Emotions and intergroup relations

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http://www.elsevier.com/locate/permissionusematerial From Leach, C.W., Zeineddine, F.B., Cidam, A., 2015 Emotions and Intergroup Relations In: James D Wright (editor-in-chief), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Vol Oxford: Elsevier pp 502–506 ISBN: 9780080970868 Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd unless otherwise stated All rights reserved Elsevier Author's personal copy Emotions and Intergroup Relations Colin W Leach, Fouad Bou Zeineddine, and Atilla Cidam, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved Abstract Emotion has long been considered important to the relations between groups because emotions are powerful collective experiences that people share with like-minded others As such, emotion enables coordinated and concerted action as a group, vis a vis other groups As such, the emotions that people feel about intergroup relations are useful to social and behavioral science because they are potent symbols for the meaning people give to their experience In this article, we focus on recent social psychological work on anger, empathy, pride, shame, and guilt The (social, political, economic) relations between groups have long been considered passionate affairs Since antiquity, observers have focused on pride in one’s nation, hate for one’s enemies, and shame for the foibles of one’s fraternity Because emotions were long considered irrational and impulsive states, a great deal of classical thought viewed emotion suspiciously as a tempest in the otherwise tranquil sea of social life This view of emotion continued in much of early twentieth-century social scientific work on antagonistic social relations evidenced in crowds, war, protest, revolution, prejudice, caste, and conflict For example, in much of the psychological work on stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination before the 1960s, feelings of indignation, disgust, envy, and even hatred were thought to provide the psychological animus behind the oppression of societally devalued or disadvantaged groups Influenced by psychoanalytic notions that destructive feelings and impulses submerged below the surface were the primary drivers of intergroup antagonism, many social and behavioral scholars viewed groups as something like Freud’s primal horde blinded by their bloodlust and rapacious desire for power (for reviews, see Duckitt, 1992; Mackie and Smith, 2002) Even the seemingly benevolent feeling of love and pride for one’s own group was refracted into a latent ethnocentrism that positioned own as superior and other as inferior when viewed through the prevailing lens Parallel developments in approaches to emotion and intergroup relations in the 1960s ushered in a radically different view, however At the same time as cognitive, phenomenological, and semiotic (or meaning-based) approaches to emotion began to replace psychodynamic notions, sociological and psychological approaches to intergroup relations began to increasingly understand emotion as a marker of the social and psychological quality of the actively constructed relations between groups Nowhere is this convergence of ideas more clear than in the sociological and psychological work on the concept of relative deprivation in the 1960s and 1970s Much of this work was an attempt to understand the social, political, and economical bases of the feelings of anger and resentment expressed by people around the world disenfranchised by colonialism, poverty, segregation, sexism, and other large-scale forces that promote inequality between groups (for a review, see Walker and Smith, 2002) What sociologists, psychologists, and economists came to see is that the anger in the streets, in Jakarta, in Watts, in Algiers, in Paris, was not the spitting, envious, 502 infantile, and irrational anger of the mob described by thinkers such as Freud, Le Bon, or Tarde Rather, the anger in the streets, in the music, and in the posture of the people, was an anger of resistance And, the action of this anger was often calculated, targeted, and the result of organized efforts to rebel Although many everyday accounts, and some scholarly ones, continue to describe collective rebellion as ‘riots’ of rage and ‘mob mentality,’ this view of emotion in intergroup relations is increasingly regarded as misguided (van Zomeren et al., 2012; Walker and Smith, 2002; see also Scott, 1977) Anger in Intergroup Relations At the heart of the revolution in thinking about group-based emotion and its role in rebellion was the idea that individuals can feel anger, resentment, and dissatisfaction about grievances that they share with other members of their ingroup This is called (a sense of) relative deprivation (for a review, see Walker and Smith, 2002) And, this shared anger is a basis for shared action to coordinate in-group members to rebel against those viewed as responsible for illegitimate deprivation In fact, a comprehensive empirical summary by Smith and Ortiz (2002) showed peoples’ feelings of group deprivation to be a potent predictor of the desire to protest, as well as actual protest In contrast, feeling dissatisfied about individual grievances has little link to protest, instead predicting psychological difficulties such as stress and poor well-being Recent integrative work on relative deprivation in sociology and social psychology shows that this form of anger can operate in conjunction with quite careful consideration of the material and other resources at one’s disposal and with deliberative estimations of the effectiveness of various strategies of protest Thus, rather than being an irrational and impulsive basis of destructive antagonism, anger about a group grievance is often part of a larger constellation of feelings, thoughts, and motivations aimed at best addressing the grievance (van Zomeren et al., 2012) A growing body of research on anger in intergroup relations more generally also shows that anger is a common response to a sense of grievance and that it routinely motivates people to resist, rebel, or otherwise take antagonistic action aimed at redressing a perceived wrong (for reviews, see Mackie and Smith, 2002; Parkinson et al., 2005) This is consistent with appraisal theories of emotion, which argue that International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.24057-9 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 502–506 Author's personal copy Emotions and Intergroup Relations the emotion of anger is based in part on appraisals (or interpretations) of an unpleasant event as a wrong that should be righted by some form of antagonistic action toward those responsible (see Lazarus, 1991) Although the experience of anger may be seen as implying that one has some modicum of power or control to act (Lazarus, 1991), the calculus of how to act most effectively appears to be a distinguishable process (van Zomeren et al., 2012) In fact, impulsive or otherwise poorly planned resistance can undermine the apparent purpose of anger by leading people to engage in unwise or ineffective action Combining anger with strategic concerns for the efficacy of possible action may be especially important in intergroup relations marked by dramatic differences in power, status, and moral commitment Like in all relationships, in intergroup relationships the aggrieved party must gauge what can and should be done with its anger This determination should be based in its assessment of the solidarity of feeling in the group and its ability to act in the concerted and coordinated way required for effective protest (van Zomeren et al., 2012) Of course, even the most organized group must also strategize in response to the coordination, power, status, and likely response of its adversary Thus, it is important to be aware that emotions such as anger not necessarily lead to antagonistic action irrespective of the quality of the intergroup relation in which the anger develops Emotions are, after all, relational As emotions emerge within relationship their expression in feeling and action also emerges within the relationship and is thus rooted in it (Lazarus, 1991; Tiedens and Leach, 2004) A group of workers, aggrieved at a cut in pay, is likely to express and act on its anger in the context of a cooperative relationship with benevolent management in a way quite different to another in a competitive relationship with blatantly exploitative or callous management Anger in a cooperative or otherwise benevolent relationship is more likely to manifest as a complaint oriented toward constructive efforts at changing the other party or the relationship itself for the better In contrast, anger in a competitive or otherwise malevolent relationship is more likely to be a protest oriented toward destructive efforts at punishing the other party, weakening their ability to further wrong, or reducing the material or psychological importance of the relationship itself (for discussions, see Parkinson et al., 2005; Tiedens and Leach, 2004) Other Examples of Emotions in Intergroup Relations Although work on anger and relative deprivation in intergroup relations continues, social psychological work in the last 15 years has come to focus on a wider range of emotions in a wider range of intergroup relations than the gross inequality typically studied in work on relative deprivation (for reviews, see Mackie and Smith, 2002; Parkinson et al., 2005; Tiedens and Leach, 2004) This recent effort was aided by Smith’s (1993) important ideas integrating the social psychology of group identity, emotion, and intergroup relations Since then, social psychologists have developed emotion-based approaches to relative group advantage (Leach et al., 2002), stereotypes (Fiske et al., 2002), prejudice (Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005), and a host of other phenomena that occur 503 within intergroup relations (for reviews, see Iyer and Leach, 2008; Mackie and Smith, 2002; Parkinson et al., 2005) Empathy In many ways, empathy is the most general way in which we can understand how the relations between parties affect them emotionally Indeed, empathy appears to be the psychological process by which the boundaries between people are transcended to increase understanding and responsiveness A prominent view in social psychology is that there are different kinds of empathy Three types are most often discussed: perspective-taking, empathic concern (i.e., sympathy, compassion), and empathic distress (Davis, 1983) However, empathy can also be thought of simply as the ability to simulate, or mirror, the cognitive, motivational, affective, and/or behavioral state of another organism (Iacoboni, 2009) Both perspectives seem valid According to the ethologist De Waal (2008), empathy and imitation share a hard-wired simulation mechanism observable in humans and many other social organisms This mechanism allows for simple and effortless types of empathy such as emotional contagion, mirroring, and motor mimicry But, as cognitive capacities increased over evolutionary history, this state-matching became more complex among social species to include more elaborate forms of empathy (e.g., concern for other and perspective-taking) and imitation (e.g., coordination, shared goals, emulation) Many empathy researchers are concerned with the question of how empathy translates into altruism and prosocial behavior De Waal’s (2008) examination of the evolution of empathy argues that the adaptiveness of empathy is determined by the degree of self–other differentiation, trust in reciprocity, and the value given reciprocal altruism Thus, where self and other are highly differentiated – perhaps because of tribal, ethnic, national, or other group distinctions – there is likely to be less empathy Less empathy is also expected in structural, political, and cultural contexts where reciprocity is not prioritized or is not possible Consistent with this view of empathy as rooted in social relations, psychological research has shown that empathy is less likely when others are not valued (Batson et al., 2007), and when others are seen as unfair (Singer et al., 2006) Self–other distinctions in power are also associated with lower empathy For example, powerful people engage less in perspective-taking (Galinsky et al., 2006), and show less empathic concern and more egocentric allocation than the less powerful (Dana et al., 2007) Where ‘market’ exchange relations and competitiveness are inherent ‘rules,’ the less powerful are seen as responsible for their own advancement Thus, the less powerful are ‘fair game’ for the more powerful to exploit without concern for their welfare Importantly, many of these trends can be eliminated by changing the rules of the game to espouse reciprocity (van der Weele et al., 2010) And inducing empathy can also eliminate the egocentrism that the powerful display in a ‘business transaction’ environment (Batson and Moran, 1999) However, in such environments the completely powerless are not seen as viable competitors for resources nor as responsible for their own advancement This evokes among the powerful feelings of social responsibility and altruistic International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 502–506 Author's personal copy 504 Emotions and Intergroup Relations behavior instead of competitive dominance and egocentric behavior (Handgraaf et al., 2008) Although much of the above work focuses on individuals’ empathy toward other individuals, it is clear that similar processes occur in the empathy that individuals experience toward members of out-groups (for a review, see Weiner, 1995) For example, Fong (2007) found that poor people, who are seen as having some power and as responsible for their poverty, invite less empathy and help from others Similarly, empathy for groups victimized by war or oppression is increased by valuing the group and by not seeing the group as responsible for its own suffering (e.g., Cehajic et al., 2009) At an even simpler level, intergroup distinctions between self and other affect the level of empathy that people experience Thus, whether in the majority or the minority, ethnic groups show greater empathic neural responses to in-group than to outgroup members (for a review, see Chiao and Mathur, 2010) Although people appear to be especially empathetic to fellow in-group members, this too appears to be modulated by power and status In fact, members of low power or otherwise subordinate groups show an even greater bias in favor of empathizing with in-group members than members of dominant groups (Chiao and Mathur, 2010) Consistent with De Waal’s (2008) more general view, this is likely the result of the lesser value and trust given to intergroup reciprocity by subordinate groups, who have more reason to wary of reciprocity in unequal intergroup relations Indeed, members of subordinate groups distrust dominant groups and authorities more than others, often with good reason (for a review, see Bou Zeineddine and Pratto, 2014) Especially for subordinate groups then, being more empathic toward the in-group than the dominant out-group reduces the individual costs and risks associated with nonreciprocated empathy and altruism In contrast, for powerful or dominant groups, there is little cost, little risk (and little value) in empathizing with the less powerful even if they are unlikely to reciprocate (see also Leach et al., 2002) The greater prevalence of opportunityhoarding, dominance, and exploitation among advantaged groups who have overcome the problem of subsistence has strengthened their orientation toward competition and profit (see Scott, 1977) When combined with recent shifts toward greater individualism and narcissism, such dominance may be expected to reduce empathy (see Konrath et al., 2011) The literature on empathy also shows many ways in which empathy can be used to improve intergroup relations In their review, Batson and Ahmad (2009) identify perspective-taking as especially promising in reducing stereotyping, increasing situational explanations of suffering, and fostering positive attitudes, empathic concern, and willingness to help outgroups Because of this, many interventions aim to improve intergroup relations by inducing or encouraging empathy for the disadvantaged For example, the encouragement of empathy is used in conflict resolution and reconciliation workshops and antidiscrimination and bullying educational programs In many of these interventions, personalizing contact with individual members of disadvantaged groups, sympathy-provoking examples, and/or the identification of common goals initiate perspective-taking Perspective-taking, and the associated situational explanations of suffering, generate empathic concern for the out-group member Concern for the out-group member translates to concern for the outgroup as a whole It is unclear, however, how such efforts at using empathy to reduce prejudice and improve understanding might translate into larger scale change at the cultural, political, or structural level There is a danger that the effects of empathy interventions remain psychological and local, never translating to the core aspects of the intergroup relation that are likely to have reduced empathy in the first place Future work would well to better integrate the macro- and microelements of empathy so that this important concept can be better used to examine and improve intergroup relations Pride and Other Positive Emotions Likely because unpleasant emotions are considered more common or more important in intergroup relations, there is decidedly less work on pleasant feelings, such as pride, joy, and satisfaction (for reviews, see Iyer and Leach, 2008; Parkinson et al., 2005) This parallels work on emotion more generally, which also tends to parse unpleasant emotions more finely and to thereby focus on a larger variety of unpleasant emotions (see Lazarus, 1991; Tiedens and Leach, 2004) Often, when pleasant emotions are examined, they are taken to be problematic for intergroup relations For example, some recent studies examine Schadenfreude – satisfaction at seeing an out-group suffer a defeat or other misfortune Gloating over the inferiority of out-groups is another emotion that is implied in work on expressions of in-group superiority, nationalism, collective narcissism, and the excessive glorification of the in-group (for a discussion, see Leach et al., 2002) This has some similarity to notions of individual narcissism and hubristic pride, as such positive feelings are thought to be exaggerated and unnecessarily antagonistic (Tracy et al., 2007) There is surprisingly little work on the seemingly more prevalent and pervasive feeling of pride that people feel about their national, ethnic, political, and other in-group memberships (for a review, see Leach et al., 2002) However, the experience of pride is often implied in a lot of theory and research on the experience and expression of positive in-group identity Whether higher or lower in power and status, ingroups that afford positive identification are presumed to lead individuals to feel proud of their membership in the group Such pride is expected to lead members to view the group and its future more optimistically and it is expected to lead members to be more committed to the group and be more willing to sacrifice for the group’s benefit However, more work is needed to determine whether, when, and why pride in one’s in-group is related to the perceived in-group superiority and hostility toward out-groups that are more obviously troublesome for intergroup relations Shame and Guilt In an effort to understand perpetrator groups’ acknowledgment of their mistreatment of out-groups and their possible role in processes of restitution and reconciliation, researchers have recently focused on self-critical emotions about in-group wrongdoing like shame and guilt (for reviews, see Branscombe and Doosje, 2004; Iyer and Leach, 2008; Parkinson et al., 2005) Although the words ‘shame’ and ‘guilt’ are often used International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 502–506 Author's personal copy Emotions and Intergroup Relations interchangeably in everyday English, they are typically conceptualized as two distinct emotions that have distinct implications for intergroup relations in light of group wrongdoing The prevalent view in emotion theory and research is that guilt is a feeling of regret and blameworthiness for causing another party harm As such, guilt is thought to be linked to empathy for the other’s suffering and thus a desire to make restitution for it (e.g., apology, compensation) Shame is thought to be a more intense and aversive state of self-criticism focused on the perpetrator’s flaw rather than the harm caused the victim Thus, shame is thought to be less moral than guilt, motivating perpetrators to avoid their misdeeds and those harmed by them (Tracy et al., 2007) There is now ample evidence that individuals can feel shame and guilt about the wrongdoing of their group (for reviews, see Branscombe and Doosje, 2004; Parkinson et al., 2005) Like most other such group-based emotions, shame and guilt are greater when individuals feel psychologically connected to their in-group and recognize its role in wrongdoing against undeserving victims (for a review, see Iyer and Leach, 2008) For example, Iyer et al (2007) found students in the US and the UK to report feeling a little guilty and a little more ashamed about their country’s occupation of Iraq and its detrimental effects on the citizenry Both feelings were associated with holding the in-group responsible and viewing its actions as illegitimate Consistent with this, both shame and guilt predicted a greater desire to see the US and the UK withdraw from Iraq and to compensate Iraqis for the damage done Although anger was most associated with wanting to confront the respective governments for the wrongdoing, shame and guilt were also associated with this sort of antagonistic political action These findings are consistent with a great deal of other work showing that individuals’ guilt about an in-group’s wrongdoing is tied to wanting to make up for the wrongdoing, typically by apologizing or compensating (for a review, see Branscombe and Doosje, 2004) Although the positive effects of shame in Iyer et al (2007) run in contrast to the general view of this emotion as oriented to the avoidance of wrongdoing, numerous recent studies also show shame to be linked to the constructive approach of in-group misdeeds (for a review, see Gausel and Leach, 2011) One reason that shame may be linked to wanting to make restitution for in-group wrongdoing is that the feeling of shame can be based in a concern for the in-group’s image in the eyes of others In fact, in Iyer et al (2007), participants’ shame was linked to a concern that the country’s social image in the eyes of others was threatened by their occupation of Iraq One way to reduce this threat to social image is to make restitution to the out-group in an attempt to reestablish the in-group’s moral standing (for a review, see Gausel and Leach, 2011) Many countries, for example, make material or symbolic restitution to out-groups they have mistreated in an effort to regain acceptance in ‘the international community’ after being condemned by them Indeed, membership in international organizations, such as the United Nations or the European Union, is sometimes predicated on aspirants atoning for past wrongs The European Union pushing Turkey to acknowledge the mass killing of Armenians in the early twentieth century is only one example of this 505 Shame about in-group wrongdoing can also be linked to support for restitution because group members wish to improve the collective self-image damaged by their wrongdoing (Gausel and Leach, 2011) Because shame is more focused on peoples’ identity as good, shame may motivate change of the self in a way that guilt’s focus on the harm of wrongdoing may not Where shame is the result of an intense self-criticism for a failing in the self that can be repaired, shame is likely to lead to concerted effort to improve the self (Gausel and Leach, 2011) By improving the group’s failing, shame may offer a more profound change that is more promising for the in-group’s relation to the out-group relations and is thus more satisfying to the affected out-group Of course, where shame is felt about an irreparably damaged social image or self-image, such shame is likely to lead to the kind of avoidance of wrongdoing and those affected by it that emotion theory and research consider detrimental to social relations Thus, the latest theory and research on shame and guilt about in-group perpetrators of wrongdoing suggest that the reparability or irreparability of the wrongdoing is more important to understanding what group members will than whether they experience shame or guilt As feelings of self-criticism, both shame and guilt may motivate constructive efforts when this criticism is aimed at a wrongdoing that is seen as reparable through concerted action On the other hand, feelings of selfcriticism, especially the more intense emotion of shame, may motivate an avoidance designed to defend self-image and social image when it appears that little can be done to redress the in-group’s wrongdoing Taken together, this line of thinking suggests that those who wish to encourage constructive efforts to repair wrongdoing and to reconcile perpetrator and victim would well to encourage perpetrator and victim to view the wrongdoing and the intergroup relation as reparable Conclusion Emotion has long been considered important to the relations between groups This is because emotions can be powerful collective experiences that people share with like-minded others Such shared emotion is a sign of the solidarity that enables coordinate and concerted action as a group, such as in a protest or a parade Although emotions were frequently considered an irrational and impulsive basis of conflict between groups, it should be clear that emotions are now typically thought of as the social and psychological meaning that individuals give to their membership in a group and to its relation with other groups As such, the emotions that people feel about intergroup relations are useful to social and behavioral science because they are potent symbols for the meaning people give to their experience (Tiedens and Leach, 2004) To know that a group’s members are angry about a court decision is to know that they feel that the decision is unfair and that they may be prepared to act against it In contrast, to know that the group is sad is to know that they are disappointed about the court decision and that they are unsure if they have the wherewithal to respond Social and behavioral scientists use emotion terms to describe these experiences for the same reason that the people they study use emotions to characterize their own experience; emotions are pregnant with meaning and International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 502–506 Author's personal copy 506 Emotions and Intergroup Relations motive Thus, compassion, pride, joy, shame, anger, envy, disappointment, and the like allow us to convey a great deal about what we think, what we feel, and what we wish to about the world we live in and those we live with Poets, priests, and politicians all recognize this power in emotion, and thus work at moving people to common feeling for a common purpose Those who wish to understand such collective mobilization would well to examine and understand the social psychological processes at the heart of emotion See also: Collective Behavior, Social Psychology of; Culture and Emotion; 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IZA Discussion Paper No 5374 http://ssrn com/abstract¼1728331 Weiner, B., 1995 Inferences of responsibility and social motivation Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 27, 1–47 van Zomeren, M., Leach, C.W., Spears, R., 2012 Protesters as “passionate economists”: a dynamic dual pathway model of coping with collective disadvantage Personality and Social Psychology Review 16, 180–199 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 502–506 ... used to examine and improve intergroup relations Pride and Other Positive Emotions Likely because unpleasant emotions are considered more common or more important in intergroup relations, there... in intergroup relations marked by dramatic differences in power, status, and moral commitment Like in all relationships, in intergroup relationships the aggrieved party must gauge what can and. .. personal copy Emotions and Intergroup Relations interchangeably in everyday English, they are typically conceptualized as two distinct emotions that have distinct implications for intergroup relations