Ethical Prudence in Rebuilding Iraq

Ethical Prudence in Rebuilding Iraq: An Analysis of Coalition Provisional Authority Leadership Richard K Ghere Abstract This inquiry assesses the ethical character of leadership in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) amid unfolding events in 2003 that affect its mission to rebuild Iraqi society Such analysis can inform the study of public sector ethics to the extent it balances moral concerns of leadership with the political complexities of rebuilding a society This study incorporates J Patrick Dobel’s treatment of political prudence as a framework for evaluating CPA leadership—especially that of its Administrator, Paul Bremer Dobel’s seven dimensions of political prudence (openness, foresight, power deployment, timing, means/ends alignment, legitimacy, and community empowerment) in pursuit of political excellence are used as criteria for assessing CPA leadership in reference to particular issues and events Although tentative, the findings suggest that some specific CPA leadership accomplishments in rebuilding Iraqi institutions are overshadowed by the Administrator’s ideological commitment to a vast scale of privatization—a scale that is disproportionate in reference to the breadth of vital needs and insensitive to core values in Iraqi culture In 1947, Harvard University President James Conant hailed George C Marshall as “An American to whom freedom owes an enduring debt of gratitude, a soldier and statesman whose ability and character brook only one comparison in the history of the nation.” The comparison in Conant’s tribute, delivered in awarding Marshall an honorary doctorate, was to George Washington (Hart and Hart, 1992 85-86) Six years later, Marshall was presented the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to rebuild Europe—one year after Dr Albert Schweitzer had won that award In their treatment of George Marshall as a moral exemplar, Hart and Hart elaborate upon his steadfast commitment to the public interest not only in his military career but also in his subsequent civilian roles of as Secretary of State as architect of the European Recovery Program and of Defense (1992 91-93) The ethical example of Marshall as leader—especially in rebuilding the institutions and economy of a war adversary—offers an especially salient benchmark in observing current Coalition efforts (between the United States and Great Britain) to rebuild Iraq after the fall of the Ba’athist regime in Spring of 2003 In this vein, an ethical assessment of leadership within the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the entity currently governing Iraq and directing reconstruction efforts, can inform the study of ethical leadership in the public sphere Such an assessment can be helpful to the extent it reasonably balances the moral qualities of leadership (such as truthfulness, openness, and fairness) with the inherent political complexities of rebuilding a society from outside of its culture The tension between ethical performance in leadership and problematic political contexts is by no means unique to the CPA experience in Iraq Rather, it assumes prominence as a central theme in the study of ethical leadership In his influential book Leadership of Public Bureaucracies, Larry Terry portrays the administrator as a two-faced Janus figure whose first face looks to virtuosity but whose opposing face peers away toward abusive authority, ostensibly in the “furtherance” of good motives (1993 172-173) And, perhaps with less dramatic flair, particular case studies of ethical administrators characterize the leadership challenge in terms of demonstrable effectiveness in the midst of particularly difficult political circumstances Sherwood for example recounts how George Hartzog, Jr., Director of the National Park Service from 1964 to 1972, contended with a Congress that had turned its vision toward urban America (1992 146-150) Stivers elaborates on Beverlee Myer’s tenure as California’s Cal-Med (Medicaid) Program that brought her in head-to-head combat with the state’s medical establishment As Comptroller General, Elmer Staats stood at the fault-line between Congress and a president who impounded appropriated funds and who later engaged in the Watergate cover-up (Frederickson, 1992 22-239) Gloria Flora served as Supervisor at the HumboldtToiyabe National Forest in Nevada during the “Sagebrush Rebellion,” when local hostilities against the Federal presence in the West had peaked (Frederckson and Newman, 2001 342-362) Pfiffner characterizes the exemplary moral courage of Elliot Richardson, the Attorney General “caught in the middle” between Federal Judge John Sirica who subpoenaed White House tapes and Richardson’s boss, Richard Nixon (2003 261-263) And in particular, Patrick Dobel’s treatment of William Ruckelshaus’s administrative leadership as Director of the U.S Environmental Protection Agency during both the Nixon and Reagan administrations graphically illustrates ethical finesse in navigating “divided government” wherein conflict between the legislative and executive branches was intense Dobel’s work on Ruckelshaus is especially insightful in demonstrating the bureaucratic resources available for strategic managerial responses to challenging political environments For example, Ruckelshaus relied upon savvy staff appointments, his bureaucratic obligation to enforce environmental laws, and the agency’s information function as supports for maintaining his independence in turbulent political settings (1995 488-503) In essence, the institutional routines within bureaucracy offer some degree of ethical autonomy that can foster effective leadership amid complex political environments Yet from an organizational standpoint, the CPA is not a permanent bureaucracy but is instead a temporary coalition team that ultimately reports to the U.S Secretary of Defense As Administrator of the Coalition, Paul Bremer exercises his authority as a one-person executive and legislator and imposes strong oversight on a reconstituted Iraqi court system (discussed later) Detailed information about the structure and processes of the CPA is not widely available The CPA website shows the “top wrung” of an organization chart that places eleven directors under the direct charge of the Administrator.1 Five of these eleven (Directors of—Operations and Infrastructure, Economic Development, International Development, Civil Affairs, and Security Affairs) sit on the CPA Review Board that approves project funding requests from three resource streams: U.S congressional appropriations, seized Iraqi (property and cash) assets, and Iraqi oil proceeds It is difficult to document how this top-level apparatus couples with middlemanagement staffing (if it indeed exists) or with “street level” CPA personnel widely cited in journalistic reports as instrumental in various rebuilding efforts A London Times article, for example, tells of Steve Wirges, a U.S Army enlisted man (a stock broker in civilian life), who has assumed key policy responsibility in reforming banking practices and in reopening the Baghdad Stock Exchange and who speaks for the CPA at International Monetary Fund meetings “One sergeant joked that when Wirges went for a meeting with senior bankers, his commanding officers stood outside guarding his vehicle Another pointed out that the rank of specialist in the US Army was ‘lower than whale s .’ He is paid about 15,000 pounds a year” (Beeston 2003) This inquiry addresses ethical leadership in the Coalition Provisional Authority at a time when “the ground is in motion” (that is, events affecting the mission of the CPA are frequently unfolding) and when much information about how the CPA functions is unavailable In regard to ethical autonomy, it appears that Administrator Bremer lacks some of the administrative resources for establishing the degree of independence that William Ruckelshaus harnessed in the EPA bureaucracy (Dobel 1995) to cope with a complex political environment Nonetheless, there is some contextual similarity between Ruckelshaus’s conundrum of “divided government” (between the Congress and Executive Branch) and Bremer’s plight in the center of a widelyreported bureaucratic struggle for policy control between the U.S Departments of Defense and State Paul Bremer was appointed CPA Administrator in early-May of 2003, in some regards a “compromise candidate” replacing Retired General Jay Garner—Administrator of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid (predecessor of the CPA) Garner had been closely allied with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to the extent that “the NGO’s [nongovernmental organizations undertaking relief efforts in Iraq] complained that putting Garner in command made it look like they were working for the Pentagon” (Donnelly 2003) Reports covering Bremer’s appointment contrast his diplomatic image to Garner’s military presence as more palatable to the Department of State, even though Bremer “is known as a hawk and a neoconservative with close ties to Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz” (Harper 2003) It appears that a series of security problems during the summer of 2003, most notably the bombing of U.N headquarters in mid-August, weakened Rumsfeld’s influence over Iraqi reconstruction in relation to the State Department (Watson and Hider 2003) And almost two months after the U.N incident, President Bush authorized his National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice, to assume an operational role as head of a Stabilization Group (with representatives from Defense, State, Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency) that would likely “cut through” some Pentagon red tape as well as buffer CPA leadership from direct Defense Department control Thus, although Administrator Bremer may not exercise the degree of leadership authority available to an executive in bureaucracy—for example Ruckelshaus, one can trace gradual movement of the CPA in a direction that offers its Administrator a bit more executive latitude since May of 2003 As mentioned previously, ethical assessment of Coalition Provisional Authority leadership depends upon criteria that temper moral obligation with the political complexity of the reconstruction effort in Iraq In this regard, Patrick Dobel recommends a moral framework based upon the ethics of political prudence, a virtue that obliges leaders toward “moral self-mastery” in pursuit of lasting political achievement (1998 74-75) For some, the pragmatic character of political prudence may constitute an unreasonably low ethical standard that could offer selfserving justification for most any act of leadership Dobel addresses such a concern, observing that “virtues alone [and political prudence in particular] cannot sustain a full political ethics” and that they “co-exist in dialogue with norms, principles, and conceptions of the good society” (1998 75; [insertion added]) Yet Dobel’s prudence framework is especially helpful in assessing CPA leadership as it recognizes the legitimate uses of power as essential for accomplishing lasting political achievement—something that moral intentions and behaviors alone cannot insure Given its timing amid unfolding events, this study can offer only tentative assessments of the ethical character of CPA leadership that align Dobel’s criteria for political prudence with current journalistic accounts of CPA activities in Iraq Specifically, this case study of Paul Bremer’s leadership of the Coalition Provisional Authority draws upon available media reports that speak both to prudent administrative actions and corresponding deficits in regard to each of Dobel’s seven dimensions This inquiry therefore assesses CPA leadership in rebuilding Iraq by comparing ethical strengths and weaknesses in achieving lasting political accomplishment in the rebuilding process Prudence and Coalition Provisional Authority Leadership Dobel presents political prudence as a leadership virtue that interjects moral actions into “…a world of limited resources and constraints set by circumstances, all morally imperfect” (1998 79) Rather than rescuing it from politics, prudence projects morality as excellent political achievement Dobel therefore treats prudence as political achievement in reference to seven particular dimensions, each of which stimulates ethically pertinent discussion of Coalition Provisional Authority leadership in Iraq Reason and Openness Dobel maintains that prudence requires disciplined reason and an openness to the complexity of reality The complexity of the reconstruction task is especially daunting given the multitude of Iraqi expectations on the CPA to restore semblances of normalcy to basic living Indeed, the Baghdad Bulletin presents numerous articles that address claims citizens make that seek remedies to the fundamental failings of public institutions—students demand the physical restoration of Baghdad University, which was damaged by military actions (Walker and McCaul 2003); power officials call for enforcement of existing contracts with foreign companies to provide power to Iraq; citizens demand an end to the dramatic surge of violent crime, especially assaults on women (Walker 2003b); and ethnic groups—such as Jewish minorities—seek normal passage in and out of Iraq’s borders Although Coalition officials cannot effectively respond to all claims, those expectations that are directed toward the most visible deficits of existing Iraqi institutions and markets warrant special attention Openness to expectations that the CPA can “deliver” in fixing existing public institutions appears crucial in maintaining Coalition legitimacy among Iraqis Particular attention, for example, needed to be directed toward the inability of public institutions in Iraq to adopt appropriate personnel standards and to offer reasonable compensation for workers (and in some cases, provide back pay for labor rendered) While reports of such demands are widespread (among for example hospital physicians, police officers, and power grid workers), the problem of compensation for city-wide trash pickup in Baghdad is indicative of how the lack of adequate pay incentives leads not only to service ineffectiveness but also to more complex patterns of corruption One journalistic account relates how a lack of personnel standards and operations procedures has resulted in trash that has accumulated on Baghdad streets for over a decade (McCaul 2003b) The Head of the Department of Cleaning reports that drivers, not having received pay for two months, draw straws on a daily basis for preferred routes in the city’s affluent residential neighborhoods where tipping is generous A U.S military officer (a city planner in civilian life) in charge of municipal centers for the CPA reported that $400,000 has been allocated to pay rubbish subcontractors on a performance basis-$1.25 per cubic meter of garbage delivered Yet this official concedes that this “remedy” simply reconfigures the corruption He comments on particular on a subcontractor who submitted a bill for $18,000 worth of trash reportedly collected in a single week: “There aren’t enough trucks in the whole country to collect that much garbage in a week.” On October of 2003, Administrator Bremer authorized implementation of Order Thirty—entitled “Reform of Salaries and Employment Conditions of State Employees”—that establishes a civil service-like system—one that would “foster transparency in payments and regularize payments to ensure that individuals are compensated at comparable levels for comparable work across all areas of public service.” (This action also disqualifies those stripped of employment through DeBa’athification from any retirement benefits.) Although the Order does not refer specifically to the issue of back pay, it does suspend any previous salary enactment (outside the limited discretion of the CPA Director of Management and Budget) Thus, Iraqis presumably accrue the institutional benefits of an American-style personnel system, but without consideration of past compensation inequities Central to Iraqi reconstruction is the development of a market economy that can sustain trade and attract investment Understandably, the CPA (through its association with the U.S Agency for International Development—AID) states these market-oriented goals in macroeconomic terms: For example, the U.S AID web page announces its request for proposals to “facilitate the economic integration of Iraq with its regional and international partners, adopt international standards of production, harmonize economic policy, reinforce traditional trade linkages, develop new trade partnerships, and foster sustainable job creation.” Nonetheless, citizen expectations of a viable market are more likely directed toward micro-level concerns that impact directly upon their lives As a case in point, the real estate market in Baghdad (as of early July, 2003—see Walker, 2003e) is booming as agents purchase properties of fleeing Ba’athist officials at deep-discount prices and then profit from the high demand created by the resettlement of people (such as Kurds) who had been forced out of Iraq under Saddam Hussein In some ways, the property market is currently correcting itself from Sadddam’s practice of confiscating the property of those groups out of favor and then reselling it to partisans of the regime Yet, the question of legal ownership looms over this booming market One real estate agent comments, “At the moment, everybody is working on a matter of trust My role now is simple: direct negotiation between landlord and buyer Deals are struck quickly, but there may be some consequent difficulties in the future” (Walker 2003e) In response, a Committee for the Restoration of Properties works in conjunction with the CPA in an effort to establish rightful ownership in the absence of appropriate institutional controls over real estate transactions Moreover, the CPA has published some resolutions that govern property sales—one for example temporarily suspends the sale of property owned by Ba’ath party members Whether these resolutions will prove effective in regulating the real estate market remains to be seen If prudence can be attributed to (the CPA as) a network of dispersed agents, there is evidence of openness in response to the complexity of rebuilding public institutions and markets In essence, CAP’s “street level bureaucrats” (from both civilian and military ranks) appear to have secured modest allocations to pay trash haulers and to establish a transitional means to address property ownership issues Ostensibly, resources to alleviate the most immediate of institutional problems are available through funding request approval by the CPA’s Program Review Board or U.S AID’s Quick Response Programs that “link short-term emergency programs to longer-term reconstruction.” Perhaps it is the longer-term that calls the prudential questions of reason and openness into question Foresight and the Long Term Foresight, according to Dobel, obligates the prudent leader “to think through the consequences of action and avoid actions where probable negative consequences will overwhelm the public good sought” (1998 76) Leaders nonetheless must contend with the pressures and ambiguities of the political missions they follow.3 The political climate in which the Coalition Provisional Authority functions is also aptly characterized as a strong force-field, but one that is particularly ambiguous in at least two important respects First, there appears to be considerable uncertainty regarding the degree and complexity of effort needed to rebuild Iraq Thomas Freidman comments, “We are not rebuilding Iraq We are ‘building’ a new Iraq from scratch… Iraq is not a vase that we broke to remove the rancid water inside, and now we just need to glue it back together We have to build a whole new vase We have to dig the clay, mix it, shape it, harden it and paint it” (2003b) And second, there is little certainty about how long the CPA will remain in authority in Iraq The possibilities range from merely a few months (until a new Iraqi constitution can be drafted and established) to many years (consistent with Freidman’s appraisal of the task’s enormity) In reference to an ethical prudence that attends to the long-term, the question arises if CPA leaders can direct their powers in ways that anticipate the unfolding of future events yet also satisfy their political masters in addressing the expediencies of the present With regard to powers, the Administrator of the CPA is authorized to issue regulations and orders that, in essence, pre-empt parts of existing Iraqi law (otherwise in effect) as necessary As legislator/executive, the Administrator can issue an order as encompassing as that establishing a new Iraqi army (Order 22) or as specific as outlawing vehicles with tinted windows (public notice issued June 29, 2003) From the standpoint of prudence, the administrator’s dilemma becomes clear: Strategically, regulations and orders needed to be crafted and issued in a compressed time frame immediately after Paul Bremer assumed CPA leadership—indeed, twenty-two orders were issued in the first six weeks of his tenure Although this expeditiousness establishes the Coalition’s authority in the short-run, it may preclude opportunities to anticipate adversities in rebuilding Iraqi institutions It is not surprising, for example, that four of the first five orders issued by the CPA administrator (issued within a ten-day period in May, 2003) address various DeBa’athification issues related to Ba’ath Party Member dismissal from positions of authority, property holdings, and subsequent criminal proceedings Order Number One—entitled “DeBa’athification of Iraqi Society”—stipulates that Full members of the Ba’ath Party holding the ranks of [Regional Command Member, Branch Member, Section Member, and Group Member] are hereby removed from future employment in the public sector These Senior Party Members shall be evaluated for criminal conduct or threat to the security on the Coalition Those suspected of criminal conduct shall be investigated and, if deemed a threat to security or a flight risk, detained or placed under house arrest (Section 1, 2) 10 along side the CPA—relies heavily upon U.S contractors in rebuilding Iraqi institutions Some firms were selecting outside open bidding on an emergency basis—such as the KBR subsidiary of Halliburton—to act effectively with compressed time frame Commenting upon the need to complete contract negotiations within sixty-three days rather than the customary six months, the USAID Director Andrew Natsios indicated that, for political and humanitarian reasons, the Iraq project could not wait: “We wanted all in place so we could begin construction immediately” (Dwyer and Balfour 2003) Further means-related controversy arose over the assertion that USAID was under a legal mandate to use only U.S suppliers that, unlike international firms, could gain security clearances for access to classified documents critical to bid negotiations Even though the Director has the authority to waive the American-only requirement, the security clearance is out of reach for potential foreign bidders Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) objected strongly to the selective contracting barriers that have obstructed their participation in the reconstruction process Speaking about USAID, one NGO executive complains, “The seem to have turned to just a small pool of preselected, large firms for these activities, despite the decades of experience that NGOs can bring.” In response, Natsios defended the awarded contracts as proportional—to use Dobel’s term (1998 78)— to the scope of tasks: “We want to build six-thousand schools in a year If you took all the NGOs in the world they wouldn’t have the ability to that” (Cleeland and Fineman 2003) The controversy surrounding exclusive reliance on U.S firms as prime contractors extends beyond NGOs to Iraqi nationals Although a few Iraqi firms have been hired as subcontractors, many others with experience in large-scale construction and associated development projects claim to have been excluded from meaningful participation in the reconstruction effort Some claim that U.S prime contractors’ formal solicitations essentially amount to a symbolic application process for subcontracting work without subsequent notification of outcome Others somewhat more successful 19 complain that the U.S prime contractors permit them to compete merely for small procurement deals One Iraqi businessman comments, From the tenders that I’ve seen, it’s nothing—very small We have engineers and equipment of the very highest level We can handle road-building and construction—they ask us for office supplies Big contracts are available—it’s just that were not getting them Some big tenders are awarded that we not hear about We just fill in a lot of forms then sit and wait (Walker 2003a) In this regard, one prime contractor—Bechtel International—reports on hiring some five percent of two-thousand applications received from Iraqi subcontractors Bechtel representatives explain that the $680 million in their contract is earmarked for emergency “patch up” repairs to six critical areas of infrastructure Thus, “actual” reconstruction efforts begins after Congress appropriates funds4 to underwrite the non-military cost of Iraqi operation One Bechtel representative comments upon how the term “reconstruction” is easily misunderstood: Because it was the first big contract and it had ‘reconstruction’ in its title, there was created a perception that this in fact was going to reconstruct the infrastructure And that perception created some difficulties because it was known from the outset that—what it would be able to do, that $680 million spread across six major infrastructure areas—would be to get on the ground and emergency critical repairs that absolutely had to be done to provide some base level of services (Raz 2003a) That spokesperson proceeds to explain that if all of the $680 million were devoted to one infrastructure area—for example, repair of the electrical grid at most only two power plants could be upgraded with negligible impact on power provision in Baghdad (Raz 2003) How well means and ends align in awarding contracts to reconstruct Iraq appears shrouded within ambiguities surrounding both means and ends As addressed above, major (prime) contracts are awarded to U.S firms based on USAID protocols that, in a “Catch 22” fashion, either enforce statutes that allow for only U.S bidders or (even if those requirements are waived) necessitate security clearances unavailable to foreign firms And with regard to ends, it is anything but clear how the USAID/CPA mission prioritizes humanitarian rebuilding efforts against a neo-conservative agenda for widespread privatization in Iraq Some journalistic reports quote the CPA Administrator as calling for a devolution of reconstruction responsibilities back to 20 local Iraqis (see Andrews 2003) Other accounts cast the Administrator as the pivotal economic decision maker who facilitates the Bush Administration’s privatization agenda (see Steele 2003) In this regard, Administrator Bremer signed off on extensive plans to privatize the Iraqi economy that follow a model similar to that used to reform the Soviet economy in Russia (Sachs 2003) Either way, confusion over means and ends has its costs in undermining the legitimacy of the Coalition’s reconstruction efforts within Iraqi society and among NGOs Durability and Legitimacy Dobel recognizes a lasting, or durable, legitimacy as the crowning achievement of prudent leadership In essence, a durable legitimacy justifies the various strategies of action—for example, deployment of power and prudent timing—addressed earlier At first glance, it might appear that the temporary nature of the Coalition’s authority in governing Iraq exempts it from the test of ultimate legitimacy Through this line of reasoning, ‘achievement’ could be characterized as duly transferring authority to an Iraqi governing structure after a constitution is drafted Legitimacy in that case would depend upon the subsequent efforts of Iraqis in power to build on the institutional and market reforms initiated under the CPA (Indeed, Bush Administration representatives look to Jordan as the model for affluence in the Middle East spurred on by comprehensive market reforms—see Kleinfelter, 2003) But given the time constraints of the Coalition’s mission, it is reasonable to assess CPA legitimacy in terms of more immediate impacts on Iraqi society In this regard, Dobel’s comments on legitimacy offer particular clarity in examining CPA leadership: “A prudent leader will work to ensure that achievements will endure and gain legitimacy in the eyes of individuals who must live with them Political achievement earns its legitimacy with people by the provision of benefits, respect for people’s interests and commitments, and links to their cultural norms and rights (1998 78; emphases added) 21 As discussed above, goal ambiguity that intermingles the rebuilding vital institutions in Iraqi society with privatization in pursuit of wide-scale international investment exacts its costs on CPA legitimacy Specifically, the systematic exclusion of Iraqi construction firms from bid processes signals that Iraqi nationals have little to gain in the reconstruction effort Neither the sole reliance on U.S firms as prime contractors nor the privatization goal to open Iraqi markets to outsiders appear sensitive to a culture that has traditionally looked inward in distributing its benefits A brief news story published in the Baghdad Bulletin underscores the prevalence of these ethnocentric tendencies: A cardiologist who owns and operates a hospital in Baghdad became the target of rancorous rumor because he named his facility “Good Samaritan Hospital”—‘proof’ of its financial backing from Jewish outsiders (McCaul 2003a) Although such ethnocentricity may miss the mark of democratic openness, CPA market reform efforts that take direct aim at these cultural tendencies are not likely to be embraced within contemporary Iraqi society The Coalition’s actions to establish legitimacy in Iraqi life are undermined as well by its shortcomings in restoring security and order In mid-July, 2003, Human Rights Watch published a report documenting a dramatic rise in sexual assaults of women and more general violations of women’s rights since the fall of the Ba’athist regime In chiding the U.S for its security failings, this NGO report refers specifically to language in the Geneva Convention that calls upon occupying powers to provide women special protections against psychological, physical, and sexual attacks In reporting on these Human Rights Watch findings, a Baghdad Bulletin journalist links rising maltreatment of Iraqi women to a fundamentalist backlash: HRW’s fellow human rights advocacy organization, Amnesty International, reported that religious extremism was also contributing to a more hostile environment for Iraqi women AI interviewed one female health worker who claimed, “Because of the current situation of insecurity my life is extremely limited For example, I cannot visit with my family or go to the market without the company of my husband.”.…This report comes after a rise in fundamentalist activity, including a burgeoning amount of radical imams issuing fatwas stating that women in Iraq are ordered to don the hijab among other more religious demands… (Paul 2003) 22 Notwithstanding the accuracy of the causality asserted (above) among lax security, crimes against women, and fundamentalist backlashes, it can be maintained that CPA legitimacy suffers from the perception that it cannot restore the order needed to sustain core social values—such as those concerning the treatment of women in Iraqi society Yet any relationship between crime rates (as an indicator of security failure) and CPA legitimacy (or lack thereof) is further complicated since valid statistical measures of crime are not available Although anecdotal comments from CPA representatives imply that security is improving (for example, Charles Heatley, the chief media officer of the CPA maintains, “It is impossible to give statistics or figures, so no scientific evaluation can be done But it is clear that general levels of crime are dropping significantly.”—Walker 2003b), those claims lack empirical validation To the contrary, some emergency rooms in Baghdad hospitals maintain sketchy records that show increases in inpatients with gunshot wounds during the summer months of 2003 One reporter in Baghdad sums up the general perception of crime as follows in an article published in August of 2003: In the absence of reliable statistics for violent crime in Baghdad, people have to rely on hearsay and their own judgment when assessing whether it is safe to go out on the streets It seems that all most every one knows someone who has been a victim of violent crime since the end of the war So whatever might be the truth about levels of these crimes in Baghdad, people are still living in fear for their safety (Walker 2003b) Defining political achievement in terms of gaining legitimacy substantially elevates the ethical standard for assessing CPA leadership in the rebuilding of Iraqi society Perhaps this test of a durable legitimacy sets the bar unreasonably high for the CPA as a temporary center of authority imposed by a foreign (U.S.) government in the aftermath of war In that regard, recognition of tangible coalition efforts improving society may be overshadowed by the obvious CPA role as the pivotal agent of Bush Administration policies And, as has been mentioned, the presumably brief time parameters around CPA authority by definition limit capability to achieve 23 demonstrable legitimacy, at least in the short-run Yet these rational explanations for CPA impediments to gaining legitimacy not necessarily account for troublesome backlashes to CPA rebuilding efforts For example, fundamentalist reactions to security problems signify not merely lost opportunities to gain the confidence of Iraqi nationals but also ground lost in restoring civil society An incident concerning an abrupt change of Baghdad University’s leadership vividly illustrates how backlashes can reverse the direction of the Coalition’s progress In late-September of 2003, Sami al-Muhdafel was fired as university president allegedly on the grounds of “ineffective leadership.” Strongly backed by CPA Administrator Paul Bremer, al-Muhdafel directed his efforts toward separating the University from the Iraqi government—specifically from the Iraqi Ministry of Education and its political culture of cronyism Speculation among University faculty and students attributes their president’s dismissal to his recent criticism of the Iraqi Governing Council’s actions appointing ministers on the basis of political affiliation rather than professional ability (Raz 2003b) The prospect that the Iraqi Governing Council—in some respects, the “child” of CPA endeavors—can and will act in a manner that reverses Coalition initiatives has ominous implications for the legacy of the CPA mission Empowering5 Community Dobel speaks of an ethical responsibility to build community as follows: “This obligation to strengthen the communal affiliations and bonds among members of the society should inform and constrain judgments as a substantive demand of political prudence The possibility of political community depends upon trust Trust for each other in institutions are the social resources and capital that leaders and institutions should work to create and sustain” (1998 79) He also references Vaclav Havel’s argument that leaders bear a special obligation to sustain an inclusive society that supports civil discourse amid diverse groups Various accounts of 24 community life in Baghdad indeed document CPA efforts to improve cultural amenities in the aftermath of war For example, CPA representatives have helped restore soccer competition, even though U.S troops had used the principal soccer venue—Olympic Stadium—as a parking lot for heavy vehicles One Coalition adviser in charge of restoring sports activity, speaking to the crowd of spectators at the resumption of the games, maintained that the re-emergence of soccer was a symbol of cooperation between the Coalition and the Iraqi people (Walker 2003d) The Coalition’s community-building efforts are also evident in contributions to restoring university education With the help of UNESCO, Coalition efforts contributed to the resumption of classes at Baghdad University in mid-July of 2003 CPA authorities were instrumental in providing supplies and equipment—particularly, air conditioners—and in underwriting the costs of the University’s post-war reconstruction This assistance in restoring university education is especially significant since, prior to Ba’athist rule, Iraq had the highest number of graduate students in the Arab world (Walker and McCaul 2003) One Coalition adviser spoke to the advantages of investing in Iraqi higher education: “We are fortunate because we are dealing with the educated people of Iraq who are rational and have an end goal.” By contrast, CPA community-building efforts directed toward a less-educated segment of Iraqi society pose a more difficult challenge A CPA consultant in charge of municipal services stresses the difficulty in educating people in rural areas to dispose of their wastes responsibly In comparison, the United Nations Development Programme has achieved more success by earmarking $2.5 million from the Japanese government to create employment directed toward waste disposal in these rural communities over a ninety-day period This program has been effective in achieving community pride through co-production The project manager comments that the project will continue after the funding dissipates: “We are already looking for volunteers to staff it We already had thirty- 25 five volunteers in ten days The idea is to educate people to care and to encourage the community councils to depend on their own resources” (McCaul 2003b) In covering various facets of community life that reemerged after the war, Baghdad Bulletin reporters document the efforts of some “street-level” (civilian and military) CPA representatives in fostering community-building activities ranging from educational improvement to the resumption of Iraqi Symphony Orchestra performances Yet in reference to top leadership within the Coalition, there are indications of neglect for essential communicationbuilding process needed to integrate dialog with Iraqis Timothy Carney, a retired career ambassador who served as a high-level Coalition adviser to the Ministry of Industry, returned from Iraq in late- June of 2003 complaining about overt planning failures in establishing lines of communications with Iraqis In an interview with a National Public Radio correspondent, Carney explained how the CPA’s failure to plan for basic communications obstructed Iraqi efforts at political organization: [The communications challenge] was an impossibility Essentially, there were no working telephone contacts between the coalition effort and the Iraqis whom we were advising, nor were there telephones that worked between the cities of Iraq You did have local telephone communication in Baghdad, itself, but only within a given telephone exchange, because we had bombed all the switching equipment So while you could call within a neighborhood, you couldn't call from one neighborhood to another As a result, to get a meeting organized, for example, you had to go and see people…This lack of communication stultified the political process, because Iraqis couldn't call each other and organize the kinds of meetings that might have thrown up representative political figures from the Baghdad area as well, and that was a limit placed on the effort of the coalition, to create an interim Iraqi authority (Norris 2003) Dobel maintains that “Prudent political leaders hold special responsibilities to maintain and strengthen community foundations” (1998 79) To the extent of their merit, Ambassador Carney’s criticisms of CPA leadership are indicative of a lack of will toward investing in those community foundations By contrast, the noted op/ed writer Thomas Friedman reports on the efforts of RTI International—a prime USAID/CPA contractor—in community building within each of Bagdhad’s eighty-eight neighborhoods According to Friedman, teams of RTI representatives and U.S Army officers have gone in to each of these neighborhoods to organize 26 “interim advisory councils” as mechanisms to facilitate the creation of a Baghdad city council (2003a) Thus, the evidence available attributes CPA success in community improvement to the ad hoc discretion of those military forces and civilians who act under the auspices of the Coalition but at its periphery Yet overall, perhaps no other outcome is more injurious to Iraqi society than the assault on language as a reality of a post-war economy A biological researcher relates how English has become the language of employment: “There are no jobs for the Iraqis of yesterday If you are a satellite repairman or a computer expert, or if you are an English-speaker and have connections with foreigners—then you have a job Like Darwin—we must adapt or become extinct” (Garthwaite 2003) In perspective, other organization outside of the coalition’s authority, particularly NGOs such as the United Nations, require fluency in English as a condition of employment Nonetheless, the combined effects of CPA contracting procedures and privatization initiatives tear the language bonds of community….Upon receiving his honorary doctorate at Harvard, George Marshall spoke of empowering and morale-building: “It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically This is the business of Europeans The initiative, I think, must come from Europe.” (Walker 2000, 242) Against this lofty standard of community empowerment, Administrator Bremer’s leadership falls considerably short Discussion As applied to Coalition Provisional Authority leadership in Iraq, Dobel’s seven dimensions of prudence essentially commend the exercise of power, channeled in an appropriate and proportionate manner, that enables political accomplishment—perhaps not realized in final form but expressed as significant movement toward a desired end This ethic of prudence defines political excellence, and justifies the deployment of power in achieving it, in terms of legitimacy 27 of outcomes perceived by those most directly affected This analysis of CPA leadership in reconstructing Iraqi institutions points out several areas of accomplishment, yet some of these have adversely impacted on Iraqis in ways that compromise legitimacy and obstruct community empowerment On a positive note, the CPA Administrator deployed his power to re-establish a much-needed Iraqi court system in a manner consistent with Iraqi judicial tradition The CPA is also exercising its power discreetly as it phases in international stock trading in attempting to accommodate the ethnocentricities of the culture Other aspects of market reform, however, are exacting their costs in terms of Iraqi legitimacy CPA efforts at monetary reform (that is, revaluing currency) have elicited the wrath of some Kurds, traditionally staunch allies of the U.S against the Ba’athist regime And as indicated in several places above, reforms directed specifically toward the privatization agenda have the effect of excluding Iraqis from their economy and language, rather than including and empowering them And clearly, the CPA leadership—along with the military—has fallen short in establishing the security and order necessary to support the fundamental values of Iraqi culture, particularly in regard to the imperative to protect women These tentative observations acknowledge that the CPA has functioned for only six months in an extremely turbulent and ambiguous environment This compressed time frame limits the CPA Administrator’s repertory of prudent strategies –most notably, the foresight to anticipate far into the future and the ability to time (or delay) CPA actions in accordance with a position of strength Indeed, the CPA can justify wholesale DeBa’athification, and its adverse impacts on leadership in Iraqi institutions, in terms of the imperative for expedient action in the short-run Moreover, the boundary ambiguity between the CPA as a functioning (nonbureaucratic) entity and its policy force-field (characterized by the Bush Administration’s agenda in Iraq) raises questions as to the extent of Administrator Bremer’s ethical autonomy to make 28 mission-defining decisions The evidence cited above however indicates that Bremer wields considerable executive authority that presumably translates into ethical autonomy Few others on the American political landscape after all enjoy unchecked executive and legislative powers— along with judicial authority intentionally delegated to closely-monitored judges To date, the Administrator has issued forty-three orders, most of which are comparable in scope and significance to major legislative initiatives Further, he has engaged his authority in a manner that prioritizes the re-establishment of market-serving institutions (most notably, the Central Bank and Baghdad Stock Exchange) over other pressing institution-building needs in Iraq society In this regard, Administrator Bremer’s candor in his neo-conservative advocacy for widespread privatization signals his willingness to assume the pivotal role of pushing the Administration’s agenda “Moving the Iraqi Economy from Recovery to Sustainable Growth” forward And the Administrator chairs the six-member program review board controlling the spigot of disbursements for various development projects in Iraq Thus, despite its non-bureaucratic form and turbulent political environment, the Coalition Provisional Authority allows its top leadership wide-ranging executive authority with considerable decision autonomy This evidence is much less clear regarding Bremer’s capabilities to control his personnel resources in pursuit of CPA missions A number of journalistic accounts insinuate that many who work under the auspices of the CPA at the streetlevel are directly answerable to military superiors or to consultant (contracting) organizations Documentation of internal management processes in the CPA is not as yet widely available To some extent, the non-bureaucratic nature of the CPA limits ethical comparisons between Paul Bremer and George Marshall Clearly, Marshall, as Secretary of State, exercised control over a cabinet-level bureaucracy in the Truman Administration when he directed the European Recovery Program Nonetheless, these structural differences hardly account for the striking 29 contrast between Bremer’s ideological focus on the privatization project in Iraq and Marshall’s pragmatic openness to a range of programmatic ideas and a diversity of participants in the European recovery dialogue Notes The eleven directorates of the Coalition Provisional Authority are as follows: Oil Policy, Governance, Operations and Infrastructure, Office of Management and Budget, Economic Development, Private Sector Development, AID, Civil Affairs, Interior Affairs, Security Affairs, and Strategic Communications This study draws heavily on two particular news sources, the Baghdad Bulletin and All Things Considered—a National Public Radio news program—as well as upon other press accounts The Baghdad Bulletin is (was) a bi-monthly newspaper edited by a young American journalist, David Enders, previously an intern with the New York Times and Associated Press, and more recently a reporter for the Grand Rapids Press Seven editions of this newspaper were published (from June to September 1, 2003) until its funding was depleted—these issues, along with more current stories, can be found at http://www.baghdadbulletin.com An apt description of this news source appears in its mission statement: “[The Baghdad Bulletin] is a non-partisan publication whose only tenet is that the presence of a free press offering a forum for all sides is an inalienable human right With balanced investigative journalism from a mixture of Iraqi and foreign staff writers, Baghdad Bulletin aims to provide insightful news from inside Iraq Baghdad Bulletin also publishes opinionated ‘Guest’ articles which tackle Iraqi issues from a range of angles.” This news source was especially helpful to this study since its focus of post-war redevelopment stimulated many articles that address how the post-war situation in and around Baghdad affects the lives of Iraqis Retrieval of media accounts pertinent to CPA leadership in rebuilding Iraq followed a two-step strategy First, articles in each of the editions of the Baghdad Bulletin were reviewed in reference to Dobel’s seven dimensions of prudence Second, more generalized media searches were pursued to provide greater depth of issues treated in Baghdad Bulletin articles In this regard, audio excerpts of interviews in National Public Radio programming (particularly All Things Considered) offered particular depth— access National Public Radio: All Things Considered interviews found in the reference list through http://www.npr.org/rundowns/calendar/calendar.php?prgId=2 Given the range of perspectives among reporters and commentators, biases of sources used in this study are assumed to be randomly distributed To the extent possible, effort is taken in this study to focus inquiry toward the ethics of leadership within the Coalition Provisional Authority as distinct from the policy ethics of Bush Administration initiatives in Iraq On November 6, 2003, President George W Bush signed the bill that authorizes $87.5 billion for emergency spending for Iraq and Afghanistan $20.3 billion is earmarked for the rebuilding of Iraq 30 Liberty is taken here with Dobel’s terminology by replacing “building” community with “empowering” it, in order to distinguish the responsibility to strengthen civil bonds (as Dobel discusses) from “brick-and-mortar” activities References Andrews, Edmund L (2003) “U.S Focus in Iraq Is on Repairs, Not Rebuilding.” New York Times June 20: A11 Arnold, Catherine (2003) “Kurds Angered by Exchange Rate for New Dinar Ponder Collusion Between CPA, Leaders.” Baghdad Bulletin August 4: Beeston, Richard (2003) “American NCO boosts his stock in Iraq.” The Times June 12: 16 “Bullish on the U.S Army” [editorial] (2003) St Louis Post-Dispatch March 23: B2 Caiden, Gerald E., O.P Dwivedi, and Joseph Jabbra, eds (2001) Where Corruption Lives Bloomfield, CN: Kumarian Press Cleeland, Nancy and Mark Fineman “For-Profits Are Focus for a New Iraq.” Los Angeles Times April 10: 3-1 Cooper, Terry L and Yoder, Diane E (2002) “Public Management Ethics Standards in a Transnational World.” Public Integrity 4: 333-351 Dionne, E J (2003) “Bremer's Iraq: Pragmatism vs Dogma.” Washington Post July 15: A19 Dobel, J Patrick (1998) “Political Prudence and the Ethics of Leadership.” Public Administration Review 58: 74-81 - (1995) "Managerial leadership in divided times: William Ruckelshaus and the paradoxes of independence." 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