Institutional forces in the making of the british tactical disaster in malaya 1941 1942

INSTITUTIONAL FORCES IN THE MAKING OF THE BRITISH TACTICAL DISASTER IN MALAYA 1941-1942 MALCOLM TAN SHIH LUNG B.A. (Merit), NIE A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements iii Summary v Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Background and Context 8 Chapter 2: The British Army in 1941 19 Chapter 3: The Imperial Japanese Army in 1941 38 Chapter 4: The British Army on the Defensive in the Malayan Campaign 50 Chapter 5: The British Army on the Offensive in the Malayan Campaign 69 Chapter 6: The British Army’s Delaying Missions in the Malayan Campaign 83 Chapter 7: The British Army in the Greek, Crete and Burma Campaigns 1941-1942 92 Conclusion 109 Bibliography 118 Appendix One: Profile of Selected British and Indian Army Units 123 Appendix Two: Orders of Battles, Selected Battles, Malayan Campaign 129 Appendix Three: Orders of Battles, Selected Battles, Greek, Crete and Burma Campaigns 133 ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my supervisor, “Field Marshal” Associate Professor “Sir” Brian Farrell, “KBE, KCE, DSO, etc, etc.” Despite the fact that I graduated without an Honours Degree, he was willing to support my application into this Masters program. During these two years, he kindly endorsed my application for funding to do research at the Imperial War Museum and the British Archives, provided guidance in content matters, given me invaluable advice on conducting research and thesis writing, and has spent many hours correcting my lengthy drafts. He has enhanced my understanding of military history as a whole, and more narrowly, of the British and Japanese military institutions during World War II. I have gained lots of on-theground information from him through participating in the various field trips that he conducted. I would also like to thank my parents for understanding my decision to resign from my economically stable and well-paid teaching job to pursue this scholarly undertaking of mine, in the name of passion, without any scholarship or regular income. They have been most gracious in supporting my “leap of faith” and to accept that I would not be able to contribute to the family income during these two years. Indirectly, they sparked off my passion in history by encouraging me to watch historical dramas and documentaries, and bringing me to historical sites on family outings when I was in primary school. On my first visit to the then Sentosa Wax Museum at the age of eight, I was awed by the wax figures replicating the scenes of the British and the Japanese surrenders in Singapore during World War II. On the same trip at Fort Siloso, I was fascinated with the coastal guns and mysterious tunnel complexes. It is thus not by coincidence that my thesis topic is about the Malayan Campaign. My interest in history, especially military history, took off from that trip and I have never looked back since – I chose to study history all throughout my years in education from secondary level to the current Masters program. Gratitude must also be expressed to Dr Karl Hack, Dr Daniel Crosswell and Mdm Tan Teng Lan. They taught me history while I was an undergraduate in NIE and readily agreed to be my referees in my application to this Masters program. Mdm Tan, in particular, has been a iii mentor to me all these years. Thanks also be to Dr Mark Emmanuel, who allowed me to see the potential that narrative history has to offer, Dr Thomas Du Bois, from whom I learnt useful tips on academic writing, the administrative staff of NUS History Department, especially Kelly and Gayathri, who have been most helpful, and Brandon Chee, my fellow course mate who has been a source of encouragement to me. I would also like to thank my two confidantes, my “intellectual sparring” partner, Philip Seetho, and fellow military history enthusiast, Ho Tze Yee, for listening to me share my findings and discussing history related topics. I will not want to forget Susan Chin, who besides encouraging me, also kindly allowed me the use of her most conducive premises to do my work on a number of occasions. Last but not least, I would like to thank our Heavenly Father, who has been providentially guiding me through many personal “ups” and “downs” these two years according to His good will and purpose for me. All praise and glory be to the Lord Jesus Christ. iv SUMMARY The British defence of Malaya and Singapore was seriously jeopardized once Germany conquered France in June 1940, as this event encouraged both Italy and Japan to join the Axis Powers and opened the way for Japan to occupy the air and naval bases in French Indochina. Yet how does one explain the speed and scale of the British surrender at Singapore? How did the British Army lose Malaya and Singapore so easily, even though it had an overall numerical superiority of two to one over the Imperial Japanese Army? Why did British Empire troops not put up a better and longer fight in the Malayan Campaign? How did strategic defeat turn into tactical disaster? This thesis seeks to answer these questions by focusing on the tactical aspects of the Malayan Campaign. Relatively few authors have specifically looked at how British military disaster happened on the Malayan battlefields. They typically mention British Malaya Command‟s weaknesses visà-vis the Japanese 25th Army‟s strengths in command, control, communications and intelligence, tactical doctrines, training, experience, ethos, morale, organisation and equipment in isolation, without making the connections between them to identify the main overarching problem. This thesis fills an important gap by examining the institutional forces that influenced, shaped and caused the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese and British armies respectively, while, not discounting the role of circumstantial factors and personalities. This thesis argues that institutional forces in the form of the British military system were the decisive and prime mover influencing and affecting most, if not all, of the weaknesses of the British Army in 1940-1942. They were, hence, the main determinant of the British tactical disaster in the Malaya Campaign. It makes three assertions. First, the British military system was primarily responsible for the many flaws of the British Army in the Malayan Campaign. Second, the British military system is more responsible for the British Army tactical disaster in Malaya than adverse circumstantial and personality factors. Third, the British Army‟s tactical disaster in v Malaya was not an isolated case but was part of a global chain of failures, revealing the general failure of the British military system from 1940-1942. vi INTRODUCTION The size of the British surrender at Singapore, the scale of the British defeat in the Malayan Campaign and the great strategic and political impact that followed, have rarely been matched throughout the long military campaigns involving the British Empire. Although the British government never conducted an official inquiry regarding the fall of Singapore, postmortems and reviews were conducted in both private and official capacities in Britain, India, Australia and Japan, starting soon after Singapore surrendered. This process still continues, boosted by the declassification of official documents in the public archives of Britain and Australia in the 1990s. Three questions tended to dominate the scholarly debates and controversies in the historiography of the reasons for the British defeat in Malaya - Who was ultimately to blame for the defeat? Was the British defeat inevitable? Why were the British defeated so quickly and easily by the Japanese? The first two questions examine the Malayan Campaign mainly at the strategic level. 1 Amidst controversy, eminent military historians, such as Raymond Callahan, Alan Warren, Karl Hack, Kevin Blackburn and Brian Farrell, have convincingly argued that the ultimate blame for the British defeat in Malaya lie with the successive war planners in Whitehall, in the two decades leading up to December 1941 - they all decided to put the defence of the UK homeland and the Mediterranean region on a higher priority than the Far East.2 They also agreed that British defeat was hard to avoid, as the strategic and tactical situation in the first six months of the Pacific War favoured the Japanese overwhelmingly.3 1 According to Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the 20th Century (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2001), 5, strategic level of warfare „takes into considerations the political objectives and limitations of governments‟. In this thesis, the strategic level of command is equivalent to the command of army groups and theatres of war. 2 Raymond Callahan, The Worst Disaster – The Fall of Singapore (Singapore: Cultured Lotus, 2001 (1977)), 271; Brian Farrell, The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1941-1942 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing Ltd., 2005), 173-182. 3 Alan Warren, Singapore – Britain’s Greatest Defeat (London, Talisman, 2002), 289-291; Farrell, 379382; Karl Hack & Kevin Blackburn, Did Singapore Have to Fall? Churchill and the Impregnable Fortress (New York, Routledge, 2003), 87-88. 1 The British defence of Malaya and Singapore was seriously jeopardized once Germany conquered France in June 1940, as this event encouraged both Italy and Japan to join the Axis Powers and opened the way for Japan to occupy the air and naval bases in French Indochina. Yet how does one explain the speed and scale of the British defeat? How did the British Army lose Malaya and Singapore so easily, even though it had an overall numerical superiority of two to one over the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA)? It must be remembered that although the US also suffered the humiliation of surrendering the Philippines to Japan in May 1942, it did so only after five long months of struggle during which the defending American and Filipino soldiers were able to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy at Bataan. Why did British Empire troops not put up a better and longer fight in the Malayan Campaign? How did strategic defeat turn into tactical disaster? This is the concern of the third question, which seeks to explain why the British Army collapsed as swiftly as it did. Relatively few works have specifically looked at how British military disaster happened on the Malayan battlefields. Tim Moreman‟s The Jungle, the Japanese and British Commonwealth Armies at War 1941-1945 – Fighting Methods, Doctrine and Training (2005), was an exception. In it, he aptly said, „Very few books deal with these issues specifically while devoting much time on narrating the battles. They may mention the lack of training [in jungle warfare] of the British Empire forces, for example, but do not explain the reasons‟.4 They also typically mention British Malaya Command‟s weaknesses vis-à-vis the Japanese 25th Army‟s strengths in command, control, communications and intelligence (collectively known as C3I), tactical doctrines, training, experience, ethos, morale, organisation and equipment in isolation, 4 Tim Moreman, The Jungle, the Japanese and British Commonwealth Armies at War 1941-1945 – Fighting Methods, Doctrine and Training (New York: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2005), 7. While “jungle warfare” predominated in the Malayan Campaign, most combat actually took place in a variety of “bush terrain” such as rice-fields, orchards, plantations, mangroves, scrubs and jungle near settlements, roads and tracks. The tactical objective was actually to control the crucial paved trunk roads rather than the “bush country” surrounding them. This was unlike in the Southwest Pacific Theater 1942-1945, some aspects of the Burma Campaign 1942-1945, the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, the Indonesian Confrontation 19631966 and some aspects of the Vietnam War 1965-1975, where the strict term “jungle warfare”, could be more appropriately used. See Ian Stewart, History of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 2 nd Battalion (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd, 1947), 2. 2 without making the connections between them to identify the main overarching problem.5 David Fraser‟s book, And We Shall Shock Them – The British Army in the Second World War (1983) was another exception. He linked these British shortcomings together and attributed them to one common source – the British military system itself. At the heart of the matter, however, was the unpreparedness of the British Empire for crisis‟ … „The consequent was a system completely unfitted to take the first shock of war. All else – the incapacity of commanders, the poor training of troops, the failure of morale, the neglect of preparations, the inadequate equipment – all stemmed from the same basic cause.6 In his landmark work, The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1941-1942 (2005), Brian Farrell concurred that ultimately it was the inherent flaws of the British military system itself, or what could be termed as “institutional forces”, rather than the particular circumstances faced by Malaya Command, or mistakes made by any of its generals, which converted defeat into disaster.7 In other words, a more complete explanation of the British tactical disaster warrants deeper analysis beyond just examining Malaya Command‟s deficiencies. It must examine the institutional forces behind these as well. David French, in his Raising Churchill’s Army (2000), took this approach to explain the British Army‟s tactical defeat in the European and Mediterranean theatres in the first half of the Second World War.8 However, other than Farrell, only Toh Boon Ho and Toh Boon Kwan have in recent years explicitly taken the approach of analyzing the British tactical defeat in Malaya in the light of institutional forces.9 This thesis fills this important gap by expanding and going beyond the works done by the above authors. 5 See for examples, Woodburn Kirby, Singapore: The Chain of Disaster (London: Cassell, 1971); Stanley Falk, Seventy Days to Singapore – The Malayan Campaign 1941-1942 (London: Robert Hale, 1975); Peter Elphick, Singapore, The Pregnable Fortress – A Study of Deception, Discord and Desertion. (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1995); Louis Allen, Singapore 1941-1942 (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1993 (1977)). 6 David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them – The British Army in the Second World War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988 (1983)), 197-198. 7 Farrell, 8. 8 David French, Raising Churchill’s Army – The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 9 Toh Boon Ho & Toh Boon Kwan, “Poor Military Leadership or Flawed Military Organisation?: The British Army in the Malayan Campaign”, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, V29 N1 (Jan – Mar 2003), 3 This thesis argues that institutional forces in the form of the British military system were the decisive and prime mover influencing and affecting most, if not all, of the deficiencies of the British Army in 1940-1942. They were, hence, the main determinant of the British tactical disaster in the Malaya Campaign. In this thesis, the British military system is taken to encompass factors such as British Army organization, ethos, doctrine, established practices, standard operating procedures, beliefs, attitudes and tradition. This thesis examines the Malayan Campaign mainly at the tactical level. 10 The thesis necessarily excludes the local civilian authority‟s culpability in the fall of Singapore but does not ignore military decisions made at the strategic level and operational level where they affected the course and outcome of battles.11 While being primarily concerned with institutional forces, the thesis does not totally ignore circumstantial factors such as British material deficiencies on land, sea and air, Britain‟s adverse circumstances in having to fight a three-front war, the British military‟s lack of unified command over the three services and the personalities of their senior commanders such as Air Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Far East Command, Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival, General Officer Commanding (GOC) Malaya Command, and Lieutenant-General Lewis Heath, GOC III Indian Corps, as these things can also dictate the outcome of battles. Finally, this thesis focuses on the British Army, in particular, the infantry, armour and artillery combat arms, rather than the Royal Air Force (RAF), Royal Navy (RN) and the British Army‟s other combat and supporting arms. Timothy Harrison Place rightly argues that although the British Army classified engineers, signals and reconnaissance corps as combat arms, 10 House, 5, defined “tactical level of warfare” as „the process of combining of different arms and services to win a battle‟. In this thesis, the tactical level of command is equivalent with the command of divisions, at the highest hierarchy, to sections/squads, at the lowest. 11 House, defined “operational level of war” as involving „sequence steps, co-ordinating actions and battles to achieve the strategic goal‟. In this thesis, the Operational level of command is equivalent with the command of armies and corps. 4 their main role was „not to fight but to perform some other function that served to facilitate the fighting action‟ of the other three combat arms.12 The chapters in this thesis are grouped around themes. Chapter 1 sets the background and context by reviewing primary sources in the form of dispatches and memoirs written by key British, Australian, Indian and Japanese military officers who fought in Malaya. It will establish that the strengths of 25th Army and the weaknesses of Malaya Command reflected those of their respective armies and military systems. Chapter 2 examines and evaluates how the pre-war and early war British military system laid the foundations for the British Army‟s tactical disaster in the Malayan Campaign. Conversely, Chapter 3 examines and evaluates how the pre-war and wartime Japanese military system laid the foundations for the IJA‟s tactical victory in the Malayan Campaign. This is necessary as any attempt to account for the British Army‟s poor performance in Malaya would not be complete without examining the IJA. The next three chapters analyse how the unique characteristics of the British and Japanese military systems interacted with circumstances and personalities to influence the battlefield performance of both armies, in six Malayan battles. It is important to include two major battles each from defence, counterattack and delay missions as case studies, to ensure that the full range of combat missions in Malaya is represented. Chapter 4 examines the British Army‟s set-piece defences of Jitra and Kampar. Jitra is selected as it was the first major clash between the two forces and their opposing systems in Malaya. Here, the British Army‟s rigid, low tempo, linear tactics were pitted against the IJA‟s fluid, high tempo, encirclement tactics. Kampar, on the other hand, was an atypical battle where the British Army defended in depth, at a strategically strong position which nullified the IJA‟s tactical advantages. Chapter 5 examines the British Army‟s counteroffensives at Bukit Pelandok and Bukit Timah. These were the only battles in the entire campaign where the British Army went on the 12 Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 4. 5 offensive, with the equivalent of a battalion and a brigade respectively. The two battles demonstrated the contrast between the two military systems – the typical linear, sluggish, uncoordinated and piecemeal attacks of the British Army, and the typical fast tempo, aggressive offensive-defence tactics of the IJA. Chapter 6 examines the British Army‟s delaying actions at Kuantan and Telok Anson. Delaying actions are the most difficult tactical missions to perform and can be good gauges of the strengths and weaknesses of a military system. Near failure at Kuantan and success at Telok Anson reveal the difference in the tactical systems and training emphasis of two very different brigades in Malaya – the “conventional” 22nd Indian Brigade and the “unconventional” 12th Indian Brigade. The delaying actions also illustrate how failures in the operational leadership of the British Army jeopardized its tactical mission in Malaya. Chapter 7 examines two other disastrous British Army campaigns in 1941-1942 – Greece and Burma. If institutional forces really did play a large part in the British Army‟s tactical disaster in the Malayan Campaign, then they should also account for other British Army tactical disasters during World War II. The Greek Campaign bore many circumstantial similarities with the Malayan Campaign and occurred just seven months before the outbreak of the Pacific War, which meant there was little time for the British Army to digest and apply any lessons learnt in Greece to Malaya. Since the IJA‟s system was modelled after the German Army‟s system, there is consistency in our comparison of the two campaigns. The Burma Campaign is even more relevant as the British Army faced a similar enemy, under similar strategic circumstances, in the same time period and in similar terrain as in Malaya. Finally the concluding chapter examines how the transformation of the British military system in 1943 allowed the British Army to shed its earlier systemic weaknesses, and surpass the IJA‟s combat performance in Burma and the Far East from 1944-45. This long path to victory further highlights the role played by institutional forces in the making of the British Army‟s tactical disaster in the Malaya Campaign. It then sums up the three arguments of our research thesis. First, the British military system was primarily responsible for the many shortcomings of 6 the British Army in the Malayan Campaign. Second, the British military system was more responsible for the British Army tactical disaster in Malaya than adverse circumstantial and personality factors. Third, the British Army‟s tactical disaster in Malaya was not an isolated case but was part of a global chain of failures, revealing the general failure of the British military system from 1940-1942. 7 CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT This chapter examines memoirs and reports written by British, Australian, Indian and Japanese military officers who fought in the Malayan Campaign. They are chosen for their significance and perspective. As such, repetition of points will largely be omitted. The focus is on their main arguments for the British Army‟s tactical defeat in Malaya to establish commonalities and the overarching links behind them. When examined collectively, they reveal that Malaya Command‟s weaknesses and 25th Army‟s strengths reflected those of their respective armies and military systems. The man often blamed for the loss of Singapore was Percival, most senior British Army field commander in the campaign, who wrote the dispatch, Operations of Malaya Command from 8 December 1941 to 15 February 1942 (1948). This was subsequently incorporated into his memoir, The War in Malaya (1949).13 Percival‟s memoirs highlighted the many difficulties he faced at the operational level. The British High Command‟s unrealistic strategy to make the RN and the RAF the mainstays of Singapore‟s defence, despite being unable to reinforce both services, jeopardised the army‟s ability to defend ground. Moreover, in a display of typical British poor inter-service cooperation, the RAF did not consult the army concerning the defensibility of their chosen site for airfields. This, and the British loss of air and sea control forced Percival to disperse his army widely all over Malaya to defend airfields in strategically poor positions such as Alor Star, Kota Bahru and Kuantan and rear coastal areas such as Mersing and Singapore.14 What stood out was his assertion that the many reasons for the fall of Singapore was due to British institutional failure to prepare for war in peacetime: A great many of the causes which contributed to our defeat in Malaya, had a common origin, namely the lack of readiness of the British command for war. Our shortage in fighting ships and in modern aircraft, our lack of tanks, the inexperience of many of our 13 A.E. Percival, Operations of Malaya Command from 8 December 1941 to 15 February 1942 (Supplement to the London Gazette, February 1948), ; A.E., Percival, The War in Malaya (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949). 14 Ibid, 297-300. 8 leaders, the lack of training of most of our troops can all be attributed to a failure to prepare for war at the proper time. This unpreparedness is no new experience. It is traditional in the British command.15 Seeing the campaign from the artillery‟s perspective was Brigadier E.W. Goodman, Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) 9th Indian Division, who wrote a dispatch, Notes on the Campaign in Malaya from the Artillery Point of View” (1946).16 With the artillery units of his division separated halfway across the east coast of Malaya, Goodman could not play his designated role of coordinating their actions, but instead took on a supervisory and advisory role for them. In this capacity, he toured the country widely and made many pertinent observations regarding the close jungle terrain‟s limitations on the use of artillery. First, the lack of large open spaces made it difficult to deploy artillery in the conventional way, which necessitated its dispersal. Second, the lack of visibility hampered the work of observation posts. Third, Malaya‟s hot and wet climate disintegrated cable lines, while the ever presence of tall trees interfered with wireless communications. Thus the artillery arm, upon which British tactical doctrine placed so much emphasis on, proved less effective in Malaya than in North Africa and Europe, to the detriment of Malaya Command.17 Seeing the campaign from the combat engineer‟s perspective was Brigadier Ivan Simson, Malaya Command‟s Chief Engineer, who toured Malaya and Singapore extensively and wrote a published memoir, Too Little, Too late (1970).18 His main argument was that the British Army‟s complacency and underestimation of the IJA led to it neglecting to build fixed defences in Malaya. In peacetime, the War Office failed to allocate enough money for the recruitment of local labour for the construction of permanent defences in Malaya and Singapore, which meant that much of the work then had to be done by troops who were already busy and weary with training. 15 Percival, 306. E.W. Goodman, Notes on the Campaign in Malaya from the Artillery Point of View (Delhi: War Department Historical Section, 1946), 17 Ibid. 18 Ivan Simson, Singapore: Too Little, Too Late (London: Leo Cooper, 1970). 16 9 Moreover, most senior commanders, including Lieutenant-General Lionel Bond, the previous GOC Malaya Command, and Percival, were reluctant to construct a comprehensive permanent defence system to cover strategic positions throughout Malaya and Singapore. Percival claimed that such constructions would affect the morale of troops. 19 Simson recalled attending many lectures which also preached this position and pointed to the British Expeditionary Force‟s similar neglect in preparing fixed defences in France in 1940. From these instances, he surmised that there was a systemic “anti-defence mentality” amongst British Army senior commanders since the end of World War I, who feared that troops would not have an offensive spirit in the presence of fixed defences.20 As Malaya Command HQ‟s Director of Operations and Training and then its GSO I, Lieutenant-Colonel B.H. Ashmore was most qualified to comment on its operations and training. He did so in his dispatch, Some Personal Observations of the Malayan Campaign 1940-1942 (1942), written after he had been safely evacuated to Ceylon.21 Ashmore noted that Malaya and India Commands emphasized training for desert warfare until 1940 when a manual on jungle warfare was finally issued by each command. 22 However, Percival gave Ashmore only an assistant for training, which was insufficient to ensure that all formations put them into practice. In any case, training at all levels was hindered by many factors - the hot and humid climate, inexperienced officers and NCOs, frequent changes in formation organization, the wide dispersal of troops all over Malaya to perform a great variety of tasks such as building fixed defences, guard key installations and the late arrival of certain weapons, heavy equipment and artillery. In addition, Ashmore lamented the fact that staffwork was patchy as many untrained regular unit 19 Ibid, 20, 21, 30-38, 45-47, 57, 68-71. Ibid, 73-74. 21 Percival Papers P49, “Some Personal Observations of the Malayan Campaign 1940-1942”, LieutenantColonel B.H. Ashmore, Ceylon 1942. 22 These were MTP 9: Extensive Warfare - Notes on Forest Warfare (New Delhi: HQ India Command, October 1940) and “Tactical Notes for Malaya” (Singapore: Malaya Command, December 1940). 20 10 officers were brought in to fill vacant positions. As will be elucidated in Chapter 2, the problems which hampered military training in Malaya mirrored what was happening in the UK at that time. Furthermore, the reinforcements that arrived after the conflict started did not have the time nor chance to acclimatize and train systematically and collectively for six months before being committed into battle - a requirement that Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery understood as necessary. In addition, Ashmore criticised Malaya Command‟s senior commanders for their flawed tendency to remove units from formations and dispatch them to widely separated areas, to launch piecemeal counterattacks without collective cohesion. 23 As will be highlighted in subsequent chapters, this is a trait that characterized British Commonwealth commanders in all theatres of war, especially in the early war years. One memoir which revealed the poor state of Malaya Command‟s intelligence was, The Jungle is Neutral (1948) written by Major Spencer Chapman, the Commander of 101 Special Training School.24 Chapman‟s main grouse was that the IJA‟s advance down Malaya would have been severely delayed to allow British reinforcements to arrive in time, had his plans of organizing “stay behind” guerilla and reconnaissance parties involving locals led by British officers, been approved by Percival before the war.25 He recorded that as late as two weeks into the campaign, the III Indian Corps was starved of information about the enemy‟s equipment, transport and tactical methods. Thus, Heath approved of his long range penetration mission to Perak to gather information and sabotage the enemy.26 As will be mentioned in Chapter 2, Malaya Command‟s poor intelligence about the enemy was not unique in the British Army. The man most suited to present the campaign from the infantry‟s perspective was Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Stewart, Commanding Officer (CO) of the most renowned and probably the best “jungle-trained” British infantry unit in Malaya – the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland 23 Percival Papers P49. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 1997 (1948)). 25 Ibid, 11-12, 70. 26 Ibid, 14-17. 24 11 Highlanders. Although scoffed at by Brigadier Kenneth Torrance, Brigadier General Staff Malaya Command, for training his unit realistically and rigorously for jungle warfare, this battalion proved to be one of the few that matched the IJA in the campaign. This was recognized by General Archibald Wavell, C-in-C India Command, who ordered Stewart to escape to pass on his personal knowledge of jungle warfare. 27 In the safety of India, Stewart wrote the dispatch, Comments on the Loss of Singapore (1942), of which a shorter response to Percival‟s dispatch appeared in the form of The Loss of Singapore – A Criticism (1948). 28 Uniquely, Stewart downplayed the tactical impact of the Japanese control of the air and sea and their use of tanks. Instead, having been vindicated by the events in Malaya, his thesis was that the British Army was a flawed organization with no commonly enforced jungle warfare tactical doctrine, an unrealistic and low tempo infantry training system which put insufficient emphasis on jungle warfare training, inadequate and over-theoretical system of officer training, and a mistaken reliance on static linear defences.29 He argued that all these defects had a common systemic origin: It [the disaster] was the failure of a mental outlook and of [the British Army‟s] system which was its expression. [British] leaders faithfully and efficiently served that system in the light of the mentality and tempo to which they had been trained.30 One British junior officer who wrote his memoir, Singapore – The Inexcusable Betrayal (1992) from the “grassroots” level, was Lieutenant George Chippington, a platoon commander in the 2nd Leicesters, which fought in many major battles in the Malayan campaign.31 He wrote his memoirs to defend the honour of the common British soldiers whom he felt were made scapegoats for the fall of Singapore to cover up for the complacency and negligence of politicians and local senior military commanders. 32 Chippington revealed the grueling conditions British 27 Stewart, vi. CAB106/91, “The Loss of Singapore – A Criticism”, Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Stewart; WO106/2579B “Comments, Lieutenant-Colonel I.M. Stewart, Argylls and Sutherland Highlanders”. 29 Ibid. 30 WO106/2579B, Stewart. 31 George Chippington, Singapore – The Inexcusable Betrayal (Harley Swan, Woves, United Kingdom: SPAL, 1992). 32 Chippington, 9-12. 28 12 soldiers had to endure which undermined morale even before contact was made with the enemy – frequent enemy air attacks, fatigue caused by the need to dig and prepare fixed defences, and discomfort and deprivation of sleep caused by constant rain. 33 He also noted that the British Army‟s standard doctrinal emphasis on motorised mobility, which was drilled into him as an officer cadet in the UK, proved useless in Malaya. He also lamented the fact that junior officers were not issued with maps, binoculars and compasses, as Malaya Command was disinclined to entrust them with initiative and responsibilities.34 As will be elaborated in Chapter 2, this system of “autocratic command” was practiced throughout the British Army. The most important contemporary Australian perspective was articulated by MajorGeneral Gordon Bennett, the GOC 8th Australian Division, who was also the most senior Australian soldier in Malaya. Bennett was an arrogant and controversial figure who fled to Australia just before the fall of Singapore without official permission, where he wrote the dispatch, On the Malayan Campaign 7th December 1941 to 15th February 1942. The 8th Australian Division‟s two brigades were amongst the best jungle-trained formations in Malaya Command and performed admirably against the IJA in Johor. Bennett‟s dispatch displayed nationalistic bias in extolling the high morale, tough qualities and jungle fighting skills of Australian soldiers while alluding to the lack of these in British and Indian troops.35 This sense of self-importance and need to defend his escape from Singapore made him incorporate the contents of his dispatch into his published memoir, Why Singapore Fell? (1944).36 Like Stewart, Bennett downplayed the tactical effectiveness of Japanese warplanes and tanks. Instead, he looked to human factors to explain the fall of Singapore: 33 Ibid, 27-30. Ibid, 39, 44. 35 WO106/2569 “On the Malayan Campaign 7th December 1941 to 15th February 1942”, Major-General Gordon H. Bennett (1942). 36 Gordon H. Bennett, Why Singapore Fell (Sydney: Angus & Robertson Ltd, 1944). 34 13 To summarise, the loss of Singapore was not due to lack of skill in the senior leaders. It was due in the main to poor leadership on the part of the commanders of most units. This poor leadership was responsible for the poor morale displayed by most of the troops.37 Although Bennett absolved senior commanders like himself from blame, he obviously had Heath and Percival in mind as candidates for „poor leadership‟ with the reference to Heath‟s tendency to advocate retreat and Percival‟s failure to rein in on him.38 Bennett attributed the cause of „poor leadership‟ to the British Army‟s flawed system of „selection and training of junior officers'. Bennett, a militia officer, had prejudices against regular officers and believed that they lacked the aggressiveness, enterprise and resilience of militia officers, who needed these qualities to excel in their civilian jobs. However, he also singled out the British „system of training for all ranks‟ for not imbibing offensive spirit, aggressive patrolling, individuality, initiative and resourcefulness, which were all needed in jungle warfare. In addition, he disparaged the British Army‟s tropical clothing, heavy equipment and its tactical doctrine of emphasising long-range artillery firepower and motorised mobility for being suited to open rather than jungle terrain.39 Finally, in his dispatches, he also critiqued the British Army‟s poor intelligence and staff work for being inefficient and geared towards peacetime low tempo.40 Considering that Indian soldiers comprised half of all troops who fought under the British flag in Malaya, it is most important to include memoirs that saw the campaign through their eyes. Fortunately, we have the memoirs of two prominent native Indian officers, Soldiers’ Contribution to Indian Independence (1974) by Major Mohan Singh and, India’s Freedom Struggle and the Great INA (1992) by Major Mohammad Zaman Kiani.41 Singh was a company commander in the 1/14th Punjabs, who surrendered to the Japanese after being cut off from his unit when the war was barely one week old. He then became the commander of the Japanese-sponsored, First Indian 37 Ibid, 226-227. Ibid, 21-22. 39 Ibid, 14-17, 20, 23, 227-228. 40 WO106/2569. 41 Mohan Singh, Soldiers’ Contribution to Indian Independence (New Delhi: S. Attar Singh, 1974); Mohammad Zaman Kiani, India’s Freedom Struggle and the Great INA (New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House, 1992) 38 14 National Army (INA). Kiani served as General Staff Officer (GSO) III (Intelligence) of the 11 th Indian Division HQ throughout the campaign. After the fall of Singapore, he joined the INA and commanded one of its divisions. Although the focus of both memoirs was about the founding of the INA, its activities and contributions to Indian nationalism and independence, they included some important insights about the pre-war British Indian Army. Both officers noted that during peacetime, the British Indian Army had an officer corps that took preparation for war lightly, had an inadequate and unrealistic training system, and largely neglected jungle warfare training. 42 Furthermore, they noted that it was a mercenary force which lacked motivation to fight for the British cause. 43 Finally, Kiani reflected that the British early war system of „milking‟ regular units of experienced officers and NCOs to help form a cadre of newly raised conscript units, robbed Indian units in Malaya of experienced leadership. The replacement British Emergency Commissioned Officers (ECOs) were inexperienced and, having received little study in Indian languages, culture and customs, could not bond effectively with the sepoys.44 To make the literature review complete, it is necessary to include Japanese sources. There are not many due to the linguistic barrier and the fact that many military documents and diaries were destroyed in the course of the Pacific War. The most prominent and most significant of the English-translated Japanese memoirs is Singapore – The Hinge of Fate (1951), written by the controversial Lieutenant-Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, 25th Army HQ‟s staff officer in charge of operations. In this capacity, he often went right up front as liaison officer and tactical advisor.45 Tsuji‟s memoirs owed much in content to the wartime post-campaign report produced by the 25th Army HQ, Outline of the Malayan Campaign (1942), which he must have played a large part in 42 Kiani, 13-14; Singh, 36. Singh, 42-46; Kiani, 1. 44 Kiani, 2-3, 6. 45 Later published as Masanobu Tsuji, Japan’s Greatest Victory, Britain’s Worst Defeat (New York: Sarpedon, 1993 (1951)). 43 15 compiling. 46 His memoir had the stated aim of responding to some facts and opinions in Churchill‟s memoirs which differed from the Japanese perspective.47 It was a largely self-serving nationalistic account, prone to exaggeration and biased coverage at several points. Notwithstanding that, it provided insights on the IJA‟s ingredients for victory and its assessments of the British Army. What was groundbreaking was Tsuji‟s claim that the IJA‟s thorough and intensive gathering of information and combat preparations in tropical climate and jungle terrain were all carried out during the first six months of 1941. 48 Augmented by good intelligence about the dispositions and intentions of the enemy through clandestine air and ground reconnaissance, the IJA formulated highly successful “unorthodox” tactics, based on the principles of speed, surprise and flexibility - tanks, light artillery and some infantry were employed to attack frontally on the road, while other infantry flanked through the jungle and in small boats along the coast and rivers, to trap and annihilate the enemy.49 Tsuji credited the extraordinary efficiency and resourcefulness of Japanese combat engineers, in improvising and repairing bridges in a much shorter time than expected, and the IJA‟s use of bicycles, for maintaining the rapid speed of advance and pursuit through all terrain despite the British use of demolitions. Consequently, given neither rest nor opportunity to regroup, the British Army often retreated without destroying its „Churchill supplies‟ - petroleum, food, weapons, ammunition, motor vehicles and heavy equipment, which were captured by the IJA intact and pressed into immediate use to sustain land and air operations.50 Tsuji stated that the Malayan Campaign was given top priority in Japan‟s military preparations for war, so the GOC 25th Army, Lieutenant-General Tomuyuki Yamashita, his staff 46 “The Outline of the Malayan campaign”, Twenty-Fifth Army HQ (30 June 1942). Tsuji, ix, xii. 48 Ibid, 1-5. 49 Ibid, 6, 32-33, 92-93, 125-127, 136, 139. 50 Ibid, 105-107, 147-151. 47 16 officers and three well-trained, crack divisions were all “specially selected” for the task.51 He also gave credit to the close co-operation and support given by the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force to the IJA. 52 However, Tsuji‟s thesis was that victory in Malaya was mainly due to spiritual and moral factors: It was not jungle experience or training in jungle warfare but the indomitable fighting spirit of the officers and men [of the 25th Army] which enabled them to surmount difficulties and hardships to make detours through the jungle and attack the enemy rear.53 As will be addressed in Chapter 3, contrary to Tsuji‟s claims, the thorough and intensive preparations and training made by 25th Army for the Malayan campaign and its use of so-called “unorthodox” tactics were characteristics of the IJA. The 25th Army‟s capture and use of „Churchill supplies‟ was possible only because the British Army traditionally placed great emphasis on logistics, as will be highlighted in Chapter 2. Another useful Japanese memoir written in English is Lieutenant Takao Fusayama‟s, A Japanese Soldier in Malaya and Sumatra (1997). He was the commander of the 2nd Radio Platoon of the Imperial Guards Division.54 In this capacity, Fusayama served near the frontline with the Kunishi Detachment HQ in its small boat flanking operations along Malay‟s west coast from early January 1942 onwards. Like Tsuji, Fusayama‟s memoirs was unashamedly nationalistic and claimed that the main reasons for the Japanese victory were the brilliance of the leadership of the 25th Army and the spiritual and moral superiority of its men over those of the enemy, which was especially crucial in the close jungle terrain. He also noted the devolution of command amongst Japanese field and junior commanders, which allowed the 25th Army to conduct high tempo operations.55 As will be elaborated in Chapter 3, this system of “mission command” was practiced throughout the IJA. 51 Ibid, 20, 29, 32-33. Ibid, 42-48, 115-116, 161, 163. 53 Ibid, 132. 54 Takao, Fusayama, Memoir of Takao Fusayama – A Japanese Soldier in Malaya and Sumatra (Kuala Lumpur: Universiti Kebangsaan Press, 1997). 55 Ibid, 12-13, 23, 74-76, 79-81, 103, 107-108. 52 17 This chapter has established that most of the strengths of 25th Army and the weaknesses of Malaya Command actually reflected their respective armies and military systems. Malaya Command‟s tardiness in preparing fixed defences, its flawed intelligence, its “autocratic command” system, its inadequate system of officer selection and training, its decentralized, unrealistic and low tempo system of training, its use of “milking” as a system for expanding the army, its cumbersome equipment and its static linear defence tactics focusing on the artillery arm and motorized mobility – all reflected the British military system. Conversely, the 25th Army‟s thorough and professional preparation for war, its excellent intelligence, its “mission command” system, its centralized, realistic and high tempo system of training for all ranks, its light equipment and its flanking offensive tactics focusing on the infantry arm - all reflected the Japanese military system. Thus, the tactical outcome of the Malayan Campaign was decided by the superiority of the one military system over the other. 18 CHAPTER 2: THE BRITISH ARMY IN 1941 The British Army had strengths which eventually helped to win the war. However, in the early years of the war when defeat was the norm, its weaknesses were more evident. This chapter examines and evaluates how the pre-war and early war British military system laid the foundations for the British Army‟s tactical disaster in the Malayan Campaign. It asserts that the shortcomings of Malaya Command actually reflected the shortcomings of the British Army as a whole. Malaya Command‟s lack of homogeneity betrayed systemic weakness. Although known collectively as the “British Army” (the generic term used in this thesis), it was in reality a diverse Commonwealth and Empire army, administered by three affiliated yet separate armies – the British Army, the Indian Army and the Australian Army. 56 This multi-national and multi-ethnic army was largely structured, organised, led, trained and fought according to a common imperial system. Only the Australian Army had a considerable measure of autonomy as Australia was a Dominion within the British Empire. However, differences in culture, customs, background, motivation, religion, food requirements and languages, undermined collective cohesion and complicated command and supply requirements.57 War Office and Malaya Command‟s complacency and lack of preparation for war laid the foundation for British defeat in Malaya.58 Wavell wrote that this was „typical of the British way of war‟, a verdict that Brian Bond and Fraser agreed with.59 Mark Urban contended that the British Army traditionally started every major war since the 18 th century unprepared, and then 56 Based on a calculation from S.W. Kirby, The War against Japan Vol. 1: The Loss of Singapore (History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series (London, HMSO, 1957), 473, Malaya Command‟s troops comprised of 48.5 percent from India (including Gurkha troops from Nepal), 13.3 percent from Australia, 10.4 percent from Malaya and Singapore and only 27.8% from Britain. 57 Simson, 149; Tim Moreman, Desert Rats – British 8th Army in North Africa (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007), 13; Kirby, 503; Raymond Callahan, Churchill and His Generals (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 2007), 244, footnote No. 21; F. W. Perry, The Commonwealth Armies – Manpower and Organisation in Two World Wars (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 221. 58 “Lecture on Malaya Campaign” (21/6/1942), Lieutenant-General Lewis Heath, Heath Papers LMH4; Simson, 20; WO106/2569. 59 Wavell‟s foreword in Chapman, 5; Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 58; Fraser, 22-23. 19 progressed in combat proficiency until a peak of excellence was reached. Then, with the coming of peace, the army would lapse into unpreparedness again until the next war, and repeat the whole cycle.60 Simson added that British democratic institutions tended to focus on popular domestic priorities at the expense of sound but unpopular military preparations. Finally, in the interwar years, the British nation naïvely believed in the viability of international collective security and was reluctant to wage a major war.61 Moreover, Martin van Creveld and French observed that the British Army had a tradition of “muddling through a crisis” rather than preparing thoroughly for it, due to its officer corps regarding war as a “great game”.62 Similarly, there was consensus opinion that British and Indian Army officers were conservative, amateurish, and given to sports, recreation and socialisation rather than preparing for war.63 The British Army‟s “unpreparedness” for the campaign was thus systemic in its origins. Farrell argued that the greatest flaw of the British military system was that it insisted „the situation must fit the plan at all levels.‟ This resulted in what he called the frequent „disconnect‟ in planning at all levels.64 Brooke-Popham imposed on Percival the mission to keep the enemy as far away as possible from the Singapore Naval Base until reinforcements arrived to “roll” back the enemy‟s advance.65 Aware that 11th Indian Division would have to bear the brunt of delaying the enemy until substantial reinforcements arrived at Singapore to turn the tide, Percival then instructed all its successive GOCs to „preserve their division as an effective fighting formation‟. 66 Yet the 11th Indian Division had no hope of imposing maximum delay on the enemy unless it 60 Mark Urban, Generals – Ten British Commanders Who Shaped the World (London: Faber and Faber limited, 2005), 303-304, 310. 61 Simson, 134. 62 Martin Van Creveld, The Training of Officers – From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance (London: The Free Press, 1990), 49; David French, “Big Wars and Small Wars between the Wars 1919-1939” in Hew Strachan, (ed.) Big Wars and Small Wars – The British Army and the Lessons of War in the 20 th Century (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 50. 63 Bond, 44; Kiani, 13-14; Singh, 36; Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals (London: Cassell, 1983 (1960)), 103-105. 64 Farrell, 8. 65 Percival, Despatch. 66 Percival as quoted in Heath Papers LMH4; Kirby, 212. 20 fought hard with all its might. This contradiction would lead to a half-hearted defence of Malaya and the constant danger of the division being overwhelmed piecemeal, as Tsuji noted.67 Another example of British rigidity in sticking to an original plan without changing to fit circumstances was Percival‟s reluctance to build a permanent defence network throughout Malaya – a fact which Tsuji noted in bewilderment. 68 Wavell subsequently asked Percival to rectify this but advised that it be done in secrecy, which gave greater credence to Simson‟s claim of a systemic “anti-defence mentality” amongst British Army senior commanders.69 This attitude made sense only if Wavell and Percival still expected British reinforcements to somehow turn up on time and in numbers to counterattack as originally envisaged. They were thus concerned that the offensive spirit of these troops might be dented by the sight of permanent defences. However, this delusion was out of sync with the reality of the grave strategic situation and undermined defence preparations. The British Army paradoxically lacked knowledge of the equipment, tactics, capabilities and intentions of the IJA, despite possessing rather accurate assessments of them. It had erroneously underrated the IJA as a weaker opponent than the Italian Army. 70 This was in part due to complacent ethno-centrism displayed by British officers of all three services, as well as the British Army‟s flawed assessments of the IJA‟s performance against the Chinese and Red armies in the 1930s.71 However, French also noted that British Army commanders at home tended to see the German Army from their own perspectives, instead of recognising that different armies had different ethos and ways of working. Consequently, the British Army‟s Staff College, which 67 Tsuji, 123-124. Tsuji, 152-153, 179. 69 Clifford Kinvig, “Scapegoat: Percival in the Malayan Campaign” in Brian P. Farrell, & Sandy Hunter, (eds.) Sixty Years On – The Fall of Singapore Revisited (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2002), 256; Brian P. Farrell, “Wavell‟s Leadership and Responsibilities in Malaya” in Brian P. Farrell (ed.), Leadership and Responsibility in the Second World War – Essays in Memory of Robert Vogel (Montreal: McGillQueen‟s University Press, 2004), 201. 70 Heath Papers LMH4; Simson, 20, 26-27; Percival Papers P49; WO106/2569. 71 John Ferris, “Double-edged Estimates: Japan in the Eyes of the British Army and the RAF, 1900-1939” in Ian Gow & Yoichi Hirama, (eds.) The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations 1600-2000 Volume III: The Military Dimension (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 96-98; Tsuji, 104. 68 21 produced most of its senior officers, neglected the study of foreign armies until 1936.72 Malaya Command‟s intelligence failure was also due to its under-emphasis on the value of active fighting patrols.73 However, the German Army also noted that the British Army in Greece seldom sent patrols, which reinforced the pattern of British Army systemic failure in intelligence.74 The combat divisions of Malaya Command were rigidly organised along standard British Army lines without modification for local conditions. Except for territorial divisions, British and Indian divisions and brigades were not permanent structures and had no regional affiliations battalions within a brigade and even brigades within a division were often transferred from one to another due to the need to scatter the army to garrison far-flung colonial territories. Thus, there was often insufficient esprit de corps within a brigade or division.75 Although divisional assets, were more commonly decentralised in 1941 to form temporary combined arms “brigade groups” for specific tasks, close co-operation between them was markedly less effective and expended more time than if they had been permanently grouped together for training in peacetime.76 British and Indian infantry battalions were recruited from a particular region in the UK and India, to foster regimental esprit de corps and pride. This was the basis of the British Army‟s famous regimental system imbibed through regimental parades, customs, uniform distinctions and history lessons on the regiment‟s glorious deeds. Although the regimental system sustained morale during combat, it also led to “tribal elitism” which hindered combined arms and inter- 72 French, Raising Churchill’s Armies, 45-46. Chapman, 14-17; WO 106/2579B “Appreciation of the Malayan Campaign from the Viewpoint of A Member of the Intelligent Corps”. 74 US Army, The German Campaigns in the Balkans 1941 (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1986 (1953)), 75 George Forty, British Army Handbook 1939-1945 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1998), 95; Fraser, 12-13. 76 One artillery battery, a machine gun and an engineer platoon, and a troop of anti-tank guns were now often attached to each battalion, from the divisional assets. French, 39-41, 191. See also Shelford Bidwell & Dominick Graham, Firepower – The British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1905 (Barnsley, Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Military Classics, 2004 (1982)), 193, 198; Moreman, 15; Kirby, 502; House, 126. 73 22 battalion co-operation.77 The adverse impact of the lack of cohesion within British and Indian formations and units on their combat performance in Malaya will be evident in subsequent chapters. Due to the perceived lack of threat from a major modern army in jungle terrain, the British Army did not conceptualise a specific doctrine for jungle warfare but instead relied on one standard doctrine until 1940. It assumed that preparing for conventional warfare, with correct application of general tactical principles, could be prepared for other forms of warfare in the colonies.78 This “one size fits all” approach to doctrine was due to the many roles assumed by the British Army and Indian Army since the early 20th century. The first was traditionally preoccupied with continental war in open terrain against Germany, while the second was traditionally preoccupied with mountain warfare in Afghanistan against the Russian Army and Pathan irregulars. In addition, throughout the interwar years both armies were heavily involved in “policing” the vast empire in India and Palestine. With Italian entry into the Second World War, the Middle East, East and North Africa became the main overseas preoccupation of the British Army, which changed the emphasis to desert warfare.79 As a result, many formations and units in Malaya were trained in garrison work and warfare in open terrain rather than jungle warfare. Even when directives were finally given by Malaya and India Commands regarding jungle warfare, Brigadier W. Carpendale, CO 28th Indian Brigade, lamented that Malaya Command HQ did not set up any jungle warfare school nor gave assistance on jungle warfare 77 Anthony Clayton, The British Officer – Leading the Army from 1660 to the Present (Edinburgh Gate, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), 193; Bond, 59-63, 70-71; Callahan, 20; Fraser, 88, 91-92; French, 122-124, 145; Barnett, 104; Michael Howard, “Leadership in the British Army during the Second World War – Some Personal Observations” in G.D. Sheffield, (ed.) Leadership and Command – The Anglo-American Military Experience since 1861 (London: Brassey‟s, 1997), 122-123. 78 That was why only one chapter out of twelve of the Field Service Regulations (1929) and two pages of the Field Service Regulations (1935) contained “Warfare in Undeveloped and Semi-civilised Countries”. Alan Jeffreys, The British Army in the Far East 1941-1945 (London: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 10-11. See also Moreman, The Jungle, the Japanese and the Commonwealth Armies at War, 11; French, “Big Wars and Small Wars”, 36-37. 79 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 13; Fraser, 12; Perry, 101-102; Daniel Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes – The Indian Army in the Burma Campaign (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 2728; Tim Moreman, Development of Frontier Warfare 1914-1939, 23 training. As a result, each formation and unit commander was left to his own devices to train his troops, with most of them being ignorant about jungle warfare training.80 Simson discovered large quantities of unissued War Office anti-tank pamphlets stored in Malaya Command HQ and also cited Percival‟s refusal to allow him to conduct centralised training for combat engineer units, despite the fact that some of them had little knowledge of camouflaging, bridge demolition techniques, pillbox, anti-boat and anti-tank defence construction and close co-operation with infantry.81 In addition, useful lessons learnt by British and Indian units in Malaya during outfield exercises were also not followed up or passed on to higher command.82 Unfortunately, in all these cases, valuable lessons were not transmitted to Malaya Command HQ for deliberation and circulation. The lack of circulation and centralisation of a common doctrine was not unique to Malaya Command. After all, the British Army traditionally viewed doctrine, as encapsulated in its many versions of Field Service Regulations (FSR), as merely broad principles to be adapted by unit and formation commanders, rather than common technique to be prescribed authoritatively in detail. In the same grain, Moreman noted that India Command had since the late 19th century been reluctant to issue specific manuals prescribing mountain warfare techniques for its units fighting on the Northwest Frontier, for fear of over-specialisation. 83 Similarly, while the two jungle warfare manuals produced in 1940 contained sound principles, they did not deal with minor tactics.84 This made sense as the multiple-roles performed by British and Indian armies globally required local garrison commanders to have some autonomy over the use of doctrine and tactics. Moreover, the Directorate of Military Training (DMT) in the UK had too many duties to enforce 80 WO 106/2579B, “Report on Operations of 11th Indian Division in Kedah and Perak”, Brigadier W. Carpendale, 28th Indian Brigade. 81 Ibid, 36-38, 45, 46, 53-57. 82 Three of the 15th Indian Brigade‟s schemes in June, July and October 1941 demonstrated the vulnerability of static defences to flanking attacks made in the jungle. In another scheme in July, the 2/9 th Jats learnt that it took longer to move troops on vehicles than to march them for distances of less than 15 miles. WO 172/117 “15th Indian Brigade War Diary”; WO172/121 “2/9th Jats War Diary”; WO106/2579B, Carpendale. 83 Moreman, Development of Frontier Warfare. 84 Moreman, The Jungle, the Japanese and the Commonwealth Armies, 19-20. 24 a common interpretation of doctrine. Furthermore, the British Army‟s regimental system also hindered the passing on of good practices. In addition, most British Army officers typically detested intellectual pursuits and so ignored reading the voluminous issues of doctrinal manuals.85 Thus, in the UK, many division and corps schools issued their own supplementary doctrinal manuals, instead of issuing a common one.86 Standard British Army doctrine in the interwar years emphasised the need to avoid the mass slaughters in the trenches of the First World War. 87 Thus, senior commanders preferred what Martin van Creveld termed „timetable war‟ and what Martin Samuels called „restrictive control and timetable tactics‟, which brought victory to the British Army on the Western Front in 1918. 88 Such tactics were characterized by meticulously planned, centrally controlled and methodically executed set piece battles, with an emphasis on careful consolidation of ground rather than active pursuit and exploitation of breakthrough opportunities.89 As Place asserted, the British Army had so assumed that the artillery would be able to suppress the enemy that, „Little thought had been given to the training of the infantry in the minor tactics [in the last two hundred yards] needed to close in with an unsuppressed enemy'.90 The British Army failed to recognize that lack of visibility and wealth of cover provided by the jungle terrain favoured the offense over the defense, in which infantry played a more crucial role than artillery. Consequently, Malaya Command relied on fighting World War I-style, static, linear defensive warfare on the road, supported by heavy artillery firepower and reinforced by motor-borne infantry. 91 This fact was well-documented even in Japanese sources. 92 The 85 French, “Big Wars and Small Wars”, 40-42; Moreman, Desert Rats, 28; Callahan, 15, 20; Clayton, 193; Bond, 59-63, 70-71; Place, 16. 86 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 194-195, 200-203. 87 Callahan, 12-15; Fraser, 8; French, 12-15, 43. 88 Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Singapore: Cultured Lotus, 2001 (1985)); Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command training and Tactics in the British and German Armies 1888-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 2003 (1995)). 89 French, 12, 24. 90 Place, 37-38, 67-68. 91 WO106/2579B, Stewart; WO106/2569. 25 assumption that jungle terrain was “impenetrable” might explain why Lieutenant-Colonel M. Elrington, CO 2nd Loyals, claimed that machetes for cutting jungle vegetation were not standard issues within Malaya Command.93 Standard British artillery doctrine and tactics, which envisaged the systematic use of centrally massed divisional artillery to neutralise the enemy in support of the infantry, were not suitable for jungle warfare. Due to the close terrain of Malaya and the lessons learnt from the French Campaign, artillery batteries were now frequently attached to brigades instead of being concentrated at divisional level. However, the standard lengthy process needed by brigade and battalion commanders to obtain firepower support from the CRA, slowed the rate of firing. Moreover, the jungle terrain reduced visibility and hindered signal communications which hampered the use of the artillery‟s new and effective method of short concentrated area-firing.94 Insulated by the RN and the RAF in home defence, the British Army‟s mobilization system was geared towards fighting small colonial wars, which resulted in its quality being diluted when expanding rapidly in times of major war. Alone amongst its European counterparts, the British Army was a small core of long-service regular force, backed up by a larger part-time territorial force and reserves. Conscription was only made universal in the two world wars.95 The British Army had been using the system of “milking” to expand its size quickly since 1918. However, this system robbed existing units of experienced leadership.96 Indian units especially, had their combat cohesion and performance undermined by the inability of British ECOs to speak the local languages of the sepoys, and the lack of familiarity with their different culture and 92 Tsuji, 90-91, 207-209, 211-213; Fusayama, 21, 34-35, 42-44, 74-75, 85; Henry Frei, Guns of February – Ordinary Japanese Soldiers’ Views of the Malayan Campaign and the Fall of Singapore 1941-42 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004), 87, 110, 112, 114. 93 CAB106/174 “An Account of the 2nd Loyals in Malaya”, Lieutenant-Colonel Elrington. 94 Bidwell & Graham, 198-201; French, 27; Goodman, Despatch. 95 French, 12, 15, 63-64; Perry, 47-49; Fraser, 97. 96 Perry, 104-109; Callahan, 22; Fraser, 100-101. 26 customs.97 British units were not spared from having inexperienced leadership due to “milking,” but they were at least spared linguistic and cultural problems. 98 The effects of “milking” on selected British and Indian Army units can be seen from Appendix One. The British Army‟s poor pool of infantry recruits laid the foundations for the poor performance of Malaya Command‟s infantry units. The close combat nature and rigours of jungle warfare required good quality infantrymen with aggressiveness, ruggedness, enterprise and initiative.99 However, in line with the erroneous British Army‟s doctrinal belief that infantrymen needed no quality other than obeying orders, the better educated recruits were channelled to other combat arms and services, while the infantry took in the rest.100 Moreover, its system of assigning recruits to a branch and service according to the recruiting officer‟s recommendation, based on their professional trade, choices and medical test, proved unsatisfactory. Tests done by Northern Command at home in May 1941 showed that 20% of an infantry intake lacked the aptitude needed, which affected their morale.101 Thus, many recruits lacked the necessary qualities for jungle warfare. Japanese Army veterans had scant respect for the spiritual and moral qualities of British Empire troops.102 Undoubtedly, being on the losing side, with no air or naval support, and in a constant cycle of retreat, prepare defences, fight and retreat again without sufficient sleep, undermined the latter‟s morale and confidence.103 In the first place, the British military system was not designed to produce aggressive soldiers. After all, British soldiers were literate urban products of an interwar liberal democratic and un-militaristic generation, who were cynical about making unnecessary sacrifices due to their memories of the futility of World War I. 97 Alan Warren, “The Indian Army and the Fall of Singapore” in Farrell & Hunter, (eds.), 271; Clayton, 276; Marston, 11-15. 98 Stewart, 6. 99 WO106/2569; WO106/2579B, Stewart. 100 Callahan, 21-22; Fraser, 102; Place, 42; Jeremy A. Crang, The British Army and the People’s War 19391945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 6-7; French, 70-72. 101 Crang, 5-9; Perry, 65-66; French, 66-67, 80. 102 Tsuji, 90-91, 132, 221-222; Frei, 114; Fusayama, 103, 107-108. 103 Heath Papers LMH4; WO 106/2579B, Steedman; Percival, Despatch; Abbot, Lieutenant S., 8911511, 2nd East Surrey, Imperial War Museum; 27 Consequently, despite government propaganda, many of them were apathetic about the ideological cause of their struggle, had no personal hatred for the enemy, and no fervor for close quarter combat. Instead, regimental and small group loyalties, and the desire to do their duty and return safely to their loved ones, served as their motivations to fight. This was reflected in the popularity amongst British troops in what Michael Howard called „the nostalgic, home-sick refrains‟ of Vera Lynn and Gracie Fields.104 Such traits hardly conditioned them for the demands of jungle warfare. To make matters worse, the Indian soldiers who made up half of Malaya Command‟s troops, traditionally based their motivation on career advancement and a sense of duty to their regiment, clan, caste and religion, rather than patriotism for the British crown. By the outbreak of war, most native Indian officers had divided loyalties, due to their sympathy with the Indian National Congress. They were also resentful about the overt racism and the unequal treatment perpetuated by the British military establishment.105 The potential unreliability of Indian troops and their susceptibility to anti-British propaganda were noticed by Japanese officers and noted in the tropical warfare pamphlet issued to every Japanese soldier.106 A few days before the fall of Singapore, Major Iwaichi Fujiwara, commander of F-Kikan, which aimed to subvert Indian troops, even managed to persuade an entire Indian battalion to defect.107 Indian and British officers alike noted the inadequate training of Malaya Command‟s troops. This is evident from the profile of selected British and Indian Army units in Appendix One. They usually trained for garrison duties, mostly near barracks rather than outfield, escaped indoors at noon to avoid the tropical heat, kept office hours and did not train at night for fear of 104 French, 14-15, 123-126, 133-134, 151, 154; Robert Lyman , The Generals – From Defeat to Victory, Leadership in Asia 1941-1945 (London: Constable & Robinson, 2008), 350; Fraser, 99; Howard, 125. 105 Singh, 38, 42-46, 50; Kiani, 1, 42-43; Pradeep P. Barua, Gentlemen of the Raj – The Indian Army Officer Corps, 1817-1949 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 69-80; Marston, 24-26. 106 Tsuji, 90-91, 244-245; Fusayama, 48-50, 103; 25th Army HQ, 178; Akashi Yoji “General Yamashita: Commander of the 25th Army” in Farrell & Hunter (eds.), 190. 107 Iwaichi Fujiwara, F. Kikan – Japanese Army Intelligence Operations in Southeast Asia during World War II (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1983), 123-124, 171-173. 28 diseases spread by mosquitoes.108 Anti-tank training for infantry, apart from anti-tank rifle crews, was limited to a demonstration on the use of Molotov cocktails on dummy tanks. Finally, realistic military training was further compromised by an injunction against damaging private property or cutting down crops or trees.109 The inadequate nature of Malaya Command‟s training can be seen from the example of the 15th Indian Brigade. Of the six collective exercises it had, all except one were single-day schemes. Its typical exercise had no bayonets fixed, with blanks fired only at twenty yards onwards, while artillery, engineers and enemies were often „imagined‟. Another of its schemes in November 1941 involving the defence of the Jitra Line against a „motorised enemy force‟ lasted for only five hours!110 Jeremy Crang, French and Bond also noted that the British Army‟s standard training regime at home was characterized by similar low tempo, unrealism and laxity. 111 A large proportion of infantry training was spent on parade drills and endless fatigue duties designed to inculcate blind obedience, discipline and a sense of collective spirit. Many senior officers believed that these things were necessary to sustain morale, while cultivating independent rational thought and individualism would lead to insubordination and demoralization. Significantly, encounter battles and night operations, which were suited to jungle warfare conditions, were rarely practiced.112 Although common “battle drills” were used in 1918, a combination of factors militated against their universal adoption – the British liberal tradition, the social belief in the adaptability of British “gentlemen” officers, and the perceived inability of lower class soldiers to perform without supervision.113 Instead, the British Army traditionally left infantry training in the hands of unit, regimental and formation commanders in depots and schools. Thus, depending on the 108 CAB 106/53 Harrison, “History of the 11th Indian Division”; Kiani, 13-14; Percival, 300; Percival Papers P49. 109 Heath Papers LMH4; WO 172/120 Appendix II; Chippington, 29. 110 WO 172/117; WO 172/120 “1st Leicesters War Diary”; WO 172/121; Percival Papers P49. 111 Bond, 35-37; French, “Big Wars and Small Wars”, 42-43; Crang, 79. 112 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 48, 55-57, 122, 124-129, 152-153; Fraser, 12-13; Crang, 79. 113 French, 21 29 personality of individual commanders, training tempo and standards remained uneven at home.114 The British Army‟s training system was inadequate to prepare its troops for conventional warfare against a modern opponent, much less to fight in the jungle. Most formations in Malaya, except for the 22nd and 27th AIF and 12th Indian Brigades, had insufficient collective exercises, while the 22nd Indian Brigade had none. Neither the 9th nor the 11th Indian Divisions had a scheme with all its components.115 This reflected the situation at home where large scale maneuvers beyond brigade level rarely took place. This was due to the scattering of the army all over the Empire, the reluctance to call up territorials and reserves, the shortage of equipment, the instruction to respect private property and the lack of suitable training ground. As a result, monotonous and unrealistic exercises with flags representing troops and weapons were conducted.116 Naturally, co-operation of artillery with infantry in the attack was also insufficiently practiced.117 After 1940, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) also failed to introduce collective training for the concentrated army at home as there was a continued shortage of weapons and heavy equipment, while troops had to dig trenches, man coastal defences and provide labour for civil needs. 118 Thus, the factors which hampered collective training in Malaya also affected training in the UK. The leadership of Malaya Command at all levels left much to be desired. At the eve of the Kampar battle, Heath complained that many junior commanders and even some unit commanders „lacked tactical sense.‟119 The British Army‟s amateurish and unsatisfactory officer selection system laid the foundation for its poor leadership. It was unsatisfactorily leaned towards a subjective interview. In the case of pre-war regular officer candidates and ECO candidates, the interviewer favoured candidates of middle and upper class background who could be expected to 114 Chapman, 157; French, 170, 199-200, 203-205, 210. Kirby, 211; CAB 106/53; Percival Papers P49; CAB 106/193; WO 172/124 22 nd Indian Brigade War Diary; WO 172/112 12th Indian Brigade War Diary. 116 French, “Big Wars and Small Wars”, 42-44; Clayton, 189-190; Crang, 79; Fraser, 12-13. 117 Bidwell & Graham, 3. 118 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 199, 200. 119 WO 172/18 Appendix R16. 115 30 have the academic or professional qualifications, eloquence and bearings. Only the wartime officer selection system could be considered meritocratic as potential candidates had to be from outstanding conscripts with six months of service who had the recommendation of their unit commanders. 120 However, regimental loyalties made unit commanders reluctant to send their better personnel as officer candidates, which retarded the quality of the army‟s officer pool. In any case, the officer selection system proved “unscientific” and inadequate, as failure rates in the Officer Cadet Training Units (OCTUs) reached 25% in 1941 at home.121 The British Army‟s system of training junior infantry officers was typically amateurish, haphazard and inadequate. It was a mere three months for wartime officers and ECOs.122 Upon graduation, officers underwent further practical training in their units by mentor officers, which typically resulted in uneven training standards. Infantry officer training was often a revision of recruit training but emphasised sports, riding, hunting, physical fitness and the inculcation of “gentlemanly” character and values. The cultivating of initiative, critical thinking and independent-thought was neglected, while man management skills were totally excluded, beyond the issue of a pamphlet. Tactical training consisted mainly of demonstrations and unrealistic “Training Exercises Without Troops” (TEWTs). The training of infantry NCOs was similarly conducted in the units and also failed in training initiative. It was clear that the training system of infantry officers was unsatisfactory as many units complained about the unsuitability of the officers they received, with some invalided due to nervous breakdowns in action.123 OCTU Malaya‟s syllabus for infantry officer cadets conformed to those in the UK and suffered from the same deficiencies. Its three-month course mainly consisted of drills, weapons training and many lectures, demonstrations and films. The art of leadership was covered in only a lecture, while practical anti-tank warfare training was absent. There was only a day‟s outfield 120 Crang, 21, 23-24; Clayton, 194-195, 203, 278; French, 49-51, 73; Fraser, 101. Fraser, 101-102; Crang, 25-30; French, 74, 80. 122 French, 131. 123 Place, 45-49; Clayton, 196; Crang, 58; French, 50, 57-59, 75, 131; Callahan, 18-21; Bond, 44, 53, 56, 68-70; Fraser, 100-102; French, 131. 121 31 training in jungle warfare and only two night training schemes. Throughout the course, none of the field training was multi-day and did not involve the other arms. Finally, tactical training consisted of only a mandatory five-day TEWT in Johor.124 A junior officer who had attended OCTU Malaya „remembered that its syllabus was based on doctrine laid down in the UK, with no specific lessons about conditions specific to Malaya,‟ which was most unhelpful.125 Considering that the close terrain and high tempo nature of jungle warfare required good leadership from junior officers and NCOs, it was most unfortunate that the British Army‟s system of selecting and training officers failed to supply this important ingredient. The British Army‟s system of training unit and formation commanders was just as inadequate, haphazard and amateurish. Since the 18th century, the British Army believed that personal experience built upon public school education and sound character was sufficient to prepare officers for higher appointments.126 However, there were inadequate divisional and corps level exercises in the interwar period to help higher formation commanders gain experience. Until 1939, when a Higher Commander‟s Course was finally instituted too late to have any impact on improving quality of higher leadership, formation commanders were trained by their superior officers in a combination of TEWTs, troop exercises, discussions and conferences. However, standards were typically patchy depending on the latter. A Senior Officer School had existed to train unit commanders since 1920, but it was typically unrealistic and lax. Training took place mainly during office hours and mainly consisted of “paper” signal exercises, TEWTs, war games and staff tours.127 In the interwar years, the Staff College also trained field commanders, having erroneously thought that they were interchangeable with staff officers. As graduates were mostly 124 WO172/32 “War Diary of OCTU, Malaya”. Quoted in Farrell, 120. 126 Lyman, 344-346. 127 French, 60-61, 169. David French, “An Extensive use of Weedkiller: Patterns of Promotion in the Senior Ranks of the British Army, 1919-1939” in David French and Brian Holden Reid (eds.), The British General Staff – Reform and Innovation 1890-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 173. 125 32 junior officers, their learning became outdated when they eventually became unit and formation commanders. 128 This was bound to have a great impact on the high leadership of the army, considering that the majority of senior officers from lieutenant-colonel onwards were Staff College graduates and lecturers by the 1930s.129 This resulted in certain senior officers, such as Percival, Lieutenant-General Thomas Hutton, GOC Burma Command and Lieutenant-General Maitland Wilson, GOC “W” Force in Greece being given field command, when they were actually more adapt at staff work. 130 To compound matters, hasty wartime expansion of the officer corps brought rapid promotion to inexperienced officers who had only participated in colonial “policing” during peacetime. Not surprisingly then, command of formations and units in the British Army was frequently poor in the early years of the war.131 Typically, the training system in the British Army‟s Staff College left much to be desired. The course itself was narrowly designed to prepare graduates to take up appointment as brigademajors only. Its syllabus was typically characterised by sports, TEWTs and academic studies of subjects such as staff duties, politics and grand strategy but left out tactics and realistic field exercises. Military history instructors were often narrowly oriented towards the trench warfare of the Western Front, rather than the mobile warfare in Palestine, during World War I. Finally, with the emphasis on rote learning, the course did not prepare graduates for independent thinking and analysis. The many complaints about the poor quality of staff college graduates suggest that Malaya Command‟s shoddy staffwork was not merely circumstantial as claimed by Ashmore.132 French, “An Extensive use of Weedkiller,” 173. French, 167-168. 130 Keith Simpson, “Percival” in Keegan, John, Churchill’s Generals (London: Cassell, 1991), 269-271; Lyman, 336; Jon Latimer, Burma – The Forgotten War (London: John Murray Publishers, 2004), 46; Clifford Kinvig, “Lieutenant-General Percival and the fall of Singapore” in Farrell & Hunter (eds.), 241, 260; Woodburn Kirby, Singapore: The Chain of Disaster (London: Cassell, 1971), 129; Michael Dewar, “Wilson” in Keegan (ed.), 167. 131 House, 119; Clayton, 219; Bond, 37; Howard, 124. 132 Barua, 100; Van Creveld, 48-51; Bond, 37; Fraser, 103; French, “An Extensive use of Weedkiller”, 173; Percival Papers P49. 128 129 33 Malaya Command‟s use of “autocratic command” system was in fact characteristic of the British Army, which had since the 18th century been using it to bring order out of battlefield chaos and unpredictability. In accordance with this, brigade commanders and below were expected to issue detailed verbal orders to subordinates which had to be later confirmed in writing, while divisional commanders and above had to write out all their orders in detail. Subordinates were expected not to deviate from their given orders and to report back when the situation changed.133 In fact, a pre-war British officer‟s military manual recommended that orders be in written form „where possible‟ and stated that, „a formal order will never be departed from either in letter or spirit.‟ 134 The only concession made after 1940 was that orders would henceforth be issued verbally via radio or conferences, instead of in writing. 135 This “autocratic” system of command allowed peacetime umpires to judge an exercise efficiently but ensured that the British Army could only fight predictable, low tempo, set-piece battles reminiscent of First World War trench warfare.136 To facilitate their “autocratic” system of command, British division commanders and below were expected to set up their HQ behind the front, so that they were in a better position to give and receive orders. Formation commanders were also expected to co-ordinate the work of their staff officers and execute orders personally. These often made them lose touch with the situation at the front in the early years of the war.137 This was only partially alleviated by the “Field Service Regulations” (1935), which recommended that divisional HQ should be split, into a “rear echelon” consisting of staff officers not needed for immediate operations and a smaller “forward echelon” with the commander and the staff officers needed for operations. 138 The 133 Callahan, 14-15, 20; French, Raising Churchill’s Armies, 18-19, 22-23, 27, 33, 43, 161; Moreman, Desert Rats, 54. 134 Field Service Pocket Book (London: HMSO, 1932), iii, 26. 135 French, 189-198, 210. 136 Moreman, 54; House, 108, 124; French, 20-23, 43. 137 Moreman, 54; French, 26, 164-165. 138 French, 33. 34 British Army‟s antiquated system of command made it unable to cope with the frequent loss of command and control which characterised jungle warfare. Malaya Command units were entirely motorised, just like the other British and Indian units. British Empire units were consequently very mobile on roads but had limited off-road capabilities. Moreover, in Malaya‟s jungle and Greece‟s mountainous terrain, where good roads were scarce, “bottlenecks” and traffic jams were inevitably created which were vulnerable to enemy air attacks and ambushes. Over-reliance on motorized transport also developed what Major-General Ian Playfair, Chief of Staff Far East Command, called the “Rolls Royce” attitude – the reluctance of troops to dismount and march on foot for short distances.139 The British Empire soldier‟s standard tropical uniform and equipment were not conducive for jungle warfare, being more “sporty” than practical. Khaki-drill, the traditional colour of British tropical uniforms since the late 19th century, blended well with desert terrain but stood out in Malaya‟s green jungle terrain. Moreover, the wearing of shorts exposed soldiers‟ legs to insect bites, the hard ground and thorns. Furthermore, the conspicuously shiny brass clasps of the belt and buckles were meant for peacetime “spit and posh” parade smartness and were impractical for combat. Finally, the studded heavy leather boots were meant for marching and were too noisy for stealthy movement.140 The unsuitable tropical uniform and equipment reflected the amateurish approach taken by the British Army towards jungle warfare preparations. The British Army‟s “autocratic” command system and artillery required good communications to function effectively in a modern high tempo war. Unfortunately, its signaling methods had not progressed enough since World War I. Lacking high powered, secure radios and trained signalers, only the artillery and armour used wireless sets extensively. British Empire infantry divisions had so few wireless sets that only one set could be used to communicate with 139 French, “Big Wars and Small Wars”, 46; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East Vol. 2: The Germans Come to the Help of Their Ally (1941), (London: HMSO, 1954), 77-78, 91-92; CAB 106/193 “Some Personal Reflections on the Malayan Campaign” (1943), Major Playfair; Percival Papers P49; WO106/2579B. 140 Martin Brayley, The British Army 1939-45 (3) The Far East (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 35. 35 all three brigades if used exclusively. At battalion level, the sole wireless was used exclusively to communicate with the brigade. Thus field telephones lines, supplemented by civilian ones, were laid as the main form of communication as they were easy to maintain, more technically reliable and secure from enemy interception. However, cables could be easily cut when visible and had to be augmented by the use of dispatch riders and runners, which was time-consuming.141 Malaya‟s humid and hot climate and dense jungle terrain disrupted British field communications more often than in Europe or North Africa, to the detriment of its “autocratic” command system and use of artillery.142 The “retreat mentality” of British field commanders in Malaya in the face of Japanese flanking maneuvers is well-known.143 Due to its long tradition of fighting colonial warfare in difficult terrain, the British Army had always considered the management of logistics as of great importance. 144 Logistics assumed an even greater priority in the interwar period as tactical doctrine shifted to an emphasis on firepower and motorization.145 However, this proved to be a “double-edged sword” – British field commanders became over-sensitive to the vulnerability of their lines of communications, while Ashmore and Tsuji revealed that too much British ammunition was “unwisely dumped” too far forward in northern Malaya, then subsequently captured and used by the IJA to sustain its operations.146 All these greatly facilitated the IJA‟s use of bold encirclement tactics. This chapter has examined in great detail how the shortcomings of Malaya Command in its C3I, tactical doctrines, selection and training of all ranks, ethos, morale, organisation and equipment actually reflected the shortcomings of the British Army as a whole. The pre-war 141 Clayton, 218; French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 33, 165, 166; House, 74, 124; Bidwell & Graham, 172, 173, 228, 229; Moreman, 58, 59. 142 Farrell, 159; Elphick, 309; WO 172/75 “11 th Indian Division Signals War Diary”; CAB 106/53; CAB 106/64, Narrative of Events in Malaya, Interview with Brigadier Lay, 6 th Indian Brigade. 143 WO106/2579B, Stewart; WO106/2569; Tsuji, 90-91; Fusayama, 21, 42-44. 144 French, “Big Wars and Small Wars”, 46. 145 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 110, 115, 117, 121-122. 146 Percival Papers P49; Tsuji, 105-107, 151; Goodman, Despatch. 36 British military system was geared towards fighting low tempo “small wars” against an inferior opponent. Yet, its High Command adopted a rigid “one size fit all” systemic approach in preparing for war as it assumed that time and opportunity would always be given for the British Army to expand and adapt to meet the demands of a global war. After all, this had always been the case historically. Instead, the British Army found itself fighting a high tempo world war against several modern opponents simultaneously. In Malaya, it had the misfortune of facing an “unorthodox”, first-class, sufficiently well-equipped, battle-hardened and well-trained IJA, in a major war in predominantly jungle terrain, which was not conducive to standard British Army C3I, ethos, doctrine, tactics, training, organisation and equipment. Adverse circumstances did play their roles in bringing about ultimate British strategic defeat in Malaya. However, Malaya Command was unable to cope with and mitigate these adverse circumstances to prevent tactical disaster. As Farrell highlighted, this was due to the fact that the British military‟s “one size fit all” system was not robust and flexible enough to cope with anything other than what its High Command had envisaged – „predictable grand strategy, methodical strategy and set-piece tactics.‟147 Thus, the pre-war and early war British military system laid the foundations for the British Army‟s tactical disaster in the Malayan Campaign. 147 Farrell, 137-138. 37 CHAPTER 3: THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY IN 1941 The IJA was modeled largely after the German Army. 148 It had shortcomings which proved fatal in the latter half of the war. However, in the early victorious years of the war, its strengths were more evident. The capability of an army or the soundness of a military system is ultimately relative to that of its enemy. To be victorious, one side does not have to be perfect or even very good - it just has to be better than its enemy. This chapter examines and evaluates how the pre-war and wartime Japanese military system laid the foundations for the IJA‟s tactical victory in the Malayan Campaign. It asserts that the strengths of the 25th Army actually reflected the strengths of the Japanese military system itself. Unlike the British Army, the IJA, like the German Army, regarded war as a “science” rather than a “great game” and had a culture of planning thoroughly and professionally for war.149 This was reflected in their planning and preparations for tropical warfare. The Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) commissioned the “Taiwan Army Research Department” in January 1941 to gather information about operating and fighting in the tropics, culmination in the publishing and distributing of a doctrinal manual. This it did in six months with a small staff, despite the fact the IJA had previously been preparing for war against Russia in the open terrain of mainland northeast Asia. The department meticulously looked into every aspect of tropical warfare, including geography, equipment, tactics, sanitation, supplies and organization. 150 It sent clandestine reconnaissance over land and air to study the area and terrain in which the IJA would attack, in order to resolve tactical issues.151 It also conducted two realistic and rigorous exercises over long distances and under anticipated wartime conditions, such as difficult terrain and the expected enemy‟s use of demolitions to slow down advance, to test out and refine the 148 Edwin Hoyt, Three Military Leaders – Heihachiro Togo, Isoroku Yamamoto & Tomoyuki Yamashita (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1993), 14. 149 Van Creveld, 49. 150 Tsuji, 1-5. 151 Ibid, 24-25, 33-41. 38 amphibious, combined arms, engineering and jungle warfare tactics that would be used in the invasion of Malaya.152 The combat divisions of the 25th Army were organized along typical IJA lines. Unlike British Empire divisions, all IJA divisions were recruited from a particular region and had a “twin” depot division to train conscripts and replacements for field service. Subordinate formations and units were permanently assigned to their parent divisions. This enhanced the esprit de corps and collective cohesion of units within a division. Typically, independent task forces and combat groups could be flexibly formed from formations and units detached from divisions. 153 Japanese infantry units had lesser long ranged firepower, such as artillery and mortars, than British Empire units but had more close range firepower, such as machineguns and grenade dischargers.154 This would have placed the IJA at a disadvantage in open terrain but not in the close jungle terrain of Malaya, where combat took place at point blank range. The 25th Army‟s tactical doctrine reflected standard IJA doctrine. The IJA had no specific doctrine on jungle warfare until IGHQ published a tropical warfare manual, in 1941, which emphasised superiority of the spirit, night attacks, forced fast march, active fighting patrols and outflanking through difficult terrain. This comprehensive manual was focused on general tactical principles instead of spelling out detailed tactics, as it was meant to be flexible and integrated into existing IJA tactics as used against irregular Chinese guerilla armies and the modern Red Army in the 1930s, which everyone understood.155 However, contrary to his claims, the tactics that the 25th 152 Ibid, 7, 9, 12. George Forty, Japanese Army Handbook 1939-1945 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1999), 39, 40; Rottman, 25-27. 154 British battalions had the integral firepower of fifty light machine guns, twenty-five anti-tank rifles, sixteen light mortars and six medium mortars, while IJA battalions had the integral firepower of two light infantry guns, twelve heavy machine guns, eight anti-tank rifles, thirty-six grenade dischargers and thirtyseven light machine guns. US War Department, The British Army in World War II (London: Greenhill Books, 1990 (1942)), 25 & Leo Daugherty III, Fighting Techniques of A Japanese Infantryman 1941-1945: Training, Techniques and Weapons (St Paul, Maine: MPI, 2002), 44. 155 This is Read This and the War Can Be Won, prepared by Taiwan Army Research Unit. Tsuji, 9-10, 237269. The IJA‟s Field Service Regulation (1938), had only three pages on “Operations in Wooded Terrain”, put together with fighting in urban areas. As quoted in Edward Drea, In the Service of the Emperor – Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 63. 153 39 Army used in Malaya were not revolutionary. They were simply existing standard IJA tactics adapted by the “Taiwan Army Research Unit” for jungle warfare and then passed on to IGHQ to be centrally disseminated to every soldier serving in the tropics. The IJA‟s tactical doctrine emphasised good quality infantry, with tank and artillery in supporting roles, which harked back to the pre-modern tradition of having samurai warriors as the mainstay of Japanese armies. This was the logical result of Japan‟s industries being unable to produce enough heavy armaments and mechanical transport to match its Western enemies. Unlike the British Army, the IJA did not suffer prolonged heavy casualties in trench warfare during the Russo-Japanese War or World War I to undermine its faith in the primacy of an infantry offense.156 Fundamental to the prowess of the Japanese infantry was the belief that the indigenous tradition of cultivating superior “seishin”, or spirit and morale, could bring victory over its more technologically advanced Western enemies.157 This belief in the moral over the material became a codified doctrine with the Field Service Regulation (1928), which famously removed the words “surrender”, “retreat” and “defence”, as they were deemed cowardly and bad for spirit and morale. Instead, it prescribed annihilating the enemy in an offensive, especially when the latter was regarded as spiritually “weak” and susceptible to unorthodox tactics.158 Principles of speed, surprise, boldness and determination were to be applied through the use of “guerilla” type tactics - ruses, night attacks, aggressive combat patrols, “hugging” and melee tactics involving closing in with the enemy to nullify his superior firepower, and finally encirclement tactics to spread confusion, cut supply lines and disrupt command, control and communications. If the enemy escaped annihilation, he should be pursued and destroyed before 156 Drea, 60. Drea, 11; Meirion & Susie Harries, Soldiers of the Sun – The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army (New York: Random House, 1991), 322-325, 348; Daugherty III, 14-15. 158 Leonard Humphreys, The Way of the Heavenly Sword (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 106107; Drea, 12-13; Harries, 326; US War Department, Handbook on Japanese Military Forces (London: Greenhill Books, 1991 (1944)), 85-86. 157 40 he had the chance to regroup. 159 These were the tactics that unraveled Malaya Command‟s defences and proved as applicable to the jungle terrain of Malaya as they were to the open terrain of China.160 Japanese artillery doctrine and tactics in Malaya also followed standard IJA norms. These were outdated compared to the British Army‟s if applied in open terrain. However, in Malaya‟s close jungle terrain where there was limited space for deploying guns, the Japanese tendency to disperse in ones or twos and fired short barrages to suppress the enemy in support of the infantry‟s attack, proved effective enough. As some Japanese artillery officers still thought it dishonourable to position their guns in the rear and fire at the enemy, they preferred to deploy their guns at the frontline and fire over direct sights. This would have minimised the effect of Japanese artillery fire in open terrain. However, jungle terrain limited field of fire and hampered signal communications which often made this the only way artillery could be deployed.161 Japanese tank doctrine and tactics in Malaya utilised the IJA offensive principles of flexibility, speed, surprise, boldness and determination. Depending on the situation, they either supported infantry attacks in deliberate assaults such as at Jitra and Kampar or were employed in mass attacks, rapid pursuits and breakthrough exploitations without infantry support such as at Slim River and Bukit Timah.162 The IJA was able to expand rapidly in times of major war without compromising its quality due to its mobilization system, which was geared towards territorial expansion on continental Asia. This was despite Japan being an island nation like Britain, similarly with 159 Forty, 204-207; Daugherty III, 55-64; Drea, 11, 64-69; Harries, 327-332; House, 173; 25th Army HQ, 55; US War Department, 85-98; Moreman, The Jungle, the Japanese and the Commonwealth Armies at War, 27. 160 WO106/2569. Akashi Yoji, “General Yamashita” in Farrell & Hunter (eds.), 190-193, 196; 25th Army HQ, 55; Fusayama, 12-13, 21-25, 31-32, 42-44. 161 Humphreys, 101; Daughery III, 61; Drea, 69; Harries, 333-334, 349, 352; Forty, 216. 162 Gordon L. Rottman, & Akira Takizawa, World War II Japanese Tank Tactics (London, Osprey Publishing, 2008), 18, 44-45; Daugherty III, 38-39; Harries, 333. 41 homeland security primarily resting on the IJN. Unlike the British Army, the IJA was largely a conscript force augmented with reservists, backed up by a core of regulars and special volunteers. What made the IJA such a formidable force in jungle warfare was its good quality infantry. Its selection system laid the foundation for that. Conscripts were selected for a particular arm or service based on a medical examination and an aptitude test. Although there were substantial conscripts from an urban background, most were from peasant families, who were already used to hardship and deprivations. In contrast with the British Army, the better conscripts would be selected for the traditionally prestigious infantry arm.163 Undoubtedly, being constantly on the winning side in the campaign with overwhelming air and naval support did boost the morale and confidence of Japanese soldiers in Malaya. However, the Japanese military system was also uniquely designed to produce “fanatical” soldiers, who were ideal for the arduous demands of jungle warfare. Psychological indoctrination for the Japanese soldier started in primary school onwards with the practice of emperor worship and the inculcation of the virtues of militarism, obedience, loyalty and duty to the Emperor and his officers.164 Official propaganda claimed that Japan was providing leadership for the liberation of Asia under the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere”. This belief motivated Japanese soldiers to fight a “sacred war” to help Japan preserve its China interests and overthrow AngloAmerican domination, racism and colonialism.165 Patriotic and enthusiastic families of conscripts even arranged a grand “send off” procession to show support for them.166 Regimentation in the barracks was through the indoctrination of Emperor Meiji‟s famous five military virtues. Consistent with Confucianism, which exhorted collectivism over 163 Forty, 15, US War Department, 2-3; Gordon L. Rottman, Japanese Infantryman, 1937-1945, (London, Osprey Publishing, 2005), 5-6; Drea, 63. 164 Frank Gibney (ed.) Senso: The Japanese Remember the Pacific War (expanded) (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007 (1995)), 9; Arthur Swinson, Four Samurai – A Quartet of Japanese Army Commanders in the Second World War (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1968), 16-19; Frei, 11, 16; Drea, 80. 165 Haruko Taya Cook, & Theodore F. Cook, Japan At War – An Oral History (London: Phoenix Press, 2000 (1992)), 50-54, 77-78; Frei, 12. 166 Cook, & Cook, 125-126; Drea, 79-80; Frei, 12-13, 38-39. 42 individualism, conscripts were taught to see the company as one big “family”. Conscripts were also taught the nine “golden rules” of bushido or “warrior spirit”.167 They were exhorted to have a fatalistic view towards life and reminded that they were “expendable goods”. Dying in battle would result in a family pension for life and also personal honour in being enshrined at Yasukuni, where the Emperor worshipped annually. Committing suicide was considered more honorable than to be taken prisoner.168 The slightest infringements would be punished by typically abusive senior privates, NCOs and officers. Even senior officers were known to slap junior officers in front of their men.169 All this made Japanese soldiers patriotic, fanatical, resilient and aggressive fighters, who obeyed orders without question and could endure immense hardships. 25th Army‟s troops were unanimously regarded to be very physically fit and well-trained. A British Army officer, who witnessed the IJA‟s “ambush drills” in action at the Thai frontier, was impressed: They struck me as absolutely first-class. The speed with which they tumbled out of their lorries and commenced an enveloping operation against us is incredible.170 In addition, Japanese mortar and machine gun fire were exceptionally accurate.171 These were the results of a comprehensive, rigorous and realistic system of training. As Japan was a highly militarised society, boys from the age of eight started semi-military training, which progressed to military training under regular army personnel after primary education.172 Training of conscripts was done systematically from individual, to sub-unit, unit, higher formation level and also combined divisional exercises in the first year. In the second training cycle, more time and emphasis was given to vocational training. The comprehensive training 167 Swinson, 15; Humphreys, 14; Gibney, 40-41; Harries, 344; Frei, 12; Forty, 27-28; Drea, 77, 81-82. Frei, 14-15, 38; Robert B. Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sun – A History of the Japanese Military (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997), 308-309; Drea, 83-85, 95; Harries, 322-323; Swinson, 219-230; Daugherty III, 11-13. 169 Gibney, 23-28, 43-45, 53-54, 92, 93; Frei, 14-15, 19, 40, Edgerton, 309; Drea, 81-82. 170 As quoted in Richard Holmes & Anthony Kemp, The Bitter End – The Fall of Singapore (Chichester, Anthony Bird Publications, 1982), 88; Tsuji, 143; WO106/2569. 171 Heath Papers LMH4; WO 172/18, Appendix J3. 172 Edgerton, 308; Hoyt, 143-144, 164; Daugherty III, 19. 168 43 syllabus included physical fitness, target shooting, field works construction, battlefield maneuvers, quick route marches of twenty to twenty-five miles in hot and cold weather with full gear, bivouacking in the open, bayonet fighting, camouflaging, judo, field hygiene, patrolling and swimming. “Battle drills” and field exercises were very physically demanding and conducted performed realistically with the firing of live ammunition. In addition, there was at least one weekly night exercise.173 Conscripts also did part of their training in China, which helped them acquire battle experience and an aggressive spirit through the bayoneting of “live” prisoners.174 The high tempo, realistic, rigorous, and thorough training of the Japanese soldier contrasted with the amateurish, “spit and polish” peacetime low tempo training of British soldiers.175 Unlike in the British Army, the Inspectorate General of Military Training efficiently supervised the technical and tactical training of the combat arms and services to ensure they conformed to Japanese doctrine. 176 This ensured that IJA units and even subunits could be detached and combined with others to form ad hoc battlegroups without loss of cohesion and effectiveness, unlike their British counterparts. The 25th Army‟s leadership at all levels was excellent due to the IJA‟s rigorous and sound selection and training system for officers and NCOs. Except for a small but important core of usually upper and middle class regular officer candidates, officer candidates had to be outstanding conscripts recommended by their unit commanders, who had served for six months in the ranks, while NCO candidates had to have served a year in the ranks.177 The IJA‟s system of selecting officers from amongst soldiers who had already proven themselves was more sound, meritocratic and egalitarian than the British Army‟s system.178 173 Frei, 14; Daugherty III, 22, 27-36; Drea, 86-88; Forty, 25-26. Cook & Cook, 42; Gibney, 65, Forty, 27-28; US War Department, 6. 175 Hoyt, 14-15; Harries, 169; Swinson, 25. 176 Forty, 36; US War Department, 12. 177 Forty, 16, 18, 20, 30; US War Department, 4-5; Daugherty III, 22-27; Frei, 28-29; Humphreys, 32-37; Harries, 170-171. 178 Harries, 344. 174 44 Training of Japanese officers was characteristically comprehensive, rigorous and realistic, requiring officer cadets to serve eight months with units after the usual training phase at the War Academy.179 Officer training was just as comprehensive as that for recruits and consisted mainly of theoretical studies of tactical textbooks, battle drills and training regulations, spiritual training, physical fitness and vocational fieldwork training. After graduation, all new officers had to undergo a four-month probation period as sergeant-majors in units before being commissioned.180 A “special field operations training exercise” of about a week was also held by regiments in China, to induct newly commissioned officers. This consisted of battlefield tours, lectures, and might even involve a demonstration and practice of beheading a prisoner to “bloody” the young officer.181 The excellent planning and coordination done by the staff of the 25th Army in Malaya was due to the IJA‟s rigorous and sound system of selecting and training Staff College cadets. Staff College graduates were the “cream” of the IJA. They dominated the army‟s combat function hierarchy to such an extent that almost all generals were staff graduates. Moreover, most Japanese officers aspired to be staff officers. 182 Thus, places for the staff college course were very competitive, ensuring that only the best officers were admitted to it.183 Training was typically comprehensive, rigorous and professional, which prepared cadets to competently assume their staff duties.184 The IJA‟s thorough and sound system of selection and training prepared its officers for its unique command and control system. One feature of this was the extraordinary authority given to staff officers at divisional HQs, which was practiced by the 25th Army in Malaya. Although IJA division HQs had a smaller staff than typical British ones, staff officers practically planned and 179 Forty, 20; US War Department, 5-7; Daughery III, 24-27. Forty, 30; US War Department, 7; Harries, 170-174; Drea, 71. 181 Cook & Cook, 41-42. 182 Humphreys, 31-32, 38-39, 73-74, 108-109. 183 Hoyt, 122; Drea, 95; Swinson, 25. 184 Forty, 30; US War Department, 6. 180 45 managed all aspects of the division. Although final approval and authority lay with the divisional commander, they were usually expected to be mentors and not expected to interfere in the work of staff officers, unless circumstances dictated.185 This freed the divisional commander to tour the frontline to assess the situation, motivate the men and supervise the execution of orders, while the function of planning and conveying orders was being carried out by the staff officers at divisional HQ. This allowed Japanese divisions to be managed efficiently and flexibly at a high tempo in combat, as in Malaya.186 The 25th Army‟s use of “mission command” in Malaya mirrored standard IJA practice. Japanese senior officers usually issued vague, broad, objectives and orders to junior officers, who were expected to use their initiative to work out the detailed plans, without reporting back and asking for further orders. The IJA had adopted the German Army‟s approach of empowering junior officers with the authority to react to the inevitable chaos and unpredictable nature of war, which was the opposite of the British Army‟s approach. This also allowed IJA divisions to be flexible in detaching units and subunits into task forces under relatively junior field officers to achieve a particular mission, as was often the case in Malaya. 187 Unlike the British Army‟s “autocratic” command system, the IJA‟s “mission command” system allowed its units to react quickly to the often fluid situations that jungle warfare produced. Finally, the IJA‟s command and control system emphasized the need for its commanders at all levels to exercise personal leadership, in true samurai fashion. 188 Although this was especially so for platoon leaders who were supposed to lead and charge from the front with their men, company leaders were also expected to personally lead a column at night. Even senior commanders such as brigade, regimental, division and even army commanders did so quite often 185 Rottman, Japanese Army in World War II, 53-54; Hoyt, 138; Tsuji, 214; Kyoichi Tachikawa, “Yamashita and His Style of Leadership” in Brian Bond & Kyoichi Tachikawa (eds.), British & Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War 1941-1945 (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2004), 87. 186 Tsuji, 203, 214. 187 Fusayama, 79-80; Tsuji, 43-45, 72-73, 168-169, 182-185; 25th Army HQ, 3, 53, 54, 58, 67; Lyman, 40; Drea, 69, 72; Harries, 336, 342. See also WO106/2569. 188 Hoyt, 15; Swinson, 16. 46 in China, as well as in Malaya.189 Consequently, Japanese command posts were found further in the front than those of Western armies.190 Leading from the front allowed Japanese officers to boost the morale of their men and direct their actions more effectively. This was especially important in the close jungle terrain of Malaya where communications often failed. The IJA also often sent out staff officers as liaisons to deputise for the senior commander and to give tactical advice to the field commanders. This was a role which Tsuji and the other staff officers of the 25th Army often did in Malaya, which was a key factor in the Japanese ability to conduct and sustain high tempo operations throughout the campaign despite frequent communication disruptions.191 Most IJA divisions still used animal transport. The exceptions were the 5 th and the Imperial Guards Divisions, which were the first two divisions to be motorised as part of the 1941 modernization program. Displaying the typical Japanese flair for thorough planning, IGHQ had specially assigned them to advance down the west coast of Malaya, which was well-served with good roads. The 18th Division, by contrast, remained largely horse-drawn, like most, and was thus assigned to advance down the east coast of Malaya, where roads were undeveloped.192 Uniquely, bicycles were provided to every Japanese infantryman in Malaya who had no space on the trucks and wagons, in order to allow them to advance and pursue rapidly on any kind of terrain. It was easy to find replenishments and spare parts for these bicycles as they were widely used throughout the land. 193 The use of bicycles enabled every Japanese soldier to be a “light cavalryman” on the trunk roads of Malaya as they could even cross demolished bridges, which became impassable to motor vehicles. The IJA‟s equipment in Malaya was well-known to be very light and well-suited for use in the jungle terrain.194 Yet these were also standard characteristics of IJA equipment - the result 189 Yoji, 188; Tsuji, 59, 60, 203, 214; Fusayama, 12, 13; Drea, 100. Gibney, 43-44; Drea, 98, 99; Fusayama, 42; Rottman, Japanese Infantryman, 1937-1945, 31. 191 Ibid, 72, 91, 156-157. 192 Drea, 11-13; Lyman, 24; Yoji, 188-189. 193 Tsuji, 149-151; Frei, p. 174. 194 Chapman, 21; WO106/2569. 190 47 of Japan‟s inferior industrial capability, shipping constraints and doctrine. Their tanks of all make were designed to be easily transportable by sea, very maneuverable and could use most bridges in Malaya, while their infantry guns and mortars were designed to be man-portable in the jungle.195 The IJA‟s cotton tropical uniforms, worn with canvas shoes, proved to be especially light-weight and practical in the jungle. Finally, the full load of equipment carried by Japanese soldiers was, at only sixty-five to seventy pounds, half as heavy as those that were supposed to be carried by British soldiers, which conferred a great advantage to them in jungle fighting.196 IJA field communications were no better than those of the British Army‟s. At divisional and regimental HOs, field telephones were used as they were easy to maintain, more secure from enemy interception and more reliable. Wireless radios were used only for high tempo situations by units constantly on the move, such as by units on small boat operations in Malaya, as testified by Fusayama. At battalion HQs, “runners” were used. 197 With such technology, field communications often broke down in the close jungle terrain of Malaya. In fact, Fusayama observed that the Imperial Guards Division‟s field commanders quite often sited their front HQs away from signal units or relegated them to the rear during an advance. 198 While 25th Army‟s signal communications often broke down in Malaya, unlike for the case of Malaya Command, this did not hinder its operations due to its “mission command” system. 25th Army often fought in Malaya with scant regard for logistics, which facilitated its flanking operations. This trait reflected the IJA‟s habitual neglect of logistics management, which was very unlike the British Army. The IJA‟s doctrinal emphasis on the spiritual and the offensive, its underestimation of the enemy‟s fighting power, its traditional frugality in logistical requirements compared to the British Army, and Japan‟s industrial inferiority all meant that 195 Rottman, & Takizawa, 59-60; Rottman, Japanese Army in World War II, 48-50; Drea, 6-7; Rottman, Japanese Infantryman, 1937-1945, 17-20; Harries, 350-352. 196 Rottman, Japanese Infantryman, 1937-1945, 20-25, Harries, 371. 197 Rottman, Japanese Army in World War II, 55, 56; US War Department, 303, 316-317, 321; Harries, 373. 198 Fusayama, 12-13, 23, 74-76, 79-81. 48 campaigns had to be conducted with limited resources.199 However, the IJA‟s ability to operate on a “shoe string” by improvising, “living off the land” and commandeering local resources worked to their advantage in jungle terrain with few good roads. Thus, its units were freed to infiltrate the flanks and rear of the British Army.200 This chapter has examined in great detail how the strengths of the 25th Army in its C3I, tactical doctrines, selection and training of all ranks, ethos, morale, organisation and equipment actually reflected the strengths of the IJA as a whole. The pre-war Japanese military system was geared towards fighting a high tempo conventional war against a first-class modern opponent. Its High Command adopted a flexible approach in preparing for war, knowing that the IJA had strong foundations, which could be easily adapted to fight guerilla warfare in China or jungle warfare in Southeast Asia. In Malaya, the IJA had the fortune of facing an albeit modern, but inexperienced, poorlyled and poorly-trained British Army in a major war in predominantly jungle terrain, which was conducive to its standard C3I, ethos, doctrine, tactics, training, organisation and equipment. Fortuitous circumstances did bring about ultimate Japanese strategic victory in Malaya. However, the IJA‟s ability to exploit these fortuitous circumstances to achieve tactical victory was due to the fact that its system was robust and flexible enough to cope with whatever situation it faced. Japanese preparations for jungle warfare started only in 1941, while the British Army had been operating in jungle terrain since the 19th century. Yet, the flexible IJA adapted itself to jungle warfare faster than the rigid British Army due to the fact that the Japanese military system was much sounder than the British military system. Thus, the pre-war Japanese military system laid the foundations for the IJA‟s tactical victory in the Malayan Campaign. 199 200 Yoji, 202; Forty, 82-84, 92; Drea, 9, 10; Harries, 369, 370; Swinson, 23, 24. Chapman, 21, Kiani, 19; WO106/2569. 49 CHAPTER 4: THE BRITISH ARMY ON THE DEFENSIVE IN THE MALAYAN CAMPAIGN Malaya Command was most often on the defensive during the Malayan Campaign. This was not just due to strategic weaknesses shaping Percival‟s campaign strategy but also because the defence suited British Army doctrine. This was in contrast to the IJA‟s system which preferred the offense. This chapter examines the two largest British set piece defensive battles of the Malayan Campaign, Jitra and Kampar, to analyse the systemic differences between the two armies, which influenced the course and outcome of these battles. The Battle of Jitra, 11th – 12th December 1941 Jitra was the first major battle between Malaya Command and the 25th Army. It was a classic encounter between the favoured static linear defense tactics of the British Army and the favoured mobile encirclement offensive tactics of the IJA. Despite the 11th Indian Division having four months before the conflict to prepare the Jitra Line (a luxury denied to other defense positions in Malaya) elements of the Japanese 5th Division broke through it easily in two days, with a much inferior force of two battalions. This mismatch between the tactics and systems of the British Army and the IJA was repeated time and again throughout the campaign. At Jitra, the 11th Indian Division suffered such heavy losses that it could not hope to gain a respite until the next viable position at Kampar. Thus, Farrell, Richard Holmes and Clifford Kinvig were right in regarding Jitra as the most crucial battle of the campaign, setting a trend for subsequent battles.201 The British military‟s inflexibility in planning resulted in the contradiction in strategic, campaign and tactical objectives and dealt heavy blows to Jitra‟s defenders. Even after the RAF had evacuated Alor Star Airfield, Brooke-Popham still insisted that Percival hold Jitra to deny the airfield to the enemy instead of giving him freedom to withdraw to the more defensible pre-war reconnoitered Gurun position, some thirty miles south. Percival, too, was rigidly “fixed” into the idea of defending Jitra and feared the loss of morale in such a withdrawal despite this being 201 Farrell, 160; Clifford Kinvig, 248; Holmes & Kemp, 105, 106. 50 favoured by Heath and Major-General David Murray-Lyon, GOC 11th Indian Division.202 This also resulted in him ignoring the latter‟s request for permission to withdraw from Jitra until too late on the night of the 12th, which led to many men and equipment being cut off.203 Before hostilities, Percival gave the 11th Indian Division two possible roles – “Operation Matador” (an advance into southern Thailand to contest the expected Japanese landing) and “Man Jitra” (defending the Jitra Line to deny Alor Star Airfield), without giving clear direction as to which was the priority. This was not just due to his indecisive personality. Brooke-Popham and Percival were reluctant to abandon “Operation Matador” even though realistically it could not be implemented. In addition, Heath erroneously delegated responsibility for “Krohcol” (a brigade group responsible for delaying the enemy‟s advance down the Kroh Road, which led to the rear of the division hundreds of miles away) to the 11th Indian Division. As a result, the division‟s triple preparations overstretched the already undermanned and inexperienced division HQ, making them unable to devote sufficient time to consider the tactical problems of defending Jitra. As a result, even at the height of the battle, Murray-Lyon and his staff‟s attention remained split between Jitra and Krohcol. Murray-Lyon was so overworked he fainted from fatigue on the 13th while supervising the retreat.204 Murray-Lyon, reflecting the rigidity of Percival and Brooke-Popham, wishfully assumed to the very last, that “Operation Matador” was the priority over “Man Jitra”. Many mines and cable lines were held in readiness in motor transports to move and not allocated for the Jitra Line until released by Percival with the cancellation of it on the 9th of December. As late as the 11th, the defences were uncompleted with nine thousand land mines still short, while telephone lines 202 Elphick, 351; CAB 106/53; CAB 106/193; WO 106/2579B Carpendale; CAB 106/64; Goodman; WO 106/2579B Carpendale; Percival, Despatch. 203 WO 172/18 Appendices Q3, C4, K4, W3; Percival, Despatch; Warren, 90, 93; Elphick, 351-352; Farrell, 157-159; CAB 106/53; WO 172/64. 204 Kirby, 210, 212; Kiani, 20; Kinvig “General Percival and the Fall of Singapore”, 248; Heath; Percival Papers P49; CAB 106/53; WO 172/33 III Indian Corps War Diary, “11 th Indian Division Operational Instructions No. 3”, 24th July 1941; Percival, Despatch; Simson, 47-48; Smith, 232, 278; Farrell, 153, 160. 51 had not been completely laid in the 6th Indian Brigade‟s sector.205 Murray-Lyon also planned for Jitra‟s defences leisurely. He took as long as until the last day of November to change the location of the tank ditch in Jitra to fit the anti-tank regiment, which had already arrived a month before. Consequently, it was never completed in time. 206 This was not just Murray-Lyon‟s individual fault. He merely reflected the institution as a whole. As Farrell commented, „Far East Command was now so committed to Matador that it convinced itself events would unfold as it desired‟ to the detriment of Jitra‟s defences.207 Murray-Lyon‟s rigid assumption also affected morale of troops. It resulted in the unexpected and inconvenient transition from offensive to defensive roles – which saw British and Indian troops digging and building defensive works for four consecutive days before the battle. The last minute change in the pre-war dispositions of the 15th Indian Brigade at the Jitra Line also caused further confusion, sapped morale and negated some of the familiarity of the ground which the defenders ought to have had.208 Thus, on the morning of the 12th, two companies of the 1/8th Punjabs were so tired and demoralised they would not respond even to Carpendale‟s and MurrayLyon‟s exhortations to advance.209 Heath‟s and Murray-Lyon‟s career was typical of most British formation commanders and helped to explain their flawed decisions. Although Heath had combat experience as a division commander in Abyssinia and as Murray-Lyon was a brigade commander on the northwest frontier in India, both had not entered Staff College and were not trained for their present appointments. They were also deprived of the experience of commanding their complete 205 Kiani, 26; “Memories of Malayan Campaign”, Abbot, Lieutenant S., 8911511, 2nd East Surrey, Imperial War Museum; CAB 106/53; WO 172/18 Appendices OO, P2; Percival, Despatch; CAB 106/193; Farrell, 159. 206 WO 172/121 “2/9th Jats War Diary; CAB 106/53. 207 Farrell, 106. 208 Singh, 57; Kirby, The Loss of Singapore, 211; Abbot; Heath; CAB 106/53; CAB 106/193; WO 106/2579B, Steedman; WO 172/18 Appendix A4, Y2, Z3; Percival, Despatch. 209 CAB 106/53; WO 106/2579B Carpendale; WO 172/120. 52 formations before the war.210 The 11th Indian Division, newly formed only in 1940, had received its artillery only in October 1941 and was fully concentrated only in November, did not even have a collective exercise together with all its units and assets.211 Thus both had limited experience and no training in their new appointments before the war. By contrast, the IJA displayed typical operational flexibility. Although the outline operational plan and broad objectives for the capture of Malaya and Singapore had already been planned by IGHQ in November 1941, Yamashita and his staff were given authority to modify according to the circumstances they found. Having observed the weak British resistance on the Thai-Malayan border, the 25th Army HQ decided on an immediate rapid advance with all haste to the Perak River. This was in contrast to the original slow and deliberate plan to consolidate in southern Thailand and await reinforcements, before taking the offensive. 25th Army HQ‟s decision to advance swiftly and boldly caught the British and Indian defenders by surprise, and foiled Malaya Command‟s delaying tactics based on demolitions and fighting withdrawals to buy time for the completion of Jitra‟s defences.212 Typical British intelligence failures crippled Jitra‟s defenders. The Jitra Line was still incomplete by the outbreak of hostilities as Malaya Command HQ assumed that the annual northeast monsoon would deter any Japanese invasion. It had thus commenced constructing it only in August 1941 and projected its completion in mid-February 1942 to coincide with the subsiding of the monsoon.213 The debacle at Changlun and Asun happened because Heath and Murray-Lyon assumed the IJA would consolidate its beachhead in Thailand before conducting a cautious, set piece offensive against Jitra, and that British demolitions at bridges would hold up 210 Kiani, 31; Kirby, 130; Smith, 277, 278; Elphick, 242; Ashmore; CAB 106/193; Moreman, 29; CAB 106/70; CAB 106/173; Percival, 31-33. 211 Kirby, 211; CAB 106/53; Ashmore; CAB 106/193; Moreman, 29; WO 172/124 22 nd Indian Brigade War Diary; WO 172/112 12th Indian Brigade War Diary. 212 Tsuji, 43-45, 72, 73. 88, 89, 168, 169, 182-185; 25th Army HQ, 3, 53, 54, 58, 67; Warren, 94. 213 WO 106/2579B, Steedman. 53 Japanese tanks for twenty-four hours at least.214 This underestimation of the IJA was institutional - Stewart‟s similar assumptions led to the disaster at Slim River. 215 British intelligence, in particular, was typically poor due to what Major Harrison, the GSO1 11th Indian Division, described as „ineffective patrolling‟. This made it difficult for Murray-Lyon and Carpendale to identify the main offensive thrust of the enemy, as at Jitra.216 By contrast, the 25th Army had good intelligence of the 11th Indian Division‟s dispositions and defences due to their thorough pre-war reconnaissance of northern Malaya and a lucky capture of an accurate map of the British defences around Changlun and Jitra in an action on the Thai-Malayan frontier, which accounted for the audacity of their tank „blitzkrieg‟ at Changlun. 217 However, the IJA‟s emphasis on intelligence was evidenced by 25th Army HQ placing 5th Reconnaissance Battalion as their advance guard in the invasion. Displaying similar emphasis on intelligence on the night of the 11th, Saeki and Tsuji envisaged this unit occupying a sector of the Jitra Line to reconnoiter the enemy before the main force of the 9 th Infantry Brigade attacked the next day. Their subsequent decision to attack that night was based on good intelligence given by patrols who noted the weaknesses in the British defences.218 Murray-Lyon, Heath and Percival opted for linear defensive dispositions at Jitra, in conformity with British doctrine. This spread thin the 6th and 15th Indian Brigades abreast over twenty-four miles of mixed swamp, rubber, rice field and jungle terrain, where units and subunits were too isolated to give mutual support to one another. The 28th Indian Brigade was both to screen as well as act as a reserve behind the other two.219 An outpost was supposed to be able to delay the enemy until the main defences were complete. The main line would then pin the enemy 214 Tsuji, 95-98; 25th Army HQ, 100-103; WO 106/2579B Carpendale; CAB 106/53; WO 172/18 Malaya Command War Diary Appendices J3, N3; Percival, Despatch; Farrell, 156-57; Heath; WO 106/2579B Lieutenant Carr, 2/9th Jats; Kiani, 26; Singh, 59; Kirby, 211. 215 Elphick, 257; CAB106/53; Kirby, Loss of Singapore, 278. 216 CAB 106/53. 217 Tsuji, 7, 73. 218 25th Army HQ, 103, 104; Tsuji, 98, 99. 219 WO 106/2579B Carpendale; WO 172/64 “11th Indian Division Operational Instruction No. 25”, 23rd August 1941; Elphick, 351; WO 172/121. 54 while the artillery punished them. Any enemy breakthrough would be stopped by a reserve line and repelled by the motor-borne counterattacks of the reserve battalion of each brigade and the division‟s reserve brigade. Such tactical dispositions and planning reflected the British Army‟s early war preference for fighting in World War I-styled defensive linear entrenched positions under slow tempo and supported by powerful artillery, regardless of the ground.220 Given the terrain and long frontage to cover, it would have been better for Murray-Lyon to concentrate his three brigades in depth along the trunk road and railway.221 Even during the battle, when the enemy was using outflanking tactics, Brigadier W. Carpendale, who had temporarily assumed command of 15th Indian Brigade in the absence of its commander, thought in terms of linear tactics and was typically concerned with the security of lines of communications. In the wee hours of the 12th, he extended the reserve line of 2/2nd Gurkhas at Tanjong Pau eastwards to Kelubi with three companies from 6th Indian Brigade. 222 That afternoon, he ordered most of the 1st Leicesters to wheel southwards along the trunk road to link up with 2/2nd Gurkhas, while 2/9th Jats withdrew southwards to the reserve line already formed. 223 Consistent with the tactical thinking of Carpendale, Murray-Lyon later recalled most of the 2/9th Gurkhas from the airfield and, together with the sole remaining company of the 2/1st Gurkhas, positioned them six hundred yards to the rear as a reserve.224 Japanese senior commanders chose to fight a radically different battle than that envisaged by their British counterparts. They typically preferred the kind of „chaos‟ and „unpredictability‟ that an offensive „meeting engagement‟ produced. After all, the „battle drills‟ for conducting such a battle were well-prescribed in their doctrinal manuals and practiced thoroughly during maneuvers.225 Saeki accepted the risk of a night assault as it would allow his infantry to close in 220 Farrell, 156, 160; CAB 106/53. Kirby, 212. 222 WO 106/2579B Carpendale; Farrell 157, 160-161 223 CAB 106/53; WO 172/121; 224 WO 106/2579B Carpendale 225 Daugherty III, 58; Farrell, 160. 221 55 to “hug” and confuse the British, thus neutralising the latter‟s advantage in manpower and artillery.226 These bold tactics reflected standard IJA doctrine, which were anathema to the British Army‟s doctrinal emphasis on careful consolidation of ground over bold and risky exploitation of the situation. For the night assault in the early hours of the 12 th, Saeki chose to attack through the strategic „blind‟ gap near the trunk road between the 1st Leicesters and the 2/9th Jats, knowing that this would confuse the enemy and threaten to split his centre.227 Correctly identifying that this was the most vulnerable and crucial sector, he committed whatever reserves he had at dawn, to renew the attack here in coordination with tanks on the trunk road. Kawamura too saw this sector as the key, and took over Saeki‟s tired troops with the lead infantry battalion of the 41 st Regiment by noon.228 By contrast, throughout the battle, Carpendale typically launched only small, sluggish, local counterattacks of up to two companies in strength at most to attempt to restore the wedge in the line.229 The 2/9th Jats failed counterattack on the trunk road after dawn on the second day involved two sections from the reserve platoon of the company. 230 In the abortive attempt to retake the „market garden‟ copse and the observation pillbox, it was better for Carpendale to order the right and reserve companies of the 1st Leicesters to co-ordinate with the left and reserve companies of the 2/9th Jats and the reserve 2/2nd Gurkhas to „pinch‟ out this wedge between them. In addition, all available artillery support should have been assigned for this mission.231 Instead, Carpendale, allowed the bulk of the two battalions to stay in their defensive positions while ordering the 1/8th Punjabs, minus two companies, to undertake the task with a platoon of the 226 25th Army HQ, 103, 104; Tsuji, 98. Tsuji, 99; 25th Army HQ, 104. 228 Tsuji, 99. 229 Farrell, 157, 160, 161. 230 WO 172/121; 25th Army HQ, 104; Percival, Despatch. 231 Farrell, 158-160. 227 56 reserve „A‟ Company of the 2/9th Jats, supported by only an artillery battery.232 He was reluctant to commit the 2/2nd Gurkhas as that was his last reserve.233 Typically British field commanders strived to withhold a certain portion of a unit as reserve to maintain equal strength at every sector. However, this habit meant breaking up unit cohesion and placing together “penny pockets” of subunits and units which could not work collectively towards a common task. However, this was by no means unique to Malaya Command. House agreed with Montgomery‟s observation that in North Africa, the numerically superior British 8th Army had a tendency to „fight as uncoordinated and dispersed collection of small units‟, thus inviting defeat in detail by the much smaller but concentrated mobile German forces.234 In conformity with British doctrine, Murray-Lyon stayed in his HQ and failed to visit the frontline until late morning of the 12th. This was even though he had no direct communications with the 6th Indian Brigade HQ and his presence was needed to guide the unfamiliar Carpendale. 235 Murray-Lyon arrived too late to prevent Carpendale from requesting reinforcements from 6th Indian Brigade without his permission, earlier that morning. This act prevented Murray-Lyon from having the necessary strength in reserves to launch a successful counterattack later that day.236 By contrast, the IJA‟s system of sending out staff officers to the frontline as liaison and empowering them with authority eased command and control and maintained their high tempo of operations. For instance, just after dawn on the 12th, Japanese communications failed and the progress of Saeki Detachment‟s attack was in doubt. Tsuji took the initiative to quickly drive to 232 Warren, 91; CAB 106/53; WO 172/121. WO 106/2579B Carpendale. 234 Montgomery as quoted in House, 126. 235 WO 106/2579B Carpendale; CAB 106/53; Percival, Despatch. 236 WO 106/2579B Carpendale; Farrell 157, 160, 161. 233 57 the rear to urge Kawamura to send in his main force, which arrived later at noon to reinforce a hard pressed Saeki Detachment .237 The British Army‟s “autocratic” command system made Chippington and the other junior officers unaware of the role of their subunits in the bigger scheme of things. 238 Even before hostilities, Murray-Lyon interfered in all aspects of planning from locating the reserve battalion of the 15th Indian Brigade to reducing the frontage of “B” Company, 2/9th Jats by eight hundred yards in September to deciding the location of its “C” Company in October, which should properly be the domain of the formation and unit commanders. 239 In the heat of battle, when wireless failed to work and Japanese soldiers cut cables and intercepted dispatch riders, British command and control became paralysed throughout the battle and field commanders simply became passive. 240 For example, the 2nd Leicesters and a company of the 2/9th Jats, in the absence of any communication with higher command, maintained their positions even after the rest of the division had withdrawn. They were only withdrawn on the 13th, resulting in unnecessary stragglers being cut off.241 By contrast, the IJA‟s “mission” command system and its effective infantry training using a series of “battle drills” enabled officers and men to react quickly to the chaos and ambushes that jungle warfare produced. After all, the well-trained 5th Division was battlehardened through having fought in China since 1937.242 It is most telling that Saeki and Tsuji launched their night attack on the 11/12th after Second-Lieutenant Oto had returned from his reconnaissance and insisted on the viability of a night attack.243 Farrell was right to observe that 237 Ibid, 100-101. Elphick, 309; Chippington, 39, 44; WO 106/2579B, “Hurdwood”. 239 WO 172/121 “2/9th Jats War Diary; CAB 106/53. 240 Farrell, 159. 241 CAB 106/53; WO 172/121. 242 Yoji, 190; Frei, 3, 13-15; Gordon L Rottman, Japanese Army in World War II – Conquest of the Pacific 1941-1942 (London, Osprey Publishing, 2005), 17, 23-24; Fusayama, 45; Tsuji, 7, 8, 25, 26, 32, 45; Drea, 10, 80, 94. 243 Tsuji, 99; 25th Army HQ, 104. 238 58 this would have been unthinkable in the British Army.244 Saeki Detachment‟s night attack used dispersion to great effect, as its platoons, led by junior officers and NCOs, split up into sections and smaller detachments to infiltrate the positions of 2nd Leicesters and 2/9th Jats, which caused much confusion. 245 Junior officers showed good tactical grasp by leading their men to attack using good cover. On the trunk road sector, the 1st Company‟s leaders made their key objectives the huts along the trunk road and two copses opposite the 1st Leicesters and the 2/9th Jats.246 Using such cover, this company overran the Indian section occupying a crucial pillbox which contained a British artillery observation post and killed the forward observer there, thus preventing the enemy from using their powerful artillery arm.247 After this, it instinctively sent out parties to probe towards the rear of the 1st Leicesters and the 2/9th Jats on both sides of the trunk road.248 On the afternoon of the 12th, the Japanese II/41st Battalion took cover from the heavy bombardment of British artillery in the anti-tank ditch just in front of „D‟ Company of the 2/9th Jats. It instinctively emerged to charge and overrun the enemy when the shelling slackened and the enemy‟s weapons jammed. This action unhinged the crucial trunk road sector.249 The British Army‟s doctrinal emphasis on firepower at the expense of infantry proved to be liabilities in Malaya‟s terrain. This partially explained the reluctance of Lieutenant-Colonel Bates, CO 1/8th Punjabs, to counterattack when ordered to by Carpendale at the trunk road sector. Left with two platoons out of two companies due to earlier “friendly fire”, he was discouraged by the lack of good visibility of the enemy‟s position, the bogging in the mud of 2/9 th Jats bren carriers and the lack of a forward observation officer to co-ordinate artillery support. 250 The 244 Farrell, 160. Tsuji, 99; 25th Army HQ, 104; Kiani, 26; Smith, 242; Heath; CAB 106/53; Percival, Despatch; WO 106/2579B Carpendale; WO 172/121. 246 WO 106/2579B Carpendale. 247 WO 172/121; 25th Army, 104; Percival, Despatch. 248 WO 106/2579B Carpendale; Chye, 35; CAB 106/53. 249 Warren, 91-92; CAB 106/53; WO 106/2579B Carpendale; WO 172/121. 250 CAB 106/53. 245 59 counterattack retook the pillbox but not the “market garden” copse, resulting in heavy losses.251 This was unsurprising, since existing British doctrine and training assumed that the artillery would always be available to suppress the enemy before the infantry attacked, and had not prepared for the unexpected.252 The isolated British and Indian troops demonstrated their weaknesses that night when they became so unnerved by small parties of Japanese soldiers infiltrating around them. Imagining themselves being surrounded by superior numbers of enemy, they fired at „targets‟ intermittently throughout the night, whether real or imagined, which expended large quantities of ammunition and deprived themselves of much needed sleep. So restless was the reserve platoon of the 2/9th Jats that their unit commander had to move it to an alternative position near his HQ. Throughout the night, inexperienced officers called for „blind‟ artillery fire on suspected enemy troop concentrations.253 In the confusion, there were many false reports of enemy breakthroughs on the main trunk road sector and this made Murray-Lyon overestimate the enemy‟s strength as six battalions the next day.254 There was also a “friendly fire” involving the 2/9th Jats and the 1/8th Punjabs during Bate‟s countertattack on the 12th.255 Such jittery reactions, which were common occurrences throughout the Malayan Campaign, revealed the inexperience, lack of cohesion and paucity of night jungle training in Malaya Command.256 Finally, 11th Indian Division‟s lack of training in dealing with tanks and in working with artillery crew was exposed at Changlun and Asun. The 1/14th Punjabs and the 2/1st Gurkhas were overrun by enemy tanks without the knowledge of dealing with them. 257 The failure of 2nd Leicesters to send out a tank hunting platoon to deal with these tanks was an indication that none 251 25th Army HQ, 105; WO 106/2579B Carpendale; Percival, Despatch. Place, 37, 38, 67, 68. 253 Kiani, 26; Smith, 242; Heath; CAB 106/53; Percival, Despatch; WO 106/2579B Carpendale; WO 172/121; Warren, 91-92. 254 Warren, 94; WO 172/18 Appendices Q3, C4, K4; CAB 106/53; Percival, Despatch. 255 CAB 106/53. 256 WO 106/2579B Hurdwood; Moreman, 27, 28. 257 Tsuji, 95-98; 25th Army HQ, 100-103. 252 60 of the infantry was confident and proficient enough in anti-tank warfare to do this hazardous job.258 A British anti-tank section in the sector of the 2nd Leicesters was also forced to relocate the next day despite having done good work in keeping out enemy tanks, due to the fact that no infantry was posted to support it.259 Japanese casualties numbered a mere two officers and twenty-five other ranks killed with another eleven officers and ninety-nine other ranks wounded.260 By comparison, the 15th Indian Brigade lost three quarters of its strength and was left with six hundred men, the 6 th Indian Brigade was „seriously depleted‟, while the 28th Indian Brigade had two battalions with one hundred casualties each and a third was left with one company. 261 It was a decisive defeat on all counts and at all levels. Japanese and British sources acknowledged the prowess of the British artillery in suppressing and breaking up many of their attacks, including the advance of Japanese tanks on the trunk road on the night of the 11th. The British artillery bombardment made Tsuji worry about the prospects of success initially, forced Saeki to relocate his HQ several times, killed the commander of 1st Company, and caused most of their casualties. However, the Japanese disparaged the British infantry for being weak.262 This was hardly surprising given the emphasis of the British Army‟s doctrine on the artillery arm, which was constantly hailed as superior to the infantry arm by both British and German observers alike. 263 At Jitra, the pattern of British superiority in artillery being unable to compensate for their inferiority in infantry was set for the rest of the campaign. Kampar, 30th December 1941 – 2nd January 1942 258 WO 106/2579B Carpendale. CAB 106/53; WO 106/2579B Carpendale. 260 25th Army, 112. 261 Kirby, 210; WO 172/18 Appendix N3; Percival, Despatch. 262 WO 106/2579B Carpendale; 25th Army HQ, 103-105; Tsuji, 91, 98-101 263 French, 6-7, 92; Bidwell & Graham, 223. 259 61 Kampar was the first attempt by Malaya Command to adjust its tactics according to those of its enemy. In contrast to previous attempts to defend static linear prepared positions, the 11th Indian Division deployed in depth along the main trunk road with fields of fire as wide as 1,200 yards over open tin mines. It was also the first time in which the British Army had the time and opportunity to prepare and fight on a strategically strong position, which conformed to its tactical doctrine of defensive warfare based on infantry fighting from prepared positions and trenches, supported by artillery.264 Despite the feat of resisting all frontal assaults by the Japanese 5th Division for four days, the 11th Indian Division, now commanded by Paris, withdrew when its flanks and rear were threatened by a Japanese double-envelopment by sea and through the marshes. In this sense, Kampar was still a typical Malayan battle, illustrating the British Army‟s inability to cope with the IJA‟s high tempo, aggressive, encirclement tactics. As Farrell noted, at Kampar, the British Army was unable to stand for long even when the terrain conformed to its tactical doctrine.265 This reflected the inferiority of its system compared to the Japanese. The same British rigidity that created a dilemma between operational and tactical imperatives at Jitra, again haunted 11th Indian Division at Kampar. The division was again limited by Percival‟s instructions not to risk the division being destroyed in sustained combat as it was needed for more fighting withdrawals further south, to buy time for British imperial reinforcements to arrive at Singapore. Already a rear position was reconnoitered at Slim River.266 This contradicted the mission of holding Kampar for as long as five to six weeks if possible to prevent the enemy from capturing the Federal capital of Kuala Lumpur, with its several large military depots and airfields, and also allow reinforcements to arrive safely at Singapore.267 This 264 CAB 106/53; Percival, Despatch. Farrell, 191. 266 Percival, Despatch; WO 172/18 III Indian Corps Operational Instructions No. 7, 11 th Indian Division Operational Instructions No. 2, Appendices E13, K13; LMH 4 Heath Papers. 267 Percival, Despatch; WO 172/18 III Indian Corps Operational Instructions No. 7, 23 rd December 1941, Appendices Z12, E13, K1; CAB 105/53. 265 62 confusion over priority of roles partially led to Major-General Archie Paris, the second GOC 11th Indian Division, failing to implement the new tactics which would have held Kampar longer fighting an in-depth defence along the main trunk road, screened by active fighting patrols, with units stocked with many days of supplies, so that they could hold tight when cut off by the enemy‟s predictable encirclements, and depend on mobile reserves to counterattack and relieve them.268 The 5th Division‟s battle plan was merely a larger scale version of the familiar IJA pinand-encircle tactics, with the objective of annihilating the defenders in a four-pronged attack. While the entire 41st Regiment, supported by the divisional artillery, made frontal assaults to pin the enemy on the trunk road in the centre, and one and a half battalions of the 11 th Regiment feinted down the eastern loop road, the 42nd Regiment was to flank Kampar‟s defences through the marshes and swamps on the western sector. Finally, the other one and a half battalions of the 11th Regiment, with an Imperial Guards Regiment, were to embark on a series of coastal hooks on the west coast of Perak and Selangor, to cut off the retreat of the defenders. Thus, the 11 th Indian Division would be kept baffled and would not have the local numerical strength to block every thrust.269 Such a bold and aggressive plan entailed dispersing the 5th Division over a very wide area, which complicated command and control problems and increased communication difficulties. Fortunately, the division was used to devolving command responsibilities to junior officers, which overcame these considerable problems. The plan also risked the division being “defeated in detail” as each of the four thrusts was unable to aid the other directly. It was based on the correct assumption that the British Army was slow to react and would “sit tight” and let the IJA “walk around them”. In typical IJA fashion, the attack was preceded by scout parties which 268 269 Percival, Despatch; WO 172/18 Appendix F7, III Indian Corps Operational Instructions No. 7. Tsuji, 125-130. 63 probed the British positions at Kampar, seeking weak spots and helping to identify Paris‟ intention.270 Paris previously commanded the 12th Indian Brigade with much success. However, he did not have Staff College training and was untrained for his new appointment. 271 This, and the contradictory mission given to him, made him display the same conservatism and “defensivemindedness” as Murray-Lyon. The enemy‟s main attack, with the 41st Regiment on the trunk road sector, stalled against stiff resistance by the well-entrenched British Battalion. Its advance down the loop road with the 11th Regiment was much weaker and easily checked by the 28th Indian Brigade‟s lead Gurkha battalion, with artillery support, on the 30th.272 Paris should have used it in a pincer attack up the loop road on the flank of the main enemy force pinned on the trunk road sector. 273 In fact, Tsuji admitted that with the 42nd Regiment stuck to the west of Kampar and the 41st Regiment pinned down on the main trunk road, a British counterattack was what he feared most.274 Instead, on the 1st, Paris‟ retracted his original counterattack plan and allowed Brigadier W. R. Selby, commanding 28th Indian Brigade, to retreat his two battalions down the loop road to reinforce his divisional reserve at Temoh. No doubt this was influenced by the fact that British observation posts had spotted the wide flanking moves of the enemy to the west and along the coast.275 However, Paris‟ had given contradictory orders to the brigade to counterattack without danger of being cut off, which was similar to his own order from Percival to delay the enemy without losing too many casualties. This confusion 270 WO 172/100; WO 172/121; WO 172/18 Appendices M17, Q17, E18, U18; Percival, Despatch; CAB 106/53.. 271 Kiani, 31; Kirby, 130; Smith, 277, 278; Elphick, 242; Ashmore; CAB 106/193; Moreman, 29; 2nd Argylls War Diary; Moffatt & McCormick, 11-14; CAB 106/70; CAB 106/173; Percival, 31-33. 272 WO 172/100; WO 172/121; WO 172/18 Appendices M17, Q17, E18, U18; Smith, 306; Percival, Despatch; WO 172/100; CAB 106/53; Chye, 158. 273 Farrell, 190. 274 Tsuji, 130. 275 CAB 106/53; WO 172/18 11th Indian Division Operational Instructions No. 2, Appendices D19, K19, X19; Farrell, 190. 64 made the newly appointed and untrained Selby naturally opt for caution and withdraw when pressed by the enemy down the loop road.276 On the afternoon of the 2nd, the similarly newly appointed and untrained Brigadier H. D. Moorhead, commanding the amalgamated 6/15th Indian Brigade, displayed similar caution by launching two piecemeal unsupported company sized attacks with „A‟ and then „C‟ companies of his reserve Jat/Punjab Battalion, instead of as a unit in a decisive attempt to restore the British Battalion‟s right flank on Green Ridge. It was hardly surprising that the two companies were squandered in the ultimately successful attempt, which left the British Battalion still in a precarious position with the brigade having only two more companies as reserves. 277 This Moorhead failed to do though even other sectors were quiet throughout the previous two days. Thus, all the British formation commanders displayed the characteristic inability to identify the main threat to their position and launch a decisive counterattack with adequate force.278 This British habit of carefully holding back reserves and launching piecemeal counterattacks was characteristic even at unit and subunit level. On the morning of the 1st, upon learning that the Japanese had gained a foothold on the eastern edges of both Green and Thompson Ridges, Morrison ordered Captain Vickers, commander of the reserve „D‟ Company, to restore the situation. The latter led two of his platoons instead of his entire company in a counterattack which expelled the enemy from both ridges.279 The next morning, when the enemy had overrun 9th Platoon of „A‟ Company on the eastern sector of Thompson Ridge, Morrison again ordered Vickers to counterattack, who led only a platoon of his company into the fray. While successfully relieving the immediate threat to „A‟ Company‟s hold on Thompson Ridge, the counterattack failed to dislodge all the Japanese from the upper slopes of the eastern edge of 276 Selby previously commanded the 2/9th Gurkhas. WO 172/18 Appendix K13; Heath Papers LMH 4; Farrell, 190. 277 Moorhead previously commanded the 3/16th Punjabs. CAB 106/53; Farrell, 191. 278 Farrell, 190. 279 Percival, Despatch; WO 172/100; CAB 106/53. 65 the ridge.280 The two counterattacks could have been more effective and less costly had the entire reserve company been used, instead of a platoon or two at a time. By contrast, the 5th Division‟s officers and NCOs displayed tactical flair and employed “mission” command to good use throughout the battle. On the morning of the 1 st, the 41st Regiment used its main force to pin the British Battalion on Thompson and Green ridges along the trunk road, while companies, platoons and even sections infiltrated down the narrow 20-40 yard cleared corridor that existed between the eastern ends of the ridges and the jungle-clad steep slopes of Bujang Melaka. Thus, they were able to gain temporary footholds on Thomson and Green ridges and threatened to overwhelm 10th Platoon of „B‟ Company posted on the right-most sector of Green Ridge.281 The next morning, the 5th Division employed pre-assault mortar and artillery bombardment to suppress the British infantry before the 41st regiment closed in, using “hugging” tactics so that British artillery could not be used for fear of “friendly fire.” This paid off when the regiment managed to overrun a British platoon on the right-most sector of Thompson Ridge and again gained another temporary foothold on the eastern edge of Green Ridge. Both footholds were only later partially dislodged by the British, with great loss and difficulty.282 On the afternoon of the 2nd, the Jat/Punjab Battalion demonstrated its lack of proficiency in counterattacking the enemy without artillery support. As the enemy closed in on the British Battalion‟s positions on Green Ridge, it was impossible to call for artillery fire to dislodge the enemy from the right-most sector. The battalion‟s first effort to counterattack with its „A‟ Company failed miserably as Japanese machine guns mowned down two platoons in the charge, leaving the sole platoon too weak to continue the mission. The second effort was done by „C‟ Company, which successfully cleared the enemy out of their position on the ridge. However, it 280 WO 172/100; WO 172/18 Appendix K19; CAB 106/53. Percival, Despatch; WO 172/100; CAB 106/53. 282 WO 172/100, WO 172/18 Appendices K19, U19, X19; CAB 106/53. 281 66 was almost annihilated. 283 Such casualties incurred in the counterattack could have been minimized had the troops been adept at using the close terrain to advantage to close in on the enemy before attacking. However, throughout the British Army, the minor tactics for doing so were neglected.284 11th Indian Division‟s poor anti-tank training was best highlighted by the rearguard action of the 12th Indian Brigade on the 28th and 29th of December at Dipang. Almost reminiscent of Changlun and Asun, the brigade was caught by surprise by Japanese tanks advancing down the road, while Japanese infantry dismounted at the rear and flanked through the surrounding country. As a result, the brigade withdrew with great difficulty through Kampar that day. If the best brigade of the III Indian Corps could not stand up to the frontal assault of enemy tanks, it is reasonable to suppose that the other brigades and units could not either.285 Kampar was one of Malaya Command‟s better fought battles. British sources estimated Japanese casualties at five hundred.286 Tsuji‟s memoirs admitted that their assault on Kampar was so difficult that for the first time a set piece battle had to be staged and all available troops had to be used. He acknowledged that there were even times when he doubted whether his troops would prevail and that the Japanese suffered heavy casualties from the powerful British artillery. The 42nd Regiment had to make a bigger detour than expected to escape the attention of the British artillery, which made it unable to fulfill its role of threatening the British rear and cutting off their retreat.287 Nevertheless, the British Army failed to take full advantage of their superior ground, strong defences and powerful artillery at the tactical level. While it could match the IJA in open battle behind fixed defences with artillery support, it still had not found a way to counter the enemy‟s “hugging” and outflanking tactics. Overly dependent on artillery, its infantry could not 283 WO 172/100; WO 172/121; WO 172/18 Appendices D19, U19, X19; CAB 106/53-58. Place, 37-38, 67-68. 285 CAB 106/53; Stewart, 58-61; Kirby, 244. 286 WO 172/18 Appendix U19. 287 Tsuji, 128-131. 284 67 fight well without it. Its commanders also failed to muster all their reserves for a counterattack at the decisive point. Moorhead reported that Kampar „could not be held indefinitely‟. Despite the heroism displayed, the sub-units of his brigade were being “bled dry” piecemeal and yet Paris still declined to launch a strong and determined counterattack.288 Kampar demonstrated the great gulf between the two military systems. 288 CAB 106/53. 68 CHAPTER 5: THE BRITISH ARMY ON THE OFFENSIVE IN THE MALAYAN CAMPAIGN The British Army rarely attacked in the Malayan Campaign. On the few occasions Malaya Command attacked locally, it was to relieve beleaguered forces or restore a defensive line. Despite the differences in circumstances and some of the personalities involved, the British Army‟s attacks in Malaya generally displayed similar characteristics and followed similar tactical procedures and principles as their counterparts in Europe and North Africa. Attacks tended to take place at dawn, preceded by a strong artillery bombardment, launched in a linear fashion, with preordained timetables and objectives dictated to all formations and units, as part of a centrally planned and managed set piece affair. The offensive required a good command and control system with well-trained troops, led by competent leaders, to succeed.289 Unfortunately, Malaya Command did not have these conditions. The IJA, by contrast, was seldom on the defensive in the Malayan Campaign and its tactical doctrine disdained defense. When facing an offensive, it tended to react boldly and aggressively by counterattacking immediately, using its famed encirclement tactics. This chapter examines the two largest British set piece offensive battles of the Malayan Campaign – Bukit Pelandok and Bukit Timah, to illustrate the contrast in the two systems. Bukit Pelandok, 19th -22nd January 1942 Bukit Pelandok is an example of British incompetence on the attack even when possessing overwhelming artillery superiority and the customary three to one numerical superiority military textbooks cited as necessary for a successful offensive. 53rd Brigade could only field the equivalent of a battalion at most, throughout four days, in two sluggish, piecemeal and futile offensives against a Japanese task force that amounted to merely two infantry companies without artillery support. Although Japanese warplanes were more active than usual in supporting the army, this battle illustrated all that was wrong with the British military system 289 Infantry Section Leading, (London: HMSO, 1938), 104. 69 poor leadership and command, the rigidity of its tactics, the leisurely tempo of its operations and the weakness of its infantry. The tactical objective of the 53rd Brigade‟s counterattack to allow the remnants of the cut off 45th Indian Brigade and 2/19th and 2/29th Australian Imperial Forces (AIF) battalions at Bakri to retreat to safety, was difficult to achieve from the start but Percival‟s over-caution made it even more daunting. The geography of the whole position favoured defence - the hill features were covered in thick jungle except at the forward slopes, overlooked the British positions to the east, while the trunk road running through the defile had deep irrigation ditches on both sides preventing motor vehicles from going off-road.290 As Percival admitted, even if the 53rd Brigade could drive the Japanese battalion from the two hills covering the defile, they would still need to clear another enemy battalion to the west covering the Bukit Payong defile along the seven mile trunk road leading towards Parit Sulong Bridge.291 Percival should have allocated another brigade to support 53rd Brigade - one to take the first defile and the other to „leapfrog‟ the first to capture the second defile. In fact, by the 21st, the remaining two battalions of the well-trained 27th AIF Brigade were in reserve at Yong Peng.292 Unfortunately, Percival typically did not dare risk such a bold and decisive move. Warren rightly noted that Percival‟s „inability to concentrate his forces at a point of crisis, even with the location of the point of crisis was an enduring theme of the Malayan Campaign.‟293 To make things worse, Percival‟s over caution also ensured that 53rd Brigade fought with only one of its integral infantry battalions at hand, the 6th Norfolks. He had earlier detached its two other battalions to two different locations under different commands. As he himself admitted, this was „contrary to all military teaching‟ but attempted to justify it by stating that, „but, with so 290 WO172/144, 53rd Brigade War Diary; Neil Storey, To Singapore and Beyond (Norwich, Norfolk: Holyboy Publications, 1992), 23. 291 Warren, 178; Percival, War in Malaya, 232. 292 Kirby, 313; Warren, 178. 293 Warren, 172. 70 many danger points and so few troops to guard them, it proved most difficult to avoid.‟ 294 Percival‟s decision to split up a brigade‟s infantry components piecemeal without regards for cohesion, was another constant feature of the Malayan Campaign. This was due to Percival‟s constant obsession to be “strong everywhere” and not take risks on any sector.295 In this, Percival was merely reflecting the typical British establishment‟s fear of taking risks. Brigadier C. L. B. Duke, commanding the 53rd Brigade, was as inexperienced, poorlytrained, cautious, pessimistic and “defensive-minded” as the other British formation commanders in Malaya.296 That being the case, it was all the more important for his superiors to visit and guide him. Key, whose HQ was at Yong Peng some seven miles away, came only on the second day, after the counterattack failed. Bennett, who absorbed 53rd Brigade under his command on the 21st, typically only sent Thyer as liaison to enforce his order.297 While Moorhead had experience, Elrington and Lieutenant-Colonel Lywood, CO 6th Norfolks, did not. In fact, the latter was unfit for command. After the defeat on the 19th, he had been so “shaken” that his adjutant effectively commanded the battalion after that. Unsurprisingly, Key found the battalion „very nervous and poorly deployed.‟298 Lywood‟s nervous breakdown in combat mirrored many such cases amongst British senior officers in the field throughout the early years of World War II which reflected an inadequate selection and training system for British senior commanders. 294 5th Norfolks to Mersing and 2nd Cambridgeshires to Batu Pahat. This was most unfortunate as the original three battalions of this brigade were familiar with one another and had trained together in the UK. Percival,231; Neil, 12, 20; Ron Taylor, “Royal Norfolks in the Far East”, 295 Smith, 370; Simpson, “Percival” in Keegan (ed.), 272; Kinvig, “General Percival and the Fall of Singapore”, 252, 253 296 Farrell, 267 quoted Percival‟s opinion of Duke, „Just arrived from England where training had probably been on more deliberate lines.‟; Farrell, 266, also cited Colonel Thyer, Westforce‟s GSO1, as stating that he was shocked to see Duke and his staff leisurely conducting a reconnaissance „in full view‟ of the two hills on the 21st, convinced that the enemy was not there, thus compromising the element of surprise; Julie Summers, The Colonel of Tamarkan – Philip Toosey and the Bridge on the River Kwai (London: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 79, cited Lieutenant-Colonel Phil Toosey, CO 135th Field Regiment, as saying that Duke had prepared for withdrawal exercises after hearing of the spate of disasters in Malaya while on the troopship bound for the Far East. 297 WO 172/20 Appendix H33; Farrell, 265, 266; Bennett, p. 117; Percival Despatch; WO172/144; Kirby, Singapore, 132. 298 Key as quoted in Farrell, 265; WO 172/20 Appendix C33; WO 172/89; CAB 106/53. 71 Duke‟s counterattack plan was flawed. He should either have followed Moorhead‟s advice to counterattack quickly with all existing forces on the 19th or wait till the bulk of the 2nd Loyals arrived the next day, before launching a coordinated set piece assault with artillery support. Instead, Duke decided on a pre-dawn attack the next day without the main force of the 2nd Loyals. Revealing his inexperience of local conditions which disrupted signal communications, he did not even relocate the supporting artillery battery at Yong Peng nearer to the brigade throughout the battle. Duke‟s dispositions exposed his over caution which reduced his numerical advantage - on his left sector, a company of the 6th Norfolks and the sole company of 2nd Loyals were to attack Bukit Pelandok and the ridge to its south respectively. On his right sector, the 3/16th Punjabs was to attack Bukit Belah and the ridge to its north respectively. 299 Despite being aware that he would soon be reinforced by the bulk of the 2 nd Loyals that morning, Duke retained the equivalent of two combat and two support companies as reserve at the causeway to guard the trunk road to Yong Peng. Duke‟s “defensive-mindedness” and obsession with the security of his rear communications mirrored Percival and other British senior commanders. 53rd Brigade‟s junior leadership was also culpable for the failure of the crucial counterattack. “B” Company, 3/16th Punjabs advanced and successfully occupied the ridge north of Bukit Belah that morning. It then inexplicably “sat tight” and later withdrew in the afternoon to no purpose instead of “marching to the sounds of guns” southwards, to counterattack the lone Japanese company of I/5th Battalion on Bukit Belah from the rear.300 Meanwhile, on the other side of the road at dawn, “B” Company, 6th Norfolks advanced up Bukit Pelandok and were met with heavy fire from both hills. Demoralised, the company commander decided to withdraw immediately without waiting for the artillery to register its target.301 This lack of initiative and persistence in the attack was due to both company commanders being inexperienced, poorly 299 WO172/144; WO 172/89; WO 172/123 “3/16th Punjabs War Diary”; CAB 106/174; CAB 106/53. WO172/144; WO 172/106; WO 172/123; CAB 106/53. 301 WO172/144; WO 172/20 Appendix H33; CAB 106/53. 300 72 trained and unfamiliar in bush warfare, which exposed the shortcomings of the British Army‟s selection and training system for officers. Yet, such was the numerical superiority Duke had on Bukit Belah that the counterattack would still have worked if not for the shortcomings of the British military system. It was not Duke‟s fault that he did not have maps of the area. However, he erroneously considered aggressive patrols of the bushes beyond the company areas „not practical,‟ which prevented him from knowing that the enemy had only two companies in strength. This reflected the British Army‟s lack of training in „active patrolling‟ and flawed assumption that the jungle was “impenetrable”. The counterattack on Bukit Belah in the pre-dawn hours of the 20th would have been successful had British patrols located the lost company of the 6th Norfolks and coordinated with it. The latter‟s “friendly fire” with a company of 3/16th Punjabs would also have been prevented had the British Army emphasised training in „active patrolling‟, night operations and standard „battle drills‟. This “own goal” disrupted the British counterattack, and killed the experience and dynamic Moorhead, amongst others.302 By contrast, Major Yamamoto and his commanders proved to be enterprising and tactically competent, while their men had high morale and were familiar with chaotic night operations, having trained hard and realistically in “battle drills”. They were from the elite Imperial Guards Division, which uniquely took in recruits with the best physique and selected top officer graduates of the Military Academy from all over Japan. Although not as experienced as the other two divisions of the 25th Army, the division had been in action in China and Indochina since 1940.303 Their lone company on Bukit Belah had not been content to “sit tight” after their successful attack in the afternoon of the 19th. Instead, it pressed on through the night to seize the summit. That paid off, when in the wee hours of the next day, it capitalised on the “friendly fire” 302 WO172/144; WO 172/106; WO 172/123; CAB 106/53; Captain Butterworth, 3/16 th Punjab quoted in Elphick, 387. 303 Yoji, 190; Frei, 3, 13-15; Gordon L Rottman, Japanese Army in World War II – Conquest of the Pacific 1941-1942 (London, Osprey Publishing, 2005), 17, 23-24; Fusayama, 45; Tsuji, 7, 8, 25, 26, 32, 45; Drea, 10, 80, 94. 73 between a British and an Indian company to immediately counterattack. Without the chance to reorganise, both enemy companies suffered heavy casualties and were driven downhill.304 This was in accordance with Japanese tactical manuals which emphasized speed, surprise, opportunism, the advantage of high ground and counterattacking aggressively while on the defense.305 Duke‟s over caution, pessimism and “defensive-mindedness” became even more pronounced after the failure of the counterattack on the 20th. Time was running out for the Australian and Indian troops withdrawing from Bakri, while the main force of the fresh 2 nd Loyals arrived that day. Yet Duke declined to counterattack and made no offensive preparations, despite Key‟s repeated order.306 Instead, he feared for the safety of his brigade‟s communications at the rear, and opted for a defensive posture – he placed 3/16th Punjabs and 6th Norfolks in positions covering the western end of the causeway, while putting 2nd Loyals in positions east of the causeway, to guard against enemy infiltration.307 Key, who finally visited the brigade later that day allowed Duke to postpone the counterattack till the next morning.308 Like Percival and other British field commanders, Key and Duke had only pessimistically considered their own difficulties without grasping that the enemy might be in a worse condition. Duke finally had to make belated offensive preparations on the 21st as Bennett proved to be less patient and sympathetic than Key. However, Duke displayed rigidity in planning. When Thyer correctly pressed him for a “snap” counterattack, Duke insisted on a deliberate set piece assault, which took a long time to prepare.309 The 2nd Loyals were typically so dependent on motor transport that Elrington did not attempt to march his widely dispersed companies across country to their assembly points, even after Japanese warplanes had interdicted the trunk road and 304 WO172/144; WO 172/106; WO 172/123; CAB 106/53; Captain Butterworth, 3/16 th Punjab quoted in Elphick, 387. 305 Forty, p. 210. 306 French, “Big Wars and Small Wars”, 41; Moreman, 55, 56. 307 WO172/144; WO 172/147; CAB 106/174. 308 WO 172/20 Appendix H33; Farrell, 265, 266. 309 Quoted in Farrell, 266; Bennett, p. 117; Percival Despatch; WO172/144. 74 made travel by road risky. In accordance with British doctrinal manuals, proper reconnaissance and detailed briefing of orders had to be done before an offensive. Due to communication difficulties in Malaya‟s climate and terrain, much time was also spent coordinating with the artillery battery, which was still inexplicably left at Yong Peng! Consequently, Duke had to postpone the counterattack several times in the afternoon. Finally, he postponed it till next morning as the artillery was still unable to register its target by evening due to faulty fuses. 310 In any case, it was unlikely that Duke would have ordered a night assault, given the British Army‟s disinclination for and lack of training in that. The rigid and leisurely way in which the brigade prepared its counterattack mirrored the British Army‟s preference for slow tempo operations. The British Army‟s doctrinal overreliance on artillery doomed the planned counterattack on the morning of the 22nd. The artillery battery yet again failed to register its target and so Duke postponed the counterattack until that was accomplished. As the sun rose, the British lost the element of surprise as Japanese warplanes heavily bombed the assembly area, causing Duke to finally cancel the counterattack for good.311 The decision to wait for the artillery to be ready was due to what Bennett attributed as 2nd Loyals having „a strong disinclination to attack without artillery support to pave the way‟, which was typical of the British attitude in Malaya.312 He was right. 11th Indian Division HQ specified artillery support as a pre-requisite to any attack, in accordance with the British Army‟s doctrinal emphasis on firepower. 313 Given that Malaya‟s dense jungle terrain hampered the use of artillery, this inflexible requirement slowed down the tempo of operations and made attacks predictable. In the absence of artillery support, the IJA would have placed faith in its well-trained infantrymen to “go in with the bayonets” and take both hills in a surprise night attack. This reflected a crucial difference in the two military systems. 310 The full procedures can be seen from US War Department, The British Army in World War II (London: Greenhill Books, 1990 (1942)), 187-199. WO172/144; CAB 106/174; WO 172/20 Appendix J36, T34. 311 WO 172/147; CAB 106/174; WO 172/20 Appendix J36. 312 Bennett, 23. 313 WO172/144; CAB 106/174; Bidwell & Graham, 223. 75 Bukit Timah, 11th February 1942 Bukit Timah, where “Tomforce” launched the largest British offensive in the campaign, was the ultimate showdown between the Japanese superiority in infantry and the British superiority in artillery. For once, Malaya Command was heavily outnumbered in infantry but it had overwhelming superiority in artillery against the bulk of two Japanese divisions with plentiful air support. Unfortunately, in the dense terrain, the British Army‟s powerful artillery proved unable to compensate for its flawed tactics, infantry weakness and poor leadership and command. The IJA, on the other hand, proved that their superior infantry, led by enterprising junior officers with good tactical grasp, could make use of the close terrain to overcome their lack of artillery. At Bukit Timah, the differences between the British and the Japanese systems were again clearly accentuated. Like many battles in the campaign, the outcome of the offensive was compromised by Percival‟s operational decisions. Once the Japanese 5th and 18th divisions breached the KranjiJurong defensive line on the morning of the 10th, everything depended on a much-anticipated “all or nothing” counterattack. Yet, Percival remained obsessed with the threat of another Japanese landing on the northeastern part of the island. Despite the fact that ABDA Command‟s intelligence had correctly identified the Dutch East Indies as the target of a large IJN convoy at sea he was reluctant to commit it as a complete formation, much to the dismay of 18 th Division‟s HQ which planned for such a counterattack. 314 Instead, Percival asked Heath, GOC Northern Area, to send a brigade group of three battalions to the Bukit Timah Race Course area to be placed under Bennett, now GOC Western Area, by the evening of the 10th.315 He justified his over-caution by to the lesson he learnt while on an exercise in the UK, „not to commit your reserve until you are quite certain you are dealing with real thing‟.316 Yet Percival‟s caution was 314 WO 106/2579B “Captain Beamish‟s account”; Percival Papers P49; WO 106/2550C Staff Officer, 18th Division, 19/6/1942; Kirby, 363. 315 CAB 106/173 “Tomforce”, CAB 106/70 “18 th Division” Appendix C, Percival, Despatch. 316 Percival, 272. 76 not unique as it mirrored that of his subordinates in Malaya, and also Major General Bernard Freyberg at Crete. Probably mirroring Percival‟s preoccupation with the possibility of another Japanese landing, Heath declined to deploy either the fresh 54th or 55th Brigades from the 18th Division for this task. Instead, he “stitched” together three units of that division, previously not brigaded together, to form “Tomforce”. Unlike the permanent HQs of the above-two brigades, its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Thomas, and his new staff, were typically totally inexperienced and untrained for their new appointments. Consequently, Major-General Merton Beckwith-Smith, GOC 18th Division, had to mentor Thomas during the battle. 317 As at Bukit Pelandok, Percival and Heath‟s tendency to deploy units piecemeal with no regards for formation cohesion was to be disastrous. However, this was by no means unique to Malaya Command. As with 53rd Brigade at Bukit Pelandok, “Tomforce” was asked to do too much with too little. The fault lay with the British Army‟s poor C3I. Bennett envisaged “Tomforce” counterattacking at dawn on the 11th, in conjunction with a counterattack by the neighbouring 15th Indian and 27th AIF brigades, to secure Bukit Timah, retake Bukit Panjang and restore the KranjiJurong switchline.318 As Farrell noted, had Bennett been able to coordinate the offensive of all these three brigades together, it would have troubled the Japanese considerably. Unfortunately, as was common throughout the campaign, British field communications broke down. In any case, the 15th Indian Brigade had already disintegrated while Brigadier D. S. Maxwell, commanding 27th AIF Brigade, typically sited his HQ so far away that he lost touch of the situation. Yet Bennett, in accordance with British military doctrine, also sited his HQ a distance to the rear, and declined to visit his brigades to re-establish contact with them. It was only the next morning when “Tomforce” had already started moving that he sent a liaison officer to press it on and a dispatch 317 Thomas was CO 9th Northumberland Machine Gun Battalion, Major Leech of his own battalion was brigade major, while two subalterns acted as staff captain. Thomas also complained about the ineptness of his signal officer. CAB 106/173; CAB 106/70; WO 106/2550C. 318 Percival, Despatch; Bennett, 180-18; CAB 106/70; CAB 106/173. 77 rider to contact Maxwell a while after that, which was too late.319 Although let down by poor C3I, Bennett had also showed typical British lethargy, which compromised the outcome of the counterattack. Even so, the solo counterattack by “Tomforce” still had a chance to make an impact had it been launched soon after dark on the 10th when the Japanese had not yet reached the vicinity. However, the breakdown in communications and the British Army‟s typical lack of emphasis on fighting patrols gave Bennett no inkling about the great strength of the enemy and the extent of its breakthrough. He thus did not hasten the counterattack. It was not till the next morning, when the counterattack had already started, that Paris arrived to report on the gravity of the situation.320 In any case, the British Army typically eschewed high tempo operations, especially at night. However, the IJA was expert in high tempo operations at night. By dawn on the 11th, the 5th Division advancing south down Bukit Timah Road had secured the hill (the highest point on the island) and the village with two regiments forward, while the 18th Division advancing east along the Jurong Road had linked up with it at the village and junction, also with two regiments forward.321 Even though “Tomforce” was now outnumbered four-to-one, a counterattack timed at dawn might still have been disruptive as Tsuji reported that the 5th and 18th divisions were now intermingled with some confusion. 322 However, “Tomforce” moved ponderously at dawn and missed the “golden opportunity”. As Farrell noted, the counterattacked was doomed by the time it was launched as the Japanese had already consolidated their strength.323 Thomas‟ initial counterattack plan was rigidly linear, according to British Army doctrine, which exposed his inexperience in local terrain. However, Bennett had also autocratically imposed wide frontages to each battalion with no regards to ground conditions. In the centre, the 319 Farrell, 353, 354; Elphick, 257; CAB 106/70; CAB 106/173; Bennett, 182; Kirby, Loss of Singapore, 278; Kirby, Singapore, 132. 320 CAB 106/173; CAB 106/70, Appendix C. 321 25th Army, 161, 162; Tsuji, 203-205. 322 Tsuji, 207. 323 Farrell, 353. 78 18th Reconaissance Battalion was to move up the trunk road frontally in both armoured vehicles and on foot to capture Bukit Timah village and remove the enemy roadblock there, before going into reserve. After that, it was to „swing slightly to the right‟, bypass the Bukit Timah Hill and advance up the road to form a line through Bukit Panjang village. On the right, the 4 th Norfolks was to move between the trunk road and the pipeline at a depth of 2,000 yards to take Hill 255, while on the left, the 1/5th Sherwood Foresters was to move south of the trunk road at a depth of 2,000 yards to take Hill 180.324 The long frontages given to the battalions on the left and right necessitated them deploying all their companies forward without reserves in dense terrain, which hampered command and control and facilitated the kind of infiltration tactics the IJA excelled in. Farrell aptly commented that „extended line abreast made sense in the open country of northwest Europe but quickly snarled in the bushes around Bukit Timah Hill.‟325 The 25th Army‟s C3I, on the other hand, worked smoothly and its tactics were flexible and suited to the ground here. The Japanese had a great intelligence advantage over the British with the use of air reconnaissance and the capture of high ground. Tsuji recorded that he and Lieutenant-General Takuro Matsui, GOC 5th Division, were both on the peak of Bukit Timah Hill to watch the progress of the battle, while Lieutenant-General Renya Mutaguchi, GOC 18th Division was doing the same from Hill 186.326 Unlike Bennett and Thomas, they did not need to control the tactics and dispositions of their formations and units closely. The IJA‟s “mission command” and common understanding of doctrine meant that field commanders, junior officers and even NCOs instinctively knew what to do. Their men were experienced and well-trained in „battle-drills‟. The Japanese initially sought to make maximum use of the cover and clear fields of fire afforded by the railway embankment to disrupt the enemy‟s advance. At the same time, patrol detachments would be sent to “feel” for the flanks and rear of the enemy. Once the enemy‟s attack had been stalled along this natural defensive ground, an aggressive counterattack would be 324 CAB 106/70; CAB 106/173; WO 172/21 “Appendix F60. Farrell, 353. 326 Tsuji, 207-208; 25th Army, 161, 162. 325 79 launched, using the usual encirclement tactics. This was in accordance to Japanese tactical manuals, in facing a determined enemy offensive, field commanders were to be on the defense temporarily while seeking opportunities to take the counteroffensive.327 In the centre, the 18th Reconnaissance Battalion‟s progress along the congested trunk road was slow. Its unsophisticated frontal assaults were unable to take Bukit Timah village the whole morning, despite Bren carrier, mortar and artillery support. This was partly due to neglect in minor tactics when artillery fire could not be used.328 By 1100 hours, all three companies were held up along the line of the railway embankment by Japanese light machine gun posts, mortars and dive-bombers. In the afternoon, the Japanese then counterattacked briefly and „pushed back‟ the battalion east of the railway, until later driven back by British artillery.329 On the right, from Tsuji‟s account, one can surmise that the 4 th Norfolks on the right sector counterattacked in typical British linear fashion with the artillery seeking to suppress the enemy, while the infantry then moving behind this barrage „like a gigantic wave‟ to occupy enemy ground. This was typical of British barrage tactics introduced during World War I, which illustrated how their offensive tactics had remained stagnant since then.330 However, the battalion could get no further than Hills 255 and 275 by 1300 hours, after it had correctly reorganized to attack in echelons.331 Typically, more Japanese battalions of the lead regiment of the Sugiura Brigade marched towards Hill 255 throughout the afternoon which blunted the advance of the 4 th Norfolks. Meanwhile, the lead regiment of the Kawamura Brigade was already probing past the right flank of the 4th Norfolks in the crucial gap that existed between the latter and the reservoir 327 Daugherty III, 66. Place, 37, 38. 329 Tsuji, 207; CAB 106/70; CAB 106/173; WO 106/2579B; Smith, 502, 505; Kirby, Loss of Singapore, 394. 330 Place, 67, 68. 331 CAB 106/70, CAB 106/173; Kirby, 394; Smith, 502. 328 80 earlier in the morning. By evening, 5th Division had retaken Hill 275 and forced 4th Norfolks onto the defensive.332 On the left, the inexperience and inadequate training of the 1/5th Sherwood Foresters were thoroughly exposed, despite it making the most progress after reorganizing to attack in echelons. Its lack of training with artillery was demonstrated when in the late morning half of its “C” Company took Hill 180, cleared it of the enemy, was then shelled by the enemy and automatically withdrew, thinking it was “friendly fire”. Three of its companies were then subsequently swept up in the general rout of the 22nd AIF and 15th Indian Brigades, which they came into contact with along the Reformatory Road. So disorganised was the battalion that it eventually passed through AIF positions at Point 127 and rested there the whole afternoon.333 By late afternoon, “Tomforce” was dispersed in unfamiliar „bush terrain,‟ running out of supplies and sustaining increasing casualties. Yet the enemy was steadily reinforced to such a point that the British were by now pushed to the defensive and in danger of being outflanked on the right.334 Fearing that his command would disintegrate in a night melee with the IJA, Thomas ordered a withdrawal back to the Race Course at 1700 hours. When the roll calls were mustered the next day, the 18th Recce, the 4th Norfolks and the 1/5th Sherwood Foresters were down to a hundred and twenty, two hundred and a hundred men respectively. 335 Tsuji admitted the fighting at Bukit Timah had been so severe that he was concerned that both Japanese divisions „appeared somewhat exhausted‟ to advance.336 The 25th Army Official History also credited “Tomforce” with putting up „strong resistance‟. While showing disdain for the British infantry, it credited the British artillery for inflicting „heavy casualties upon the [18th] division‟, which prevented its infantry and artillery from concentrating 332 CAB 106/70; CAB 106/173; Percival, Despatch. CAB 106/70. 334 25th Army, 161, 162; Tsuji, 203-205; CAB 106/70; CAB 106/173. 335 CAB 106/70; CAB 106/173. 336 Tsuji, 208, 209, 223. 333 81 on the evening of the 11th in time for the general assault on the following day.337 This was a most accurate assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the British Army. The close terrain of Malaya played to the strengths of the IJA rather than the British Army. 337 25th Army HQ, 150, 151, 161-163. 82 CHAPTER 6: THE BRITISH ARMY’S DELAYING MISSIONS IN THE MALAYAN CAMPAIGN The way an army conducts a delaying mission against a tenacious and aggressive attacker is a good gauge of the training of its troops, the work of its staff officers and the leadership of its commanders. Throughout the campaign Malaya Command had to conduct numerous delaying missions to buy time to bring in reinforcements, deny the enemy use of a key military facility for a certain period of time, or for the next defensive line to be prepared. Malaya Command‟s record in delaying missions was mixed, although overall, it succeeded in getting its troops safely back to Singapore from the mainland. This chapter examines Telok Anson and Kuantan, to illustrate how the success or failure of delaying missions depended on the feasibility of the objective given and the state of discipline, morale and training in high tempo operations. Telok Anson, 2nd – 3rd January 1942 Telok Anson is an example of a tactically successful fighting withdrawal limited by typical over-caution and pessimism from British senior commanders. Despite the 12th Indian Brigade possessing overwhelming artillery support to cover the trunk road to Bidor in relatively open terrain, the British High Command timidly chose to delay Watanabe Detachment, a Japanese coastal landing task force of roughly a regiment, for only a day. Japanese warplanes gave some support to its troops on this occasion, but this was by no means decisive. As a result, the 11th Indian Division had to withdraw from Kampar earlier than necessary. If the best brigade of III Indian Corps could not confidently hold a comparable force of Japanese troops for a longer time, it was reasonable to suppose that other formations were even less capable. The IJA, used to high tempo operations, had landed elements of the 11 th Regiment at Utan Melintang on the evening of the 1st. It then swiftly followed this up by landing the III/4th Guards Battalion the next morning at Telok Anson. Colonel Watanabe, commanding this detachment, was conscious of his task force‟s role as the outer coastal pincer to „threaten the enemy [at Kampar] from the rear‟ in conjunction with the inner pincer formed by the 42 nd 83 Regiment. 338 Typical of a professionally selected and trained IJA officer, he understood the importance of speed and marched his regiment rapidly overnight from Utan Melintang to link up with and absorb the Guards battalion at Telok Anson the next morning.339 By contrast, without even bothering to visit this sector or to send a liaison officer there, Paris instinctively opted for a passive rather than aggressive stance - cordoning off with the 12th Indian Brigade rather than annihilating the enemy beachhead. That decision guaranteed that the enemy would break inland. The usually dynamic Paris was undoubtedly influenced by his given mission to „preserve his division as a fighting force‟. This led him to display typical British overcaution, pessimism and over-concern for the security of line of communications.340 Percival and Heath proved just as “defensive-minded” as Paris. British air reconnaissance and coastal patrols overestimated the strength of the enemy‟s landing party as two battalions and many mortars at Telok Anson and a „considerable‟ force at Utan Melintang. They also received reports of enemy numerous ships making southwards for Kuala Selangor. 341 Both became so concerned with the general threat to the west coast that on the afternoon of the 2 nd, they ordered Paris to withdraw from the Kampar position that night. 12th Indian Brigade‟s mission then became that of delaying the enemy along the two trunk roads that forked at Changkat Jong to Ayer Kuning and Degong to ensure that the withdrawal of the division‟s main force was unmolested.342 Stewart, like Paris, being inexperienced and untrained in his new appointment, was losing his usual cool and optimism after having been overworked for weeks. When enemy bombing and pressure on the ground mounted on his brigade throughout the 2nd, he became so convinced he 338 Kirby, Loss of Singapore, 247; Bhargava & Sastri, Campaigns in Southeast Asia 1941-1942 (Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War 1939-1945) (New Delhi: Combined InterServices Historical Section India and Pakistan, 1960), 210; 25 th Army HQ, 25; WO 172/18 Appendices W18 & C19; Percival, Despatch; 25th Army HQ, 25. 339 Bhargava & Sastri, 206; CAB 106/53; WO 172/18 Appendix L19; Percival, Despatch. 340 Percival, Despatch; WO 172/18 III Indian Corps Operational Instructions No. 7, 11 th Indian Division Operational Instructions No. 2, Appendices E13, K13; LMH 4 Heath Papers. 341 WO 172/18 Appendices N19 & Q19. 342 WO 172/18 Appendix M19; Stewart, 67. 84 was facing „at least a regiment in strength‟ that he reported to Paris „he could not guarantee to keep the main road open by more than twenty-four hours‟.343 This was pessimistic, given the fact that he had well-trained and experienced troops in comparable numbers, with superior artillery, and on good defensive ground consisting of young low rubber trees and open tin mines.344 That night, Paris had to order 12th Indian Brigade to „deny Ayer Kuning village to the enemy until midnight on the 3rd/4th‟ to prevent it from interfering with the division‟s withdrawal down the trunk road southwards to the Slim River position.345 Stewart was otherwise sound in his tactical deployment. To block the advance from the coast on the 2nd, he placed his brigade in-depth along the two trunk roads to Ayer Kuning and Degong. 2nd Argylls deployed in depth six miles along the road forward of the crucial Changkat Jong junction. 5/2nd Punjabs deployed behind the 2nd Argylls with bridgeheads along the two trunk roads to a depth of four miles, followed by 4/19th Hyderabads behind up to two miles on the Ayer Kuning road. A platoon of the 5/2nd Punjabs was placed as a fighting patrol in the “bush” to the north of the trunk road and the parallel Bidor River. The squadron of 3 rd Indian Cavalry was to patrol the trunk road and railway to Degong up to the 5/2nd Punjabs‟ position. When the Japanese switched to wider enveloping tactics on foot and motor boats up the Bidor River aimed at the Changkat Jong junction the next day, the British artillery, directed by a forward observer on a strategic hill near here, punished them in the favourable terrain twice that evening. Simultaneously, the three battalions took turns to successively “leapfrog” through one another 343 Percival, Despatch; Moffatt & McCormick, 97-98; Kirby, 248; Smith, 313-314; Stewart, 65. The brigade‟s three battalions were brigaded together since their arrival in August 1939, with a common set of standard operating procedures. Unlike other units, they trained to maneuver and fight confidently in the “bush” and had taken part in a rather realistic four-day brigade exercise in November 1941 against an „enemy‟ landing on the west coast of Malaya. This was in addition to two similarly tasked brigade singleday schemes to practice counterattack in November. In a two-day air-ground co-operation scheme in February, the RAF was so impressed by its ability to move off-road unnoticed from the air. It had just successfully fought along the Kroh-Grik Road against the Japanese 41st Regiment for two weeks. Stewart, 67, 68; WO 172/112 “12th Indian Brigade War Diary”; WO 172/22 “Force Emu War Diary”. 345 Kirby, 248; WO 172/18 Appendix O20; Bhargava & Sastri, 211. 344 85 towards Ayer Kuning, where they finally gave up Changkat Jong at 2300 hours and „withdrew according to plan through 15th Indian Brigade at Bidor to the Slim River area‟ at midnight.346 Stewart‟s tactical skill was matched by the capable leadership of his subordinate officers and the good training and experience of the brigade‟s troops. When at 1400 hours on the 2nd, advance elements of the Watanabe Detachment were in contact with “A” Company, 2 nd Argylls, Major K.D. Gairdner, the new CO, pulled the company three miles back along the trunk road where “D” Company had positioned itself. Japanese attempts to follow up the withdrawal were fired upon by “D” Company on the trunk road, supported by the artillery, while their infiltration parties were dealt with by the fighting patrol platoon of 5/2nd Punjabs. Then as night fell, “D” Company withdrew another mile across a demolished bridge to prepare for the anticipated Japanese “jittery parties” attempting night infiltrations around the 2nd Argyll positions. These came after dark but the enemy attempts were all contained, by the counterattacks of lightly armed “tiger patrols” supported by the battalion‟s armoured cars on the road. The 2 nd Argylls had only conceded some four miles that day and still held a position three miles forward of the crucial Changkat Jong junction, which was a real achievement, as the enemy‟s infiltration tactics rarely failed to produce a hasty and panic retreat amongst British Empire troops. 347 Watanabe also displayed typically Japanese tactical flair. When the IJA‟s usual “pin-andencircle” tactics on the trunk road were repulsed throughout the 2nd by British artillery and infantry counterattacks, he was resilient enough to switch to outflanking maneuvers on a wider front to attempt to turn the 12th Indian Brigade.348 Throughout the battle, Watanabe Detachment, although made up of units from two different divisions, were able to fight cohesively thanks to the IJA‟s standard battle drills. This was rare in the British Army. Stewart noted that the Japanese troops were well-practised and swift with their outflanking tactics. When “pinned” on the road, 346 Kirby, 248; WO 172/18 Appendix O20; Bhargava & Sastri, 211; Stewart, 67-71. Moffatt & McCormick, 97, 98; Kirby, 248; Smith, 313-314; Stewart, 68-69. 348 Kirby, 248; WO 172/18 Appendix O20; Bhargava & Sastri, 211. 348 Moffatt, Jonathan & McCormick, Audrey Holmes, Moon over Malaya: A Tale of Argylls and Marines (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing Ltd, 2002), 98. 347 86 they instinctively moved on through the “bush” to “feel” for and exploit weakly held areas in the rear of the enemy.349 Their lack of success on this occasion was due to their misfortune to be facing the best brigade of the III Indian Corps. The 12th Indian Brigade achieved its delaying mission comfortably, with little real pressure from the enemy and losing only ninety men (half from enemy air attacks).350 This was a great testimony to its having been trained differently from the rest of Malaya Command‟s formations and indeed from the usual “British way”. However, given the advantages Stewart had in this battle, it was most disappointing that the British High Command chose to delay the enemy for just over a day. Percival, Heath, Paris and Stewart all seemed to be convinced of the futility of counterattacking Watanabe Detachment and instead opted for a passive, delaying stance. When under prolonged stress of combat, the two “stars” of Malaya Command‟s senior officers, Paris and Stewart, both turned out to be typically cautious and “retreat-minded” as the others. This reflected typical over-pessimism, over-caution and “logistic-mindedness” of British senior commanders. Japanese senior commanders would have, instead, boldly and aggressively chosen to launch an “all-or-nothing” counterattack to annihilate a coastal landing force threatening their rear. This was a clear difference between the two military systems. Kuantan, 2-3rd January 1942 Kuantan is an example of how the combination of contradictory British campaign objectives and the British Army‟s penchant for slow tempo operations and lapses in planning and staffwork seriously compromised the outcome of battles in Malaya. 22nd Indian Brigade was asked to deny an abandoned airfield in an indefensible area far longer than necessary. This was exploited by the aggressive, swift-moving and opportunistic Japanese Nasu Detachment (56th Regiment). As a result, the brigade‟s withdrawal from Kuantan nearly failed and it suffered 349 350 Stewart, 68. Stewart, 71. 87 unnecessarily high casualties breaking clear from the enemy, to no purpose. This battle again revealed the shortcomings of the British Army‟s C3I, which was inferior to that of the IJA‟s. The typical British military tendency to stick rigidly to pre-war plans again created a contradiction between operational and tactical objectives, which was mainly responsible for the partial disaster at Kuantan. Brooke-Popham insisted that the army defend Kuantan Airfield even after the RAAF evacuated it on the first day of war, as its possession by the enemy would allow Japanese warplanes to harass British convoys bringing in reinforcements to Singapore. Percival thus gave the 22nd Indian Brigade, commanded by Brigadier G.W.A. Painter, the task of denying the airbase to the enemy for „as long as possible‟, which risked having it cut off, in an area unsuited for defence, by the Japanese 56th Regiment, moving across country hastily southwards along the coast. 351 Fortunately, Heath, who was aware of the speed of the enemy‟s advance through patrols, acted contrary to Percival on the 29th – he insisted that Painter withdraw the 2/18th Garwhal Rifles, across the Kuantan River,.352 While this withdrawal was taking place the next day, the enemy attacked down the Jabor Valley into the battalion‟s flank and rear. Consequently, it had to fight its way back to Kuantan town and only succeeded in crossing the river on the 31st with considerable loss.353 Even after this encounter highlighted the risk of staying put at Kuantan, Percival rigidly stuck to Brooke-Popham‟s order. He ignored Painter‟s request to withdraw the brigade to the safety of Maran, to the west, on the night of the 1st of January. Instead, he gave the usual contradictory instruction that the brigade deploy to deny the airfield for five days without jeopardising itself, and only allowed an artillery battery to be withdrawn to Jerantut. 354 Fortunately, the next day, Heath managed to persuade Percival to let the brigade withdraw along 351 CAB 106/192 “Account of 22nd Indian Brigade in Malaya”; WO 172/38 HQ 9th Indian Division Appendices 31, 3 & 7; Percival, Despatch. 352 WO 172/38 Appendices 38A, 38B & 3; Percival, Despatch; WO 172/18 Appendix R16. 353 CAB 106/192; WO 172/18 Appendices Q17, R17, Z17, T18 & Q18; WO 172/38 and Appendix 3; Percival, Despatch. 354 CAB 106/192; WO 172/18 Appendix R18; WO 172/38 Appendices 40A, 1 & 3; Percival, Despatch. 88 the trunk road westwards to Selangor, to rejoin the rest of 9th Indian Division. This was because a key reinforcement convoy had already arrived safely in Singapore, which made it unnecessary to risk holding the airfield in the face of increasing Japanese infiltration.355 Farrell was correct in stating that Percival should have given Painter and Barstow greater leeway to decide when to withdraw once the enemy was in strength around Kuantan, instead of making such decisions when he had not even visited the front to appreciate the situation for himself.356 By contrast, the Japanese 18th Division HQ had typically empowered Colonel Nasu and his subordinates with initiative. As a well-trained and experienced professional who fully grasped the Japanese doctrinal emphasis on speed, surprise and opportunism, Nasu opted to annihilate the 22nd Indian Brigade rather than just taking Kuantan Airfield. By the 2nd, elements of the 56 th Regiment had already forded the Kuantan River upstream and were threatening to cut off the brigade‟s withdrawal route.357 His regiment was part of the well-trained and battle-hardened 18th Division which had been fighting in China since 1937.358 Compromised by Percival‟s late withdrawal order, Barstow‟s lack of urgency, used to the low tempo nature of training for operations at the Staff College, further jeopardised the success of the ensuing delaying action. Malaya Command HQ had communicated to him at 1950 hours that „it must be accepted that Kuantan Aerodome could not be denied after the 3 rd of January‟.359 In essence, this meant that Percival had not specified the time of withdrawal the next day. Given the IJA‟s usual speed and flair for encirclement tactics, a further delay of even a single day could mean disaster for the brigade. Barstow should have pushed for an early withdrawal the next day. 355 CAB 106/192 “Account of 22nd Indian Brigade in Malaya”; WO 172/38 HQ 9 th Indian Division Appendix 31, 3 & 7; Percival, Despatch. 356 Farrell, 187. 357 CAB 106/192; WO 172/20 Appendices F19 & X19; WO 172/38 and Appendix 3 & 7. 358 Yoji, 190; Frei, 3, 13-15; Gordon L Rottman, Japanese Army in World War II – Conquest of the Pacific 1941-1942 (London, Osprey Publishing, 2005), 17, 23-24; Fusayama, 45; Tsuji, 7, 8, 25, 26, 32, 45; Drea, 10, 80, 94. 359 WO 172/38 Appendix 7; Kiani, 31; Kirby, 130; Smith, 277, 278; Elphick, 242; Ashmore; CAB 106/193; Moreman, 29; CAB 106/70; CAB 106/173; Percival, 31-33. 89 He did not. Instead, he chose to interpret Percival‟s instruction as holding the airfield until night fell.360 Malaya Command HQ, which had not even sent a liaison officer to inspect the ground, drew up the plan of withdrawal which Painter adopted. 361 While consistent with the British Army‟s autocratic system of command, this also reflected the typical inexperience and inadequate training of Painter and his staff. A brigade fighting withdrawal along a road had to be carefully covered by successive “leapfrogging” battalions and companies, with mobile reserves ready to counterattack any enemy outflanking through the “bush”. Artillery batteries should also be positioned to cover areas where the enemy might attempt to follow or outflank. In addition, timing and distance of the withdrawal of each company and battalion had to be carefully planned and executed. In the event, the flawed plan violated these principles. The 5/11th Sikhs withdrew on the afternoon of the 3rd and by evening, it and the 63/81st Battery, minus a section of two guns, had reached a harbour at Gambang, some ten miles west of the airfield, without incident. Painter claimed that „the close nature of the jungle now to be traversed precluded its [the artillery battery‟s] effective employment‟. This was a mistake. By allowing these elements to withdraw so far, Painter ensured that they could not cover the withdrawal of the rest of the brigade. 362 Fortunately, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Cummings, CO 2/12th Frontier Force, the rearguard, utilised his Northwest Frontier experience to good use by posting a company at a potentially dangerous defile six miles west of the airfield.363 Another mistake Painter made was to assume his troops could withdraw unscathed in one long leap under cover of darkness, to escape from enemy air interference. This was standard British practice whenever the enemy had air control. It was predicated by the British Army‟s heavy reliance on motor transport, which made the withdrawal of long convoys vulnerable to 360 Farrell, 137-138. WO 172/38 Appendix 1. 362 WO 172/127; CAB 106/192; WO 172/38 Appendix 5. 363 Smith, 317-318. 361 90 enemy bombing.364 However, Painter underestimated the speed of the advancing Japanese troops, who were typically well-trained to fight at night, unlike British Empire troops. At dusk, when troops of the leading 2/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles were boarding their motor transports, Japanese mortars shelled the northwestern side of the perimeter. Just when its last vehicles left the airfield, the Japanese mounted an attack on the northern and western perimeter. In the desperate close quarter fighting, the rest of the brigade managed to fight its way through the closing Japanese pincers and withdrew safely through Gambang - except the 2/12th Frontier Force, completely surrounded by superior enemy forces. It had to run a gauntlet, and suffered accordingly.365 Painter‟s main force pulled out just in the nick of time. Had Percival, Barstow or Painter delayed the withdrawal from the airfield for even a while more, the 22nd Indian Brigade, heavily laden with transports, would be trapped and forced to fight its way out on foot with little chance to escape.366 Senior British commanders habitually underestimated the tempo by which the IJA conducted warfare, as the British Army habitually waged slow tempo battle. Unfortunately, the IJA operated according to a different system. The Japanese were probably kept busy by the sacrificial rearguard action of the 2/12th Frontier Force and so could not pursue closely. Thus, the bulk of the brigade withdrew to safety but at the sacrifice of half a battalion. This could have been avoided had Percival and Barstow allowed the brigade to withdraw earlier and Painter carefully “leapfrogged” the units through one another, covered by artillery fire. By contrast, Nasu and his battalion and company commanders were clear about their mission and recognized the importance of proper coordination, speed and flexibility. The differences between the two military systems were yet again demonstrated. 364 Heath Papers LMH4. WO 172/127; CAB 106/192; WO 172/18 Appendices T21 & X20; WO 172/38; Percival, Despatch. 366 WO 172/127; CAB 106/192. 365 91 CHAPTER 7: THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE GREEK, CRETE AND BURMA CAMPAIGNS 1941-1942 In the previous three chapters, we examined battles from the Malayan Campaign to analyse how institutional forces influenced their course and outcome. If the British military system indeed caused the British tactical defeat in Malaya, then the string of British tactical defeats elsewhere in the world should also be due to the influences and impact of this system. Thus, this chapter will focus on various aspects of the Greek Campaign of 1941 and the Burma Campaign 1941-1942 to examine how institutional forces shaped the course and outcome of the battles in Greece, Crete and Burma. Greece, 6th -30th April 1941 The Greek Campaign was particularly relevant to Malaya as it was also fought on a peninsula and an island not particularly conducive to mechanised forces, barely seven months before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Moreover, it pitted the British Army against the German Army, whose military system influenced the IJA. There were thus many similarities between them. First, German staff planning for the Greek campaign was typically thorough and meticulous as evidenced by the divisional composition of 12th Army‟s three corps. Two of its three corps had at least a tank and an infantry division each, while 18th Corps even had two mountain divisions to maneuver in the central mountain ranges of Greece.367 Second, the German Army favoured the “mission” command system, which helped them overcome command and control difficulties over great distances in the rough Greek mountains, where signal communications were poor.368 Third, German tactical doctrines emphasized combined arms cooperation, encounter battles and encirclement attacks. Fourth, German military training was realistic and rigorous, achieved through systematic battle-drill training and exercises from sub- 367 The 18th and the 40th Corps. Playfair, 84, 85; US Army, 81, 114; Gavin Long, Greece, Crete and Syria (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1953), 50. 368 US Army, 114. 92 unit to formation levels.369 Fifth, the pack mules and horse transports of German mountain and infantry units, respectively, gave them greater off-road mobility in the Greek mountains. Finally, most German divisions had a wealth of experience through campaigning in France and Norway the previous year.370 Circumstantial factors that handicapped “W” Force‟s defence of Greece were similar to those facing Malaya Command. It had to fight without air support as the RAF was heavily outnumbered by the combined German and Italian air forces. This negated the RN‟s superiority in the Mediterranean, severely demoralised the British Empire troops while disrupting troop movements.371 “W” Force was also not given time to acclimatise and train to fight in mountain warfare, a requirement the Germans themselves understood.372 The fact that it had to perform a series of delaying mission deprived its troops of rest and lowered morale, due to the need to prepare defences and then being asked to retreat for no apparent reason, only to repeat the whole cycle again.373 However, Lieutenant-General Maitland Wilson, GOC “W” Force, had accurate access to the order of battle of the German Army and their intentions through ULTRA, a system which allowed British code-breakers to tap into many German Army code messages. 374 Moreover, Greece‟s mountainous terrain, like Malaya‟s jungle terrain, seemed to favour defence and handicapped the movement and use of German mechanised troops, the main component of their all-conquering “blitzkrieg” tactics.375 Instead, it placed the British Empire troops at a tactical disadvantage against German infantry and mountain troops, and the former could only hold on in Greece for a mere three weeks.376 369 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 174. US Army, 118. 371 Playfair, 81. 372 Long, 65; US Army, 114. 373 Playfair, 84. 374 Callahan, 43; Fraser, 136. 375 West Point, 94; US Army, 77. 376 Playfair, 84. 370 93 As in Malaya, the British Empire forces displayed symptoms and influences of the British military system which hampered their ability to defend mainland Greece more effectively. First, there was no unified command over the three services. 377 Second, “W” Force used the “autocratic” command system, which made command and control difficult in the mountains of Greece, where signal communications were poor. 378 Third, its training was geared towards motorised warfare in open terrain, rather than mountain warfare, and was neither realistic nor rigorous enough. As the Germans observed, patrolling, counter-patrolling, fire discipline, night operations and off-road flanking maneuvers were consequently neglected.379 Fifth, “W” Force‟s units were so heavily motorized they were overly dependent on the few roads in the Greek mountains, which made them vulnerable to traffic jams and enemy air attacks. 380 Sixth, “W” Force units were multi-national in composition, had never trained together in peacetime and were uneven in experience.381 Finally, British Empire field commanders used cautious set-piece linear defence tactics and were typically so conscious about the safety of their flanks, rear and lines of communication that they became “retreat-minded”. Wilson‟s operational plan for defending mainland Greece was conservatively based on a series of thin linear defences across great distances, susceptible to enemy outflanking attempts – the seventy-mile long Aliakmon-Vermion Line, the Olympus-Servia Line and the thirty-mile long Thermopylae Line. In each case, he withdrew prematurely without counterattacking the Germans or seriously engaging them. 382 A rearguard action that illustrated these problematic British characteristics was the fighting withdrawal of Mackay Force‟s, 19th Australian Brigade Group under Brigadier Alan Vasey, from Vevi on 12th -13th April. In conformity with British doctrine, Major-General Ivan 377 Playfair, 151, US Army, 118 & Long, 44 & 77 Playfair, 84. 379 US Army, 114. 380 Playfair, 77, 78, 91, 92. 381 Only the hardy 6th Australian (AIF) Division had combat experience in North Africa while the 2 nd New Zealand (NZ) Division and the newly formed British 1 st Armoured Brigade had never seen action before. Two Greek regiments were also placed under “W” Force. Playfair, 76, 78-80, 88; US Army, 118. 382 Fraser, 134; US Army, 77; Playfair, 77-81, 86, 87, 89, 95; Dewar, 171; Long, 80, 93, 195; Westpoint, 94, 95. 378 94 Mackay dispersed the brigade group‟s four battalions along a front of ten miles, which was far too long and extended. It would have been better for Mackay to allow Vasey to deploy his brigade according to the ground, but this was unthinkable given the British preference for autocratic command.383 As a result, Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell, CO 2/8th AIF, had to deploy its four companies in a thin line along a ridge to the right for some two thousand and five hundred yards, which made it easier for the Germans to threaten both flanks of the battalion.384 The British army‟s reliance on autocratic command system proved nearly disastrous. When the signal wires with brigade HQ and some of his companies were cut at 1630 hours on the 12th Mitchell insisted on meeting his company commanders to brief them on the withdrawal plan. Thus, when German tanks and infantry were scaling the slopes and making an all-out attack on the entire battalion front, the companies were left leaderless. Individual men and subalterns withdrew with much difficulty by abandoning heavy equipment and weapons. Meanwhile, the breakdown in signal communications meant that the 2/4th AIF did not receive Vasey‟s order to withdraw. Lacking the initiative to do so, its withdrawal was delayed until the enemy was already attacking.385 The battalion and company commanders of the two AIF battalions also lacked initiative and remained passive when they should have counterattacked. Following the retreat of the 1 st Rangers, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler SS Mechanised Regiment focused on occupying the abandoned valley and did not make any serious attempt to dislodge the 2/8th AIF on the right. All this while, its two right-most companies were not attacked but, inexplicably, sat tight without counterattacking the Germans below them. Instead, Mitchell merely reinforced his left flank with a platoon from the right. It was only at 1400 hours that Mitchell led a limited counterattack to regain some vacated high ground lost to the Germans, between the two left-most Australian 383 Long, 58, 59; Playfair, 86. Playfair, 87; US Army, 91; Long, 59-62, 71. 385 Long, 60-62, 71; US Army, 91. 384 95 companies. Similarly, the 2/4th battalion had been sitting tight all day despite being unengaged instead of “marching to the guns”.386 Vasey displayed the usual preference for British senior commanders to stay in their HQs and became out of touch with developments. By 1500 hours, the retreat of the1st Rangers two miles to the rear created a gap between it and the two Australian battalions on the high ground to its left and right. According to Long, the 19th Australian Brigade HQ seemed unaware of the critical situation all this while. Vasey should have intervened by now to order both Australian battalions to counterattack downhill in a pincer attack towards the Germans in their centre. Failing this, he should have ordered both battalions to withdraw. Instead, he did not venture out of his HQ to discover what was going on and so did nothing.387 The inactivity of British field commanders, coupled with the typical British Army‟s lack of training in combined arms understanding, led to the Germans capturing five anti-tank guns in the valley, which was devoid of friendly infantry troops. The lack of cohesion and understanding between the two units from two nationalities was also evident. According to Long, the 1st Rangers began withdrawing from the valley by 1100 hours, as they mistakenly thought the 2/8th AIF had been overwhelmed. This exposed the left flank of the latter which forced Mitchell to pull back his two left-most companies 150 yards to refuse it. 388 The withdrawal at Vevi was too premature and unnecessary losses were suffered due to the faults of the British military system. Three field guns and sixteen anti-tank guns were lost in addition to the many soldiers cut off from their units in the withdrawal.389 To the dismay of British Empire senior commanders, the mountains of Greece, like the jungles of Malaya, proved most conducive to German offensive tactics based on a combination of bold and rapid armour thrusts down the roads and flanking infantry attacks across country, 386 Playfair, 87; US Army, 91; Long, 59-62, 71. Long, 60-62, 71; US Army, 91. 388 Playfair, 87; US Army, 91; Long, 59-60, 71. 389 Long, 64. 387 96 supported by tactical airpower, as demonstrated at the Battle of Pinios Gorge on the 18th of April.390 A panel of West Point military historians commented: „As had been the case in France, they [Germans] made aggressive thrusts with armoured columns under commanders who stayed well forward. They exploited every advantage rapidly and with little regard for flank security.‟391 By contrast, “W” Force seemed unable to react to the fast tempo German attacks other than to sit tight and defend in isolated companies. Insufficient active fighting patrols were sent to gather information about the enemy‟s strength and to disrupt his preparations for attack. Instead static observations on high ground by day provided limited information and insufficient warning of an enemy attack.392 Crete, 20th-30th May 1941 If the campaign on mainland Greece bore similarities with the campaign on the Malay Peninsula, the Crete Campaign also had many commonalities with the Malayan Campaign. First, Wavell neglected to order the construction of fixed defences and communication lines on Crete in the six months after November 1940 while there was time to do so. In addition, he also failed to order the destruction of the island‟s three airfields when the RAF departed three days before the invasion.393 Second, there was again no unified command of all services.394 Third, Freyberg, C-inC “Creforce”, displayed typical British caution despite having a significant strategic intelligence advantage over the Germans through the use of ULTRA and the fortuitous discovery of a map case containing their plans and orders for the invasion in a crashed German plane.395 Not entirely trusting the intelligence he obtained Freyberg prepared the defences of Crete for both airborne as well as seaborne attack – he split “Creforce” into five equal battlegroups around the three 390 Westpoint, 96; US Army, 112-114; For a good read of this battle, see Long, 96, 97, 106-127. Westpoint, 96. 392 US Army, 114. 393 Fraser, 139; Westpoint, 96, 97; Peter Antil, Crete 1941, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 88; Long, 316; Callum Macdonald, The Lost Battle: Crete 1941 (London: Macmillan Publishers Limited, 1993), 299; I. McD. G., Stewart, The Struggle for Crete 20 May – 1 July 1941, (London: Oxford University press, 1966), 478, 479. 394 US Army, 142; Stewart, 480. 395 Callahan, 51; Antill, 36, 88; Ian Sumner, British Commanders of World War II, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003), 20; Westpoint, 97; Fraser, 140, 143. 391 97 airfields on the island at Maleme, Retimo and Heraklion, Canea and Suda Bay Anchorage. Each battlegroup was effectively isolated and unable to support one another due to the lack of motor transport and roads on the island. Moreover, Freyberg also spread out the elements of each battlegroup thinly to cover the coast as well as the airfields, not understanding that the three airfields were the key objectives of the enemy. 396 Finally, although “Creforce” had numerical superiority over the Germans, they were an assortment of hastily collected formations that had little collective cohesion and lacked heavy equipment and transport, lost on mainland Greece. Their worst shortage was in wireless signal equipment.397 By contrast, the Germans had a unified command under General Kurt Student, who commanded all land and air troops. Although outnumbered two to one, they were made up entirely of well-trained and experienced elite formations. 398 These formations were rapid deployment forces and lacked heavy equipment, especially after the sinking of a convoy carrying some tanks and field artillery. Fortunately, for the Germans, the Luftwaffe had complete superiority of the air as the island was out of range of British warplanes from the airfields of North Africa and the Middle East. This restricted the RN‟s supremacy over the Mediterranean Sea to the hours of darkness. It also allowed the Germans to utilize air reconnaissance and tactical air support, which compensated for their lack of artillery.399 The German Army‟s patent “mission command” system proved to be its “saving grace” in Crete. It helped to overcome the command and control problems of coordinating the chaotic actions of many scattered small groups of lightly-armed troops.400 396 Fraser, 141; Westpoint, 98; Antill, 34, 35, Macdonald, 300; Antony Beevor, Crete: The Battle and the Resistance (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 155, 229; Playfair, 126, 127; US Army, 123. 397 Antil, 24-29, 93; Fraser, 141, 142; Westpoint, 97, 101; Stewart, 481; Playfair, 123. 398 The 7th Air Division, an Airlanding Regiment of glider troops and the 5 th Mountain Division (augmented to three regiments). 399 Antil, 24, 29-31, 93; Fraser, 142-143; Westpoint, 97; Stewart, 484; Playfair, 129; US Army, 121, 124, 141-142. 400 Antill, 87; Stewart, 484. 98 Our focus is the Battle of Maleme Airfield on 21st-22nd May, as it decided the outcome of the entire Crete Campaign. This sector was defended by the 5th NZ Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Hargest.401 In the first two days of the airborne assault on Crete, the Germans came close to failure everywhere on the island due to their intelligence failure, which could not account for the strength and disposition of Creforce, Student‟s insistence to conduct airdrops on Maleme, Canea, Retimo and Heraklion rather than concentrating on one, and the German tactics of dropping containers of heavy weaponry which were often separated from the paratroopers. 402 However, they had a better military system than that of the British and this was sufficient to wrench victory from the jaws of defeat. Hargest and Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew, CO 22nd NZ Battalion displayed typical British caution rather than dynamism. The German Airlanding Regiment landed with heavy casualties around the airfield and Hill 107. After a failed counterattack by C Company 22 nd NZ Battalion with two tanks, Hargest refused to launch a coordinated counterattack with the 21 st and the 23rd NZ battalions in the evening, when requested by Andrew, as he imagined them to be heavily engaged. Andrew displayed “retreat mentality” caused by pessimism over the fate of his subunits, which he lost touch with, and over-concern for the integrity of supply lines. Neglecting to send out patrols to locate them and discover their true strength, he withdrew from the airfield and the hill, convinced this was necessary to save his battalion. Similar to British commanders in Malaya, Hargest, Andrew and Freyberg only considered their own difficulties without considering that the enemy might be in similar or even worse predicament. The British Army‟s autocratic command system made the 22nd NZ‟s companies sit tight instead of attacking when communications was lost. Moreover, Hargest and Andrew lost touch with the battle as they typically set up HQ a little distance from the front and miss the chance to counterattack.403 401 Westpoint, 96, 97. Fraser, 143; Westpoint, 97; Antill, 32-34, 87; Stewart, 480; US Army, 126, 127, 143, 145. 403 Westpoint, 97, 98; Fraser, 144; Antill; 37-41, 45, 57-59; Stewart, 481, 484; Playfair, 131-133. 402 99 The German airborne troops, by contrast, never lost their aggressive and opportunistic instinct even when split up into many small detachments and had many of their field commanders killed. Junior officers were familiar with their immediate superior‟s plans and objectives. They simply rose to the occasion and used their initiative to carry them out. Moreover, German commanders, often set up their HQ near the front and so were intimately acquainted with the course of the battle. It was their senior medical officer who led the capture of Hill 107, after virtually all their officers became casualties.404 Despite gaining a foothold on Maleme Airfield and occupying Hill 107 on the morning of the 21st, the surviving German airborne troops were still in dire straits. They had only two thousand tired and unsupplied troops as opposed to seven thousand New Zealand troops in the vicinity, and were nowhere near being reinforced. Yet Hargest, Brigadier Puttick, GOC 2nd New Zealand Division, and Freyberg did not order a counterattack by all available troops of their commands, partially due to fears of an enemy coastal landing. The difference between British sluggishness and caution and German haste and boldness was demonstrated again the next day. Student reinforced his beleaguered troops at Maleme Airfield with two companies of paratroopers and two mountain battalions, which helped to secure the airfield by 1700 hours. Freyberg finally ordered a night counterattack that evening with the 5 th Brigade‟s reserve battalion – the 28th (Maoris), the 20th Battalion of the 4th Brigade and a troop of three tanks. However, 20th Battalion reached the startline only in the early morning on the 22 nd, as Freyberg insisted it had to be first relieved by an Australian battalion along the coast, in case of an enemy seaborne landing. By then, the Germans had consolidated their positions and were reinforced and resupplied. Unsurprisingly then, the counterattack by too small a force failed amidst heavy bombing by the Luftwaffe by late afternoon. Freyberg finally planned to send in the other two battalions of the 4th NZ Brigade to retake the airfield that night, supported by 5th NZ Brigade. However, Puttick heard exaggerated reports of German infiltration through Prison Valley towards 404 Antill, 59, 88; Stewart, 481, 482, 484; Beevor, 127, 128. 100 Galatas on the coastal road. As this threatened to cut off 5th NZ Brigade‟s supply and communication route, he decided to withdraw and concentrate the division at Canea. Freyberg agreed with him and commenced withdrawal in the early hours of the 23rd just when the Germans, reinforced by two battalions of mountain troops by air in the afternoon, were beginning to advance eastwards towards Platanias.405 At this point the campaign was essentially lost, despite the fact that the Germans failed to capture any of the other airfields and were hanging on precariously in the other sectors.406 In the Crete Campaign, the Germans suffered six thousand and five hundred casualties (half of whom missing or dead), compared with the British losses of three thousand and five hundred (half of whom missing or dead) and twelve thousand men captured. The heavy losses made Hitler ban the use of major airborne operations for the rest of the war.407 More could have been achieved, however, as “Creforce” could have annihilated the enemy had it launched, in Stewart‟s words, a „swifter and stronger counterattack on the 20th or 21st.‟408 Macdonald put it down to the „First World War mentality of the officers involved,‟ who were familiar with positional rather than mobile warfare, and reported Freyberg‟ later regretted not putting younger senior commanders, who were physically and mentally fitter, in charge of the division.409 While acknowledging that Freyberg should have pushed Puttick to counterattack according to his plan rather than simply trusting the judgement of his subordinates, Callahan and Stewart rightly attributed the defeat to a failure of the whole system from Freyberg down to battalion commanders.410 D.M. Davin, the official New Zealand historian of Crete, wrote „The conclusion is inevitable that he [Freyberg] began with a battle plan which gave his battalion commanders too 405 Callahan. 52, 252, 253; Antill, 57; Westpoint, 98, 100; Antill, 60, 62-65; Macdonald, 202, 203, 229, 230; Stewart, 481-482; Beevor, 155; Playfair, 134, 135; 140, 141; Fraser, 144-146. 406 Fraser, 144-146; Westpoint, 98, 100; Playfair, 140-141. 407 Antill, 87; Playfair, 147. 408 Beevor, 231; Stewart, 481; Long, 317; However, Long felt that this would only “have prolonged the resistance” but not decided the ultimate outcome. 409 Macdonald, 202, 203. 410 Callahan, 252, 253; Stewart, 480-483. A verdict agreed by Beevor, 155; Antill, 88; Macdonald, 203, 300. 101 much choice of role with too little guidance on which roles were prior and that in the battle he failed to give his commanders firm direction.‟411 British military historian Sir David Fraser hit the nail on the head when he reflected that: „the chaos and disorganizations of the [British] retreat through Cyrenaica were African versions of the early disasters in Norway. The Germans had appeared to be everywhere and everywhere prevailed. They were better equipped, better led, more boldly and intelligently handled and had been masters of the field … By contrast the British High Command appeared indecisive and amateur. All could see that the balance of armoured strength and anti-tank guns had given the British little chance. But this was happening at the same time too in Greece and Crete … It was too habitual.‟412 Raymond Callahan noted that a „fair commentary‟ on Crete would be that, just like in Norway, the British had “an army over-deliberate, slow…‟413 In the Greek Campaign as in the Malayan, Norwegian and North African campaigns, institutional forces were responsible for the string of British tactical disasters from 1940 to 1942. Burma, 8th December 1941 – 30th May 1942 The Japanese invasion of Burma in 1941-1942 had the same ingredients for disaster as the Malayan Campaign. Burma suffered from the same pre-war neglect and was given even lower priority in defence than Singapore. Greatly outnumbered, the RAF was unable to prevent Japanese warplanes from dominating the Burmese skies, harassing and interdicting British supply lines and giving support to the IJA at will. In the face of enemy air supremacy, the RN could not prevent the enemy from carrying out amphibious landings.414 Moreover, with the exception of the dry, open, rice-cultivated central plains, the terrain of Burma was very much like that of Malaya – plantations, mountains and jungles in the interior, mangrove swamps along the coast with few metalled roads and large settlements. These hampered signal communications and firepower, 411 D. M. Davin, Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-1945: Crete (Wellington: War History Branch, 1952), 138. 412 Fraser, 154. 413 Callan, 52. 414 Ian Lyall Grant & Kazuo Tamayama, Burma 1942: The Japanese Invasion (Chichester, West Sussex: The Zampi Press, 1999), pp. 327, 329, 330, 345, 350-358. 102 while favouring the infantry arm. Like Malaya, Burma also had a hot and humid climate but with a different annual wet monsoon period, from late May to October. The course and outcome of the Japanese invasion of Burma was set and decided from 8th December 1941, when the IJA commenced its invasion, to 7th March 1942, when the British Army abandoned Rangoon, the capital. After heavy losses suffered during the withdrawal across the Sittang River, which made Rangoon untenable, Burma Command‟s mission essentially changed to that of a fighting withdrawal to delay the enemy‟s occupation of upper Burma, until it reached eastern India by the end of May.415 This thesis will only focus on the first phase of the Japanese invasion of Burma. The Japanese 15th Army, tasked with the conquest of Burma, was not very far behind the 25th Army in combat readiness. General Shojiro Iida, its GOC, like Yamashita, was renowned for being a meticulous, brilliant and dynamic commander. His 33rd Division, although a relatively new formation, had at least seen combat experience and realistic field training in China for over two years. It was typically led by well-trained and experienced senior commanders who were all subsequently promoted after the conquest of Burma. The 55th Division was a newly raised inexperienced formation but had the benefit of typically thorough and realistic field training. The two divisions were well-equipped with light artillery pieces and mortars and a combination of motor and animal transport, which allowed them to move across country easily.416 By contrast, the combat readiness of Burma Command mirrored that of Malaya Command. It was made up of two newly formed and inexperienced divisions – the 1st Burma and the 17th Indian. Lieutenant-General Thomas Hutton, a rather conservative staff officer, had no experience of recent command. Both his predecessor and him did not give any directive on training in jungle warfare and also failed to impose any centralized training system. Morever, Hutton was overstretched, having to assume the roles of theatre and corps commander. His two 415 416 Moreman, 42. Grant & Tamayama, 371-377; Rottman, Japanese Army in World War II, 16, 17, 332-338. 103 divisional commanders were also inexperienced and inadequately trained for their command. Their use of “autocratic command” system slowed down decision-making. Both divisions were made up of improvised brigades with no collective training, which after having been heavily “milked” were left with a large proportion of inexperienced and ill-trained Indian and Burmese recruits and some British regulars, who had little effective training in anything other than static and motorised warfare. They were also typically well-supplied with motor transport but short of artillery and heavy weapons, which proved to be a serious handicap as British Army tactical doctrines emphasised firepower to compensate for the weaknesses of the infantry.417 Wavell and Hutton decided to use the same operational strategy as Brooke-Popham and Percival in Malaya – delay the Japanese as far away as possible from Rangoon so as to deny them use of the three key airfields, which would allow them to threaten British troopships bringing reinforcements to Burma through the capital. 418 Thus, Major-General John Smyth, GOC 17th Indian Division, was also forced to hold indefensible ground over a large area with too few troops. Both Hutton and Smyth typically placed faith in the linear defence of successive rivers such as the Salween and the Sittang. 419 The result was predictable – the thin, widely dispersed linear positions were easily outflanked by Japanese units moving through the jungles or along rivers to form roadblocks, cutting off the supply and communication lines of the defenders. The rout of the 16th Indian Brigade under Brigadier Hugh Jones at Kawkareik from 20-22 January 1942 by two regiments of the Japanese 55th Division, in an encounter battle, was a good example of the mismatch in tactics of the opposing sides. Kawkareik set the trend for the first stage of the Burma Campaign very much like Jitra did for the Malayan Campaign. Jones, with Smyth‟s approval, erroneously made his battalion commanders spread their companies to cover 417 Grant & Tamayama, 360-368; Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan Volume II: India’s Most Dangerous Hour, (London: HMSO, 1958), 74, 93, 94; Latimer, 46, 55; Graham Dunlop, “British Tactical Command and Leadership in the Burma Campaign 1941-1945” in Brian & Tachigawa (eds.), 90, 91; Jeffreys, The British Army in the Far East 1941-45, 43, 52, 340-344. 418 Lyman, 105, 106; Kirby,ibid, pp. 26-27 & Grant & Tamayama, p. 346. 419 Lyman, 110, 111; Kirby, ibid, 74; Latimer, 48; Grant & Tamayama, 346. 104 all tracks, which gave little depth in defence. This was despite there being no wireless set, while the units were too far apart for sufficient cables to be laid. Consequently, the brigade had to rely on civilian telephone lines instead, to the detriment of signal communications. Unsurprisingly, two battalions of the 112th Regiment of the Japanese 55th Division overran the isolated company of the 1/7th Gurkhas on the main trunk road, on the 20th of February. To the south, on the Palu track, the Japanese 55th Reconnaissance Regiment dispersed the lone company of the 1/9th Jats, which uncovered the right flank of the 16th Indian Brigade. Many companies, though not seriously engaged, became jittery when Japanese patrols and snipers infiltrated their positions. They wasted ammunition firing at real or imagined enemies in the dark, which only revealed their positions. Jones, responded by sending a reserve company of the 1/9th Jats to cover each of the two tracks that branched out of the Palu track at Kwingale. This piecemeal effort was totally insufficient and the reserve company at Myohaung was overwhelmed by the enemy the following morning. Even though his brigade positions on the main trunk road were still intact, Jones feared that his isolated companies would soon be enveloped between the two enemy forces. He ordered a disorganised retreat on the evening of the 21st, which led to much loss of morale, as there were several friendly fire incidents in the dark by inexperienced troops who had never trained in night operations and never worked with each other previously.420 If Kawkareik resembled Jitra, then the battle of the Bilin River, the first set-piece battle between the two armies in Burma, resembled Kampar. Hutton asked that Smyth delay the Japanese for as long as possible along the Bilin River, which was fordable at many points. By the 16th of February, Smyth placed his three brigades in depth from the Bilin River northwestwards to the Sittang River Bridge (which was held by 2nd Burma Brigade) over a distance of thirty miles to counter the usual enemy encirclement tactics – 16th Indian Brigade along the Bilin, 48th Indian Brigade several miles in reserve behind the Thebyu River, and the 46th Indian Brigade much further back at Kyaikto. However, Smyth placed his three brigades too far apart, which gave Iida 420 Lyman, 115, 116, Kirby, ibid, 28, 29; Grant & Tamayam, 62-69. 105 the chance to concentrate his two divisions to defeat the British brigades in detail. Everything depended on how swiftly Smyth could bring up his reserves to counterattack the expected Japanese penetrations in the gaps of the leading 16th Indian Brigade‟s overextended fifteen-mile positions along the Bilin River, from Yinon to Bilin.421 On the 16th, the 16th Indian Brigade had three battalions, from left to right, along the river with one in reserve. However, two battalions of the 214th Regiment of the Japanese 33rd Division were already across at Dayingon on the left flank of the brigade. Over the next three days, the 2 nd KOYLI, the 1/7th Gurkhas, the 1/4th Gurkhas of the 48th Indian Brigade and even the 4/12th Frontier Force of the 46th Indian Brigade fought to eliminate, or at least contain, the Japanese bridgehead on the west bank of the Bilin, which had now been reinforced by a third battalion in a roadblock position. At the same time, a battalion of the 215th Regiment of the Japanese 33rd Division was locked in a similar struggle with the 16th Indian Brigade‟s 8th Burma Rifles and the 1/9th Jats and the 2/5th Gurkhas from the 48th Indian Brigade. By the 18th, stalemate ensued on all fronts but the 215th Regiment still had two battalions in reserve on the east bank of the Bilin, while the British had none in the vicinity. More important, the Japanese 55 th Division performed the same kind of coastal outflanking maneuver which had unhinged the tough British defence at Kampar. Its 143rd Regiment crossed the Bilin to the south and landed at Zokali, some six miles behind the British lines. British failure to contain the enemy‟s coastal landing forced Smyth to begin withdrawal to the Sittang on the 19th.422 Although Smyth‟s division fought better than previously, his brigades and battalions reacted slower than the enemy and were often defensive-minded. On the British right flank, the British had a Japanese battalion in between the 8th Burma Rifles and the 1/9th Jats, with the 2/5th Gurkhas reinforcing them by the 18th. Brigadier Hugh-Jones, commanding the 48th Indian Brigade should have aggressively launched a three prong counterattack with all three battalions to “pinch” 421 422 Kirby, 59-60; Grant & Tamayam, 96-98. Kirby, ibid, 60-64, 444; Moreman, 39, 40. 106 out this Japanese bridgehead on the 18th, rather than containing it with the Gurkha battalion while the other two sat tight. However, it could be argued that the 1/9th Jats and the 8th Burma Rifles were too raw and inexperienced. They were involved in “friendly fire” incidents and suffered loss of morale through enemy “jitter” parties.423 Smyth made the same mistake of using his reserves in driblets, similar to senior British commanders in Malaya. He wasted the raw 5/17th Dogras as outpost which only resulted in their being defeated in detail on the 17th, as was the case at Changlun and Asun. At least he dispatched them in complete battalions rather than in companies, like Murray-Lyon at Jitra and Paris at Kampar. Still, he should have sent the entire reserve 48th Indian Brigade to eliminate the Japanese bridgehead on the left, before shifting them south to counter the Japanese coastal “hook”. However, that was unthinkable in a British Army accustomed to cautious and ponderous maneuvers and counterattacks. By committing his reserves in battalions instead of brigades, Smyth had to artificially divide the Bilin Line into two sectors on the second day of the battle the 16th Indian Brigade on the left and the 48th Indian Brigade on the right, as there were now six battalions. Each of the two brigades now controlled only one of its original battalions, which hampered collective cohesion.424 The sustained four-day failed action at Bilin Line delayed the 17th Indian Division‟s withdrawal which partially contributed to the premature blowing of the Sittang River bridge on the 23rd of February.425 This was the most significant disaster that befell the British in Burma in 1942, as two-thirds of the 17th Indian Division was left on the hostile side of the river. Counting the stragglers who had to abandon their motor transports, heavy weaponry and equipment to cross the Sittang, the division mustered only three thousand and five hundred men, not enough to hold Rangoon. This made Hutton decide that Rangoon had to be abandoned. However, the physically unwell Smyth displayed the British trait of excessive caution by organising a typical staff college 423 Lyman, 128. Grant & Tamayama, 102. 425 Lyman, 127-129. 424 107 methodical and controlled withdrawal back to the Sittang. Thus, he did not urge his tired division to withdraw with full speed, but instead allowed them to rest and obtain water on the 20 th-21st. This allowed the partially motorized Japanese 33rd Division to reach the bridge first, despite having to move across poor country tracks, while the fully-motorised 17th Indian Division had the advantage of using the only all-weather road.426 However, Smyth‟s subordinates were not blameless either. In the absence of Smyth‟s direction and leadership, the brigade and battalion commanders did not grasp the need for haste and did not take the initiative to push their men on. This reflected the British Army‟s autocratic command system and the typically luxurious time given to British officers to make decisions in their peacetime TEWTs and exercises, which proved inadequate in fast tempo warfare. Given the IJA‟s mission command system and its emphasis on speed and realism during training, it is hard to imagine Japanese field commanders allowing their regiments and battalions to stay immobile for a day, even if their divisional commander was inactive due to ill-health. That was a key difference between the two military systems in the early war years. 426 Lyman, 130, 131; Latimer, 58-60; Grant & Tamayama, 110-116; Kirby, ibid, 72, 73, 77. 108 CONCLUSION This thesis argues that institutional forces, in the form of the British military system, were more responsible for the British tactical disaster in the Malayan Campaign than personalities and circumstances. In chapters 2 and 3, we examined the differences in the British and Japanese military systems in terms of their ethos, C3I, doctrine, training, organisation, equipment and morale. In chapters 4, 5 and 6, we examined how the differences in the two opposing military systems interacted with circumstances and personalities shape the course and outcome of six crucial Malayan battles from three different tactical missions – defensive, counteroffensive and delay. In Chapter 7, we examined how the same British system fared poorly against two superior enemies – the German Army in the Greek Campaign and the IJA in the Burma Campaign - which suggested that the British tactical defeat in Malaya was systemic. As noted by Warren, the British Army‟s defeat in Malaya was not an “isolated occurrence.”427 It was part of what Farrell called „the great wave of defeats that exposed the weaknesses of the British Empire‟s military system [which] ran from Norway in spring 1940 to Burma in spring 1942.‟428 Finally, this concluding chapter will glance at the later stages of the Burma Campaign. It examines how changes in the British military system in 1943 essentially transformed the combat effectiveness and performance of the British Indian Army. In 1942-1943, the inferior British military system was the main cause of the Indian Army‟s expulsion from Burma and tactical defeat in the First Arakan Campaign by the IJA. However, unlike in Singapore, the defeated Indian Army was able to retreat to India in both instances, where it was given a chance to prepare for a rematch. By 1944, the transformation of the British system led to the same Indian Army surpassing the IJA, whose military system remained stagnant after the outbreak of the Pacific War. The effects of this “wind of change” were first demonstrated in the two Chindit operations, 427 428 Warren, 292, 293. Farrell, 405. 109 the 2nd Arakan and the Kohima and Imphal campaigns in 1943-1944, and confirmed in the reconquest of Burma at Meiktila and Mandalay in 1945. After the successful “longest retreat” into India, Wavell, now GOC India Command, commissioned an inquiry to gather reports from escaped senior officers from Singapore and Burma. 429 Circumstances and personalities aside, the reasons for the British Army‟s tactical defeat in Burma were essentially similar to those for its tactical defeat in Malaya. They included lack of intelligence about the enemy, lack of training and preparation in jungle warfare, over motorization of units, unsuitable linear defensive tactics, lack of morale, experience and ruggedness in troops, amongst others. 430 That pointed to a common origin, a flawed military system. Notwithstanding its ethno-centric report, a rather accurate evaluation of the early war British Army and system was reported by the Japanese 15th Army HQ in Burma: The British forces were superior in weapon, tanks, artillery and vehicles but their fighting spirit was inferior. They did not carry out aggressive actions and were lazy in digging trenches and positions. They were excellent at concentrating artillery, mortar and machine gun fire on the front line but were not good at jungle fighting. Commanders did not control their units well and co-ordination between units was poor.431 Out of Wavell‟s commission came a new jungle warfare school for the 14th Indian Division at Comilla in June 1942 (later absorbed into at Sevoke set up by GHQ India in February 1943), a jungle warfare training centre at Raiwala Bara in December 1942, and increased emphasis on jungle warfare in the syllabus of the Officer Training School at Bangalore and the Tactical School at Poona. A training manual, “Military Training Pamphlet No. 9: Notes on Forest Warfare” was also issued by GHQ India Command in August 1942. Besides noting down the many shortcomings of the British Army in the Malayan and Burma campaigns and incorporating a section on Japanese tactics, this useful manual emphasised aggressive patrols, ambushes, encirclements and defensive “boxes” (a concept already used in North Africa) when on the 429 Moreman, 50-54. Moreman, 53; WO 106/2579B “Report by Major Thomas” for General Archibald Wavell. 431 “Lessons learnt from the Burma Operation,” HQ Japanese 15th Army, August 1942, as quoted in Grant & Tamayama, 328, 329. 430 110 defense.432 Wavell also authorized the reorganization of two Indian divisions to “light” divisions and another five Indian divisions to “animal and transport” divisions in October 1942. Part of the scale of motor transports in these divisions was replaced by mules to carry supplies, heavy equipment and weaponry, allowed them to have better cross-country mobility. 433 These first important steps in rectifying the flaws of the Indian Army coincided with positive reforms within the British Army in the UK during the summer of 1942 to bring about a “wind of change” in the British military system, which would transform the British Army. However, despite these positive reforms, Wavell failed to centralize the training of all its formations and units, which partially led to the British Army‟s defeat in the First Arakan Campaign 1942-1943.434 Changes taking place in the British Army in the UK also affected the combat performance of the Indian Army. To improve the quality of potential officer cadets, the War Office Selection Board (WOSB) finally reformed the much criticized officer selection system. Following the German Army‟s (and IJA‟s) system a more realistic and meritocratic selection process consisting of a three-day interview, practical leadership tests and screening by psychologists was implemented in April. More distinguished NCOs were also selected to attend OCTUs.435 Similarly, a more effective selection procedure using aptitude and psychological tests was implemented to assign recruits to the various arms and services of the army. This led to more suitable recruits being assigned to the infantry arms than previously.436 These two reforms were introduced in India Command in June 1943, which allowed the Indian Army to have the necessary raw materials for jungle warfare - better leaders and better infantrymen.437 432 Jeffreys, 14, 39; Moreman, 56-60, 65, 95; Daniel Marstow, “Lost and Found” in Strachan (ed.), 88, 92, 93. 433 Jeffreys, 23; Moreman, 55-56; Marston, 84, 86; Marstow, “Lost and Found”, 89 434 Marstow, “Lost and Found”, 88; Daniel P. Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes – The Indian Army in the Burma Campaign (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 79, 80; Moreman, 58. 435 Crang, 21-39; French, 74. 436 Crang, French, 69-71. 437 Moreman, 91. 111 The quality of British Army officers was enhanced during the war as the trials of war weeded out unfit, incompetent and rigid officers and replaced them with more dynamic and capable ones, usually younger in age.438 This was especially important for India Command as the rigours of jungle warfare required fitter officers.439 The training of officers in the UK also became more realistic. Human management courses with role-plays were now taught to officers by psychologists to help them better understand their men in order to improve their welfare and better motivate them. Morale also improved with the narrowing of the gap between officers and men, as more ECOs came from the same working class background as the men.440 In addition, acting on the recommendation of the Infantry Committee commissioned by Wavell in June 1943 to re-evaluate the recent British Army‟s defeat in the Arakan Campaign, the Indian Army recruited more ethnic Indian officers, who understood Indian soldiers better. Although “Indianisation” of the officer corps had begun in the 1920s, this process had been slow with only 7.65% of the officer corps being native Indians in 1941.441 This trend was now reversed. Officer cadet training within India Command was also extended to five months, to allow British Army officers enough time to study the language and culture of their sepoys. Finally, the same Infantry Committee recommended that a more realistic jungle warfare training syllabus be commonly taught to officers and NCOs at the various jungle warfare training and tactical schools, which were now expanded to meet increasing demand.442 Learning from the failure of the First Arakan Offensive, General Claude Auchinleck, the new GOC India Command, appointed Major-General Reginald Savory as the inspector and director of infantry with authority to ensure that all infantry training in India Command was according to the official jungle warfare doctrine, exemplified in a new and updated fourth edition 438 Crang, 45-54. Dunlop “British Tactical Command and Leadership in the Burma Campaign 1941-1945”, 89. 440 Crang, 58-70; French, 74, 131, 132. 441 Sumner, 18; Perry, 99, 100; Barua, 53-55, 69, 70, 79, 80, 130. 442 Jeffreys, 15, 16, Moreman, 91; Dunlop “British Tactical Command and Leadership in the Burma Campaign 1941-1945”, 98, 99. 439 112 of “Military Training Pamphlet No. 9: The Jungle Book” of September 1943.443 The presentation of this jungle warfare manual was revolutionary as it included many photographs and cartoons to appeal to all unit officers and NCOs to read. The manual retained all the relevant content of previous manuals but had new lessons on taking out IJA bunkers, tank-infantry co-operation, common jungle “battle drills” for units to train their men, and also incorporated lessons learnt in the First Arakan Campaign and by the Leithbridge Mission of June 1943, which visited the Australian Army fighting the IJA in the jungles of the Southwest Pacific. It also emphasized the importance of night training, jungle craft, marksmanship, physical fitness and decentralized leadership in jungle warfare.444 The traditional British Army pre-occupation with logistics would not be changed due to the emphasis on firepower and technology to substitute for the country‟s lack of manpower, which was running dry by 1944. Instead, the RAF‟s regaining of air supremacy over Burma allowed the Indian Army to use air supply to augment existing supply arrangements, an idea first experimented by the First Chindit Operation. This allowed the Indian Army to counter the IJA‟s encirclement tactics with the combination of air supply and defensive boxes. 445 Following recommendations by the Leithbridge Mission, the standard divisional organization was also changed in June 1944 to standardise all previous experimental organisations. Henceforth, each division would have a “light infantry” battalion to provide better reconnaissance and patrols. The early war standard scale of one machine gun battalion and an anti-tank regiment per division was reintroduced, while one of the standard three field artillery regiments was replaced with a mountain artillery regiment. The partial animal and motor transport system of Indian divisions was retained.446 The setting up of the Indian Intelligence Corps in 1942 gave overdue official recognition to the importance of this neglected arm. Learning from the mistakes of Malaya, the 443 Callahan, 202; Moreman, 84-86; Jeffreys, 69. Jeffreys, 17, 18; Moreman, 104, 105; Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes,104-109. 445 Moreman, 78, 99; Marston “Lost and Found”, 90; Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes,107. 446 Jeffreys, 24; Marston, “Lost and Found”, 94. 444 113 Indian Army gathered better intelligence about the Japanese through the use of friendly indigenous people operating behind enemy lines in V Force, Z Force and Force 136.447 The training of the infantry arms took a big step forward in the summer of 1942, when the Director of Military Training enforced a common understanding of doctrine across the British Army in the UK and set up a School of Infantry to train infantrymen in common “battle drills”, like the German Army‟s (and IJA‟s) system. 448 This development was adopted by India Command following the recommendation of the Infantry Committee. In the summer of 1943, the system of “milking” was officially abolished while a very systematic, thorough and centralised training program was implemented to train units and formations for jungle warfare. Soldiers who passed out of basic infantry school (now extended to six months) would now be trained for two to three months in jungle warfare through one of two training divisions and, later, a training brigade, set up for this purpose. Upon completion, they would receive further training at reinforcement camps before being posted to units for a series of training from sub-unit training to higher formation, combined arms exercises which included battle inoculation under realistic conditions. Besides enhancing the jungle warfare combat techniques of the Indian Army, this reform ensured that units and formations had better collective cohesion.449 It is appropriate at this point, to pause to analyse the roots of the British Army‟s inability to fight a sustained high tempo jungle conflict in the first half of the war. No doubt this was due to the British Army‟s reliance on motor transport, field cables, their autocratic command system and failure to train officers, NCOs and men for independent thinking and initiative. However, although the IJA used “mission command”, it also favoured the use of field telephones and its officers training also emphasised rote learning and obedience to authority, which militated against 447 Jeffreys, 72; Moreman, 95. Place, 50-59. 449 Jeffreys, 15, 16, 18-20; Dunlop “British Tactical Command and Leadership in the Burma Campaign 1941-1945”, 99; Moreman, 91-95; Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes, 95-99; Marston, “Lost and Found”, 90, 91. 448 114 independent thinking and initiative. 450 What then made the IJA better able to react to the confusion of jungle warfare than the British Army in 1941-1943? The secret lay in the IJA‟s common understanding of doctrine, enforced and applied through battle drills in realistic conditions. This allowed every officer, NCO and man to instinctively know what to do when the unexpected happened, such as when communications failed or when a superior officer was absent, wounded or dead. By contrast, the early war British Army lacked a common understanding of doctrine and had no enforced battle drills. Thus, when the unexpected happened or when contact with higher HQ was cut, junior officers and men were thrown into confusion without a standard operating procedure to follow. Under such conditions, they instinctively followed the British Army‟s traditional emphasis on caution and the security of supply lines. Retreat became the norm when the situation seemed hazy and the flanks were “up in the air”. The possibility that the enemy himself was also in danger of being cut off by an instant and strong counterattack was not contemplated in the light of the British Army‟s post-World War I instinctive belief that defence was better than offense, as it incurred less casualties. Lieutenant-General William Slim, the GOC 14th Army tasked with the reconquest of Burma, realized that the British Army‟s traditionally autocratic command system was incompatible with the demand for decentralized control in the jungle terrain of Burma. Improvements in wireless signals technology and the proliferation of their use in formations and units, coupled with the emulation of the German Army (and IJA) emphasis on senior field commanders leading close to the front, and their use of staff officers as liaison at the front, improved the typically inadequate field communications of the British Army, but did not fundamentally change its autocratic command and control system.451 Slim recognized the need to further imitate the German Army (and IJA) system by adopting “mission command”. He sought to imbibe junior officers with the spirit of initiative and independent thinking within the 450 Cook & Cook, 133. Harries, 172, 174, 336, 337, 341; US War Department, Handbook of Japanese Military Forces, 6; Drea, 71, 72, 76, 79. 451 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 31, 32; Jeffreys, 71, 72. 115 boundaries of their given objectives, through practical training. Slim‟s endorsement of this particular Infantry Committee‟s recommendation went against the grain of British Army tradition, but enabled the 14th Army to fight the kind of high tempo battles that were formerly associated only with the IJA and the German Army. This made Slim and his 14th Army unique amongst British senior commanders and their commands.452 By November 1943, when the Second Arakan Offensive commenced, the British 14th Army was a radically different army from the British Army that surrendered Singapore and quit Burma in 1942. While the defensive battles of the Admin Box, Imphal and Kohima in the jungles of Burma and India in 1944 demonstrated British ability to repulse the favoured pin-and-encircle aggressive offensive tactics of the IJA, the offensive battles of Meiktila and Mandalay on the open plains of Burma in 1945 demonstrated the new-found British ability to maneuver and smash through the toughest of the IJA‟s stubborn bunker defences. The Indian Army had undergone a transformation which, as Slim aptly titled his memoirs, brought “defeat into victory.” Meanwhile, in the Mediterranean and Europe too, the British Army was also onto winning ways as the “tide” turned against the Axis Powers globally. No doubt, strategic factors such as the American and Soviet alliance, the regaining of air and naval supremacy, and the boost in the quantity and quality of British Army material guaranteed victory. But the tactical performance of the British Army improved significantly and was now able to match and, for some units, even surpass in combat its tactically stagnant German and Japanese enemies, whose manpower and material resources declined. The final irony was that the British Army became better tactically by shedding some of the aspects of the British military system and adopting many aspects of the German (and Japanese) military system. In winning, the British military system had become more “German” and “Japanese”, while still retaining some core “Britishness”. 452 Dunlop, “British Tactical Command and Leadership in the Burma Campaign 1941-1945”, 92, 98, 103; Jeffreys, 71; William Slim, Defeat into Victory, (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000 (1956)), 541, 542. 116 Warren rightfully commented, „The [British Army‟s] defeat [in Malaya] was a team effort‟ and so neither one factor, nor one individual nor one nationality should be blamed. 453 The common claim that the British Army‟s tactical performance in Malaya was poor due merely to a lack of jungle warfare skills and the novelty of IJA tactics was not borne out by the fact that the latter, too, had little specific training in jungle warfare, but adapted its system to jungle warfare. The reality was that the British military system in the first half of the war was so deficient that it was not prepared even to fight a conventional, fast tempo, war against a modern enemy. This was evident on the wind-swept hills of Hong Kong in 1941 and in the central plains of Burma in 1942, where the British Army, even with the use of tanks at the latter battle, was still defeated by the IJA. This thesis asserts that the flawed and rigid British military system of the pre-war and early war years was the underlying, overarching and unifying main cause of the many wellknown shortcomings of Malaya Command. The jungle terrain, so often quoted as a circumstantial factor, worked against the British Army because its rigid, defensive, motorized and firepoweroriented military system was not suitable for fighting in the jungles. This was unlike the IJA‟s flexible, offensive, infantry-oriented military system. The flawed tactical thinking and rigidity of many British senior commanders in Malaya were not merely their personal failures. These reflected the British military system, which they came from. Finally, the British Army‟s tactical disaster in Malaya was not an isolated case but was part of a global chain of failures, notably in Greece, Crete and Burma, which revealed the general failure of the British military system from 1940-1942. While British strategic defeat in Malaya and Singapore was ultimately inevitable due to circumstances, British tactical disaster was avoidable, having been largely self-inflicted by systemic forces. 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French, David and Reid, Brian Holden (eds.), The British General Staff – Reform and Innovation 1890-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 2002) 120 French, David, Raising Churchill’s Army – The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) Gibney, Frank (ed.) & Cary, Beth (trans.) Senso: The Japanese Remember the Pacific War (expanded) (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007 (1995)). Gow, Ian & Hirama, Yoichi, (eds.) The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations 1600-2000 Volume III: The Military Dimension (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) Grant, Ian Lyall & Tamayama, Kazuo, Burma 1942: The Japanese Invasion (Chichester, West Sussex: The Zampi Press, 1999) Hack, Karl & Blackburn, Kevin, Did Singapore Have to Fall? Churchill and the Impregnable Fortress (New York: Routledge, 2003). Harries, Meirion and Susie, Soldiers of the Sun – The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army (New York: Random House, 1991). 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Place, Timothy Harrison, Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944 (London: Frank Cass, 2000) Perry, F. W., The Commonwealth Armies – Manpower and Organisation in Two World Wars (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988) 121 Rottman, Gordon L, Japanese Army in World War II – Conquest of the Pacific 19411942 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005). Rottman, Gordon L, Japanese Army in World War II – The South Pacific and New Guinea, 1942-1943 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005). Rottman, Gordon L & Takizawa, Akira World War II Japanese Tank Tactics (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008). Rottman, Gordon L, Japanese Infantryman, 1937-1945 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005). Samuels, Martin, Command or Control? Command training and Tactics in the British and German Armies 1888-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 2003 (1995)). Sheffield, G.D., (ed.) Leadership and Command – The Anglo-American Military Experience since 1861 (London: Brassey‟s, 1997) Smith, Colin, Singapore Burning – Heroism and Surrender in World War II (London: Penguin, 2005). Summers, Julie, The Colonel of Tamarkan – Philip Toosey and the Bridge on the River Kwai (London: Simon & Schuster, 2005) Sumner, Ian, The Indian Army 1914-1947 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001). Stewart, I. McD. G., The Struggle for Crete 20 May – 1 July 1941, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966) Strachan, Hew (ed.) Big Wars and Small Wars: the British Army and the Lessons of war in the 20th century (New York: Routledge, 2006). Swinson, Arthur, Four Samurai – A Quartet of Japanese Army Commanders in the Second World War (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1968). Thompson, Peter, The Battle for Singapore – The True Story of Britain’s Greatest Disaster (London: Portrait, 2005). Toh Boon Ho & Toh Boon Kwan, “Poor Military Leadership or Flawed Military Organisation? The British Army in the Malayan Campaign” in Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, V29 N1 (Jan – Mar 2003), http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2003/Vol29_1/3.htm Urban, Mark, Generals – Ten British Commanders Who Shaped the World (London: Faber and Faber limited, 2005). US Army, The German Campaigns in the Balkans 1941 (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1986 (1953)), http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/balkan/20_260_3.htm US War Department, The British Army in World War II (London: Greenhill Books, 1990 (1942)). US War Department, Handbook on Japanese Military Forces (London: Greenhill Books, 1991 (1944)). Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War (Singapore: Cultured Lotus, 2001 (1985)). Van Creveld, Martin, The Training of Officers – From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance (London: The Free Press, 1990) Warren, Alan, Singapore – Britain’s Greatest Defeat (London: Talisman, 2002). 122 APPENDIX ONE – PROFILE OF SELECTED BRITISH AND INDIAN ARMY UNITS454 Unit/Date of Arrival 2nd Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders (August 1939) Selected Battles Kampar Telok Anson 2nd East Surreys (October 1940) Jitra Kampar 2/12th Frontier Force (March 1941) Kuantan 2/18th Garwhal Rifles (November 1940) Kuantan Infantry Units Training, personnel and equipment455 Eight recorded exercises as a battalion - only two were single-day events, one was an exclusively night flanking scheme and another was a week-long route march of over 100 miles in July 1941. Some involved movement through jungle terrain. Carpendale, was very impressed by the swift and aggressive attack of this battalion during an exercise in November. Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel. A draft of 62 other ranks arrived in November, while 10 officers were new and inexperienced. Stewart‟s assessment was that only a third was fully “jungletrained”, a third partially so, while the last third was not.456 Eleven recorded exercises as a battalion - all were half or single-day schemes involving defence of static positions and motorized counterattacks; two of them being night schemes. From August 1941 onwards, had to detach a company or two at a time to prepare the Jitra defences. Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel. By late November, was still short of 6 officers.457 Training was only at company level only. Frequent detachments sent to prepare defences and other fatigue duties for the equivalent of five months. “Milked” of 37 officers and 385 sepoys before embarkation for Malaya. By December 1941, only 121 other ranks with more than a year‟s post-recruit service.458 Four recorded exercises as a battalion – Only one was a multi-day scheme involving beach defences while the others were single-day withdrawal exercises. Training at company level for three weeks in August in field craft, patrolling, route marches, night operations and withdrawal. Frequent detachments 454 Units represented here are those involved in the six Malayan battles included as case studies in the thesis. Units are listed in alphabetical and numerical order. 455 The training record of infantry units here is based on field combat exercises before the outbreak of the Pacific War, rather than on drills, “paper” schemes and TEWTs. 456 WO 172/22 “Force Emu War Diary”; WO 172/112 “12th Indian Brigade War Diary”; WO 172/113 “2nd Srgylls War Diary”; Moffatt & McCormick, 53-56; Stewart, p. 6; WO106/2579B. 457 WO 172/152 2nd East Surreys War Diary 10/40-1/41; WO 172/100 2nd East Surreys War Diary 2/402/42 458 WO 172/105 & 129 2/12th Frontier Force War Diary; Perry, p. 105 123 2/1st Gurkhas (September 1941) Jitra Kampar 2/2nd Gurkhas (September 1941) Jitra Kampar 2/9th Gurkhas (September 1941) Jitra Kampar 4/9th Hyderabads (August 1939) Kampar Telok Anson 2/9th Jats (November 1940) Jitra Kampar 1st Leicesters (February 1941) Jitra Kampar sent to prepare defences and other fatigue duties for the equivalent of five months.459 Three recorded exercises as a battalion – one was a 24 hour scheme without Bren platoons, while the others were single-day. Only one single-day company-level exercise in November 1941 on debussing from motor transport and moving through jungles. “Milked” of 26 other ranks in November. By December, still short of 1 officer and 76 other ranks.460 Only one recorded exercise as a battalion – involved artillery firing overhead to inoculate troops to actual battle conditions in November 1941. Training was otherwise at platoon and company level - weapon training, three weeks of route marches in September and a week of jungle training in October. Received Bren carriers as late as October. “Milked” of 1 officer and 1 other rank.461 Only two recorded exercises as a battalion – all multi-day affairs. Training was otherwise at platoon and company level - jungle warfare training in September. Received Bren carriers and Bren guns as late as October and November 1941. “Milked” of 3 officers in November.462 Five recorded exercises as a battalion - one was an exclusively night scheme while the rest were all single-day affairs. Some involved movement through jungle terrain. Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel.463 Four recorded exercises as a battalion - none was overnight, one involved the defence of slit trenches, while the others involved motorized counterattacks. Frequent detachments sent to prepare the Jitra defences and other fatigue and sentry duties in October and November 1941. Received full allotment of Bren carriers and Bren guns only in June and October respectively. “Milking” of 2 officers, 3 NCOs and 42 other ranks to India in August and September 1941.464 Only two recorded exercises as a battalion - one of which was a single-day scheme. Practised defence of 459 WO 172/107 & 130 “2/18th Garhwal Rifles War Diary.” WO 172/136 “2/1st Gurkhas War Diary”. 461 WO 172/134 “2/2nd Gurkhas War Diary”. 462 WO 172/135 “2/9th Gurkhas War Diary”; CAB 106/53-58 463 WO 172/115 “4/9th Hyderabad War Diary”; WO 172/22 “Force Emu War Diary”; WO 172/112 “12th Indian Brigade War Diary” 464 WO 172/121 “2/9th Jats War Diary” 460 124 2nd Loyals (1938) Bukit Pelandok 4th Norfolks (January 1942) Bukit Timah 6th Norfolks (January 1942) Bukit Pelandok 5/2nd Punjabs Kampar static positions and motorized counterattacks. Frequent detachment of a company or two at a time to prepare the Jitra defences. Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel. A large draft of 10 officers, 4 NCOs and 138 men arrived in late May. Still short of 6 officers and 137 men in November 1941. Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison took command after outbreak of war.465 As Singapore Fortress‟ only mobile reserve battalion, six of the recorded schemes as a battalion involved static defence and motorised counterattacks; all except one were multi-day affairs. Only two schemes involved movement through jungle for two days each, in 1940. Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel. Still short of 46 men in December 1941.466 In the UK, training was in manning coastal and airfield defence and motorized counterattacks. Had insufficient exercises with “live” ammunition. Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel. Arrived in Singapore after a long voyage with no opportunity to train and acclimatise in Malaya. Lieutenant-Colonel Knights, assumed command only in September 1941 – a month before the battalion sailed.467 Captain Thorpe, the 2IC of “C” Company, noted in his diary that his men were “depressingly slack and careless” and “completely indifferent” and confessed that “I myself only feel mildly excited and hardly feel it concerns me”.468 In the UK, training was in manning coastal and airfield defence and motorized counterattacks. Had insufficient exercises with “live” ammunition. Arrived in Singapore after a long voyage with no opportunity to train and acclimatise in Malaya. Brought up to strength only in June 1940 with a large draft of 140 recruits. “Milked” of best 16 NCOs in 1939 and many changes in officers in the latter half of 1940. Remaining NCOs of poor quality. Arrived in Singapore with Bren carriers and mortars that it had not been trained to use. Lieutenant-Colonel Lywood, took command in May 1941, was the third change in commander.469 Seven recorded exercises as a battalion - one was a 465 WO 172/120 “1st Leicesters War Diary” WO 172/147 2nd Loyals War Diary; CAB 106/174 An account of the 2 nd Loyals in Malaya; Smith, 385; WO 172/146 “1st Malayan Brigade War Diary”. 467 Neil, 7-8; Smith, 510; Taylor, “Royal Norfolks in the Far East”, http://www.britain-atwar.org.uk/WW2/Royal_Norfolks_in_Far_East/html/enlisting_and_training.htm 468 Smith, 504-505. 469 WO172/89 “6th Norfolks War Diary”; Neil, 15, 18-21; Ron Taylor, “Royal Norfolks in the Far East” 466 125 (August 1939) Telok Anson 1/8th Punjabs (October 1940) Jitra Kampar 1/14th Punjabs (March 1941) Jitra Kampar 2/16th Punjabs (October 1940) Jitra Kampar Bukit Pelandok 3/16th Punjabs (March 1941) Kampar Bukit Pelandok three-day affair while another was an exclusively night scheme. Some involved movement through jungle terrain. Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel.470 Four recorded schemes as a battalion – all were single-day ones. Carpendale followed the unit for a scheme in November 1941 and had mixed opinions about its combat readiness. Frequent detachments of personnel for fatigues and digging trenches at Jitra from April onwards. “Milked” of 3 Viceroy Commissioned Officers (VCOs) and 44 other ranks to India in March 1941 and another 4 officers and 36 other ranks to India in October. By the last week of November, it was still short of 6 officers.471 Six recorded schemes as a battalion – all except one were single day ones, with one lasting for only half a day. Mostly involved defence of static positions and motorized counterattacks. Rarely trained in jungle terrain. Frequent detachments of personnel for fatigues, road building and digging trenches at Jitra from August onwards. Receiving Bren guns and mortars as late as August 1941. Received a large draft of 1 officer and 72 other ranks in May. “Milked” of 1 officer, 1 Subedar and 2 other ranks in October.472 Only two recorded schemes as a battalion – one of which was a single-day one. Mostly involved defence of static positions and motorized counterattacks. No evidence of jungle training. Frequent detachments of personnel for fatigues, road building and digging trenches at Jitra from August 1941 onwards. “Milked” of 2 officers, 4 VCOs, 50 other ranks to India and received constant drafts of a total of 4 officers, 1 NCO, 130 other ranks throughout the year.473 Only one recorded scheme as a battalion, which was a single-day one. Involved motorized counterattacks. No evidence of jungle training. Frequent detachments of personnel for fatigues, road building and digging trenches at Kroh from March 470 WO 172/114 “5/2nd Punjabs War Diary”; WO 172/22 “Force Emu War Diary”; WO 172/112 “12th Indian Brigade War Diary”. 471 WO 172/101 “1/8th Punjabs War Diary”; WO 172/102; WO 106/2579B Carpendale 472 WO 172/122 “1/14th Punjabs War Diary”; Singh, p. 36. 473 WO172/144; WO 172/123; WO 172/102 2/16 th Punjabs War Diary. 126 18th Recce Battalion (January 1942) Bukit Timah 5/11th Sikhs (April 1941) Kuantan 1/5th Sherwood Foresters (January 1942) Bukit Timah Unit/Date of Arrival Selected Battles Kuantan Bukit Timah 5th Field Regiment (November 1941) 88th Field Regiment (November 1941) 122nd Field Regiment (February 1941) Kampar 137th Field Regiment (November 1941) Jitra Kampar Kampar 1941 onwards. “Milked” of 2 Subedars and 25 other ranks and received 2 officers, 1 VCO, 39 NCOs and 107 other ranks since August.474 Rescued from a ship sunk by Japanese bombers. Had insufficient exercises with “live” ammunition. Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel. Arrived in Singapore after a long voyage with no opportunity to train and acclimatise in Malaya. Only had a partial replacement of ten armoured carriers to perform its scouting role.475 Three recorded schemes as a battalion – all two days affairs involving defence of static positions. No evidence of jungle training. Receiving mortars and Bren guns as late as August and October respectively. “Milked” of 1 officer, 2 VCOs, 8 NCOs and 16 other ranks in October and received 25 other ranks; poor quality NCOs.476 In the UK, training was in manning coastal and airfield defence and motorized counterattacks. Had insufficient exercises with “live” ammunition. Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel. Arrived in Singapore after a long voyage with no opportunity to train and acclimatise in Malaya. Artillery Units Training, personnel and equipment477 Consisted of three batteries. Only one training exercise with infantry in November 1941.478 Consisted of three batteries. No opportunity to train and acclimatise in Malaya.479 Consisted of three batteries. Only one recorded training exercise by three troops with infantry in November 1941.480 Consisted of three batteries. No opportunity to train and acclimatise in Malaya.481 474 WO172/144; WO 172/123; WO 172/102 2/16 th Punjabs War Diary. Smith, 500; CAB 106/173. 476 WO 172/127 5/11th Sikhs War Diary 477 The training record of artillery units here is focused on combined training with infantry before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Goodman stated that all artillery units had insufficient charged wireless batteries and many batteries were short of equipment and not up to strength. 478 WO172/42 “5th Field Regiment War Diary”. 479 WO172/43 “88th Field Regiment War Diary”. 480 WO172/112 “12th Indian Brigade War Diary”; WO172/154 “122 nd Field Regiment War Diary”; Goodman. 481 WO172/155 “137th Field Regiment War Diary.” 475 127 155th Field Regiment (September 1941) 22nd Mountain Regiment (August 1939) Telok Anson Jitra Kampar Bukit Pelandok Jitra Kampar 80th Anti-tank Regiment (October 1941) Jitra Kampar Telok Anson Bukit Pelandok 85th Anti-tank Regiment (January 1942) Bukit Timah Consisted of two batteries. Only one recorded training exercise by three troops with infantry in November 1941.482 Consisted of four batteries. One section each, of 4th, 7th & 10th batteries were trained and armed with Breda anti-tank guns; only managed to fire 42 rounds of armour piercing shells during range. These batteries had eight recorded separate exercises with infantry and another similar scheme as a regiment in 1941. Inadequate training in wireless equipment.483 Consisted of four batteries. Unit formed in the UK in July (a month before sailing for Malaya) of other rank personnel not trained in anti-tank artillery; personnel of each battery were from a different regiment. No opportunity to train and acclimatise in Malaya.484 Consisted of three batteries. No opportunity to train and acclimatise in Malaya.485 482 WO172/77 “155th Field Regiment War Diary.” WO172/64-68 “22nd Mountain Regiment, 4th, 7th, 10th & 20th Batteries War Diary”; Goodman. 484 WO172/188 “80th AT Regiment War Diary”; Goodman 485 WO172/91 “18th Indian Division War Diary” 483 128 APPENDIX TWO: ORDERS OF BATTLE, SELECTED BATTLES, MALAYAN CAMPAIGN Jitra, 11th – 12th December 1941486 Imperial Japanese Army 5th Division: Saeki Detachment (5th Reconnaissance Regiment): Two truck-borne infantry companies A light tank company A medium tank company from the 1st Tank Regiment A mountain artillery platoon An engineer platoon st 41 Regiment: Regimental Gun Company II Battalion I & III battalions (arrived night of 12th December) th 11 Regiment (arrived night of 12th December) British Army 11th Indian Division: 6th Brigade: 2nd East Surreys 1/8th Punjabs 2/16th Punjabs th 15 Brigade: 1st Leicesters 1/14th Punjabs (overrun at Changlun) 2/9th Jats th 28 Brigade: 2/1st Gurkhas (one company as reserve on coast, the rest overrun at Asun) 2/2nd Gurkhas (became 15th Brigade reserve) 2/9th Gurkhas, minus two companies guarding Alor Star Airfield (available 12th December) 22nd Mountain Regiment: 4th Battery (left behind during withdrawal of outpost) 7th Battery (with an anti-tank section in lieu of guns) th 137 Field Regiment: Two batteries (arrived morning, 12th December) th 155 Field Regiment: Two batteries 80th Anti-tank Regiment: Two batteries (left with the equivalent of one after withdrawal from outpost) Kampar, 30th December 1941 – 2nd January 1942487 Imperial Japanese Army 486 Rottman & Takizawa, p. 9; Tsuji, 94; 25th Army HQ, p. 101; Kirby, Loss of Singapore; Warren, pp. 86, 88; Percival, Despatch; CAB 106/53; WO 172/117; WO 172/97; WO 172/64; WO 172/77; WO 172/155; WO 172/188. 487 CAB 106/53-58; Tsuji, 125-130; Kirby; WO 172/17; WO 172/100; WO 172/121. 129 5th Division: 11th Regiment: One and a half battalions (II & III battalions) 41st Regiment (3 battalions) 42nd Regiment (3 battalions) 5th Field Artillery Regiment 1st Tank Regiment (elements) British Army 11th Indian Division: 6/15th Brigade: British Battalion 1/14th Punjabs 2/16th Punjabs 3/16th Punjabs Jat/Punjab Battalion (reserve) 88th Field Regiment: 351st Battery 352nd Battery nd 122 Field Regiment: 278th Battery th 80 Anti-tank Regiment: 273rd Anti-tank Battery Machine Gun Platoon, Federated Malay States Volunteer Force 28th Brigade: 2/1st Gurkhas (in reserve with only two companies) 2/2nd Gurkhas 2/9th Gurkhas 155th Field Regiment: Two batteries 80th Anti-tank Regiment: A troop of 215th Anti-tank Battery th 12 Brigade (withdrawn from outpost into reserve at Bidor on 29th December): 2nd Argylls and Sutherlands Highlanders (with a section of armoured cars) 5/2nd Punjabs 4/19th Hyderabads 137th Field Regiment: Three batteries Divisional reserve at Temoh: 5/14th Punjabs 7th Mountain Battery A troop of 215th Anti-tank Battery Bukit Pelandok, 20th - 22nd of January 1942488 Imperial Japanese Army Imperial Guards Division: I/5th Battalion, less two companies (Bukit Pelandok-Bukit Belah Defile) III/4th Battalion, less a company (Parit Sulong Bridge) 488 WO172/144; Kirby. 130 British Army 18th Division: 53rd Brigade: 6th Norfolks (one platoon detached to hold the Parit Sulong Bridge and another to patrol the trunk road) 3/16th Punjabs (with only three combat companies) 2nd Loyals (arrived on the 20th) 155th Field Regiment: 336th Battery (4.5inch howitzers) (withdrawn on the 19th) 344th Battery (25 pounders) (in support at long range west of Yong Peng) 2 anti-tank troops (along trunk road from defile to Yong Peng) Bukit Timah, evening, 11th February 1942489 Imperial Japanese Army 5th Division: 21st Brigade (at least one regiment deployed in the morning): 21st Regiment (3 battalions) 42nd Regiments (3 battalions) 18th Division (at least one regiment deployed in the morning): 56th Regiment (3 battalions) 114th regiments (3 battalions) British Army 18th Division: “Tomforce” brigade group: 18th Recce Battalion 4th Norfolks 1/5th Sherwood Foresters 85th Anti-tank Regiment: A troop from 45th Bty (attached to 18th Recce Battalion) A troop from 270th Bty (attached to 4th Norfolks) A troop from 251st Bty (attached to 1/5th Sherwood Foresters) Composite battery from 5th Field Regiment RA: A troop of 4 x 25 pdrs field guns A troop of 4 x 4.5 inch howitzers A troop of 3 x 4.5 inch howitzers Supported also by 2/15th Australian Field Regiment Telok Anson, 2nd – 3rd January 1942490 Imperial Japanese Army Watanabe Detachment 5th Division: 11th Regiment: One and a half battalions (I & II battalions) A section of mountain guns 489 490 Warren, p. 90, 309; Kirby; 25th Army HQ, pp. 161-162; CAB 106/70; CAB 106/173. CAB 106/53-58; Tsuji, p. 125; Kirby. 131 Imperial Guards Division: III/4th Battalion British Army 11th Indian Division: 12th Brigade: 2nd Argylls and Sutherlands Highlanders 5/2nd Punjabs 4/19th Hyderabads 137th Field Regiment: Two batteries 1st Independent Company (withdrawn morning of 2nd January) „B‟ Squadron, 3rd Indian Cavalry (withdrawn morning of 2nd January) A troop of 215th Anti-tank Battery (withdrawn morning of 2nd January) Kuantan, 2-3rd January, 1942491 Imperial Japanese Army 18th Division: 56th Regiment (3 battalions) British Army 9th Indian Division: 5/11th Sikhs 2/18th Royal Garwhals 2/12th Frontier Force 5th Field Regiment: 63/81st Battery Armoured Car Platoon, Federated Malay States Volunteer Force 491 Tsuji, p. 78; WO 172/20 Appendices R18 & C19; WO 172/42; WO 172/124; CAB 106/192; Kirby. 132 APPENDIX THREE: ORDERS OF BATTLE, SELECTED BATTLES, GREEK, CRETE AND BURMA CAMPAIGN GREECE Vevi, 12th-13th April 1941492 German Army Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler SS Mechanised Division British Empire Forces “Mackay Force”: 19th Australian Brigade Group: 2/4th Australian Battalion 2/8th Australian Battalion 1st Rangers 27th NZ Machine Gun Battalion (less two companies) 2nd Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery 2/3rd Australian Field Regiment 64th Medium Regiment (less one troop) 2/1st Australian Anti-Tank Regiment 102nd Anti-Tank Regiment: One battery CRETE Maleme-Galatos, 20th-22nd 1941493 German Forces 7th Airborne Division: Airlanding Regiment (around Maleme): 1st Parachute Battalion 2nd Parachute Battalion 4th Parachute Battalion Glider Battalion (less two companies) 2nd Parachute Regiment (two companies; dropped, 21st May around Maleme) 3rd Parachute Regiment (around Prison Valley) I Battalion II Battalion III Battalion Engineer Battalion Glider Battalion (two companies) 5th Mountain Division (arrived at Maleme, evening, 21st May): 85th Regiment (arrived, 22nd May): I battalion th 100 Regiment: I Battalion II Battalion 95th Pioneer Battalion (arrived, 22nd May) British Empire Forces New Zealand Division: 4th Brigade (around Galatos): 492 493 Playfair, The Germans Come to the Help of Their Ally; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria. Playfair,; Long,; Antil. 133 18th Battalion (“Creforce” reserve) 19th Battalion (“Creforce” reserve) 20th Battalion (divisional reserve; arrived at Maleme, 22nd May) 4th Field Regiment: Equivalent of one battery One troop, 3rd Hussars 5th Brigade (around Maleme): 21st Battalion 22nd Battalion 23rd Battalion 28th (Maori) Battalion (reserve) 5th Field Regiment: Equivalent of one battery One troop, 7th Royal Tank Regiment 10th Brigade (around Galatos): Composite Battalion Divisional Cavalry Battalion 27th NZ Machine Gun Company (one platoon) st 1 Greek Battalion (Kastelli) 6th Greek Battalion (around Galatos) 8th Greek Battalion (around Prison Valley) BURMA Kawkareik, 20th-22nd January 1942494 Imperial Japanese Army 55th Division: 55th Reconnaissance Regiment 112nd Regiment: I Battalion II Battalion British Army 17th Indian Division: 16th Brigade: 4th Burma Rifles 1/9th Rajputs (less one company) 1/7th Gurkhas (less one company) Bilin, 16th-19th February 1942495 Imperial Japanese Army 33rd Division: 214th Regiment (3 battalions) 215th Regiment (3 battalions) th 55 Division: 143rd Regiment (3 battalions) British Army 17th Indian Division: 494 495 Kirby, India’s Most Dangerous Hour; Grant & Tamayama. Kirby; Grant & Tamayama. 134 16th Brigade: 2nd King‟s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry 8th Burma Rifles (less a company) 1/9th Jats 1/7th Gurkhas 5/17th Dogras Section, 5th Field Battery, Burma Auxiliary Force Armoured Car Section, Burma Auxiliary Force 48th Brigade: 1/4th Gurkhas 2/5th Gurkhas 1/3rd Gurkhas th 28 Mountain Regiment: 12th Battery th 46 Brigade (defending Kyaikto): 4/12th Frontier Force (divisional reserve) 3/7th Gurkhas 4th Burma Rifles (less a company) th 28 Mountain Regiment: 15th Battery 28th Battery 135 [...]... concluding chapter examines how the transformation of the British military system in 1943 allowed the British Army to shed its earlier systemic weaknesses, and surpass the IJA‟s combat performance in Burma and the Far East from 1944-45 This long path to victory further highlights the role played by institutional forces in the making of the British Army‟s tactical disaster in the Malaya Campaign It then... of the 11 th Indian Division HQ throughout the campaign After the fall of Singapore, he joined the INA and commanded one of its divisions Although the focus of both memoirs was about the founding of the INA, its activities and contributions to Indian nationalism and independence, they included some important insights about the pre-war British Indian Army Both officers noted that during peacetime, the. .. the tactical impact of the Japanese control of the air and sea and their use of tanks Instead, having been vindicated by the events in Malaya, his thesis was that the British Army was a flawed organization with no commonly enforced jungle warfare tactical doctrine, an unrealistic and low tempo infantry training system which put insufficient emphasis on jungle warfare training, inadequate and over-theoretical... then sums up the three arguments of our research thesis First, the British military system was primarily responsible for the many shortcomings of 6 the British Army in the Malayan Campaign Second, the British military system was more responsible for the British Army tactical disaster in Malaya than adverse circumstantial and personality factors Third, the British Army‟s tactical disaster in Malaya was... difference in the tactical systems and training emphasis of two very different brigades in Malaya – the “conventional” 22nd Indian Brigade and the “unconventional” 12th Indian Brigade The delaying actions also illustrate how failures in the operational leadership of the British Army jeopardized its tactical mission in Malaya Chapter 7 examines two other disastrous British Army campaigns in 1941- 1942 – Greece... If institutional forces really did play a large part in the British Army‟s tactical disaster in the Malayan Campaign, then they should also account for other British Army tactical disasters during World War II The Greek Campaign bore many circumstantial similarities with the Malayan Campaign and occurred just seven months before the outbreak of the Pacific War, which meant there was little time for the. .. system over the other 18 CHAPTER 2: THE BRITISH ARMY IN 1941 The British Army had strengths which eventually helped to win the war However, in the early years of the war when defeat was the norm, its weaknesses were more evident This chapter examines and evaluates how the pre-war and early war British military system laid the foundations for the British Army‟s tactical disaster in the Malayan Campaign... common interpretation of doctrine Furthermore, the British Army‟s regimental system also hindered the passing on of good practices In addition, most British Army officers typically detested intellectual pursuits and so ignored reading the voluminous issues of doctrinal manuals.85 Thus, in the UK, many division and corps schools issued their own supplementary doctrinal manuals, instead of issuing a common... were used in 1918, a combination of factors militated against their universal adoption – the British liberal tradition, the social belief in the adaptability of British “gentlemen” officers, and the perceived inability of lower class soldiers to perform without supervision.113 Instead, the British Army traditionally left infantry training in the hands of unit, regimental and formation commanders in depots... Anti-tank training for infantry, apart from anti-tank rifle crews, was limited to a demonstration on the use of Molotov cocktails on dummy tanks Finally, realistic military training was further compromised by an injunction against damaging private property or cutting down crops or trees.109 The inadequate nature of Malaya Command‟s training can be seen from the example of the 15th Indian Brigade Of the six ... institutional forces in the form of the British military system were the decisive and prime mover influencing and affecting most, if not all, of the deficiencies of the British Army in 1940 -1942. .. performance in Burma and the Far East from 1944-45 This long path to victory further highlights the role played by institutional forces in the making of the British Army‟s tactical disaster in the Malaya. .. The British Army on the Defensive in the Malayan Campaign 50 Chapter 5: The British Army on the Offensive in the Malayan Campaign 69 Chapter 6: The British Army’s Delaying Missions in the Malayan