The law uses the concept of duty to limit the situations where a defendant is liable for a plaintiff’s injury. Whether a defendant has a duty to protect the plaintiff from harm is a question decided by the court, not the jury. Over time, courts have developed numerous rules creating and limiting a person’s duty to others, and sometimes duties are established or limited by statute. Whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty depends upon the relation- ship between the defendant and the plaintiff. A pre-existing relationship can create an affirmative duty to exercise reasonable care to protect another person from harm. For exam- ple, an inn has an affirmative duty to protect its guests, a school has a duty to its pupils, a store has a duty to its customers, and a lifeguard has a duty to swimmers. One always has a duty to refrain from taking actions that endanger the safety of others, but usually one does not have a duty to render aid or prevent harm to a person from an indepen- dent cause. One common example of this limitation on duty is the lack of a duty to go to the aid of a person in peril. An expert swimmer with a boat and a rope has no duty to attempt to rescue a person who is drowning (although a hired lifeguard would). A physician who witnesses an automobile accident has no duty to offer emergency medical assistance to the accident victims. Sometimes a person can voluntarily assume a duty where it would not otherwise exist. If the doctor who encounters an automobile accident decides to render aid to the victims, she is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in rendering that aid. As a result, doctors who have stopped along the highway to render medical assistance to accident victims have been sued for negli- gence. Many states have adopted “good samari- tan” statutes to relieve individuals who render emergency assistance from negligence liability. Even if a plaintiff establishes that the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from harm and breached that duty by failing to use reasonable care, the plaintiff must still prove that the defendant’s negligence was the PROXI- MATE CAUSE of her injury. Proximate Cause Perhaps no issue in negligence law has caused more confusion than the issue of proximate cause. The concept of proximate cause limits a defendant’s liability for his negligence to con- sequences reasonably related to the negligent conduct. Although it might seem obvious whether a defendant’s negligence has caused injury to the plaintiff, issues of causation are often very difficult. Suppose, for example, that a defendant negligently causes an automobile accident, injuring another driver. The colliding cars also knock down a utility pole, resulting in a power outage. Clearly the defendant’s negli- gence has in fact caused both the accident and power outage. Most people would agree that the negligent defendant should be liable for the other driver’s injuries, but should he also be liable to an employee who, due to the failure of her electric alarm clock, arri ves late for work and is fired? This question raises the issue of proximate cause. Actually, the term proximate cause is some- what misleading because as a legal concept it has little to do with proximity (in time or space) or causation. Rather, proximate cause is related to fairness and justice, in the sense that at some point it becomes unfair to hold a defendant responsible for the results of his negligence. For example, Mrs. O’Leary’s negligent placement of her lantern may have started the Great Chicago Fire, but it would be unjust to hold her responsible for all the damage done by the fire. In determining whether a defendant’s negli - gence is the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injury, most courts focus on the foreseeability of the harm that resulted from the defendant’s negligence. For example, i f a driver negligently drives his automobile, it is foreseeable that he might cause an accident with another vehicle, hit a pedestrian, or crash into a storefront. Thus, the driver would be liable for those damages. But suppose the negligent driver collides with a truck carrying dynamite, causing an explosion that injures a person two blocks away. Assuming that the driver had no idea that the truck was carrying dynamite, it is not foreseeable that his negligent driving could injure a person two blocks away. Therefore, the driver would not be liable for that person’s injury under this approach. When apply ing this approach, courts frequently instruct juries to consider whether the harm or injury was the “natural or probable” consequence of the defendant’s negligence. A minority of courts hold the view that the defendant’s negligence is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury if the injury is the “direct GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 248 NEGLIGENCE result” of the negligence. Usually, a plaintiff’s injury is considered to be the direct result of the defendant’s negligence if it follows an unbro- ken, natural sequence from the defendant’s act and no intervening, external force acts to cause the injury. Intervening Cause Sometimes a plaintiff’s inj ury results from more than one cause. For instance, suppose a defendant negligently injures a pedestrian in an automobile accident. An emergency room doctor negligently treats the plaintiff, aggravat- ing her injury. The doctor’s negligence is an “intervening cause” of the plaintiff’s injury. A cause of injury is an INTERVENING CAUSE only if it occurs subsequent to the defendant’s negligent conduct. Just because an intervening cause exists, however, does not mean that the defendant’s negligent conduct is not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The defendant remains liable if he should have foreseen the intervening cause and taken it into account in his conduct. If a defendant negligently spills a large quantity of gasoline and doesn’t clean it up, he will not be relieved of liability for a resulting fire merely because another person causes the gaso line to ignite, because it is foreseeable that the gasoline might be accidentally ignited. Also, it is fore- seeable that a sudden gust of wind might cause the fire to spread quickly. Even if an intervening cause is foreseeable, however, in some situations the defendant will still be excused from liability. If the intervening cause is the intentio nal or criminal conduct of a third person, the defendant is not liable for this person’s negligent conduct. In the example where the defendant spilled gasoline and did not clean it up, he is not responsible for the resulting fire if someone intentionally ignites the gas. Also, sometimes a third person will discover the danger that the defendant created by his negligence under circumstances where the third person has some duty to act. If the third person fails to act, the defendant is not liable. In the gasoline example, suppose the defendant, a customer at a gas station, negli- gently spills a large quantity of gas near the pumps. The owner of the gas station sees the spilled gasoline but does nothing. The owner of the gas station, not the defendant, would be liable if another customer accidentally ignites the gasoline. Sometimes, however, a completely unfore- seeable event or result occurs after a defendant’s negligence, resulting in harm to the plaintiff. An abnormal, unpredictable, or highly improbable event that occurs after the defendant’s negli- gence is known as a “superseding cause” and relieves the defendant of liability. For example, suppose a defendant negligently blocks a road, causing the plaintiff to make a detour in her automobile. While on the detour, an airplane hits the plaintiff’s car, killing the plaintiff. The airplane w as completely unforeseeable to the defendant, and thus he cannot be held liable for the plaintiff’s death. The airplane was a superseding cause of the plaintiff’s death. Even great jurists have had difficulty articu- lating exactly what constitutes proximate cause. Although the law provides tests such as “fore- seeability” and “natural, direct consequences,” ultimately the issue of proximate cause is decided by people ’s sense of right and wrong. In the example where the defendant spills gasoline and does not clean it up, most people would agree that the defendant should be liable if a careless smoker accidentally ignites the gasoline, even if they could not articulate that the smoker was a foreseeable, intervening cause of the fire. Defenses to Negligence Liability Even if a plaintiff has established that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty, and proximately caused the defen- dant’s injury, the defendant can still raise defenses that reduce or eliminate his liability. These defenses include contributory negligence, comparative negligence, and ASSUMPTION OF RISK. Contributory Negligence Frequently, more than one person has acted negligently to create an injury. Under the common law rule of contributory negligence, a plaintiff whose own negligence was a contributing cause of her injury was barred from recovering from a negligent defendant. For example, a driver negligently enters an intersection in the path of an oncoming car, resulting in a collision. The other driver was driving at an excessive speed and might have avoided the collision if she had been driving more slowly. Thus, both drivers’ negligence contributed to the accident. Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, neither driver would be able to recover from the other, due to her own negligence in causing the accident. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION NEGLIGENCE 249 The doctrine of contributory negligence seeks to keep a plaintiff from recovering from the defendant where the plaintiff is also at fault. However, this doctrine often leads to unfair results. For example, even if a defendant’s negligence is the overwhelming cause of the plaintiff’s injury, even slight negligence on the part of the plaintiff completely bars his recov- ery. Also, the negligence of many defendants such as corporations, manufacturers, and land- owners creates no corresponding risk of injury to themselves. In such cases, the doctrine of contributory negligence, which can completely eliminate the liability for their negligence, reduces their incentive to act safely. As a result, courts and statutes have considerably weakened the doctrine of contributory negligence. Comparative Negligence Most states, either by court decision or statute, have now adopted some form of comparative negligence in place of pure, contributory negligence. Under com- parative negligence (or “comparative fault” as it is sometimes known), a plaintiff’s negligence is not a complete bar to her recovery. Instead, the plaintiff’s damages are reduced by whatever percentage her own fault contributed to the injury. This requires the jury to determine, by percentage, the fault of the plaintiff and defendant in causing the plaintiff’s injury. For example, suppose a plaintiff is injured in an automobile accident and sustains $100,000 in damages. The jury determines that the plaintiff was 25 percent responsible for the accident and that the defendant was 75 percent responsible. The plaintiff will then be allowed to recover 75 percent of her damages, or $75,000. Most states have adopted the “50 percent rule” of comparative negligence. Under this rule, the plaintiff cannot recover any damages if her negligence was as great as, or greater than, the negligence of the defendant. This rule partially retains the doctrine of contributory negligence, reflecting the view that a plaintiff who is largely responsible for her own injury is unworthy of compensation. A minority of states have adopted “pure comparative fault.” Under that rule, even a plaintiff who is 80 percent at fault in causing her injury may still recover 20 percent of damages, reflecting the defendant’s percentage of fault. Assumption of Risk Under the assumption of risk defense, a defendant can avoid liability for his negligence by establishing that the plaintiff voluntarily consented to encounter a known danger created by the defendant’s neglige nce. Assumption of risk may be express or implied. Under express assumption of risk, persons agree in advance that one person consents to assume the risk of the other’s negligence. For example, a skier who purchases a lift ticket at a ski resort usually expressly agrees to assume the risk of any injury that might occur while skiing. Thus, even if the ski resort negligently fails to mark a hazard on a trail, resulting in an injury to a skier, the ski resort may invoke the assumption of risk defense in the skier’s subsequent lawsuit. Assumption of risk may also be implied from a plaintiff’s conduct. For example, the defendant gives the plaintiff, a painter, a scaffold with a badly frayed rope. The plaintiff, fully aware of the rope’s condition, proceeds to use the scaffold and is injured. The defendant can raise the implied assumption of risk defense. This defense is similar to the contributory negligence defense; in the above example, the defendant might also argue that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent for using the scaffold when he knew the rope was frayed. The implied assumption of risk defense has caused a great deal of confusion in the courts because of its similarity to contributory negli- gence, and with the rise of comparative fault, the defense has diminished in importance and is viable today only in a minority of jurisdictions. FURTHER READINGS Bar-Gill, Oren, and Omri Ben-Shahar. 2003. “The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence.” American Law and Economics Review 5 (spring). Buswell, Henry F. 1997. The Civil Liability for Personal Injuries Arising out of Negligence. Littleton, Colo.: F.B. Rothman. Cupp, Richard L., Jr., and Danielle Polage. 2002. “The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis.” New York Univ. Law Review 77 (October). Henderson, James A., Jr. 2002. “Why Negligence Dominates Tort.” UCLA Law Review 50 (December). Levmore, Saul and Catherine M. Sharkey. 2009. Foundations of Tort Law. New York: Foundation Press. Weaver, Russell L. 2009. Mastering Tort Law. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press. CROSS REFERENCES Alcohol; Automobiles; Damages; Good Samaritan Doctrine; Guest Statutes; Last Clear Chance; MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co; Natural and Probable Consequences; Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company; Pr oduct Liability; Rescue; Rylands v. Fletcher; Strict Liability. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 250 NEGLIGENCE NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT The act of leaving an object, such as an automobile or firearm, with another whom the lender knows or should know could use the object to harm others due to such factors as youth or inexperience. Negligent entrustment claims arise when an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver causes damages while driving a motor vehicle owned by someone else. A party injured by such a driver must generally prove five components of this TORT: (1) that the owner entrusted the vehicle to the driver; (2) that the driver was unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless; (3) that the owner knew or should have known that the driver was unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless; (4) that the driver was negligent in the operation of the vehicle; and (5) that the driver’s NEGLIGENCE resulted in damages (Amaya v. Potter, 94 S.W.3d 856 [Tex. App. 2002]). If a plaintiff proves these elements, an owner may be liable for the full amount of damages caused by the driver. In some instances, the plaintiff may also recover PUNITIVE DAMAGES from the owner, particularly if the owner himself acted recklessly in entrusting the vehicle to the driver (Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wade, 579 S.E.2d 180 [Va. 2003]). According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the general duty of care regarding entrustment of a firearm includes the following duties: (1) not to give or lend the firearm in violation of an applicable statute or ordinance; (2) not to entrust the firearm to a person who appears to be inco mpetent or inexperienced; (3) not to furnish the firearm to one who appears likely to misuse it; (4) to be aware of who else may gain access to the weapon if it is entrusted, and whether such person or persons have any dangerous traits or propensities; (5) to train and/or supervise the person to whom the weapon is entrusted; (6) to advise the person to whom the weapon is entrusted of any unusual characteristics of the weapon; and (7) to retake possession of the weapon upon observing signs of misuse. Failure to discharge any of the duties can be offered as proof of negligent entrustment and may by itself be sufficient to establish liability, depending on the circumstances. FURTHER READING Kionka, Edward J. 1999. Torts in a Nutshell. 3d ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT A COMMERCIAL PAPER, such as a check or pro- missory note, that contains the signature of the maker or drawer; an unconditional promise or order to pay a certain sum in cash that is payable either upon demand or at a specifically designated time to the order of a designated person or to its bearer. NEGOTIATE To conduct business transactions; to deal with another individua l in regard to a purchase and sale; to bargain or trade. To conclude by way of agreement, bargain, or compa ct. To transfer a negotiable instrument, such as a promissory note, or other COMMERCIAL PAPER. v NELSON, JOHN John Nelson was a prominent U.S. lawyer, congressman, and diplomat who served as attorney general of the United States under President JOHN TYLER. Nelson was born on June 1, 1791 (some sources say 1794), in Frederick County, Mary- land. As a you ng boy he was educated by private tutors; subsequently he entered the College of John Nelson 1791–1860 ❖ 1791 Born, Frederick County, Md. 1843–45 Served as U.S. attorney general under Tyler 1861–65 U.S. Civil War ▼▼ ▼▼ 17751775 18251825 18501850 18751875 18001800 1775–83 American Revolution 1812–14 War of 1812 ◆ 1811 Graduated from the College of William and Mary ◆ 1813 Admitted to Maryland bar 1831–32 Served as U.S. chargé d'affaires to the Two Sicilies ❖ 1860 Died, Baltimore, Md. 1846–48 Mexican War 1821–23 Served in U.S. House GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION NELSON, JOHN 251 William and Mary at William sburg, Virginia. He graduated in 1811 and went on to study law with attorneys in both Virginia and Maryland. He was admitted to the bar in 1813 and established a practice in his hometown. In 1820 Nelson was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives as a Democrat. He took the oath of office on March 4, 1821, and served until March 3, 1823. He did not run for reelection but did support ANDREW JACKSON’s presidential bid in 1828. Over the next two decades, Nelson served the U.S. government in a number of unofficial capacities. He received the first of his official appointments from President Jackson in 1831, when he was named to a diplomatic post in Naples. He served as U.S. charge d’affaires (charge d’affaires is a title accorded lower-level diplomats) to Two Sicilies from October 24, 1831, to October 15, 1832. (The Two Sicilies was an independent Bourbon/Spanish-ruled kingdom located in southern Italy prior to that country’s unification in the mid-1860s. The kingdom’s capital was Naples.) When Tyler assumed the presidency follow- ing the death of President WILLIAM H. HARRISON, he named Nelson atto rney general of the United States. Nelson held a cabinet post as SECRETARY OF STATE ad interim at the same time. (The position of attorney general was not a cabinet- level post at the time.) Nelson served in both capacities from 1843 to 1845. In his later years, Nelson resumed the PRACTICE OF LAW in Baltimore, Maryland. He died there on January 8, 1860 and is buried at Baltimore’s Gr eenmount Cemetery. FURTHER READINGS Baker, Nancy V. 1992. Conflicting Loyalties: Law and Politics in the Attorney General’s Office, 1789–1990. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas. Monroe, Dan. 2003. The Republican Vision of John Tyler. San Antonio: Texas A&M Univ. Press. Peterson, Norma Lois. 1989. The Presidencies of William Henry Harrison and John Tyler. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas. v NELSON, SAMUEL Samuel Nelson served as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1845 to 1872. He brought with him experience as a politician, lawyer, and judge, which had included service as chief justice of the New York Supreme Court. His nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court by a desperate President JOHN TYLER came only after several prior nominees had declined or had been rejected by the U.S. Senate. Nelson was born in Hebron, New York, on November 10, 1792. He entered Middlebury College, in Vermont, at the age of 15 and graduated in 1813. Nelson chose a career in law, and during his twent ies he man aged a successful private practice in real estate and COMMERCIAL LAW that brought him political recognition. In 1821 he was the youngest delegate to serve in the New York state constitutional conven- tion. His judicial career began in 1823 with his appointment as a judge to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In 1831 he began a 14-year tenure on the New York Supreme Court, during the last four years of which he served as its chief justice. (Since 1847 New York’s highest court has been called the New York Court of Appeals.) There Nelson developed a reputation for common sense and a belief in the limits of judicial power. In 1845 President Tyler turned to Nelson in desperation. The president’s attempts to fill a vacant seat on the U.S. Supreme Court had produced more than half a dozen nominees, all of whom had refused the nomination or had failed to win Senate approval. Nelson, a Samuel Nelson 1792–1873 ❖ 1792 Born, Hebron, N.Y. 1861–65 U.S. Civil War ▼▼ ▼▼ 17751775 18251825 18501850 18751875 18001800 1775–83 American Revolution 1812–14 War of 1812 ◆ 1813 Graduated from Middlebury College ◆ 1817 Admitted to New York bar 1823–31 Served on the Sixth Circuit ❖ 1873 Died, Cooperstown, N.Y. 1846–48 Mexican War 1857 Wrote preliminary opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford; it was scrapped in favor of Taney's inflammatory opinion 1837 Became chief justice of the New York Supreme Court 1831–45 Served on the New York Supreme Court 1845–72 Served as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court 1860 Nelson and Judge John Campbell tried to mediate a compromise between the North and South to avoid the Civil War ◆ ◆◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 252 NELSON, SAMUEL last-minute substitution, sailed through the nomination process. Nelson believed that the Court should move cautiously in matters pertaining to the expressed will of Congress. He wrote the original majority opinion in the Dred Scott decision that upheld the institution of SLAVERY (DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD, 60 U.S. [19 How.] 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 [1857]). Nelson’s opinion sought to avoid answering the highly controversial question of slavery. But under political pressure from Southern justices on the Court, his opinion was scrapped, and Chief Justice ROGER B. TANEY’s inflammatory opinion was substituted. Taney’s decision led to violent protest and deepened hostilities that ultimately led to the Civil War. Nelson died December 13, 1873. FURTHER READINGS Friedman, Leon, and Fred L. Israel, eds. 1995. The Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions, Volumes I–V. New York: Chelsea House. Nelson, Samuel Peter. 2005. Beyond the First Amendment: The Politics of Free Speech and Pluralism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. Sherman, R.R. 2006. The U.S. Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years. Charleston, SC: BookSurge. NET The sum that remains following all permissible deductions, including charges, expenses, discounts, commissions, or taxes. Net assets, for example, are what remain after an individual subtracts the amount owed to creditors from his or her assets. Net pay is the salary an individual actually receives after deductions such as INCOME TAX and SOCIAL SECURITY payments. NET WORTH The difference between total assets and liabilities; the sum total of the assets of an individual or business minus the total amount owed to creditors. The net worth of a corporation is ordinarily determined by subtracting the liabilities from the assets, or by adding the capital account to the surplus account, as shown in the balance sheet of the company. NEUTRALITY The state of a nation that takes no part in a war between two or more other powers. Since the nineteenth century, INTERNATIONAL LAW has recognized the right of a nation to abstain from participation in a war between other states . In an international war, those taking no part are called “neutrals.” This means that a neutral state cannot provide assistance to the belligerents, the principal hostile powers, or to their allies, who cooperate and assist them. The law of neutrality that emerged from the nineteenth century was codified in several of the Hague Conferences of 1907, including No. 3, Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostili- ties (requiring notice to neutrals of a state of war); No. 5, Convention Respecting Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land; and No. 11, Convention Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War. Once a state decides on a position of neutrality, it must take steps to prevent its territory from becoming a base for military operations of a belligerent. It must prevent the recruiting of military personnel, the organizing of military expeditions, and the constru cting, outfitting, commissioning, and arming of war- ships for belligerent use. A neutral state is under no obligation to prevent private persons or companies from advancing credits or selling commodities to belligerents. Such sales are not illegal under the international law of neutrality. Samuel Nelson. PHOTOGRAPH BY MATTHEW BRADY. COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION NEUTRALITY 253 A neut ral state may, if it chooses, go beyond the requirements of international law by placing an embargo upon some or all sales or credits to belligerents by its nationals. If it does so, it has the obligation to see that legislation, com- monly referred to as “neutrality laws,” is applied impartially to all belligere nts. Once enacted, neutrality laws are not to be modified in ways that would advantage one party in the war. For most of its history, the United States tried to remain neutral during the wars among European states. President GEORGE WASHINGTON issued a neutrality proclamation in 1793 after the outbreak of war between France and the European allies. Congress enacted its first neu- trality law in 1794 (1 Stat. 381), which prohibited private individuals from accepting a foreign military commission, outfitting military vessels for a foreign state, or enlisting or hiring persons for the service of a foreign state. This legislation proved ge nerally effective in accomplishing its objectives, but it did not deter citizens who wished to support revolutionary belligerent or insurgent movements in South and Central America during the nineteenth century. The Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the counterrevolution that followed led to the trafficking in arms and ammunition across the border. In response, Congress enacted, in 1912, its first arms embargo (37 Stat. 630), a pro- hibition not required by international law. It authorized the president, upon finding that conditions of violence in an American country were promoted by procu rement of arms or munitions of war in the United States, to prohibit further export of them. With the rise of international conflicts around the world in the 1930s, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937 (49 Stat. 1081, 49 Stat. 1152, 50 Stat. 121). These laws required registration and licensing by a National Munitions Control Board of all persons trading in munitions and a mandatory embargo on the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, and on loans and credits to all belligerents or to neutrals for trans-shipment to belligerents. An embargo would take effect when the president found a state of war to exist. The desire of the United States to remain neutral has been called isolationism. During the 1930s the U.S. public did not want the United States entangled with the international strife perpetrated by Italy, Germany, and Japan. In 1935 President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT invoked the arms embargo provision after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the consequent war. With the outbreak of the European war in 1939, limiting the conflict by an arms embargo was no longer possible. Although isolationist sentiment was strong, there was also a growing feeling that the Allies needed support against Nazi aggression. The Roosevelt administration, with some difficulty, secured the repeal of the arms embargo in the Neutrality Act of 1939 (22 U.S.C.A. § 441). Because this re peal could work to the advan- tage only of Great Britain and France, it was a deliberately non-neutral act. The United States remained a neutral state before its entry into WORLD WAR II in December 1941, yet it took actions that undermined its status. In 1940 the United States entered into an agreement for the transfer of 50 old destroyers to Great Britain in exchange for leased naval and air bases in British islands off the Atlantic coast of the United States. Congress took a further step in the LEND-LEASE ACT of 1941 (55 Stat. 31) by agreeing to provide munitions, food, machinery, and services to Great Britain and the other Allies without immediate cost, thus eliminating their difficulty in finding dollar credits for purchases. Later repayment could be made in kind or property or other acceptable benefits. Under the Lend-Lease Act, the United States made huge shipments before and after entering the war. Following the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, the United States became increasingly involved in direct military assistance, permitting U.S. merchant ships to transport war materials to the Allies, using U.S. pilots to deliver bom- bers to Canada and Britain, and using naval vessels for a “neutrality patrol” in the Atlantic that assisted in protecting belligerent convoys against submarines. Much of the 1939 act remains in force (22 U.S.C.A. §§ 441–457), including the president’s authority to find and proclaim a state of war, prohibition of travel by citizens on belligerent ships, and prohibition of financial transactions by persons in the United States with belligerents or solicitation or collection of contributions for a belligerent except for humanitarian purposes. The authority for an arms embargo, which was revoked in 1941, has not been reinstated. Sales by U.S. individuals and companies are governed by the international law of neutrality, unless Congress enacts a specific embargo provi sion. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 254 NEUTRALITY In the post–World War II era, the U.S. government has committed several neutrality violations. Its conduct was less than disinter- ested and neutral in the overthrow of the Guatemalan government in 1954, in its spon- sorship of the Bay of Pigs military expedition against Cuba in 1961, in its intervention in the civil war in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and in its aid to those who overthrew the Salvador Allende government in Chile in 1973. Congress did enact the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2751– 2796c [1989 Supp.]), which was designed to restrict the transfer of arms to nations that support international TERRORISM.TheIRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR that emerged as a political scandal in President RONALD REAGAN’s administration in- volved violations of this act. The transfer of arms to Iran, a nation that supported terrorism, and the financial and military support of a right-wing revolutionary group in Nicaragua violated congressional legislation and, in the case of Nicaragua, thwarted the desire of Con- gress to remain neutral in the conflict. In 2005, at a world summit organized by the UNITED NATIONS, 150 members, including the U.S., signed a document that embodied the “responsibility to protect” doctrine. The doc- trine calls for collective UN Security Council action should national authorities fail “to protect their populations from GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES , ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” With the occurrence of genocide in the Sudan’s Darfur region since 2004, HUMAN RIGHTS groups have called on the U.S. gover n- ment to invoke this doctrine and intervene. Though the U.S. has not employed it, this doctrine is the subject of a debate over traditional concepts of neutrality. FURTHER READINGS Chadwick, Elizabeth. 2002. Traditional Neutrality Revisited: Law, Theory, and Case Studies. New York: Kluwer Law International. Gabriel, Jurg Martin. 2002. The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Evans, Gareth.2009. The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All.Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Politakis, George. 1998. Modern Aspects of the Laws of Naval Warfare and Maritime Neutrality. London, New York: Kegan Paul International. Vagts, Detlev F. 1999. “The Traditional Legal Concept of Neutrality in a Changing Environment.” American University International Law Review 14 (January- February). NEW DEAL “I pledge you, I pledge myself, to a new deal for the American people.” In July 1932, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT said these words to the delegates at the Democratic National Convention, which had just elected him the party’s candidate for president of the United States. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’sNewDeal was a response to the tumultuous events of the years leading to his nomination. After World War I, the people of the United States experi- enced unprecedented prosperity. Consumers of all income levels were buying goods “on time” by putting a few dollars down and paying a few dollars a month. Record numbers of people were also using the installment-buying concept to purchase stocks. The number of stockbrokers grew from fewer than 30,000 in 1920 to more than 70,000 in 1929. Stockbrokers allowed their clients to “buy on margin,” meaning that a customer only had to pay 10–15 percent down on a stock, with the broker lending the client the rest and being repaid when the stock went up in value. By 1929 the skyrocketing prices in the stock market indicated continued prosperity to some economists, but to others it signaled impending doom. So much investing had been done on margin that stockbrokers had borrowed money from banks that by then were also heavily in debt. Stock prices began rapidly dropping in September 1929, and on “Black Thursday,” October 24, 1929, they plummeted beyond all belief, devastating thousands of brokerage houses. By the following Tuesday, October 29, virtually all stocks were worthless. Millionaires became paupers overnight. People who had Unemployed men gather at a Chicago soup kitchen in February 1931. Roosevelt’s New Deal was a response to the severe economic decline that engulfed the nation in the first years of the Great Depression. Two years after the September 1929 crash of the stock market, 33 percent of the labor force was unemployed. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION NEW DEAL 255 invested their savings woke up to find themselves penniless. This was the start of the Great Depression. HERBERT HOOVER was the president at the time of the great STOCK MARKET crash. He initially refused to believe that there was a problem, and even in April 1930, when more than three million people had lost their jobs, he continued in vain to reassure people that everything was fine. Because people were afraid of losing their jobs and running out of money, they refused to engage in the free-spending ways of the past and chose to save rather than to spend their money. This behavior, in turn, created a new cycle of problems. Because many banks had failed during the crash, people no longer trusted them and kept their money at home, which depleted the supply of capital that banks needed. People also refused to buy new products and instead repaired old ones. Because few people were buying new products, companies were forced to close and to lay employees off. Many people were evicted from their homes for failing to make payments, and often several members of extended families lived together. The number of homeless persons soared, as did cases of malnutrition. President Hoover still remained firm in his stance that government aid was not an option. He believed that private charity could take care of those individuals who could not take care of themselves and that the ingenuity of private business, not government intrusion, would cure the ills of the country. The American people resented President Hoover’s attitude. The camps of makeshift shacks in which many people lived after being evicted were called Hoovervilles, and slogans such as “Hard Times Are Hoover-ing Over Us” were heard every- where. By December 1931 the unemployment rate was more than 13.6 million, a third of the labor force. When President Hoover sent military troops with bayonets and tear gas to disband the Bonus Army—a group of WORLD WAR I veterans who had come to Washington, D.C., to seek early payment of a promised bonus for fighting in the war—his approval among U.S. voters plunged irrevocably. Although the Republicans knew that the Democratic presidential candidate would more than likely win, they nominated Hoover again in 1932. The Democratic nominee, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, won all but six states and received 22 million votes, as compared to Hoover ’s15 million. Roosevelt came from a wealthy family, had served as assistant secretary of the navy and as governor of New York, and had battled polio courageously. His promised “new deal” was anxiously awaited. The day after he was inaugurated, Roosevelt requested a special session of Congress to convene and declared a week-long bank holi- day. He guaranteed that at the end of one week’s time, banks that the government found to be sound and secure would reopen. Roosevelt also announced a MORATORIUM on the export of gold. Because foreign investors required trading to be done in gold (paper money was believed to be too risky) the combination of the moratorium and the bank holiday effectively put the economy of the United States on hold. After the week had passed, Roosevelt held the first of his famous “fireside chats” via the radio to reassure the American people. As promised, the majority of the banks reopened. Many people followed Roosevelt’s advice and again placed their money in the ban ks. During those same first weeks, Roosevelt and Congress worked together to repeal PROHIBITION, allowing the sale and consumption of alcohol to resume. These moves were only the beginning of what is referred to as the Hundred Days. More legislation was passed during the first hundred days of Roosevelt’s presidency than had been passed in any similar period of any previous presidency. Roosevelt worked with young law- yers, professors, and social workers to create legislation that was meant to get people work- ing and spending once again. To relieve the immediate need for food and shelter, Roosevelt ushered through Congress the Federal Emer- gency Relief Administration, which granted $500 million in aid to the states for distribution to people in need. Next came congressional approval of Roo- sevelt’s Civilian Conservation Corps Act (ch. 383, 50 Stat. 319). The government paid young men between the ages of 18 and 25 for six months to one year to do construction or conservation work. The men built bridges, dams, and roads and planted more than 17 million acres of new forests. They were paid $30 per month and were required to send most of their money home to their families. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA), 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 601 et seq., also was passed during these first hundred days. Farmers were growing large surpluses of crops such as wheat and corn, and these surpluses drove GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 256 NEW DEAL prices down even though the farmers’ expenses were rising. The AAA sought to reduce the surplus of crops by paying farmers not to grow them. Although some Americans questioned this practice because so many people were starving, the theory of the plan bore out, and by 1936 farmers were receiving $1.02 per bushel of wheat, as compared to the 38 cents per bushel that they had received in 1932. Toward the end of the Hundred Days, Congress enacted the NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOV- ERY ACT OF 1933 (NIRA), (ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195) and created the National Industrial Recovery Administration to implement the act ’s goals. The legislation’s main goal was to stimulate dormant factories and industries and to get people back to work. The National Industrial Recovery Administration believed that the best way to do this was to create a series of codes (746 in all) that companies had to follow in the marketplace. These codes regulated everything from a minimum hourly wage to the maximum number of hours per week that an employee could work. They controlled advertising and business production and output. Fearing a return of the high unemployment rate, one code forbade industry from developing technological advances that would lead to employee layoffs. NIRA represents the first direct government involvement in business operations. It allowed industries and business to engage in previously prohibited monopolistic price-fixing so that one manufacturer could not underprice its goods to drive a competitor out of business. The legislation allowed workers to unionize and to bargain collectively for better pay and working conditions. This was all done with the goal of increasing business profits, which, in turn, would create more jobs and more spending. How- ever, NIRA posed difficulties for many business owners who were forced to restructure their business operations. One of the most popular programs of the New Deal was the Works Progress Administra- tion (WPA), which created more than 250,000 projects, putting millio ns of people to work. Most of the money and effort went to public construction of bridges, roads, and government buildings such as post offices. Writers were employed to interview town residents and to compile local histories. Actors and musicians were hired to bring theater and live music to residents of rural towns, who otherwise had little opportunity to see live performances. After the first 18 months of the New Deal, five million previously unemployed people had found work. However, Roosevelt and his New Deal were not without their critics. When wealthy people realized that Roosevelt was intending not to return the country to the pre- crash STATUS QUO but rather to reform the entire national economic structure, they soon turned on him, calling him a traitor to his class. They disliked Roosevelt for the new taxes imposed on them, and some believed rumors that Roosevelt wanted to make the United States a socialist state under his dictatorship. The leaders of big business, once beholden to Roosevelt for getting their businesses bac k on track, were now among his most forceful critics. Wealthy people were not Roosevelt’s only critics. People to the political left of Roosevelt thought that he had let the common citizen down. Socialists such as UPTON SINCLAIR and some Democrats such as Huey Long, the senator from Louisiana, complained that Roo- sevelt and his New Deal did not do enough for the lower and middle classes of society. Despite criticism from many angles, the majority of U.S. citizens loved Roosevelt, re-electing him One of the most popular programs of the New Deal was the Works Progress Administration, which created more than 250,000 projects, putting millions of people to work. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION NEW DEAL 257 . College of John Nelson 179 1–1860 ❖ 179 1 Born, Frederick County, Md. 1843–45 Served as U.S. attorney general under Tyler 1861–65 U.S. Civil War ▼▼ ▼▼ 177 5 177 5 18251825 18501850 1 875 1 875 18001800 177 5–83 American. entrusted of any unusual characteristics of the weapon; and (7) to retake possession of the weapon upon observing signs of misuse. Failure to discharge any of the duties can be offered as proof of negligent. under the international law of neutrality. Samuel Nelson. PHOTOGRAPH BY MATTHEW BRADY. COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION NEUTRALITY