BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE POLITICAL ECONOMY: SPERI RESEARCH & POLICY Series Editors: Colin Hay and Anthony Payne THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BRITAIN IN CRISIS Trade Unions and the Banking Sector Christopher Kirkland Building a Sustainable Political Economy: SPERI Research & Policy Series editors Colin Hay SPERI University of Sheffield Sheffield, UK Anthony Payne SPERI University of Sheffield Sheffield, UK The Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI) is an innovation in higher education research and outreach It brings together leading international researchers in the social sciences, policy makers, journalists and opinion formers to reassess and develop proposals in response to the political and economic issues posed by the current combination of financial crisis, shifting economic power and environmental threat Building a Sustainable Political Economy: SPERI Research & Policy will serve as a key outlet for SPERI’s published work Each title will summarise and disseminate to an academic and postgraduate student audience, as well as directly to policy-makers and journalists, key policyoriented research findings designed to further the development of a more sustainable future for the national, regional and world economy following the global financial crisis It takes a holistic and interdisciplinary view of political economy in which the local, national, regional and global interact at all times and in complex ways The SPERI research agenda, and hence the focus of the series, seeks to explore the core economic and political questions that require us to develop a new sustainable model of political economy More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/14879 Christopher Kirkland The Political Economy of Britain in Crisis Trade Unions and the Banking Sector Christopher Kirkland Department of Politics University of Liverpool Liverpool, MSY UK Building a Sustainable Political Economy: SPERI Research & Policy ISBN 978-3-319-59237-4 ISBN 978-3-319-59238-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59238-1 Library of Congress Control Number: 2017943636 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017 This work is subject to copyright All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations Cover illustration: Pattern adapted from an Indian cotton print produced in the 19th century Printed on acid-free paper This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Contents 1 Introduction 1 The Trade Union Crisis of 1976–1979 53 Placing the Thatcher Reforms in the Context of the Capital/Labour Relationship 105 The Financial Crisis of 2007 129 5 Conclusions 185 Bibliography 203 Index 205 v List of Figures Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 2.3 Fig. 2.4 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Table of selected trade union data 1950–1980 61 Public perceptions of trade unions 1963–1989 79 Public perceptions of trade unions power, 1972–1988 82 Respondents (%) to the Gallup question: “What would you say is the most important problem facing the country at the present time?” 85 House prices 1975–1995 110 Household debt as a proportion of household income Chained volume measure 113 Percentage of people living below 60% of median incomes before housing costs 1977–2010 113 GDP adjusted for inflation 2004–2013 168 UK unemployment rate Q1 2005–Q3 2016 169 vii CHAPTER 1 Introduction Abstract This chapter introduces notions of crises It highlights how crises are perceived as holding both constructivist and materialist elements It argues that accepted narratives of events combine to constitute/construct a crisis, before exploring how crises are related to concepts such as blame, framing and agenda setting Furthermore, crises are not necessarily viewed as negative events, but can be utilised by certain actors to promote certain agendas Hence, it may be beneficial for some actors to highlight/generate notions of crises This chapter establishes the research questions and hypothesis for the remainder of the study, in particular it hypothesises that the trade unions will be over blamed for the crisis of 1976–1979 and the banking sector will be under blamed for the crisis of 2007 Keywords Blame · Banking · Crisis · Trade unions The fluid nature of British political economy has historically been observed in many contexts Political researchers, among others, have placed increasing importance on such developments through exploring the relationships that exist between what had previously been viewed in separate “political” and “economic” spheres (Habermas 1979; Kindleberger and Aliber 2005) This book, through exploring two recent economic crises, explores and expands existing debates around the © The Author(s) 2017 C Kirkland, The Political Economy of Britain in Crisis, Building a Sustainable Political Economy: SPERI Research & Policy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59238-1_1 2 C KIRKLAND relationship between crises and policy formation Crises are by no means the product of a single realm, but are frequently described and explored by academics and other from within a variety of disciplines Crises are often assumed to treat all those unfortunate enough to be caught up in them equally Such an assumption, however, is questionable and can be challenged through comparing the crises of 1976–1979 and the financial crisis of 2007 These crises, and the responses of the media and politicians to these crises, demonstrate that crises can impact unequally upon those blamed for the onset of the crisis I further wish to explore how such inequalities can manifest themselves within crises In particular, here I wish to explore how notions of blame can lead to inequalities This study explores the relationships that occur within times of crises (particularly between those who are blamed and those who are charged with finding a resolution to the crisis) and ask how useful the existing literature of crises and crisis resolution is, if current understandings are sufficiently adequate to explain how crises occur, how the effects of crises bear out upon various agents, groups of agents and institutions and finally how crises can be resolved or overcome (if they can indeed be resolved or overcome at all) In exploring the nature and resolutions of crises and notions of blame this book explores two comparable cases studies; the case of the trade union movement in the late 1970s and the banking sector post 2007 Both cases have commanded large works of literature in their own right (see, e.g Taylor 1991; Gamble 2009; Hay 2011) Each body of literature has explored, though with little consensus, the importance of these events in their contemporary settings Studies of the trade union movement and its history remain as important in shaping the relations today as they were in the 1970s and 1980s (Nuttall et al 2011; Quinn 2010) Equally, the financial problems that emerged in 2007 have had wide-ranging effects upon populations, and looks set to shape the political and economic settlements for the foreseeable future These two crises are linked through the policy responses or crisis resolution of the 1976–1979 crisis The 2007 crisis—did not emerge from the blue but came about as a result of the crisis resolution to the crisis of the 1970s (see Chap. 4) Such links strengthen the case for compare the 1976–1979 crisis with the financial crisis which started in 2007 I use the experiences of both crises to map out policymakers’ options in times of crisis and argue that the experience of the 1970s and 1980s demonstrates that current government macroeconomic 1 INTRODUCTION policy will fail to offer a long-term sustainable recovery to the crisis which emerged in 2007 Such linkages also enable me to offer a revisionist account of the responses to the crisis of the 1970s and the crisis resolution in the 1980s, questioning that the sustainability of the “resolution” These case studies will form the basis for comparison of the questions set out in the first two chapters The linkages between the two crises mean, I contend, that the latter crisis should not be studied without first learning or exploring the lessons of the 1976–1979 crisis Krippner (2011) has explored such linkages relative to the American crisis Tracing the American economy from the 1970s and 1980s into the 2000s, she argues that the problems of the crisis stemmed from a financialisation of the economy Defining the central thesis of her argument she notes: the turn to finance allowed the state to avoid a series of economic, social and political dilemmas that confronted policy makers … paradoxically preparing the ground for our own era of financial manias, panics and crashes some three decades later (Krippner 2011, 2) Such links have been largely absent from the existing literature on the British crisis Though one exception to this is Gamble (2014, 13) who moves beyond the initial comparisons made between the crisis and the 1930s to argue that “there is greater similarity with the 1970s … out of that crisis a new order did ultimately arise, the neo-liberal order” Gamble (2014) links the crisis of the 2010s (which he identifies as starting in 2008) to the crisis of both the 1930s and the 1970s However, Gamble views the crises as holding an international impact and argues that the cause of the crisis in the 1970s was the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 Whilst I not seek to question the economics of such an argument, I contend that such analysis fails to explain Britain as the “sick man of Europe” or the presentation of some politicians and journalists of the crisis of the 1970s Rather than viewing the crisis in international terms, I wish to emphasise the domestic nature of the crisis, viewing the crisis as having a distinguishably British element to it Newspapers and politicians did not in the late 1970s reference the collapse of the Bretton Woods economic system when talking about the contemporary crisis—as Gamble himself notes this collapse failed to alter the hegemonic power of the USA or generate a paradigm shift—instead the increasing number of elites interested in defining a crisis focused 5 CONCLUSIONS 193 a substantial amount (both in relative and absolute terms) as notions of excessive government spending have become dominant and the policy objectives of plugging the national deficit have been prioritised Partly, this is a result of the nature of government spending (i.e government spending is regressive) but more importantly, it is due to the definition of the crisis pursued by the coalition government, the willingness of the public sector to absorb private (i.e banking sector) losses and the defence of the Anglo-American or neoliberal growth model pursued by both the New Labour administration and the Conservative-led coalition government Such redefinitions of the crisis further have a secondary goal of blame avoidance Through blaming, those in receipt of government spending capital not only enhanced its stranglehold over the British economy, but could also deflect blame Here the avoidance of blame largely has resulted in governments and the media accepting the continuation of a paradigm—broadly defined as a neoliberal, globalised ideology—which generated the crisis and the space for the crisis in the first instance This meant that policies of retribution as seen in the experiences of the trade unions in the 1980s have not manifested themselves in the wake of the 2007 crisis This ability to avoid blame (or from the trade unions perspective inability to avoid blame) is one manner in which agents can be seen to hold different levels of power during times of crisis In terms of those able to instigate or debate policies aimed at resolving each crisis, there exists a clear monopoly of capital Governments provide some consistency in this regard, pushing through reforms aimed at achieving a “liberation” of the crisis The liberations that were sought varied; the Thatcher government especially sought to significantly reduce the powers of the trade unions whilst the reframing of the 2007 crisis towards one of debt has sought to shift blame away from elites—either those in financial institutions or those who undertook prolific spending whilst in government—towards those in receipt of government expenditure Both narratives came from those in privileged positions—most notably those within the media or government—and can be linked to my second hypothesis which suggested that certain individuals aided by their positions within society are able to cast and shape the dominant narratives within times of crises Equally, these dominant narratives are more likely to favour capital than labour My fourth research questions asked: What agency/powers did the blamed parties have in times of crisis? 194 C KIRKLAND The framing of the 1976–1979 crisis was such that the trade unions were excluded from policymaking circles The crisis was, according to the dominant narration, one of excessive trade union power (defined in the ability of trade unions to undertake industrial action)—the solution according to such proponents was to remove some—if not all—the avenues for trade unions to exert such power Such powers were also linked to influence over policy and as a result, the trade unions were excluded from the policymaking process Linked to this were economic changes such as the privatisation programme which transferred assets from the public to private sector and in doing so ensured that the trade unions could not disrupt government activity in the same manner as they were perceived to have done/blamed for doing in the 1970s The status quo—the product of consensus, policies which the trade union movement was heavily involved in shaping—became part of the problem This overhaul of the political model inherited in 1979 was a keep pillar of the Thatcher governments’ attempt to weaken the powers of organised labour Through the New Right’s definition of the crisis as one of a structural nature, there was little scope for agents to act in defending their positions Alongside, this political overhaul came an economic one—shifting the balance of power away from organised labour to capital and the owners of capital—through changes to regulation Trade unions who challenged the dominant narrative were often presented unfavourably within the media Through describing the unions as overly militant, the media was able to discredit the trade unions’ responses to charges of excessive power The unions were therefore excluded from debates and not offered a platform to attempt to change the nature or focus of the crisis—they were unable to redefine the crisis as one of (low) investment, for example In terms of the banking sector, the focus upon the role of agency enabled and promoted a paradigm reinforcing narrative surrounding the crisis resolution to be instigated and accepted According to this narrative, no new structures needed to be sought; rather if certain individuals were replaced and decisions overturned, then the economy could return to good health Indeed, much of the government’s response can be viewed as being paradigm reinforcing In effect, discourses surrounding the crisis were not designed to instigate any significant changes to British politics or the economy Politicians and the media gave both financial institutions and bankers the chance to help shape or frame the definition of the crisis; bankers were invited to contribute to newspaper articles and 5 CONCLUSIONS 195 to give evidence to select committees Rather than viewing the banks as undertaking reckless decisions leading to the near collapse of the banking system and increasing the levels of national debts, “good” bankers and banking institutions were portrayed as being central to the response— either through their lending abilities or through the need to maintain the confidence of financial markets Bankers were incorporated into the debates by both politicians and the media Partly, this was due to the complexity of the crisis—much of the crisis rested upon financial transactions; the causes of the crisis were not as visible as the industrial unrest of the 1970s This meant that “experts” had to help unpack the crisis and explain what was happening Such a framing of the debate further enabled bankers to help shape the responses to the crisis and politicians to emphasise the importance of the existing economic model and need to retain the market’s confidence This helped shift the discourse away from a banking crisis towards one of debt The powers held by those blamed in times of crises are not constant of fixed entities The incorporation of bankers into groups charged with seeking to resolve the 2007 crisis resolution stands in contrast to the exclusionary tactics of the governments of the 1980s The structural elements of the banking crisis were not portrayed in such a manner, leaving scope for those blamed to help contribute and shape the crisis resolution This fits with my third hypothesis that suggested that the banking sector and the trade unions, due to their relative positions within society, would be treated differently during times of crises despite both being blamed for generating the crises in the first instance My fifth research question asked: Were the crises resolved? If so How? What effect did the resolution have upon the blamed party or parties? In terms of the resolution, discourses of each crisis wide differences emerged In terms of the crisis of 1976–1979, for which the trade unions were blamed, the discourse established a structural crisis, ensuring that wide-ranging reforms were required The trade unions had, according to the narrative been able to exert excessive power and needed to be brought under control This crisis was a structural problem—one that could not be overcome through tweaking the existing paradigm Keynesianism could no longer explain the economic problems faced by 196 C KIRKLAND Britain This ideological failure according to the contemporary narratives “required” new forms of government–trade union interaction and led to a paradigm shift and what Hall (1993) describes as “third order change” In terms of the banking sector, the focus upon the role of agency enabled and promoted a paradigm reinforcing narrative which has become the dominant discourse instigated and accepted by politicians and the media Here no new structures needed to be sought; merely, if certain individuals were replaced and decisions overturned, then the economy could return to good health The emphasis upon structures as opposed to agency led to the wide-ranging changes surrounding the trade unions in the 1980s The reverse was true with respect to the banking sector post-2007 Here the emphasis upon agency, rather than structures, retained the same normative assumptions such as the role of the state and nature of debt that led Britain (and indeed other countries) into the period crisis The changes required by the narrative of the banking crisis (as opposed to a debt crisis) were confined to agential ones The changing relationship between capital and labour further aided the banking sector in the 2007 crisis Whereas in the late 1970s—when the trade unions were being blamed for generating and extending a crisis—there existed a counterweight in the form of capital to the power of labour, no such counterweight could effectively challenge the actions of the banking sector post-2007 In part, this occurred due to the prominence of the banking sector following Thatcherite reforms of the 1980s and in particular the “Big Bang” deregulation of 1986 Equally the role of the government, as defenders of capital, is important in this respect Governments of the 1970s portrayed themselves as victims of the crisis, through doing so they can be seen as having a greater willingness to push through trade union reform In terms of the 2007 crisis, the redefinition of the crisis as one of debt did not present the banking sector (on a structural level) as villains, making it easier to defend the existing paradigm The government also acted as the key responders to the crisis—the diminished role of organised labour which occurred in the wake of the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s left it unable—or insufficiently placed—to act in a retributive manner It was not in a position to enact, or even propose, a radical overhaul of the economic relationship in Britain My first hypothesis to be tested suggested that: H1 The capacity to blame within crises is inherently unequal The bourgeoisie due to their prominent positions in society and greater resources 5 CONCLUSIONS 197 are better equipped to blame other individuals (and structures) and to avoid blame themselves Throughout the crises, I have explored here the capacity to blame has been seen as being inherently unequal Blame in both the trade unions crisis of the 1976–1979 and the banking crisis of 2007 has been levied by members of the elites, politicians and journalists Following the crisis of 2007, there was little scope for the trade unions of members of the proletariat to instigate blame in the same way as members of the bourgeoisie instigated blame in the late 1970s Linked to this was my second hypothesis which stated: H2 Such groups are able to create a dominant narrative due to their favourable positions in society (e.g as politicians or within the media) Again this ‘dominant narrative’, due to its origins, is intrinsically likely to be more favourable to capital than labour Throughout the crises, this study has compared newspapers and political speeches were used to both instigate notions of crisis (e.g The Sun’s headlines “Crisis what Crisis?” and “Crisis Britain”) These dominant positions have been used and exploited to support capital, for instance through the redefinition of the 2007 crisis to one of a debt crisis, and the ideological underpinnings regarding the nature of debt My third and fourth hypotheses require an exploration of the “crisis resolution” which emerged from the respective crises explored above H3 The trade unions and the banking sector, due to their respective positions within the labour-capital relationship, will be treated differently in times of crisis despite both being blamed for certain events H4 The trade unions for the crisis of the 1970s then were ‘over blamed’ or over punished for the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s whilst the banking sector were ‘under blamed’ or under punished for the crisis of 2007 The two case studies presented suggest that responses to blame were not equal during the trade union crisis of 1976–1979 and the banking sector crisis of 2007 The vested interests of the trade unions were aggregated, to present a structural problem, whilst the interests of bankers (i.e bonus payments) were disaggregated and portrayed as questions of agency Through defining the trade unions crisis as being of a structural 198 C KIRKLAND nature, the government, aided by pressure from sections within the media, instigated structural changes, weakening the powers of the union movement as a whole In terms of the banking sector crisis, the definitions of the crisis (to the extent to which it defined in terms of the banking sector) as a crisis of agency avoided such widespread structural changes Despite both groups being blamed, and this blame being accepted by similar groups of people (politicians and journalists) blame in each crisis led to a different crisis trajectory and potential crisis resolutions These differences in blame and who was able to blame have led to an over blaming of the trade unions during the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s and an under blaming of the banking sector post-2007 The crisis resolutions then were highly unequal The trade unions, as the blamed parties in the crisis of 1976–1979 were legislated against and excluded from policies surrounding the crisis resolution, whilst the role of capital (the counterbalance to the power of labour within the economy) was enhanced Through defining the banking sector crisis as of one of agency, discourses negated the need for such large-scale structural reforms Instead, reforms and change focused upon and were limited to specific individuals Such discrepancies support my third hypothesis that the two groups, due to their relative socio-economic positions within society would be treated differently in times of crises despite both being blamed for the onset of said crises, and my fourth hypothesis that the trade unions were “over blamed” for the crisis whilst the banking sector was effectively “under blamed” for the crisis they were portrayed as generating, due to both an individualisation of the crisis and a reframing of the crisis towards one of debt Conclusion The case studies explored here have shown how elites—from within the media and political spheres—were able to offer different discourses in two crises of British political economy In the late 1970s, governments and the media promoted a structural crisis narrative which claimed that the role of the trade unions had extended too far into the daily lives of ordinary citizens This discourse, though tampered with at the edges by various governments, sought to reign in the powers of trade unions through limiting their powers to strike 5 CONCLUSIONS 199 In terms of the banking sector, both governments and the media generated an agential discourse which it has rested upon the actions of a few senior employees and managers This has led to some changes in personnel at the top of some banks, though has largely sought to defend the complex system of neoliberal international finance Alongside this reductionist account of the banking crisis, a secondary crisis has been purported to further deflect blame away from the banking sector This secondary crisis can be identified as one of debt As a result of the coalition and in particular Conservative Party’s emphasis upon this “debt crisis” some seeds of a structural discourse can be identified Here it matters not who the recipients of benefits are—whether it be Mr Jones or Mrs Smith, or indeed what their social requirements may be—but the fact that the government is spending money in such a manner as to enable some people who not contribute to society through paid employment to live what are portrayed as rather luxurious lifestyles In terms of the trade union crisis of 1976–1979, it has been suggested both politicians and the media promoted a discourse—if not an ideology—which viewed the unions as a homogeneous movement Increasingly, little space or effort was devoted to offer an analysis of industrial relations or the causes of strikes Such analysis was further developed to maximise the impact of industrial relations and the actions of trade unions upon the wider population In terms of the banking sector, the politics of individualisation viewed banking sector employees as heterogeneous Clear divisions between “good” and “bad” bank(ers) were purported This distinction was important in enabling some bankers and technocrats to help shape the debate and demonstrating that structural reforms to the system were not required This book has offered three contributions to the exiting literature, using two recent case studies in British politics, and these are worth reiterating here First, it has demonstrated that crises should be viewed as constructed entities This is not to say that they are irrespective of real events, but it is the interpretations of such events (and their consequences) which lead to narratives of crises In the case of the 1970s, perceptions of excessive trade union power led to narratives of crisis emerging, and being accepted In the case of 2007, crisis fears over large budget deficits led to notions of a debt crisis—though such a notion has been challenged at least in parts of the academic literature which suggest the crisis is best viewed as a growth crisis Each of these narratives has based their arguments upon “real” or at least commonly 200 C KIRKLAND accepted economic figures, such as GDP growth, levels of budget deficit Irrespective of the normative assumptions which underlay them, narrations are based upon interpretations of events or economic indicators The second contribution is that agents and institutions are unequal in times of crisis Despite blame being levied at both the trade union movement and the banking sector for respective crises, the powers of both have differed Governments largely removed trade unions from policymaking circles and legislated against them through measures banning the closed shop or requiring a ballot before the undertaking of strike action The crisis of 2007—to the extent that it was considered a banking crisis—was defined in more technical terms Banks and financial institutions remained central to the British economy and indeed senior personnel from these institutions were incorporated into the debates surrounding policy responses and potential methods of crisis resolution Their commentary was given prominence in media outlets in favourable or at least balanced terms—something not afforded to the trade unions of the 1970s Central to this claim is the unequal position of bankers and trade unionists in the economy and the different ideologies each group possess The trade unions were ideologically opposed to the Thatcherite government (and to an extent the governments that preceded Thatcher) this ensured attempts to delegitimise the unions and their policies became a natural course of action for governments to take Conversely, the banking or financial sector did not hold philosophies that were inconsistent with policy makers Here there existed no government incentives or benefits in excluding these sectors—on an aggregate level—from the debate Such incentives of exclusion therefore were not the same as they had been vis-a-vis the trade unions in the 1980s Instead, politicians were—in the interests of “understanding”—keen to tap into the banking sectors experiences, offering bankers the chance to help frame the debates surrounding both the nature of the crisis and the politics of crisis resolution Equally, the financial markets became central to policymakers—retaining the confidence of the markets was given as the logic for instigating a period of austerity This requirement/goal of policymakers further reinforced the central position of bankers and financial institutions in the economy The third contribution is to demonstrate that these two crises were linked The crisis of 2007 cannot be separated from the reforms of the 5 CONCLUSIONS 201 1980s, undertaken in response to the crisis of 1976–1979 The crisis of 2007 I have argued occurred due to, rather than irrespective of, the policy responses to the crisis of the 1970s In Chap 4, I demonstrated how the Thatcherite reforms of the 1980s altered the balance of power in the capital–labour relationship and helped generate an economy which was over reliant upon credit, debt and the banking sector and in particular the City of London Such changes along with wide deregulation helped create the scope for the crisis of 2007 Such conclusions have been drawn using two case studies, the answering of research questions and the testing of hypotheses I set out in Chap Whilst these not point to a comprehensive analysis of the nature of crises, it offers some key implications for policy, policymakers and agenda setters and those involved, or blamed, in times of crises For institutions blamed in times of crisis, structural reforms can be avoided through promoting the crisis as one of agential factors The banking sector through scapegoating certain individuals has maintained favourable economic conditions Further study may extend the notions of structural and agential crises, developed here It may further draw upon wider crises, both in relation to political economy but also in other areas of politics to analyse the manner in which those embroiled in the crisis are (un) able to promote particular discourses Further study may wish to use the hypotheses and research questions generated within this study to offer a fuller account of crises (or at least move towards a fuller account of crises) Some reasons for these discrepancies in abilities to promote particular goals have been alluded to in the study: propensity to media reporting, common discourses and ability to offer counter-discourses and the role (or lack) of blame, however, a wider incorporation of case studies could prove beneficial in terms of moving towards a more generalised understanding of structure/agency debate in times of crisis The reflexive approach undertaken to explore the crisis of the 1970s has posed new questions about the Thatcher governments’ responses to the crisis not least in respect of what the long-term effects of such policies have been This study has demonstrated how the two crises— that of 1976–1979 and the 2007 crisis—should be viewed as interconnected In linking the two crises, a reflexive account of each has been offering, one which has explored the role of elites (politicians and those 202 C KIRKLAND within the media) in defining and shaping the crisis Such an analysis may in time prove useful when analysing the current governments’ responses to the crisis of 2007, especially if no new paradigm or policy shift occurs Reference Hall, P A (1993) Policy 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What Crisis?, 72, 73, 77, 197 D Daily Mail, 73, 74, 76, 143, 152 Darling, Alistair, 155 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017 C Kirkland, The Political Economy of Britain in Crisis, Building a Sustainable Political Economy: SPERI Research & Policy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59238-1 205 206 Index Debt, 8, 37, 39, 130, 136, 138, 140, 141, 148–151, 153, 154, 156, 157, 159, 161, 164, 166–169, 171, 172, 187, 193, 195–199, 201 Demonisation, 32, 33, 131, 152, 160 Diamond, Bob, 145, 147, 160, 162 F Financial Times, 160, 167 Ford, 67, 84 Framing, 4, 5, 7, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27–30, 32, 33, 44, 45, 54, 63, 68, 95, 130, 131, 143, 154, 171, 185, 195, 198 FSA, 146, 159 G 1979 general election, 72, 84 2010 general election, 159, 165, 187 Goodwin, Fred, 142, 145, 159, 160, 189 Gekko, Gordon, 112 Greenspan, Alan, 112 K Keynesianism, 31, 61, 195 L Labour Party, 58, 60, 61, 64, 65, 88, 91, 93, 136, 155, 158, 188 Labour’s debts, 155 LIBOR, 38, 137–139, 144–146, 159, 160, 162 Lloyds, 139, 160, 163, 173 M Miliband, Ed, 168 Monetarism, 20, 31, 61 Mortgage, 137, 139, 145, 149, 156, 161 N New Right, 40, 44, 65, 72, 84, 88, 91, 96, 187, 192, 194 Northern Rock, 38, 137, 138, 156, 159–161 H Habermas, Jurgen, 1, 9, 21 HSBC, 163 O OBR, 162 Osborne, George, 149, 153, 154, 160, 164 I In Place of Strife, 57, 59, 60, 64, 66 Inflation, 11, 20, 23, 28, 31, 38, 39, 57, 59, 66, 69, 70, 72, 81–84, 86–88, 91, 94, 95, 167, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192 Interest rates, 41, 132, 134, 135, 138, 145, 168, 169 P Paradigm, 3, 8, 29–31, 84, 93, 130, 136, 146, 147, 154, 161, 164– 166, 168, 170–173, 193–195, 202 Privatisation, 92, 140, 148, 194 Public opinion, 30, 62, 75, 78, 83, 86, 90, 95 Index R RBS, 139, 142, 144, 163, 167 Right to Buy, 105–111, 122 S Scapegoat, 62, 151, 190 Social contract, 38, 39, 44, 54, 59, 63, 64, 67, 78, 80, 84, 90, 199 Strike, 13, 39, 54, 57, 61, 63, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73–75, 77, 78, 81, 84–86, 90, 91, 93–95, 187, 188, 198–200 T Thatcher, Margaret, 11, 13, 20, 34, 66, 67, 73, 88, 91, 92, 96, 187, 193, 194, 201 Thatcherism, 44 The Express, 143, 153 The Sun, 34, 70, 72, 73, 76, 152, 155, 159, 160, 197 Trade union, 2, 4, 6, 13–15, 17–19, 25, 28, 29, 33, 35, 37–39, 41, 43, 44, 53–66, 68, 70–78, 80, 207 81, 83, 84, 86–96, 130, 137, 154, 165, 167, 186–189, 191, 193–195, 197–200 Trade union power, 44, 59, 63, 66, 71, 80, 83, 91, 194, 199 TUC, 57, 60, 62, 64, 65 U Unemployment, 8, 10, 11, 20, 23, 28, 38, 41, 57, 61, 65, 70, 84, 86, 89, 91, 93, 151, 153, 156, 169, 173, 186, 187 USA, 3, 40, 45, 106, 136, 140, 172, 173 W Wage, 34, 35, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 64, 66, 68, 69, 74, 81, 83, 86, 88, 90, 93, 95, 143, 189, 190, 192 Wilson, 38, 64, 66, 69 Winter of Discontent, 24, 38, 44, 54, 63, 67, 69, 72, 78, 81, 84, 85, 94, 188, 192 ... Kirkland The Political Economy of Britain in Crisis Trade Unions and the Banking Sector Christopher Kirkland Department of Politics University of Liverpool Liverpool, MSY UK Building a Sustainable... within society today the power of the trade unions declined in the 1980s through legislation of the Thatcher governments, changes in the British economy and industry (and in particular the decline... exploring two recent economic crises, explores and expands existing debates around the © The Author(s) 2017 C Kirkland, The Political Economy of Britain in Crisis, Building a Sustainable Political