Japan and the shaping of post Vietnam War Southeast Asia Tai Lieu Chat Luong Japan and the Shaping of Post Vietnam War Southeast Asia The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the consequent out[.]
Tai Lieu Chat Luong Japan and the Shaping of Post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the consequent outbreak of the Cambodian conflict brought Southeast Asia into instability and deteriorated relations between Vietnam and the subsequently established Vietnam-backed government in Cambodia on the one hand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries on the other As a result of the conflict, the Soviet Union established a foothold in Southeast Asia while China, through its support of the anti-Vietnam Cambodian resistance, improved relations with Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand Japan’s Fukuda Doctrine – its declared priorities of promoting cooperative and friendly relations between Communist Indochinese nations and non-Communist ASEAN countries – became increasingly at odds with Japan’s role as a member of the Free World in the broader Cold War confrontation Tokyo had to steer a path between Washington’s hard-line policy of isolating Vietnam and its own desire to prevent regional destabilization Against this background, this book addresses the following questions: what was Japan’s response to the challenges to its objectives and interests in Southeast Asia and to the Fukuda Doctrine? What role did Japan play for the settlement of the conflict in Cambodia? How did Japan’s diplomacy on the Cambodian problem affect the Japanese role in the region? It argues that Japan’s contribution was more active than has widely been recognized Andrea Pressello is Assistant Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan Politics in Asia series New Dynamics in US–China Relations Contending for the Asia Pacific Edited by Mingjiang Li and Kalyan M. Kemburi Regional Community Building in East Asia Countries in Focus Edited by Lee Lai To and Zarina Othman Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia The ideology of the family-state David Bourchier Contested Ideas of Regionalism in Asia Baogang He China’s Power and Asian Security Edited by Mingjiang Li and Kalyan M. 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accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 All rights reserved No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Names: Pressello, Andrea, author Title: Japan and the shaping of post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia : Japanese diplomacy and the Cambodian conflict, 1978–1993 / Andrea Pressello Description: New York : Routledge, 2018 | Series: Politics in Asia series | Includes bibliographical references and index Identifiers: LCCN 2017011433| ISBN 9781138200234 (hardback) | ISBN 9781315514932 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Japan–Foreign relations–Southeast Asia | Southeast Asia–Foreign relations–Japan | Cambodian-Vietnamese Conflict, 1977–1991–Peace Classification: LCC DS525.9.J3 P74 2018 | DDC 959.604/2–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017011433 ISBN: 978-1-138-20023-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-51493-2 (ebk) Typeset in Galliard by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear Contents Acknowledgments vi Introduction: regional conflict, Cold War, and Japan’s Southeast Asia policy 1 Southeast Asia in Japan’s postwar foreign policy, 1950s–1960s US “exit” and Japanese “entry”: post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia and the Fukuda Doctrine, 1969–1977 44 The Cambodian conflict and the polarization of Southeast Asia: Japan’s response, 1978–1980 91 New Cold War and Japan’s pursuit of its regional agenda, 1981–1982 131 The unfolding of Japan’s “twin-track” diplomacy in Southeast Asia, 1983–1984 157 Changing Cold War environment and the intensification of Japan’s peace diplomacy, 1985–1988 183 The Cambodian peace process and the shaping of post-Cold War Southeast Asia: Japan’s role, 1989–1993 215 Conclusion 245 Index 255 Acknowledgments This book draws largely from the research I carried out as a doctoral student in the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo I am highly grateful to Professors Iwama Yoko, Michishita Narushige, Miyagi Taizō, and Nobori Amiko for their valuable guidance and comments on my research My gratitude goes also to the anonymous reviewers for their useful inputs and suggestions Professor Sudō Sueo’s comments on part of my research at the 2011 Annual Convention of the Japan Association of International Relations have also been important for the realization of this work Finally, I am indebted to the several diplomats, officials, politicians, and scholars who, both in Japan and overseas, have patiently answered my questions and shared their experiences and inspiring insights with me I am solely responsible for the analyses and any factual errors of this book This book is derived in part from articles published in Japanese Studies on March 31, 2014 (available online: www.tandfonline.com/ http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/10371397.2014.886506), in Japan Forum on July 1, 2013 (available online: www.tandfonline.com/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09555803.2013.8 02368), and in Asian Studies Review on March 5, 2013 (available online: www tandfonline.com/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2012.760531) In this book, Japanese names are written according to the Japanese system of first indicating the last name and then the given name The only exceptions are in the footnotes The sources in Japanese language used in this book have been translated in English by the author Introduction Regional conflict, Cold War, and Japan’s Southeast Asia policy The objective of this book is to clarify Japan’s role in the shaping of the post- Vietnam War order in Southeast Asia by examining its diplomacy on the Cambodian conflict (1978–1993), the main source of regional instability in those years In the period after World War II, the Japanese considered Southeast Asia1 to be important in the process of rebuilding their economy and international role The fact that Japan did not have diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China until the early 1970s and had a difficult relationship with the Korean Peninsula increased the importance of Southeast Asian countries for the Japanese This region’s natural resources and markets were deemed attractive in Japan When Tokyo began to provide official development assistance (ODA), a large part of it – as well as increasingly of Japanese trade and investments – went to Southeast Asia During the 1970s, a growingly confident Japan, whose economy had by then become the second largest in the Free World, looked at Southeast Asia also as instrumental to enhance its international role by acting as a sort of “representative” of this region in the developed world The fact that vital sea routes, through which oil from the Middle East was shipped to resource-scant Japan, were located in proximity of Southeast Asian waters further increased the strategic importance of this region, especially in the aftermath of the first oil shock of 1973 Realizing peace and stability in Southeast Asia became, therefore, one of the important issues for Japan’s foreign policy However, the fluid regional environment during the 1970s complicated the realization of such an objective The end of the war in Vietnam brought significant changes in Southeast Asia A division was consolidated between the non- communist countries of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) on the one hand – which, during the 1970s, included Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – and, on the other, the Indochinese communist regimes of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam After the rather traumatic experience of its participation in the Vietnamese conflict, the United States reduced its involvement and military presence in the region This created room for the Soviet Union and China to increase their influence in Southeast Asia, a scenario that the Japanese expected to have adverse implications for Southeast Asia’s stability and for Tokyo’s interests in that region With one of the driving forces being the objective of stopping such a scenario from materializing, Japan 2 Introduction intensified efforts to promote development in Southeast Asia and cooperative and friendly relations between Indochinese and ASEAN countries; this was expected to strengthen their resilience and make them less vulnerable to external sources of destabilization These objectives were central in the policy toward Southeast Asia that Japan formulated during the 1970s One of its major articulations was contained in the speech that Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo delivered in Manila in August 1977, which became known as the Fukuda Doctrine He made clear that Japan had no ambition to become a military power, and that it desired positive relations with Southeast Asian nations based on mutual trust and understanding The third pillar of the speech enunciated Japan’s commitment to help realize peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia by supporting the development of the ASEAN countries and the establishment of peaceful and cooperative relations between them and the communist states of Indochina The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the consequent outbreak of the Cambodian conflict brought Southeast Asia back into instability and deteriorated relations between Vietnam (and the newly established Vietnam- backed government in Cambodia) and ASEAN countries As a result of the conflict, the Soviet Union established a foothold in Southeast Asia by obtaining access to Vietnamese military bases China supported the communist Khmer Rouge (the largest among the anti-Vietnam Cambodian resistance groups) and their leader, Pol Pot It especially improved relations with Thailand, the country most exposed to the effects of the Cambodian conflict and through whose territory Chinese aid was allegedly provided to the Khmer Rouge The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 significantly heightened the Cold War tension, marking the beginning of the so-called New Cold War In Southeast Asia, the result was the deepening of divisions between, on the one hand, countries that opposed the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia – including the United States, China, and the ASEAN nations – and, on the other hand, the Soviet Union and Vietnam The Cambodian conflict and the invasion of Afghanistan complicated Japan’s implementation of the Fukuda Doctrine in that they enlarged the division between ASEAN and Indochinese countries – especially Vietnam – and, at the same time, created an incongruity between the doctrine’s third pillar and Japan’s role as a member of the Free World in the broader Cold War confrontation Against this background, this book addresses the following questions: what was Japan’s response to these challenges to its objectives and interests in Southeast Asia and to the Fukuda Doctrine? What role did Japan play for the settlement of the conflict in Cambodia? How did Japan’s diplomacy on the Cambodian problem affect the Japanese role in the region? A case of passive diplomacy? It is argued in the literature that, as a result of the Cambodian conflict and of the New Cold War, Japan – in line with its being a member of the Free World – gave up the pursuit of the Fukuda Doctrine and of bridging efforts between the ASEAN countries and Indochina Therefore, the argument goes, Japan put on Introduction hold its active diplomacy and its search for a larger political role in the region until the late 1980s, when the waning of the Cold War created the conditions for a Japanese involvement in the Cambodian peace process after 1989 In his important work, Wakatsuki Hidekazu argues that after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Japan abandoned its Southeast Asia policy based on the Fukuda Doctrine, which had become inoperable following the outbreak of the Cambodian conflict.2 With Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao leaving office in late 1979, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and with the Iran hostage crisis, Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi’s policy toward Vietnam changed and became firmer.3 Despite initial attempts to maintain in existence the Fukuda Doctrine, the argument goes, during 1980, Japan eventually took a firm stance as “a member of the West,” especially under Prime Minister Ōhira and Foreign Minister Itō In this context, the third principle of the Fukuda Doctrine became inoperable, and the age of Japan’s omnidirectional foreign policy ended.4 Hence, Wakatsuki points out that, from that moment, Japan concentrated on its status as a “member of the West” and, especially under Foreign Minister Itō, actively backed ASEAN and China’s hostile stance against Vietnam, leading to the deterioration of Tokyo’s Southeast Asia policy and to the shelving of the Fukuda Doctrine’s third principle.5 Consequently, Japan abandoned the policy of maintaining a “dialogue pipe” with Vietnam, strongly criticized Hanoi, and supported the Khmer Rouge’s hold on the Cambodian seat at the United Nations (UN).6 Thus, by shifting to a firm posture as a “member of the West,” Japan gave up attempts to pursue an independent political role based on preserving a free hand in its diplomacy.7 In the words of international relations scholar Sudō Sueo, by 1980, “Japan’s Southeast Asian policy, which had been centered on aid to Vietnam, had lost its direction,” as the outbreak of the Cambodian conflict “resulted in the termination of Tokyo’s pursuit of a political role” and in the failure of “the policy of urging coexistence.”8 Under Prime Minister Ōhira and Foreign Minister Itō, Japan shifted toward a foreign policy as a “member of the West,” thereby abandoning its independent diplomacy and dialogue with Vietnam.9 Sudō claims that, despite Foreign Ministers Sonoda Sunao and Abe Shintarō’s proposals on the Cambodian problem, respectively, in 1981 and 1984, Japan supported the ASEAN’s anti-Vietnam stance by suspending aid and aligning with “a policy of isolating Vietnam in every possible way [which] has been formulated as an implicit ‘consensus’ among ASEAN, China, the United States and Japan.” Hence, “politically, Japan’s role in promoting a solution to the Kampuchean issue has been minimal, going little beyond the promise of aiding the post-settlement reconstruction of the Indochinese states.”10 As a result of the tendency in the literature to consider Japan’s pursuit of the Fukuda Doctrine as having ended by around 1980 and, accordingly, to regard the Japanese diplomacy on the Cambodian problem as passive, previous studies claim that Japan’s active contribution to peace efforts in Cambodia began only several years later, when Japan restarted actively pursuing the Fukuda Doctrine and playing a political role to stabilize and integrate Southeast Asia Indeed, Japan’s initial involvement in efforts to settle the Cambodian conflict has been 250 Conclusion the Cambodian problem As shown in this work, throughout the period of the Cambodian conflict, the basic objectives of Japan’s Southeast Asia policy as formulated in the 1970s continued to be valued and pursued in Japan’s regional policy Several of the foreign ministers who served in that period, such as Sonoda Sunao, Sakurauchi Yoshio, Abe Shintarō, and Nakayama Tarō proved particularly eager to promote the ideas of Prime Minister Fukuda’s 1977 Manila speech and some of them were particularly keen on improving Japanese relations with Vietnam Other high-ranking MOFA officials at the vice foreign minister and deputy foreign minister levels (such as Owada Hisashi and Kuriyama Takakazu) were also eager to have Japan step up its political role in the region by building on Tokyo’s diplomacy on the Cambodian problem Prime ministers in this period seemed to rely on MOFA for policymaking on the Cambodian problem, either because their ideas were in line with MOFA’s approach or because their attention was focused on other matters, such as Japan’s relations with the United States For example, for Prime Minister Nakasone, Japan’s diplomacy on the Cambodian problem helped his efforts to enhance Japan’s international role beyond that of an economic power For others, such as prime ministers Takeshita, Kaifu, and Miyazawa, Japan’s involvement in the Cambodian settlement provided a support basis for their administrations’ political initiatives in Asia or beyond Throughout the Cambodian conflict, the Asia Bureau – which had been central in the formulation of the Fukuda Doctrine and which was strongly motivated to have Japan playing a more prominent part in Asia – continued to have significant influence on Japanese policymaking on Southeast Asia, thereby making an important contribution to Japan’s consistent pursuit of its regional agenda The changing international and Japanese domestic environment is another factor to consider in explaining Japan’s diplomacy in Southeast Asia At the time of the Vietnam War, there were already several Japanese politicians or officials within MOFA who wanted Japan to play a role in ending that conflict and to engage with North Vietnam with the aim of promoting stability and cooperation in Southeast Asia However, at that time, domestic and international constraints hindered such aspirations The internal situation in Japan, characterized by the presence of widespread anti-Vietnam War opinions, made the Vietnam issue a highly sensitive one, thereby limiting Japan’s involvement in it At the same time, US direct involvement in Vietnam also limited the unfolding of Japan’s initiatives After the end of the conflict in Vietnam, these constraints weakened significantly, as seen in the decline of the Japanese public’s interest in Southeast Asian issues and the US disengagement from Indochina Therefore, from the mid-1970s, space was created for Japan to step up its regional diplomacy As a result, differently from the period of the Vietnam War when Japan acted fully as “a member of the Free World” in terms of its aligning closely with US regional strategy and toward Vietnam in particular, after the re-emergence of conflict and instability in Southeast Asia in the late 1970s, Japan pursued its own agenda in that region with more determination, despite the already mentioned divergences with Washington A more confident Japan and a less involved United States are important factors in understanding this change Conclusion 251 Evaluating Japan’s Southeast Asia diplomacy during the Cambodian conflict On several aspects, Japan’s diplomacy proved far too cautious and not efficacious One example is Japanese attempts to reduce the distance between Hanoi and Washington on the one hand, and Hanoi and Beijing on the other In particular, considering Vietnam’s high perception of threat from China, helping to improve Sino-Vietnamese relations was one of the keys in convincing the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia, hence opening the way to the restoration of peace in Indochina China was also an important actor, considering it was the main supporter of the Khmer Rouge, the largest Cambodian resistance faction However, Japan was fairly cautious in its attempts to persuade Beijing to soften its position on Vietnam During the 1970s, Japan had finally realized the long- awaited normalization of its relations with Beijing and had begun to provide economic assistance to it Therefore, Tokyo was unwilling to strain this important relationship by appearing too critical of the Chinese stance on the Cambodian problem Similarly, Japan was not persuasive enough when suggesting that the United States adopt a more flexible approach toward Hanoi Certainly, Japan’s unwillingness to damage relations with the United States, as well as the firm American anti-Soviet/Vietnam stance, made Tokyo’s diplomacy more timid in this respect This case shows the difficulties that Japan’s Southeast Asia diplomacy faced at the time of the Cambodian conflict in pursuing autonomous initiatives outside the framework of the bilateral relationship with the United States, in which the American influence is clearly strong Japan’s regional diplomacy at the time of the Cambodian problem has to be evaluated also from the point of view of how it relates to the process of mending Japan’s relations with the countries of Southeast Asia; a region in which the legacy of Japanese deeds during the Pacific War still lingered As mentioned above, Tokyo’s efforts to progress that process intensified in the 1970s At that time, in a phase in which the ASEAN countries had to deal with the uncertainties resulting from the post-Vietnam War, reduced American involvement in the region, and the parallel continuation of the communist threat, Japan showed willingness to stand by ASEAN countries by launching the Fukuda Doctrine and by increasing ODA to the region When the Cambodian conflict broke out, Japan moved to play a role for its settlement but was careful not to “walk alone”; instead, it closely cooperated with ASEAN nations, paying particular attention to the position of Thailand Japan’s cooperation with ASEAN countries on the Cambodian problem helped strengthen and expand their relations Kawashima Yutaka, the director of the First Southeast Asia Division in the early 1980s, stated that, before the Cambodian conflict, the Japanese dialogue with ASEAN was only on trade matters; however, after that conflict broke out, “all of a sudden, […] we had a shared interest on some security and political issues with ASEAN, and that was something new.”4 In this sense, the expansion of Japanese interactions with Southeast Asian countries to more sensitive political issues, such as during the Cambodian conflict, can be seen as having marked a 252 Conclusion further step in the process of reconciliation The fact that several Southeast Asian nations and actors gave credit to Japanese diplomatic efforts in Cambodia and expected Japan to play an important role in the peace process can be seen as signs of a higher degree of readiness in the region to accept a more politically involved Japan The fact that, for example, there was no major opposition in the region to Japanese political initiatives, such as the speeches delivered in 1991 by Prime Minister Kaifu in Singapore and by Foreign Minister Nakayama in Kuala Lumpur – in which Japan made clear its willingness to play a greater political role in the region to foster regional political and security dialogue and cooperation – and the fact that the dispatch of Japanese SDF to the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia did not generally provoke strong reactions in the region, reflected Japan’s improved image in Southeast Asia So, what was the impact of this example of Japan’s diplomacy on that country’s foreign policy? One result of the Japanese initiatives on the Cambodian conflict is that they contributed to expanding what is sometimes called Japan’s “economic diplomacy” in Asia to encompass political and security issues After ten years of diplomatic involvement in peace efforts in Cambodia, Japan (which had already established itself in Southeast Asia as a large trade partner, investor, and ODA donor) strengthened its confidence to the point of taking up an unprecedented role of promoter of regional dialogue and cooperation on political and security affairs As mentioned, Prime Minister Kaifu’s 1991 speech in Singapore and the following proposal by Foreign Minister Nakayama – both of which touched upon Japan’s role in settling the Cambodian conflict – symbolized Tokyo’s readiness to contribute to the shaping of the emerging post-Cold War regional architecture, and not by virtue of economic power alone In relation to this, Richard H Solomon, the US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs from 1989 to 1992, noted in hindsight that Japan had been an active player in the Cambodian peace process.5 He observed that, despite Japanese diplomacy being “still burdened with the legacy of the Second World War,” during the Cambodian peace negotiations, Japan demonstrated a more assertive diplomacy.6 According to Solomon, as an economic power, the Japanese “might have felt that they could be more assertive.”7 A related observation is that, through its involvement in Cambodia, Japan gained significant experience in conflict resolution and peace-building Kohno Masaharu, the director of the First Southeast Asia Division from 1989 to 1992, revealed that a Japanese “hidden agenda” during the peace process was that Cambodia represented “the most appropriate case study for us” because Japan was willing to play a more proactive and constructive role in future peace efforts.8 Indeed, from the 1990s, Japan became involved in other endeavors to settle disputes in the region For example, in 1997, Tokyo carried out mediating efforts during a crisis in Cambodia resulting from a violent dispute between the two prime ministers, Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh The Japanese presented a plan to solve the crisis, eventually contributing to restoring order in the country and to the holding of national elections in 1998 In that endeavor, Conclusion 253 Japan could count on its well-established relationship with both parties in the dispute In 1999, Japan contributed to peace efforts in East Timor; later, it dispatched its SDF to participate in the peacekeeping operation in that country and cooperated with attempts to restore peace in Aceh, Indonesia Starting from the 1930s, Japan gradually terminated its cooperative approach in its international relations and decided to walk alone in pursuit of its national interests, leading to confrontation and war with the West and provoking damage and suffering in Asia In the postwar period, through cooperation with the West and Asia, Japan rebuilt its economy and gradually returned to play a role in international affairs, including to help achieving regional peace, development, and prosperity through its economic assistance, investments, and trade In the case discussed in this book, by cooperating with Western and Asian actors, Japan helped to tackle a major challenge to regional peace and stability, namely the Cambodian conflict Japan’s Southeast Asia policy at the time of this conflict had to deal with several constraints – such as the already mentioned limited space for Tokyo to pursue autonomous foreign-policy initiatives outside the framework of the bilateral relationship with the United States, the difficult international environment, and the historical legacy vis-à-vis Asian countries Nevertheless, it can be said that the Japanese showed determination to pursue their regional agenda despite these constraints In the end, Japan could make a contribution to the restoration of peace in Cambodia and could earn trust in Southeast Asia for its efforts Certainly, today’s regional environment has changed significantly The Cold War has ended and several of the Southeast Asian nations have achieved high levels of economic, political, and social development, while China has emerged as a regional economic and military power In this context, Japan – whose economy has represented the major source of its regional and global influence during the Cold War period – has been struggling to fix its economy and to define its role in the world Despite these changes and a number of new security threats in the region, a basic idea behind the Fukuda Doctrine, that is, promoting regional cooperation and peaceful coexistence and prosperity over existing differences, can be expanded beyond Southeast Asia and can still represent a valid driving force to guide Japan’s diplomacy in the whole of Asia For this approach to succeed, Japan has to show determination not to be inhibited by the constraints existing in its foreign policy but, instead, to be willing to shoulder the responsibility and accept the political risks of taking the lead on initiatives to foster peace and stability in Asia and globally This is one of the most important lessons learned from the case of Japan’s diplomacy toward Southeast Asia during the Cambodian conflict Notes “Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 30, 1976, 10:30 a.m.,” Department of State Memorandum of Conversation Document 225, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d225 (accessed October 9, 2016) 254 Conclusion Yasuhiro Nakasone, Nakasone Yasuhiro ga kataru sengo Nihon gaikō [Postwar Japan’s diplomacy told by Nakasone Yasuhiro], Takuma Nakashima et al., eds (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2012), 382 Calder, Kent E., 1988 “Japanese foreign economic policy formation: explaining the reactive state.” World Politics 40(4), 519–520, 537 For a discussion on the nature of Japan’s foreign policy, see, for example, Miyashita, A and Sato, Y., 2001 Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration New York: Palgrave Personal interview with Kawashima Yutaka, Tokyo, March 11, 2011 Richard H Solomon, Exiting Indochina: US Leadership of the Cambodia Settlement and Normalization of Relations with Vietnam (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 96 Personal Interview with Richard H Solomon, Washington DC, March 2, 2012 Ibid Personal interview with Kohno Masaharu, Rome, May 8, 2012 Index Abe, Shintarō 160, 169, 218; fourprinciple proposal 191–5; meeting with Nguyen Co Thach 171–3, 192; threepoint proposal 170–1, 191–2 Aceh, Indonesia 253 Afghanistan, Soviet Union invasion of 2, 3, 122, 246; East–West tension on 112, 115; Japan’s Southeast Asia policy and 112–15; link with Cambodian problem 113; Moscow Olympics, boycott of 113; withdrawal of Soviet troops 207, 215 Aichi, Kiichi 49 Akiyama, Teruji 53 anti-Japan demonstrations 59–61, 80 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 96–7, 139, 190 Aquino, Corazon 237 Armitage, Richard 192 ASEAN–Indochina relations 68–9, 71; on Cambodian problem 144; on creation of CGDK 151; deterioration of 116; improvement of 102; on Japanese aid to Indochina 72; Japanese role in promotion of 70; Ōkita’s proposal on 115–17; on Thai- Vietnamese clashes 116 ASEAN–Japan Development Fund 203 ASEAN–Japan Forum 78 ASEAN–Japan summit (1987) 201, 203 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 238 ASEAN–Vietnam relations 3, 107–10; on ASEAN anti-Vietnam stance 3, 115–17, 150–1, 172; ASEAN diplomatic moves and Vietnam 186–9; criticism of Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia 108; on dialogue between Vietnam and the CGDK 187; dialogue on improving 160, 163, 167 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 36, 70 Asian economic community 22 Asian financial crisis of 1997 236 Asia-Pacific regional framework of cooperation 234 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 1–2, 57, 59, 67, 186; Cambodian policy of 4, 100, 142, 144, 165–7; communist Indochina, emergence of 62; dependency on Japan 59–60; differences with China on Vietnam issue 142; on disarmament of all Cambodian factions 141–2; domino theory 62; Head of State Summit 202; heads-of-government summit 68; impact of Japanese investment in 60; invitation to Heng Samrin 142; Japanese policies on 61, 68; Japan Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 64; mistrust with Indochina 68; MOFA’s role in reducing difference with Vietnam 148–50; PMC Senior Officials Meeting 238; political unity and stability 168; Post Ministerial Conference 170, 191, 198–9, 207, 238; proposal for “direct or indirect talks” with the CGDK 193; reactions to Sonoda’s speech 144; rejection of political role for the Khmer Rouge 141; relation with Indochina see ASEAN– Indochina relations; relation with Vietnam see ASEAN–Vietnam relations; Soviet “peace offensive” toward 97; support for Democratic Kampuchea 121; trade with Japan 79, 110; Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 68 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 53 256 Index Badawi, Abdullah Ahmad 233 Baker, James A., III 235 balance of power 77, 159, 162 Bali proposal (1979) 143 Brezhnev, Leonid I 96, 136; speech in Tashkent 150 Brown, William A 165 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 97, 103, 105, 112 Bureau of Intelligence and Research (US) 219 Bush, George H W 185 Cambodian conflict (1978–1993) 1, 118; Abe’s four-principle proposal for solving 191–5; Abe’s three-point proposal for solving 170–1, 191–2; ASEAN–China contrast on 142; ASEAN’s initiatives on 100, 165–7; CGDK eight-point proposal for settlement of 187–8; China’s hard line on 117–21; Cold War tension and 122, 215–18; and deepening of regional divisions 91–4; issue of aid to Vietnam 100–2; Japan’s regional policy and settlement of 5, 117–21, 174, 191, 249–50; Japan’s support of ASEAN’s position on 105; Japan’s Vietnam policy after outbreak of 98–107; Khmer Rouge 62; Kuantan principle for settlement of 115; outbreak of 3, 92, 122, 230; political solution of 120; refugee problem 106–7; Sonoda’s proposal to solve 117, 140; Soviet humanitarian assistance 103; Soviet military support to Vietnam in 190; stalemate on 117–21; “Takeshita Initiative” and 203–8; Thailand position on 108, 165–7; Thai–Vietnamese rapprochement on 115; US policy on 185–6; Vietnamese invasion 2, 91, 132, 138, 159, 172; Vietnamese participation in settlement of 144; Vietnam’s economic difficulties and 117–21; withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from 100, 168–9, 202, 215, 228 Cambodian peace process: buffer state 199; demilitarized zone, creation of 116, 123, 140; fact-finding mission 222–3; Japanese “hidden agenda” during 252; Japan in the final years of 227–33; Japan’s diplomacy in 3, 218–27; Japan’s peace proposal 227–9; Japan’s Vietnam policy at outset of 219–21; Khmer Rouge participation in 192, 202, 222; mediation, peacekeeping, and the reconstruction of Indochina 230–3; P5’s peace plan 218, 221, 228; Paris International Conference (1989) 221–2; people’s right to self-determination 92, 100, 106, 131, 166, 175, 191, 198–9, 219; persuading Prime Minister Hun Sen 229–30; regional political and security dialogue for 236–40; and relations with Vietnam 66; Sino–Vietnamese War, impact of 94–8; tilt toward China 67; Tokyo Conference (1990) 218, 225–7; Tokyo’s establishment of contacts with the Phnom Penh government 222–5; UN peacekeeping operations 5, 204–6; UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 230 Cam Ranh Bay military base 97, 189; Soviet use of 97, 104, 139, 146, 167, 189–90; Soviet withdrawal from 190, 220 Casey, Richard 19 Chatichai, Choonhavan 207, 216, 225–6, 235 ChiCom (Chinese Communist) assistance 20, 24, 32–3 China: after Vietnam War 65–7; anti-US sentiments 22; border agreement with Burma 23; communist rule in 10; Cultural Revolution in 28; destabilizing effects in Southeast Asian countries 67; differences with ASEAN on Vietnam 142; diplomatic isolation of 216; establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan 53; formation of 8; imposition of economic and arms sanctions 216; industrialization of 9, 23; influence in Southeast Asia 22–4, 65–6, 160, 185; Japanese relations with 9; nuclear tests 28; overseas Chinese 58; relation with Vietnam 32; rise of 10; role in Vietnam War 57; stance on Vietnam 107–10; support for the Pol Pot-led group 141; Tiananmen incident (1989) 215; US rapprochement with 44–6, 51, 57, 66, 77 Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) 151, 167, 169–70, 187, 224; ASEAN’s proposal for “direct or indirect talks” with 193; eight-point proposal for a Cambodian settlement 187–8; Japan support for ASEAN’s proposal for talks 192 Index 257 Cold War 2, 4–5, 253; and Cambodian problem 122, 215–18; and Japan’s agenda in Southeast Asia 245–8; proxy-conflict in Cambodia 122; US strategy 75, 82, 123, 245; waning of 215–18; Western bloc’s efforts in Asia 190, 247 Colombo Plan 19 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 91, 94 Cultural Revolution 28 Da Nang military base (Vietnam) 96, 139 demilitarized zone: along Thai– Cambodian border 166; creation of 116, 123, 140 Democratic Kampuchea 107–9, 117, 119, 133, 142, 149; ASEAN support for 121 Deng, Xiaoping 94, 107, 184; meeting with Gorbachev 215 Diet 26, 46, 48–50, 56, 61, 63, 78, 132, 135–6, 145, 160, 220–1 domino theory 62 Dulles, John Foster 11, 13–14, 16–17, 19–20 East China Sea 139, 190 East Timor 207, 253 Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) summit (1984) 173 economic diplomacy 37, 252 Edamura, Sumio 63, 68, 77, 80, 98 Eisenhower, Dwight D 11–12, 18–19 European Economic Community (EEC) 22 Fairless, Benjamin F 18 Ford, President 62, 64, 73–4, 246 Foreign Affairs 49 Fujī, Hiroaki 136, 145; concern over Cambodian problem 146; on improvement of Sino–Soviet relations 146; mission of 144–8 Fujita, Kimio 192, 196, 200 Fujiyama, Aiichirō 20, 35 Fukuda Doctrine (1977) 2, 6, 78–81, 102, 123, 135, 139, 145, 157, 163, 189, 196, 233, 245–6, 248, 251, 253; expansion of 236–40; formulation of 218, 250; Japan’s implementation of 2–3, 122; Japan’s pursuit of 3; passive diplomacy 2–4; realization of 200; and re-emergence of conflict in Southeast Asia 91; third principle Fukuda, Takeo 2, 17, 50–1, 66, 77, 114; five-year plan to double Japan’s economic assistance 219; Manila speech 80, 218, 240; Southeast Asian policy 75–81 Fukuda, Tokuyasu 30 G-5 summit 61, 68, 76 G7 Summit 199 Geneva Accords (1988) 33, 207 Goh, Chok Tong 237 Gorbachev, Mikhail 6, 183–4, 188; meeting with Deng Xiaoping 215; visit to Beijing 215; Vladivostok speech 184 Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GRV) 54 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 18 great powers and Southeast Asia, after Vietnam War 63–7; China 65–7; Soviet Union 65; United States 63–5 guerrilla warfare 92, 93, 109, 118 Gulf crisis and war of 1990–1991 232 Gulf of Siam 190 Gulf War shock 232 Habib, Philip C 64, 66–8 Haig, Alexander 137 Hashimoto, Hiroshi 163; meeting with Ha Van Lau 164 Hatoyama, Ichirō 76, 78; Japanese Southeast Asian policies 15–17; relations with Soviet Union and China 15 Ha, Van Lau 162–3, 167, 173; meeting with Hashimoto 164 Heng, Samrin 91, 118, 141, 148, 166, 169, 187–8, 193, 201, 222, 224, 229 Hirata, Keiko Hitomi, Hiroshi 109–10 Hoang, Bich Son 192 Ho Chi Minh 32, 94, 136–7, 147, 161, 194, 230 Hodgson, James D 65 Hōgen, Shinsaku 50–1, 58 Holbrooke, Richard 105, 117, 148 Holdridge, John 137, 147, 148 Hong Kong 69, 194 Hun, Sen 207, 218, 225, 226–8, 252; on Cambodian peace process 229–30; health problems 229; talks with Sihanouk 200–3; trip to Japan 229; UN’s peace proposal 229–30 Hu, Yaobang 150 258 Index Ikeda, Hayato: on China’s influence in Southeast Asia 22–4; Income Doubling Plan 21; on Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation 24–6; Southeast Asian policies 21–6; vision for creation of “Asian EEC” 25; visit to Southeast Asia 26 Ikeda, Tadashi 206, 216, 226, 228–30 Imagawa, Yukio 82, 196, 200–2, 205, 221, 226, 228 Imperial Japan 8, 20; sphere of influence in Asia 18 Income Doubling Plan 21 Indochina’s reconstruction: funds for 50; Japanese role in 52, 54, 71; mediation, peacekeeping, and 230–3; refugee problem and 110–12; and relations with ASEAN countries see ASEAN–Indochina relations; Sino–Soviet competition on 63; Tanaka’s policies on 53; UNHCR’s relief programs 111 Indochinese Foreign Ministers Conference (1985) 187 Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation, Japan’s diplomacy on 24–6, 29–30 Indonesia Times, The 237 Information Disclosure Law Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987) 185, 215 International Committee of the Red Cross 111 International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) 231 International Conference on Kampuchea (1981) 141–4, 149, 174 International Cooperation Initiative (1988) 4, 203, 219 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 234, 235 International Peace Cooperation Law (1992) 232 International Red Cross 54 Iran–Iraq armed conflict 152 Ishii, Hajime 135 Itō, Masaya 21–2 Itō, Masayoshi 117–18, 132 Jakarta Conference on the Cambodian problem (1970) 49 Japan: accession to the OECD 21; aid policy toward Laos 164; aid policy toward Vietnam see Japan’s aid policy, toward Vietnam; Cold War objectives 247; concerns on US Asia policy 45; concerns on US rapprochement with China 45–6; diplomatic relations with the Khmer Rouge regime 62; efforts on the Cambodian problem 5, 117–21, 174, 191, 249–50; exports to Southeast Asia 16; on formation of Malaysia 25; importance of Indonesia for 25; issue of aid to Vietnam 100–2; occupation of French Indochina 8; oil embargo on 8; Pacific War 8, 14, 36–7, 60, 239, 245, 251; peace efforts in East Timor 253; Pearl Harbor attack (1941) 8; perceptions of the Soviet Union 65; reaction to Vietnam’s dry-season offensive 167; relations with Asia 10; reparations payments to the Philippines 14; repayment of prewar debts 16; Sihanouk’s visit to 168–70; trade with Vietnam 72, 73, 162, 194; Vietnam policy during Cambodian peace process 219–21; and Vietnam problem 48–53 Japan–ASEAN Comprehensive Exchange Program 203 Japan–ASEAN cooperation 158, 238 Japan Defense Agency 30, 97, 139, 189 Japanese foreign policy: aid to Laos 164; for ASEAN countries 60–1, 68; Asia policy 61; concerns over Soviet threat 97; kokusai kyōchō (international cooperation) 206; post-Vietnam War on Southeast Asia 67–73; reinvigorated diplomacy (1987–1988) 196–200; “three pillars” of 17, 21, 206; “twintrack” diplomacy see “twin-track” diplomacy (Japan); US assessment of 73–5; see also Japan’s Southeast Asian policy Japanese militarism, re-emergence of 206–7 Japanese–North Vietnamese relations 48, 51; aspect of 55; government-togovernment loans 52; improvement in 56; on Japan’s annual aid 50, 52; normalization of 56, 60; North Vietnamese trade mission to Japan 51; on post-conflict reconstruction North Korea 51; Tanaka’s policy on 53–61; trade relations 53, 72; US attitude toward 50–4 Japanese POL shipping routes 97 Japanese Self-Defense Forces 5, 205, 231, 233; peacekeeping missions 206, 232 Japanese trade and investments: Index 259 dependency of Southeast Asian countries on 27, 28; major import/ export markets 27; official development assistance (ODA) 1, 14, 27; in Southeast Asia 1, 27; with US 27 Japan Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 64 Japan–Philippines Friendship Association 17, 75 Japan’s aid policy, toward Vietnam 54, 114, 135, 164; after outbreak of war in Cambodia 98–107; ASEAN countries reaction to 100; economic assistance 98–9, 172; emergency aid 99; grants and loans 99; issue of 100–2; medical and cultural aid 193–4; official development assistance (ODA) 107, 120, 135, 161, 193; for reconstructing the Vietnamese economy 146; resumption of economic assistance 234–6; during Sino–Vietnamese conflict 98–107; trade and humanitarian aid 193; US objections to 102–7 Japan’s “economic diplomacy” in Asia 252 Japan’s Indochina policy: Abe’s fourprinciple proposal 191–5; American reactions to 147–8; initiatives to tackle the Indochinese problem 191 Japan’s postwar economic recovery: American aid program for 17; economic self-reliance 12, 18; import of natural resources from US 12; and initiative for the development of Southeast Asia 12–14; international profile, enhancement of 14–15; and Southeast Asia 8–15; and threat of communism in the region 10–12; under Yoshida administration 8–15 Japan’s regional policy, reassessment of 189–91 Japan’s Southeast Asian policy 3; after Vietnam War 4–5; anti-Japan demonstrations and 59–61; background of 70; during Cambodian conflict 249–50; changing international environment and 44–8; Cold War and 245–8; contribution to peace efforts in Cambodia 3; diplomacy in post-Vietnam War 248–9; and enhancement of political role in international affairs 76–8; evaluation of 251–3; Fukuda administration and 75–81; under Hatoyama administration 15–17; idea of establishing contacts with North Vietnam 50; under Ikeda administration 21–6; under Kishi administration 17–21; objectives of 70, 189; oil crisis 59–61; Ōkita’s proposal on 115–17; reappraisal of 59–61; reinvigorated diplomacy (1987–1988) 196–200; under Satō administration 26–36; Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 112–15; support for ASEAN’s anti-Vietnam stance 3; US support for 16; Vietnam policy under Nakasone administration 160–4; under Yoshida administration 8–15 Japan’s “strategic” diplomacy (1984): Abe–Nguyen Co Thach meeting 171–3; Abe’s three-point proposal 170–1; economic assistance to Cambodian refugees 169; and Prince Sihanouk’s visit to Japan 168–70; regional environment and 167–77; for solving Cambodia problem 167 Japan–US relationship 18, 234; on Indochina policy 147–8; on Japanese criticism of US bombings 55; on Japanese policy on North Vietnam 50–5; Japan’s international role and position within 77; Security SubCommittee meeting 110; Security Treaty 30; strengthening of 29; trade relations 26; on US rapprochement with China 45–6; on Vietnam issue 34, 164–5 Japan–US Security Consultative Committee 91 Japan–US Security Sub-Committee 97, 110 Japan–Vietnam dialogue 171–3 Japan–Vietnam Friendship Association 163 Japan–Vietnam Trade Association 72 Johnson, Alexis 33, 45–6, 55 Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation 91 Kapitsa, Mikhail 159, 184 Kawashima, Yutaka 104, 108, 137–8, 145, 152, 227, 251 Kennedy, Robert F 24, 26 kenpō kaisei (constitutional revision) 206 Khieu, Samphan 151, 169, 222, 226–7 Khmer Rouge 2–3, 62, 92, 107, 109, 118, 132, 140–1, 167–9, 185, 198, 227–8; Chinese support to 108, 119, 251; Democratic Kampuchea 107–9; genocide committed by 229; guerrilla 260 Index Khmer Rouge continued warfare 93, 109; Japanese diplomatic relations with 62; Paris peace agreements 218; participation in peace talks 192, 202, 222; political authority 201; presence in the CGDK 158; return to power 216; sabotage of Cambodian peace process 230, 232; Thai support to 152 Kikuchi, Kiyoaki 108, 198, 201 Kishi, Nobusuke: foreign-policy agenda 17; Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 18; on risk of communist influence 21; Southeast Asia Development Fund 18–21; Southeast Asia diplomacy 17–21; visit to Southeast Asia 17 Kissinger, Henry 44, 46, 55, 73–4 Kiuchi, Akitane 134–5, 172 Kohno, Masaharu 222–5, 228–9, 232, 235, 252 kokusai kyōchō (international cooperation) 206 Kuantan principle, for settlement of Cambodian conflict 115 Kuranari, Tadashi 191–5, 198–9 Kuriyama, Takakazu 196–7, 199, 203–7, 220, 223, 226–7, 238, 250 Laos 66; influence of USSR and Vietnam on 67; Japanese aid to 164; Lao People’s Democratic Republic 62 Laurel, Jose P 17 least developed countries (LDCs) 26 Le, Duan 136, 188 Lee, Kuan Yew 68, 159, 190, 207, 233, 237 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 51; and Cambodian problem 203–8; delegation’s mission to Vietnam and Cambodia 136; Research Group on Asia–Africa Problems 135 MacArthur II, Douglas 18 McNamara, Robert S 30 Mahathir, Prime Minister (Malaysia) 160, 190, 207 Malaysia 25; concerns over Soviet and Chinese influence 160; relation with Vietnam 160 Manila proposal (1981), for improving Thai–Vietnam relations 139–41, 153 Mansfield, Michael J 103, 117, 121 “Maphilindo” regional plan 25 Marshall Plan 13 Matsunaga, Nobuo 24, 162, 167 Mekong Committee 70 Miki, Prime Minister 64, 68–9, 246; Lockheed scandal 69; policies toward Asia 61; reaction to fall of Saigon 61–3; reaction to reunification of Vietnam 61–3 Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia 35–6, 70 Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia 231 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan 5, 9, 112, 198, 206; on ASEAN–Vietnam difference on Cambodian problem 148–50; Asia Affairs Bureau 10, 31, 57, 69–71, 123, 196; assessment of Chinese threat 22–3; on destabilizing effects of China’s ideological influence 67; Diplomatic Bluebook 67, 118, 139, 144, 152, 171, 176, 191, 203; Economic Cooperation Bureau 36; First Southeast Asia Division 49–50, 71, 93, 94, 99, 111, 119, 122, 133, 148, 168, 186, 197, 208, 219, 222; Foreign Policy Planning Committee 47; on future of Southeast Asia after Vietnam War 56–8; North American Affairs Bureau 31; opposition to Tanaka’s proposal 53; policymaking on the Cambodian problem 250; Regional Policy Division 69; support for US policy in Vietnam 31; UN Bureau 141 Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Japan 12, 72 missing in action (MIA) 62, 163, 186, 217, 234 Miyake, Wasuke 32, 48–51, 56, 113; secret visit to Hanoi 51 Miyazawa, Kiichi 32, 61–3, 69, 216, 231, 235, 238, 240, 250 Moertopo, Ali 64 Mori, Haruki 50 Motono, Moriyuki 201, 202 Murata, Ryōhei 203, 205–6 Nakae, Yōsuke 31, 48, 51, 55, 66, 69, 71, 77, 79–81, 93, 99 Nakamura, Takeshi 70, 94–6, 98, 113, 120, 122–3, 132 Index 261 Nakasone, Yasuhiro 171, 198; China factor 159; on developing positive relations with Vietnam 157; Reagan– Nakasone summit (1983) 159; Southeast Asian policy 157–64; speech in Kuala Lumpur 158; Vietnam policy 160–4; visit to Indonesia 158; visit to Southeast Asia 158–60; visit to South Korea 157; visit to United States 157 Nakayama, Tarō 218, 226, 227, 230, 234, 238, 239, 250, 252 National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 12th 150 National Diet Members’ League for Japan– Vietnam Friendship 73, 136, 145, 235 nation building, Japan’s role for supporting 46 Natsume, Haruo 65 New Cold War 2, 112 Nguyen, Co Thach 135–6, 151, 160, 163, 167–8, 196, 200, 221; criticism toward Japan for supporting ASEAN 176; materialization of Japan visit 174–7; meeting with Abe 171–3 Nguyen, Dy Nien 199 Nguyen, Giap 135 Nguyen, Van Linh 188, 197 Nishiyama, Takehiko 69, 81, 94, 114 Nixon Doctrine 44, 63 Nixon, Richard M 44–5; Asia policy 45; statement in Guam 44, 46 Noda, Eijirō 113, 131, 136–7 non-aligned movement 160, 221 non-interference, principle of 23, 92, 100, 105 North Vietnam: Japan’s recognition of 57; relations with Japan see Japanese–North Vietnamese relations; trade with Japan 72; trade with Soviet Union 72 official development assistance (ODA) 1, 14, 27, 82, 107, 193, 203, 252; Japanese ODA to Southeast Asia 28; resumption of 234; to Vietnam 107, 120, 135, 161 Ōhira, Masayoshi 93, 95, 109–10, 117 oil shock of 1973 1, 59–61 Okazaki, Hisahiko 46 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 21, 76 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 59 Owada, Hisashi 76, 80–1, 218, 226–7, 229–31, 233, 250 P5’s peace plan 218, 221, 228 Pacific War 8, 14, 36–7, 60, 239, 245, 251 Paris International Conference on Cambodia (1989) 4, 221–2, 230 Paris Peace Accords on Vietnam (1973) 44, 53, 55, 60, 196, 218 passive diplomacy, case of 2–4 peacekeeping operations (PKO) 204, 231; Japanese effort to play a role in 206; Japanese Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF) cooperation with 205 Peacock, Andrew S 117 Pearl Harbor attack (1941) People’s Daily 162 People’s Republic of Kampuchea 91–2 perestroika 183 Pham, Van Dong 136 PKO Law (1992) 233 Pol Pot 2, 92–3, 107–8, 133, 140, 158, 168, 175, 184, 187, 219, 221; China’s support for 141; military opposition to the Vietnamese 107–8 post-Vietnam War policy on Southeast Asia, Japanese 67–73 Prem, Prime Minister (Thailand) 115, 159, 190, 200 prisoner of war (POW) 217, 234 Ranariddh, Prince 232, 252 Reagan–Nakasone summit (1983) 164 Reagan, Ronald W 152, 159, 164, 185, 216 refugee camps, attacks on 116–18 refugee problem, Indochinese 110–12, 204; aid distribution to Cambodian refugees 111; economic, social, and political impact of 110; Geneva International Conference on the Indochinese Refugee Problem 111; humanitarian aspect of 111; Japan’s proposal to tackle 111; Japan’s support for Thailand on 111; negative effects of 110; threat to Southeast Asia’s stability 110; UNHCR’s budget for 192, 222; UNHCR’s relief programs for 111 regional power centers, reemergence of 217 Reischauer, Edwin O 26, 30–1, 34 Saigon, fall of 61–3; US reaction to 62 Sakurauchi, Yoshio 148, 165; appointment as foreign minister 145; pro-Vietnam stance 144–8; visit to Washington 148; voluntary refugee acceptance centers 145 262 Index Satō, Eisaku 45; dealing with Vietnam War problem 30–5; Indonesian issue 29–30; on preservation of Japanese interests in Southeast Asia 27; on regional cooperation 35–6; on relations with China 28; Southeast Asian policies 26–36 Satoh, Yukio 138, 189, 239 Scowcroft, Brent 62 sea lanes of communication 122, 189, 220 self-determination, principle of 92, 100, 106, 131, 166, 175, 191, 198–9, 219 Shevardnadze, Eduard 183–4, 190, 197 Shultz, George P 216 Sihanouk, Norodom 168–70, 184, 201, 208, 216, 221, 227; Japan’s support of peace process 204; talks with Hun Sen 200–3 Sino–Japanese relations: normalization of 66; on role of Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea 107–8; Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1978) 96 Sino–Mongolian relations 215 Sino–Soviet rivalry 44, 146, 195; on Cambodian issue 184; and impact of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan 215; for influence on Indochinese nations 63; normalization of 151; policy of solving “three obstacles” 150–1, 184, 207; Soviet willingness to reduce 150; and Vietnam’s diplomatic offensive 150–2 Sino–US relations: on issue of North Vietnam 51; on US rapprochement with China 44–6, 51, 57, 66, 77 Sino–Vietnamese conflict (1979) 109, 135, 158, 169, 189; American concerns over 96–7; anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 97; ASEAN declaration for ending 95; ASEAN reaction to 108; impact on Cambodian situation 94; Japanese concerns over 94–7; Japan’s Vietnam policy after outbreak of 98–107; and Soviet foothold in Southeast Asia 94–8; Soviet support to Vietnam 96–7; withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam 95 Sino–Vietnamese relations 32, 91, 164; armed conflict see Sino–Vietnamese conflict (1979); normalization of 184; over Cambodia problem 120; Soviet interference in 96 Sixth Indochinese Foreign Ministers Conference (1982) 151 Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) see Vietnam Solarz, Stephen J 133 Solomon, Richard H 224, 228, 252 Sonoda, Sunao 3, 91, 93, 95, 99; ASEAN reactions to speech of 144; Bali proposal (1979) 143; on implementation of Fukuda Doctrine 144; Manila proposal (1981) 139–41, 145, 153; policy of engagement with Vietnam 101; proposal to solve Cambodian conflict 117; three fundamental requisites for peace 143 Son, Sann 151 South China Sea 96–7, 139, 153, 177, 189–90, 246 Southeast Asia Development Bank 35 Southeast Asia Development Fund 18–21, 35; proposal for 20 Southeast Asian Marshall Plan 13 South Vietnam: Japanese diplomatic relations with 50; Japanese trade with 53; Japan’s annual aid to 52 Soviet–ASEAN relation 190 Soviet Union: after Vietnam War 65; AsianPacific identity 183; backing of Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia 2; diplomatic offensive toward China and US 189; foothold in Southeast Asia 94–8; foreign-policy 183–5; invasion of Afghanistan 2, 3, 112–15, 122, 207, 246; involvement in the Vietnam conflict 58; Japanese perceptions of 65; military assistance to Indochinese countries 139; military presence in East Asia 167, 177, 189–90; military support to Vietnam 96–7, 190, 193; North Vietnam’s trade with 72; Pacific fleet 177, 190; peace offensive 185; “peace offensive” toward ASEAN states 97; perestroika 183; relaxation of tension with US 57; role in Southeast Asia 65, 189; strategy of using Vietnam for expanding its power 220; support of North Vietnam and North Korea 23; “three obstacles” for improving relation with China 150–1, 184; use of Vietnamese naval bases 97, 153, 167, 189–90, 220; Vietnam issue 32–3; Vietnam treaty of friendship and cooperation with 91; withdrawal from Afghanistan 183, 215 Soviet–Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1978) 93 standards of living 16 Index 263 Stassen, Harold E 15 “stick-and-carrot” approach, of Japan toward Vietnam 131–3; due to Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia 132; policy of engagement 131; signs of 132 Straits Times, The 237–8 Suharto, President (Indonesia) 30, 115, 158, 190 Sukarno, President (Indonesia) 17, 25, 26, 29–30 Supreme National Council (SNC) 227 Suzuki, Zenkō 117, 122, 132–3, 138, 235 Takasaki, Tatsunosuke 15 Takeshita, Noboru 219; ASEAN–Japan Development Fund 203; Cooperation for Peace 204; initiative on Cambodian problem 203–8, 219; Liberal Democratic Party 203; points for a settlement of Cambodian conflict 219; Takeshita Initiative 203–8 Tanaka, Kakuei: on economic assistance to North Vietnam 54; establishment of diplomatic relations with China 53; initiative to resume peace in Vietnam 53; on reconstruction of Indochina 53; on relations with North Vietnam 53–61; resource diplomacy 79 Tanino, Sakutarō 66, 196, 218, 230 Tet Offensive (1968) 36, 49 Thai–Cambodian border 166, 226; Cambodian resistance factions 187; safe zone, establishment of 167, 175; Vietnamese attacks along 188; Vietnamese withdrawal from 170 Thai–Kampuchean border 166 Thai–Vietnamese relations: on act of aggression by Vietnam 116; deterioration of 92; on fight between Thai and Vietnamese forces 116; military-political threat by Vietnam 109; over attack on refugee camps by Vietnam 116–18; rapprochement on the Cambodian problem 115; Sonoda’s Manila proposal for improving 139–41; on Thai support to the Khmer Rouge 152; on Vietnamese intrusion into Thai territory 116 “three pillars” of Japanese foreign policy 17, 21 Tiananmen incident (1989) 215–16 Tōgō, Fumihiko 57 Tokyo Conference (1990) 218, 225–7, 239 Tokyo Economic Summit (1979) 110–11 Tomoda, Seki Toronto Economic Summit (1988) 207–8, 219 Tran, Quang Co 200 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 68 Truong, Chinh 188 “twin-track” diplomacy (Japan) 135, 147; US reactions to 133–9 UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) 70 UNICEF 111 United Nations (UN) 3, 206; Development Programme 231; Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) summit 173; electoral observers 143; General Assembly 92, 117, 173, 201; Japan’s accession to 17; peacekeeping operations (PKO) 5, 204–6; permanent members (P5) 216, 221, 225; Resolution 35/6 166; Resolution no 766 230; Resolution no 783 231; resolutions to isolate Vietnam 174; Security Council 92, 196, 216, 221, 231; US opposition to Vietnam’s membership to 62; work on the Cambodian problem 225 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 109, 166; budget for Indochinese refugees 192, 222; relief programs for Indochinese refugees 111 United States (US): after Vietnam War 63–5; aid program for Southeast Asia 17; assessment of Japan’s regional approach 73–5; billion-dollar investment 35; bombings of North Vietnam 30; Bureau of Intelligence and Research 219; China policy 45–6, 57, 77; Cold War strategy 75, 82, 123, 245; Department of Defense 97; National Security Council 11, 48, 50, 103, 217, 221; policy of isolating Vietnam 133, 221, 246; policy on Cambodian conflict 185; reassessment of its line toward Vietnam 185–6; relaxation of tension with USSR 57; stance toward Vietnam 133, 185–6, 246; trade embargo on Vietnam 62, 147 UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 230, 232; SDF’s participation in 232 264 Index Ushiba, Nobuhiko 55 US–North Vietnam negotiations 51; impact of Japanese–North Vietnamese diplomacy on 51 US–Soviet relations 195; concerns over Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay 190; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987) 185, 215; on Soviet diplomatic offensive 189; on US line toward Vietnam 185–6 USSR see Soviet Union Vietnam 186; ASEAN nations’ criticism of 108; Cambodia’s relations with 66, 91; China and ASEAN’s stances on 107–10; dissatisfaction with Soviet aid 119; economic difficulties 117–21; establishment of the Socialist Republic of 62; grant aid from Japan 62, 99; hardening of ASEAN’s stance toward 107–10, 115–17; invasion of Cambodia 2, 91, 132, 138, 159; Japanese economic assistance to 99; Japanese “twin-track” diplomacy 133–9; in Japan’s new regional policy 70–3; Japan’s “stick-and-carrot” approach toward see “stick-and-carrot” approach, of Japan toward Vietnam; Japan’s trade with 72, 73, 162, 194; major trading partners 195; normalization of relation with US 99; occupation of Kampuchea 148; rapprochement with ASEAN 71; reaction to Sihanouk–Hun Sen talks 202; reunification of 61, 62; Sino–Soviet relations and diplomatic offensive of 150–2; Soviet military support to 96–7, 162, 193; support for a regional conference on Cambodia 167; treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union 91; UN resolutions to isolate 174; US opposition to UN membership of 62; US trade embargo on 62, 147 Vietnam–Cambodia dispute 91 Vietnamese Communist Party 71, 164; Sixth Congress of (1986) 188 “Vietnamization” of Cambodia 187 Vietnam syndrome 159 Vietnam War 169, 186, 234, 246; American bombings of North Vietnam 30, 36, 44; Americans missing in action (MIA) 62; ceasefire and withdrawal of American forces 56; Chinese role in 57; fall of Saigon 61–3; great powers and Southeast Asia after 63–7; Japan’s dealing with 30–5, 48–53; mistake of the US in 94; Soviet involvement in 58; Tet Offensive (1968) 36 Vo, Do Giap 160 Vo, Dong Giang 145, 146, 193 voluntary refugee acceptance centers 145 Wakatsuki, Hidekazu Watanabe, Akio 206 Watanabe, Michio 73, 231, 235 Watanabe, Toru 223; missions to Cambodia 223 Wolfowitz, Paul 164–5, 192 World War II 1, 66, 206, 207, 221, 237 Yanagiya, Kensuke 92, 105–7, 114, 123 Yatabe, Atsuhiko 138, 160–2, 173 Yoshida, Shigeru: on cooperative relations with Asia 9; initiative for the development of Southeast Asia 12–14; on Japanese reparations payments to the Philippines 14; Japan’s postwar economic recovery under 8–15; poverty and nationalism, issue of 13; Southeast Asian Marshall Plan 13; on termination of Japanese trade with China 12; trip to Europe and North America 13 Yoshino, Bunroku 61, 68 Zhou, Enlai 23, 150