Singapores role in indonesias confrontation of malaysia and the impact of confrontation on singapore indonesia relations 3

Chapter 1: Introduction This dissertation examines the role Singapore played in Confrontation and how Confrontation has affected Singapore-Indonesia relations. The orthodox historiography of this bilateral relationship tends to start with the period of hostility during the Confrontation years from 1963 to 1966. After the Confrontation came to an end in 1966 when Suharto took power from Sukarno, Singapore-Indonesia relations were still marked by hostility because of the execution of the two Indonesian marines in 1968 despite Suharto‘s pleas for clemency. However, relations became cordial and cooperative in 1973 until 1998 when Suharto stepped down. In the post 1998 or post New Order period, relations have been characterised by moments of unfriendly exchanges although the overall tenor of the relationship has remained close and cooperative (Hamilton-Hart, 2009). While this orthodox interpretation is commonly accepted as the way bilateral relations progressed, the study of how British decolonisation affected bilateral relations has not been subjected to much scrutiny. Indonesia‘s Confrontation of Malaysia was a major event in the British decolonisation process in Southeast Asia and has largely been examined from the domestic political and British strategic points of view. This dissertation highlights the agency of the political actors involved in the politics of decolonisation, Confrontation, and nation-building during the 1960s, with a focus on how Singapore played a central role in escalating regional tensions during Confrontation. The focus on Singapore‘s long overlooked role during Confrontation is important because it sheds light on the key role Confrontation played in the re- organisation and development of the international relations of Southeast Asian postcolonial states.1 An appreciation of the role played by Singapore in relation to the role played by Indonesia in the prelude to Confrontation which was characterised by the British decolonisation process in Southeast Asia, the Confrontation years from 1963 to 1966, and the aftermath of Confrontation up till 1973 when Singapore-Indonesia relations were restored, highlights how each side drove the conflict and thus related to each other. These years were marked by the search by both countries (although Singapore was then briefly part of Malaysia) for their own post-colonial identity which was played out in the form of their strategic and international behaviour during the Confrontation years. The focus on Singapore‘s role in the prelude to Confrontation and the years of the conflict is significant because, firstly, it challenges notions about the hegemonic role Indonesia plays in Southeast Asia. For example, Ganesan argues that ―Indonesian political stability and leadership are crucial to the maintenance of a stable environment in Southeast Asia‖ and that ―in a positive situation, Indonesian hegemonic ambitions would be usefully channelled into a regional leadership role, not unlike its primus inter pares status in ASEAN. On the other hand, in a negative situation, the entire region could become politically turbulent, akin to the Indonesian military confrontation against Malaysia between 1963 and 1966‖ (2005: 81). Sorensen highlighted in 1997 that the post-colonial state is one other main state prototype in the international system in addition to the ―taken for granted‖ Westphalian state, which has largely formed the basis for the analysis of conflict and cooperation in the international system. However, this approach fails to ―adequately investigate substantial changes in statehood and their consequences for conflict and cooperation‖, which requires an analysis of how ―specific types of statehood set the stage for distinct forms of conflict and cooperation.‖ (―An Analysis of Contemporary Statehood: Consequences for Conflict Cooperation‖, Review of International Studies, Vol.23 No.3, Jul 1997, pp. 267-268) Thus, it appears that an explanation for Confrontation was that Indonesian hegemonic ambitions were not accommodated in a positive manner. Similarly, Emmers argues that, in the quest for hegemony in maritime Southeast Asia, ―Indonesia exercised coercive power in the mid-1960s‖ (2005: 649) in the form of Confrontation. Emmers also addresses the question of whether Indonesia can be regarded as a regional hegemon possessing the ability to ―inflict punishment on a regional and international rival, to cause a change in the distribution of power as well as the pattern of relationships by its ability to act alone, and to develop a process to achieve consent and restraint among rivals within a region‖ (Kapur, cited in Emmers, 2005: 647). Indonesia, however, could not and did not act unilaterally in a way that set the pattern of relationships in Southeast Asia. While Sukarno and his political leaders at that time expressed their vision of what post-colonial Southeast Asia should be – Hatta in fact echoed consistent Indonesian claims that ―Indonesia has no territorial claims whatsoever beyond the area of the former Netherlands Indies‖ (a posture which was consistently ignored or distrusted by Britain and her allies who held the belief that Sukarno had to have expansionist ambitions) and that ―once Indonesia had achieved independence, the ending of colonialism everywhere became one of the objectives of its foreign policy‖ (1965: 139) – it did not mean that Indonesia harboured territorial ambitions and sought regional hegemony. This was because Singapore‘s interests and strategies relating to the establishment of Malaysia and how the PAP collaborated with the Tunku and the British to form Malaysia were crucial factors pushing Indonesia on the path towards Confrontation.2 Poulgrain argues that ―the British played a part in fomenting confrontation to facilitate the inclusion of Sarawak in the formation of Malaysia‖ and that ―given the conditions which prevailed in Sarawak in late 1962 and early 1963, the principles of anti-colonialism espoused by Sukarno inevitable drew him and Indonesia into Konfrontasi‖ (―The Genesis of Konfrontasi: Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, 1945- Secondly, a focus on Singapore‘s role in Confrontation challenges the notion that the relationship was asymmetrical in nature and Singapore played an essentially reactive role in the bilateral relationship (Hamilton-Hart, 2009). This reactive role is expressed in the form of the ―practice of foreign policy predicated on countering an innate vulnerability (which) is a function of a minuscule scale, a predominantly ethnic Chinese identity associated with a traditional entrepot role and also a location wedged between the sea and airspace of two larger neighbours with which Singapore has never been politically at ease‖ (Leifer, 2000: 1). While Confrontation was one significant instance where Singapore was not politically at ease with both Malaysia and Indonesia, the nature of Singapore‘s relationship with both countries was not one where Singapore merely played a reactive role. This was shown in the key role Singapore played in setting up the conflict through its pursuit of merger with Malaya and internationally as a counterweight to Indonesia‘s diplomatic offensive against Malaysia. Indonesia‘s Confrontation against Malaysia was an enigma, beginning and ending ―cryptically, hesitantly and shrouded in ambiguities‖ (Mackie, 1974: 1). In fact, when Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman made the public proposal on 27 May 1961 that Malaya, Singapore, Brunei and the ―British colonial possessions‖ of Sabah and Sarawak be ―incorporated within a single political frame‖, the Indonesian reaction was ―neither truly sympathetic nor truly discouraging‖ (Leifer, 1983: 76). However, after the Brunei revolt in December 1962, the Indonesian Government began to express opposition to the said Malaysia Plan.3 1965‖, C.Hurst & Co., 1998, UK, p. 10). This dissertation illuminates how Lee Kuan Yew‘s interests and strategies regarding Malaysia were largely aligned with and pushed along the British decolonisation plan, resulting in Confrontation. According to Leifer, ―Until the uprising in Brunei in December 1962, the only explicit opposition to the formation of Malaysia from within Indonesia had been expressed by the Central Committee of the Subsequently, the Indonesians criticised this Malaysia Plan vehemently as a British ‗neo-colonialist project‘ and as a threat to their country‘s security (Mackie, 1974: 3). Despite Indonesian opposition to Malaysia, the new state came into being on 16 September 1963 when Malaya merged with the former British colonies of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. Indonesia‘s subsequent launch of Confrontation against Malaysia was described by The Times of London as ―the most irrational of all recent disputes‖ (Boyce, 1968: xi). This dissertation argues that it is through an analysis of Southeast Asian, in particular, Singaporean and Indonesian perspectives, strategic interests and behaviour with regard to the concept of Malaysia and Malaysia‘s formation, as well as how Confrontation was really a means for establishing a postcolonial international foundation for Southeast Asia through ―creative destruction‖, that we can understand the ―irrationality‖ of this conflict – why it started and took the course it did. 1.1 The formation of Malaysia: The key role of Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew Indonesia‘s opposition to the newly created state that was Malaysia was based on the perception that Malaya‘s independence which was declared by the Tunku on 31 August 1957 was a ―sham while the making of Malaysia was a neo-colonial conspiracy‖ (Stockwell, in Burroughs and Stockwell (eds) 1998: 139). According to Fieldhouse, ―neo-colonialism .came into general use only in the 1950s as a consequence of the withdrawal of political control from an increasing number of European colonies; and its implication is that for a less developed country the normal end of colonialism does not necessarily result in genuine independence‖ (1981: 8). Communist Party in December 1961. The significance of such opposition was less in its timing than in its terms, which foreshadowed the idiom in which Sukarno was to reject the legitimacy of the new federation. It was described as ‗a new concentration of colonial forces on the very frontiers of Indonesia‘ and ‗an unacceptable colonial intrigue‘‖. (―Indonesia‘s Foreign Policy‖, Allen and Unwin, 1983, UK, p. 77) Malaysia was regarded by its detractors as the embodiment of neo-colonialism in Southeast Asia because it appeared to maintain British hegemony over its constituent parts which all had shared the experience of British colonial rule. The perpetuation of British influence over the post-colonial state of Malaysia was made possible due to the state-society relationships and institutions established during colonial times (Stockwell, 1998: 139). Stockwell questions whether Malaysia‘s establishment was the making of a neo-colony, arguing that ―neo-colonialism is flawed so far as Anglo-Malayan relations are concerned .(and) a preliminary review of the government record indicates a number of weaknesses regarding its application to the period from the coming of independence to the formation of Malaysia‖ (Stockwell, 1998: 144). British and Australian archival records that sketched out the course towards Malaysia‘s establishment validate Stockwell‘s thesis. Archival records revealed that the lead-up to Malaysia Day on 16 September 1963 was fraught with pitfalls that reflected how British plans were influenced by the objectives and ambitions of the Malayan, Indonesian and Singaporean leadership. One such pitfall was the pressing concerns of the Indonesians on the question of whether the people of the North Borneo territories were willing to be part of Malaysia, which formed the main basis for Indonesian opposition to Malaysia and accusations that the new state was the embodiment of British neo-colonialism. This concern was revealed by Mr Djokojuwono of the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs on 13 December 1962, shortly after the Brunei revolt, which signalled the start of a more assertive policy against Malaysia. He emphasised Indonesia‘s natural legitimate interest in developments in a neighbouring territory and the implementation of the Malaysia proposal which was a threat to Indonesia‘s security. Djokojuwono went on to say that ―If the Malaysia plan was acceptable to the people involved and had gone through smoothly then that was well and good. Indonesia would accept such a situation. However, events had taken a new turn‖ (A1838/3006/4/7, 13 December 1962, NAA). Djokojuwono also said that Indonesia was likely to ―make a statement emphasising the need for the people of North Borneo to be fully consulted regarding implementation of the Malaysia plan‖ (A1838/3006/4/7, 13 December 1962, NAA). Djokojuwono‘s position portrayed one significant aspect of the difficulties faced by the British in the last stages of the movement toward the establishment of Malaysia, resulting in a challenge to the British de-colonisation policy of which two guiding principles were ―that the new political leaders who assumed the reins of power when the Colonial Office departed should be known to be amenable to continued British investment; and the other, that the political environment envisaged by the British as best suited to such regional development did not include Sukarno as leader of neighbouring Indonesia‖ (Poulgrain, 1998: 6). Therefore, Anglo-Malayan relations after Malaya‘s independence in 1957 up to Malaysia‘s formation were not characterised by absolute British control over the nature of the relationship and the political future of Malaysia and Indonesian opposition towards Malaysia was one factor that threatened the disruption of the Malaysia plan. On the surface, Britain‘s plan to grant independence to its colonies in Southeast Asia as one state rather than separate states seems to suggest a strong neocolonialist undercurrent. Although the broad official British line was that ―the aim of British policy in Asia should be to encourage and persuade and help Asian countries to conduct their own affairs in an orderly, efficient, and peaceful way‖ (Stockwell, 1998: 149), which may be reflective of the objective that the former colonies secure genuine independence after colonial rule, the reality was that ―London was principally concerned to achieve the merger of Singapore and Malaysia (as) (t)his was regarded as crucial to the security of both the island and the broader region‖ (Stockwell, 1998: 149).4 This British concern with merging Singapore with Malaya to form Malaysia despite the practical difficulties of doing so5 points to an aspiration to perpetuate British influence over the post-colonial politics of the territories that were to form Malaysia. This aspiration was expressed in the form of the Grand Design, a pet project put forward by Malcolm MacDonald, the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia in the early 1950s. By 1955, MacDonald had stated that the ultimate goal of British colonial policy in Southeast Asia should be this Grand Design (Easter, 2004: 5-6) which later, in the 1960s, was revived as a way ―to accommodate the rising force of nationalism in Asia-Africa if Britain‘s influence was to survive in the postcolonial world‖, especially the ―growing nationalist assertiveness in Singapore‖ (Subritzky, 2000: 210). However, although this Grand Design was MacDonald‘s pet project, its enactment was, to a large extent, shaped by the Tunku‘s and Lee Kuan Domestically, Britain also faced tensions over the issue of how its policy towards its former colonies should evolve. For example, ―institutional fragmentation occasionally threatened to sabotage Britain‘s Malaysia policy (and) the perspectives of officials in Southeast Asia varied with the office which they held and the careers they had followed‖ (See Stockwell, 1998: 148-149). The difficulties in forming Malaysia lay in the sheer diversity of the various territories involved which were connected only by the thread of British colonialism. Easter commented on this state of affairs when he wrote that, ―in the 1950s Britain possessed a motley collection of colonies in Southeast Asia. On the mainland there was Malaya, a major producer of rubber and tin with a mixed population of indigenous Malays and immigrant Chinese. At the tip of the Malayan peninsula lay the small island colony of Singapore, with a predominantly Chinese population. 435 miles to the east across the South China Sea, Britain had two more colonies on the island of Borneo; North Borneo and Sarawak, whose population consisted of a complex mix of Malays, Chinese and tribal peoples such as Dayaks and Kadayans. Nestling in amongst Sarawak was the tiny Sultanate of Brunei, a British protectorate with great potential oil wealth. Despite the differences between these individual territories, British policymakers were periodically interested in merging them together to create an independent state‖ (2004: 5). Yew‘s interests and objectives regarding the political futures of Malaya and Singapore. This was indicative of how British neo-colonial aspirations faced an important challenge from its former colonies. The Greater Malaysia plan and the prelude to the establishment of the Federation that was Malaysia, was manipulated by the political leadership in Malaya and Singapore, showing that British did not have a free hand to whatever they wished. This supports Karl Hack‘s thesis that ―the reason for federation .had much to with local developments, little to with British plotting‖ (Hack, 2001: 275, cited in Tan Tai Yong, 2008: 4). Similarly, archival records reveal that ―as with other instances of decolonisation in Africa, the British, far from operating as the hegemonic director of an orderly process of withdrawal in the early 1960s, were forced into courses of action that they would have preferred to avoid, as bargains were struck and timetables set by the political leaders in Malaya and Singapore‖ (Jones, 2000: 86). These assessments are validated by Lord Selkirk, the UK High Commissioner of Singapore and British Commissioner in Southeast Asia, who remarked that ―Whitehall in fact took no initiative until the Federation had been proposed, first in private and then in public, by the Prime Minister of Malaya and immediately supported by the Prime Minister of Singapore .It was only after the proposals had been endorsed by all the territories concerned that Whitehall gave its full cooperation to the establishment of the Federation and sought to make it a success‖ (Selkirk, 1965, cited in Tan Tai Yong, 2008: 4). Therefore, while the idea of Malaysia had its origins in British neo-colonialist aspirations, it was the political leadership in Malaya and Singapore that drove the state-building project forward. The Tunku‘s role was crucial in bringing about Malaysia and improvising on the British Grand Design which was essentially a blueprint for the de-colonisation process in Southeast Asia to solve the following two separate problems. The Grand Design ―would provide a viable political entity for the Borneo colonies, considered too small and unsophisticated to survive by themselves as an independent state; and it would allow the transfer to the Malayans of responsibility for internal security in Singapore, thereby relieving Britain of an onerous, costly, and politically demanding task‖ (Subritzky, 2000: 210). The British wanted the Grand Design to be ―gradualist‖ because the Colonial Office believed that Britain ―would first have to bring the Borneans to political maturity‖ (Easter, 2004: 6). However, the Tunku had other plans. He perceived the usefulness of the Grand Design as a means to ―forestall possible Indonesian or Philippine claims on the Borneo colonies (and) more importantly, he saw it as a way of merging the economically important colony of Singapore with Malaya without disrupting Malaya‘s delicate racial balance‖ (Easter, 2004: 6). Thus, the Tunku made the socalled ―historic‖ announcement on 27 May 1961 in Singapore when he ―sounded the possibility of bringing the territories of Singapore, Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak and the Federation of Malaya closer together in political and economic cooperation‖ (Tan Tai Yong, 2008: 4). By making this announcement, the Tunku revived the British strategy for divesting control over its colonies in Southeast Asia. The British Grand Design was therefore to a large extent, pushed along by the Tunku who then invited Lee Kuan Yew, who was Singapore‘s Prime Minister, on 25 July 1961, ―to engage in preliminary discussions on the future constitutional 10 denounce the exploitation of man by man‖ (Penders and Hering (eds), 1977: 248). Later in July 1965, a ―Manifesto of the Malayan National Liberation League‖ was published in the Peking Review, with its vision as the ―struggle to crush ―Malaysia‖ and for the genuine independence of Malaya‖ (FO371/181492, July 1965, National Archives, UK). According to the ―programme‖ of this Jakarta-based Malayan National Liberation League, there were aims to ―realise the genuine independence of Malaya (including Singapore)‖ and to ―support the national-liberation struggle of North Kalimantan‖ (FO371/191492, July 1965, National Archives, UK). This was corroborated by Hatta who wrote, ―the leaders of Indonesia‘s freedom struggle were not solely concerned with a free Indonesia; they also demanded the liberation of all peoples from every type of colonial domination and oppression‖ (1965: 139). Thus, it appears that the alignment of Peking‘s support of ―crush Malaysia‖ and Hatta‘s statement that Indonesia demanded liberation from ―colonial domination and oppression‖ for ―all peoples‖ were reflective of the attempt of Sukarno‘s Government define Indonesia‘s strategic concerns in terms of the Chinese Communist Party‘s ideology.68 In contrast, the PAP‘s attempt to establish Singapore‘s national self-image in terms of the decolonisation experience manifested itself in the endeavour to find liberation from colonial domination through merger with Malaya and therefore support for the British-created ―Greater Malaysia‖. This led the PAP to play a key role in the formation of Malaysia through persuading the leaders in the Borneo territories to go ahead with Britain‘s Malaysia plan, conducting what was perceived by the Barisan Sosialis and Indonesian Government as a sham Singapore referendum in 1962 that ostensibly demonstrated popular support in Singapore for the Malaysia plan, the 68 One shared strategic goal between Sukarno‘s Indonesia and Peking was ―the fragmentation of Malaysia and replacement of its government by ‗anti-imperialist‘ regimes‖ (Sutter, 1966: 532). 238 opportunistic use of the Brunei revolt to suppress the Barisan Sosialis and other opposition to the Malaysia plan, and the non-support for the already nebulous and fragile Maphilindo which was a last-ditch attempt to avoid Confrontation based on a confederation of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia. The process of the formation of the state of Malaysia was therefore influenced heavily by the PAP‘s strategic objective of state survival within the anarchic international system which was embodied in the British de-colonisation policy and withdrawal from Southeast Asia. The contrast between the attitudes of the PAP and the Sukarno Government regarding the establishment of Malaysia led to the establishment of a bilateral relationship between two political entities which was driven, to a large extent, by the opposing goals of fostering and preventing the formation of Malaysia respectively. It was through this dynamic whereby both sets of political leaders engaged in debates over the ―moral personality‖ of Malaysia that the perspective that Confrontation was informed by the objectives of Southeast Asian political elites is illuminated. This was shown in chapters to which traced how the contest over Malaysia‘s moral personality and right to exist escalated into and characterised Confrontation, following which, Confrontation provided a means for re-organising the relations among the states of Southeast Asia into ASEAN. Chapters and covered the means by which states, especially Singapore and Indonesia, shaped the course of Confrontation based on the pursuit of their own interests. The chapters discussed the experiences of Singapore and Indonesia during the Confrontation years which were essentially marked by the continuation of the debates over Malaysia‘s personality which again centred on the grievances relating to Malaysia‘s establishment. This was reflected in the way that Confrontation was the 239 ultimate expression of the moral tug of war over Malaysia‘s perceived status as a graft of the British neo-colonial empire in Southeast Asia and how the Confrontation years were to a large extent the continuation of moral debates over the principles of Malaysia. This found expression in the diplomatic and economic fronts of Confrontation which portrayed the contest over Malaysia‘s right to exist as a moral question. My analysis of these two fronts of Confrontation highlighted the importance of Singapore in the moral dimension of the conflict. On the diplomatic front, Singapore, despite not being a truly independent and sovereign state during the Confrontation period, played a key role in the diplomatic theatre over the moral personality of Malaysia and its right to exist internationally through the conduct of active diplomacy, especially in the Afro-Asian world, to garner support for Malaysia and to counter Indonesia‘s diplomatic propaganda against Malaysia. This role which Singapore assumed incorporated several important implications in the form of setting the tone through the refusal of Singapore‘s PAP leadership to be a mere graft of Malaysia, as demonstrated by their propensity to attempt to influence the course and conduct of Malaysia‘s foreign policy which may be traced as far back as 1955, and the deepening of the rift between the Tunku and Sukarno through this diplomatic contest for Malaysia, which strongly echoed the case of the West Irian issue. As for the moral aspect of economic Confrontation, Singapore was a main target of the Indonesians. This had deeper historical roots. According to Ganis Harsono, an Indonesian diplomat of the Sukarno era, past history showed that the Netherlands East Indies government had bowed to the economic supremacy of British Singapore. The Netherlands East Indies government in Batavia had to accept the undesirable fact that part of Sumatra, the Riau archipelago, was under direct economic 240 control of Singapore. British colonial currency, the Straits dollar, was the only money in circulation there and not the Dutch East Indies gulden or the rupiah. The Sumatran eastern seaboard from Belawan-Deli to Selat Panjang during Dutch colonial times had moved within British Singapore‘s economic sphere of influence. Singapore was the base for smuggling operations that had greatly harmed Dutch economic interests in Sumatra. Dutch counterfeit money was produced in Singapore and smuggled into the Dutch East Indies easily. Also, a Singapore cartel system controlled the vast fishing industry of Sumatra‘s Bagan Siapiapi. This situation remained the same under the Japanese when Singapore was known as Syonanto. To make matters worse, the Japanese administration in Indonesia was under direct control of the Japanese military high command in Syonanto and so depleted Indonesia‘s resources. This situation remained nearly the same during the republican period from 1945 to 1961. Therefore, the Malaysia campaign was designed to help President Sukarno end this harmful situation for Indonesian economic interests. The first thing Sukarno did was to banish the Straits dollar from the Riau archipelago and secure the circulation of the rupiah in that area. Smuggling was brought to a halt by having Indonesian patrol boats cruise frequently in the waters and small straits around the area. Sabang on the northern tip of Sumatra was converted into a free port. Construction of the trans-Sumatra highway, long-planned and longdelayed, finally began. Other countries were persuaded to trade directly with Indonesia instead of importing Sumatran produce through Singapore. Sukarno also began lecturing the Sumatrans: ―More than fifty percent of Singapore‘s wealth was derived from your hard toil,‖ he said, ―You bartered your products with Singapore and with it skyscrapers sprang up like mushrooms in that island city. And what you get in return? Cheap plastic crockery, worthless transistors, and toy watches. Stop this 241 barter trade with Singapore and organise yourself into strong economic units to advance your area and to make Belawan-Deli the greatest seaport in Southeast Asia‖ (Penders and Hering (eds), 1977: 249-250). Harsono‘s words suggest that SingaporeIndonesia economic rivalry was a continuation of Anglo-Dutch trade and economic rivalry in Southeast Asia during the colonial era. Thus, the enduring colonial legacies of the British and the Dutch on Singapore and Indonesia respectively came to a head in the form of Confrontation. Harono‘s account implies that the economic aspect of Confrontation was also essentially moral in nature. This was corroborated by Subandrio‘s words to Lee Kuan Yew in 1963, ―Look at all the tall buildings in Singapore. They are all built with Indonesian money, stolen from Indonesians through smuggling. But never mind, one day Indonesia will come here and look after this country and put this right‖ (Lee Kuan Yew, 2000: 295). Subandrio‘s words also reflected the ―certain dignity of principle‖ that was driving the economic aspect of Confrontation. Finally, Subandrio‘s and Harsono‘s disclosures also provide the perspective that historical factors and the international distribution of power were reasons for Indonesian hostility towards Singapore during the Confrontation years. This highlights how Confrontation comprised of the inter-weaving of moral imperatives and more mundane economic disputes as well as strategic interests. Chapter discussed the political and military fronts of Confrontation which were characterised more by geopolitical rhetoric about crushing Malaysia than by any sustained military effort. This was reflected the Confrontation was not an organised military campaign. However, when taking the perspective that Confrontation was an expression of a clear campaign against Malaysia‘s legitimacy, we may be able to explain why the Indonesian political leadership consistently reiterated that it did not 242 have expansionist ambitions and that it was ultimately committed to peace. Also, the haphazardness of the military campaigns shows that the conflict was essentially a matter of principle. In addition, Weinstein has suggested that the Indonesian army never undertook any significant military action in support of Confrontation because of both the ―appreciation of Britain‘s strength and partly because they feared that any plan involving the diversion of the army‘s best units to Kalimantan would leave Java perilously vulnerable to the PKI‖ (1969: 7). While such self-interested strategic motives may be the more proximate reasons why the military aspect of Confrontation was limited, the fact that the army ―retained a vocal public commitment to confrontation throughout the pre-coup period‖ (Weinstein, 1969: 8) reinforces the argument that Confrontation was more of an expression of Indonesia‘s political ideology than an all-out military conflict. This was shown in the way a British memorandum reviewing the ―developments concerning Confrontation‖ reported that General Nasution made several ―uncompromising anti-Necolim statements looking forward to the dissolution of Malaysia and the elimination of foreign bases‖ (FO371/187546, National Archives, UK). Around the same time that Nasution affirmed the army‘s commitment to Confrontation, the first independent army contacts with Malaysian representatives may have taken place, as early as the beginning of 1965 (Weinstein, 1969: 8). This suggests that the ideological or moral nature of Confrontation meant that the conflict would start to end once it became clear that there was a consensus on the willingness to work towards resolving the Malaysia issue. An example which expressed this perspective of Confrontation was the peace move by Subandrio in February 1965 that made the Tunku ―so excited he cannot .sleep‖ (FO371/181496, 23 February 1965, National Archives, UK). According to the New Zealand High Commission in London, 243 Indonesia proposed a ministerial level meeting with Malaysia in Bangkok which would ―be direct and private possibly a tete-a-tete between Tun Razak and Subandrio‖. Also, Subandrio and Yani revealed that ―starting some time around 23 or 25 February and lasting for two or three weeks there will be a period of quiet during which Indonesia on its own accord would stop all hostile actions against Malaysia . (which) could be further prolonged if the meeting and negotiations were to take place‖ (FO371/181496, 23 February 1965, National Archives, UK). One way in which the military front of Confrontation was an extension of the political front was conveyed by the military strategy of the Malayan National Liberation League in June to July 1965. According to this strategy, which was published in Antara on 21 June 1965, ―the main troops of the Malayan National Liberation Army are not deployed along the Malaya/Thailand border, but are continuing military operations scattered throughout the motherland of Malaya in small groups. Their operations will expand and become so intensive that before long the puppet state of Malaysia will disintegrate‖ (FO371/181493, National Archives, UK). Later on July 1965, the League‘s manifesto referred to how The British imperialists have thrown into our country and North Kalimantan almost all the troops they could possibly transfer from elsewhere in an attempt to intimidate and suppress the peoples of Malaya and North Kalimantan, and to threaten and attack the people of Indonesia. The US imperialists, too, have repeatedly made a show of their military might before the peoples of our country and North Kalimantan and of Indonesia. They have tried hard to 244 infiltrate further into our country and North Kalimantan by providing the Rahman clique with military aid. (FO371/181492, National Archives, UK) The response expressed in the manifesto to these ―imperialist‖ military incursions, however, was more ideological than military in nature, exhorting parties opposed to Malaysia ―whether in Malaya or overseas‖ to ―march forward hand in hand in mutual support and in close cooperation in the struggle against our common enemy‖. In addition, one principle of the manifesto was to ―support the national liberation struggle of North Kalimantan through vigorous and unreserved support and strengthening solidarity and cooperation with the people of North Kalimantan (FO371/181492, 27 July 1965, National Archives, UK). Therefore, it appeared that the ―fight‖ against the ―imperialists‖ was more in spirit. In contrast, the manifesto accused the ―Rahman clique‖ of doing by ―enforcing conscription (which) has been supplying British imperialism with cannon-fodder for saving its tottering colonial rule‖ (FO371/181492, 27 July 1965, National Archives, UK). Chapter continued the discussion of the themes of Malaysia‘s alleged violation of the rights of the peoples in the territories cobbled together to form the British-created state and how Confrontation consisted of a conflict that provided the basis for historical progress toward peaceful relations among the states of Southeast Asia. The chapter focused on Singapore‘s expulsion from Malaysia, which was a momentous event in Confrontation due to its impact on the course of the conflict. Separation highlighted the possibility of bringing an end to Confrontation yet at the same time it appeared to embolden the Indonesian leadership to step up Confrontation. An explanation for this paradox could lie in PAP interests leading to separation and beyond separation. 245 The role which PAP interests played in causing separation and therefore going against British interest in Singapore remaining part of Malaysia had its roots in the way Malaysia was formed and the tensions between Kuala Lumpur‘s Alliance Government and the PAP during the Confrontation years. The central issue was how the Malaysian state was formed and the principles it was built on. The roots of Malaysia‘s formation grew out of British colonial policy, in the context of which a ―significant watershed‖ in the history of British colonial administration consisted of forging ―political unity out of the three components of the Malay Peninsula .the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States and the Unfederated Malay States‖ via the ultimately ―abortive Malayan Union Scheme of 1946‖ which ―at the same time (created) a separate colony out of Singapore‖. This move to keep Singapore separate from the Malayan Union was intended ―to create the racial equilibrium necessary for the political and economic stability in the mainland‖ and could be said to have led to ―the premise that in the Federation the Malays should possess political power and that Singapore because of its ‗Chineseness‘ should be excluded from merger with the mainland (becoming) the basis of the political relationship between the two states‖ (Lau Teik Soon, 1969: 156). This was ―the first step in the isolation of Singapore (by the British) after World War II‖, which then caused Malaya and Singapore to ―advance separately towards independence‖ with Malaya becoming independent in 1957 and Singapore becoming a self-governing state in 1959 (Sadka, 1962: 17-18). British colonial policy thus played a crucial role in determining the ―structural gap‖ (Sadka, 1962: 18) between Malaya and Singapore prior to the 1960s when the move toward forming ―Greater Malaysia‖ became more pressing and gathered more steam. The changing fortunes of British colonial interests therefore formed the foundation of Malaysia‘s establishment. 246 British colonial policy created many of the divisive issues between Malaya and Singapore. This divisiveness was manifested in many obvious points of friction in terms of constitutional, party, ethnic and personal factors, between the Federal and Singapore governments, which, interacting, produced the breakaway of Singapore on August 1965 (Milne, 1966: 175). In addition to these points of friction, the British continued to interfere in the domestic political rivalry between the federal and PAP Governments after the realisation of ―Greater Malaysia‖. One of the most significant instances of this interference in terms of the debates within Malaya, Singapore, Brunei and North Borneo regarding whether they wanted to form British-created Malaysia, was what Poulgrain and Zahari described as British provocation of the Brunei revolt which led to the quelling of internal opposition to the Malaysia plan. The aftermath of the Brunei revolt saw the implementation of Operation Cold Store in Singapore which neutralised internal opposition to the Malaysia plan. Cold Store was important because, first, it was not merely a domestic political development but a result of British interference in the politics of Singapore in a bid to secure its decolonisation interests. Second, two major consequences of Cold Store were the weakening of the shaky foundations of Malaysia‘s formation and subsequently pushing Indonesia into declaring Confrontation.69 Since the origin of Malaysia‘s formation stemmed from British strategic interests, conflict (in the form of the Brunei revolt) and coercion (in the form of Cold Store) and not on the genuine will of the people, many problems surfaced during the 69 Archival evidence suggests that the Indonesian leadership suspected British provocation was central in or behind the chain of events that culminated in tense relations among the Southeast Asian states regarding the dispute over Malaysia‘s establishment in order to bring down Sukarno‘s leadership. According to an Australian embassy report from Jakarta on October 1963, Subandrio said that ―the Indonesians had fallen into the trap of British provocation…and had provoked the subsequent and more violent events which had followed. This had been designed to isolate Indonesia and it was British policy to topple Sukarno…‖ (A1838/3006/4/6, NAA). 247 first few years of the new state‘s existence. Some of the most prominent troubles had to with the PAP‘s refusal to be a mere ―graft‖ of the new state, thus wanting to ―extend into Malaya‖ (Milne, 1966: 176) through its ―Malaysian Malaysia‖ cry. This was an example of how Singapore‘s ―outsider status‖ which had been cultivated by earlier British colonial policy continued to cast a spectre over the viability of the fragile new British-created state.70 The separation of Singapore from Malaysia was important in determining the course of Confrontation. The impact of separation on British policy was that it became ―all the more important for Britain to end the Confrontation‖ (Easter, 2004: 150), therefore leading Britain to speed up its plans for withdrawing its base in Singapore. However, Singapore‘s strategic interests were also instrumental in determining how separation affected Confrontation. Although the Indonesians appeared to be emboldened by separation, in fact it coincided with a gradual move toward ending Confrontation, pushed along by the goals of the Singaporean leadership in the aftermath of separation. This insight that separation played a key role in ending Confrontation highlights the theme of creative destruction as progress in the form of creating a new world order in post-colonial Southeast Asia. This was revealed in the way the aftermath of separation provided hope for Confrontation to end and for the rebuilding of ties among post-colonial Southeast Asian states. These aspirations were revealed by Col. Soenarjo, KOGAM‘s information chief, during the period 11 March 1966 to 30 April 1966, what Weinstein characterised as ―from belligerence to peaceful confrontation‖, indicating a serious initiative aimed at ending the conflict. 70 Milne also argues that ―the terms on which Singapore joined Malaysia were ambiguous‖ (RS Milne, ―Singapore‘s Exit from Malaysia: the Consequences of Ambiguity‖, Asian Survey, Vol. NO. 3, Mar 1966, p. 178). These ambiguous terms which gave the political leaders the opportunity to contest the principles and laws of Malaysia could reflect the legacy of British colonial strategies and interference in shaping the polities of Malaya and Singapore, making Malaysia an offensive entity and rendering the autonomy of Malaysia insecure. 248 Soenarjo defended the Confrontation policy arguing that Confrontation was pursued for various political, economic and military gains. Some important political gains would have been the concept of Maphilindo, which was expected in the ―near future to become a living reality‖, the sustained advancement of the ―Sukarno-Macapagal doctrine of Asian solutions for Asian problems‖, and the advent of a national awakening in Malaysia, which was viewed as beneficial to Indonesia because Malaysia could then join forces with Indonesia to struggle against British neocolonialism. Soenarjo also spoke of Confrontation‘s military and strategic victories. These included the hindering of British forces east of Suez which made it immensely difficult for London to aid the United States in Vietnam, as well as how Britain wanted to shift the Singapore military base to Australia as a result of talks about forming Maphilindo. Finally, Soenarjo said that Singapore‘s separation from Malaysia was an important part of ―confrontation‘s victory‖ because it proved that ―the artificially created Malaysian Federation would ultimately collapse‖ (Weinstein, 1969: 33-34). Soenarjo‘s argument for the advantages of Confrontation revealed the possibility for Southeast Asian states to extricate themselves from colonial domination, enabling them to form a federation of free states, for which the most explicit embodiment was Maphilindo. In addition to this ―natural‖ possibility of peaceful relations among free states arising out of the ashes of Confrontation, there was another important factor that helped to push Confrontation to an end. This was Singapore‘s espousal of the ―free spirit of commerce‖ to Indonesia in the form of stipulating resumption of trading relations as an immediate priority after separation. This move was significant because the Indonesian leadership showed ambivalence about normalising ties with Singapore, which was summed up by Sukarno who said on 24 August 1965 that ―Indonesia will 249 not decide yet when to recognise Singapore but will follow closely every new development following the separation of Singapore from Malaysia‖ (FO371/181493, National Archives, UK). However, the ―desire to re-establish relations with Singapore for reasons of economic convenience‖ (A1838/3034/2/1/8, 20 December 1965, NAA) was possibly a crucial motivation for Subandrio showing his ―willingness to have an exchange of thoughts with the leaders of Singapore, Sarawak, Malaya, Brunei and Sabah to try to find a solution to the Malaysia issue‖ (A1838/3034/2/1/8, 20 December 1965, NAA). A year later on 12 April 1966, the new foreign minister Adam Malik revealed that his statement about recognition of Singapore was ―a first move in a general settlement of confrontation, and that an important motive had also been to eliminate smuggling and get back to a basis of regular trade‖ (FO371/187561, National Archives, UK). Malik‘s statement marked a substantial shift from the economic policy of the Confrontation years which were based on Subandrio‘s ―certain dignity of principle‖. This reiterates the point that Sukarno‘s Government chose to highlight this high-minded ―certain dignity of principle‖ which downplayed the economic needs of the country. Chapter discussed the aftermath of Confrontation in terms of how Indonesia‘s Suharto Government and the PAP made sense of their experiences of Confrontation from 1965, which saw the beginnings of progress toward a resolution of the conflict, to 1973 when Singapore-Indonesia relations were finally normalised. There were common ―lessons‖ learnt from the experience such as a disdain for Sukarno‘s and Subandrio‘s foreign policy and leadership, which was also reflective of the desire to reorganise the basis of bilateral relations from one characterised by armed hostility to that of absence of war or a state of contrived peace. The other lessons established in the aftermath of the conflict were largely perceived from a 250 Singapore perspective; these included such references as viewing Confrontation as a reflection of a hostile ―Malay‖ geopolitical world toward Singapore, Suharto as a key initiator of ASEAN‘s formation, the asymmetrical nature of Singapore-Indonesia relations, and the need for Singapore to defer to Indonesia. The very selectivity of these lessons, although seemingly attributable to the strategies and interests of political leaders, can ultimately be interpreted in the light of how both countries reinterpreted Confrontation to serve as a basis for their future political development. For example, although Suharto was recognised as being a key initiator of ASEAN, the regional association had its roots in ―the international meetings which ended Confrontation‖ (Weinstein, 1969: 87). These international meetings were peace talks conducted ―in the spirit of the Manila Agreement‖ between Malaysia and Indonesia to bring an end to Confrontation, which commenced in Bangkok on 30 May 1966 (FO371/187564, 27 May 1966 and June 1966, National Archives, UK). It was also during this period of the resolution of Confrontation that Sukarno proposed his ―Greater Maphilindo‖ concept. Later, in July 1966, Malik revealed to the British that his vision of Indonesia‘s future was probably ―the primus inter pare of a loose East and Southeast Asian grouping whose principal common element would be resistance to China‖ whose aims might also be ―economic and cultural‖ (FO371/187574, July 1966, National Archives, UK). The other lessons drawn by Singapore which had to with a hostile ―Malay‖ world that Singapore was situated in and the asymmetric nature of the SingaporeIndonesia relationship, may be understood as a reflection of the reorganisation of the basis of Singapore-Indonesia relations post-Confrontation, which saw both postcolonial states come into their own both in terms of domestic and foreign policies. These lessons were established during a time when both countries had just emerged 251 out of a major international conflict driven substantially by British neo-colonial interests. For a newly independent Singapore especially, the immediate aftermath of Confrontation was a fertile time to establish the nature or characteristics of the bilateral relationship. The conclusions drawn from Confrontation have remained relatively stable since 1973, showing that Confrontation provided a means for political elites to construct national self-representations in relation to each other and served as the basis for redefining the post-colonial relations between Singapore and Indonesia. These lessons also demonstrated the purposeful creation and assertion of an ―outsider‖ status for Singapore in Southeast Asia and a demonstration that Singapore interests were central in determining the tenor of bilateral relations. The result was the construction of a symbiotic relationship based upon how each country‘s political leaders‘ selective interpretation of the conflict and subsequent development of national self-images in opposition to each other in spite of the possibility that grounds existed for finding common interests. The PAP has used Confrontation selectively and somewhat subtly in developing Singapore‘s self-representation in opposition to Indonesia. The Indonesian political leadership has done the same but to a lesser degree especially during the New Order and more recent years. This is a manifestation of how the Singaporean ruling party generally attaches more importance to Confrontation than their Indonesian counterparts and also how Confrontation has exerted a lasting effect on bilateral relations. In conclusion, Confrontation was successful even though its short-term objective of ―Crush Malaysia‖ ended on a whimper as events overtook its course. Confrontation‘s ―success‖ lay in the way the conflict guided the birth of the Republic 252 of Singapore and ushered in the foundations of present-day Singapore-Indonesia relations as well as other inter-state relations in Southeast Asia. 253 [...]... of the newly formed state of Malaysia, which is central to the development of Confrontation The analysis of Singapore s role in fomenting Confrontation and shaping the events of the conflict in relation to Indonesia s pursuit of Confrontation brings to the fore the Southeast Asian perspectives of the legitimacy of Malaysia, the principles 27 upon which Malaysia was established, and the ensuing contest... role in rapprochement with Indonesia, by first resuming trading ties with Indonesia Singapore s newfound status as an independent state that arose out of the ashes of Malaysia was also crucial in disposing Indonesia to end Confrontation Finally, Singapore- Indonesia relations in the aftermath of Confrontation are examined, highlighting that the notion of the transformative nature of the international... their own post-colonial regional order Confrontation exerted influence on the re-organisation of the International Relations of Southeast Asia This is presented through the explanation of why Malaysia fell apart with the secession of Singapore and the impact of this secession on Confrontation These two events are reminiscent of the idea that there is a propensity for progress in international politics... crucially on ―creative destruction‖ is applicable in understanding how Singapore and Indonesia transformed the nature of the bilateral relationship after the experience of the Confrontation years The lessons Indonesia and more crucially, Singapore, learnt from the Confrontation years, highlights the capacity for transformative change in international politics and history Therefore, an account of how Southeast... origins of Confrontation and how this conflict evolved This involves exploring a watershed event in Singapore s political 19 history, Operation Cold Store, which played a crucial role in the origins of the conflict Also, it is through a focus on Singapore s role in Confrontation that we can examine the reasons why Indonesia viewed Malaysia as a neo-colonialist project and decided to launch the Confrontation. .. elites drove Confrontation and reorganised the conduct of international politics among themselves as post-colonial states, emphasises that contemporary Singapore- Indonesia relations should be viewed in a macro-historical context rather than one that seems to reflect short-term disturbances 35 Chapter 2: The Underlying “Causes” of Confrontation, and Relations between Indonesia and the Federation of Malaya:... Confrontation drove Singapore (then part of Malaysia) -Indonesia relations was the debate over the legitimacy of the new Malaysian Federation and whether it was formed in accordance with the people‘s will Singapore and Indonesia adopted diametrically opposite positions on this subject The Indonesian perception, as expressed in General Nasution‘s article Confrontation: Our fight against neo-colonialism‖,... increase its influence‖ (Legge, 1972: 36 4) This shows that international politics to do with suspicions of the motives of other 32 states framed the decision to launch Confrontation, which was a reflection of how Cold War politics dominated the thinking of political elites when they considered the impact of the formation of Malaysia on the international politics of Southeast Asia Confrontation epitomised... to Indonesia s grievances and arguments against Malaysia by the determined pursuit of merger with Malaya This involved the 26 formation of Malaysia and the shaping of the concept of a Malaysia that was the antithesis of what Indonesia was prepared to accept, as well as the international campaign to gain recognition for Malaysia s right to exist in the face of Indonesia s diplomatic campaign to the contrary... Security, the Borneo Territories, and the Contours of British Policy, 1961- 63 , The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.28 No.2, May 2000, p 106) 16 1.2 Indonesian and Singaporean perspectives on Malaysia as a key driver of Confrontation The concept of Malaysia was rooted in the neo-colonial intentions9 of the British which were ―to maintain rather than end Britain‘s historic interests in the . played out in the form of their strategic and international behaviour during the Confrontation years. The focus on Singapore‘s role in the prelude to Confrontation and the years of the conflict. decolonisation, Confrontation, and nation-building during the 1960s, with a focus on how Singapore played a central role in escalating regional tensions during Confrontation. The focus on Singapore‘s. characterised by the British decolonisation process in Southeast Asia, the Confrontation years from 19 63 to 1966, and the aftermath of Confrontation up till 19 73 when Singapore-Indonesia relations were