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Networked Forces in
Stability Operations
101st Airborne Division,
3/2 and 1/25 Stryker Brigades
in Northern Iraq
Daniel Gonzales, John Hollywood, Jerry M. Sollinger, James McFadden,
John DeJarnette, Sarah Harting, Donald Temple
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
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effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world.
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© Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or
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permission in writing from RAND.
Published 2007 by the RAND Corporation
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The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded
research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant
Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense
Intelligence Community under Contract DASW01-01-C-0004.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Networked forces in stability operations : 101st Airborne Division, 3/2 and 1/25 Stryker
brigades in northern Iraq / Daniel Gonzales [et al.].
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-8330-4303-0 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Command and control systems—United States—Evaluation—Case studies.
2. Communications, Military—Evaluation—Case studies. 3. Stryker brigade
combat teams—Evaluation—Case studies. 4. United States. Army. Airborne
Division, 101st—History—21st century. 5. United States—Armed Forces—Stability
operations—Evaluation. 6. Iraq War, 2003–—Campaigns. I. Gonzales, Daniel,
1956–
UA943.N48 2007
956.7044'342—dc22
2007041879
Public release of this report was granted by the Chief of the DoD Office of Security Review
on 17 September 2007, per DD Form 1910.
iii
Preface
is case study report examines the network-centric operations (NCO) capabilities
and the operations of Stryker brigades and the 101st Airborne Division that conducted
stability operations in Iraq in the 2003 to 2005 time frame. We investigate how the
NCO capabilities and other resources available to these units were utilized to conduct
stability and counterinsurgency operations and whether these capabilities resulted in
improved mission effectiveness.
e monograph should interest U.S. Army and joint task force designers, those
concerned with the development of digital battle command and communications sys-
tems, and those interested in the implications of NCO for the transformation of mili-
tary forces.
is research was sponsored by the Office of Force Transformation and con-
ducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National
Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center spon-
sored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified combatant
commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and
the defense Intelligence Community.
For more information on RAND’s Acquisition and Technology Policy
Center, contact the director, Philip Antón. He can be reached by email, Philip_Anton@
rand.org; by phone at 310-393-0411, ext. 7798; or by mail at RAND, 1776 Main Street,
Santa Monica, California, 90407-2138. More information about RAND is available at
www.rand.org.
v
Contents
Preface iii
Figures
ix
Tables
xi
Summary
xiii
Acknowledgments
xxxv
Abbreviations
xxxvii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction 1
Background
1
Objectives
3
Analytic Approach
4
Sources of Information
9
Organization of Monograph
10
CHAPTER TWO
Iraqi Operational Setting and Unit Characteristics 13
Characteristics of Anti-Iraqi Forces
16
Phases of the Insurgency
17
Unit Organization
18
Areas of Operation
20
AO Sizes, Personnel, Funding, and Attached Units
23
Timeline of Events
28
U.S. Casualties
36
CHAPTER THREE
Force Networking, Quality of Information, and Quality of Shared Situation
Awareness
39
Networking Systems
39
Effect of Networking Systems on Quality of Information
48
Specific Effects of Networking Systems on Quality of Information
54
Effect of Networking Systems on Quality of Collaboration
56
Quality of Shared Situation Awareness
58
CHAPTER FOUR
Tactical Stability Missions, NCO-Enabled Processes, and Tactical Mission
Effectiveness
65
Tactical Military Operations in Stability Operations
65
NCO-Enabled Processes
68
Speed and Agility of Command
69
Responsive Maneuver
72
Networking with Aerial Support and Surveillance Assets
74
Robustness to Enemy Attack
75
Stability Operations Intelligence Needs
91
CHAPTER FIVE
Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations 95
U.S. Strategic Objectives and MNF–I Campaign Plan
95
Assessment Framework
98
Assessment of Effectiveness—Political Progress
101
Assessment of Effectiveness—Defeating Terrorists and Containing the Insurgency
108
Summary of Mission Effectiveness
123
CHAPTER SIX
Summary: Findings and Recommendations 129
Assessment of 101st ABD Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations
129
Assessment of 3/2 SBCT Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations
133
Assessment of 1/25 SBCT Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations
136
Role of NCO Capabilities in Improving Force Effectiveness in Stability Operations
139
Summary of Network and Intelligence Capabilities
142
vi Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st ABD, 3/2 and 1/25 SBCTs in Northern Iraq
Additional Findings 144
Recommendations
145
APPENDIX
A. Director, Office of Force Transformation, Study Authorization Memorandum 147
B. SBCT Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Used in OIF
151
C. Detailed Results of the Quality of Information and Collaboration Surveys
161
D. Iraqi National Elections
165
Bibliography
171
Contents vii
[...]... 25th Infantry Division.7 Role of NCO Capabilities in Improving Force Effectiveness in Stability Operations Our analysis indicates that command leadership, training, and TTPs, or the processes employed in stability operations, are just as important as networking technologies in improving mission effectiveness in stability operations We found the 1/25 SBCT and 101st ABD performed best overall in the stability. .. trends in civilian and U.S casualties in Iraq and in northern Iraq Summary xv Figure S.1 Civilians Killed in All of Iraq and in Mosul 101st ABD 3/2 SBCT 2,500 1/25 SBCT 200 2,000 150 1,500 100 1,000 50 500 0 All of Iraq 5 ct -0 O -0 5 05 ug A 5 nJu 05 pr -0 A b- 4 1/25 SBCT Fe 4 ec -0 D ct -0 O ug -0 4 04 3/2 SBCT A 4 nJu 04 A b- pr -0 3 101st ABD Fe 3 ec -0 D ct -0 O ug -0 3 03 0 A nJu Civlian deaths in. .. SBCT 122 In uence of Network-Enabled Capabilities on Stability Operations 126 Key Factors In uencing 101st ABD Performance in Stability Operations 130 Key Factors In uencing 3/2 SBCT Performance in Stability Operations 134 Key Factors In uencing 1/25 SBCT Performance in Stability Operations 137 Adaptation of Materiel and Nonmateriel... effectively conduct stability operations in Ninawah province without assistance from other units It is exceedingly difficult for a military unit to conduct stability operations in one area while being tasked to frequently conduct out-of-area operations A continuous force presence in Mosul and Tal Afar were difficult to sustain by the 3/2 SBCT because of extensive out-of-area operations Social networking with local... xxv • Training: focus on stability operations • Extensive planning for stability ops • Commanders’ intent: emphasis on social networking with populace xxvi Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st ABD, 3/2 and 1/25 SBCTs in Northern Iraq developed additional counter -in ltration processes, such as extensive use of randomized checkpoint operations (“snap” traffic control points), constructed a berm... Increased speed in conducting operations • Limited effectiveness at collecting intel, HVT ops, and counter -in ltration • Cannot meet 101st ABD’s prior commitments due to resource limits • MNF-I frequently orders 3/2 SBCT units out of area • Regional governor assassinated enroute to Baghdad • Numerous insurgents in ltrate Mosul after Battles of Fallujah (April 2004, November 2004) Networked Forces in. .. dynamic C2 of operations for adaptive maneuver when deployed in out-of-area operations in central and southern Iraq However, from a stability- specific operations perspective, the 3/2 SBCT’s heavy emphasis on major combat–like operations, including frequent neighborhood sweeps, did not aid in building relations with the local population From an information perspective, the 3/2 SBCT had significant information... Killed in All of Iraq and in Mosul xv U.S Personnel Killed and Wounded in Action per Enemy Attack xvi U.S Personnel Killed and Wounded in Action per Offensive Operation xvi Key Factors In uencing 101st ABD Performance in Stability Operations xviii Key Factors In uencing 3/2 SBCT Performance in Stability Operations xxii Key Factors In uencing... its dynamic mobile C2 for conducting distributed small-unit operations and could immediately redirect forces to offensive opportunities without advance planning The 1/25 SBCT was effective at a variety of counter -in ltration operations and operations against high-value targets, putting significant pressure on insurgents and capturing two levels of insurgent leadership in Mosul The 1/25 SBCT also provided... department (May 2003) Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st ABD, 3/2 and 1/25 SBCTs in Northern Iraq Operational Performance Organization Summary xix From an organizational perspective, the 101st ABD is as an air-mobile division, comprising light infantry supported by helicopters, with about 17,000 troops total In comparison, the Iraqi province in which they operated most heavily, Ninawah, has a . S.1 Civilians Killed in All of Iraq and in Mosul 0 50 100 150 200 250 Jun-03 Aug-03 Oct-03 Dec-03 Feb-04 Apr-04 Jun-04 Aug-04 Oct-04 Dec-04 Feb-05 Apr-05 Jun-05 Aug-05 Oct-05 Civilian deaths in Mosul area 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 Civlian. 57 x Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st ABD, 3/2 and 1/25 SBCTs in Northern Iraq 4.1. Timeline for Major Operations in Northern Iraq 68 4.2. An Order-of-Magnitude Increase in Speed. Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract DASW0 1-0 1-C-0004. Library of Congress Cataloging -in- Publication Data Networked forces in stability operations
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