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Managing Risks in the European Periphery Debt Crisis: Lessons from the Trade-Off between Economics, Politics and the Financial Markets
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Preface
Notes on Contributors
Part I: Genesis of the Crisis, Use and Abuse of Economic Policies
1 Philippe d’Arvisenet: The Genesis of the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis
1 Introduction
2 Without fiscal federalism, excess debt and widened external imbalances triggered a sudden stop
2.1 Rising imbalances
2.2 Sudden stops, spreads, fundamentals and beyond
3 The Eurozone is not an Optimal Currency Area (OCA)
3.1 The main features of an OCA
3.2 Convergence and divergence: is the OCA endogenous?
3.3 Reforms expected to be implemented did not materialize: no crisis, no reform
3.4 Endogenous structural divergences, the North–South divide
3.5 Precautions that were taken lacked effectiveness
4. Recent macro developments
5 Conclusion: fixing the euro for good, mutualization and a European budget
Appendix: The US fiscal federalism
Notes
References
2 Daniel Gros with Cinzia Alcidi: The Trade-Off between Fiscal and Competitiveness Adjustments
1 Introduction
2 Which challenges?
2.1 Short-term challenge: fiscal adjustment
2.2 Long-term challenge: restore competitiveness
2.3 Is debt deflation a risk?
2.4 Can debt be serviced in Europe?
3 How to make policy recommendations meaningful?
3.1 Two extreme examples: Germany and Italy
Germany
Italy
4. Conclusion
Notes
References
3 Jeffrey D. Anderson and Jessica Stallings: Ireland and Greece: A Tale of Two Fiscal Adjustments
1 A tale of two adjustments
2 Deficits and debt differ, but not as many might think
3 Strong upward pressure on Greek debt ratios due to falling GDP
4 Growth has differed, too
5 Exports have been key
6 But differing fi scal headwinds have mattered more
7 Fiscal headwinds in Greece have been ferocious
8 A useful example from Ireland for Greece’s difficult circumstances
Appendix I. Ireland: Fiscal Consolidation Measures
Appendix II. Greece: Fiscal Consolidation Measures
Notes
4 George Christodoulakis: Rating Agencies vs. Sovereign Debt Markets: A Tale of Interacting Risk Preferences
1 Introduction
2 The political economy of European periphery debt markets
3. CRAs and markets in the presence of breaking political and economic events
4. The dynamics of propagation in rating agency vs. market pessimism
5. Concluding policy remarks
Notes
References
5 Miranda Xafa: The 2012 Greek Debt Restructuring and its Aft ermath
1 Introduction
2 Background
3. The debt exchange
4. The debt buyback
5. Lessons of the Greek debt restructuring
Notes
References
6 Paul De Grauwe: Economic Theories that Influenced the Judges of Karlsruhe
1 Introduction
2 The Karlsruhe judges and the efficient market theory
3 The Karlsruhe judges and central banking
4 Conclusion
Notes
References
7 George Christodoulakis: Privatization of State Assets in the Presence of Crisis
1 Introduction
2 The political economy of EU privatization plans
3 Greece’s privatization plans: trading-off local and European politics vs. economic rationality
4 The international performance of privatization asset classes
5 Concluding policy advice
Notes
References
Part II: Crisis Resolution, Prospect and Retrospect
8 Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak: How to Manage Public Debts in the Euro Area?
1 Introduction
2. About the rise in public debt and deficits
3 About euro area governance
3.1 Strengthening fiscal discipline
3.2 A limited fiscal solidarity
4 Public debt governance
4.1 Fiscal or growth target?
4.2 Autonomous fiscal policies or fiscal federalism?
4.3 Market discipline or public debts unity?
5 Public debt governance projects.
5.1 A redemption pact
5.2 The eurobonds and debt agency proposals
5.3 Can the single currency contradictions be overcome?
Note
References
9 Kerstin Bernoth and Philipp Engler: Fiscal Risk Sharing and Stabilization in the EMU
1 The important role of fiscal policy to stabilize the business cycle
2. A fiscal compensation mechanism as a stabilization tool in a monetary union
2.1 Scenario 1: Independent fiscal and monetary policy with flexible exchange rates
2.2 Scenario 2: Monetary union without compensatory payment system
2.3 Scenario 3: Monetary union with stronger integration in real economic terms
2.4 Scenario 4: Monetary union with compensatory payment system
2.5 Empirical business cycle synchronization within the EMU
3 Structuring a compensatory payment mechanism
4 Conclusion and policy implications
Notes
Bibliography
10 Ashoka Mody: Sovereign Debt and its Restructuring Framework in the Eurozone
1 Introduction
2 The eurozone’s debt problem
2.1 Debt ratios
3 No bailout: the eurozone’s war of attrition
3.1 Three examples
3.2 Some lessons
4 Sovereign debt as a contingent claim
4.1 Which is worse: the debt restructuring or the uncertainty?
5 Contingent debt for the eurozone crisis
5.1 Sovereign cocos
5.2 Legacy sovereign debt
6 The way forward
Notes
References
11 Blaise Ganguin: Funding Risks for Corporates in the Periphery: Disintermediation to the Rescue for the Larger Ones, Challenges for the Others
1 Introduction
2 Corporate funding in the periphery: a bank-funded model
3 Large and small companies in the periphery show diverging fortunes
4 The often overlooked role of corporate funding
5 Disintermediation: likely to be more signifi cant in the periphery
6 Small and medium-sized company funding: the unanswered question
7 Conclusion
Notes
12 Adrian Blundell-Wignall and Caroline Roulet: On Solving Europe’s Financial Issues to Promote Sustainable Growth
1 Introduction
2 Monetary policy and deflation risk
3 The European economy and bank interactions
3.1 The Asset Quality Review and stress test
3.2 The EU bank separation proposal
4 Sovereign debt interactions with banks affecting the EU economy
4.1 The global and European carry trade
4.2 Cross-border exposures of banks
5 Fiscal consolidation and growth
5.1 Conflicts in policy objectives and a scenario risk
5.2 A scenario risk for Europe if it fails to carry out reform
6 Conclusion on policy requirements
Notes
References
13 Dimitris Tsibanoulis with Gerry Kounadis: European Banking Union as a Response to the Fragmentation of the Internal Market Resulting from the Financial and Sovereign Debt Crisis
1 Institutional loopholes in EU legislation, international financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis
1.1 Internal market “completion”
1.2 Institutional gaps in the legal framework governing the EU financial services and the international financial crisis
1.3 EMU institutional fl aws revealed by the sovereign debt crisis
2. Fragmentation of the banking services single market as a result of the sovereign debt crisis
2.1 The interconnection between sovereign debt and the banking sector
2.2 The vicious circle of member states’ sovereign debt and credit institutions’ recapitalization tools
3 Enhancement of supervisory efficacy through the Banking Union
3.1 European authorities in the regulatory field
3.2 The Single Supervisory Mechanism
4 A single bank resolution regime as a necessary step towards the restoration of the single market
5 Banking Union as a remedy for institutional gaps in EU law