Pledged property must be in the possession of a pledgee. This can be accomplished in one of two ways. The property can be in the pledgee’s actual possession, meaning physical possession (for example, Mary keeps John’s stereo at her house). Otherwise, it can be in the constructive possession of the pledgee, meaning that the pledgee has some control over the property, which typically occurs when actual possession is impossible. For example, a pledgee has constructive possession of the contents of a pledgor’s safety deposit box at a bank when the pledgor gives the pledgee the only keys to the box. In pledges both parties have certain rights and liabilities. The contract of pledge represents only one set of these: the terms under which the debt or obligation will be fulfilled and the pledged property returned. On the one hand, the pledgor’s rights extend to the safekeeping and protection of his property while it is in possession of the pledgee. The property cannot be used without permission unless use is necessary for its preservation, such as exercising a live animal. Unauthorized use of the property is called conversion and may make the pledgee liable for damages; thus, Mary should not use John’s stereo while in possession of it. For the pledgee, on the other hand, there is more than the duty to care for the pledgor’s property. The pledgee has the right to the possession and control of any income accruing during the period of the pledge, unless an agreement to the contrary exists. This income reduces the amount of the debt, and the pledgor must account for it to the pledgee. Additionally, the pledgee is entitled to be reimbursed for expenses incurred in retaining, caring for, and protecting the property. Finally, the pledgee need not remain a party to the contract of pledge indefinitely. She can sell or assign her interest under the contract of the pledge to a third par ty. However, the pledgee must notif y the ple dgor that the contract of pledge has been sold or reassigned; otherwise, she is guilty of conversion. PLESSY V. FERGUSON An 1896 dec ision by the U.S. SUPREME C OURT, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256, upheld the constitutionality of an 1890 Louisian a statute requiring white and “colored” persons t o be furnished “separate but equal” accommodations on railway pas- senger cars. The PLAINTIFF, Homer Adolph Plessy, who was seven-eights Caucasian and one-eighth African, paid for a first-class seat on a Louisiana railroad. He took a seat in the coach that was reserved for white passengers, but the conduc- tor told him to leave the “white” car and go to the “colored” coach under threat of being expelled from the train and arrested. When Plessy refused, he was ejected from the train and imprisoned. He was prosecuted for violating the law, which he asserted was unconstitutional and violated the THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution, which abolished SLAVERY, and the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT to the Constitution, which prohibited certain restrictive LEGISLATIVE ACTS by the states. The Supreme Court agreed to decide the constitutionality of the law. It reasoned that, although the Thirteenth Amendment intended to abolish slavery, it was insufficient to protect the “colored” people from certain harsh state laws that treated them unequally. The Four- teenth Amendment was enacted “to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law (but) it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color or to enforce social as distinguished from political equality. ” The Court decided that the law establi shing SEPARATE BUT EQUAL public accommodations and facilities was a reasonable exercise of the POLICE POWER of a state to promote the public good. “If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of voluntary consent of the individuals.” Only Justice JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN dis- sented, on the ground that such a law “inter- feres with the personal freedom of citizens” under the guise of legal equality. He maintained that the constitutional guarantees in this country were to be color-blind. In 1954 the Court overruled this decision and recognized that separate but equal educa- tional facilities were inherently unequal in BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, KANSAS, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954). Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court deci- sions prohibited racial SEGREGATION in any public facilities and accommodations. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 518 PLESSY V. FERGUSON FURTHER READINGS Anderson, Wayne. 2004. Plessy v. Ferguson: Legalizing Segregation. New York: Rosen. Medley, Keith Weldon. 2003. We as Freemen: Plessy v. Ferguson. Gretna, La.: Pelican. Postema, Gerald J., ed. 1997. Racism and the Law: The Legacy and Lessons of Plessy. Boston: Kluwer Academic. Thomas, Brook, ed. 1997. Plessy v. Ferguson: A Brief History with Documents. Boston: Bedford. CROSS REFERENCES Civil Rights; Civil Rights Movement; Integration; Jim Crow Laws; “Plessy v. Ferguson” (Appendix, Primary Document). PLURALITY The opinion of an appellate court in which more justices join than in any concurring opinion. The excess of votes cast for one candidate over those votes cast for any other candidate. Appellate panels are made up of three or more justices. In some cases the justices disagree over the outcome of the case to such an extent that a majority opinion cannot be achieved. (A majority opini on is one in which the number of justices who join is larger than the number of justices who do not.) To resolve such disagree- ments and reach a final decision, two or more justices publish opinions called concurring opinions, and the other justices decide which of these concurring opinions they will join. The concurring opinion in which more justices join than any other is called a plurality opinion. Plurality decisions can reflect a disagreement among the justices over a legal issue in a case or can reveal deeper ideological differences among the members of the court. The term plurality is also used to describe the outcome of an election that involves more than two candidates. The candidate who receives the greatest number of votes is said to have received a plurality of the votes. In contrast, the term majority is used to describe the outcome of an election involving only two In Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the Supreme Court maintained that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to enforce social equality for races, a decision that stood for 58 years. CORBIS-BETTMANN. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION PLURALITY 519 candidates; the winner is said to have received a majority of the votes. A candidate who has a plurality of the votes can also have a majority of the votes, but only if she receives a number of votes greater than that cast for all the other candidates combined. Mathematically, a candidate with a plurality has a majority if she receives more than one-half of the total number of votes cast. If candidate JOHN DOE has a plurality, he has earned more votes than any other candidate, but whether he has a majority depends on how many votes he won. CROSS REFERENCE Court Opinion. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 520 PLURALITY . years. CORBIS-BETTMANN. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION PLURALITY 519 candidates; the winner is said to have received a majority of the votes. A candidate who has a plurality of the votes can. deci- sions prohibited racial SEGREGATION in any public facilities and accommodations. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 518 PLESSY V. FERGUSON FURTHER READINGS Anderson, Wayne. 2004. Plessy. he has a majority depends on how many votes he won. CROSS REFERENCE Court Opinion. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 520 PLURALITY