a thesis submitted to the faculty of the graduate school of the university of colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy department of economics

Trade Effects of the WTO and Anti-dumping Policy in Developing Countries by Khai Cong Dinh M.A., Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2005 M.S., Economics, University of Asia and the Pacific, the Philippines, 1997 B.A., Economics, University of Economics, Vietnam, 1990 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Economics 2009 This thesis entitled: Trade Effects of the WTO and Anti-dumping Policy in Developing Countries By Khai Cong Dinh has been approved for the Department of Economics _ Professor Wolfgang Keller, Chair _ Professor Keith Maskus Date: _ The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline iii Dinh, Khai Cong (Ph D., Economics) Trade Effects of the WTO and Anti-dumping Policy in Developing Countries Thesis directed by Prof Wolfgang Keller and Prof Keith Maskus The first chapter of this dissertation is devoted to extensively review literature on the impact of trade liberalization under GATT/WTO on international trade in developed and developing countries It suggests that although it is more likely to see the positive effect of the GATT/WTO on international trade in developed countries than to the same in developing countries, the trade-promoting role of the GATT/WTO is expected to be found in developing WTO members, at least in some sectors Chapter develops a model to test the hypothesis of whether or not the WTO has promoted international trade in developing WTO members The contribution of this chapter into the existing economic literature is that this study investigates the effect of GATT/WTO membership on international trade in different types of goods, differentiated and homogeneous, in developing country members I find that WTO membership has associated with expanded imports of products which are of primary export interest to developing countries I also find that joining the GATT/WTO in a period had a bigger impact on imports of different types of goods in developing countries than already being in the GATT/WTO since applicants are required to make more serious commitments on tariff liberalization and market access before they get approved to accede to the WTO than the existing developing country members Chapter uses a cross-country sample of newly available disaggregated data to empirically examine trade effects of anti-dumping (AD) cases initiated between 1995 and iv 2003 in “new AD user” developing countries I find that there is very limited trade diversion caused by AD petitions in developing countries due to a reason unique to these countries; that is, while AD activities in developing countries reduce imports from named countries relatively high tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions in these countries impede imports from non-named countries This is probably the most relevant reason to explain the outbreak of AD laws and their escalating use in developing countries Dedication To my parents, parents-in-law, wife, and sons vi Acknowledgements I would like to acknowledge the Vietnamese Ministry of Education and Training and many individuals who gave me special supports and encouragement to complete my dissertation I would like to express my deep gratitude to my advisors, Professor Wolfgang Keller and Professor Keith Maskus, who gave me valuable comments and suggestions on my dissertation I owe special thanks to Professor Maskus who spent his precious time to shape the framework of my projects and encouraged me to pursue further goals in my academic career I am also indebted to Professor Hale Utar for her discussions and comments on my dissertation, especially chapter Thanks also go to Nam Hoang, Duong Nguyen, Ha Nguyen, Hang Nguyen, David Pinto, and Said Boakye for their encouragement and friendship All the achievements I have obtained today are dedicated to my parents who have always believed in my abilities and have always been by my side to give me wonderful support and encouragement, to my parents-in-law who have always been a great help, and to my wife and sons whose love has given me strength and confidence to pursue higher goals in my life vii Contents Chapter The Impact of the World Trade Organization on International Trade 1.1 Introduction……………………………………………………… 1.2 The Gravity Equation: Some Theoretical Foundations………… 1.3 Tariff Liberalization in Developed and Developing Countries… 16 1.4 Effects of Tariff Liberalization on International Trade………… 19 1.5 Effects of the GATT/WTO on International Trade……………… 36 1.6 Summary and Suggestions for Future Research………………… 41 Do Developing Countries Enjoy Their Membership in the WTO? 43 2.1 Introduction …………………………………………………… 43 2.2 The Estimation Model…………………………………………… 49 2.3 Data……………………………………………………………… 52 2.4 Econometric Results and Discussion on Empirical Findings…… 53 2.4.1 Basic Results……………………………………………… 53 2.4.2 Do Newly-Joined Developing Country Members Benefit from the WTO? 2.5 58 Conclusion……………………………………………………… 62 Trade Effects of Antidumping Policy in Developing Countries………… 64 3.1 Introduction……………………………………………………… 3.2 The Proliferation of AD Policy and AD Activities in 64 Developing Countries……………………………………………… 71 viii 3.3 Literature Review on Trade Destruction and Trade Diversion of AD Policy……………………………………………………… 73 3.3.1 Trade Destruction Effects of AD Actions…………… 73 3.3.2 Empirical Studies on Trade Diversion of AD Policy… 75 3.4 Estimation Model and Estimation Strategy……………………… 83 3.5 Data……………………………………………………………… 85 3.6 Econometric Results and Discussion of Empirical Findings…… 86 3.6.1 Benchmark Results….………………………………… 86 3.6.2 Trade Diversion Effects of AD Cases in the Major AD Filing Sectors in Developing Countries…………… 87 3.6.3 3.7 Discussion on the Empirical Findings………………… 92 Conclusion and Policy Implications……………………………… 110 Bibliography 113 Appendix A 120 ix Tables Table 2.1 Shares of commodity categories across trading groups……… 2.2 Shares of commodity categories in value of total trade of 47 each trading group…………………………………………… 48 2.3 Core Regression, Panel 1965-2000…………………………… 55 2.4 Cross-section Results………………………………………… 56 2.5 Effects of the GATT/WTO on imports of different goods in newly-joined and old developing WTO members………… 3.1 Antidumping initiation between 1994/95 and 2002/03 (July/June) by reporting countries…………………………… 3.2 69 Country-wise break-up of AD one-country one-product cases, 1995-2003…………………………………………………… 3.4 65 Sectors most frequently involved in AD cases between 1995 and 2003……………………………………………………… 3.3 60 70 Impact of AD Actions on Values of Imports in the Six Developing Countries………………………………………… 88 3.5 Impact of AD Actions on Quantity of Imports in the Six Developing Countries……………………………………… 89 3.6 Impact of AD Actions on Unit Value of Imports in the Six Developing Countries………………………………… 90 x 3.7 Impact of AD Actions on Values of Imports in Major AD Filing Sectors in the Six Developing Countries………… 93 3.8 Impact of AD Actions on Quantity of Imports in Major AD Filing Sectors in the Six Developing Countries…………… 95 3.9 Impact of AD Actions on Unit Value of Imports in Major AD Filing Sectors in the Six Developing Countries… ……… 97 3.10 Unweighted Average MNF Applied Tariff Rates (6-digit HS) 99 3.11 Impact of AD Actions on Values of Imports in Turkey and the Other Developing Countries………………………… 104 3.12 Impact of AD Actions on Quantity of Imports in Turkey and the Other Developing Countries……………………………… 106 106 Table 3.12: Impact of AD Actions on Quantity of Imports in Turkey and the Other Developing Countries ln Quantity ln Quantity, t-1 Investigation, t+0 Investigation, t+1 Investigation, t+2 Investigation, t+3 Affirmative Decision, t+0 Affirmative Decision, t+1 Affirmative Decision, t+2 Affirmative Decision, t+3 Negative Decision, t+0 Negative Decision, t+1 Negative Decision, t+2 Negative Decision, t+3 Number Turk (Investigation, t+0)* Turk (Investigation, t+1) * Turk (Investigation, t+2) * Turk Named Non-named 0.97* 0.95* (164.46) (296.44) -0.18** 0.02 (-2.81) (0.48) -0.06 0.01 (-0.66) (0.17) -0.35* 0.09 (-3.68) (1.73) -0.12 -0.02 (-1.27) (-0.52) -0.49* 0.07 (-5.01) (1.37) -0.02 -0.01 (-0.18) (-0.17) 0.02 -0.05 (0.21) (-0.91) -0.06 -0.03 (-0.81) (-0.76) -0.25 0.14 (-1.37) (1.09) 0.45** 0.12 (2.39) (0.93) 0.08 0.17 (0.42) (1.39) -0.002 -0.21 (-0.01) (-1.79) -0.02 0.08* (-0.52) (4.38) 0.08 0.08** (0.83) (2.91) 0.11 -0.19 (0.62) (-1.91) -0.55** 0.08 (-2.74) (0.82) 0.36 -0.15 (1.53) (-1.43) 107 0.87 -0.10 (1.78) (-0.90) -0.05 0.21 (-0.20) (1.61) -0.98* -0.12 (-3.75) (-0.91) 0.02 -0.12 (0.11) (-0.98) -0.20 -0.13 (-1.03) (-1.13) 0.67 0.24 (1.20) (1.09) -1.00* -0.03 (-3.04) (-0.15) 0.29 -0.19 (0.90) (-0.92) -0.20 -0.02 (-0.57) (-0.08) 0.003 0.008 (0.02) (0.05) Yes Yes 0.78 0.72 707.60 2551.25 Prob>F 0.00 0.00 Number of observations 8659 40199 (Investigation, t+3) * Turk (Affirmative Decision, t+0) * Turk (Affirmative Decision, t+1) * Turk (Affirmative Decision, t+2) * Turk (Affirmative Decision, t+3) * Turk (Negative Decision, t+0) * Turk (Negative Decision, t+1) * Turk (Negative Decision, t+2) * Turk (Negative Decision, t+3) * Turk Number * Turk Year dummies R F-test Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 1% level;** significant at 5% level Constant and year dummies not reported 108 The finding that there is no trade diversion caused by AD actions in Turkey could be due to the fact that Turkey has used another traditional protectionist tool, quantitative restrictions, against imports from non-named countries Historically, these restrictions were first legislated by the Short-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, initiated in 1961 and then followed by the Long-Term Cotton Textiles Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles in 1962, and the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles or Multifibre Arrangement (“MFA”) in 1974 These agreements provided rules for the impositions of quantitative restraints on textiles products to prevent market disruption, either through bilateral agreements or unilateral action By January 1st, 1995, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) became effective after seven years of negotiations during the Uruguay Round It aimed at eliminating the MFA bilateral quantitative restrictions on selected textile products in four stages over a ten year period, by the end 2005 Within the ten-year period, quotas on 51 percent of textile and apparel products listed in the Annex of the ATC would be removed The 49 percent of the items left would be integrated in the WTO in the tenth year Products that are not integrated during this ten-year phase out period would be subject to quotas, would have annual quota growth rates accelerated After the ten year phase-out period is completed there would been planned no extensions of the ATC26 In this scenario, obviously, developing countries can set quantitative restrictions to protect a number of products in their textile industries during the period of 1995-2005 The WTO Report of the Panel on Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products27 in 1999 describes clearly the Turkish commercial policy in textiles 26 27 See Pelzman and Rees (1998) See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/texti_e/texti_e.htm 109 and clothing, especially for imposition of quantitative restrictions in these sectors First of all, according to Decision 1/95, in particular Article 12, Turkey has to apply provisions and implementing quantitative measures which are substantially the same commercial policy as the Community in the textile sector including the agreements or arrangements on trade in textile and clothing Two Decrees issued by Turkey’s Council of Ministers served as the base to align Turkish commercial policy in textiles and clothing and that of the European Communities: Decree No 95/6815 on Surveillance and Safeguard Measures for Imports of Certain Textile Products which is for products countries with which Turkey concluded bilateral agreements, and Decree No 95/6816 on Surveillance and Safeguard Measures for Imports of Certain Textile Products Originating in Certain Countries not Covered by Bilateral Agreements, Protocols and Other Arrangements Based on those two Decrees, Turkey sent agreements, providing for quantitative restrictions in Turkey which are similar to those of the European Communities, to negotiate with 24 WTO member and non-member countries As of January 1st, 1996, unilateral quantitative restrictions or surveillance regimes were applied to imports originating in another 28 countries These restrictions only affected products whose export to the EU was also under restraint As shown in the Annex (Appendix 1) in the WTO report of the Panel on Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (1999), names of textile products Turkey has filed AD petitions on are included in the list of 61 textile and clothing product categories under restraint Therefore, no import diversion caused by AD actions should be found in the textile industry in developing countries 110 Thirdly, according to Blonigen and Prusa (2001), the low degree of transparency and predictability in AD determinations seems to be particular problems in new user developing countries For instance, they claim that “many new users not provide explanation of their calculations and methods underlying their determinations” (p 8) In addition, most of new user developing countries impose AD duties prospectively, this means only after a positive dumping and injury finding; therefore, the uncertainty regarding the magnitude of AD duties last longer in particular for non-named countries As a result, non-named importers are uncertain about the potential benefits of AD protection and thus reluctant to increase their imports28 It is clear that in the above-mentioned scenarios trade diversion caused by AD policy hardly occurred in developing countries since basically AD actions in these countries have reduced imports from named countries while other traditional instruments of trade protection such as tariffs and import quotas have been used to prevent imports from non-named countries Besides, the low degree of transparency in AD determinations also plays an important role to impede imports from non-named countries 3.7 Conclusion and Policy Implications This study uses a cross-country sample of newly available disaggregated data to empirically examine trade effects of AD cases initiated between 1995 and 2003 in “new AD user” developing countries The study finds very limited trade diversion caused by AD petitions, which makes AD policy a very popular instrument of trade protection in developing countries Therefore, it is the relevant explanation for the outbreak of AD 28 See Vandenbussche et al (1999) 111 laws and their escalating use in developing countries aside from explanations of the proliferation of AD policy in developing countries discussed in Nakagawa (2007) and Vandenbusche and Zanardi (2007) The study shows substantial evidence to explain why there is very limited import diversion caused by AD petitions in developing countries First, while developing countries aggressively exploited AD policy to impede imports from named countries, they have still maintained relatively high tariff barriers to prevent import diversion to non-named countries This has occurred in almost all the industries in all the developing countries investigated in this paper, where unweighted average MNF tariff rates applied in the industries protected by AD cases in the developing countries were higher than those of the world and of other developing countries The only exception is the textile industry in Turkey However, instead of using tariff barriers Turkey applied quantitative restrictions together with AD policy to protect this sector In this case, trade diversion hardly occurs in the Turkish textile industry This case study of the Turkish textile industry is significant since it shows that developing countries could use other instruments of trade protection aside from tariff barriers to impede imports from nonnamed countries in order to protect their market Some implications are suggested from the findings of this study The first is that the WTO should play a stronger role to prevent misuse of AD policy in developing countries It is because first AD statutes after having been amended through various negotiating rounds become easier for any countries to grant Second, as it is postulated by many authors such as Blonigen and Prusa (2001), Prusa (2001), and Vadenbussche and Zanardi (2007) that the WTO AD guidelines are quite vague and could easily be 112 interpreted in a way that suits the need of a country to protect its industries 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(1948) Germany (1951) Greece (1950) Iceland (1968) Ireland (1967) Italy (1950) Japan (1955) Luxembourg (1948) Netherlands (1948) New Zealand (1948) Norway (1948) Portugal (1962) Spain (1963) Sweden (1950) Switzerland (1966) United Kingdom (1948) United States (1948) Grenada (1994) Guatemala (1991) Guinea (1994) Guinea-Bissau (1994) Guyana (1966) Haiti (1950) Honduras (1994) Hong Kong SAR (1986) Hungary (1973) India (1948) Indonesia (1950) Iran Iraq Israel (1962) Jamaica (1963) Jordan (2000) Kazakhstan Kenya (1964) Kiribati Korea, South (R) (1967) Kuwait (1963) Kyrgyzstan (1998) Lao People’s Dem Rep Latvia (1999) Liberia Libyan Arab JM Lithuania Macedonia Madagascar (1963) Malawi (1964) Malaysia (1957) Maldives (1983) Mali (1993) Malta (1964) Mauritania (1963) Mauritius (1970) Myanmar (1948) Mexico (1986) Moldova Mongolia (1997) Morocco (1987) Mozambique (1992) Nepal New Caledonia Nicaragua (1950) Niger (1963) Nigeria (1960) Oman (2000) Pakistan (1948) Panama (1997) Papua N Guinea (1994) Paraguay (1994) Peru (1951) Philippines (1979) Poland (1967) Qatar (1994) Reunion (1948) Romania (1971) Russia Rwanda (1966) Samoa Saudi Arabia Senegal (1963) Seychelles Sierra Leone (1961) Singapore (1973) Slovak Republic (1993) Slovenia (1994) Solomon Islands (1994) Somalia South Africa (1948) Sri Lanka (1948) St Kitts and Nevis (1994) St Lucia (1993) St Vincent (1993) Sudan Surinam (1978) Syria Tajikistan Tanzania (1961) Thailand (1982) Togo (1964) Tonga Trinidad & Tobago (1962) Tunisia (1990) Turkey (1951) Turkmenistan Uganda (1962) Ukraine United Arab Emirates (1994) Uruguay (1953) Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela (1990) Vietnam Yemen, Rep of Yugoslavia (1966) Zambia (1982) Zimbabwe (1948) Developing Countries (147) Albania (2000) Algeria Angola (1994) Argentina (1967) Armenia Azerbaizan Bahamas Bahrain (1993) Bangladesh (1972) Belarus Barbados (1967) Belize (1983) Benin (1963) Bermuda (1948) Bhutan Bolivia (1990) Brazil (1948) Bulgaria (1996) Burkina Faso (1963) Burundi (1965) Cambodia Cameroon (1963) Cape Verde Central African Rep (1963) Chad (1963) Chile (1949) China (2001) Colombia (1981) Comoros (1948) Congo, Dem Rep of (1971) Congo, Rep of (1963) Costa Rica (1990) Cote D’ Ivory (1963) Croatia (2000) Cyprus (1963) Czech Republic (1993) Djibouti (1994) Dominica (1993) Dominican Rep (1950) Ecuador (1996) Egypt (1970) El Salvador (1991) Equatorial Guinea Estonia (1999) Ethiopia Fiji (1993) Gabon (1963) Gambia (1965) Georgia (2000) Ghana (1957)