Đối với các công ty đơn giản và các công ty có chi phí đầu tư cho R&D thấp nên duy trì số lượng thành viên HĐQT ở mức hiện tại nhằm hạn chế chi phí gia tăng từ việc tăng thêm số lượng thành viên HĐQT.
Ngoài ra để nâng cao giá trị công ty, doanh nghiệp có thể tiết giảm chi phí để nâng cao hiệu quả hoạt động kinh doanh của doanh nghiệp như đầu tư vào máy móc dây chuyền mới để tăng năng suất lao động, giảm giá thành sản phẩm. Doanh nghiệp cũng nên sử dụng đòn bẩy tài chính ở mức hợp lý để tận dụng lợi ích từ tấm chắn thuế.
Ngoài ra, việc gia tăng sở hữu của các CEO trong các công ty cổ phần bằng cách thưởng cổ phiếu ESOP sẽ giúp các CEO chuyên tâm hơn trong việc điều hành hoạt động kinh doanh cũng như gắn kết lợi ích của CEO vì lợi ích chung của công ty là tối đa giá trị cổ đông.
5.3.Hạn chế của đề tài
Nghiên cứu chỉ tiến hành thực nghiệm trên các doanh nghiệp được niêm yết trên sàn HOSE.
Trong Báo cáo tài chính của các doanh nghiệp theo quy định của Bộ Tài chính hiện chưa có khoản mục đo lường chi phí R&D vì vậynghiên cứu sử dụng tỷ lệ quỹ đầu tư nghiên cứu phát triển trên tổng tài sản để đo lường chi phí R&D.
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. sum board insider outsider insiderf tobinsq segment lnsale leverage risk roa freeCF intangible l
> nagef lntenure lnage ceo
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max ---+--- board | 1386 5.746753 1.182334 5 13 insider | 1386 2.038961 1.039958 0 5 outsider | 1386 3.680375 1.317312 1 11 insiderf | 1386 .3567799 .1720064 0 .8333333 tobinsq | 1386 1.182941 .8655516 .3402 20.933 ---+--- segment | 1386 1.373737 .5496333 1 4 lnsale | 1386 27.23934 1.312341 21.26566 31.06335 leverage | 1386 .4860907 .2058366 .0026 .9655 risk | 1386 .0280218 .0057512 0 .0817911 roa | 1386 .1289545 .0955506 -.5101 .7317 ---+--- freeCF | 1386 .0806196 .1713378 -.9127 1.6785 intangible | 1386 .0062076 .0253308 -.0001 .4639 lnagef | 1386 .9775214 .7307033 0 2.5649 lntenure | 1386 1.170294 .8751348 0 3.6636 lnage | 1386 3.883786 .1571696 3.1781 4.2485 ---+--- ceo | 1386 .0539427 .1125754 0 .8278
. xtsum board insider outsider insiderf tobinsq segment lnsale leverage risk roa freeCF intangible
> lnagef lntenure lnage ceo
Variable | Mean Std. Dev. Min Max | Observations ---+---+--- board overall | 5.746753 1.182334 5 13 | N = 1386 between | .9882286 5 10 | n = 243 within | .6025902 2.746753 10.03247 | T-bar = 5.7037 | | insider overall | 2.038961 1.039958 0 5 | N = 1386 between | .8685157 0 4.285714 | n = 243 within | .5718333 -.5324675 5.324675 | T-bar = 5.7037 | | outsider overall | 3.680375 1.317312 1 11 | N = 1386 between | 1.109747 1.285714 8.428571 | n = 243 within | .6867668 .537518 6.680375 | T-bar = 5.7037 | | insiderf overall | .3567799 .1720064 0 .8333333 | N = 1386 between | .1449928 0 .7428571 | n = 243 within | .0938948 -.0932201 .8227663 | T-bar = 5.7037 | | tobinsq overall | 1.182941 .8655516 .3402 20.933 | N = 1386 between | .4574554 .5783 5.185743 | n = 243 within | .7162935 -2.941501 16.9302 | T-bar = 5.7037
between | .527568 1 3.75 | n = 243 within | .1774555 .5165945 2.945166 | T-bar = 5.7037 | | lnsale overall | 27.23934 1.312341 21.26566 31.06335 | N = 1386 between | 1.254434 21.48466 30.63687 | n = 243 within | .4390534 23.85283 29.47798 | T-bar = 5.7037 | | leverage overall | .4860907 .2058366 .0026 .9655 | N = 1386 between | .1893793 .0638714 .957975 | n = 243 within | .0810032 .1191478 .8660657 | T-bar = 5.7037 | | risk overall | .0280218 .0057512 0 .0817911 | N = 1386 between | .003273 .020494 .0395865 | n = 243 within | .0047516 .0032783 .0702264 | T-bar = 5.7037 | | roa overall | .1289545 .0955506 -.5101 .7317 | N = 1386 between | .0791709 .00546 .5061 | n = 243 within | .0564756 -.4759741 .6160795 | T-bar = 5.7037 | | freeCF overall | .0806196 .1713378 -.9127 1.6785 | N = 1386 between | .1102441 -.1661 .53215 | n = 243 within | .1330841 -1.032295 1.377305 | T-bar = 5.7037 | | intang~e overall | .0062076 .0253308 -.0001 .4639 | N = 1386 between | .0182528 0 .1571286 | n = 243 within | .0169218 -.150421 .312979 | T-bar = 5.7037 | | lnagef overall | .9775214 .7307033 0 2.5649 | N = 1386 between | .4506146 .447925 2.281829 | n = 243 within | .5721106 -.2403501 1.829436 | T-bar = 5.7037 | | lntenure overall | 1.170294 .8751348 0 3.6636 | N = 1386 between | .6992044 0 2.884129 | n = 243 within | .5238836 -.7110773 4.310523 | T-bar = 5.7037 | | lnage overall | 3.883786 .1571696 3.1781 4.2485 | N = 1386 between | .1387257 3.40008 4.212 | n = 243 within | .0789127 3.231371 4.353771 | T-bar = 5.7037 | | ceo overall | .0539427 .1125754 0 .8278 | N = 1386 between | .1095799 0 .5899 | n = 243 within | .0437932 -.2409144 .4460094 | T-bar = 5.7037
stats | board insider outsider insiderf tobinsq segment lnsale leverage ---+--- mean | 5.746753 2.038961 3.680375 .3567799 1.182941 1.373737 27.23934 .4860907 sd | 1.182334 1.039958 1.317312 .1720064 .8655516 .5496333 1.312341 .2058366 p50 | 5 2 4 .4 .9653 1 27.24135 .515 variance | 1.397914 1.081513 1.735311 .0295862 .7491795 .3020968 1.722239 .0423687 N | 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 ---
stats | risk roa freeCF intang~e lnagef lntenure lnage ceo ---+--- mean | .0280218 .1289545 .0806196 .0062076 .9775214 1.170294 3.883786 .0539427 sd | .0057512 .0955506 .1713378 .0253308 .7307033 .8751348 .1571696 .1125754 p50 | .0282668 .11215 .0593 .0001 1.0986 1.0986 3.912 .0061 variance | .0000331 .0091299 .0293566 .0006416 .5339274 .7658608 .0247023 .0126732 N | 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 ---
. *Do complex firms have larger boards and more outsiders on the board? . ttest board, by(advice)level(95)
Two-sample t test with equal variances
--- Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] ---+--- Simple | 759 5.637681 .0431129 1.187758 5.553046 5.722316 Complex | 627 5.878788 .0464479 1.163055 5.787575 5.970001 ---+--- combined | 1386 5.746753 .0317584 1.182334 5.684453 5.809053 ---+--- diff | -.2411067 .0635 -.3656734 -.1165401 --- diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = -3.7970 Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 1384
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 Pr(T < t) = 0.0001 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0002 Pr(T > t) = 0.9999
. ttest insider, by(advice)level(95)
Two-sample t test with equal variances
--- Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] ---+--- Simple | 759 2.100132 .0382649 1.054198 2.025014 2.17525 Complex | 627 1.964912 .0406703 1.018384 1.885045 2.044779