This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. Limited Electronic Distribution Rights Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details For More Information Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution Support RAND This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND Corporation. 6 Jump down to document The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Networked Forces in Stability Operations 101st Airborne Division, 3/2 and 1/25 Stryker Brigades in Northern Iraq Daniel Gonzales, John Hollywood, Jerry M. Sollinger, James McFadden, John DeJarnette, Sarah Harting, Donald Temple NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R ® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2007 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract DASW01-01-C-0004. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Networked forces in stability operations : 101st Airborne Division, 3/2 and 1/25 Stryker brigades in northern Iraq / Daniel Gonzales [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-4303-0 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Command and control systems—United States—Evaluation—Case studies. 2. Communications, Military—Evaluation—Case studies. 3. Stryker brigade combat teams—Evaluation—Case studies. 4. United States. Army. Airborne Division, 101st—History—21st century. 5. United States—Armed Forces—Stability operations—Evaluation. 6. Iraq War, 2003–—Campaigns. I. Gonzales, Daniel, 1956– UA943.N48 2007 956.7044'342—dc22 2007041879 Public release of this report was granted by the Chief of the DoD Office of Security Review on 17 September 2007, per DD Form 1910. iii Preface is case study report examines the network-centric operations (NCO) capabilities and the operations of Stryker brigades and the 101st Airborne Division that conducted stability operations in Iraq in the 2003 to 2005 time frame. We investigate how the NCO capabilities and other resources available to these units were utilized to conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations and whether these capabilities resulted in improved mission effectiveness. e monograph should interest U.S. Army and joint task force designers, those concerned with the development of digital battle command and communications sys- tems, and those interested in the implications of NCO for the transformation of mili- tary forces. is research was sponsored by the Office of Force Transformation and con- ducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center spon- sored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified combatant commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on RAND’s Acquisition and Technology Policy Center, contact the director, Philip Antón. He can be reached by email, Philip_Anton@ rand.org; by phone at 310-393-0411, ext. 7798; or by mail at RAND, 1776 Main Street, Santa Monica, California, 90407-2138. More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org. v Contents Preface iii Figures ix Tables xi Summary xiii Acknowledgments xxxv Abbreviations xxxvii CHAPTER ONE Introduction 1 Background 1 Objectives 3 Analytic Approach 4 Sources of Information 9 Organization of Monograph 10 CHAPTER TWO Iraqi Operational Setting and Unit Characteristics 13 Characteristics of Anti-Iraqi Forces 16 Phases of the Insurgency 17 Unit Organization 18 Areas of Operation 20 AO Sizes, Personnel, Funding, and Attached Units 23 Timeline of Events 28 U.S. Casualties 36 CHAPTER THREE Force Networking, Quality of Information, and Quality of Shared Situation Awareness 39 Networking Systems 39 Effect of Networking Systems on Quality of Information 48 Specific Effects of Networking Systems on Quality of Information 54 Effect of Networking Systems on Quality of Collaboration 56 Quality of Shared Situation Awareness 58 CHAPTER FOUR Tactical Stability Missions, NCO-Enabled Processes, and Tactical Mission Effectiveness 65 Tactical Military Operations in Stability Operations 65 NCO-Enabled Processes 68 Speed and Agility of Command 69 Responsive Maneuver 72 Networking with Aerial Support and Surveillance Assets 74 Robustness to Enemy Attack 75 Stability Operations Intelligence Needs 91 CHAPTER FIVE Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations 95 U.S. Strategic Objectives and MNF–I Campaign Plan 95 Assessment Framework 98 Assessment of Effectiveness—Political Progress 101 Assessment of Effectiveness—Defeating Terrorists and Containing the Insurgency 108 Summary of Mission Effectiveness 123 CHAPTER SIX Summary: Findings and Recommendations 129 Assessment of 101st ABD Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations 129 Assessment of 3/2 SBCT Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations 133 Assessment of 1/25 SBCT Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations 136 Role of NCO Capabilities in Improving Force Effectiveness in Stability Operations 139 Summary of Network and Intelligence Capabilities 142 vi Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st ABD, 3/2 and 1/25 SBCTs in Northern Iraq Additional Findings 144 Recommendations 145 APPENDIX A. Director, Office of Force Transformation, Study Authorization Memorandum 147 B. SBCT Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Used in OIF 151 C. Detailed Results of the Quality of Information and Collaboration Surveys 161 D. Iraqi National Elections 165 Bibliography 171 Contents vii [...]... 25th Infantry Division.7 Role of NCO Capabilities in Improving Force Effectiveness in Stability Operations Our analysis indicates that command leadership, training, and TTPs, or the processes employed in stability operations, are just as important as networking technologies in improving mission effectiveness in stability operations We found the 1/25 SBCT and 101st ABD performed best overall in the stability. .. trends in civilian and U.S casualties in Iraq and in northern Iraq Summary xv Figure S.1 Civilians Killed in All of Iraq and in Mosul 101st ABD 3/2 SBCT 2,500 1/25 SBCT 200 2,000 150 1,500 100 1,000 50 500 0 All of Iraq 5 ct -0 O -0 5 05 ug A 5 nJu 05 pr -0 A b- 4 1/25 SBCT Fe 4 ec -0 D ct -0 O ug -0 4 04 3/2 SBCT A 4 nJu 04 A b- pr -0 3 101st ABD Fe 3 ec -0 D ct -0 O ug -0 3 03 0 A nJu Civlian deaths in. .. SBCT 122 In uence of Network-Enabled Capabilities on Stability Operations 126 Key Factors In uencing 101st ABD Performance in Stability Operations 130 Key Factors In uencing 3/2 SBCT Performance in Stability Operations 134 Key Factors In uencing 1/25 SBCT Performance in Stability Operations 137 Adaptation of Materiel and Nonmateriel... effectively conduct stability operations in Ninawah province without assistance from other units It is exceedingly difficult for a military unit to conduct stability operations in one area while being tasked to frequently conduct out-of-area operations A continuous force presence in Mosul and Tal Afar were difficult to sustain by the 3/2 SBCT because of extensive out-of-area operations Social networking with local... xxv • Training: focus on stability operations • Extensive planning for stability ops • Commanders’ intent: emphasis on social networking with populace xxvi Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st ABD, 3/2 and 1/25 SBCTs in Northern Iraq developed additional counter -in ltration processes, such as extensive use of randomized checkpoint operations (“snap” traffic control points), constructed a berm... Increased speed in conducting operations • Limited effectiveness at collecting intel, HVT ops, and counter -in ltration • Cannot meet 101st ABD’s prior commitments due to resource limits • MNF-I frequently orders 3/2 SBCT units out of area • Regional governor assassinated enroute to Baghdad • Numerous insurgents in ltrate Mosul after Battles of Fallujah (April 2004, November 2004) Networked Forces in. .. dynamic C2 of operations for adaptive maneuver when deployed in out-of-area operations in central and southern Iraq However, from a stability- specific operations perspective, the 3/2 SBCT’s heavy emphasis on major combat–like operations, including frequent neighborhood sweeps, did not aid in building relations with the local population From an information perspective, the 3/2 SBCT had significant information... Killed in All of Iraq and in Mosul xv U.S Personnel Killed and Wounded in Action per Enemy Attack xvi U.S Personnel Killed and Wounded in Action per Offensive Operation xvi Key Factors In uencing 101st ABD Performance in Stability Operations xviii Key Factors In uencing 3/2 SBCT Performance in Stability Operations xxii Key Factors In uencing... its dynamic mobile C2 for conducting distributed small-unit operations and could immediately redirect forces to offensive opportunities without advance planning The 1/25 SBCT was effective at a variety of counter -in ltration operations and operations against high-value targets, putting significant pressure on insurgents and capturing two levels of insurgent leadership in Mosul The 1/25 SBCT also provided... department (May 2003) Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st ABD, 3/2 and 1/25 SBCTs in Northern Iraq Operational Performance Organization Summary xix From an organizational perspective, the 101st ABD is as an air-mobile division, comprising light infantry supported by helicopters, with about 17,000 troops total In comparison, the Iraqi province in which they operated most heavily, Ninawah, has a . S.1 Civilians Killed in All of Iraq and in Mosul 0 50 100 150 200 250 Jun-03 Aug-03 Oct-03 Dec-03 Feb-04 Apr-04 Jun-04 Aug-04 Oct-04 Dec-04 Feb-05 Apr-05 Jun-05 Aug-05 Oct-05 Civilian deaths in Mosul area 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 Civlian. 57 x Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st ABD, 3/2 and 1/25 SBCTs in Northern Iraq 4.1. Timeline for Major Operations in Northern Iraq 68 4.2. An Order-of-Magnitude Increase in Speed. Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract DASW0 1-0 1-C-0004. Library of Congress Cataloging -in- Publication Data Networked forces in stability operations