Các khái niêm cơ bản về Chế độ tài chính trong Luật dầu khí và Hợp đồng dầu khí của các nước trên thế giới. Nhiều hợp đồng dầu khí thực hiện theo phương thức chia sẻ một phần số lượng dầu mỏ sản xuất được cho nhà nước. Hệ thống này được tính toán như sau: Sau khi trừ đi chi phí cho việc sản xuất, khoản còn lại được gọi là “lợi nhuận” dầu khí sẽ được chia cho các công ty tham gia hợp đồng và chính phủ. Với phần “lợi nhuận” nhận được, chính phủ có thể bán một phần hoặc toàn bộ lượng sản phẩm này, hoặc cũng có thể được quy đổi và thanh toán bằng tiền mặt thay cho lượng sản phẩm nhận được.
Petroleum Fiscal Regimes Basic Concepts Dr Alfred Kjemperud Opening Statements • The fiscal arrangement is the Government’s most important tool for managing petroleum resources • It is mandatory for all managers and technical personnel in the Government and industry to understand the basics of fiscal arrangements Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Government Options • Value of National Resources Determining Factors The resource base The market – oil price Terms and regulations Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Income PDO Contract signing Activities and cash flow Government Time Costs Pre-license Dr Alfred Kjemperud Exploration Development Production CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Production Rehab Abandonment General Objective The objective of petroleum resource management is: To maximise the value of the petroleum resource Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Company objective To attain maximum net present value of the petroleum resources Build equity Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Government Objectives • Provide a fair return to the state and the industry • Avoid undue speculation • Limit undue administration • Provide flexibility • Create healthy competition • Create a market efficiency Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 The role of the authorities Definition of policy Setting of terms Promotion Licensing Monitoring and supervision Adjustment of terms as required Managing the impact Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Petroleum Fiscal Regimes • Covers : Legislative issues Tax issues Contractual issues • There are more fiscal systems in the world than there are countries due to: Negotiation of Terms Numerous vintages Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Legal/Contractual Framework The Constitution The fundation which is the basis for all other regulations The Law E.g tax law Petroleum Law and Legislation Not all countries have a separate petroleum law If that is the case the contract has to cover all aspects Production sharing Contract Concessionary agreement in countries using that system Joint Operating Agreements Between partners in a field (can also be the state company) Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 10 Economic Rent • The Classic Definition by Economists The produce of the earth derives from labour and capital The produce is divided between: Labourers (Wages) Owners of Capital (Profit) Owners of Land (Rent) Rent = Value - Cost Dr Alfred Kjemperud 11 CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Resource Rent Allocation of revenues from Production •Bonuses •Royalties •Prod Sharing •Taxes •Gov Participation After Johnston (1995) Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 12 Regressive - Progressive Cost recovery phases ov ery ry st dis c ov e ed isc Po Pr Government Risk Before cost recovery Royalties Bonuses Profit Tax Production Sharing Regressive Progressive The non profit based government takes (bonus and royalties) are regressive i.e the lower profitability the higher effective tax Dr Alfred Kjemperud 13 CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Regressive system 100 % Regressive Progressive Individual taxes 80 % 85 % Cummulative taxation 60 % 40 % 20 % Ap pl ic at io n Si fe gn e at ur e bo D nu is co s ve Pr r y od b on uc t io us n fe e/ R Pr oy od al uc ty t io n Sh ar in g In Sp co m ec e ia Ta lP x et ro le um R Ta ep x at ria tio n Ta x 0% Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 14 Progressive system 100 % Regressive Progressive Individual taxes 80 % 85 % Cummulative taxation 60 % 40 % 20 % Ap pl ic at io n Si fe gn e at ur e bo D nu is co s ve Pr r y od bo uc nu t io s n fe e/ R Pr o od ya lty uc t io n Sh ar in g In Sp co m ec e ia Ta lP x et ro le um R Ta ep x at ria tio n Ta x 0% Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 15 Rent vs Risk • The Profit Margin for the Oil Companies must be large enough to accommodate failures Nine out of Ten exploration possibilities are unsuccessful Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 16 Risk- & Non Risk-Takers • Fiscal Terms must account for the large Risk in the Oil Business Oil Companies are High Risk Takers Companies can reduce risk by diversification Governments are Low Risk Takers Governments can reduce risk by introducing a Regressive tax system (Bonuses and Royalties) Dr Alfred Kjemperud 17 CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Global Exploration Market Government Take High Low interest from Oil Companies Low potential for any Government take dF e z i tim p O i s erm T l sc a Low Poor Dr Alfred Kjemperud High interest from Oil Companies Potential for higher Government take Geological Promise CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Good 18 Value of Discovery after Tax Illustrated as Field Size Necessary Field Size to match low est tax regime (Ireland) Reference Field Size (25 MMBBL) 160 144 140 117 120 MMBBL 104 104 99 94 100 75 80 63 60 46 49 45 40 40 25 20 An go C am la er oo n C hi na G ab on In di In a ne sia Ire la nd M al ay si a N ig er ia N or w Ph ay ilip pi ne s Vi et na Ba m ng la de sh A 25 million bbl field in Ireland gives the same profit after tax for the oil company as a 144 million bbl field in Indonesia The Importance of Fiscal Regimes Dr Alfred Kjemperud 19 CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 UK Tax Reform 45 350 Tax revenue relative to Total revenue (%) Absolute tax revenue (MM£) Oil Price (£/ton) Production (MM tons o.e.) 40 35 300 250 % M M to n s £/to n 30 200 MM£ 25 20 150 15 100 10 PRT removed for new fields Royalty removed for new fields 50 0 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 Years Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 20 10 Petroleum Fiscal Systems • Two Families Concessionary system Allows private ownership to mineral resources Contractual systems The State retains ownership to mineral resources Dr Alfred Kjemperud 21 CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Fiscal Systems Classification Petroleum Fiscal Arrangements Petroleum Fiscal Arrangements Concessionary Systems Concessionary Systems Contractual Systems Contractual Systems Norway Norway United Kingdom United Kingdom Service Contracts Service Contracts Pure Service Contracts Pure Service Contracts Production Sharing Contracts Production Sharing Contracts Risk Service Contracts Risk Service Contracts Indonesian (profit) Peruvian (gross) Pakistan Pakistan Limited usage Limited usage Argentina Argentina Indonesia Tunisia Tunisia Mexico Mexico Brazil Brazil Angola New Zealand New Zealand Venezuela Venezuela Yemen The Philippines The Philippines Albania Nicaragua Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 22 11 Systems around the World Concessions (R/T System) Far East Australia Brunei Korea, South New Zealand Pakistan (On) PNG Thailand Timor Gap B Argentina Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica Falkland Is Paraguay T&T (On) Abu Dhabi Ajman Dubai Fujairah Canada United States Neutral Zone Sharjah Turkey Former Soviet Union Latin America Middle East North America Dr Alfred Kjemperud PSC Bangladesh Cambodia China India Indonesia Laos Malaysia Azerbaijan Georgia Kazakstan Kyrghystan Belize Cuba Guatemala Guyana Jamaica Bahrain Iraq Joran Libya SC Mongolia Myanmar Pakistan (Off) Timor Gap A Vietnam Nepal Sri Lanka Russia Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Philippines Nicaragua Panama T&T (Off) Uruguay Brazil Honduras Chile Panama Ecuador Peru Haiti Venezuela Iran Kuwait (OSA) Saudi Arabia Oman Qatar Syria Yemen 23 CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Systems around the World R/T System Africa Europe Dr Alfred Kjemperud C Afracan Rep Chad Congo (K.) Ghana Madagascar Malawi Mali Morocco Namibia Niger Senegal Seychelles Somalia South Africa Tunisia (Old) Australia Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark France Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Spain UK PSC Algeria Angola Benin Cameroon Congo (Br.) Cote D'Ivoire Egypt Eq Guinea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Kenya Albania Malta Poland Turkey CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 SC Liberia Libya Madagascar Mozambique Nigeria Sudan Tanzania Togo Tunisia (New) Uganda Zambia 24 12 Concessionary System • Oil company have exclusive right to explore and produce at its own risk and expense • Oil Company Owns production • Oil Company often pays Royalty and Surface rental to Government • Oil Company Pays Taxes on profit • Oil Company owns equipment • Oil company has right to export hydrocarbons Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 25 Production Sharing Contract • The Contractor gets a share of production usually in kind • The Contractor never holds title to oil • The Contractor share the risk with the Government Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 26 13 Risk Service Contracts • The Contractor share the risk with the Government • The Contractor gets a share of Profits usually as money • The Contractor never holds title to oil Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 27 Technical Assistant (EOR) Contracts • • • • • Dr Alfred Kjemperud Joint Venture PSC Oil Company Financing DMO (Domestic Market Obligation) Base Oil or Determined Oil CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 28 14 P A l ure l c JV os t/r isk Ty shar ed Go pic th ver al J ro nm V ug e h nt Ex ca pl rri or ed ati Fu on Go ll C Ex ver ar pl nm ry or ati ent JV on ca an rrie dD d ev thro FS elo ug Go U t pm h y v Re er pe en n h un a b m JV t til A e n t ca nd ca sh r flo Dev ried w elo th fro pm rou m g O p e nt h era tio ns JV Burden on Contractor Light Heavy Burden on Contractor Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 29 Direct State Participation • Free Ride Have access to all information Can choose the goodies Does not pay for pre-license exploration Does not pay for R&D • Carried interest The State can be carried through: Exploration Exploration +Development Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 30 15 Elements in a PSC • • • • • • • • Work Commitment Bonus Payment Royalties Cost Recovery (Cost Oil) Profit Oil Government participation Domestic Market Obligation Ring fencing Dr Alfred Kjemperud 31 CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Indonesia- PSC Mother of all PSCs (4th Gen.) Contractor •(85/15 Split) Royalty: FTP split Cost Oil : Profit Oil: Tax Rate: Government Gross Revenues 0% 20% 100% 28.8462% 48% 100 5.8 First Tranche Petroleum 20 % 14.2 14.2 % Net Revenues 80 28.0 Cost Oil 35 % Profit oil 52 •Effects The split does not change with the level of cost Effective Gov take is 85% Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 15.0 Profit oil to Contr 37.0 28.8462 % Taxable 20.8 -10.0 Tax 10.0 48 % 38.8 After tax entitlement 10.8 Net Cash Flow 61.2 15 % Take 85 % 61.2 32 16 Work Commitments • Acquisition of Seismic Data Shooting, where and when Processing Kilometres or Minimum Expenditure • Drilling Obligations Number of Wells , where and when Stratigraphic interval Minimum Expenditure Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 33 Bonuses • Signature Bonus Paid upon contract signing • Discovery Bonus Paid upon first discovery • Production Bonus Paid when production reaches a specified level • Bonuses makes a fiscal regime regressive and are unpopular with oil companies Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 34 17 Royalties • Calculated from Gross Revenue • Can cause premature abandonment • Ranges from zero to 20% • Sliding scale (Example.) First Step Second Step Third Step Dr Alfred Kjemperud Up to 5.000 bopd 5.001-10.000 bopd Above 10.000 bopd 5% 10% 15% CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 35 Special Royalty Schemes • The Philippines have a negative Royalty up to 7,5% (Philippine Participation Incentive Allowance - FPIA) • New Zealand have a hybrid system 5% Royalty or 20 % Accounting Profits Royalty • Rate Royalty $/bbl (Columbia, Russia) Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 36 18 Negative Royalty Scheme Philippine RSC Flow Chart Contractor Government Gross Revenues 100 FPIA 7.5 7.5 % Net Revenues 92.5 32.4 Cost Recovery 35 % Revenues for sharing 60.13 24.1 Profit share 36.1 40 % Taxable 24.1 Tax paid by Gov Dr Alfred Kjemperud 0.0 0% 7.5 FPIA (% of Gross) 0.0 31.6 Service Fee 32.4 Cost Recovery 63.9 Entitlement 36.1 46.7 % Take 53.3 % CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 37 Cost Oil (Cost Recovery) • Cost Oil usually has an upper limit • Cost oil normally includes: Unrecovered costs carried over from previous years Operating costs Expensed capital costs Current year DD&A ( Depreciation, Depletion & Amortisation) Interest on Financing Investment Credit (Uplift) Abandonment cost recovery fund Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 38 19 Cost Recovery Range of Cost Recovery Limits (%) 20 Cruel Dr Alfred Kjemperud 40 60 Unusual Low End Upper End Rare Typical Typical 80 100 Concessions + a few PSCs CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 39 Profit Oil • Profit oil = Net revenue - Cost recovery Net revenue = Gross revenue - Royalties • Profit oil is analogue to taxable income in a concessionary system and Service fee in a service agreement • Profit oil is split between Government and Contractor • Profit oil is usually, but not always taxed Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 40 20 Ratio-Factor (R-factor) • Objective Sharing between the Government and the contrator is based on Profitability • Design Both revenue and cost are included in the calculation Contractors cumulative revenue R= Dr Alfred Kjemperud Contractors cumulative cost CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 41 Different R- Factors • Cumulative revenues/Cumulative cost • Cumulative Revenue-Cumulative Opex/cumulative Capex • Cumulative Revenue – Cumulative Profit Share/Cumulative Investments + Cumulative Opex • Cumulative net income/Cumulative Costs Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 42 21 Peruvian onshore R-Factor 0.0 < R < 1.0 1.0 ≥ R < 1.5 1.5 ≥ R < 2.0 2.0 ≥ R Dr Alfred Kjemperud ************ROYALTY RATE ************* $25/bbl ≤ $15/bbl ≥ $35/bbl 19% 23% 27% 24% 29% 32% 30% 35% 37% 36% 39% 42% CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 43 Domestic Market Obligations (DMO) • A certain volume of oil to be sold to the Government • Discounted Price • Local Currency Predetermined exchange rate • Example - Indonesian DMO • • Production: MMBBL Oil price: 20 USD/BBL Discount: USD/BBL Contractor’s profit oil: 28.8462% of total production DMO: 25% of Contractors profit oil 1MMBBL*(20USD/BBL-2USD/BBL)*25%*28.8462%= 1,298 MMUSD 1,298MMUSD/20USD/BBL=0.0649 MMBBL= 6.49% of total production ( Pure volume calculation: 28.8462%*25%=7.21%) Dr Alfred Kjemperud CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 44 22 The Importance of Tax Holidays 25.0 Production curve (100 %) 20.0 MMBBL Protected by 5y tax holiday (62 %) 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Years A years tax holiday represents 25% of project time, but 62 % of produced volume (Undiscounted) Dr Alfred Kjemperud 45 CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Global Exploration Market Government Take High Low interest from Oil Companies Low potential for any Government take dF e z i tim p O i s erm T l sc a Low Poor Dr Alfred Kjemperud High interest from Oil Companies Potential for higher Government take Geological Promise CCOP, Pattaya, September 2003 Good 46 23