This Paper was presented, upon invitation, at th th SAFETY IN ACTION 2006, Melbourne Exhibition Centre, AUSTRALIA, 16 – 18 May 2006 Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice; Integrating the Transformational Safety® Culture Improvement System within Traditional BBS Programs David G Broadbent Safety Psychologist TransformationalSafety.Com PO Box 250 MAITLAND NSW 2320 AUSTRALIA Safety is known by the ABSENCE of events, which makes it a difficult challenge to achieve We know that essentially all major safety events have their roots deep into the past practices of the organisations involved and grow out of long causal chains involving the way that people work In most cases the pre-cursors of events were there to see, but the organisations were seemingly unable to recognise them Safety requires people to adopt a set of habits and ways of thinking that are often difficult and unnatural (e.g reporting one's own mistakes, stopping a job in the middle, etc.) As such, building a strong safety culture is a specific challenge of leadership Safety never sleeps and organisations cannot achieve exceptional performance without a deep-rooted set of beliefs, practices and behaviours that guide people's decisions and action at all times I believe that the culture of an organisation embraces everything it does It includes the policies, procedures and standards It includes the housekeeping, the procedures and tools A strong culture is one that is widely shared and based on a common and wellunderstood identity A weak culture is diverse and differs from area to area in the organisation But a strong culture is not necessarily an effective culture (i.e it may not achieve the required results) and it will also be resistant to change Safety culture is becoming more and more recognised as a fundamental foundation of effective and sustained safety outcomes1 For an explanation of some of the factors that contribute to the development and maintenance of safety culture refer to “The Structure of Culture” at Attachment1 Optimal safety cultures typically provide the necessary support for employees to strive beyond minimal efforts Organisations relying on conventional safety and leadership approaches often fail to inspire the necessary safety-related behaviours and attitudes in their employees In addition, these organisations have difficulty identifying, and then removing barriers to safety excellence Although most individuals possess the necessary values and intentions, their actual behaviours may not support an effective safety culture The Transformational Safety® Culture Improvement System has as its prime objective, one of assisting organisations gain an understanding and appreciation of their own unique safety culture along with providing proven insights toward strategies which enable employees to close the gap between their values, intentions, and actual behaviours The state-of-the-art application of a survey protocol targeting safety leadership behaviours, which have a foundation within transformational leadership theory, is instrumental in developing a culture which shall maximise the sustainability of effective safety behaviours within the workforce th Broadbent, D.G., (2004) “Maximising Safety Performance via leadership Behaviours”, 28 International Congress of Psychology, Beijing, CHINA Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page of 21 Since its inception, the concept of safety culture has been a key topic in discussions of safety across many industries There is “a general recognition that while the importance of engineered safeguards and formal management systems to control risks is essential, it is equally important to win the commitment of the workforce to treat safety as a priority through a genuine corporate commitment to achieve high levels of safety2” The concept of ‘”safety culture” has largely developed since the OECD Nuclear Agency observed that the errors and violations of operating procedures occurring prior to the Chernobyl disaster were evidence of a poor safety culture at the plant, and within the former Soviet nuclear industry in general3 Safety culture has been defined as:‘‘….that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals, which establishes that, as an overriding priority, plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance4” Safety culture is important because it forms the context within which individual safety attitudes develop and persist and safety behaviours are promoted5 It is interesting to note that the concept of safety culture developed in response to major organisational accidents; however, it is now being more widely applied to explain accidents at the individual level6 Safety climate is regarded as a manifestation of safety culture in the behaviour and expressed attitude of employees7 The number of dimensions of safety climate remains disputed, although recurring themes across safety climate surveys include management commitment, supervisor competence, priority of safety over production, and time pressure8 Elements of safety climate emerge as predictors of unsafe behaviour or accidents in numerous structural models9,10,11,12 and non-linear models13,14, and it is increasingly becoming accepted that a favourable safety climate is essential for safe operation15 Lisa Ronald in her excellent literature review16 of factors contributing to successful safety programs concluded that the following dimensions were recognisable predictors of improved safety outcomes:• • People Oriented Culture Active Safety Leadership/Management Commitment International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, INSAG-15 (2002) Culture”, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria Pidgeon, N., & O’Leary, M., 2000 “Man-made disasters: why technology and organisations (sometimes) fail” Safety Science, 34, 15–30 International Atomic Energy Agency (1986) “Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident”, VIENNA: International Atomic Energy Agency, ISBN: 92-0-1231 Zohar, D., (1980) “Safety climate in industrial organisations: theoretical and applied implications” Journal of Applied Psychology, 65, pp.96–102 Florczac C., (2002) Cox, S., Flin, R., (1998) Flin, R., Mearns, K., O’Connor, P., Bryden, R., (2000) Safety Science, 34, pp 177–193 Brown, K.A., Willis, P.G., Prussia, G.E., (2000) “Predicting safe employee behaviour in the steel industry: Development and test of a sociotechnical model” Journal of Operations Management, 18, pp.445–465 10 Cheyne, A., Tomas, J.M., Cox, S., Oliver, A., (1999) sectors” European Psychologist, 1, pp.4–10 11 Thompson, R.C., Hilton, T.F., Witt, L.A., (1998) “Where the safety rubber meets the shop floor: a confirmatory model of management influence on workplace safety” Journal of Safety Research, 29, pp.15–24 12 Tomas, J.M., Melia, J.L., Oliver, A., (1999) “A cross validation of a structural equation model of accidents: organisational and psychological variables as predictors of work safety” Work and Stress, 13, pp.49–58 13 Guastello, S.J., (1989) “Catastrophe modelling of the accident process: evaluation of an accident reduction program using the Occupational Hazards Survey” Accident Analysis and Prevention, 21, pp.61–77 14 Guastello, S.J., Gershon, R.R.M., Murphy, L.R., (1999) “Catastrophe model for the exposure to bloodborne pathogens and other accidents in health care settings” Accident Analysis and Prevention, 31, pp.739–749 15 Wiegmann, D.A., Zhang, H., Von-Thaden, T., Sharma, G., and Mitchell, A., (2002) “A Synthesis of Safety Culture and Safety Climate Research”, Technical Report ARL-02-3/FAA-02-2, Federal Aviation Administration, Atlantic City International Airport, NJ, Contract DTFA 01-G-015 16 Ronald, L., (1998), “identifying the elements of successful safety programs: A literature review” A Report prepared for the Prevention Division, Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia, 6711 Elmridge Way, RICHMOND, BC, V7C 4N1 “Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety “Maximizing Profitability with Safety Culture Development”, Butterworth-Heinemann:NY “Safety culture: philosopher’s stone or man of straw”? Work and Stress, 12, pp.189–201 “Measuring safety climate: identifying the common features” “Modelling employee attitudes to safety: a comparison across Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice • • • • • Page of 21 Joint Health and Safety Committee Activities Safety Diligence Safety Training and Motivational Programs Disability (injury) Management and Health Promotion Workplace and Workforce Demographics Specifically Ronald makes the observation, “active safety leadership/ management commitment variables appear to play an integral (if not the most crucial) role in ensuring safety success” It is also worth noting the 1982 report by the US Committee on Underground Coal Mine Safety17 which outlines why management commitment may be so essential to safety program success Specifically, it states that while legislation has contributed to improved safety performance, compliance will not by itself produce an outstanding safety record "The initiative to achieve and maintain excellent safety must come from management , they alone have the authority within their companies to establish the policies and priorities and to communicate them throughout their organisations… they alone have the authority to implement safety programs, commit resources, and reward their managers and employees for achieving the goals of those programs The goals may not be attainable without the cooperation of employees, but only management has the authority to request of its employees the actions needed to realise those goals." Additionally, the authors state that "commitment provides a sense of purpose, identity and direction to those responsible for managing a company [which] must be highly visible and effectively communicated to all ranks of workers It must be genuine and backed by the highest levels of company management, including the chief executive officer and the board of directors or owner." But importantly, the authors state, "it must be accompanied by actions that convince everyone in the company of the sincerity of the commitment, [since] commitment can create only an illusion of accomplishment unless it results in action." (Committee on Underground Coal Mine Safety, 1982) Research has focused on supervisors as role models for instilling safety awareness and supporting safe behaviour18,19 Involvement of the workforce in safety decision-making has also received attention20 Both of these concepts naturally lead to a consideration of the safety philosophy of upper management and the safety management system of the organisation Hofmann and others21 label the individual attitudes and behaviours discernible in safety climate as the micro-elements of an organisation, which themselves are determined by macro-elements of the safety management system and practices In this sense management attitudes and behaviour are critical components toward safety; permeating down through the organisation to the workforce More recently Barling22 and Broadbent23 both explore the impacts that specific management systems and approaches to leadership can have upon safety outcomes in measurable terms and have drawn some powerful conclusions In 2004, whilst presenting his own thinking on the value of transformational leadership competencies Broadbent coined the term “transformational safety®; to describe a particular range of observable leadership behaviours directly related to the safety environment21 17 Committee on Underground Coal Mine Safety: National Research Council (1982), Mines”, National Academy Press: Washington, D.C., pp.1-190 18 Fleming, M., Flin, R., Mearns, K., Gordon, R (1996) “The offshore supervisor’s role in safety management: Law enforcer or risk manager” Conference Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Health, Safety and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, New Orleans, 9–12 June 1996, SPE 35906 19 Mattila, M., Hyttinen, M., Rantanen, E., (1994) “Effective supervisory behaviour and safety at the building site”, International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 13, pp.85–93 20 Simard, M., Marchand, A., (1994) “The behaviour of first line supervisors in accident prevention and effectiveness in occupational safety” Safety Science, 17, pp.169–185 21 Hofmann, D.A., Jacobs, R., Landy, F., (1995) “High reliability process industries: individual, micro and macro organisational influences on safety performance” Journal of Safety Research, 26, pp.131–149 22 Barling, J., Loughlin, C., and Kelloway, E.K (2002) Development and Test of a Model Linking Safety-Specific Transformational Leadership and Occupational Safety, Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, No pp.488-496 23 Broadbent, D.G (2004), “Maximising Safety Performance via Leadership Behaviours”, International Congress of Psychology, Beijing, CHINA, 8th – 14th August, 2004 “Toward Safer Underground Coal Proceedings of the 28th Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page of 21 This paper is primarily concerned with how to better lead your businesses toward Best Practice outcomes by implementing/integrating the constructs of Transformational Safety® within your more traditional behavioural based safety (BBS) programs To achieve this goal we are going to have to spend some time thinking about BBS in general, and maybe considering some of the socio-historical context from whence it came BBS programs have become increasingly popular over the past couple of decades To quote a very famous American physicist, who was also well known within Australia, Julius Sumner-Millar, “Why is it so24?” This is something well worthy of consideration as the amount of “take-up” for BBS style programs appears to have been exponential in their application At the most simplistic of levels it is believed to deliver cost savings25 In real terms that often means less people experiencing occupational injury; that has to be a good thing Another factor is that it is relatively “simple” to explain, even if that explanation is only part of the story You often hear behavioural safety advocates saying things like “ninety percent of your accidents are caused by unsafe behaviours; therefore if we can modify the unsafe behaviours we get rid of the accidents” Now, this is actually nothing new It is actually the work of H W Heinrich Heinrich was an Assistant Superintendent of the Engineering and Inspection Division of Travellers Insurance Company during the 1930's and 1940's Thus the claim that 90% (or a similar number) of injuries are due to unsafe acts is a “straight lift” of Heinrich's work Heinrich's conclusions though were based on poorly investigated supervisor accident reports, which pretty much held workers accountable for their own injuries; accident causation, as a science, did not exist at the time Heinrich actually concluded that 88% of all industrial accidents were primarily caused by unsafe acts (his actual data only gave 70%) DuPont says that 96% of injuries and illnesses are caused by unsafe acts Behaviour Science Technology (BST) has stated that between 80% and 95% of all accidents are caused by unsafe behaviour When we really try and explore the science behind these claims we find a fair bit of “poetic licence” being used Almost all of the behavioural safety advocates conveniently leave out the rest of Heinrich’s findings For example if we take the time to read the original work we can see that another of his conclusions, "ancestry and social environment are factors in every accident26", does not seem to receive much airplay; despite it being the first domino in the sequence; and this is a sequential model! We also find that many conveniently forget to identify the second domino (accidents are the fault of the person concerned) One of the regular criticisms of BBS programs is that workers feel that it is “fault based” and part of a “blame game” We spend quite some time trying to convince workforces this is not the case, when maybe it is partly so? 24 Australian Red Cross Society (1998) Ringwood, Vic; Penguin Books 25 Hantula, D.A., Rajala, A.K., Brecher, E.G DeNicolis Braggerm J.L (2001) “The Value of Workplace Safety: A TimeBased Utility Analysis Model,” Journal of Organizational Behavior Management, Volume: 21 Issue: 26 Heinrich, H.W., (1936) “Industrial Accident Prevention”, McGraw Hill, New York, NY “ Why is it so? : The very best Millergrams of Professor Julius Sumner Miller;” Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page of 21 It has been said, somewhat unfairly I believe, that Heinrich was both racist and strongly class conscious within his conclusions27 If we are going to allow such a criticism to stand then we also have to discard the conclusions of almost all of the scientific thinkers of the 1920’s, 1930’, and even the 1940’s Even within my own field of applied psychology we have been equally effective in taking the same path of the times28 Psychologists at the time were very keen to support the hypothesis that intelligence was race related29 It’s only a small step to jump from that view, to linking intelligence (read problem solving) to thinking about accident causation Whilst you might feel that I have been somewhat critical of Heinrich’s work I would beg to differ What I have done, ever so briefly, is consider the basic premise from the position of current safety science; a way of thinking that was unavailable to Heinrich This giant amongst men was a product of his time and the world owes limitless gratitude to this man for his attention to a field that had been often timed ignored Another more contemporary investigator in the world of safety is James T Reason We often find him floating about within many business safety systems What often surprises me is often we find Reason within BBS systems as well; again if we read his own work he was not a great advocate of BBS Indeed the Reason Model was far more focused on identifying latent or underlying conditions that were primarily the purview of management etc In 2003 though he began to change his tune somewhat; suggesting that in “highly protected environments” we might have reached a point of diminishing returns and something else is called for30 For James Reason it all happened sometime in the 1970’s, whilst he was preparing a cup of tea At the same time his cat was crawling up his leg indicating its own need for sustenance Reason states he then proceeded to open the tin of cat food and, without thought or regard, loaded up the teapot Not only that, the “moggy” had its first taste of Chinese green tea As a cognitive psychologist, Reason suddenly realised a new research topic was literally under his nose In tracing the causes of absent minded incidents, Reason began an exploration of human error Three decades later, Reason has become a leading expert on error and one of the recognised architects of the tools used to improve safety in the workplace The key development around Reason’s work is “The Swiss Cheese” model Unlike Heinrich’s Domino Model, which was considered to be very sequential (knocking over one domino before you get to the next one), Reason suggests the accident is actually a product of a number of events that are continually moving about, and it is when these events (holes in the cheese) line-up that an accident/incident occurs In other words, the need for sequencing in causation has been removed, and more open acknowledgement of other factors influencing the system, allows for a somewhat gentler approach to the problem of causation 27 28 McDonald, G., (2006) “The Origin and Fallacies of Behaviour Based Safety - A TWU Perspective”, Published by the TWU Health and Safety Department, 1700 Broadway, Second Floor, New York, NY Gould, S.J (1996) “The Mismeasure of Man”, WW Norton and Company, New York: NY 29 Gossett, T.F., (1965) 30 Reason, J.T., (2003) “Aviation psychology in the 20 century – did we really make a difference”, Australian th Aviation Psychology Symposium, December 12t -5 2003, Sydney, Australia “Race: The history of an idea in America”, New Yorlk: Schocken Books th Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page of 21 This is a very simplistic view of Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model, although it can be as simple or as complex as you wish to make it There are untold articles and monographs exploring Reason’s work and they are well worth reviewing31,32,33 Again we find that many behavioural safety advocates are quick to identify the cheese slices concerned with risk appreciation, personal attitudes, work practices etc Only more recently have we begun to see some more serious consideration of the more global contextual environment in which both the dominoes and the cheese co-exist34 Reason himself has made this point35 over and over again When we look at a number of industrial environments that are known to invest heavily in safety programming we find they are beginning to see a recognition of the need to approach the dominos and the cheese from a different direction Falconer, within a body of work exploring one of the most risk protected industries, military service, has published extensively in the area of “soft skills” as a fundamental requirement often overlooked36 Conclusions were that “culture” is a construct not given enough attention, and it is high time more attention was paid Similarly the question of “culture” has been explored within the oil and gas industries for some time with strong conclusions supporting the view that culture is a significant protagonist within the causation argument37,38,39 For a moment let’s consider a low margin industry such as “facilities management”; becoming increasingly popular as businesses try and rationalise to their core business and seek to “out source” just about everything else, and generally look for low price alternatives In such a harsh environment, where safety performance becomes a point of difference between competitors (at least on the paperwork) we see increasing attention being paid to culture related constructs40 For the purpose of clarity lets not forget Heinrich basically stated these sorts of things as his first (1st) domino; “social environment” is certainly applicable to the cultural environment within the workplace As to the question of “ancestry” I am going to suggest that the myths and histories associated with a workplace provide an organisational ancestry in and of itself This view is an extension of the seminal work of Edgar Schein and his work on the impact of myth within organisational life41 I am sure you can see where we are going with this The construct of 31 Johnson, W., & Palanque, P (2004) “Human Error, Safety And System Development”, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 3300 AH Dordercht, THE NETHERLANDS 32 Partington, A (2003) “Constructing Risk and Safety in Technological Practice”, Routledge:London 33 Reason, J T (1990) “Human Error”, Cambridge University Press, 34 Young, M., Shorock, S., Faulkner, J., & Braithwaite, G (2004) “Who moved my ‘swiss’ cheese? The (r)evolution of human factors in transport safety investigation” , International Society of air Safety Investigators Annual Conference, th nd Gold Coast, Australia, 29 Aug – Sept, 2004 35 Reason, J.T., (1997) “Managing the risks of organisational accidents”, Ashgate Publishing Company: Hampshire, England 36 Falconer, B., (2005) “Cultural Changes in military aviation: Soft Issues at the Sharp End” Human Factors and Aerospace Safety Journal, (1), pp 61-79 37 Laing, R., (2003) “Safety in the Oil and Gas Industry - An Operator's Experience”, Construction Safety Awards, London December 9, 2003 38 Flin, R & Mearns, K (2002) “Factoring the human into safety: Translating research into practice” In B Wilpert & B Fahlbruch (Eds) Systems safety - Challenges and Pitfalls of Intervention Amsterdam: Elsvier 39 McDonald, R., (1997) “Empowering and Motivating Grassroots Staff to Take Ownership of Safety Management”, Offshore Safety Management Conference, Marcliffe Hotel, Aberdeen, 29th September 1997 40 Birsztejn, T., (2006) “Establishing Best Practice Strategies To Optimise The Performance Of Your Contractors: th Tackling The Soft Issues Not Usually Contained Within A Contract”, The Annual Pan European Assett Management and Plant Maintenance Summit, October 2006 41 Schein, E (1992) nd “Organisational culture and leadership” Edition San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page of 21 safety culture has a clear place even within Heinrich's domino theory of accident causation Not only does it have a clear place it has the primary place; i.e safety culture has a clear relationship with domino Moving back to the cheese for a moment If we accept that we have all these cheese slices with holes in them (system failures) it stands to reason (no pun intended) that the speed at which the slices move around the plane is going to have a direct relationship with the number of times the holes are going to line up; and when they you have an accident/incident (system event) So what is it that determines the lateral movement of the cheese? Surprise, surprise, I am going to put it to you that the culture that exists within the organisation is that which provides these controls (system stability) In other words the healthier and robust is your safety culture the less movement of the cheese I am sure you have seen the journey coming around the mountains and where have we ended up In some respects we have arrived at the beginning Two of the primary models which are commonly referenced within the world of BBS can be shown to require a solid appreciation of the impacts of safety culture to make them more complete Such requires leaders within the business to take far closer looks at their own safety behaviours Before we start dealing with that “sacred cow” let’s take a small deviation in the journey; to use more appropriate language we might call it a small detour Those who are regularly exposed to my own work shall know that I have been known to become a little lateral in my approach to the subject at hand To this end let us take a brief journey into the world of Karl Popper and the philosophy of science Popper is arguably the most influential scientific thinker of the 20th Century We all have our philosophies, whether or not we are aware of the fact, and our philosophies are not worth very much But the impact of our philosophies upon our actions and our lives is often devastating This makes it necessary to try to improve our philosophies (Paraphrased from Karl Popper42) The way in which we believe things occur determines how we will respond and attempt to manage them An analysis of accident causation in many ways is an examination of our own philosophies and/or prejudices It is therefore culture, time and place specific If one believes that people are dying from the plague because of selective retribution from God for past sins, then the way this risk is managed will be different from the society, which believes in germ theory If you really want to try and stretch those little things called synapses and neurones let’s play with another “sacred cow”; the concept of Zero Injury Do you believe it is attainable? On what fundamental belief you base this conclusion? Is it based upon your historical experience? Is it what you want to achieve for business outcomes? Is it something you focus upon for a competitive advantage? Is it just “right”? You therefore have a number of competing philosophies which all have their own prejudices attached to them Let me suggest to you that large numbers of your workforces generally not believe that Zero Injury is attainable; despite your best efforts, at times, to convince them otherwise Why we know this with some certainty? 42 Popper, K., (2002) “The Logic of Scientific Discovery,” Routledge Classics: Taylor & Francis Books Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page of 21 Because of the many people who have been asked this question directly and anonymously (n>20,000)43 To consider this from a quality perspective just reflect on the principles of the Six Sigma approach This is one of the most aggressive quality systems available and it statistically acknowledges that “perfection” is unattainable; although success can be “pretty close”44 If we apply Six Sigma to Zero Injury we are forced to acknowledge that we shall always have a system event within the sixth sigma; not zero (pretty close though) This does not mean your goal should not be Zero Injury; you might need to think about that for a while So let’s spend a moment considering how we attain these philosophies Knowledge is acquired and processed in the context of world views, of systems of knowledge and of cultures which people share and regularly confirm to each other (I hope you thought that bit was important) It is built into existing frames of reference, evaluated and selected, and meaning is attached to it, and tied into the historical experience of a given social environment It is neither autonomous nor objective but rather bound into those social conditions under which people live, and influenced by the social position of an individual in his or her society and their respective material living conditions The sociology of knowledge has provided ample evidence for this and many empirical studies have explored the images of society held by different social strata and professional groups45 Such paradigms which are relatively resistant against change also exist in science, as Thomas Kuhn has argued46 In everyday life, we accept a statement as “true” if it is confirmed by the rules of everyday experience, if it seems reasonable, if it is held true by people we love and respect, or if it is confirmed by secondary information A statement is taken to be “scientifically true” if it has been published in a highly reputable volume and is taken for granted by respected scientists, or if it has been tested according to the rules of scientific methodology Karl Popper insists that the truth of a statement can never be objectively confirmed in scientific rigour and that the scientific method exists to falsify wellestablished hypotheses, and thus gradually narrows the field of potential truth47 It does not count very much in real practical research sadly, because new hypotheses are being continuously generated and tested in the hope of verification (not falsification), while sets of well established hypotheses being falsified is the exception In other words those of us sitting in the Universities are more concerned about supporting what we believe, and often designing our experimentation etc with our “philosophies and prejudices” in mind Not quite the way it is supposed to work Safety research is rarely any different In extra-scientific everyday life, sensual experience, the opinion of a reference group, although sadly it is mostly the mass media, prove to be the relevant proofs of truth In most of the sciences the empirical proof of truth is made by statistical tests based on probability theory, while quoting from the bible, or from a classical author has lost in persuasiveness (although in some cultures this measure of truth still exists) How about we end our detour into the philosophy of science at that point If there was a point it was to point out that there is a great deal of flexibility in regards to what constitutes a “true” theory I would put it to you that such applies equally powerfully to the “theories” of accident causation and their safety related outcomes Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons, including issues around our discussion above; there continues to be real debate as to what behavioural based safety is and its efficacy, from a number of sources48,49 Nevertheless even one of the critics, and a past President of the American Society of Safety Engineers, Donald J Eckenfelder, has stated 43 Pitzer, C., (1999) “Safety Culture Survey Report – Minerals Council of Australia”, Publication of The Minerals Council of Australia, PO Box 4497, KINGSTON, ACT, 2604, AUSTRALIA 44 Pande, P.S., Neuman, R.P Cavanagh, R.S (2000) “The Six Sigma Way: How GE, Motorola, and Other Top Companies are Honing Their Performance”, McGraw Hill, New York:NY 45 Mannheim, K., (1956) 46 Kuhn, T (1996) 47 Popper, Karl (1960) 48 Manuele, F.A., (2002) Itasca, IL “Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge”, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London “The Structure of Scientific Revolutuions”, Univerity of Chicago Press “The Poverty of Historicism” Routledge & Kegan Paul: London “Heinrich Revisited: Truisms or Myths”, National Safety Council 1121 Spring Lake Drive, Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page of 21 “This is the best idea that safety has seen in the last thirty years and perhaps since 50 we first decided that injuries were preventable ” I have to say that in my capacity as a Safety Psychologist this all intrigues me and, as you can see; tends to take up a bit of “thinking time” On the other hand when I put on my Safety Consultant hat, which is more concerned with the basic outcome of having workers return home at least as well as when they arrived at the workplace, I am nowhere near as “precious” about the “science” It is not the purpose of this presentation to provide a detailed primer and critique of behavioural safety; there are numerous locations where you can embark upon that journey if you so wish51,52 Firstly we have the very real issue of what is a BBS program? Now before we all get caught up on definitions, and more definitions, I need to suggest that there actually is some importance to this debate also No doubt you have heard the expression “we need to make sure we are comparing apples with apples”; and the alternate position equally heard, at times, is “you can’t say that; you’re comparing apples with oranges” My own concern is that essentially what we have here is an industrial environment within which there are an infinite number of programs out there all purporting to be behavioural safety programs Some of these are actually quite good and others are actually quite good “quackery” While behavioural safety shares a concern with human behaviour and safe performance in the workplace with other approaches, it is actually more than that Behavioural safety is the application of behavioural research on human performance to the problems of safety in the workplace This means that any safety program labelling itself as a behavioural safety program should meet the standards of behaviour analytic research, as these practices are applied to the workplace; such a position narrows the field significantly Indeed one international organisation, the Cambridge Centre for Behavioural Studies, provides independent accreditation of workplace behavioural safety programs against defined parameters53 Having been an applied safety professional for many years, supporting both small businesses and multinational corporations with their safety related interventions, I have lost track of the number of times internal safety managers and CEO’s have expressed frustration with their behavioural safety systems We regularly hear comments similar to:i ii iii iv We gained significantly in the early days and it’s levelled off We just can’t seem to get any further improvement Our people don’t seem as serious about safety as they were The consultants’ have gone and we are seeing our safety performance start to slide again One can understand the levels of frustration behind these observations as behavioural safety interventions are often quite expensive to implement In most cases they would seem to be at least cost neutral in the medium term The anecdotal evidence though is that in the longer term their efficacy is being questioned by the very people who are reaching into the corporate wallet to pay for them in the first pace; and thus the value of the original investment would seem to be being questioned This is unfortunate as again the real meaning to safety statistics deteriorating is often people being killed, maimed, or experiencing other life impacts that are not desired I appreciate the strength of the imagery here, and it is deliberate Whilst some might practice the psychological process of “dissociation” and think of safety performance as 49 Eckenfelder, D.J., (1996) “Values-Driven Safety: Re-engineering Loss Prevention using Value-inspired Resource Optimization” Government Institutes Inc, Maryland USA 50 Eckenfelder, D.J., (1996) “Values-Driven Safety: Re-engineering Loss Prevention using Value-inspired Resource Optimization” Government Institutes Inc, Maryland USA 51 Hidley, J.H and T.R Krause, (1994) “Behavior-Based Safety: Paradigm Shift Beyond the Failures of AttitudeBased Programs” Professional Safety Oct.1994 pp 28-32 52 Geller, S.E., (1995) pp 16-22 53 Cambrdge Centre for Behavioral Studies, 336 Baker Ave Concord, MA 01742 “Behavioral Safety: Key to Achieving a Total Safety Culture” Professional Safety July 1995, Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page 10 of 21 LTIFR etc; this too is unfortunate Statistical processes are important and we find businesses boasting to each other about the low levels of their LTIFR etc Nevertheless the real world impact of such numbers is people growing up without fathers, mothers etc Households being completely decimated due to the financial changes often associated with workplace injury Increases in chronic health conditions, alcoholism and a whole range of other socio-cultural impacts Let me say again; it is not worth getting too “precious” about whether you have the best or worst BBS program on the planet The value here is how we make it culturally superior and therefore improve its performance and sustainability I have already explored the history of safety culture, some of the foundational elements of many behavioural safety interventions, and how the healthier the safety culture the more robust the safety systems that essentially hang off it There is limited value in implementing behavioural safety systems within cultures that not have appropriate commitment and stability They shall not work effectively, irrespective of how much money is thrown at them The very basis of this presentation is how The Transformational Safety® Culture Improvement System can be the point of difference in making your behavioural safety (BBS) programs give maximum “bang” for your “buck” The Transformational Safety® Culture Improvement System is an integrated suite of applications and interventions which has a foundation in the world of transformational leadership Many of the worlds leading authors have commented about the applicability of transformational leadership principles to the real world of applied safety54, 55, 56, 57 Therefore to achieve our goal we are going to have to take a closer look at the world of transformational leadership, and particularly safety leadership Recall the excellent work of Lisa Ronald58 “active safety leadership/ management commitment variables appear to play an integral (if not the most crucial) role in ensuring safety success” So let’s think about what are some of the factors that might act as influencing vehicles as far as enhanced safety performance is concerned What is it then that stops things falling on your head? One group from Australia have developed a model of safety performance which draws upon more traditional understandings around work performance in general59 They then go on to describe two (2) key aspects of safety performance as being:Safety Compliance - The term “safety compliance” is used to describe the core activities that need to be carried out by individuals to maintain workplace safety These behaviours include adhering to standard work procedures and wearing personal protective equipment 54 Zohar, D., & Luria, G., (2003) “The Use of Supervisory Practices as Leverage to Improve Safety Behaviour: A Cross-level Intervention Model”, Available from: Prof Dov Zohar, Faculty of I.E & Management, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel E-mail: dzohar@tx.technion.ac.il 55 Barling, J., Loughlin, C & Kelloway, E.K (2002) “Development and test of a model linking safety-specific transformational leadership and occupational safety” Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 3, pp 488-496 56 Barling, J., Weber, T & Kelloway, E.K (1996) “Effects of transformational leadership training on attitudinal and fiscal outcomes: A field experiment” Journal of Applied Psychology, 81, pp 827-832 57 th Broadbent, D.G., (2004) “Maximising Safety Performance via leadership Behaviours”, 28 International Congress of Psychology, Beijing, CHINA 58 Ronald, L., (1998), “Identifying the elements of successful safety programs: A literature review”, A Report prepared for the Prevention Division, Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia, 6711 Elmridge Way, RICHMOND, BC, V7C 4N1 59 Neal, A, & Griffin, M (2002) Safety Climate and Safety Behaviour, Australian Journal of Management, Vol 27, pp 67-76 Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page 11 of 21 Safety Participation - The term “safety participation” is used to describe behaviours that not directly contribute to an individual’s personal safety, but which help to develop an environment that supports safety These behaviours include activities such as participating in voluntary safety activities, helping co-workers with safetyrelated issues, and attending safety meetings The largest of questions is; what we need to more of to maximise safety compliance and safety participation within our workplaces Once we get these aspects right, outcomes such as reduction in injury rates etc shall naturally follow Thus the safety systems that fly, couple aspects of Transformational Leadership within their behavioural paradigms, remember the majority of BBS programs are pretty “lite on” on this area Now we are getting closer to the purpose of this article You don’t believe me you? What are the real world consequences of ignoring Transformational Leadership within safety system design; and then what is the “payoff” when we actually ensure Transformational Leadership is an integral foundation of the safety system When some researchers exploring safety climate/culture crunched their numbers they found some common relationships between a range of variables eg supervision & management, existence of a safety system, risk taking behaviour, work pressure, and work competence.60 A further group concluded when they looked at over a dozen safety climate outcome measures the common theme was “management safety activity”.61 The United States Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) have recognised the “power” of leadership and have defined “management leadership” as a key program element in safety system design.62 The U.K Health and Safety Regulator apparently is aware of this and associates the organisational factors influencing safety culture as follows • • • • • Senior management commitment Management style Visible management Good communication between all levels of employees (management action) A balance of health and safety and production goals (management prioritisation) Some well regarded Canadian researchers63 have argued that leadership is one of the most critical determinants of workplace safety performance They go on to express the belief, supported by much research64,65, that leadership plays an integral role in developing and maintaining the safety climate within an organisation By now I hope that it is understood how crucial safety leadership is to your safety results Your leadership creates and maintains the culture that determines what will, and will not, work in your BBS Programs (or in any other endeavour really) An effective safety leader clearly communicates what results are required; in addition to what is acceptable to achieve those results It doesn’t take a lot of time to see the relationship which is clearly self evident The impact of management, and more importantly, leadership is a key, if not the key “influencer” on any effective safety management system We may have all sorts of reasons for not wanting to look in this mirror; nevertheless the “hard data” doesn’t lie 60 Flin, R et al (2000) “Safety Climate: Identifying the Common Features”, Safety Science, 34, 177 61 Guldenmund, F (2000) 215 62 Program Evaluation Profile (PEP), Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20210 63 Barling and Zacharatos, A (1999), “High performance safety systems: Management practices for achieving optimal safety performance”, paper presented at the 25th annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Toronto, CANADA 64 Hoffman D.A & Morgeson, F.P (1999) “Safety-related behavior as a social exchange: The role of perceived organizational support and leader-member exchange”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol 84, no 2, pp 286–296 65 Zohar, D (2000) “A group-level model of safety climate: Testing the effect of group climate on micro accidents in manufacturing jobs”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol 85, No 4, pp 587–96 “The Nature of Safety Culture: A Review of Theory and Research”, Safety Science, 34, Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page 12 of 21 The most obvious strategy is that we develop a transformational leadership culture throughout the organisation, and I mean at ALL levels, which shall then directly impact upon the way that all the “speed bumps” and “collisions” are resolved Transformational leadership culture may well be something you have not come across before Consider for a moment you develop a free thinking, problem solving, transformational leader within an organisational culture which is highly transactional You will not likely achieve the “beyond expectation” safety outcomes that you wish to experience So how you determine where the organisation is as regards the goals of optimal safety culture and safety leadership? Firstly we need to gain an appreciation as to where the organisation is placed against the parameters of Safety Culture and Safety Leadership The Transformational Safety® Survey, an integral component of The Transformational Safety® Improvement System, has two primary components that have been strategically integrated to allow an organisation to gather this information quite painless66, a third component is developed to explore site specific workplace behaviours (items of which can be drawn from an organisations current behavioural data) If you have a closer look at the model presented you can see aspects of the more traditional BBS; particularly when we look at Site Specific Workplace Behaviours One of the key differences is that we loudly acknowledge that the leadership behaviours demonstrated within the organisation, particularly the safety leadership behaviours, have a critical impact within the behavioural triggers of operational workforces Part A of the Transformational Safety® Survey is targeted at the construct of Safety Culture It uses a Likert scale survey methodology, in conjunction with formal 1:1 survey structure to interrogate a number of well validated cultural dimensions Using the unique safety-plex© to display the results, organisations are able to compare their safety culture against work units, departments, geographical locations, etc The actual items of the Transformational Safety® Survey are components of a fully researched and factor analysed safety culture instrument Part A of The Transformational Safety® Survey was developed by The University of Loughborough's school of 66 At times looking into the organisational safety mirror can be a little painful Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page 13 of 21 Safety Science67 When developing transformational safety® within an organisations’ culture we are always trying to move our cultural dimensions toward, or ideally inside, the “green zone” Management operates an open door policy on safety issues Safety is the number one priority in my mind when completing a job Co-workers often give tips to each other on how to work safely 10 Safety rules and procedures are carefully followed 11 Management clearly considers the safety of employees of great importance 12 I am sure it is only a matter of time before I am involved in an accident 13 Sometimes I am not given enough time to get the job done safely 14 I am involved in informing management of important safety issues 15 Management acts decisively when a safety concern is raised 16 There is good communication here about safety issues which affect me ® Sample Items from Part A of The Transformational Safety Survey Part B of The Transformational Safety® Survey Part B is based upon the thinking of Joseph Rost68, James McGregor Burns69 and the later developmental work of Professors Bernie Bass70 and Bruce Avolio71 In this component of The Transformational Safety® System we build on the powerful work that has come before with a specific targeting of safety leadership behaviours Part B has been developed around the authors own experience in applied safety management and observation of safety cultures, whilst also being synergistically related to the constructs developed by Professors Bass and Avolio, though with a powerful safety leadership focus The Transformational Safety® System safety leadership constructs are: • • • • • • • • • The Invisible Man (FRLM® 72 equivalent – Laissez-Faire) The Fire-fighter (FRLM® 72 equivalent – MBE-P) The Policeman (FRLM® 72 equivalent – MBE-A) The Dealer (FRLM® 72 equivalent – Contingent Reward) The Motivator (FRLM® 72 equivalent – Inspirational Motivation) ® 72 equivalent – Idealised Attributes) The Knight (FRLM The Innovator (FRLM® 72 equivalent – Intellectual Stimulation) The Carer (FRLM® 72 equivalent – Individualised Consideration) ® 72 equivalent – Idealised Behaviours) The Missionary(FRLM Reporting of Part B of the Transformational Safety® Survey uses an exploded pie chart Best practice balancing of the Transformational Safety® slices are able to be determined by the, taking into account a range of factors including context, hazard and risk profiles etc 67 Cox., S., & Cheyne, A.J.T., (2000), 111-129 68 Rost, J., (1991), 69 Burns, J.M., (1978), “Leadership”, Harper and Roe Publishers, New York:NY 70 Bass, B.M., (1985), “Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations”, 71 Avolio, Bruce J (1999), “Full Leadership Development: Building the Vital Forces in Organisations” Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 72 This instrument is not a replacement for assessing general transformational leadership; if that is required the appropriate tool is the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) available as a unique service from www.transformationalsafety.com or from the Australasian distributor www.mlq.com.au.The Transformational Safety ® Leadership dimensions not share any direct statistical association with the FRLM Items have been developed to ® share a synergistic relationship only The Full Range Leadership Model is copyrighted to Professors Bernie Bass and Bruce Avolio “Assessing safety culture in offshore environments”, Safety Science, 34, pp “Leadership in the twenty first century”, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport: CT New York: Free Press Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page 14 of 21 With Part B we take advantage of the same colour metaphor When it comes to the transformational safety® dimensions that appear in red we actually not wish to see any of them, or if they have to be present, only in infinitesimal proportions Those colours that are shown in amber are depicting the presence of safety leadership behaviours that are required in an effective safety system, though they should not be the primary behaviours exhibited within the organisation These are transactional leadership behaviours within a safety related context It is when the transformational safety® leadership behaviours are shown to be demonstrably “green” that you are giving your safety system the power of transformational leadership competencies Part B of The Transformational Safety® Survey has the ability to separate the result profiles based upon level of leadership within the organisation This is critical data if an organisation is attempting to determine the levels of leadership within the organisation that shall most benefit from targeted transformational safety® interventions I am proud to be associated with the management team at this workplace for the manner in which they approach safety My line manager/supervisor comes across as being fair and ethical in matters of workplace safety 11 When my line manager/supervisor promotes safety within the workplace it is personal, powerful and has a high impact on me 16 My line manager/supervisor is willing to consider all approaches to workplace safety, even if that means “rocking the boat” a bit 21 My line manager/supervisor is regularly seen “out and about” talking to people abut their own jobs and workplace safety 26 My line manager/supervisor is always willing to help out with safety matters though there is often something required in return 31 My line manager/supervisor is regularly looking around the workplace for poor housekeeping, things out of place etc ® Sample Items from Part B of The Transformational Safety Survey The Transformational Safety® Survey is able to be provided using a range of delivery systems By far the most powerful and valid administration of The Transformational Safety® Survey is using our patented wireless delivery system Due to the added validity that this delivery system gives to the data this mechanism shall always be explored prior to exploring alternate methods of data collection Wireless delivery allows there to be no impacts associated with literacy, and allows complete anonymity; maximising more robust result profiles Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page 15 of 21 Should it be determined that the On-Site Wireless Delivery System (shown actual size) is untenable then a number of alternate delivery systems to enable data collection may be appropriate These are:• • • • Customised Web Administration Email Administration PDF Fillable Form Administration Paper/Pencil Administration Off-site administrations provide an abridged Part A The power and flavour of a number of cultural constructs are unable to be quantified without using the additional value of strategic Focus Group methodologies Having completed Part A and Part B of The Transformational Safety® Survey organisations are well placed to assess their position toward a Best Practice transformational safety® system Part C (customised behavioural safety indicators) also allows the organisation to map its contemporary BBS outcomes (beyond those traditional LTIFR metrics) The preferred method for exploring the interrelationships of “safety culture”, “safety leadership” and BBS opportunities is to implement the Integrated Safety Culture Assessment; this presentation format was developed by the author in 2000 It was created as result of an awareness of the significant gap in the manner in which many safety culture assessments were not only being delivered, also the value of their reporting Essentially the author’s view was that safety culture assessments were being poorly implemented, despite a small number of "providers" leveraging significant dollars out of their customers And for what! In many cases organisations would be told information they felt they already knew The biggest concern was that, for the most part, there was very little science behind the offerings out there (there’s that word again) Added to that, much of what was being offered to the market did not really address the identified constructs of safety culture as demonstrated by some of the worlds leading published commentators You will remember Lisa Ronald’s pre-eminent work on safety culture programs throughout the world, identified some significant predictors of effective safety cultures, and yet many of the tools on the market did not adequately measure, and/or assess, the presence of those within the organisation Arguably one of the most well respected thinkers on organisational culture in general, and more recently specifically in the area of safety culture is Edgar Schein73, we have spoken of him previously Ed Schein has developed a cultural framework specific to safety which has been adopted throughout the nuclear industry internationally74 In Schein’s model75, culture is assumed to be a pattern of shared basic assumptions, which are invented, discovered or developed by an organisation as it learns to cope with problems of survival and cohesiveness According to Schein’s three-level model, an organisation’s safety culture can be assessed by evaluating the organisation’s artefacts, claimed values, and basic assumptions On the first level of the model are the organisation’s artefacts Artefacts are the visible signs and behaviours of the organisation, such as its written mission, vision, and policy statements The second level consists of the organisation’s claimed or espoused values Examples of claimed values might include mottos such as, “safety first” or “maintaining a blame-free work environment.” The third level is comprised of the basic assumptions of the individuals within the organisation Basic assumptions are the beliefs and attitudes that individuals bring into the organisation or that are developed as a result of experience within the organisation Examples of basic assumptions may include, “safety can always be improved” or “everyone can contribute to safety.” The 73 74 75 Schein, E., (2004) “Organizational Culture and Leadership”, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, INSAG-15 (2002) “Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety Culture”, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria Schein, E (1992), nd “Organisational culture and leadership” Edition San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page 16 of 21 organisation’s basic assumptions regarding safety culture are less tangible than the artefacts and claimed values They are often taken for granted within the organisation that shares the culture Artefacts, claimed values, and basic assumptions are evaluated to identify the presence or absence of the characteristics that have been found to be important for the existence of a positive safety culture These characteristics include: • Safety is a clearly recognised value in the organisation • Accountability for safety in the organisation is clear • Safety is integrated into all activities in the organisation • A safety leadership process exists in the organisation • Safety culture is learning driven in the organisation The TransformationalSafety.Com Integrated Safety Culture Assessment© achieves its benchmark status within the market as a result of the manner in which it literally integrates a number of different safety culture interrogation methods into the one intervention In the world of applied psychology this might be though of as convergent validity The Transformational Safety® Culture Improvement System’s Integrated Safety Culture Assessment includes:ã ã ã ã đ Quantitative Analysis - The Transformational Safety Survey ® Qualitative Analysis - Transforming Safety Focus Groups Observational Analysis - On-Site behavioural review mechanisms Procedural Analysis - Summary observations of organisational procedures against international standards eg., AS/NZS 4801, BSI 18001(1999), or ILO-OSH 2001 All of the above are integrated within the most comprehensive safety culture assessment report available today; with specific mapping to the Ed Schein Safety Culture Model Would it surprise you to know that the Integrated Safety Culture Assessment© is the only qualitative/quantitative intervention in the World that "maps" an organisations safety culture against the framework of Ed Schein At Risk Safety Culture Transformational Leadership Passive-Avoidant The Invisible Man The Fireman Dangerous Workplaces Transactional Leadership The Policeman The Dealer Expected Effort Only Average Safety Performance The Motivator The Knight The Innovator The Carer The Missionary Heightened Desire to reach safety leadership outcomes Exceptional Safety Performance Optimal Safety Culture Visual depiction of the impacts of Transformational Safety® Leadership Behavioural Competencies upon Safety Culture Let us now have a look at some graphical representations of how Transformational Safety Survey results can assist organisations place their safety cultures into some sort of development context If one looks at the image presented we find that those organisations who demonstrate a profile with a lot of red safety leadership behaviours (primary behaviours Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page 17 of 21 consistent with The Invisible Man and The Fireman) are actually demonstrating a safety culture which is significantly "at risk" Whilst they might occasionally delve into some of the transactional leadership competencies this is generally inconsistent in its application Rarely cultures based upon invisibility and fire fighting develop toward a healthier safety culture without some sort of cathartic impact Let us move on to a transformational safety view of a traditional BBS based culture These cultures Transformational are heavily Leadership based around The Motivator Transactional observed The Knight Leadership Passive-Avoidant The Innovator behaviours and The Carer The Policeman dealing with the The Invisible Man The Missionary The Dealer employees, by The Fireman way of risk/reward Heightened Desire Dangerous Expected systems There to reach safety Effort Only Workplaces leadership are regularly outcomes both overt and Average covert reward Safety Performance Exceptional Safety systems in Performance place It has to be said that the regulatory Optimal compliance Safety pressures and Culture statistical ® measurement Visual depiction of the impacts of Transformational Safety Leadership Behavioural Competencies upon Safety Culture systems often encouraged (read legally required) by authorities, encourages the maintenance of these more traditional systems Traditional BBS Programs Traditional BBS systems have islands of recognition around the values associated with particular leaders Why some team leaders have “safer” work teams than others doing the same or similar work It has been shown it is not because of the “size of the stick” It is the quality of the leader Indeed it would seem that some of the global leaders in the marketing and promotion of BBS systems have begun to “twig” to this observation Scott Geller’s “People Based Safety” program begins to try and leverage this construct within their BBS paradigms The contrasts, or inconsistencies in approach, often continue to show themselves though These types of cultures also tend to show icebergs of avoidance In other words there are occasions where the passive-avoidant approaches of invisibility and firefighting continue to show some presence This is a significant problem and is frequently a source of concern for those running these programs Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Transformational Safety Culture Transformational Leadership Passive-Avoidant The Invisible Man The Fireman Dangerous Workplaces Transactional Leadership The Policeman The Dealer Expected Effort Only Average Safety Performance The Motivator The Knight The Innovator The Carer The Missionary Heightened Desire to reach safety leadership outcomes Page 18 of 21 It is evident from this depiction where transformational safety leadership behaviours need to develop The whole “oval of influence” needs to consistently move toward the right and encompass more of the transformational safety leadership behaviours Exceptional Safety Performance Note well, a highly functioning transformational Optimal safety culture Safety does not discard Culture the transactional styles of Visual depiction of the impacts of Transformational Safety® Leadership Behavioural Competencies upon Safety Culture “policing” and “dealing” We recognise these are effective approaches when utilised strategically within a primarily transformational culture At the same time transformational safety does not suggest that we should discard the risk/reward systems associated with traditional BBS Behavioural based safety has shown itself to be effective, to a point, in its application over a number of years It is when these actions occur, more often than not, that the system begins to reap the rewards so regularly associated with transformational cultures Now that our journey is coming to a conclusion it is valuable to review where we have been I have attempted to demonstrate, from a number of sources, the powerful probative value of safety culture as a foundational element within any workplace safety system Without an effective safety culture the evidence clearly shows that you could end up having the most number of fatalities and severe injuries within your industry76 I have then explored the fundamental positions of Heinrich and Reason and demonstrated the relationships that safety culture has within those behavioural paradigms Many contemporary BBS systems have the work of these authors as foundational elements; some may not even realise it In addition we have seen the very powerful impact that effective leadership, particularly transformational leadership, has been shown to have within corporate outcomes generally, and more particularly within the real world outcomes of safety Finally By adopting an integrated approach to the implementation of Transformational Safety® within your organisation’s cultural systems, the evidence clearly shows direct 76 Bergman, L., & Barstow, D., (2003) “A Dangerous Business”, A FRONTLINE coproduction with The New York Times and The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page 19 of 21 and indirect impacts upon safety outcome measures77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84 In striving toward a Best Practice implementation of Transformational Safety® 85 the integration of the Transformational Safety® Culture Improvement System would be the strategy of choice 77 Geyer, A.L & Steyrer, J (1998) “Transformational Leadership, Classical Leadership Dimensions and Performance Indicators in Savings Banks” Leadership Quarterly, 47, 397-420 78 Sarros, J.C and Santora, J.C (2001) “Personal Values and Executive Leadership: Global Comparisons and Practical Implications”, Paper presented at the 2001 Academy of Business and Administrative Sciences International th th Conference, Quebec City, CANADA, 12 – 14 July 2001 79 Page, A., (2004) “Keeping Patients Safe: Transforming the Work Environment of Nurses”, National Academies Press, New Your:NY 80 Krause, T., & Hidley, J., (2004) “The Art of Collaboration”, Perspectives in Behavioural Performance Improvement, July/August Yule, S.J., Flin, R., & Mearns, K (2002), “Managing Director Influence on Safety Performance”, Proceedings of the th 25 Congress of Applied Psychology, SINGAPORE 81 82 Yule, S (2002) “Do Transformational Leaders lead Safer Businesses”, Proceedings of the 25 Congress of Applied Psychology, SINGAPORE 83 Flin, R., & Yule, S (2004), “Leadership for Safety – Industrial Experience”, Qual Saf Health Care, 13 (Suppl II):ii45– ii51 doi: 10.1136/qshc.2003.009555 84 Barling, J., Moutinho, K., & Kelloway, K.E., (2006), “Transformational leadership and group performance: The mediating role of affective commitment”, Working Paper 00-07, Queens School of Business, Queens University, ONTARIO: CANADA 85 th Copyright © 2006, David G Broadbent – All Rights Reserved: David G Broadbent asserts his rights, in accordance with the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, to be known as the author of the concept “Transformational Safety” and “Transformational Safety System” The phrase Transformational Safety® is a registered trademark and incorporates The Transformational Safety® Culture Improvement System, The Transformational Safety® Survey, and The Integrated Safety Culture Assessment© Model incorporating the Observational Protocol Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page 20 of 21 Attachment The Structure of Culture Although "culture is everything" that goes on in an organisation (communications, procedures, housekeeping, the way of running meetings etc.), for practical purposes it can be considered to exist in layers Some of the layers are directly observable, and some are invisible and have to be deduced from the things that can be observed in the organisation A way of thinking about the layers of culture is shown below Understanding the Safety Culture Map Underlying Assumptions Edgar Schein proposes that cultures are based on a set of underlying assumptions about reality In the practical context, this means that an organisation will display observable artefacts and behaviours that result from what it assumes about things such as vulnerability to an event, the nature of people (how are they motivated) and the importance of following rules Unless the leaders are intrusive about spreading the appropriate assumptions in their organisations, people will simply form assumptions based on their own experience This is normally bad for a safety culture* Ideas and Knowledge The next layer of culture in organisations is the set of basic ideas and specialised knowledge that management and others have about what to do, why to it and how to get it done in their organisation There is therefore a whole layer of organisational culture made up of the patterns of thinking and ideas about things such as how to direct people, how to run meetings and whether to measure things All of these ideas ultimately manifest themselves in observable forms such as documents and behaviours In general it is management that leads the way in these patterns of ideas However, management must also make sure that other people understand and hold the "right" thinking patterns for their tasks Examples are where specialised knowledge or insight is key to performance (e.g skilled operators, designers) In these cases the organisation must train and develop people to hold the appropriate ideas and insights for the situations that may be encountered Patterns of Behaviour People in organisations develop patterns of behaviour that become deeply embedded and which are passed on to new staff very quickly They range from the specialised (skills of the trade), through important traits such as complying with procedures or wearing (or not wearing) protective equipment, and into less defined areas like raising concerns and running meetings These patterns of behaviour are the most obvious manifestation of the culture in the human dimension and ultimately are of critical importance to safety It is known that people will imitate others very strongly in order to "fit in" to a new culture, that patterns of behaviour are strongly triggered by specific situations, and that the patterns can be very hard to change These facts mean that the task of leadership in guiding and shifting behaviours is a serious challenge and requires a long-term effort Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page 21 of 21 Physical Things The culture also exists in physical aspects such as documents, tools and equipment, housekeeping standards etc These can be of vital importance to performance If the physical environment makes it hard for someone to "the right thing" but easy to the wrong thing then performance will almost certainly suffer An example would be out-of-date procedures In this type of situation people will tend to apply their assumption that what is really required is to "do it right", and they will not follow the procedures Procedural non-compliance then becomes a pattern of behaviour, which on occasion will cause a serious event when a correct procedure is not followed At this stage (if the event was sufficiently serious) management will typically say: "We have a cultural problem" Words, Language and Images Finally the culture exists in words, language and images Indeed without a structured language of organisational concepts and concerns people cannot effectively form a cohesive culture It is an important task of leaders to create and use the language of an organisation People become especially attached to jargon, and the use of specific language will also trigger specific behaviours Therefore it is sometimes necessary to change the jargon and the language, or to introduce new images in order to change the culture Rules of Culture There are some general rules of culture that can help to solidify the concepts In social cultures the layers generally tend to get more stable from the top down However, in organisational cultures management has particularly strong control over the ideas and knowledge This means that it is often easier to change the patterns of thinking in an organisation than to change its patterns of behaviour (e.g new managers can come in with new ideas, but fail to get people to change their old behaviours.) Cultures are not good or bad in themselves, but are good or bad at achieving certain results such as safety or quality There is always a safety culture in an organisation The question is whether it is what management needs it to be, and whether it is improving or degrading Cultures are a product of social learning Therefore they cannot be shifted without a learning orientation and without a lot of explanation and discussion as well as action Cultures have a natural tendency to degrade in the sense that the basic assumptions can get forgotten leaving the patterns of thought and action; these then degrade in turn through complacency, changes in personnel and other means Therefore cultures always need renewal at the lower (invisible) layers, even to "stand still" Leaders change culture by intervening at all levels: they hold new and different assumptions and patterns of thinking, they establish new patterns of behaviour and they can change the physical environment and the language and images In particular, leaders constantly refresh the lower, invisible, layers of culture People not generally know their own underlying assumptions, and people not all hold the same underlying assumptions Cultures reduce anxiety for their members by establishing shared patterns of thinking, speaking and acting Therefore changing the culture will always increase anxiety until the new patterns are learned Leaders must make the anxiety of learning less than the anxiety of staying in the old culture David G Broadbent Safety Psychologist PROFILE A highly experienced and innovative corporate and counselling psychologist who has synthesised these frameworks into a value adding experience for a large and varied customer base David is very focused upon the needs of his customers and this is evidenced by a business that continues to prosper within a referral network created by customer satisfaction David has highly developed interpersonal and groupwork skills and this has resulted in recognition both nationally and internationally for his pragmatic ability to deliver the most complex information in an entertaining and successful style SKILLS SUMMARY • • • • • • • • • • Highly experienced Groupwork Facilitator Demonstrated Program Development skills within a variety of industrial environments Leadership Development and Change Management strategist within organisational settings Developed and implemented the POWER© Management Systems; an integrated management skillset collection Development and provision of Safety Management Systems for both domestic and international consumption Internationally recognised as one of Australia’s foremost commentators on Full Range Leadership and associations with corporate and safety outcomes Demonstrated expertise in Agents of Change© and Leaders of Change Development Systems Industrial History and a pragmatic ability to relate within all levels of an organisation; from the Stock Room to the Board Room Industry leader in the development of Trauma Recovery Solutions within organisational frameworks Experienced presenter to both small groups and large convention centres CAREER HIGHLIGHTS • • • Director of Strategic Management Systems; a customer focused organisational psychology practice Development of a trauma education package for one of Australia’s largest multi-national corporations Creator of The Transformational Safety System©; the Worlds only integrated safety culture assessment system incorporating Full Range Leadership© Theory QUALIFICATIONS • • • • Bachelor of Arts (Psych-Hons) - 1987 Certificate IV in Assessment & Workplace Training – 2000 Advanced Trauma Specialist – International Critical Incident Stress Foundation - 2000 Advanced Coach – MLQ Leadership Development Systems – 2001 David G Broadbent Safety Psychologist EMPLOYMENT HISTORY Managing Director - Strategic Management Systems Pty Ltd Incorporating: The Leadership College – Leadership Development Solutions throughout the Asia-Pacific The Safety Site – International Provider of Integrated Workplace Safety Systems DG Broadbent & Associates – Organisational and Counselling Psychologists TransformationalSafety.Com – Integrated Safety Culture Analysis and Reporting Key Deliverables: Leadership Development • Designed the Lead to Succeed© Program - An outcome oriented leadership development program incorporating Full Range Leadership principles • Developed Good to Greater© - The Asia-Pacific’s first experiential workshop incorporating the seminal works of Jim Collins’ Good to Great • Developed Project to Success© - A Project Management education primer with particular emphasis upon integrated leadership competencies • Created the ATLAS© Paradigm: A leadership competency framework for developmental coaching Safety Culture Analysis • Developed and implemented the Integrated Safety Culture Assessmentâ model drawing upon contemporary safety culture research ã Regularly provides strategic advice to both domestic and international clients in regard to safety enhancement programs • Demonstrated expertise utilising the SAFEMAPâ Assessment System ã Developed and provides a cross-cultural multi-lingual safety culture assessment system ã Created The Transformational Safety Systemâ: The worlds first fully integrated safety culture enhancement system incorporating Full Range Leadership Theory Occupational Health and Safety • Assisted a key regional employer reduce their workers compensation exposure from $1,200,000 to $60,000 across three (3) years • Assisted a key regional employer improve their occupational injury return to work rate from 35% to 100% within a twelve (12) month cycle • Developed an integrated EAP/Injury Management System for a high stress work environment which improved return to rates from 0% to >80% within a twelve (12) month cycle • NSW Workcover accredited Rehabilitation Provider with the highest sustained Return to Work Rate for the preceding five (5) years • Internationally qualified to audit against ISO18000: Occupational Health Management System Development and Implementation • Nationally qualified to audit against AS/NZS 4801:2001: Occupational health and safety management systems - Specification with guidance for use Coaching • Foundation Member of the International Association of Coaches (IAC) • Regularly provide corporate interventions using industry recognised coaching frameworks; eg GROW, ACHIEVE, and the IAC-15 Proficiencies Risk Assessment • Development and implementation of Australia’s only risk management training programs based upon Operational Risk Management (ORM) principles: the risk management protocols utilised by the US Navy Seals • Accredited by the NSW Workcover Authority as a Premium Discount Adviser at the maximum rating • Regularly conduct Risk Assessments/Incident Investigations for numerous organisations Trauma Management • Provider of Trauma Recovery Solutions throughout Australia • Advanced qualifications in Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) David G Broadbent Safety Psychologist PAPERS PRESENTED “Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice: Integrating the Transformational Safety Culture Improvement System within traditional BBS Programs”, Safety in Action 2006, Melbourne Convention and Exhibition Centre, MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA, 16th – 18th May 2006 “Maximising Safety Performance via Leadership Behaviours”, 28th International World Congress of Psychology, BEIJING, CHINA, 8th -13th August 2004 “Leadership Styles and their Impact upon Safety Outcomes”, Transfield-Worley Best Practice Conference, ADELAIDE, AUSTRALIA, 22nd – 23rd March 2004 “Managing Traumatic Incidents in the Workplace”, Futuresafe 2001, Brisbane Convention and Exhibition Centre, BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA, 6th -8th June 2001 “Critical Incident Stress Management in the Workplace”, Huntersafe 2001 - Managing Workplace Risk, Newcastle City Hall, NEWCASTLE, AUSTRALIA, 8th – 9th March, 2001 "Occupational stress and rehabilitation; The need to give 'em EAP's", Third National Employee Assistance Professionals Association of Australia Conference, 9th -10th November, 1994, AIRPORT SHERATON, SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA "Occupational Stress Management: A practitioners perspective", Professional training developed for Queensland Psychology Group, Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service, MILTON, QLD, 24th August, 1994 "A review of rehabilitation procedures for Custodial Officers experiencing Occupational Stress", 1st National Occupational Stress Conference, ANA Hotel, SURFERS PARADISE, AUSTRALIA, 15th - 17th June, 1994 "Behaviour Economics Theory and its implications to medical practice", Tenth National Behavioural Medicine Conference, University of Sydney, AUSTRALIA, 29th September – 1st October, 1993 "A review of psychological reactions to occupational injury and associated pain", 1st National CRS Conference, MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA, 30th April – 3rd May, 1991 PUBLICATIONS “Maximising Safety Performance via Leadership Behaviours”, Proceedings of 28th International World Congress of Psychology, BEIJING, CHINA, 8-13 August 2004 “Managing Traumatic Incidents within AMCOR”, Corporate publication for the AMCOR group of Companies, MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA, September 2001 “Managing Traumatic Incidents in the Workplace”, Proceedings of Futuresafe 2001, Brisbane Convention and Exhibition Centre, BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA, 6-8 June 2001 “Traumatic Events in the Workplace – An Operational handbook”, Proceedings of Huntersafe 2001Managing Workplace Risk, NEWCASTLE, AUSTRALIA, 8-9 March 2001 "A review of rehabilitation procedures for Custodial Officers experiencing Occupational Stress", cited in “Psychological Health in the Workplace: Understanding and Managing Occupational Stress”; Peter Cotton (Ed.): 1996 "A review of psychological reactions to occupational injury and associated pain", Proceedings of the 1st National CRS Conference, MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA, 30 April - May, 1991 ... employee attitudes to safety: a comparison across Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice • • • • • Page of 21 Joint Health and Safety Committee Activities Safety Diligence Safety Training... (2002) Safety Climate and Safety Behaviour, Australian Journal of Management, Vol 27, pp 67-76 Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page 11 of 21 Safety Participation - The term ? ?safety. .. Broadbent Safety Psychologist PAPERS PRESENTED ? ?Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice: Integrating the Transformational Safety Culture Improvement System within traditional BBS Programs”, Safety