Order at the bazaar power and trade in central asia

ORDER AT THE BAZAAR ORDER AT THE BAZAAR Power and Trade in Central Asia Regine A Spector CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON Cornell University Press gratefully acknowledges receipt of a publication subvention from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, which aided in the publication of this book Copyright © 2017 by Cornell University All rights reserved Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850 First published 2017 by Cornell University Press Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Spector, Regine A., 1976– author Title: Order at the bazaar : power and trade in Central Asia / Regine A Spector Description: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2017 | Includes bibliographical references and index Identifiers: LCCN 2017004753 (print) | LCCN 2017006146 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501709326 (cloth : alk paper) | ISBN 9781501712388 (epub/mobi) | ISBN 9781501709746 (pdf) Subjects: LCSH: Bazaars (Markets)—Kyrgyzstan—Bishkek | Postcommunism—Economic aspects—Kyrgyzstan—Bishkek | Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan)—Commerce Classification: LCC HF5475.K982 B57 2017 (print) | LCC HF5475.K982 (ebook) | DDC 381/.1—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017004753 Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers For further information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu Cover: Scene in the Karasuu bazaar, Kyrgyzstan, August 2007 Photograph by the author To my family Contents List of Illustrations ix Introduction The Possibility of Order 1 Varieties of Order in a New Market Context Changing Meanings of Bazaar Trade in Central Asia 21 Organizing Collectively at Dordoi Bazaar 46 Adapting to Bazaar Ownership through Diplomacy 82 Centralizing to Modernize at Osh Bazaar 111 Becoming Trading Elders and Local Authorities 137 Local Orders in Post-Soviet Bazaars and Beyond 165 Conclusion Rethinking Policy, Politics, and Development 179 Acknowledgments Research Appendix Notes Index 191 195 207 247 Illustrations Table A Interviews referenced 203 Figures 2.1 Number of bazaars in Kyrgyzstan (1980–2005) 25 2.2 Retail turnover in Kyrgyzstan (1994–2005) 26 Photos 2.1 Shuttle trade bags, Osh bazaar 23 3.1 Bus terminal and buses, Dordoi bazaar 47 3.2 Bus terminal and buses, Dordoi bazaar 47 3.3 Trading row, Dordoi bazaar 59 3.4 Double-stacked containers, Dordoi bazaar 63 3.5 Open container, Dordoi bazaar 78 5.1 Rice pavilion, Osh bazaar 114 5.2 Street traders, Osh bazaar 116 5.3 Street traders, Osh bazaar 116 5.4 Main entrance, Osh bazaar 117 6.1 Kyrgyz kalpaks, Karasuu bazaar 146 ix 240 NOTES TO PAGES 177–181 47 Maria Fernanda Garcia-Rincon, “Redefining Rules: A Market for Public Space in Caracas, Venezuela,” in Street Entrepreneurs, ed Cross and Morales, 36–57 48 Ibid., 37, 39 49 Ibid., 45 50 Ibid., 53 CONCLUSION Thomas Carothers, “The Rule of Law Revival,” Foreign Affairs 77 (1998): 95; Dani Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform,” Journal of Economic Literature 44, no (December 1, 2006): 973–87 For an alternative perspective on how these reforms in Russia in fact justified and maintained the continuation of provision of Soviet social welfare programs in practice, see Stephen J Collier, Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) Jennifer N Brass, “Development Theory,” in Handbook on Theories of Governance, ed Christopher Ansell and Jacob Torfing (Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Pub, 2016), 119; see also Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) For examples from Eurasia, see Henry E Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Eric McGlinchey, Chaos, Violence, Dynasty: Politics and Islam in Central Asia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011) For work on historical European and contemporary Egyptian struggles for democracy, see Amel Ahmed, Democracy and the Politics of Electoral System Choice: Engineering Electoral Dominance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Amel Ahmed, “Revolutionary Blind-Spots: The Politics of Electoral System Choice and the Egyptian Transition,” Middle East Law and Governance 3, no 1–2 (March 25, 2011): 3–12 Douglas North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981); World Bank, World Development Report: Building Institutions for Markets (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002); Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, “Unbundling Institutions,” Journal of Political Economy 113, no (2005): 949–995 Donald C Clarke, “Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem,” American Journal of Comparative Law 51, no (2003): 89–111 Yuen Yuen Ang, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2016); Mary Elizabeth Gallagher, Contagious Capitalism: Globalization and the Politics of Labor in China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Doug Guthrie, China and Globalization: Social, Economic, and Political Transformation of Chinese Society (New York: Routledge, 2006); Kellee S Tsai, “Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China,” World Politics 59, no (2006): 116–41 For more on the highly skilled, trained designers and technical specialists from the Soviet era in the sector today, see Aisalkyn Botoeva and Regine A Spector, “Sewing to Satisfaction: Craft-Based Entrepreneurs in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan,” Central Asian Survey 32, no (December 1, 2013): 487–500 Many of the production shops themselves are scattered throughout Bishkek and initially operated below the radar of state officials Cesare Aspes and Juergen Pack, “Broader Strategy for the Textile and Manufacturing Industry in Kyrgyzstan: 2009–2011, Strength of the Value Chain,” Promotion for Sustainable Development Programme, GTZ, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, November 2009; Artur Aliev, “Textile and Clothing Sector of Kyrgyzstan,” International Trade Center, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, December 2009; Artyom Zozulinsky, “Kyrgyzstan Textiles Market,” United States Embassy, Commercial Section, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, September 2008 NOTES TO PAGES 181–184 241 I use “relative” stability to signal that the local sociopolitical work of those involved at the bazaar could not prevent broader structural changes, such as the 2008 recession or the more recent economic downturn tied to global and regional political and economic trends 10 For more on industrialization and development in the Third World, see Robert Wade, “After the Crisis: Industrial Policy and the Developmental State in Low-Income Countries,” Global Policy 1, no (2010): 150–61 Multiple scholars and analysts familiar with this sector in Kyrgyzstan argued that precisely the absence of FDI and outside intervention has allowed individual, relatively small shops in the apparel sector to rise, grow, and flourish from the bottom up 11 For more on the location of production, as opposed to purchase of raw materials and the sale of finished goods at bazaars, and the infrastructural and electricity foundations of the manufacturing process more generally, see Regine A Spector and Aisalkyn Botoeva, “New Shop Owners in Old Buildings: Spatial Dynamics of the Apparel Sector in Kyrgyzstan,” Post-Soviet Affairs, forthcoming 12 James C Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) For an analysis of how the Almaty municipal and state authorities in Kazakhstan sought to remove and reshape bazaars by first making them legible, see Regine A Spector, “Bazaar Politics: The Fate of Marketplaces in Kazakhstan,” Problems of Post-Communism 55, no (November 1, 2008): 42–53 13 An additional area of international influence that has become intertwined with bazaar trade has been the proliferation of microcredit and other loan programs since the 2000s While most traders in the 1990s did not have access to these sources of capital, traders since the 2000s have been able to take out loans through these institutions to begin their trade or expand it 14 Specifically, the IMF concluded: “The most immediate explanation for the persistence of shuttle trade appears to be the tax advantage accorded to such trade at the point of entry of these goods In the absence of this preferential treatment, import wholesalers would have a substantial cost advantage over shuttle traders for most goods, and the latter would likely be driven out of business “Shuttle Trade,” Report BOPCOM98/1/3, Prepared by the Statistics Department of International Monetary Fund for the Eleventh Meeting of the IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics in Washington, D.C., October 21–23, 1998, 20 15 Annex of this report summarizes the types of patent and their costs in Kyrgyzstan: “Investment Climate in the Kyrgyz Republic as Seen by Businesses,” International Finance Corporation, 2013 For more on presumptive taxation in the post-communist region, see Konstatin Pashev, “Presumptive Taxation and the Gray Economy: Lessons from Bulgaria,” Working Paper from the Center of the Study of Democracy, WP 0512/1 En, December 2005 16 https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/tlaw/2000/eng/stan.htm 17 Gulnara Toralieva, “Kyrgyzstan: Fury over Sales Tax,” IWPR, October 9, 2003 18 Interview with Bakyt, May 14, 2015, Bishkek 19 Michael Engelschalk, “Small Business Taxation in Transition Countries,” Working Paper, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2006 See also “Kyrgyz Republic: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Progress Report” IMF Country Report No 04/200, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., July 2004, 11 20 Ibid., 21 Kiren Chaudhry, “The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers,” Politics and Society 21, no (September 1993): 245–74 For more details on these tax issues in the region, see IEG Country, Corporate, and Global Evaluation, 242 NOTES TO PAGES 184–187 “World Bank Support for Revenue Policy Reform in Eastern Europe and Central Asia,” Document of the World Bank, Report No.: 62994, 21 The report further mentions Dordoi bazaar on p 23 22 Elizabeth Day, “The Slap That Sparked a Revolution,” Guardian, May 14, 2011 23 Mehdi Mabrouk, “A Revolution for Dignity and Freedom: Preliminary Observations on the Social and Cultural Background to the Tunisian Revolution,” Journal of North African Studies 16, no (December 1, 2011): 629 24 We can see other such cases throughout the world In India, two cases of selfimmolation by traders garnered significant attention in 2004 and 2006 In 2004, after the municipal government’s decision to lease out sidewalks to a “local gangster” who charged traders five times as much as local authorities, the leader of a local street vendors union set himself ablaze after negotiations failed In 2006, a different leader of food vendors also committed an act of self-immolation in front of a crowd after two years of waiting for alternative promised space to trade after their places were retaken for conversion into a garden See Sharit K Bhowmik, “Street Vending in Urban India: The Struggle for Recongnition,” in Street Entrepreneurs: People, Place, and Politics in Local and Global Perspective, ed John Cross and Alfonso Morales (New York: Routledge, 2007), 92–107 25 Galima Bukharbaeva, “Uzbekistan: Tax Hikes Killing Off Traders,” IWPR, RCA Issue 161, November 15, 2002 26 Some analysts attribute the stark policy to “a government push to reduce demand for foreign currency before a visit by the IMF.” The IMF closed its office in April 2001, but then after Uzbekistan allowed the United States to use its military air base (Khanabad) to support the campaign in Afghanistan, allegedly, “Washington agreed to help with economic reforms and persuaded the IMF to give the republic another chance.” In this context, the IMF signed an MOA in January 2002 to liberalize its foreign currency market, which would have resulted in $100–300 million in fall 2002 if the reforms were implemented One World Bank analyst stated: “Although the republic needs this money, it is not as important as IMF recognition and cooperation, which will be a powerful signal to all international financial institutions that Uzbekistan is a nation with a market economy.” Bobomurod Abdullaev, “Uzbekistan: Traders Clash with Police,” IWPR RCA Issue 145, September 10, 2002 For a more thorough summary of these policies and protests in Uzbekistan, see “Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising” Asia Briefing No 38, International Crisis Group, May 25, 2005 27 For example, the American Bar Association has a Rule of Law Initiative in the region 28 See the DAI website for information on this program, available at: http://www.dai com/our-work/projects/kyrgyzstan%E2%80%94parliamentary-strengthening-programkpsp 29 Interview with Azamat, May 19, 2015, Bishkek 30 “Assessment of Parliamentary Legislative Drafting Process in the Kyrgyz Republic,” Kyrgyzstan Parliamentary Strengthening Program (KPSP), October 2011, USAID implemented by DAI, 14–15 31 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) For more on what have been called “transparency devices” initiated by the international development community, see Penny Harvey, Madeleine Reeves, and Evelyn Ruppert, “Anticipating Failure,” Journal of Cultural Economy 6, no (August 1, 2013): 294–312 32 Pieter De Vries, “Don’t Compromise Your Desire for Development! A Lacanian/ Deleuzian Rethinking of the Anti-Politics Machine,” Third World Quarterly 28, no (January 1, 2007): 25–43 NOTES TO PAGES 187–188 243 33 Mary B Anderson, Dayna Brown, and Isabella Jean, Time to Listen: Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid (Cambridge, Mass.: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2012) 34 Pat Horn, “Collective Bargaining in the Informal Economy: Street Vendors,” Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) and the Solidarity Center (Global Labour Programme), January 2014 In one crucial difference, this report investigates street vendors and traders as conceptualized as part of the informal economy I instead heed to the language that traders themselves use, which in the case of Dordoi bazaar does not include reference to “street traders,” “informal economy workers,” or “unofficial economy.” As chapter has argued, they based their actions and practices on the belief of their work as legal, legitimate, and formal in the sense that they pay the patent tax and abide by state laws, and thus deserve to claim and possess certain rights 35 For an analysis of a progressive and successful trade union formed in Kyrgyzstan after the Soviet Union’s collapse in a different sector, see the creation of the Union for the Protection of Railway Workers (UPRW) in 2001 under its charismatic founder, Ernis Dokenov Matthew Naumann and Burul Usmanalieva, “Organising Railway Workers and Land Migrants: Another Side of Civil Society in the Kyrgyz Republic,” INTRAC Central Asia: Social Movements Case Studies, 2008 36 Andrew Schrank, “Toward a New Economic Sociology of Development,” Sociology of Development 1, no (June 1, 2015): 247 For a similar critique of political science literature related to Latin American political economy, see William C Smith et al., “Special Section: Political Economy and the Future of Latin American Politics,” Latin American Politics and Society 56, no (March 1, 2014): 1–33 This latter piece argues forcefully that “social scientists have done little to generate empirically grounded studies that can help us understand, let alone respond to, Latin America’s transformation” (4) 37 For a review of the “economic turn” in the fields of comparative politics and comparative political economy since the 1970s, see Margaret Levi, “The Economic Turn in Comparative Politics,” Comparative Political Studies 33, no 6–7 (September 1, 2000): 822–44 38 Clifford Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 39 We can and should also investigate local understandings of ownership and private property as parts of broader sociopolitical orders that differ significantly from Western ones, and the ways in which people on the ground adapt, subvert, and reshape Western attempts via international organizations and aid agencies to implement their own visions For an analysis based in Mongolia, see David Sneath, “Mongolia in the ‘Age of the Market’: Pastoral Land-Use and the Development Discourse,” in Markets and Moralities: Ethnographies of Postsocialism, ed Ruth Mandel and Caroline Humphrey (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 191–210 For two examples from the African continent, for Senegal, see Dennis C Galvan, The State Must Be Our Master of Fire: How Peasants Craft Culturally Sustainable Development in Senegal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); for Ghana, see Christian Lund, Local Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 40 Andrew Sayer, “Moral Economy as Critique,” New Political Economy 12, no (June 1, 2007): 268–69 41 Schrank, “Toward a New Economic Sociology,” 234 42 Karl Polanyi argued that the commodification of land and labor threatens local social and cultural organization “These institutions are disrupted by the very fact that a market economy is foisted upon an entirely differently organized community; labour and land are made into commodities, which again, is only a short formula for the liquidation of every and any cultural institution in an organic society.” Karl Polanyi, Primitive, Archaic, and Modern Economies: Essays of Karl Polanyi, ed George Dalton (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1968), 49 244 NOTES TO PAGES 188–200 43 World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 44 The summary goal of the report, stated on page three is as follows: “The title of this Report, Mind, Society, and Behavior, captures the idea that paying attention to how humans think (the processes of mind) and how history and context shape thinking (the influence of society) can improve the design and implementation of development policies and interventions that target human choice and action (behavior) To put it differently, development policy is due for its own redesign based on careful consideration of human factors.” World Bank, World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behavior (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2014) 45 Ibid., 25 46 For other studies that examine the moral sentiments and deliberations surrounding professionalism and other economic processes in Kyrgyzstan, see Balihar Sanghera and Aibek Ilyasov, “The Social Embeddedness of Professions in Kyrgyzstan: An Investigation into Professionalism, Institutions, and Emotions,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no (June 1, 2008): 643–61; Balihar Sanghera and Elmira Satybaldieva, “Moral Sentiments and Economic Practices in Kyrgyzstan: The Internal Embeddedness of a Moral Economy,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 33, no (September 1, 2009): 921–35 47 James Howard Smith, Bewitching Development: Witchcraft and the Reinvention of Development in Neoliberal Kenya (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2008), 244 48 Noah Coburn, Bazaar Politics: Power and Pottery in an Afghan Market Town (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) 49 Laurent Gayer, Karachi: Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for the City (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), RESEARCH APPENDIX For two thoughtful overviews of field research challenges, see guest editors Roselyn Hsueh, Francesca Refsum Jensenius, and Akasemi Newsome, “Fieldwork in Political Science: Encountering Challenges and Crafting Solutions,” Political Science and Politics 47, no (April 2014): 391-417; for a symposium on field research issues related to positionality and identity, see guest editors Candice D Orgbals and Meg E Rincker, “Fieldwork, Identities, and Intersectionality: Negotiating Gender, Race, Class, Religion, Nationality, and Age in the Research Field Abroad,” Political Science and Politics 42, no (April 2009): 287-328 For an example of three different perspectives on the fate of bazaars in Kazakhstan, see Regine A Spector, “Bazaar Politics: The Fate of Marketplaces in Kazakhstan,” Problems of Post-Communism 55, no (November 1, 2008): 42–53 See also Madeleine Reeves, Border Work: Spatial Lives of the State in Rural Central Asia, Culture and Society after Socialism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014) Edward Schatz, ed., Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009) For an example of this type of ethnography exploring questions of mass industrial violence, power, concealment and “the politics of sight” based on work experience in three different positions in a slaughterhouse, see Timothy Pachirat, Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight, Yale Agrarian Studies Series (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013) For this type of research related to women’s rights activism in Russia, see Julie Hemment, Empowering Women in Russia: Activism, Aid, and NGOs (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007) Frederic Charles Schaffer, “Thin Descriptions: The Limits of Survey Research on the Meaning of Democracy,” Polity 46, no (July 1, 2014): 303–30; Frederic Schaffer, Elucidating Social Science Concepts: An Interpretivist Guide (New York: Routledge, 2015) NOTES TO PAGE 200 245 Bent Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) For more on this type of interviewing, see Frederic Charles Schaffer, “Ordinary Language Interviewing,” in Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn, ed Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (Armonk, NY: M.E Sharpe), 150–60 Nick Megoran, “On Researching ‘Ethnic Conflict’: Epistemology, Politics, and a Central Asian Boundary Dispute,” Europe-Asia Studies 59, no (2007): 260 Megoran addresses this challenge with focus groups on the topic of border disputes to see if and how ethnicity is discussed in relation to kinship, gender, and class 10 Ibid, 255 For another example of this approach applied to understanding the 2010 ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan, see Nick Megoran, “Shared Space, Divided Space: Narrating Ethnic Histories of Osh,” Environment and Planning A 45, no (April 1, 2013): 892–907 Index Page numbers followed by letters f, p, and t refer to figures, photos, and tables, respectively administration, bazaar, 82; aksakals/baibiches and, 143, 147–48; bottom-up creation in Russia, 175–76; media critiques of, 90; trade union and, 56, 57, 58–61, 74, 93 Afghanistan: islands of order in, 189; NATO campaign in, 7, 20 Africa: islands of order in, 189; predatory states in, 18; reconfiguration of bazaars in, 113, 135, 161 Akaev, Aidar, 98 Akaev, Askar, 94; and aksakal courts, 140, 141; business environment under, 6, 159; Dordoi bazaar owners and, 88; economic policies under, 8, 26; family of, businesses acquired by, 88–89, 98, 126–27, 225n19; and parliament, changes in composition of, 95, 105; resolutions regarding kolkhoz markets, 121–22 See also Akaev ouster Akaev ouster: assassinations in aftermath of, 172; competitive parliamentary elections and, 97, 105; looting accompanying, 57, 68, 168; property redistribution in aftermath of, 5, 98, 129; subversive clientelism and, 101 aksakal courts: creation of, 140, 141; women in, 145 aksakals (elders): age of, 142; at bazaars, roles of, 141–44, 147–48, 163; characteristics of, 143, 145, 147; and conflict mediation, 141, 147–48, 156–57; and order at the bazaar, 138, 141, 143, 148, 154, 163–64, 167; at Osh bazaar, 3, 17, 137–38, 140, 147–48, 162, 167; in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, 139–40, 162; in pre-Soviet Central Asia, 139; and social order, 163–64; starshie compared to, 53, 54, 138, 167; younger traders compared to, 159 Alamudin bazaar, Bishkek, 229n98 apparel manufacturing, in Kyrgyzstan, 181, 184, 241n10 Babanov, Omurbek, 227n70 baibiches (female elders), 145–48; at Osh bazaar, 3, 146–48, 163 Baibolov, Kubatbek, 87–88, 99, 227n69, 229n93 Bakiev, Kurmanbek, 94; business environment under, 6, 159–60, 227n69; family of, businesses acquired by, 88–89, 98, 99, 227n72; protests against, 83, 98–101, 133 Bakiev, Maksim, 98 Bayat, Asaf, 161 bazaars: bribes paid at, 57, 92, 175–76, 178; in Central Asia, 7–8, 21, 22, 32, 33; disorder associated with, 2, 9, 14–15; dispossession and opportunity associated with, 8, 24, 31–32; emergence in post-Soviet region, 1, 8–9, 174; in Georgia, 176–77; handmade vs foreign-made goods at, 33–35, 37, 42; as institutions, 10, 11–12, 13; in Kazakhstan, 9, 33–35; literature on, 7–10; location and future trajectories of, 166; mafias at, 8–9, 9–10, 151, 171; as physical spaces, 10–11; questions regarding, 21–22; in Russia, 174, 175–76; Soviet precursors of, 118–19, 230n12 bazaars, in Kyrgyzstan, 6, 21; cash registers at, government attempts to install, 61–62, 182–83; challenges to doing business at, 10, 92–93, 105–6; changing generational and social context at, 163; and collective identity, recreation of, 73–74; economic dynamism of, 1–2, 7, 24; growth in postSoviet era, 25–29, 25f, 26f; imports to, countries of origin for, 29, 41, 169, 216n30; international customers at, 29, 46, 77; as islands of order, 6, 10, 57, 79, 165; leadership at, 3, 11, 17; privatization of, 11, 123, 166, 177; reconstruction of, 113–14, 134–36; Soviet and pre-Soviet organizational forms reappropriated in, 11–12, 16, 17 See also Dordoi bazaar; Karasuu bazaar; Osh bazaar bazaar trade: biases against, 24, 25, 32–33, 36–37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 218n59, 219n80; and capital accumulation, 1, 7, 31, 60, 92, 180, 181; changing understandings of, in Kyrgyzstan, 25, 37–38, 40–41; collapse of social welfare and, 31–32; evolution in Kyrgyzstan, 27–28; as form of dispossession, 31–32, 166; as honorable profession, 247 248 INDEX bazaar trade (continued) reframing of, 44, 56, 92, 220n9; profits in, 7, 31, 43; Russian government’s policies to curb, 174–75; and social mobility, 7, 31, 60, 92, 106; as survival after Soviet collapse, 7, 8, 30–32, 33, 42, 44; toll on traders, 42–43 Bereket bazaar, Bishkek, 135 Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: bazaars in, 168–69, 229n98, 237n23; as re-export hub for Chinese-made goods, 1, 29, 181 See also Dordoi bazaar; Osh bazaar Bouazizi, Mohamed, 184 Brazil, 18, 180 bribe(s): bazaar owners/administration and, 92, 175–76; at bazaars in Central Asia, 57; at bazaars in Russia, 175; of customs officials, 238n32; at marketplaces in Venezuela, 178; relative absence at Dordoi bazaar, 55–57, 76, 222n38; trade as alternative to, 43 Bulgaria, views on bazaar trade in, 219n80 businessmen: as MPs, 96–97, 99–100, 101, 102–6, 171, 228n80, 229n93; Soviet-era nomenklatura as, 85–88, 173; Soviet-era sportsmen as, 170, 171, 173 capital accumulation, bazaar trade and, 1, 7, 31, 60, 92, 180, 181 Caracas, Venezuela, marketplaces in, 177–78 caravan trade, in Central Asia, 36, 218n53 See also Silk Roads cargo companies, and traders, 64–65 cash registers: Kyrgyz government’s attempt to install, 61–62, 182–83; use in Uzbekistan, 184–85 Central Asia, 207n1; bazaars in, 7–8, 21, 22, 32, 33; caravan trade in, 36, 218n53 See also specific countries Chavez, Hugo, 177–78 Chechens, attitude toward trade, 218n59 chelnoki (shuttle traders), 27, 29; women as, 31 See also shuttle trade Cherkizovsky bazaar, Moscow, 175 China: economic growth in absence of formal institutions, 180; Kyrgyzstan as re-export hub for goods made in, 29, 169, 170, 216n30; as manufacturing export hub, 27; Salymbekov’s investments in, 107; shuttle traders and exports from, 27–28 collective bargaining: absence in Soviet system, 51; at Dordoi bazaar, 58–59, 78 collective identity, Soviet-era, recreating at the bazaar, 73–74 conflict, order as absence of, 15, 67–68, 71–72 conflict mediation: aksakals and, 141, 147–48, 156–57; starshie and, 64–67, 72, 76 containers, at bazaars: disputes regarding, 65; documentation of ownership of, 93–94; doors on, 77; at Dordoi bazaar, 62, 63p, 65, 78p; double-stacked, 62, 63p; at Karasuu bazaar, 222n42; open, 78p; ownership of, 222n43; sublet market for, 65–67 controllers, at bazaars, 54, 55, 82, 98 cooperative(s): municipal takeover of bazaar land and, 122; Osh bazaar, privatization of bazaar land and, 124, 125–26; in Soviet Union, property held by, 121 corruption: in Kyrgyzstan, 2, 5, 6, 10, 87, 151, 207n2; police, 48, 56, 93, 172, 173, 175–76 See also bribe(s) creative syncretism, 12, 49, 210n34 crime, at bazaars, 48, 60 See also mafias customs policies: in Kazakhstan, 28, 216n26; in Kyrgyzstan, 28; in Russia, 28, 216n25 Datka, Kurmanjan, 146 de Soto, Hernando, disorder: bazaars associated with, 2, 9, 14–15; at Karasuu bazaar, 170, 172, 173, 174; Kyrgyz words for, 14; at Orto Sai bazaar, 168; at Osh bazaar, 113, 115–18, 127, 132, 134, 144, 147, 149, 151, 161; owners blamed for, 154; in present-day Kyrgyzstan, traders on, 68–71; Russian words for, 14 dispossession: bazaar trade as form of, 31–32, 166; post-Soviet market transition and, 8, 24, 29–32, 90–91 Dordoi bazaar, Bishkek: annual sales turnover at, 221n17; bribe-free environment at, 55–57, 76, 222n38; bus terminal at, 47p; and capital accumulation, 1, 180, 181; cash registers at, attempts to install, 61–62; challenges for traders at, 55–57, 90; containers at, 62, 63p, 65, 78p; economic crisis of 2015-2016 and, 80–81; entrance of, 41; ethnic origins of traders at, 39, 75–78, 220n8; infrastructure development at, 58, 86–87, 95; international customers at, 29, 46, 77; Karasuu bazaar compared to, 172–73; location of, 3, 85, 86, 166; Madina bazaar compared to, 169; money exchangers at, 60; order at, 6, 48, 57, 78, 79, 81, 166; origins of name, 228n76; Orto Sai bazaar compared to, 169; Osh bazaar compared to, 13–14, 111, 113, 136, 137, 152, 166; owner of, 3, 82–88, 106–10, 166, 172–73; as re-export hub, 1, 29, 46, 181; rental fees at, 58; Russian economic crisis of 1998 and, 80–81; security at, 57, 93, 97; Soviet-era origins of, 85, 230n12; starshie (senior leaders) INDEX at, 3, 17, 50–55, 166; trading row at, 59p; transportation to, 46 Dordoi trade union, 48, 166; and bazaar administration, 56, 57, 58–61, 74, 93; and bazaar owner, 84; and bribe-free environment, 55–57, 76; communitybuilding and social welfare activities of, 73–74, 75, 76; and conflict mediation, 64–67; continuity and legitimacy of, 81; different perspectives on, 74–80; leadership of, 3, 50, 220n9; and order at the bazaar, 78, 81; origins of, 49, 50, 75, 78–79; and patent payments, enforcement of, 62–63; political instability and security measures by, 57; resistance to changes in tax system, 61–62; Soviet-era organizations reappropriated in, 17, 49; ties with government officials, 56 See also starshie Dungans, and bazaar trade, 35, 36, 37, 112 economic development: in China, 180; in Kyrgyzstan, importance of bazaars for, 7, 24; property rights and, 6, 180–81; state’s role in, 18–19, 179–80, 181; in weak rule-of-law context, 2, economic statistics, national-level: for Kyrgyzstan, 2, 5, 6; unreliability of, 2, 20, 165 education, in Soviet era, 38–39, 219n69 elders: in pre-Soviet Central Asia, 139, 234n7 See also aksakals; baibiches; starshie Elias, Norbert, 71 Emgek political party, 107, 108 England, privatization of pastureland in, 11 entrepreneurs: patent payment and, 62; renaming of traders as, 44, 56, 220n9 Erkinbaev, Bayaman, 171–72, 173, 229n93, 237n23 ethnic groups: commodity specialization at bazaars, 35, 38; in Kyrgyzstan, 24–25, 50, 76, 77, 214n5; in leadership positions at Dordoi bazaar, 50; in Soviet Union, 68, 71; and understanding of trade, 25, 35–37 See also specific ethnic groups factory workers, turn to trade in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, 11, 41, 151 family, role in Kyrgyz society, 38, 228n76, 238n28 farm markets: in Soviet Union, 1, 11, 25, 35, 118–20 See also kolkhoz markets fees, bazaar: after Kyrgyzstan’s independence, 58, 121, 151–52; in Soviet era, 119, 121 foreign direct investment (FDI): as indicator of economic development, 180–81; 249 manufacturing growth in absence of, 181, 241n10 French national identity, 71 Georgia, bazaars in, 176–77 global capitalism, traders as victims of, 31–32 government officials: predation at bazaars, 10, 55–56; turned traders, 43 See also municipal authorities Grozny, Chechnya, bazaar in, 218n59 Harvey, David, Hirshman, Albert, 100 India: exports from, 41, 46; street traders in, 162, 242n24; urban bazaars in, 177 institutions: absence of formal, economic growth in context of, 180; at bazaars, 10, 11–12, 13; bottom-up creation of, 4, 210n34; community, in Soviet era, 53–54; development programs focused on, alternative to, 4, 179, 188; formal and informal, intertwining of, 17, 212n64; Soviet and pre-Soviet, reappropriation in Kyrgyz bazaars, 11–12, 16, 17 intellectuals, as traders in post-Soviet era, 8, 11, 42, 153 international development agencies: disruptive policies and directives of, 181–87; microcredit provided by, 241n13 International Monetary Fund (IMF): on shuttle trade, 182, 241n14; on taxation, 182, 183, 185, 242n26 interviews, 14, 16, 24, 199–202, 203t–205t Islam: bazaar administration on, 148; and bazaar trade in Central Asia, 41, 144 islands of order, 163, 165; in Kyrgyzstan, 6, 10, 57, 79, 165; and manufacturing growth, 181; metaphor of, 209n30; in Russia, 174, 176; in Venezuela, 178; in weak rule-of-law environments, 2, 13, 20, 165, 166, 167, 174, 176, 178, 179–80, 189 Jalalabad bazaar, privatization of, 123 Japan: businessmen-politicians in, 95; postwar modernization in, 210n37 Karachi, Pakistan, islands of order in, 189 Karasuu bazaar, Kyrgyzstan, 146p, 169–74; containers at, 222n42; disorder at, 170, 172, 173, 174; location of, 170; owners of, 170–72, 173, 238n26; trade union at, 172, 173, 174 Kazakhs, ethnic: and caravan trade in Central Asia, 36; goods sold at Soviet markets, 35; 250 INDEX Kazakhs, ethnic (continued) in Kyrgyzstan, 214n5; as nomadic people, 8, 35, 36; role in post-Soviet environment, questions regarding, 36; traders, mixed feelings about profession of, 42–43 Kazakhstan: bazaars in, 9, 33–35; border closure with Kyrgyzstan, 80–81; customs policies in, 28, 216n26; ownership of bazaars in, 82; shuttle traders from, 27, 29 Kenya, islands of order in, 189 kolkhoz markets (collective farm markets): in Kyrgyzstan, 121–22, 230n12; legal status in 1990s, 123–24, 168; in Soviet Union, 1, 11, 25, 35, 118–20 Komfort bazaar, Bishkek, 224n18 Koreans, in bazaar trade, 35, 37, 50 Kyrgyz, ethnic: commodities sold by, 35, 38; communal values of, 38; in Dordoi trade union, 77, 78; education in Soviet era, 38–39; entry into bazaar trade, 81; lack of financial experience, 70–71; as nomadic people, 8, 33, 35, 36; at Osh bazaar, 39, 43; as percentage of Kyrgyzstan’s population, 214n5; stigma of trade among, 32–33, 36–37, 42–43; trading possibilities for, new narrative seeking to legitimate, 37–38, 41 Kyrgyz Consumer Union (Potrebsoiuz), 121; ownership of bazaars, 122–23, 170–71 Kyrgyz language, 14, 39, 162 Kyrgyzstan: border closure with Kazakhstan, 80–81; capital flows in, 7; chaos and conflict in, narratives of, 20; colonial history of, 16; corruption in, 2, 5, 6, 10, 87, 207n2; economic liberalization in, 26; economic statistics for, 2, 5, 6; electoral institutions in, 96–97; ethnic groups in, 24–25, 50, 76, 77, 214n5; gold resources of, 7; industrial collapse in, 29–30, 216n33; as “island of democracy,” 209n30; islands of order in, 6, 10, 57, 79, 165; languages spoken in, 14, 38–39, 162, 211n48, 219n69; manufacturing in, 29–30, 180, 181, 216n33; NATO campaign in Afghanistan and, 7, 20; patronage-based system in, 19; political instability in, 2, 5, 6; population of, 5, 24–25, 214n5; privatization in, 11, 26, 95, 123, 177; property redistribution in 2000s, 5, 88–89, 98, 99; property rights in, 5, 6, 207n2; as regional trading hub, 6, 21, 29, 170; shuttle traders in, 27, 28; state’s role in development of, reframing of, 18–19, 179–80, 181; stigmas associated with bazaar trade in, 24, 25, 32–33, 36–37, 39, 40, 43; tariffs and import polices of, 28; transition after Soviet collapse, 29–32 See also under bazaars; laws; parliament; tax system laws: order in terms of, 15; Russian, aiming to curb bazaar trade, 174–75 See also laws, in Kyrgyzstan; rule of law laws, in Kyrgyzstan: contradictions among, 10, 103, 186; foreign-inspired, criticism of, 185–86; hierarchy of, 103, 228n85 leadership: at bazaars, 3, 11, 17; at Dordoi bazaar, 3, 50–51, 220n9 See also aksakals; baibiches; starshie library research, 197–98 Lilo bazaar, Tbilisi, 177 Luzhniki bazaar, Moscow, 230n12 Madina bazaar, Bishkek, 169 mafias, at bazaars, 9–10, 93, 151, 171 manufacturing: bazaar orders and emergence of, 180, 181; collapse in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, 29–30, 216n33; decline in postSoviet region, Medici, Cosimo de’, 110 Mexico, bazaars in, 113, 177 Middle East: democratic uprisings in, event precipitating, 184; quiet encroachment in, 161–62 migration, in post-Soviet era, 31, 174 Mohammed (Prophet), 37, 38, 41 money exchangers, at Dordoi bazaar, 60 moral economy, 213n76 moral suffering, bazaar work and, 42, 43 Moscow, Russia, bazaars in, 174–75, 230n12 municipal authorities: and bazaar reconstruction, 113–14, 131–36, 138, 142, 149, 156, 160–61, 167; claims to bazaar land, 122–23, 170–71; and order at bazaars, 158 Musoni, Francis, 161 Nasritdinov, Emil, neoclassical economic assumptions, shift away from, 187–88 new institutional economics, 84–85 nomenklatura, Soviet, economic wealth in post-Soviet era, 85–88, 173 Omurkulov, Isa, 133, 143, 158 order: aksakals and, 163–64; educational and professional institutions and, 70; local populations’ understanding and creation of, 13, 19, 20; private, studies of, 17–18; Soviet-generated ideas of, 68, 69, 72, 79, 152; spontaneous, theories of, 18, 213n67; INDEX in weak rule-of-law environment, creating, 166 See also disorder; islands of order; order, at the bazaar order, at the bazaar: as absence of conflict, 15, 67–68, 71–72; aksakals and, 138, 141, 143, 148, 154, 162, 167; baibiche on, 147; creation of, 3, 10, 11–12, 18, 19; at Dordoi bazaar, 6, 48, 57, 78, 79, 81, 166; in fiscal relations, 62; as lawfulness, 15; municipal authorities and, 158; older traders’ perspectives on, 148–54; at Osh bazaar, attempts to impose, 128, 130–36; ownership regulation and, 15, 85, 172–73; owners’ role in creating, 93–94, 110; in personal environment and relations, 15, 67–68, 71–72, 155; vs private order, 17–18; sociopolitical work of traders and, 10, 11–12, 13; vs spontaneous order, 18; street traders’ perspectives on, 161; threat of violence and, 9; traders’ understandings of, 15–16, 48–49, 148–59; younger traders’ perspectives on, 155–59 Orto Sai bazaar, Bishkek, 168–69 Osh bazaar, Bishkek, 112; aksakals at, 3, 17, 137–38, 140, 147–48, 162, 167; Arabinfluenced traders at, 144; baibiches at, 3, 146–48, 163; Caracas marketplaces compared to, 177, 178; centralized control in, attempts to impose, 126–27, 129–30, 131; changes in 2000s, 111–12; construction of, 124; disorder at, 113, 115–18, 127, 132, 134, 144, 147, 149, 151, 161; Dordoi bazaar as source of commodities for, 112; Dordoi bazaar compared to, 13–14, 111, 113, 136, 137, 152, 166; illegal vs legal traders at, 135, 155–56, 158, 167; Kyial section of, 234n1; Kyrgyz traders at, 39; location of, 3, 111, 113, 166; main entrance of, 115–17, 117p; municipal efforts to modernize, 114, 115, 174; older traders at, 148–54, 162–63; order at, aksakals and, 138, 141, 143, 148, 154, 162, 167; order at, attempts to impose, 128, 130–36; Orto Sai bazaar compared to, 168; owners of, 3, 114–15, 118, 126, 127–30, 131, 132, 134–35, 147, 149, 152, 167; privatization of, 124–26, 127, 135–36, 151, 167; reconstruction after 2010, 131–36, 138, 142, 149, 156, 160–61, 167; rice pavilion at, 114p; street traders along perimeter of, 116p, 130, 131, 159–61; trade union at, desire for, 152–53, 154; younger traders at, 154–59, 162–63 Osh city, ethnic violence in, 163 ownership: container, documentation at Dordoi bazaar, 93–94; local understandings of, 243n39 251 ownership/owner(s), of bazaar land: aksakals and negotiations with, 143–44; assassinations of, 170, 172, 237n23; as barons/stationary bandits, 19, 84–85, 91; challenges for, 89, 92–93, 105–6; vs container ownership, 222n43; and disorder, blame for, 154; of Dordoi bazaar, 3, 82–88, 106–10, 166, 172–73; emergence in postSoviet era, 11; exit strategies of, 227n69; and infrastructure development, 86–87; as job providers, 91–92; of Karasuu bazaar, 170–72, 173; in Kazakhstan, mystery surrounding, 82; Kyrgyz Consumer Union (Potrebsoiuz) and, 122–23, 170–71; legitimacy of, narratives regarding, 84, 89–90, 91–93, 166–67; media critiques of, 90–91; moral and social drivers of, 19; as MPs, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 105, 106, 115, 229n93; vs municipal officials, 115; negative stereotypes regarding, 87; new-institutional economist perspective on, 84–85; and order, 15, 85, 93–94, 110, 172–73; of Orto Sai bazaar, 168–69; of Osh bazaar, 3, 114–15, 118, 126, 127–30, 131, 132, 134–35, 147, 149, 152, 167; property redistribution in 2000s and threats to, 89; rational-choice perspective on, 84–85; Soviet-era connections and, 85–86, 173, 224n18; struggles over, in 1990s-2000s, 121–22; traders’ perceptions of, 106–8; and trade unions, 84, 169, 229n98 Pakistan, islands of order in, 189 parliament, of Kyrgyzstan: Akaev presidency and changes in, 95, 105; assassination of members of, 170, 172, 237n23; businessmen in, 96–97, 99–100, 101, 102–6, 171, 228n80, 229n93; immunity from government prosecution, 104–5; international development agencies and, 185–87; laws passed by, 103; ministerial appointments by, 104; negative views of, 94–95; on reconstruction of Osh bazaar, 134 participant observation, 14, 16, 22, 23–24, 195–97 patent (combined license/tax system), 28–29, 56, 182; aksakals and payment of, 142, 143; vs cash-register taxation, 183; government attempts to replace, 61, 103; international development agencies’ efforts to reform, 182–84; street traders’ avoidance of, 130; traders’ views on, 154, 158; trade union and payment of, 62–63, 166 pensioners, at bazaars, 175, 176 252 INDEX Philippines, bazaars in, 113, 177 Poland, bazaars in, 230n12 Polanyi, Karl, 11, 243n42 police, and racketeering at bazaars, 48, 56, 93, 172, 173, 175–76 poverty, in Kyrgyzstan, 5, 30 presumptive tax, 182 See also patent private order, 17–18 private property: local understandings of, 243n39 See also ownership; property rights privatization: of bazaar land, 11, 123, 166, 177; of common pastureland, in eighteenthcentury England, 11; early dynamics of, and property stability or contestation, 166; of Karasuu bazaar, 170, 171; in Kyrgyzstan, after independence, 11, 26, 95, 123, 177; of Orto Sai bazaar, 168; of Osh bazaar, 124–26, 127, 135–36, 151, 167; in post-Soviet region, 9, 11, 85–88, 177, 232n44 See also property redistribution profits: bazaar trade and, 7, 31, 43; shuttle trade and, 27; vs spiritual values, traders on, 43 property redistribution: assassinations accompanying, 172, 173; businessmen-MPs’ resistance to, 99–100, 104–5; in Kyrgyzstan, in 2000s, 5, 88–89, 98, 99, 129; in postSoviet region, property rights: and economic development, 6, 180–81; and foreign direct investment, 180; intergenerational nature of claims to, 238n28; in Kyrgyzstan, 5, 6, 207n2 protest(s): businessmen-MPs and, 99–100, 101; against cash registers at bazaars, 61, 62, 183; negative associations among traders, 67; and ouster of Kyrgyz presidents, 57, 68; against President Bakiev, 83, 98–101; vs quiet encroachment, 161–62; against reconstruction of Osh bazaar, 133–34; Salymbekov’s decision to remain on sidelines of, 83, 97, 98, 99, 100 racketeering See mafias; police rational-choice economics, 84–85 rental fees, at bazaars, 58, 151–52 rest days, traders’ desire for, 60, 149, 150–51 Ruble, Blair A., 52 rule of law, international development organizations on, 185–86 rule-of-law context, weak: bazaar trade in, 12–13; economic development in, 2, 4; islands of order in, 2, 13, 20, 166, 167, 174, 176, 178, 179–80, 189; in Kyrgyzstan, 5, 207n2; manufacturing in, emergence of, 180; property redistribution resulting from, Russia, post-Soviet: bazaars in, 174–76, 230n12; bazaar trade in, policies to curb, 174–75, 238n32; customs policies in, 28, 216n25; developmentalist islands in, 18; economic situation in, impact on Kyrgyzstan, 185; economic strategies in, 26, 115; mafia decline in, 10; shuttle traders from, 29, 238n32; trade unions in, 72–73 Russian language, in Kyrgyzstan, 14, 38–39, 219n69 Russians, ethnic: at Dordoi bazaar, 39, 41–42, 50, 75, 78, 220n8, 220n9; education in Soviet era, 38–39; goods sold at Soviet markets, 35; historical association with trade, 38; in Kyrgyzstan, 50, 214n5; transition out of bazaar work, 81 Salymbekov, Askar, 82–88, 106–10; background of, 85–88; balancing of economic wealth and political power, 94, 96, 100, 105; challenges for, 92–93, 105–6, 110; and construction of Dordoi bazaar, 86–87; critical perspectives on, 107–8; and Emgek political party, 107, 108; Erkinbaev compared to, 171; family of, political and economic power of, 101, 102, 108, 228n76; as governor of Naryn region, 94, 95, 96; international investments of, 107; intuition and experience of, 89; as member of parliament, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 105, 109, 229n93; narrative legitimating role of, 84, 89–90, 91–93, 107, 108; as oligarch/baron, 84–85; and order at Dordoi bazaar, 93–94, 110; partners of, 87–88, 224n16, 227n69; and political protests, decision to remain on sidelines of, 83, 97, 98, 99, 100; property redistribution in 2000s and threats to holdings of, 89; social capital accumulated by, 97–98; success at defending and growing Dordoi bazaar, 89, 108–9; traders’ perceptions of, 106–7, 108; trade unions and, 84, 229n98; wealth accumulation by, 95, 96 Salymbekov, Mamytbai, 229n93 Saudi Arabia, 18 Schrank, Andrew, 188 security, at Dordoi bazaar, 57, 93, 97 Senegal, land pawning system in, 12 Shambetov, Askar, 126–29, 233n60 INDEX shame, trade associated with, 8, 39, 41, 44, 60, 219n80 shuttle trade, in post-Soviet region, 21, 27, 216n24; bags used for, 22, 23p; Bishkek as re-export hub in, 29; Chechens and, 218n59; IMF on, 182, 241n14; Kyrgyz policies on, 28; profits in, 27; Russian policies on, 238n32; women in, 31 Silk Roads, and bazaars in Central Asia, 7–8, 21, 32 Slavic traders, 50, 81, 220n8 social mobility, bazaar trade and, 7, 31, 60, 92, 106 social networks: Salymbekov and, 97–98; value in Kyrgyz society, 38 social welfare: aksakals and, 142; baibiches and, 147; collapse of, and rise of private trade, 31–32; Dordoi bazaar owner’s claims regarding, 92; Dordoi trade union and, 73–74, 75, 76 Sogdians, 218n53 South Korea: containers from, 222n42; as manufacturing export hub, 27 Soviet elites, acquisition of economic wealth in 1990s, 85–88, 170, 171, 224n18 Soviet Union: consumer good shortages in, 118, 120; farm markets (kolkhoz markets) in, 1, 11, 25, 35, 118–19; and order, idea of, 68, 69, 72, 79, 152; shadow economy in, 208n11; state stores in, 25, 35, 215n9; stigmas associated with trade in, 25, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44; tolerance in, 68, 71; trade in, 25, 35–36; trade unions in, 51–52, 72 Soviet Union, collapse of: changing perceptions of trade after, 37–38; and emergence of bazaars, 1, 8–9, 174; and industrial declines, 29–30, 216n33; market transition and dispossession after, 8, 24, 29–32, 90–91; migration after, 31, 174; privatization after, 9, 11, 85–88; trade as survival after, 7, 8, 30–32 speculators, traders perceived as, 33, 37, 40, 44 spontaneous order, theories of, 18, 213n67 sportsmen, Soviet-era, as businessmen in post-Soviet era, 170, 171, 173, 237n23 starshie (senior leaders), at Dordoi bazaar, 3, 17, 50–51, 166; aksakals compared to, 53, 54, 138, 167; characteristics of, 71, 74; and collective identity, 73–74; and conflict mediation, 64–67, 72, 76; election of, 52–53; ethnicity of, 50; on money exchangers, 60; and order, 81; and patent payments, 62, 166; and rental fee negotiations, 58; 253 responsibilities of, 54–55, 62, 72, 77; Sovietera experiences of, 17, 51, 53–54, 71 state: developmental, 18; and economic development, reframing of traditional conceptualization of, 18–19, 179–80, 181; and growth of bazaar trade in Kyrgyzstan, 26–29; predatory, 18, 20; pressure on traders, extreme acts in response to, 184, 242n24; role of, traders on, 69–71; shrinking of, in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, 32 See also government officials; rule of law stationary bandits: bazaar owners as, 19, 84–85, 91; theories of, 19 stores: vs bazaars, in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, 26, 26f, 215n9; state-run, in Soviet Union, 25, 35, 215n9 St Petersburg, Russia, bazaar in, 175–76 street traders: in Caracas, Venezuela, 178; self-immolation by, 184, 242n24 street traders, at Osh bazaar, 116p, 130, 131, 159–61; and disorder, 144; vs “legal” traders, 135, 155–56, 158; paths to becoming, 159–60; reconstruction and, 133–34, 135, 136, 138, 142, 160–61 suitcase trade See shuttle trade Surabaldiev, Jyrgalbek, 237n23 survival, bazaar trade as, 7, 8, 30–32, 33, 42, 44 Tajiks: historical association with trade, 8; shuttle traders, 29, 170 tax system, for traders in Kyrgyzstan, 28–29, 56; government’s attempt to change, 28–29, 56; international organizations’ recommendations regarding, 182–84, 185; problem of implementation and enforcement of, 183, 184 See also patent tax system, for traders in Uzbekistan, 184–85, 242n26 Tbilisi, Georgia, bazaars in, 176–77 teachers, turn to trade in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, 11, 42 trade: in Soviet Union, 25, 35–36 See also bazaar trade; shuttle trade trader(s): conflict avoidance by, 67–68, 71–72; critical Marxist perspective on, 44–45; encounters and conversations with, 23–24; as entrepreneurs, renaming of, 44, 56, 220n9; with foreign citizenship status, 174; generational differences among, 44, 69, 70, 141, 147; in global south, 24; illegal (informal) vs legal, 135, 155–56, 158, 167; Islam among, 144; Kazakh, 35, 42–43; Kyrgyz, 35, 38, 42–43; legal and tax advantages in 254 INDEX trader(s) (continued) Kyrgyzstan, 28; liberal market perspective on, 44; vs municipal authorities, 113–14; older, perspectives of, 3, 148–54, 162–63; and order at bazaars, creation of, 3, 10, 11–12, 19; patent paid by, 28–29, 56; paths to becoming, 39–44, 49, 141, 159–60; pensioners as, 175, 176; problems encountered by, 13, 49; protests against bazaar reconstruction, 133–34; protests against cash registers, 61, 62, 183; Russian, 35, 41–42; sociopolitical work of, 176; Soviet-era experiences of, 11, 41, 51, 151, 153; in Soviet period, 35, 208n11; state pressure on, extreme acts in response to, 184, 242n24; understandings of order, 3, 15–16, 48–49, 148–59; Uzbek, 35, 39–41; as victims of global capitalism, 31–32; as victims of rapid economic liberalization, 8; women, 31, 41–43, 145–48, 151–54; younger, baibiche on, 147; younger, perspectives of, 154–59, 162–63 See also street traders trade union(s): at bazaars, 11, 49, 79; changing understanding of, 72; global decline of, 49; at Karasuu bazaar, 172, 173, 174; at Madina bazaar, 169; at Orto Sai bazaar, 168–69; at Osh bazaar, 152–53, 154, 234n1; and owners of bazaar land, 84, 169; in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, 4, 17; in post-Soviet region, 49; in post-Soviet Russia, 72–73; Sovietera, 51–52, 72; traditional vs alternative, 223n63 See also Dordoi trade union Tunisia, street traders in, 184 Turkey, and bazaar trade, 27, 41, 73, 177 Udelnaya marketplace, St Petersburg, 175–76 Uighur language, in Kyrgyzstan, 211n48 Uighurs: at Madina bazaar, 169; produce sold by, 112 Ukraine, bazaars in, 239n45 Ukrainians, goods sold at Soviet markets, 35 unemployment, in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, 30–31 USAID, work in Kyrgyzstan, 183–84, 185 Usenov, Daniyar, 130–31 Uzbekistan: agriculture and trade in, 36; Andijon events of 2005 in, 22; cities associated with Silk Road trade in, 8, 21; economic policies in post-Soviet era, 26; exploratory trip to, 21; taxation of traders in, 184–85, 242n26; traders from, in Kyrgyzstan, 29, 170 Uzbek language, in Kyrgyzstan, 211n48 Uzbeks, ethnic: at Dordoi bazaar, 39–41, 75; elders among, 234n7; goods sold at Soviet markets, 35; historical association with trade, 8, 35–36, 38, 39; in Kyrgyzstan, 76, 77, 214n5 Venezuela, marketplaces in, 177–78 Weber, Eugen, 71 Weber, Max, 101 wholesale trade: bazaars for, 169, 170; emergence of, 27; ethnic groups and, 39 women: in aksakal courts, 145; dislocations of 1990s and, 8, 31; informal leaders, 163; shuttle traders, 31; traders, 31, 41–43, 145–48, 151–54 See also baibiches World Bank: on bazaars in Central Asia, 7–8; and institutional turn in development thinking, 179, 188; Mind, Society, and Behavior report, 188, 244n44 World Trade Organization (WTO), 26 Zimbabwe, bazaars in, 113, 135, 161 ... backdrop of initial domination of traders by private bazaar owners and the state These older traders engaged in a range of activities in their roles, including deliberating and advocating favorable... alleyways, traders complaining of the summer heat and the winter cold, visitors being warned of those who mug and swindle hovering unseen within the bazaar, officials randomly demanding bribes of traders... remained an important concern for traders.26 They fed off of the bazaar trade by demanding a host of fees and fines at almost every node in the system, whether at the bazaar itself or at the