’s home, paid for with public funds, including taxes paid by both blacks and whites, and heated at public expense. Black children’s families helped them to plow and plant in the spring, and to harvest in the fall, so the children attended school only five months during the year; white children attended school for nine months. Because Pine Level offered no schooling to black children beyond the sixth grade, Parks’s mother sent her to Montgomery to live with relatives and to continue her education. But she was forced to drop out of high school during her junior year to care for her dying grand- mother and, later, her ailing mother. She finally earned her high-school diploma in 1933 at the age of 20, a year after she had married Raymond Parks. Her husband was the first activist w hom Parks had met. He was a long-time member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ( NAACP). When he met Parks, he was working to raise money for the legal defense of nine young black men, known as the Scottsboro Boys, who had been arrested for raping a white woman. Although the charges were unsubstantiated, all of the men were found guilty and all but one were scheduled to die in the electric chair in 1931. The NAACP and other national organizations were able to file an appeal on the men’s behalf with the U.S. Supreme Court, which ordered a new trial. All of the defendants were eventually exonerated. After the Scottsboro defendants were saved from execution, Parks and her husband became involved in voter registration. Parks first attempted to register to vote in 1943. Like most other black citizens, she was forced to take a literacy test. Although she believed that she had passed the test, she was denied twice. Then, before she could complete her registration, she had to pay an accumulated POLL TAX of $1.50 per year. Blacks and whites were subject to the poll tax. However, whites were allowed to register ▼▼ ▼▼ Rosa Louise McCauley Parks 1913–2005 1950 1975 2000 1925 ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1914–18 World War I 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1913 Born, Tuskegee, Ala. 1943 Elected secretary of Montgomery NAACP; first attempted to register to vote; put off Montgomery bus for first time 1955 Parks’s refusal to give up her seat led to Montgomery bus boycott 1956 U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ruled in Browder v. Gayle that Montgomery’s bus segregation was unconstitutional 1957 Moved to Detroit, Mich. 1965 Began working for U.S. Rep. John Conyers 1964 Civil Rights Act passed ◆ 1965 Voting Rights Act passed 1963 March on Washington 1987 Founded the Rosa and Raymond Parks Institute for Self-Development 1992 Rosa Parks: My Story published 1995 Quiet Strength, written with Gregory J. Reed, published 1999 Awarded Congressional Gold Medal; sued rappers OutKast for unauthorized use of name ◆ 2000 Troy University’s Rosa Parks Library and Museum dedicated, Montgomery, Ala. 2005 Died, Detroit, Mich. ❖ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 408 PARKS, ROSA LOUISE MCCAULEY upon turning 21 and could simply pay the tax once per year from then on. On the other hand, blacks might not be able to register until they were much older, and they were then forced to pay the tax retroactively to the age of 21. Parks’s tax totaled $16.50, a considerable amount of money at that time. While Parks was making her second attempt to register to vote in 1943, she was put off of a Montgomery city bus for the first time . Blacks had to follow certain rules when riding the bus, including stepping in the front door to pay their fare, then stepping off and going around to the back door to board the bus. They were required to sit at the back of the bus, even when the front section that was reserved for whites was empty. On this occasion, Parks boarded the bus in the front and made her way through the bus to the back. When the driver insisted that she leave the bus and re-enter through the back door, she refused. The driver then grabbed her coat sleeve and told her to get off his bus. By that time, Parks was a member of the NAACP, one of only two women who were active in the local organization. At the 1943 meeting of the Montgomery branch, she was elected secretary. The Montgomery NAACP had begun to consider filing a lawsuit against the city over bus segregation, but it wanted a PLAINTIFF who had a strong case. On the evening of December 1, 1955, Parks left work and boarded the bus home. After she had paid her fare, she realized that the bus driver was the same one who had put her off of his bus 12 years earlier and whom she had since gone out of her way to avoid. Parks took a vacant seat in the front of the black section of the bus, near three other black passengers. As the bus began to fill up, a white man was left standing, and the bus driver demanded that Parks and the other blacks relinquish their seats. The other three people moved back, but Parks refused. The bus driver called the police, who arrested Parks and took her to the city jail. She was soon released on bail, and a trial date was set for the following week. Later that evening, Parks agreed to become the plaintiff whom the NAACP had been seeking to test the constitu- tionality of segregation on the buses. That evening, leaders of the Montgomery Women’s Political Caucus began calling for a bus boycott by the black community for December 5, to coincide with Parks’s hearing. The 18 black-owned cab companies in the city agreed to stop at all of the bus stops on Monday and to charge only ten cents, the same as the bus fare. When Monday came, the Montgomery city buses were nearly empty of black riders, marking the black community’s first united protest against segregation. At her court hearing that day, Parks pleaded not guilty. The court ruled that she had violated the state segregation laws, and she was fined and given a SUSPENDED SENTENCE and fined. Earlier that day, several ministers in the city, including the Reverend RALPH D. ABERNATHY, decided to fo rm a new organization, the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA), to lead the boycott. The min isters felt that the NAACPdidnothavealargeenoughmember- ship in Alabama to assume a leadership role, and they wanted to have a local group at the forefrontsothatnoonecouldclaimthat outside agitators were running the demonstra- tion. The group elected King as its president. King was then p astor of the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church. The group thought that he wasthebestcandidatebecausehewassonew to the city and to civil rights work that he had not yet made any strong friends or strong enemies. Rosa Parks. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PARKS, ROSA LOUISE MCCAULEY 409 The bus boycott lasted more than a year. Many black people lost their jobs because of their support of the boycott. Parks’s husband resigned from his job as a barber at the Maxwell Field Air Force Base when the white shop owner ordered that there was to be no discussion of Parks or the protest in his shop. The city police tried to disrupt the protest by harassing groups of blacks who were waiting at city bus stops for the black-owned cabs and by threatening to arrest cabdrivers if they did not charge their regular fare. Once the police actually began arresting the cabdrivers, the community developed a sophis- ticated, private transportation system consisting of 20 cars and 14 station wagons. Thirty-two pickup and transfer sites were established, and service was scheduled from 5:30 A.M.to 12:30 A.M. Through this system, several people were transported to and from work every day. Although white supporters of the boycott received threatening letters and telephone calls, many white women who were unwilling to go without household help trans ported their black housekeepers and cooks every day. Blacks were also subjected to violence. King’s home and those of other boycott leaders were bombed. Drivers of the black car-pool were arrested for minor traffic violations, and insurance on the cars in the pool was canceled until King located a black insuran ce agent in Atlanta who arranged for Lloyd’s of London to write a policy for some of the cars. While the boycott continued, the fight over segregation began in the courts. In February 1956, after the appeal of Parks’s conviction was dismissed on a technicality, lawyers filed suit in U.S. district court on behalf of five women, including Parks, who had been mistreated on the buses. The suit claimed that bus segregation was unconstitutional. At the same time, white lawyers discovered an old state law that prohibited boycotts, and a GRAND JURY issued 89 indictments against King, other ministers and leaders of the MIA, and other citizens, including Parks. King was the first to be tried. He was found guilty and was sentenced to pay a $500 fine or to serve a year of hard labor. His conviction was successfully appealed, however, and no one else was brought to trial in connection with those boycotts. In June 1956 a three-judge panel of a U.S. district court in Alabama ruled that Montgomery’s bus segregation was uncon stitu- tional (Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp . 707 [M.D. Ala. 1956]). The city appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. On November 13, the high court upheld the district court (352 U.S. 903, 77 S. Ct. 145, 1 L. Ed. 2d 114). The boy- cotters decided to continue their demonstration until the order was official. On December 20, the Court’s written decision arrived. On the following day, the black community ended the bus boycott. In the beginning, INTEGRATION of the buses did not go smoothly. Snipers fired at buses, and the city imposed curfews that prevented buses from operating after 5:00 P.M., which kept people who worked until 5:00 from riding the buses home. Because of the boycott, Parks and her husband received hate mail and threatening telephone calls. In 1957 they decided to move to Detroit, where Parks’s younger brother, Sylvester, lived. Parks was spending a great deal of time traveling around the country speaking about the bus boycott and the civil rights movement. She often attended meetings of a new organization formed by King and other ministers, the SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE . She also attended the 1963 March on Washington that was organized to push for civil rights legislation. By that time, black people all over the South were protesting segregation and were organizing boycotts. In 1964 President LYNDON B. JOHNSON signed the CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971, 1975a to 1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6, guaranteeing blacks the right to vote and to use public accommoda- tions. But segregation was still pervasive in the South. In March 1965 , King called for a mass march in Alabama, from Selma to Montgomery, to protest the treatment of civil rights demon- strators in Selma. Parks was invited to join the march for the final eight miles to the capital in Montgomery. In 1965 Parks went to work for U.S. Representative John Conyers, whom she had supported in his campaign for the congressional seat from the First District in Michigan. Parks remained as Conyers’s receptionist and office assistant until her retiremen t in 1988. For a long time, Parks wanted to start an organization to help young people. In 1987 she founded the Rosa and Raymond Parks Institute for Self-Development, to offer classes PEOPLE ALWAYS SAY THAT I DIDN’T GIVE UP MY SEAT BECAUSE I WAS TIRED, BUT THAT ISN ’T TRUE.I WAS NOT TIRED PHYSICALLY THE ONLY TIRED I WAS, WAS TIRED OF GIVING UP . —ROSA PARKS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 410 PARKS, ROSA LOUISE MCCAULEY in communications skills, healt h, economics, and political awareness. Time magazine named Parks one of the 100 most influential people of the twentieth century, as a heroine and an icon. In 1996 President BILL CLINTON awarded Parks the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honor in the United States. In 1999 Congress awarded her the Congressional Gold Medal of Honor, the highest award conferred by the U.S. government. “It is not an exaggeration to say that American history has moved through and with Rosa Parks This modest woman transformed an act designed to perpetuate the harsh rule of Jim Crow into the spark that ignited a determined and righteous crusade,” said Spencer Abraham (R-Mich.), one of the sponsors of the award. Despite her fame and well-regard, her later years were not easy. In 1994 she was mugged by a 28-year-old man for $53 in her own home in Detroit. By 2002 Parks was suffering from dementia and faced some financial difficulties. Parks could not pay her rent and relied on a local church to cover the costs for a time. Rosa Parks died at home at 92 on October 24, 2005. As her husband died in 1977 and the marriage was childless, she had no survivors in her immediate family. Within days, the U.S. Senate and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES passed a resolution to honor Parks by allowing her the honor of being the 31st person to lie in state at the U.S. Capitol Rotunda. Parks’ honor repre- sented some firsts: the first woman, the first American non-U.S. government official, and the second non-government official (after French- man Pierre L’Enfant) to be accorded this honor. She was the second African American to lie in honor, the first having been Jacob Chestnut, a U.S. Capitol Police officer killed a shooting at the Capitol in 1998. The Rosa Parks Library and Museum on the campus of Troy University in Montgomery was dedicated to her on December 1, 2000. It is located on the corner where Parks boarded the famed bus. FURTHER READINGS Celsi, Teresa. 1991. Rosa Parks and the Montgomery Bus Boycott. Brookfield, Conn.: Millbrook Press. Parks, Rosa, with Gregory J. Reed. 1994. Quiet Strength: The Faith, the Hope, and the Heart of a Woman Who Changed a Nation. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan. Parks, Rosa, with Jim Haskins. 1992. Rosa Parks: My Story New York: Dial. Robinson, Jo Ann Gibson. 1987. The Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Women Who Started It. Knoxville, Tenn.: Univ. of Tennessee Press. “Time 100: Heroes and Icons—Rosa Parks.” 1999. Available online at www.time.com/time/time100/heroes/profile/ parks01.html (accessed January 26, 2004). CROSS REFERENCES Pacifism; Powell v. Alabama; Voting. PARLIAMENTARY LAW The gen eral body of enacted rules and recognized usages governing the procedure of legislative assemblies and other deliberative sessions, for example meetings of stockholders and directors of corporations, town meetings, and board meetings. Roberts Rules of Order provides examples of such rules. Also called parliamentary procedure. PARODY Parody is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment as a “distorted imi tation” of an original work for the purpose of commenting on it. The use of parody as a means to express political and social views has a long history in the United States. Every PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES , including GEORGE WASHINGTON, has been the subject of satire and parody, often in the form of political cartoons. The cartoons, caricatures, and other forms of parody and satire typically distort and overly emphasize certain aspects of the subject’s physical char- acteristics, such as Abraham Lincoln’s lanky build; Franklin D. Roosevelt’s jutting jaw and cigarette holder; Ronald Reagan’s long face and slick, brown hair; and Bill Clinton’s large nose and red cheeks. Although often comical, politi- cal cartoons and other forms of satire and parody have often immortalized the individuals whom they portrayed. Parody and satire can be used for purposes beyond lighthearted comic intent. Many politi- cal cartoons, for example, have influenced the course of national debate. For instance, Thomas Nast, the famous nineteenth-century poli tical cartoonist, published a series of post-Civil War cartoons in Harper’s Weekly characterizing the activities of William M. “Boss” Tweed and other corrupt politicians in New York City’s TAMMANY HALL political machine. Likewise, in the early 2000s, late night comedians and political cartoonists lampooned New York governor Eliot Spitzer after the New York Times revealed on March 10, 2008, that Spitzer had been a GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PARODY 411 client of a PROSTITUTION ring under investigation by the federal government. Two days later, Spitzer announced his resignation as governor of New York, citing “private failings.” Some forms of parody and satire are difficult to distinguish from truthful publica- tions. Moreover, many forms of parody and satire can be particularly offensive to the subject of the parody. As a result, publication of various types of parody often involves LITIGATION over libel, slander, and other types of defamation. In 1988 the U.S. SUPREME COURT reviewed the most famous case involvi ng the use of parody in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwel l, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S. Ct. 816, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1988). In 1983, the adult magazine Hustler published a parody of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur, which featured Jerry Falwell, a nation- ally recognized evangelist who is well known for his conservative commentary on political and social issues. The original advertisements con- tained interviews with celebrities discussing the “first time” they had consumed Campari. Hustler’s parody used a layout similar to the original advertisement, but included a fictitious interview with Falwell where he stated that his “first time” occurred with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell brought suit, al leging libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court found in favor of Hustler and its publisher, Larry Flynt, on the libel claim because the court found that no reasonable person would have believed the advertisement to be true. However, the court found Hustler and Flynt liable for intentional infliction for emotional distress. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling. The S upreme Court, p er Justice WILLIAM REHNQUIST , reversed the Fourth Circuit. The Court has held in a line of cases regarding defamation that the FIRST AMENDMENT requires a PLAINTI F F who is a public official or a public figure to demonstrate “actual malice,” mean- ingitmustbeproventhatthepersonbeing accused showed a reckless disregard as to whether a statement was true or false. These cases generally apply to c laims of LIBEL AND SLANDER brought by public officials or p ublic figures. After reviewing a brief history of the use of parody in the United States, the Court found that the actual malice standard applies to cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress as well. Because Falwell was un- questionably a public figure under the Court’s analysis, he had to prove actual malice on the part of Hustler. The Court also rejected a claim by Falwell that this particular form of parody was so outrageous that it should not be the subject of First Amendment protection. This case established that the First Amendment protects forms of parody and satire involving public figures or public officials against a variety of claims, including libel, slander, and inten- tional infliction of emotional distress. The Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell prece- dent did not stop California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger from suing the maker of a Bobblehead doll that was intended to lampoon him both as a politician and as Hollywood star of the Terminator franchise. The Bobbleheads, marketed under the name “the Govinator,” portrayed Schwarzenegger in a statesman-like business suit, while also sporting a military bandolier and an ASSAULT rifle. Schwarzenegger sued the doll manufacturer , Ohio Discount Merchandise Inc. (ODM), alleging that ODM misappropriated his name, photograph, and likeness for commercial purposes. In defense, ODM asserted that the Bobble- head dolls were a constitutionally protected form of parody. Toby and Todd Bosley, owners of ODM, filed an AFFIDAVIT with the court stating that “Arnold is an aggressive governor, so we put him with a gun.” As the law suit proceeded to the discovery phase, it was learned that the Bosley brothers had created the Bobble- heads to raise money for children’s cancer charities, with the goal of raising $50,000 for the Kristen Ann Carr Fund for Sarcoma Research. Upon learning this, Schwarzenegger offered to settle the matter, and the brothers agreed. Under the terms of the Settlement, ODM was authorized to keep selling a Schwarzenegger Bobblehead doll, but without the assault weapon or bandolier. The settlement also provided that a portion of the proceeds from such sales would go to a Schwarzenegger- designated charity, Arnold’s All-Stars, an afte r- school program in Los Angeles. Parody may also involve the application of other laws. Because many parodies mimic or copy other publications, the parodies may implicate COPYRIGHT and other INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY laws. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 412 PARODY Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 127 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1994), the Court reviewed whether a parody of Roy Orbison’s song, “Oh, Pretty Woman,” by the rap group 2 Live Crew violated the Copyright Act of 1976. The court of appeals held that the parody did not constitute fair use under copyright law, primarily due to its commercial character. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the commercial charac- ter of the song did not create a presumption that the parody violated fair use. FURTHER READINGS Beck, Joseph M. 2003. “Copyright and the First Amendment after The Wind Done Gone.” Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law and Practice 5 (spring). Post, Robert C. 1990. “The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Delibera- tion, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.” Harvard Law Review 103 (January). Weaver, Russell L. and Donald E. Lively. 2009. Understand- ing the First Amendment. 3d ed. New Providence, N.J.: LexisNexis. PAROL EVIDENCE Parol refers to verbal expressions or words. Verbal evidence, such as the testimony of a witness at trial. In the context of contracts, d eeds, wills, or other writings, parol evidence r efers to extra- neous evidence such as an oral agreement (a parol contract), or even a written agreement, that is not i ncluded in the relevant written document. The parol evidence rule is a principle that preserves the integrity of written documents or agreements by prohibiting the parties from attempting to alter the meaning of the written document through the use of prior and contemporaneous oral or written declarations that are not referenced in the document. Parol evidence is a form of EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. Terms of a contract are commonly pro- posed, discussed, and negotiated before they are included in the final contract. When the parties to the negotiations put their agreement in writing and acknowledge that the statement is the complete and exclusive declaration of their agreement, they have integrated the contract. The parol evidence rule applies to integrated contracts and provides that when parties put their agreement in writing, all prior and contemporaneous oral or written agreements merge in the writing. Courts do not permit integrated contracts to be modified, altered, amended, or changed in any way by prior or contemporaneous agreements that contradict the terms of the written agreement. The parol evidence rule applies to written contracts to safeguard the terms of the contract. The courts assume by the parol evidence rule that contracts contain the terms and provi- sions that the parties specifically intended and lack those provisions that the parties did not want. The parol evidence rule does not apply to written integrated contracts in some instances. For example, clerical or typographical errors found in the written agreement may be changed because the incorrect term does not represent the true agreement between the parties. Courts will also not apply the parol evidence rule to prohibit contradictory evidence that shows that the contract was entered into under duress, mistake, FRAUD,orUNDUE INFLUENC E . Finally, the parol evidence rule will not prevent evidence that shows the existence of a separate agreement between the parties. The law of sales also involves numerous written and oral contracts to which the parol evidence rule may be applied. Under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE , the court may look to contemporaneous or prior agreements not to contradict a written agreement but to explain or supplement it. The court may examine such evidence based on the parties’ course of dealing, usage of trade, course of conduct, or evidence of consistent additional terms. Parties’ course of dealing refers to a situation where two parties have a history of working together and entering into numerous contracts with each other, and the court can look to that history to clarify or interpret their written expressions. Usage of trade refers to circumstances in which the parties are participants in a particular trade or industry that has established ways of doing business. The courts can examine those established and accepted methods within the industry to help explain a written agreement. Parties’ course of conduct refers to the actions of the parties in carrying out the particular contract, such as if a party accepts without objection the continued performance of the other party. It is also permissible for a court to consider supplemental consistent evidence that would generally not be included in the written agreement as long as it does not contradict the terms of the original agreement. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PAROL EVIDENCE 413 FURTHER READINGS Calamari, John D., and Joseph M. Perillo. 2004. Contracts. 4th ed. St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West. Mann, Richard A., and Barry S. Roberts. 2004. Essentials of Business Law and the Legal Environment. 8th ed. Columbus, OH: Thomson/South-Western West. CROSS REFERENCES Integrated Agreement; Oral Contract; Sales Law. PAROLE The conditional release of a person convicted of a crime prior to the expiration of that person’s term of imprisonment, subject to both the supervision of the correctional authorities during the remainder of the term and a resumption of the imprisonment upon violation of the conditions imposed. Parole is the early supervised release of a prison inmate. It i s usually regulated by statutes, and these provisions vary from state to state. Parole boards created by statute possess the authority to release prisoners from INCARCERATION. Parolees have no constitutional right to represen- tation in parole hearings and parole revocation hearings, but many states provide representation to impoverished inmates and parolees in such hearings. Parole was first used in the United States in New York in 1876. By the turn of the century, parole was prevalent in most states. In 1910, Congress established the U.S. Parole Commis- sion and gave it the responsibility of evaluating and setting the release dates for federal prisoners. Parole is used for several reasons. It is less expensive to supervise a parolee than to incarcerate a prisoner. A person on parole has an opportunity to contribute to society. At the same time, society still receives some protection because the parolee is supervised, and parole can be revoked for the most minor of transgressions. Parole is also a method of rehabilitation, because it gives convicts supervision and guidance during their re-entry into society. Although parole laws vary from state to state, there are some common practices. In many states, the governor is charged with appointing a parole board. The duties of the board are to study the case histories of persons eligible for parole, deliberate on the record, conduct hear- ings, grant parole, craft the conditions for parole, issue warrants for persons charged with violation of parole, conduct revocation hearings, and grant final discharge to parolees. States may charge parolees a small monthly fee to offset the costs of supervision. For example, in Kentucky, a person on parole for a felony must pay not less than $10 per month while under active supervision, but no more than a total of $2,500 per year; for a misdemeanor parole, the fee is not less than $10 per month and no more than $500 per year. KRS § 439.315. Failure to pay these fees, without a good reason for the failure, may result in revocation of the parole, but revocation may not be based on failure to pay a fee unless the board first has held a hearing on the matter. For lesser offenses, the determination of eligibility for parole is often left to the parole board. Parole will be ordered only if it serves the best interests of society. Parole is not con- sidered to be a method of reducing sentences or awarding a pardon. For more serious offenses, most states limit the discretion of the parole board. Parole statutes in these states generally iden tify a specified period of imprisonment that must be served before a prisoner is eligible for parole. The time periods are often a percentage of the prison sentence, and they can vary according to the crime for which the prospective parolee was convicted. In Arkansas, for example, persons convicted of first-degree MURDER, KIDNAPPING, aggravated ROBBERY, RAPE, and causing a catas- trophe are not eligible for parole until they have served 70 percent of their prison sentence (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-611). For lesser felonies , persons must serve at least one-third of their sentence before becoming eligible for parole (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-608). Parole has come under increasing attack since the 1970s. A powerful “truth in sentenc- ing” movement has been successful in many states. Truth in sentencing is a catchphrase used to describe the not ion that convicted criminals should serve the entire prison sentence handed down by the court. Many states have abolished parole entirely. In Virginia, for example, a felon who was committed after January 1, 1995, is ineligible for parole (Va. Code Ann. § 53.1- 165.1). A felon may have prison time reduced from his sentence for good behavior, but in any case, the felon must serve at least 85 percent of the prison sentence. At least 27 states and the District of Columbia currently require violent offenders to serve 85 percent of their prison sente nce GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 414 PAROLE before obtaining early release. Fourteen states have abolished parole board release for all offenders, with at least six other states abolishing parole board release for certain violent or felony offenders. Other states allow parole for offen- ders so long as they have served the required time of their sentence. An additional 13 states, like Arkansas, require violent offenders to serve a substantial portion of their minimum sen- tence before being eligible for release. On the f ederal level, Congress abolished parole in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (Pub. L. No. 98-473 § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 1837, 202 7 [repealing 18 U.S.C.A. § 4201 et seq.]). Federal prisoners may, however, earn a maximum of 54 days good time credit per year against their sentence (18 U.S.C.A. § 3624(b)). However, the removal of parole has had a devastating effect on the federal prison system. In 2009 the U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION heard te stimony that documented these effects. The loss of parole has led in part to the tripling of the federal prison population, with the Fed eral Bureau of Prisons operating at 137 percent of capacity with nearly 203,000 inmates. Most prisoners are low-level drug dealers. The issue of victim’s rights has also become important when dealing with parole. Most states now have laws requiring the victim or victim’s families to be notified of a parole hearing. According to the National Center for the VICTIMS OF CRIME (NCVC), 46 states and the District of Columbia require the victim or victim’s families to be given a notice of a parole application or hearing at their request. Many states have gone further and require that a victim or their family be notified of their right to attend a parole hearing, the right to submit a victim impact statement, and the earliest estimated parole eligibility date. Most states also allow victims the opportu- nity to comment on the offender’srequestfor parole. Forty-six states allow victims to submit impact testimony in person, 42 states permit written victim impact statements to be sub- mitted, six states authorize the submission of audiotaped statements, seven states permit victims to submit videotaped statements, three states allow victims to be heard via teleconfer- encing, and eight states authorize the vic tim’s counsel or representative to present a state- ment on the victim ’s behalf. Under certain circumstances, parolees may also be required to pay restitution as a condition of their parole. Several important SUPREME COURT decisions were handed down at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the twenty-first century concerning parole. In 1998, in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S. Ct. 978, 140 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1998), the Supreme Court ruled against a man who filed a HABEAS CORPUS petition challenging allegedly unconstitutional parole revocation procedures. Pointing out that the habeas petition had been filed after the petitioner’s sentence had expired, the Court held that the questions raised by the petition were moot. Thus, the Court concluded that the petitioner should have raised his challenge to the parole procedures earlier, while he was still incarcerated. In the 2000 decision of United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 120 S. Ct. 1114, 146 L. Ed. 2d. 236 (2000), the Court ruled unanimously that a period of supervised release cannot commence until the prisoner is actually released from incarceration. The case involved a defen- dant whose convictions were vacated and his prison sentence reduced to a term less than that already served. The defendant moved for reduction of his supervised release term by the amount of extra time served on the vacated convictions. But the Court ruled that when a statute provides that a supervised release term Characteristics of Adults on Parole, 2007 SOURCE: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2007. White 42% Black 37% Hispanic 19% American Indian/ Alaska Native 1% Asian/ Pacific Islander 1% Male 88% Female 12% ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION PAROLE 415 does not commence until an individual is released from prison, the word “released” means freed from confine ment. In another 2000 ruling, Garner v. Jones,529 U.S. 244, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 146 L.Ed. 2d 236 (2000), the Court determined that retroactive application of Georgia’s amended parole rule, changing the frequency of required parole reconsideration hearings for inmates serving life sentences from every three years to every eight years, did not necessarily violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. In its 6–3 decision, the Court emphasized that the States must have “due flexibility” in designing their parole procedures. There was no showing that the change in the law lengthened the inmate’s time of actual imprisonment, the Court noted, and the board had discretion to act in accordance with its assessment of each inmate’s likelihood of release between reconsideration dates. In 2008 the Supreme Court denied CERTIO- RARI in a case presenting the question of whether a person granted complete termination of his parole and sentence has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in maintaining his complete freedom such that he is entitled to due process when state officials withdraw the termination. King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 260 Fed.Appx. 375 (2nd Cir. 2008), Certiorari Denied by King v. New York State Div. of Parole, —U.S.—, 129 S.Ct. 294, 172 L.Ed.2d 151 (U.S. 2008). In the case below, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected a parolee’s argument that a parolee who has been erroneously informed of his discharge from parole has a liberty interest protected by the Due Process clause of the federal Constitu- tion. The parolee had only been discharged from parole for a few weeks before the error was discovered, the court said, a period too short for a liberty interest to attach. Otherwise, the court suggested, parolees and inmates would open the floodgates with claims of Due Process violations every time prison officials made a mistake. A year later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases examining the constitu- tionality of sentencing a juvenile to life without parole for non-homicide offenses. In the first case, the petitioner was 16 years old when he was charged with armed BURGLARY, a felony punish- able by life imprisonment, and attempted armed robbery. Graham v. State, 982 So.2d 43 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 2008), rehearing denied (May 16, 2008). Review Denied by Graham v. State, 990 So.2d 1058 (Fla. Aug 22, 2008), Certiorari Granted by Graham v. State, —U.S.—, 129 S.Ct. 2157, — L.Ed.2d—(2009). He pled guilty to the offenses in return for a sentence of three years’ PROBATION with the condition that he serve 12 months in the county jail. After his release from jail, the petitioner was charged with armed home inva- sion robbery and other offenses, and the state of Florida petitioned to revoke his probation for his earlier convictions. At the revocation hearing, the state presented evidence establishing that the petitioner and two co-defendants entered the victim’s apartment forcefully and that, while the petitioner held the victim at gunpoint, his codefendants robbed the home. The petitioner also confessed to having committed other similar robberies. The trial court found the petitioner guilty of the alleged probation violations and sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He was 19 years old at the time of his sentencing. In the second case, the petitioner was convicted in 1986 of sexual BATTERY and burglary of a dwelling. Sullivan v. State,987 So.2d 83 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 2008), rehearing denied (Aug 06, 2008), Certiorari Granted by Sullivan v. State, —U.S.—, 129 S.Ct. 2157, — L.Ed.2d— (2009). Though he was 13 years old at the time, the state of Florida sentenced Sullivan as an adult to life imprisonment without the possibility for parole. Both peti- tioners asserted that a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile is so “freakishly rare” as to be arbitrary and capricious, and hence CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT as defined by the EIGHTH AMENDMENT to the federal Constitution. The Court is expected to rule in these cases during the 2009–10 term. FURTHER READINGS Bamonte, Thomas J. 1993. “The Viability of Morrissey v. Brewer and the Due Process Rights of Parolees and Other Conditional Releasees.” Southern Illinois Univ. Law Journal 18. “Forum: Parole and Sentencing Reform in Virginia.” 1995. Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 2. National Center for the Victims of Crime. 2000. “Victim’s Rights at Parole: A Statutory Overview Summary.” Available online at www.ncvc.org/policy/issues/parole (accessed March 10, 2010). Petesilia, Joan. 2009. When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. CROSS REFERENCES Probation; Sentencing. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 416 PAROLE v PARSONS, THEOPHILUS Theophilus Parsons served as chief justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from 1806 to 1813. A man of wide interests and learning, he is recognized for a series of decisions that defined legal principles that have shaped the American business corporation. Parsons was born February 24, 1750, in Byfield, Massachusetts. He graduated from Harvard University in 1769 and was admitted to the Massachusetts bar in 1774. He established a successful legal practice in the area of Massachusetts that later became Portland, Maine. He gained prominence for his outspo- ken opinions at the ESSEX JUNTO, a 1778 gathering of merchants and lawyers from New England, the majority of whom resided in Essex County, Massachusetts. This group endorsed a state constitution that gave the state government broad authority. Parsons strongly supported ratification of the U.S. Constitution. As a delegate to the 1788 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention that ratified the document, Parsons attempted to calm the fears of those delegates who worried about a strong federal government. From 1787 to 1791 he served in the Massachusetts legislature. He maintained a lucrative COMMERCIAL LAW practice and became recognized as a distinguished lawyer. John Quincy Adams, future president of the United States and a member of the prominent Boston Adams family, read the law under Parson’s tutelage during this period. In 1805 Parsons again entered the state legislature, but his tenure was brief. In 1806 he was appointed chief justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the state’s highest court. His commercial law background proved valuable on the court because he decided cases involving shipping and insurance. More impor- tantly, Parsons had the experience and confi- dence to decide cases involving business corporations at a time when very little COMMON LAW was available to guide him. Much of what became common law in U.S. corporate law was first developed while Parsons served as chief justice. In 1799 Massachusetts became the first state to enact a set of laws governing business corporations. During this period corporations had to obtain their charters from the legislature. The legislature was liberally Theophilus Parsons 1750–1813 ▼▼ ▼▼ 17501750 18251825 18001800 17751775 ❖ ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1813 Died, Boston, Mass. 1806 Appointed chief justice of the Mass. Supreme Judicial Court 1799 Mass. became first state to enact laws governing business corporations 1787–91 Served in Mass. legislature 1788 Served as delegate to the Mass. Constitutional Convention 1778 Essex Junto gathering endorsed a (Mass.) state constitution that would give the state government broad authority 1774 Admitted to Mass. bar 1769 Graduated from Harvard Univers ity 1750 Born, Byfield, Mass. 1775–83 American Revolution ◆ 1812–14 War of 1812 Theophilus Parsons. SOCIAL LAW LIBRARY, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS. SOURCE UNKNOWN. THE LOVE OF PRECEDENT AND STABILITY GIVES TO JUDICIAL DECISIONS AN AUTHORITY ALMOST LIKE THAT OF LAW ITSELF . —THEOPHILUS PARSONS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PARSONS, THEOPHILUS 417 . percent of the prison sentence. At least 27 states and the District of Columbia currently require violent offenders to serve 85 percent of their prison sente nce GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD. authority 177 4 Admitted to Mass. bar 176 9 Graduated from Harvard Univers ity 175 0 Born, Byfield, Mass. 177 5–83 American Revolution ◆ 1812–14 War of 1812 Theophilus Parsons. SOCIAL LAW LIBRARY,. UNKNOWN. THE LOVE OF PRECEDENT AND STABILITY GIVES TO JUDICIAL DECISIONS AN AUTHORITY ALMOST LIKE THAT OF LAW ITSELF . —THEOPHILUS PARSONS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PARSONS,