Local governance, social networks and REDD Lessons from Swidden communities in Vietnam

Hum Ecol DOI 10.1007/s10745-016-9839-4 Local Governance, Social Networks and REDD+: Lessons from Swidden Communities in Vietnam Moira Moeliono & Thu Thuy Pham & Ngoc Dung Le & Maria Brockhaus & Grace Wong 1,3 & Maarit Kallio 1,4 & Dinh Tien Nguyen # Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016 Abstract Swidden is often blamed for deforestation but research has shown that these traditional systems can have a role in maintaining and enhancing carbon stocks and therefore could be compatible with efforts such as payments for environmental services (PES) and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) schemes in Vietnam This would require that PES and REDD+ project developers build on existing local governance structures In this paper we attempt to understand such structures though analysis of information and resource exchange in two communities in Vietnam, focusing on traditional local governance guiding swidden practices, and mass organisations Results show a high diversity of formal (governmentformed networks) and informal (traditional) swidden governance structures that can be embedded in REDD+ and PES schemes, where geographical accessibility, socio-cultural * Moira Moeliono moira.moeliono@gmail.com Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Jalan CIFOR, Situ Gede, Sindang Barang, Bogor (Barat) 16115, Indonesia CIFOR, No.17A, Nguyen Khang Street, Cau Giay District, Hanoi, Vietnam Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 46 Shimoadachi-cho, Yoshida, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan Viikki Tropical Resources Institute (VITRI), Department of Forestry Sciences, University of Helsinki, Latokartanonkaari 7, FI-00014 Helsinki, Finland Center for Agricultural Research and Ecological Studies (CARES), Vietnam National University of Agriculture, Trau Quy, Gia Lam District, Hanoi, Vietnam practices, and capacities of government will also determine which structure will work best for swidden communities to participate in REDD+/PES Keywords Swidden Reducing emissions from deforestation and Forest degradation (REDD+) Payments for environmental services (PES) Local governance structure Vietnam Introduction In efforts to turn the tide of deforestation and forest degradation and establish ‘good’ forest governance, governments have experimented with, among others, social (community) forestry (SF) and payments for environmental services (PES) More recently, concern over climate change has led to the development of REDD+, a scheme to reduce emissions through reducing deforestation and forest degradation in order to maintain the associated carbon stocks and thus contribute to the mitigation of global climate change (e.g., Angelsen et al., 2009) The areas targeted by many of these schemes are also areas where swidden practices remain a traditional way of life (Dove 1983; Padoch et al 2007; Fox et al 2009; Mertz et al 2009) (Figs 1, and 3) Key elements of swidden systems – such as the rotation of fields rather than crops (Mertz et al 2009), the use of fire to clear fields, and the typically long fallows of traditional systems can be productive and sustainable adaptations to challenging environmental conditions (Cairns 2007), with the CO2 emitted during the burning more than offset by the sequestration in vegetation regrowth during the fallow phase (Mertz et al 2009; FCPF 2010; Fox et al 2014) and the remaining forest in the landscape In addition, alternatives to swidden agriculture often have more adverse impacts (Ziegler et al Hum Ecol adapt, ignore, bypass, manipulate, and thereby change and reproduce, various constraining institutions and rules (Powell et al 2011) We first present the theoretical background on informal and formal structures in swidden systems and how they can be embedded in PES and or REDD+ designs, followed by our research methods and findings A final section highlights our conclusions Theoretical Background Governance, PES, REDD+ and Swidden Fig Site locations 2009; Hett et al., 2011; Ziegler et al 2012), for example the decline of soil organic carbon after conversion from swidden cultivation to oil palm plantations (Bruun et al 2013) Yet, perceptions about swidden are almost universally negative (Dove 1983; McElwee 1999; Fox et al 2009) leading to the adoption of SF, PES and REDD+ programs as strategies to change these ‘destructive practices,’ even though in cases where restricted swidden expansion coupled with increased population has led to unsustainable cultivation because of shortened fallows, REDD+ programs could provide an incentive for swidden farmers to lengthen their fallows again Whatever the motivation, the introduction of any new mechanism that aims at changing swidden and/or decisionmaking about natural resources – SF, PES or REDD+ − a thorough understanding of the local context, the socioecological system, and governance arrangements will be key to the effectiveness of the interventions (Baland and Platteau 1996; Wollenberg and Springate-Baginski 2009; Thompson et al 2011; Parrotta et al 2012; KFCP 2014) In this study, we attempt to provide a deeper understanding of local governance in two swidden systems with different political, economic and social contexts in Vietnam We analyse the governance and networks of information and resource exchange to provide guidance for the introduction of PES and REDD+ schemes Earlier research has shown that change is an integral part of swidden communities (Baland and Platteau 1996; Padoch et al 2007; Cramb et al 2009; Fox et al 2009) Furthermore, swidden communities are diverse and linked through multiple social networks to the larger community, bringing change and new opportunities Thus they continually When REDD+ was introduced in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations in 2005, it was seen as a PES-like instrument, with resultsbased payments provided to local land-use decision-makers for forest carbon as the delivered ecosystem service (for more information on the history of REDD+ and the key elements of PES schemes, see Wunder 2005; Angelsen and McNeill 2012) Early research indicates that to be effective, implementation needs to use bottom up approaches (Kanowski et al., 2011) and build on existing governance structures and linkages (Baland and Platteau 1996; Wollenberg and SpringateBaginski 2009; Thompson et al 2011; Parrotta et al 2012; KFCP 2014) PES and REDD+ can be conceived as environmental governance systems (Corbera and Schroeder, 2010; Thompson et al 2011) and similar to swidden systems involve both formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and among states, markets, citizens and organizations, through which collective interests are articulated, rights and obligations are established, and differences are mediated (Thakur and Van Langenhove 2006) At the local level, REDD+ planners need to consider the interactions of formal structures such as State organizations and institutions, usually involving some form of hierarchy (Marshall 1998), as well as informal social networks (Agrawal et al 2013) The formal structures concern rules and their enforcement to ensure that deforestation and forest degradation are handled systematically and the informal structures pertain to social relations, to how people work together in practice and build social networks, and use locally rooted compliance incentives based on tradition (Ranganathan et al 2011) Governance and incentives are inextricably linked by how people connect with, contribute to and benefit from schemes to manage their environment Incentives are defined as rewards for changing behaviour, of the individual as well as the organization, for better natural resource management (Theisohn and Land 2006) While REDD+ ultimately aims to provide incentives for individual households to change their behaviour to better protect forests, we also need to consider Hum Ecol Fig Land Use Map of Tan Xuan Commune, Son La Province were village A is located Source: CIFOR-ASFCC incentives for good governance, i.e., incentives for the different actors involved in governance, such as government agencies, actors behind drivers of deforestation and degradation and local communities involved in forest protection In this study, we look at the governance structures related to exchanges of information and resources to generate an understanding of how to enable information-sharing and participation of local actors in interventions such as REDD+ or PES We define governance structures as composed of actors and rules (Vatn and Vedeld 2013) Actors are characterized by their capacities and competencies, and their rights and responsibilities The social structures are the conventions, norms and rules facilitating the interaction/coordination among the actors We examine both the formal structure of government policies and the informal networks formed by non-State actors, focusing on two important systems in Vietnam rural life: agriculture, specifically swidden, and mass organizations Actors REDD+ (as well as PES and SF) requires Bthe formation of dominant coalitions able to challenge the structural patterns that form the root cause of deforestation and forest degradation^ (Brockhaus et al 2014) REDD+ should therefore involve actors across both vertical and horizontal linkages (Galaz et al 2012; Brockhaus and Angelsen 2012; KorhonenKurki et al 2013; Gallemore et al 2014; Korhonen-Kurki et al 2015) and aim to create synergies among different competencies and sources of knowledge to deal with complex and interlinked problems in a Bnetwork of governance^ (Dedeurwaerdere 2005; Crona and Hubacek 2010; Newig et al 2010) Involvement of local communities is thus essential (Wollenberg and Springate-Baginski 2009; Thompson et al 2011; Parrotta et al 2012; KFCP 2014) Studying the links and resulting networks acknowledges the complexity of the issues and the diversity of actors Hum Ecol Fig Land Use map of Binh Chuan commune, Nghe An province where village B is located Source: CIFOR-ASFCC (Carlsson and Sandstrom 2008) In making decisions on locations, timing and which crops to plant, for example, swiddeners in Vietnam are influenced by government actors and institutions, by the political party through the commune leaders, by traders and the market, and by labour and credit made available through mass organizations The interactions among these actors, especially in terms of exchange of information and resources, contribute to the structuring of the governance system in a village through social networks (Kickert 1997; Pierre and Peters 2000; Carlsson and Sandstrom 2008) Research Methods In order to provide an understanding of governance in two swidden systems in Vietnam through a focus on the role of both formal and informal structures and derive a set of lessons learned for future PES and REDD+ programmes, we address the following research questions: & & What are the formal and informal structures in swidden communities that could enable and/or constrain REDD+/ PES schemes? What are the social networks in these communities through which information and resources are exchanged? We adopted methodology to reflect the diversity (in terms of ethnicity, social capital and capacity) of swidden communities in Vietnam We selected two sites, village A in Son La in the north, and village B in Nghe An in the central south, to conduct our fieldwork We first analysed who is involved in Hum Ecol decision-making and the networks on information and resource exchange Secondly, we analysed the factors driving people to participate in formal (government and mass organizations) and informal structures such as the trade network and self-organized farmers groups We used social network analysis (SNA) to understand the systems of interaction as expressed through the relationships and the exchange of information and resources among actors in the context of their roles and status within the swidden communities (Wellman 1983; Bodin et al 2006; Carlsson and Sandstrom 2008) Social networks can generally be defined as a set of relationships or linkages among individuals or organizations, usually denoted as ‘actors,’ which have varying degrees of significance to wider networks The data for social network analysis were collected through four methods: Focus Group Discussions At each site, three focus group discussions (FGD) involving 51 informants in village A and 31 in village B, differentiated by gender and age, were organized to provide a basic understanding of environmental and social characteristics The FGDs identified the most important the agricultural and social organizations and networks in these swidden communities through which resources are exchanged within the community and beyond These data formed the basis for the follow-up ego-network survey Ego-Network Surveys Interviews with a random sample of household heads provided socioeconomic data as well as information used to construct resource exchange networks Questions most relevant for our analysis here were: – – – Who are the three most influential persons involved in the swidden systems? Why and who are the most important people with whom you most frequently exchange information and benefits related to swidden systems? What types of information and benefits did you exchange? We also asked whether these households participated in two dominant governance structures (agriculture and mass organizations) and what drove their participations or non-participation In total, 88 informants (48 in village A and 40 in village B) were interviewed Organizational Survey Interviews were conducted with nine (four in Son La and five in Nghe An) officials of key organizations that have decision-making responsibilities over forests and forested land focussing on policies related to forest and land use This survey provided background information on the governance structure and the sites Consultation Workshops Four feedback workshops were organized in March 2014 (two in each site: one with local authorities and one with local communities) to present preliminary research results and to seek feedback from local communities on those results Site Selection The two villages were selected based on the following criteria: & & & & & Swidden as a dominant land use in the community Significant forest cover in the village area (including mature forest) Other characteristics of specific interest for the project included proximity to a protected area, border areas, and migration history Synergies with other projects Ethnic diversity Village A is located in Van Ho1 district, Son La province and B in Con Cuong district, Nghe An province Son La is the site of the pilot PES programme of the Government of Vietnam while in village B, some REDD + −related initiatives had been conducted Both villages are poor and have been recipients of numerous poverty reduction programmes, including one that compensated local people for involvement in forest protection Description of the two sites is shown in Table The structure of power and policymaking in Vietnam is often seen as centred on three main groups of actors: the Party, the State and the people, as articulated in the motto for the management of society in Vietnam: Bthe Party to lead, the State to manage and the people to own.^ Despite more recent changes, these three components of the social structure remain the cornerstone of contemporary Vietnamese society (Wischermann 2010; Tran 2011) The state is structured according to the government hierarchy of province, district, and commune At each level, a parallel structure consists of the Peoples Committees (PCs) that among many other things regulate property rights and formal lending institutions (Pham et al 2012) Below this formal structure is the village, with the village head often the only link between village people and the formal government In addition, at commune and village level, most people belong to mass organizations With the economic reforms of 1986, the State has become less authoritarian (Wischermann 2013) and although the VCP retains control it has become less visible Mass organizations have greater leeway to express their views and are no longer Btransmission belts^ that exclusively help to implement government decisions, enlighten, convince and mobilize the Van Ho is a new district split from Moc Chau district during the period of our survey (2013) Hum Ecol Table Characteristics of the two study sites Characteristic Village A Village B Main ethnicity Hmong Thai Location (remote/relatively easy access) Remote Rural Rural/urban/in transition(*) Remote but with the new road more accessible Rural Proximity to nearest town Proximity to Laos Relatively far Merged together Border (very close) National park Core zone of the Xuan Nha National Park Respondent originates in the village (%) 67.4 Bordering, buffer zone of the Pu Huong National Park 78.7 Swidden farmers (at least partially) 80.4 91.5 Population Poverty rate 96 HHs Commune 38.9 % with Lay the poorest of villages 84 HHs Government interventions: Forest Land Allocation (Program 163) None FLA with 130 Ha allocated for swidden Forest protection contracts Before 2010 10,000 VND/yr (0.4USD/yr).; 2010: 40,000 VND/HH/yr (2002) 50,000 VND/year (2.2 USD/yr); 2011 discontinued Tree planting programs None Program 661 (5 million reforestation), Program 147 Poverty reduction programs Program 134,135,167 No of respondents interviewed 48 masses and maintain support for the VCP’s rule (Wischermann 2013) While they sometimes play the role of civil society organizations, to a large degree they still act as the government’s right arm and are not neutral in terms of their political vision and interests (Pham et al 2010) Local people are free to decide whether they want to join such social organizations although in practice most feel obliged to so to be seen as socially accepted (McCarty 2014) Households can decide on their own faith relatively freely but every other aspect of daily life is organized within the orbit of government control Findings and Discussion Swidden, Deforestation and Forest Degradation: Mismatch between Political Policies and Realities Swidden is generally considered a main driver of deforestation and degradation, especially by provincial government agencies (organizational survey), and therefore regarded as politically and socially undesirable (Dove 1983; McElwee 1999: Fox et al 2009) The Vietnamese Government has initiated various programs to halt swidden, among them the Regreening Uplands Program (Program 327), the Million Hectare Reforestation Program (Program 661), and the Community Forestry Programs that promote local Program 134, 135, 167 134 and 135 are poverty reduction programs providing support to poor districts throughout Vietnam 40 participation and increasing local over forest resources (Wode and Bao 2009) Yet, as reported by local people and supported by earlier research (e.g., Ziegler et al 2012), illegal logging, road building and dam development are in fact more important drivers of deforestation and degradation Research has also shown that if swidden is understood at the landscape scale as part of the overall landscape mosaic (Padoch and Sunderland 2013), it can contribute a wide range of ecosystem services including carbon sequestration (McElwee 1999; Cairns 2007; Fox et al 2014) Furthermore converting swidden to more permanent uses, such as rubber plantations (Fox et al 2014), more intensive cultivation (Ziegler et al 2012), or removing swidden from the landscape (Castella et al 2013) could have negative effects on the landscape and carbon balance Unfortunately, there still remains a lot of uncertainty about the role of swidden in carbon sequestration (Bruun et al 2009; Ziegler et al 2012; Bruun et al 2013) and while research is ongoing, governments continue with standard programmes to Bbring economic development^ and aimed at eradicating swidden cultivation (McElwee 1999) Government authorities in Vietnam are therefore reluctant to admit that swidden cultivation continues to be practiced and unwilling to even discuss it A forest protection officer in Son La and district committee member in Nghe An admitted that reporting on current swidden farming meant that local authorities had failed to implement government policies As a result, figures on swidden are unreported, unavailable or ignored Hum Ecol Village A Village B Fig Level of participation in agriculture and mass organizations Nodes denote respondents Lines show the participation in swidden and or mass organization With no economic alternatives and fearing social unrest, officials have allowed swidden in designated areas but attempt to restrict its expansion In border areas such as in our study sites this policy is part of the national strategy to secure the border The Forest Land Allocation (FLA) program also aims to eradicate swidden as a key driver of deforestation and degradation but does not always meet its original objectives and political goals In village B, FLA was implemented in 1998, but the legal allocation of rights allocated only 130 to swidden (with a pre-determined fallow rotation of 10 years), which is not enough for the 86 households of the village.2 In 2011, in response to stricter enforcement of the prohibition to expand swidden, people switched to paddy rice but lack of sufficient water for irrigation and shortage of land limited the potential of this option Swidden was retained but with very short or no fallow rotations, leading to degraded swidden fields, which were subsequently abandoned Officially, FLA is intended to motivate local people to protect forests In practice, all interviewees claimed that FLA is the cause of food shortages People needed to clear additional fields for survival As a result, forests are not well protected and many young people have been driven to seek employment elsewhere, mostly in industrial zones in the lowlands as well as in Laos and Thailand Although in village A, FLA was not implemented and officially all land is within the national park boundaries, to maintain food security and income, all local people admitted that they ignore prohibitions and continue their traditional practices including (illegal) logging and land clearing to expand their cultivation area A common assumption is that one household of 4–5 people require of swidden annually Governance Structure of Swidden Communities: Lessons for REDD+ The Role of Swidden and Mass Organizations Although the two sites have different social and economic characteristics, all interviewees indicated swidden and mass organizations as the most important governance structures in their daily lives (Fig 4) Swidden, however, is already changing More and more people plant maize for sale in their swidden fields and consequently need to buy rice Fallows are short: 2–3 years People also focus more on other sources of income such as bamboo shoots, which provide some VND 600,000 (USD 30) per household per year, galangal, bananas and other fruit trees, cattle, and fish While acknowledging the role of mass organizations in village governance, we focus our analysis more on the swidden system for two main reasons First, swidden comprises the main livelihood and structure of local and social development in both sites All (100 %) people in village A depend on swidden In village B, more sources of income are available, but more than 70 % of respondents said they depend on swidden Second, all villagers interviewed claimed that mass organizations are more important for their role in organizing social events than in supporting economic development Yet, in village A, where the people are very isolated both geographically and culturally, mass organizations play an important role as sources of information as well as support in developing and improving agricultural practices In contrast, where local people have better access to roads and resources, as in village B, mass organizations are more important as a social meeting venue Often, in order to cope with constraints on swidden and poverty, villagers tend to migrate to urban centres, which has a significant impact on land use, particularly in the case of Nghe An This phenomenon needs further research and analysis Hum Ecol Actors’ Reputational Power in Swidden Governance In all FGDs, a range of actors was identified as influential in swidden governance (Table 2), with government, through the District Agricultural Board, the Commune Agriculture Extension Agency, the Policy and Social Development Bank (PSD bank), and the National Park Agency, recognized as playing the most visible and important role Yet, local people are sceptical of the programmes administered through these agencies, which are often initiated and stopped without their being informed In addition, a number of programmes, such as agricultural extension schemes, which are conducted more or less regularly to provide information on how to improve agriculture production, are often weak on follow up and provision of inputs Other programs are seen as merely restrictive without providing alternatives For example, the national park is perceived mainly as a constraint to the expansion of swidden Most programs are typically delivered through the formal structure of commune and village heads and often lose information and inputs in transmission People have therefore put their trust in informal actors The household survey reveals a different set of actors considered important compared with the focussed group discussions The network analysis based on household surveys shows that in village B the most influential person is a former village leader (node # 43) who is a the secretary of the Communist Party at village level (Fig 5), while in village A, informal actors such as itinerant traders (node # 50) and shop owners (node # 51 and 52) are the most prominent (Fig 3) People perceive these actors as influential because of their wealth and power status, experience in agriculture production (e.g., members of the Farmer’s Association and Women’s Union) that local people can learn from, or the ability to access and provide important information and resources on agriculture techniques, market price and social development (e.g., traders and shop owners, members of the Farmers’ Association and Women’s Union) Network of Swidden Related Information Exchange Influential formal and informal actors (Fig 6) in both villages are also people with whom communities exchange information and resources (Figs and 8) Government actors, such as extension staff, national park staff, border police, commune staff and village heads not only inform local people about the government support programs on agriculture development but also advocate government policies on national security and forest protection programs, often perceived by local people as not relevant to their livelihood, mostly through village meetings In village B, the secretary of the CP at village level is seen as most influential He is in charge of disseminating information and arranging elections He attends meetings at commune and district level, and thus is well informed on development in general and a source of information on policy and regulations on forest management He provides both information and, as he is rich, loans in an emergency Interestingly, he is also the person with whom local people share information (Fig 8) regarding their swidden practices People come to him to discuss their problems and in the process give him information The head of mass organizations (Youth Union, Farmer Association, and Women’s Union) are also considered powerful as they represent people wishing to borrow money from the Policy and Social Development Bank Mass organizations also provide social support (swidden labor for female-headed households for example) and contribute to social cohesion Information exchange related to swidden is mostly through a network of informal actors such as traders and friends from outside the village Newly upgraded roads have allowed more frequent visits of traders who have become important sources of information on market prices of agriculture products, types of fertilizers, new seed varieties, as well as the sources of goods (e.g., clothes, radios, TVs and books) In many cases, traders also act as loan providers for local people and are also important as buyers of NTFPs (mainly herbs/medicinal plants, honey, and bamboo shoots) collected by women Both formal and informal actors provide information and resources important for swidden, but people choose those most useful, relevant and expedient for their requirements Their choice is influenced by the capacity of formal government actors, the accessibility of the site, and social customs of the swidden community itself For example, information on techniques for cultivation of maize and paddy rice and for livestock production is provided by government extension officers in both study villages However, since extension staff visit village A only once or twice a year people depend more on traders Interestingly, though brokered by village heads, the commercial growing of maize was first introduced and developed by traders As a result, people in village A prefer to seek advice and help from informal actors such as traders rather than government extension agents Informal social networks are perhaps more accessible to individuals to share information and resources They help connect people within their network to employers, gain access to government and community programs and services, and navigate through organizational spaces to obtain the required information and resources At the same time, formal structures provide the space for social networks to develop This mutually reinforcing dynamic has important implications for public policy and necessitates the recognition of informal networks and the design of programs to engage them In contrast, in village B, a formal actor such as the head of Farmers’ Association (node # 41 Fig 7), is seen as an important source of information on available government support, new agricultural techniques and market prices More importantly, he determines who can borrow money from the Hum Ecol Table Actors related to swidden governance as identified by focus group discussions Village A Village B Men Women Youth PSDBank District Agricultural Board (represented by extension staff) Government Agriculture extension service (seen as training courses) Mass organizations PSDBank District and Commune agricultural commune board extension service Forest Protection Board of national park represented by forest rangers Border Security Staff Itinerant traders Retailer agents in Moc Chau town Men Forest rangers Security police Commune clinic Itinerant traders Shops Shops in village Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DONRE) Commune government and village leaders Youth Union Fig Sources of Information on agriculture issues Youth PSDBank Agricultural extension officers PSDBank DONRE Government authorities Commune Youth and Women Youth Union Union; Farmer’s Association Gold miner Health clinic Outside traders Brokers NGO from Luxembourg Farmers’ Association and provides access to the support from government agencies Mass organizations also play a different role according to location, ethnicity, and accessibility Clearly PES and REDD+ projects can build on both formal and informal governance systems As Prell et al (2010) also found, both formal and informal networks appear to guide and constrain individual behavior, where the informal system often fills gaps that the formal system is unable or unwilling to fill For example, in our study informal networks appear to be the favoured source for information related to agriculture, Women NGO from Luxembourg Laos and Thai people NGO from Luxembourg mainly through itinerant traders This importance of traders might be the result of a governance vacuum (Lemos and Agrawal 2006); that is, government agencies fail to enforce forest protection measures and fail to deliver meaningful agriculture extension services Our survey shows that traders might also be the main drivers of Deforestation and Forest Degradation, but villagers rely heavily on their access to information At the same time, government efforts towards reforestation and reducing carbon emissions not take account of or make use of these people Hum Ecol Village A Village B Fig Most influential actors in swidden governance Node size show number of nominations by others in the village This was confirmed by interviews revealing that the formal network of the national park forest protection groups, border police, village heads and agricultural extension units, is weak and not perceived to have much influence on local livelihoods As a result, villagers not expect much from the state and continue their traditional way of life Nevertheless, modern influences are slowly being incorporated linking the villages to the larger cash economy Traders who supply cash and information on how to obtain cash are therefore more important than government development interventions, which are often inaccessible to local people Dependence on outsiders as their sole source of information poses certain risks to local communities, although traders are equally dependent on local people for the exchange of goods As they are not part of the community (and the strong ties within), these outsiders disseminate new information and trigger innovation (Granovetter 1973) Nevertheless, a change in the market might cause traders to go elsewhere for better deals Large commercial companies are often seen as privatesector drivers of deforestation, but as our results from in village A show, the many small-scale traders influence decisions on how land is used and hence on deforestation and forest degradation These traders appear to compete with government agencies in supporting and influencing local people’s activities in livelihood improvement and forest protection Ideally they should be included in the decision- and policymaking processes to address drivers of deforestation and degradation Fig Exchange of information related to swidden in village A Note: Indegree sending (left) and receiving (right) information Nodes denote actors and the size shows the frequency of being mentioned as the destination (send information) or the source (receive information) Arrows point towards actors mentioned as targets or sources of information Hum Ecol Fig Exchange of information related to swidden in Village B Note: Indegree sending (left) and receiving (right) information Nodes denote actors and the size shows the frequency of being mentioned as the destination (send information) or the source (receive information) Arrows point towards actors mentioned as targets or sources of information REDD+ and PES in Vietnam are based on existing government structures (i.e., government agencies, mass organizations, formal rule and process) with limited participation of non-State actors However, our case study shows that government is limited in reaching and informing people, both by their resources and capacity and because of the mistrust of local people who see government policies as restricting their livelihoods It might therefore be useful for any outside intervention to involve, or at least consult and understand how small and medium private sector actors at village level can disseminate information on REDD+ and PES projects Providing the right incentives might attract such involvement and at the same time might provide information leading to increased awareness of these actors of more sustainable land-use management practices and their willingness to employ them As Agrawal et al (2013) also note, people select, adapt and or combine parts of both the formal and informal structures in order to pursue their objectives in their daily lives This Binstitutional bricolage^ (De Koning 2011) is part of a survival strategy and shows that both should be strengthened Informal structures are built on local knowledge, existing customs, beliefs and capabilities (Keman 2011) This network governance should be understood as self-organization (Dedeurwaerdere 2005), whereby the relationships among actors and the rules and procedures that form these relationships are understood as elements in structuring the governance system At the local community level, informal institutions and structures might prevail over formal ones (Sokile and Van Koppen 2005) payments and/or subsidies to compensate for loss of access to land Earlier experience and access to land determined the degree of villagers’ interest in potential PES/REDD+ programmes In village A, where access to land is constrained, some 70 % of respondents said they were interested In village B, which is located in the buffer zone of a park and where people have been allocated land under FLA, only 30 % said they were interested (see Fig 9) Reasons for lack of interest are, among others, most people are already very busy; forested areas are some distance away and transportation costs are high; there is not enough labour since young people have migrated to find off-farm jobs In addition, the earlier programmes did not deliver continuous and significant benefits and sometimes payments were not received in full, thus motivation in new programs is somewhat low To further understand what PES/REDD schemes would need to consider to ensure relevance and interest, we looked at people’s motivation to engage in traditional or other societal systems, i.e., swidden and mass organizations Swidden cultivation remains an important source of income Mass organizations provide access to micro-loans, access to innovations, a source of labour exchange, a venue for social activities, and social pressure to participate in community projects (Table 3) A REDD+ design needs to take these factors into account to ensure that local interests and needs are addressed through REDD+ project activities or payments In particular, social support activities and social pressure could be used to tailor REDD+ monitoring activities Participating in mass organisations is also a risk coping strategy as it provides access to government food security programmes and labour to vulnerable groups This is shown in village A, where non-participants were better off than participants, i.e., they reported no food or labour shortages and hence had little need for ‘benefits’ of the mass organizations Expressions of Interest to Participate in PES and or REDD+ In the two villages there are no PES or REDD+ programmes as yet but the FPA had implemented programmes where people were contracted to protect or rehabilitate forest and receive Hum Ecol Fig Willingness to participate in REDD+ or PES programs REDD+ will attract local interest only if the incentives are appropriate, fair and consistent (Springate-Baginski and Wollenberg 2010) Our survey shows that people are motivated not only by direct monetary benefits Indeed as Sikor and Hoàng (2016) also showed, motivation might be driven by a sense of justice or rights, such as access to land and information, and more participatory decision making on how incentives should be distributed Therefore, combining different incentives, direct and indirect, cash and non-cash rewards that encourage institution building, support conditionality and discourage freeriding, might be more effective in gaining local participation (Van Noordwijk and Leimona 2010) than simply calculating opportunity costs as a cash benefit Understanding local informal structures might therefore also help in formulating incentives to engage local support and active participation (Fischer and Petersen 2004; Fischer et al 2009) Conclusions Our study shows how in swidden agricultural systems in the study areas, formal government organizations and informal Table Motivation to participate in mass organizations Accessing micro loans Accessing in-kind benefits (seedling etc.) Labour exchange Information exchange Entertainment activities BHerd effects^ Security issues Village A Village B 20 14 structures play different, sometimes complementary, roles in addressing drivers of deforestation and forest degradation and improving local livelihoods It also shows that an actor’s decision to participate in schemes such as REDD+ or PES depends on their understanding of the incentives and disincentives, the discourse held by different actors involved and influence of drivers of deforestation and degradation, and on the perceived capacity of formal (government) and informal structures to support their livelihoods Financial incentives are not always successful, while the potential impact of non-financial incentives appears to have been underestimated Some nonfinancial incentives at community level (such as providing more information) are simple to provide but require changes at the policy-making level Changing the attitude of local governments on reporting and dealing with swidden agriculture as a component of landscape management is a more difficult task Two main findings can be highlighted: (1) There is diversity among both formal and informal structures in terms of dominance and relevance, as determined by the diverse sources of livelihood, accessibility, social culture and government presence and capacity For a village such as village B that is easily accessible, formal structures might play a larger role, as there is more access to government programmes Actors within these structures are therefore important for involvement in PES/REDD+ In contrast, in an isolated and overlooked area such as village A, informal structures seem to be more important and therefore should be used to build up REDD+ and PES projects (2) Similarly, there is diversity in terms of incentives that are most effective and how they operate Results of the study indicate effectiveness is associated with previous experience and knowledge In summary, local context matters and interventions such as REDD+ and PES schemes cannot be effective unless they are Hum Ecol based on a careful analysis of the local social, cultural, and economic situation In order for incentives to be effective, much more up-front information sharing, e.g., as part of the free prior informed consent (FPIC), is required Without this preparation, REDD+ schemes will not work (FPP 2014) Finally, swidden communities can only engage in REDD+ programmes/policies when it is recognized that they play an important role in maintaining the larger landscape diversity For this, there needs to be more detailed research on their potential role in carbon sequestration and other environmental services Acknowledgments This research is part of Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) contribution to the ASEAN-Swiss Partnership on Social Forestry and Climate Change project coordinated by the ASEAN Social Forestry Network We would like to express our special thanks to Christine Padoch from CIFOR for her support and comments, as well as Aneesh Anandas who produced the land-use maps We also thank Le Manh Thang and Luong Thai Hung from Son La Forest Protection and Development Fund and Tran Binh from Con Cuong 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