value and context the nature of moral and political knowledge oct 2006

[...]... moral values, they used analogies between the ontological status of values and that of secondary qualities, such as colours, and between the ‘logical space’ of moral reasons and the ‘logical space’ of constructivist mathematics.⁵ One of the aims of this latter analogy was to capture the authority of moral reasons; the way in which there appears to be a necessary connection between moral knowledge and the. .. case of the hooligans, Harman argues, the best explanation of the forming of the belief that their action is cruel will rely only on the observer’s psychology, plus empirical facts about the circumstances By contrast, the best explanation of the forming of the belief by the scientist must, indispensably, mention the presence of the proton in both the aetiology and the justification of the belief The moral. .. possess moral knowledge are often motivated by other moral commitments Those commitments seem to them, paradoxically, to demand the moral rejection of the idea that we have moral knowledge (although, unsurprisingly, that tends not to be the way that these objectors would phrase their objection) The first question concerns the role of authority within moral thinking One line of resistance to the idea of moral. .. such knowledge. ) In this opening chapter I will consider the views of two philosophers who argue that the existence of moral knowledge is of direct ethical relevance; all the more unfortunate, then, that no such knowledge exists These are the positions of the non-cognitivist and of the error theorist In this chapter and the next I will set out the challenges posed by non-cognitivism and error theory... of bringing the entire system of knowledge to bear on particular knowledge claims within it The standard metaphors used to explain the structure of knowledge are the coherentist sphere and the foundationalist pyramid In contrast to these metaphors I suggest the contextualist image of knowledge as a ‘crazy’ or a ‘patchwork’ quilt From a contextualist perspective, the system of knowledge is made up of. .. sciences of syntax and mathematics, which may be equally useful in unpacking the cluster concept of objectivity I will offer a further defence of this methodology, drawn from the theory of truth, in the next section The next three issues are substantive First, any defence of moral knowledge must accept the challenge of finding some moral beliefs, unreduced, acting as the best explanations in a domain of moral. .. issues of the existence and extent of moral knowledge The problems surrounding the epistemic authority of morality can arise only when the case for and against moral knowledge has been separately decided Whether or not there is moral knowledge does not make people authoritarian or tolerant There are plenty of instances of intolerant moral non-cognitivists and equally of tolerant cognitivists Suppose,... reconcilable with the admission of a degree of localness or perspectivalness in the concepts deployed in morality Thirdly, the question of how much moral knowledge there is must be addressed All three points are crucial to the case for cognitivism In the next section I will set out what I take to be both the best way of approaching the issues of objectivity and realism, via the theory of truth The minimalist... and you do not The way in which our knowledge of the external world stands or falls with such mundane examples has attracted some of the most interesting philosophy about the problem of exactly what scepticism amounts to in this case However, the case of moral and political knowledge is not like this.² Williams pointed out that moral knowledge raises special problems independent of problems about knowledge. .. want to defend the existence of moral knowledge and will begin to suggest criteria that any satisfactory account of moral knowledge must meet However, this question—that of the existence of moral knowledge must first be detached from two others with which it is often confused These two cross-cutting issues are those of authority and of freedom I believe that many people who are resistant to the idea that . ‘non- cognitivists’ about the possibility and the nature of moral knowledge. The former assert, and the latter deny, that some of the moral claims we make should be inter- preted as claims that are often known. sect. 3 of the ‘Introduction’, sect. 5 and 6 of the ‘First Set of Variations’, and sect. 9 of the ‘Second Set of Variations’. However, the main difference between the argument of this book and Moore’s is. 12. Contents Note to the Reader x Introduction 1 I. MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND MORAL REASONS 1. The Problem of Moral Knowledge 11 2. The Case for Cognitivism 32 3. Values, Norms, and the Practical 53 4.