The thai yellow shirts movement as a struggle for class recognition


 Chapter 1: The Yellow Shirts Movement of Thailand 1.1 Introduction On 25 November 2008, supporters and members of the Peopleʼs Alliance for Democracy (PAD) marched to Bangkokʼs Suvarnabhumi International Airport and occupied it. As a result, thousands of tourists were left stranded in the capital of Thailand (Bangkok Post, 26 November 2008). Two days later, Don Mueang International airport was seized as well, bringing air traffic to a complete standstill (The Age, 28 November 2008). For a country with a rich history of social movements1, the PAD movement raised several immediate questions: Why did the Thai middle class2, recognized as supporters of democracy especially after the 1990s demonstration, choose to support a movement that was apparently extra-democratic in nature? What were their motivations for doing so? Were the accusations of corruption in the government the main reason? If so, why did the movement continue even after the fall of Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2006? The PAD movement proved to be different from other social movements in Thailandʼs history in several respects: firstly, despite the 























































 1
 Somchai
 Phatharathananunth
 (2006)
 examined
 the
 struggle
 of
 the
 Small
 Scale
 Farmers’
 Assembly
 of
 Isan
 (SSFAI)
 in
 Northeast
 Thailand
 from
 1993
 to
 2002.
 Consider
 also
 Suthy
 Prasartset
 (1996)
 who
 looked
 at
 Non‐governmental
 Group’s
 (NGOs)
 movements
 in
 Thailand
 since
1969
with
the
establishment
of
the
Thailand
Rural
Reconstruction
Movement
(TRRM),
the
 first
non‐governmental
development
group
in
Thailand.
Jim
Ockey
(2002)
highlights
the
protest
 of
22
January
1956,
arguing
that
the
protest
that
took
to
the
streets
has
been
forgotten
despite
its
 influence
 in
 shaping
 much
 of
 the
 political
 sphere
 in
 Thailand
 for
 a
 couple
 of
 decades
 after
 the
 event
itself.
The
point
is
that
Thailand
has
a
rich
history
of
social
movements
that
spans
over
at
 least
half
a
century,
yet
none
of
them
involved
the
taking
over
of
airports.

 2
 This
 was
 the
 term,
 and
 identity,
 the
 PAD
 movement
 adopted
 for
 itself.
 Here,
 I
 borrow
 its
 connotations
on
their
terms
but
maintain
that
the
term
‘middle
class’
remains
highly
problematic
 and
will
discuss
this
in
further
detail
below.

 
 1
 
 heterogeneity within the PAD (Pye and Schaffar, 2008), a large portion of its support base consists largely of the urban middle class. This differed from the middle class-led movement in May 1992, which has been touted as an epitome of democratization in Thailand (see Hewison, 1996; Ukrist, 2008). Secondly, never has any movement in the countryʼs history resulted in such a drastic political polarization of Thai society. The occupation of Suvarnabhumi airport was merely an episode in a long drawn political conflict between the PAD and the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) that peaked again in April 2010. Empirically, the question of why the Bangkok middle class supported such a movement spills over to an important theoretical question of the relationship between class, democracy and social movements. Thus, this thesis aims to understand the motivation of the ʻmiddle classʼ as well as the significance of this motivation in the recent PAD movement. 1.2 Relevance to Contemporary work(s) Following the 2006 coup dʼétat, work on Thailandʼs political conflicts has been copious (see Kasian, 2006; Giles 2007; Case, 2007; Ockey, 2008a, 2008b; Connors, 2008a; Connors and Hewison, 2008; Pasuk and Baker, 2008b; Pye and Schaffer, 2008; Thongchai, 2008; Ukrist, 2008; Funston, 2009; Kengkij and Hewison, 2009; McCargo, 2009; Montesano, 2009a; Nostitz3, 2009). While these were certainly commendable, there are several 























































 3
 Kevin
 Hewison
 (2010)
 provides
 a
 relatively
 balanced
 review
 of
 Nostitz’s
 book,
 noting
 that
 while
this
written
account
is
“not
scholarly,
[but]
nor
is
it
meant
to
be”
(ibid:
523),
it
is
influential
 enough
 to
 become
 “a
 book
 that
 anyone
 who
 has
 a
 serious
 interest
 in
 Thailand’s
 politics
 should
 have”
(ibid:
525).
It
is
important
to
note
as
well
that,
as
Hewison
highlights,
Nostitz’s
account
is
 
 2
 
 points that ought to be addressed. Firstly, scholars have attempted, directly or indirectly, to answer the important questions of why and how the movement emerged: these explanations revolve around two broader themes of intra-elite struggle and Thaksinʼs corruption. Albritton and Thawildawee (2007: 23), for instance, suggest that Thaksin was seen as competing with the king, by “insinuating himself into ceremonies honouring the 60th year of the kingʼs accession to the throne”. Similarly, Connors (2007: 252) emphasized that the movement was a consequence of Thaksin attempting to replace the “old power group – a network based around the palace, Prem, elements of the Democrat Party, members of prominent establishment families and senior bureaucrats – with his own network of intimates and associates” (see also Giles, 2009b). On the other hand, scholars such as Thitinan (2008: 142) highlighted the “controversies, contradictions, and corruption allegations” of Thaksinʼs administration and how these contributed to the displeasure towards the ex-premier (see also Case, 2007; Connors and Hewison, 2008; Pasuk and Baker, 2008; Pye and Schaffer, 2008; Ukrist, 2008; McCargo, 2009 for more explanations4). While these are not necessarily inaccurate, several questions remain: why should members of the Thai middle class be involved in the movement? What were their motivations? Moreover, if we were to approach these studies 






























































































































































 not
 “an
 entirely
 non‐partisan
 account
 as
 he
 shows
 sympathy
 for
 the
 red‐shirted
 campaigners”
 (ibid:
523).
Nevertheless,
the
attempt
to
capture
the
developments
of
events
places
it
as
one
of
 the
foremost
accounts
on
the
movement
to
date.
 4
 In
 addition
 to
 these
 articles,
 others
 have
 attempted
 to
 offer
 a
 perspective
 that
 focused
 on
 Thaksin’s
mistakes
in
isolating
the
Bangkokians
and
his
policy
mistakes
(see
for
instance
 Kasian,
 2006;
 Connors,
 2007;
 Hewison,
 2008;
 Thitinan,
 2008;
 Montesano,
 2009b).
 Nevertheless,
 I
 maintain
 that
 these
 explanations
 are
 seldom
 divorced
 from
 the
 idea
 of
 a
 conflict
 of
 interests
 between
the
Thai
elites,
such
as
military
leaders
and
the
ex‐prime
minister.

 
 3
 
 from a social movements perspective, as this thesis aims to do, the explanations offered thus far may be construed as strategies of mobilization – more specifically, as “frame alignment”. This still leaves us with the crucial question of why. In addition, the mechanisms of mobilization have also been largely overlooked. More intriguingly, substantive studies on the motivation of the participants and supporters of the Yellow shirts movement have been conspicuously neglected. Studies that come closest to this concern themselves with explaining perceptions of democracy among the Thai middle class (Albritton and Thawilwadee, 2007) or the notion of democracy and good governance (Albritton and Thawilwadee, 2009). Even then, these studies were not specific to the supporters of the Yellow shirts but the ʻmiddle classʼ, or urban Bangkokians, in general. Furthermore, the focus on democracy from the onset, I contend, restricts the viewpoint by which one perceives the phenomenon. In other words, the explicit focus on democracy (see Thitinan, 2009; Kengkij and Hewison, 2009) assumes that the movement had little to do with class interests. 1.3 Statement of Problem & Thesis Statement This brings us to one of this thesisʼs main conceptual contention – that “class” as a concept has been applied in an unproblematized and overgeneralized manner. Many authors, as well as popular media and pundits, have tended to assume and refer to a middle class – usually understood as occupying the ʻmiddleʼ of the socio-economic spectrum (see Diagram 1.1). This understanding, unfortunately, confuses more than it clarifies, especially 
 4
 
 in explaining the PAD movement. Firstly, the PAD supporters are presented as members of the Thai middle class by mainstream media. This has left those who are less attuned to the developments of the movement with the notion that the Thai middle class, as a whole, supports the PAD movement. Secondly, some scholars have been quick to dismiss the Yellow (and Red) shirts movement as a class conflict, arguing that the presence of inter-class alliance among members of both the Yellow and Red shirts negates it from being a simple class conflict (Montesano, 2009a; Nostitz, 2009; Kitti, 2010). These two representations of the PAD supporters have, in turn, placed serious limitations on the conceptualization of the PAD movement as a movement for democracy, or even royalism. I contend that these arguments tend to consider class as an immutable category, in tandem with a Marxian perspective – that is to say, class is seen as a set of fixed categories rather than a dynamic outcome of social and economic processes and conflicts. Moreover, the presence of cross-class alliances does not negate the fact that there are groups of people from similar status contesting for dissimilar interests – an important feature in Frank Parkinʼs notion of “social exclusion”. Perhaps most importantly, in considering class from this Marxian perspective, we are unable to move beyond understanding class as “mere incumbents of positions, or embodiments of systemic forces” (Parkin, 1979: 4). 
 5
 
 Diagram 1.1: Classes in the Marxian perspective In light of this, I argue that a perspective based purely on Marxian assumption and understanding hinders us from appreciating class as a dynamic concept. More importantly, it limits the appreciation of the Yellow shirts movement to a matter of intra-elite conflict, overlooking the significance of the participation of the masses. Following Parkinʼs (ibid: 13) argument that “the relations between classes are to be understood as ʻaspects of the distribution of powerʼ”, this thesis adopts a stance that incorporates both a Marxian and neo-Weberian perspective, suggesting that the movement is an attempt by particular groups of people to secure their interests in response to the social exclusion experienced. It would be more useful then, to think of several groups – or classes – occupying the ʻmiddleʼ stratum of society (see Diagram 1.2). This thesis contends that conceptualization of class in Thailand must take into consideration important issues of (class) interests and status, particularly the interaction between members of different social position. 
 6
 
 Diagram 1.2: Society/social stratum as consisting of several status groups Thus, this thesis is concerned with understanding the motivation behind the involvement of the middle class for a movement, purportedly a result of intra-elite conflict, and how this motivation is appropriated into mobilization “frames” (Benford and Snow, 2000). Accordingly, the principle contention of this thesis is that the PAD movement is not a movement of all ʻmiddle classesʼ in toto, but one aimed at usurping the opportunities and resources had been excluded from groups found in the middle stratum of Thai society. Specifically, the thesis argues that it was Thaksinʼs increasing monopolization of the Thai economic and political sphere, coupled by crucial structural changes brought about by the 2007 economic crisis which led to the exclusion, and marginalization, of the Thai economic middle class. In this respect, the movement ought to be understood in the larger context as an attempt by various groups in Thai society to counter and contest their gradual exclusion by those in power. 
 7
 
 1.4 Contribution to Knowledge In conceptualizing the PAD movement as a manifestation of class conflict – in part but not exclusively – instead of an intra-elite struggle, this thesis positions itself to make the following contributions to existing works on Thai politics and social movements. Firstly, this thesis provides an account of the emergence of the PAD movement from a social movements perspective, a perspective that has been conspicuously missing up till now. Secondly, the neo-Weberian perspective adopted by this thesis allows for a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics between the military, monarchy, and the capitalist groups – key actors in the Thai political sphere – as well as the masses, allowing for the involvement of actors from various social positions in society to be included in this struggle for social, economic and political inclusion. In doing so, I suggest that the occurrences of social movements reflect the process of class formation in Thailand as members from various strata of society attempt to consolidate and solidify their social positions. By taking a perspective that sees emotions as a function of class, and by extension an expression of social relationships, we are able to avoid reifying class and dealing with it in broad, generic terms. Instead, it allows for a more dynamic and robust approach that takes into account the interests and orientations of members of Thai society, and how these are aligned through socio-economic processes, bringing a more nuanced understanding to the notion of class in Thailand. In other words, while the movement may not be exclusively class-based, I maintain that a class perspective allows us to 
 8
 
 appreciate the intricacies of the movement. Finally, by viewing the PAD movement from this perspective, this thesis aims to provide an alternative approach to understanding the precedents leading up to the rise of the Red Shirts in early 2009. It must be made clear here that this thesis does not claim to have uncovered innovative findings per se. The fundamental contribution this thesis aims to make is the provision of an alternate theoretical paradigm to existing explanations. 1.5 Scope of Study This thesis scrutinizes the periods between the coup in September 2006 that ousted Thaksin from power and the election of current Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva in early 2009. This period is also particularly important as it provides us with a sociological and historical context to appreciating the demonstrations of the Red shirts, which reached its peak in May 2010. 1.6 Methodology Given that this thesis aims to understand the motivations behind the supporters and members of the PAD, this study adopts a primarily qualitative approach. In this section, I discuss and justify some of the research methods undertaken in the process of this research. This includes methodological issues of locating and obtaining access to informants who were interviewed, 
 9
 
 as well as a brief discussion on the challenges encountered. The limitations of this study, arising from the methods adopted, will also be outlined briefly. This study adopts both a qualitative methodology and a historical one for three main reasons. Firstly, although a quantitative approach may allow us to have a better perspective on who the participants were – facilitating a broader overview of their identity and social ʻclassʼ – statistics would be unable to provide us with an accurate depiction of the mechanisms behind the workings of the movement. As such, its validity should be critically interrogated. Secondly, qualitative methods are particularly relevant for uncovering and understanding the meanings, especially those attached to the discourses and rhetoric used by the PAD supporters. In other words, a qualitative approach allows the voices of individuals to emerge through their account of their experiences. Finally, because the phenomenon to be studied is a historical one, it is crucial that oral accounts be collected and analyzed to serve as a form of balance to official accounts. This is because such accounts afford us the ability to interrogate official accounts of events available in mainstream media, which are more often than not, influenced by those in power. Methodologically then, this study utilizes two forms of qualitative inquiries – (1) informal, in-depth interviews and (2) rigorous discourse analysis of PADʼs official and supportersʼ websites. Interviews Informants for interviews were purposively sampled for two reasons. First, it allows for the selection of case(s) based on “the basis of their 
 10
 
 relevance to [the] research questions, [the] theoretical position and analytical framework…constructing a sample…which is meaningful theoretically and empirically” (Mason, 2002: 124). This approach entails being critical in the selection of the sample from the general populace. For this study, participants who had been involved actively in the series of protests and demonstration during the peak of the PADʼs movement between 2006 and 2008 were selected. Secondly, due to my position as a foreigner, access to supporters of the Yellow shirts was limited. Hence, I contacted people I knew in Bangkok and requested to conduct an informal, one-to-one interview with them. I also explained my research objectives to them and acknowledged the sensitive nature of my topic, explaining that I would require their help in using the “snowball” sampling technique (Lee, 1993). In total, fifteen informants, aged 24 to 61 (as of 2010), were interviewed over a period of two months. In terms of socio-demographics, the informants fall into the segment between the lower-classes which execute tasks and the dominant classes who hold the decisional power in organizations although some also ran their own (small) business (refer to Table A on vii for a full list of informants and their background). Interviews were conducted in a mixture of Thai and English, with some translation, through the informant(s) who introduced us, on the spot when required. Generally, each interview lasted about an hour, although there was a case where it went up to two hours. Before the commencement of each interview, issues such as informed consent, confidentiality as well as the rights of an informant were made clear to each interviewee. Each interview began with a short self-introduction and 
 11
 
 an explanation of my research objectives. The intention to have the interview recorded for transcribing purposes was stated from the onset as well. One of the biggest methodological limitations arising from qualitative interviews is that these oral accounts, especially when the topic is centered on a past event or occurrence, “tells us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did” (Hong and Huang, 2008: 71, emphasis mine). Thus, while interviews allow for a more balanced perspective, it ought to be cross-examined with official accounts. Consequently, much caution was exercised in taking into account the background of the informant and the influence it may have on their responses. Furthermore, given the nature of the topic – where support for the PAD is almost synonymous with being nationalist or royalist – the possibility for the informant to be defensive for his or her actions and thoughts has to be recognized too. Additionally, Mills (1940: 904) reminds us that “over against inferential conception of motives as subjective ʻspringsʼ of action, motives may be considered as typical vocabularies having ascertainable functions in delimited societal situations. Human actors do vocalize and impute motives to themselves and to others…Rather than fixed elements ʻinʼ an individual, motives are the terms with which interpretation of conduct by social actors proceeds. This imputation and avowal of motives by actors are social phenomena to be explained. The differing reasons men give for their actions are not themselves without reasons.” (emphasis in original) Thus, motives are part of the linguistic tools of an individualʼs self-justification and are best understood as the basics of social rhetoric of verbal action rather than the source of social action in general. In other words, we may not be able to draw a perfect correspondence between motives and actions but it is highly plausible for us to assume that the way in which the respondents articulate 
 12
 
 their views is closely related to their motives and motivation – even if these articulations and motives appear questionable. Despite these caveats, one has to suspend a certain degree of skepticism and recall that this thesis aims to uncover the motivations of those involved. Accordingly, these personal, oral accounts should be supplemented with other empirical sources (Fairburn, 1999) in order to obtain a more holistic picture. Discourse Analysis In this study, newspaper reports and online resources were scrutinized to complement my interview data. Specifically, I analyze the discourses and rhetoric found on websites that propagate and openly support the PAD, as well as newspapers such as The Nation and Bangkok Post. These sources of data are particularly important for it shows how collective sentiments are mobilized and understood by the PAD supporters on an official front. Also, newspapers are a useful source of data in studies of collective action as it allows “more leverage over processual and mechanistic elements in causal explanations” (Earl, et al, 2004: 66). However, newspapers, given their interests, tend to reflect a position that supports the state and, or, its owner(s) (Mullainathan and Shlefier, 2002). Thus, on one hand, while newspapers provide some basic facts, the manner in which it is structured – reflected in the discourse and rhetoric used – influences how the movement, or an event, comes to be perceived and understood. Sources from public websites and 
 13
 
 newspapers then serve as important evidence of the construction and manipulation of images, rhetoric and discourses to mobilize the ʻmiddle classʼ. All in all, the combination of qualitative interviews and discourse analysis not only allows for a close comparison between rhetoric and motivation, the relationship between the two, and also allows for a more holistic construction of the phenomenon. By doing this, we can also uncover and understand the mechanisms and processes beneath the mobilization of the movement. 1.7 Prospectus This thesis is thus organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 is devoted to the discussion of the theoretical framework and concepts used in this thesis. Specifically, it aims to apply the Weberian concept of social closure as a tool to understand the class conflict underlying the PAD movement. In Chapter 3, a historical overview of the Thai political sphere will highlight the strong historical links between the recent coup and the roles key actors play. In demonstrating the contestation between these actors, I contend that there are important historical antecedents in the emergence of the PAD movement. The chapter that follows (Chapter 4) will examine the motivations of some PAD supporters, illustrating the importance of emotions – specifically fear and hope – in motivating and mobilizing support and participation for the PAD. Next, Chapter 5 explicates how these existing emotions are mobilized through discourse of royalism and the demonization of Thaksin. These, I argue, are facilitated by the strategic use of ideological 
 14
 
 resources and communications network. Finally, in Chapter 6, I reiterate this thesisʼ main argument, contributions and limitations before presenting suggestions for future research. 
 15
 
 Chapter 2: Social Closure and Social Movements (in Thailand) 2.1 Introduction This chapter aims to accomplish the following goals. First, it will consider works done on social movements in Thailand, particularly political movements. I contend that there has been a limitation in the way movements in the last two decades of Thai history has been studied and conceptualized as a ʻmiddle classʼ movement. Specifically, I argue that these studies tend to adopt a position where class is understood as set of relatively broad and fixed social relationships revolving only around capital. However, this position limits our understanding of the issue as a class conflict, presenting it as a clash among different classes – in the case of the PAD movement, the ʻurban middle classʼ and the ʻrural poorʼ (see Giles, 2009b). In addition, by postulating that these movements are ʻmiddle classʼ movements, important mechanisms and processes of class formation such as “exclusion” and “usurpation” (Parkin, 1979) are glossed over while the dynamics of interaction between the various groups, as well as their interests5, involved in the movement are neglected. Accordingly, this chapter proposes a Weberian slant, on top of the existing Marxian understanding, so as to better conceptualize the notion of ʻclassʼ in Thai society. To accomplish this, I outline 























































 5
 In this thesis, I employ a Weberian understanding of group interest, which points to the primary motivation of an actor (Swedberg, 2005). This differs from Stern’s (2007) definition of interest groups in Thailand – whereby Stern identifies interest groups as having the following characteristics: (1) a well-defined organization with members formally allied towards clearly expressed goals; (2) not related to the legislature or executive branch and having no intention to join them; (3) an organization not related to the government; (4) having some level of activity in the process of formulating, approving and/or implementing public policies.

 
 16
 
 Marxʼs conception of class and its usefulness in explaining social movements but maintain that a perspective incorporating both Marxian and Weberian perspectives on class is more beneficial for making sense of the movement at hand. In other words, while the Marxian perspective allows us to account for the economic dimension, a Weberian perspective privileges the dynamic cultural processes of class formation. Together, I argue that these perspectives allow for a more dynamic understanding of the phenomenon. This chapter, then, draws on Frank Parkinʼs (1979) notion of “social closure as exclusion and usurpation” and attempts to offer an explanation rooted in a Weberian understanding of class. In short, it emphasizes an analytical framework centered around an understanding of social closure as the dynamic struggle between forces of exclusion and monopolization on the one hand and the forces of usurpation and opportunity hoarding on the other. This would allow us to appreciate the movement as more than a push for democracy but as a movement that emerged as a consequence of social exclusion. In other words, a contest for opportunities lays the foundation for the displeasure and fear felt by the ʻmiddle classʼ. This in turn, sets the stage for their mobilization. In addition, I argue that it is these common emotions that unite the various groups in the ʻmiddle classʼ, resulting in what we have come to recognize – that the PAD movement is a ʻmiddle classʼ one. This chapter maintains that the notion of class must remain a dynamic one, especially in the study of social movements in Thailand (and elsewhere). Therefore, the principal theoretical contention this chapter aims to make remains as this: the recent Yellow shirts movement is a consequence of an 
 17
 
 attempt by contesting groups in Thai society to secure their own interests in response to the social closure experienced. Finally, this chapter will go on to survey existing literature on social movements in general and introduce us to the dominant perspectives and discussion in social movement literature. Effectively, leading theories on social movements not only explain the conditions under which movements emerge (political opportunity structure), how they are organized and mobilized (resource mobilization theory), but also attempts to account for participantsʼ involvement (grievances and relative deprivation). In outlining these theories, I lay out the theoretical tools I utilized in accounting for the mechanisms behind the emergence of the PAD movement. 2.2 Surveying the Literature: Social Movements in Thailand Studies on the social movements in Thailand can be classified into two broad categories. The first, in line with social movement literature, is concerned with what has come to be associated with the middle class: “new social movements”. The term ʻnew social movementsʼ was used to describe a diverse range of campaigns that championed a variety of causes – such as student movements (see for instance Rootes, 1980; Burg, 1998; Boren, 2001), gay (see Smith, 1999) and environmentalist (see also Albrecht, 1972, Gale, 1986) movements – or movements with interests that were not directly political or economical. These ʻnewʼ movements saw its social base coming together from a basis other than class – such as gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity or age. Another common feature among these movements was that 
 18
 
 they sought to establish some form of identity, lifestyle or were aiming to assert rights of the individual instead of the “proletarian revolution associated with classical Marxism” (Buechler, 1995: 442) of the ʻold social movementsʼ. More importantly, there appears to be an “elective affinity” (ibid: 456) between new social movements and the middle class. In the context of Thailand, antidams movements (Kanokrat, 2003), environmental movements (Forsyth, 2001, 2007), movements involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Suthy, 1996; Hirsch, 1997; Naruemon, 2002; Somchai 2002, 2006; Giles, 2009a) and religious movements (Mackenzie, 2007) constitute the main foci of these studies. The second category of work on Thai social movements revolves around political ones6 - more specifically, how the middle class advanced democracy. This branch of studies has emphasized two themes: (1) the importance of the Thai middle class in bringing about democratization (Robison, 1995; Robison and Goodman, 1996; Anek, 1997; Surin, 1997; Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001; Kengkij and Hewison, 2009) while paying attention to the socio-economic context in which the movement emerged (Robison, 1995; Robison and Goodman, 1996); and (2) the role of the middle class in relation to other actors in society (Surin, 1997; Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001). While these illustrate the importance of historical antecedents, structural conditions contributing to the emergence of the recent PAD movement and the significance of networks in these movements, there 























































 6
Here,
I
borrow
generously
from
Tilly
and
Tarrow’s

(2006)
definition
that
a
movement
becomes
 political
when
it
involves
agents
of
governments.
In
the
case
of
social
movements,
the
state
often
 takes
the
role
of
either
the
opposition
against
which
the
movement
is
challenging
or
an
actor
the
 movement
is
trying
to
win
over.
 
 19
 
 appears to be an important conceptual limitation: “class” as a concept has been applied in an unproblematized and over-generalized manner. For instance, the middle class has tended to be defined in terms of income and occupational status (Girling, 1981; Robison, 1995; Robison and Goodman, 1996). I argue that this perspective not only reifies class but presupposes that the movement is a quest for democracy instead of a consequence of a struggle for social position. In attempting to understand the middle class based on purely economic factors, the relational aspect of social stratification is overlooked. Simply put, a Marxian conception of class (over)emphasizes the material and neglects the notion that oneʼs position is defined, or understood, in relation to others in that society. Scholars have been quick to contest the notion of the PAD movement as a class conflict, noting the presence of inter-class alliance among members of the Yellow shirts (Montesano, 2009a; Nostitz, 2009; Kitti, 2010). However, I contend that such arguments are premised on the notion that class is an immutable category. That is to say, it is contingent on socio-economic measurements, or the Marxist idea of “haves” and “haves-not”. Nonetheless, such a disclaimer hardly allows us to move beyond understanding class as “mere incumbents of positions, or embodiments of systemic forces” (Parkin, 1979: 4). Furthermore, the presence of cross-class alliances does not negate the fact that there are groups of people from similar status contesting for dissimilar interests. Instead, I argue that such a perspective hinders us from appreciating class as a dynamic concept. Above all, it limits the appreciation of the Yellow shirts movement to a matter of intra-elite conflict. Hence, I 
 20
 
 propose and alternative to the conceptualization of class in Thailand that may be more useful and pertinent. 2.3 The Thai ʻMiddle Classʼ A key concept that this thesis aims to address is that of the ʻmiddle classʼ, specifically in Thailand. Often conceptualized in terms of occupational class and income level (see Girling, 1981), I contend that this perspective, while effectual, is limited in allowing for a clearer approach to understanding the PAD movement. In conceptualizing ʻclassʼ along lines such as occupation and income level, ʻclassʼ, both as a concept and a social institution, is reified (see Brubaker, 2005). In other words, to call the PAD movement a ʻmiddle classʼ movement is to replicate the rhetoric and notion of class, defined along material lines. With this in mind, this thesis proposes a perspective that views emotions as a function of class. That is to say, instead of defining the participants and supporters of the PAD movements as members of the ʻmiddle classʼ on account of their socio-economic background, this thesis proposes that these people belong to a similar social position, identified as the ʻmiddle classʼ, because of the common emotions they experience and display. Emotions allow us to understand where oneʼs position is in any social relationship. This means that the social position an individual finds himself, or herself, in may affect the extent to which s/he feels a particular emotion. For example, the less well off may feel a sense of anger towards those who are richer than them. Underlying this contention is the notion of power relations 
 21
 
 and dynamics. This argument has its theoretical roots in Barbaletʼs (2002: 4) contention that emotions arise from the “structure of relations of power and status in which [people] are implicated”, or it is in social relationships that emotions lie. For instance, if one has insufficient power in a relationship, one would more likely experience fear. Similarly, in a case of racism, the emotions of anger and hatred stems from power dynamics rather than simply income or wealth. This is to say that oneʼs structural position is not restricted to social class alone. This would allow us to approach the emotions evoked as more than a matter of socio-economic inequality as well. More importantly, by looking at emotions, we are better able to appreciate the actual social position of an actor. This is because one may possess economic wealth but lacks political power. In this case, s/he is still susceptible to the emotion of fear, in relation to those who hold the power in society. Kemperʼs (1978) work on emotion also sheds light on the notion that people sharing homologous structural positions may experience common emotions. Essentially, individuals, in their relationships with others who occupy similar social situation, contribute to “the feelings of the group qua group” (Barbalet, 2002: 5). In short, emotions tell us the social position one is in relation to others in the same society. Instead of confining them to an immutable category resting on socio-economic factors, emotions allow us to adopt a relational perspective to social class. Thus, I have attempted to categorize and conceptualize the participants and supporters of the PAD through a perspective grounded in emotions. 
 22
 
 With these in mind, I propose then, that a ʻclassʼ can also be understood as a group of people who experiences similar emotions, or group emotions7, as a consequence of structural relations of power and status. Unfortunately, ʻmiddle classʼ as a concept, and term, is an insufficient, yet necessary, expression to capture the nuanced and complex nature of a group of people occupying a specific social class and position. For the purpose of differentiation, in accordance with occupational and income categorization, people with professional occupation and small businesses shall be referred to in this thesis as the “economic middle class8”. Accordingly, this thesis borrows and retains the concept of the ʻmiddle classʼ but employs it with the following understanding: in this thesis, the “affective middle class” refers to the group of people, occupying similar social locations, who has been excluded and, hence, display group emotions of fear and hatred arising from the exclusion. It is necessary to address and discuss a crucial critique of using emotions to understand and define class. Emotions can, and often do, originate from material reasons; it would seem fallacious then, to be emphasizing a perspective that de-emphasizes the material aspect. However, I maintain that emotions remain an important indicator of class and social position because it allows us to better determine the actual status of an individual in a particular society. As we shall see, in Chapter 4, material and economic wealth does not always translate into power in society. Emotions 























































 7
Here
I
borrow
Kemper’s
(2002:
62)
idea
that
by
“group
emotion”
refers
to
a
situation
whereby
 “some
aggregate
of
individuals
is
feeling
something
that
is
sufficiently
alike
to
be
identified
as
the
 common
emotion
of
that
aggregate”.
 8
 This
term
is
used
here
to
refer
to
the
very
group
that
other
authors
have
been
looking
at.
By
 adding
the
“economic”
prefix,
I
hope
to
draw
a
distinction
between
the
middle
class
defined
and
 recognized
 by
 economic
 indicators,
 and
 those
 that
 are
 identified
 based
 on
 the
 emotions
 they
 display.
 
 23
 
 thus allow us to appreciate the overlap between socio-economic status and the corresponding, or lack of, power. In other words, by focusing on the emotions displayed, we may be able to better locate the social position of an individual who may possess wealth but lacks political voice in society, giving us a more nuanced understanding of social class and position. Again, this thesis is not arguing for a stance that negates a material understanding and definition of class. Rather, it aims to broaden this conception and advocates a perspective that takes into consideration the underlying social interactions and relations. 2.4 Class and Social Movements – Insights from Marx, Weber and Parkin Here, it is useful to revisit existing arguments on Yellow shirts movement as well as important theoretical perspectives on class. As mentioned, works on the Yellow shirts movement tended to begin with the premise that it is a movement with a ʻmiddle classʼ social base (see Pye and Schaffer, 2008; Kengkij and Hewison, 2009). Attempts to define the Thai ʻmiddle classʼ has been made (see Girling, 1981; Ockey, 1992; Surin, 1997; LoGerfo, 2000; Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001) but these have often embraced a conception of the ʻmiddle classʼ based on the notion that the structure and foundation of social stratification is defined by the ownership of property or means of production. In other words, to see the ʻmiddle classʼ as “executives and professionals…clerks and shopkeepers chiefly outside the government bureaucracy and many with specialized skills” (Prudhisan and 
 24
 
 Chantana, 2001: 263-264) is to adopt the Marxian understanding of class in terms of property and means of production. 2.4.1 Marx – Class, Revolution and Social Movements For Marx, society is structured around the central notion of ownership of property and the means of production. Those who own the means of production he called the capitalists, or the bourgeoisie, and those who did not, the proletariats. Due to their contradictory interests, these two groups were conceived as having an antagonistic relationship. This became the basis of Marxʼs famous thesis on the proletarian revolution – and also the model for classical social movements. However, it is important to recognize that this conception of class is a relational one. That is to say, the capitalist class only exists in relation to the proletariat class. This leads us to an important question of groups found in the ʻmiddleʼ, between the capitalists and proletariats. Marx identifies this third major group as the petty bourgeoisie, or the middle class – people who own some property but lack control over labour. In Marxʼs view, with the development of capitalism, this class was expected to disappear as its successful members moved into the bourgeoisie class while those who were not would become part of the working class. Importantly, Marx conceived the middle class as a group that sought to preserve their private property but often had conflicting interests to the bourgeoisie (see Giddens, 1971; Giddens and Held, 1982; Bottomore, 1983). It is evident from this that most works on social movements, especially political movements, in the Thai context tend to privilege the Marxian 
 25
 
 perspective – as highlighted, these explanations have a propensity to see the middle class in terms of ownership of capital. However, I argue while this perspective has its strengths, it has the consequence of reifying class, limiting the advancement of us understanding the movement from a more sociological perspective. This Marxian perspective has also led to the prevalent explanation that the movement is about a selected group of elites9 – for instance, military leaders such as General Prem (Ukrist, 2008; Tongchai, 2008) – mobilizing the masses to overthrow a corrupt politician. At best, explanations from this standpoint offer us insights to the strategies employed by the Yellow shirts leadership in rallying support for its cause. At worse, it leaves us wondering why these educated ʻmiddle classʼ should willingly “buy” into the rhetoric and discourse espoused by the leaders of the movement without any substantial justification. Thus, to appreciate the movement as more than a group of people led by elites exercising their ideological power, I propose that it may be useful to incorporate a Weberian perspective so as to further appreciate this issue. 2.4.2 Weber – Class, Interest, Status Groups and Social Closure While Marx saw society as consisting of two primary, conflicting groups determined by property ownership and means of production, Weber (1978; 























































 9
Some examples of elites are military, religious and political leaders. They may possess power and may exercise some form of rule, but for Marx, control of the economy or capital determines who dominates or are dominated. Thus, the dominant class would be the class own or control the means of production or property. An elite may have power, but may only be able to exercise it if they controlled of the means of production in the hands of owners (Giddens,
1971;
Giddens
and
Held,
1982;
 Bottomore,
1983). 
 
 26
 
 Gerth and Mills, 1958), however, saw classes and social groups being connected within the sphere of power and attached to the important notion of the distribution of power. For Weber, multiple overlapping dimensions of wealth, power and prestige determine social stratification. In fact, “the term ʻclassʼ refers to any group of people that is found in the same class situation” (Gerth and Mills, 1958:181), or simply put, people who display similar lifestyle patterns, occupational class and who enjoy similar prestige and privilege constitute members of the same class. In addition, Weber argues that there are three features of class: economic interest, life chances and markets (Weber, 1978; Gerth and Mills, 1958). In this thesis, the concept of interest is especially useful for not only does it “create[s] ʻclassʼ” (Weber, 1978: 928), but it is among the “most fundamental and universal components” of human behaviour (ibid: 601). Furthermore, “…the concept of divergent sectional ʻinterestsʼ cannot be limited to economic interests, but must be extended to other spheres of social life. Thus political parties, for example, have interests which derive from their situation as aspirants to, or as wielders of, power, and such interests do not necessarily rest upon shared class situations” (Giddens, 1971: 195). In other words, class, from a Weberian perspective, is one way by which society is stratified. Class does not necessarily correspond with status, however. Thus, this thesis emphasizes status honour as the more consequential concept on which society is stratified. The concept of status groups – defined by the specific lifestyle shared by members of the group – is especially relevant for it not only make up the social order, but are determined by the distribution of social honour. Rather than rely on economic indicators, 
 27
 
 such as income, occupation and assets, in stratifying society, status groups considers non-economic qualities as well. This includes political power. In short, status groups allow us to integrate social, economic and political power into determining oneʼs social position. Weber states that membership in these status groups take several forms, including kinship, education and religion. I add to this by proposing that the display of group emotions constitutes another form of identifier for class, as argued above. A more significant and crucial point for this thesis is that entry into these status groups is often restricted, or as Weber calls it, there is social closure. 2.4.3 Parkin - “Social Closure as Exclusion and Usurpation” Weberʼs notion of social closure has been elaborated on by Frank Parkin who conceptualizes this process as an exclusionary relationship in which “social collectivities seek to maximize rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles…securing for itself a privileged position at the expense of some other group through a process of subordination.” (Parkin, 1979: 44-45; see also Parkin, 1974). Parkin also notes that, any group attribute may be emphasized for “the monopolization of specific, usually economic opportunities. This monopolization is directed against competitors who share some positive or negative characteristics; its purpose is always the closure of social and economic opportunities to outsiders” (ibid; emphasis in original). However, this exclusionary process is only one side of the coin. Just as dominant groups seek to exclude others in order to preserve their advantage, groups who have been dispossessed will also attempt to amass opportunities for themselves (see Tilly, 1998). In doing so, Parkin suggests that groups in 
 28
 
 such an outsider position will mount “usurpationary actions” with “the aim of biting into the resources and benefits accruing to dominant groups in society” (ibid: 74). For Parkin, usurpationary closure tends to rely on the public mobilization of members and supporters, as in the use of strikes, demonstrations, sit-ins, marches…and the like” (ibid). 2.5 Social Closure and the People Alliance for Democracy This notion of social closure as usurpation is particularly relevant and appropriate in the re-conceptualization of the PAD movement. For one, it presents the movement as more than just a political movement concerned with democracy but also accounts for the involvement of members from all social statuses in Thai society. A fundamental idea behind Parkinʼs social closure as usurpation revolves around the interests of social groups and their active attempts in re-appropriating opportunities that had been excluded from them. Thus, a perspective consisting of Weber and Parkinʼs concepts allow us to re-conceptualize the PAD movement as more than an elite struggle, a middle class movement, or even a campaign for democracy. Instead, we can now approach the phenomenon not only as a social movement, but more importantly, a manifestation of class conflict. The difference lies in the idea that this conflict is not one characterized by class as a structural position but an interaction and contestation among social groups in Thai society. In addition, this conceptual framework fits into the overarching social movement perspective, serving as an incentive for mobilization. This will be discussed in greater detail in the chapters to come. For now, I maintain that both 
 29
 
 conceptions of social closure – exclusion and usurpation – are particularly apposite in the case of Thailandʼs political history and context. 2.6 Social Movements Theories: Tools of Analysis Having looked at the overarching theoretical framework around which this thesis bases its argument, let us now consider other relevant ʻtoolsʼ that allow for a holistic understanding of the emergence of social movements. 2.6.1 Resource Mobilization Theory The resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) essentially argues that the success of a movement depended on the resources available and the ability to mobilize these resources (see also Kent, 1982; Kerbo, 1982; Jenkins, 1983). In other words, the strategies involved in making a movement succeed and demanding a change in government policies or legislation was the main object of study instead of why the movements took place. Resource mobilization theorists argued that because grievances existed everywhere, understanding grievances in the emergence of social movements was unable to explain participation, or are at least of secondary importance (Opp, 1988). As a result, resource mobilization emerged as a form of complementary theory based on the assumption that social movements were a consequence of grievances or relative deprivation (ibid). However, the biggest limitation of this theory lies in its inadequacy in explaining the factors behind the emergence and development of all kinds of 
 30
 
 social movements as well as the form these movements come to take (Perrow, 1979; Kerbo, 1982). 2.6.2 Political Opportunity Following after the resource mobilization tradition, the political opportunity perspective contented that the success or failure of movements are dependent on the opportunities available. This perspective built upon the resource mobilization theory by pointing to the significance of external circumstances in providing sufficient openings, or opportunities, to allow mobilization. It sought to emphasize that “activists do not choose goals, strategies, and tactics in a vacuum” (Meyer, 2004: 127). Rather, the political context, or environment, provides an important backdrop against which grievances emerged and are mobilized to the advantage of the movement. For instance, if the regime is strong and repressive, the political opportunity is smaller and a movement is likely to fail, or may not emerge at all. Proponents of this school accorded less attention to the resources available, but concentrated on the interaction between the movement and the state, or other forms of established power (ibid). However, as Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275) warn, “the concept of political opportunity structure is…in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment”. Other opponents of this perspective (see Goodwin and Jasper, 2003) also argue that it accords too much credit to the environment and structures, overlooking the importance of agency. More importantly, the political opportunity argument “actually explains too little, offering only a 
 31
 
 mechanistic understanding of social movements that does not apply to many cases” (Meyer, 2004: 126). 2.6.3 Grievances, Relative Deprivation Theory and Emotions Missing from the previous perspectives, and taken for granted by resource mobilization theorists, is the important idea of motivation behind the participation. The relative deprivation theory sought to explain this by positing that the “perceived discrepancy between expectations and reality” (Gurney and Tierney, 1982: 34) leads to collective action. As mentioned, resource mobilization theorists assume that the motivation behind activism lies in grievances. However, the question of how these grievances originate is often unresolved (Opp, 1988). Similarly, as Gurney and Tierney (1982: 37) note, relative deprivation is a “necessary but not sufficient cause” of social movements and that little attention is devoted to the emergence of this relative deprivation itself and how this is translated into collective action. This perspective also overlooks the dynamics of group organization and mobilization and fails to explain how feelings of relative deprivation are translated into collective action (Kent, 1982: 530). Finally, this school of thought is unable to explicate why “the social conditions of relative deprivation have failed to mobilize larger sectors of the population” (Maheu, 1995: 3). Along the similar line, it was Hochschild (1983) who reoriented the focus of scholars towards the role and importance of emotions in the discipline. This re-orientation has had a significant impact on scholars of social movements. For one, Barbalet (2002: 3) notes, emotions offer “instant 
 32
 
 evaluation of circumstances and influence the disposition of the person for a response to those circumstances”. What this meant for social movements studies was that crucial concepts such as political opportunities, mobilizing structures and frames had to take into serious consideration the role of emotion. Political opportunity structures, for instance, emphasizes the combination of environmental and grievances, or emotions, in accounting for the emergence of movements. On the other hand, concepts such as frame alignment (Snow and Benford, 1988) highlights the cultural processes such as the definition of a social problem and a way to solve it. More specifically, it is the “motivational framing” (ibid) – which encourages people to get involved – that has the most to do with emotions for it is what “gets people to actually do something” (Goodwin, et al, 2001). All in all, it is especially useful to integrate the above-mentioned theories in explaining and accounting for the emergence, growth and sustainability of any social movements. 2.7 Conclusion: A Case of Social Closure This chapter suggests that a neo-Weberian perspective is particularly useful in viewing the movement as consisting of groups contesting for their own interests. Instead of identifying the participants of the Yellow shirts as members of a generic ʻmiddle classʼ, this approach allows us to see them as a heterogeneous group, or more accurately, the expressions of group emotions allow us to perceive these groups as occupying similar structural positions, and the emergence of that PAD movement as a contestation for competing 
 33
 
 interests. In short, the principle contention of this thesis is that the Yellow shirt movement is a consequence of exclusionary social closure which led to groups situated within the ʻmiddle classʼ to mobilize, around the expression of similar emotion, in a usurpationary manner so as to secure their interests. The next chapter outlines the important historical developments in the Thai political sphere and illustrates the processes of both social closure as exclusion and usurpation throughout its rich history. This will allow us to better appreciate the suitability of this particular framework which views the movement as a manifestation of class conflict. 
 34
 
 Chapter 3: Social Closure in Thailandʼs History 3.1 Introduction Political conflict in Thailand has been marked by “factional infighting among elites” (Patit, 2010: 117) since 1932 but has recently been recognized as largely ʻmiddle classʼ led. However, not only does this emphasis on the ʻmiddle classʼ produce a distorted image of a homogenous ʻclassʼ, it also downplays the significance of other – albeit more elite – actors in these movements. The most recent coup in 2006 has brought the attention back to these actors – namely the military, the monarchy and the economic elites10. Yet, analyses of these actorsʼ involvement has centered on the discourse of democracy and corruption. Again, I argue that social movements in Thailand, particularly political movements, have less to do with social class and democracy than it has to do with social groups contesting their gradual economic, political and social exclusion by the Thai state. More specifically, this chapter highlights the historicity of Thailandʼs social movement as a dynamic interaction between groups who have been excluded and their attempt to usurp control, thereby contextualizing and conceptualizing the PAD movement in the broader political milieu. In light of this, this chapter has two aims: first, I outline the development of the Thai political sphere and highlights significant movements that have shaped the political landscape. Concurrently, I identify the prominent groups involved and trace their roles in the narrative of Thailandʼs 























































 10
This
term
is
not
entirely
unproblematic.
For
one,
it
does
not
draw
a
clear
distinction
between
 the
new
middle
class
that
emerged
in
the
last
half
a
century
and
the
older,
traditional
elites.

 
 35
 
 social movements. Next, in constructing an account that demonstrates the historical antecedents, this chapter aims to delineate the interplay between the major actors and draws a historical link to the recent movement. Secondly, this chapter seeks to acquaint the reader with an adequate understanding of its development by sketching the progress of the Yellow shirts movement, laying the ground work for the analysis of the mechanisms behind its emergence in the later chapters of this thesis. In the previous chapter, I have sought to re-conceptualize the phenomenon as an issue of groups contesting for their interests instead of a class or intra-elite conflict – both of which, I argue, are inadequate, in and of themselves, to sufficiently accounting for cross-class alliances among the Yellow shirts as well as accounting for the participation of the people. Accordingly, in outlining the developments of the recent Yellow shirts movement, this chapter contends that the Yellow shirts movement is a contemporary manifestation of historically embedded struggles for power and recognition. In addition, this chapter maintains that the history of political conflict in Thailand is characterized by the struggle for dominance and recognition by groups of actors occupying dissimilar social positions while attempting to secure similar interests. 3.2 Thailandʼs Political History 3.2.1 1930s – 1950s: Fall of Absolute Monarchy and the Reign of the Military The fall of absolute monarchy at the start of the 1930s paved the way for a political sphere that been characterized by the frequent involvement of 
 36
 
 the military, coup dʼétats and the wrestling of power between the army and the state. Led by a group of Western-educated military officers and civilian bureaucrats (Leow, 2002), the absolute monarchy was overthrown in the name of democracy (Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001) and came to bolster the political and economic power of Bangkok (Glassman, 2010). The succeeding regime, ironically, was dominated by the military until 1937 (Leow, 2002). The royalists did not remain silent, however, following the fall of the absolute monarchy. In fact, they fought for a monarch11 with as much power as possible within the framework of democracy, albeit with little success (Thongchai, 2008). Yet by 1938, the military was, more or less, in full control and began introducing authoritarian policies, this time under the leadership of Plaek Phibunsongkhram (Hewison, 1996). The eventual defeat of the royalists in the late 1930s meant that the monarchy as an institution had to remain in a position that was “above” – meaning “beyond, out of, high and away” from – politics (Thongchai, 2008: 15), a position it was made to adopt since June 1932. Overall, the fall of the monarchy ushered in a new economic and political era for Thailand. By the end of the 1930s, Thailand had a wellestablished “commercialization, monetization, and commodification of the economy” despite not having a full-fledge capitalist system (Hewison, 2006: 83). This paved the way for the eventual emergence of the domestic capitalists. However, this did not mean that the monarchy was divorced from the state or the Thai political scene totally, as we shall see later. 























































 11
In
Tongchai
Winichakul’s
talk
entitled
“Thailand’s
Crisis
and
the
Rise
of
Asia”,
delivered
on
7
 June
2011,
he
made
the
distinction
between
monarchy
–
which
he
defined
as
the
“network
 monarchy”
(McCargo,
2005)
–
and
monarch
–
referring
to
King
Bhumibol.
In
this
thesis,
I
borrow
 these
definitions
as
well
to
differentiate
the
various
actors.
Specifically,
in
this
thesis
“monarch”
 refers
to
HM
King
Bhumibol
and
“monarchy”
refers
to
the
institution.

 
 37
 
 The fear of a growing Chinese-dominated business class, coupled with the potential threat to sovereignty, led Phibun to see this group as a serious threat to the Thai nation-state (Ramsay, 2001). As a result, Phibun adopted a “nationalist clientalism” (ibid: 61) approach to address this concern. Apart from closing down Chinese-language schools and the mandatory taking of Thai names by Chinese in Thailand, anti-Chinese economic policies were imposed as well (Ramsay, 2001). By the end of World War II, the culminated effects of the world depression which forced many Western businesses to withdraw from the country, left the Sino-Thais with even more economic influence (ibid) while Thailandʼs economy fell behind the rest of Southeast Asia. The economic surplus remained in the hands of a small group of economic elites – including the Sino-Thai businessmen as well as the “old nobility, tiny new segment of businessmen, professionals and officials” (Pasuk and Baker, 2008a). Comprising a small proportion of Thai population, this group of elites came to take firm control of Thai economy, controlling the financial and industrial sectors (Hewison, 1993). Due to the prevailing animosity towards the Chinese, this group did not, or could not, as a ʻclassʼ, “effectively or adequately control the state and its apparatuses” as the economic and political condition limited the growth of this group after World War (Turton, 1984: 29). The enmity left this group fairly small, limiting their wealth as well as political influence (Anderson, 1990). With the military government in charge, little protection was given to domestic capital as business families had to subject themselves to the patronage of political leaders in order to negotiate individual protection (Pasuk and Baker, 2008a). 
 38
 
 The Phibun regime, rising to power after a series of internal strife within the military, eventually faced challenges in the 1956 when thousands took to the streets. Marching from Sanam Luang to the parliament and later to Phibunʼs residence, the movement advocated constitutional reform in reaction to the regimeʼs authoritarian policies. This incident was touted as a victory for democracy for it signaled that the people were ready to exercise their views and political power (see Ockey, 2002). The immediate context of the protest was that Phethai Chotinuchit, an opposition MP, accused the government for having never “been for the people” (Ockey, 2002: 110) and called for the dissolution of the government, the elimination of appointed MPs and the transitional provisions of the constitution. While Phibun was to remain in power for two more years, General Sarit, with the support of students, the monarchy and the Democrat Party, carried out a coup that finally removed Phibun from power in 195712 (ibid). On one hand, this event was to be, in Thakʼs (1978) opinion, the most important event in the revitalization of the monarchy as it not only marked the removal of the men behind the 1932 revolution but also meant that Sarit, one of the first leaders since 1932 to consistently and consciously build up the monarchyʼs prestige, was back in a prominent position. This relationship between the monarch and the government, at this time, was on several levels a mutually beneficial one. The king, concerned about the threat of communism and anti-royalist opinions, allied himself to the military and 























































 12
Sarit
was
seen
as
having
cynically
manipulated
public
opinion
through
his
criticism
of
“dirty
 elections”
and
then
installed
a
regime
that
did
away
with
most
of
the
political
system
completely
 (Thak,
1978).
 
 39
 
 demonstrated this visibly – dressing in military uniform and adopting the role of the natural leader of the military for instance. While this brought the king and the royal family positive exposure and reinforced its status in Thai society, the military also gained legitimacy from the royal support. The military reciprocated by incessantly promoting the royal family through the celebration of its deeds and highly publicized events (see also Handley, 2006; Hewison, 2008). On the other hand, the fall of Phibun also ushered in a period of the most repressive regime led by the military (see Ockey, 2004). Sarit installed a regime that claimed legitimacy by capitalizing on the notion of authoritarianism in Thai political culture (ibid). At the same time, the harsh repression of opposition and management of politics became the primary concern of the Sarit regime instead of economic growth (Hewison, 1996). Throughout this period, the Chinese business class, perhaps still struggling with the prevailing hostility against them, remained small and lacked substantial political influence (Anderson, 1990). Yet, the impact of globalization had a spillover effect of uninterrupted growth for Thailand for approximately four decades after this period (Hewison, 2002a; 2006). 3.2.2 1960s – 1971: The Rise of the Business group and the Democratization of Thailand With the influx of foreigners and accompanying investment, Thailand began experiencing economic growth and unprecedented modernization in the 1960s (Surin, 1997). The resultant economic growth drastically changed the socio-demographic conditions of Thai society, posing challenges to the authoritarian regime (Ockey, 2004). Large-scale migration from the rural 
 40
 
 regions to the city meant that political attitudes became more diverse, as a wider spectrum of political views emerged. Furthermore, economic development and the Vietnam War introduced both foreigners as well as Thais returning to Thailand with new perspectives and attitudes into the country. As the economy developed, the demand for education grew alongside the expansion of the middle-class that had emerged as a result of the economic boom (Ockey, 2004; see also Hewison, 1996 and Robison and Goodman, 1996). These changes meant that politics could not remain authoritarian for long, as the capitalists rode on the new economic wave and capitalized on the governmentʼs policy and developed various industries. The open economy was also “beneficial to democratization” as it threatened to subvert authoritarian repression of democratic ideals (Anek in Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001). As the economy opened up, the new Thai middle class, emergent from the growing economy, joined private corporations or became entrepreneurs instead of joining the civil service as they had previously done. This departure from government employment, couple with the liberalization of Thailandʼs economy strengthened both the middle class and bourgeoisie class, paving the way for the alliance between these classes in the 1980s. Overall, the development and growth of the economy furthered the cause of the capitalists through the economic expansion as well as the political influence of the business group, securing further protection from the state. This alliance also brought material advantage to the people (Surin, 1997) but state policies remained somewhat repressive in the light of anti-communist sentiments (Hewison, 1996). This 
 41
 
 was also partly due to the succession of the premiership by Thanom Kittikachorn, appointed to power after Saritʼs death in 1963 (The Nation, 1 March 2007), who sought to consolidate his power. International pressure began to take its toil as well. Criticisms of Thailand being a corrupt nation run by dictators led the king, who was concerned about the international image of the country, to push for a more democratic from of governance – one that kept the military in control and introduced a weak parliament (Handley, 2006) – at the end of the 1960s. By the turn of the decade, the influence of the capitalists had grown, gaining ground in economic policy-making and becoming politically independent and assertive. The relationship between the state and capital was now forced to find a new balance while taking into account the socio-demographic changes in Thai society (Surin, 1997). At the same time, the military appeared to be testing the kingʼs authority when it killed off the parliament the king had pushed for three years earlier in 1968. This incident demonstrated the extent to which the monarch had actually cared about democracy – for “while the king had pushed for constitution in 1968, he ʻdid little to enhance the legitimacy and status of the elected parliament, participant politics…or the institutions created to implement Thai-style democracy…leaving the parliament exposed and vulnerable to…the militaryʼ” (Morell, 1974 in Hewison, 2008: 197). This lack of response from the king sent an important signal to the military, and the rest of the society: that while the king apparently supports democracy, he views it as “corrupt, disorderly and messy”, showing support for military intervention when necessary (Hewison, 2008: 197). 
 42
 
 3.2.3 The 1970s: Political Contestations Up till the end of the 1960s, the military, monarchy and the business ʻclassʼ had experienced several forms of exclusion, largely as a consequence and result of socio-economic developments in the region. Nevertheless, the relationship between these historic actors has only gotten more entwined as each attempt to secure economic and political power through various means. The domination of the military and the monarchy, as well as its supporters, in the political sphere had begun to accommodate the rise of the capitalists who had been in control of the economy, effectively sharing a piece of the pie with them. While this tripartite relationship has achieved a dedicate balance, it was in the early 1970s that the scale was tipped, paving the way for an era of social movements that sought to exclude one or more party, with the other attempting to usurp power and gain access to the exclusive political and economic spheres. The 1973 student-led movement was an attempt to overthrow the Thanom-led regime that had been in power since 1963 (see Leow, 2002 and Anderson, 1990). Having endured the authoritarian policies of the military-led regime for most of the forty years since the decline of the absolute monarchy, this move towards democracy demonstrated how the exclusion of the new ʻmiddle classʼ has come to be seen in the attempts of usurpationary actions, usually undertaken by the marginalized and excluded. More importantly, it redefined the domain of politics in Thailand, shaping the development of a civil society that would become one of the most active and dynamic in the region. The impetus behind the 1973 movement was the demand for an 
 43
 
 immediate “promulgation of a new democratic constitution” (Neher, 1975:1103). The implications of such a proliferation of democracy meant not only a conceding of power by those in power but also the adoption of liberaldemocratic agenda – including an autonomous parliamentary system, safeguarding of human rights, the decentralization of power, media freedom, and unbiased economic policy (Pasuk, 2004). However, the civilian government that succeeded Thanom was faced with several challenges, the greatest of which included the threat of communism, forcing the Thai society to adopt a Rightist stand (see Neher, 1992b; Leow, 2002). In the face of regional communist threat and the growth of a Communist uprising within its borders, confidence in the civilian government weaned and gave way to the re-establishment of a military regime shortly after, marked by the violent repression of student protestors on 6 October 1976 (see Cohen, 1991; Connors and Hewison, 2008). Most significant during the Cold War era of the 1970s was the recognition that a military dictatorship would pose more danger, not only to the public, but the economy as well. Members of the capitalist group then orchestrated a democratization project (Pasuk, 2004). Not only did this mark the division of the military-capitalist alliance that had emerged post-World War II, the breakdown of the alliance also signaled the advent of the economic middle class as a strong political actor (Surin, 1997) and ushered in a period of political instability as elections failed to produce stable governments (Connors and Hewison, 2008). Another important development was the growth of the economic middle class and the intellectuals along with the 
 44
 
 deteriorating strength of the military dictatorship as its legitimacy began to erode. The domestic capitalists thus distanced themselves from the army and aligned themselves to the foreign investors who were adverse to the militaryʼs style of governance. This also meant the capitalists adopted a position that placed them on the side of the middle class as this new alliance fought for a democratic regime – one that essentially espoused an anti-military sentiment (Surin, 1997). It is especially noteworthy that during this period, democracy, as a notion and ideology, as a mobilized as a form of anti-military tool – in other words, democracy was a means to an end. In addition, the monarchy had an unforeseen role of ʻconstructing democracyʼ by appointing an ensemble of individuals from different social status to draft a constitution (ibid). The military was on the verge of being gradually edged out of the Thai political sphere. However, the espousal of socialist thoughts among the intelligentsia led to fear among the capitalists, who were quick to re-embrace the capitalist system and maintain the status quo, putting an end to the alliance between the capitalists and intellectuals (ibid). The resultant consequence of this episode was the ideological polarization of Thai politics between the radicals, allegedly out to demolish the national pillars of “Nation, Religion and King” (ibid; see also Niels, 2000), on the one hand and the conservatives, who mobilized the bureaucrats and other religious groups, on the other. The events of this period demonstrated the shift of Thai politics away from the elites to include the ʻmiddle classʼ. Furthermore, it illustrates the presence of important social groups acting and interacting in Thai society, contesting and asserting different forms of power in an attempt to exclude 
 45
 
 other players. Anderson (1990:23) sums this up by noting that this period bears witness to the emergence of parliamentary democracy whereby “ambitious, prosperous and self-confident bourgeoisies feel most comfortable, precisely because it maximizes their power and minimizes that of their competitors”. 3.2.4 The 1980s: ʻDemocracyʼ under the Military After 1977, Thailand was led by a constitutional and parliamentary regime under the leadership of former military leaders, the most prominent of which was General Prem Tinsulanonda, who was appointed into the position of Prime Minister in 1980 (Cohen, 1991). This period is recognized as an era of “semi-democracy”(Girling, 1996), otherwise known as “Premocracy”, as the military continued to exert strong political influence, albeit within a parliamentary framework. The prime minister then, Prem, was effectively chosen by the military as opposed to being elected (Surin, 1997). Given the control the military had, political stability and economic growth were accorded greater priority during this period as well (ibid). Although the inclination towards an authoritarian regime was present, Prem chose a conservative style of leadership, one that was acceptable to most of Thai society, and displayed much loyalty to the king, gaining important royal support. In April 1981, Prem was involved in the suppression of a coup staged by a section of the Thai military – known as the Young Turks – who commanded a significant segment of the armed forces (Cohen, 1991; Leow, 2002). This faction consisted of younger, lower-ranking field officers who embraced a more radical belief in the Thai militaryʼs role in saving the nation 
 46
 
 and advocating socio-economic reform – in particular, a full democratic system – under the leadership of the military, not the civilian government (Surachai, 1982; Leow, 2002). Some have also noted the internal politics within the military – specifically the rumoured transfer of the Young Turks to less significant posts – sparking off the coup (see Surachai, 1982). With the lack of support from higher-ranking officials, students, intellectuals and workers, the coup failed to gather sufficient momentum and was easily contained. It must be noted that the kingʼs support for Prem prompted much compliance from the masses, which in turn, manifested into a lack of support for the radical Young Turks (ibid). An important repercussion of the failed coup was the resulting schism within the Thai army into two main opposing groups led by General Amnart Damrikarn and Major General Arthit Kamlang-ek, the latter having a crucial role in defeating the coup attempt in 1981. However, Amnartʼs influence continued to pose a serious threat to Arthitʼs power until his untimely death. Despite the demise of his main rival, Arthit persisted in his efforts to weed out the Young Turks and securing his own position. In a bid to conciliate the factions within the military, Prem called for an election in April 1983 where he was re-appointed as the prime minister. The army again opposed constitutional clauses that would have accorded more power to political parties (Cohen, 1991). Overall, the Prem era ushered in both political stability and economic growth, demonstrating the ability of Premʼs “grand alliance” – a “new class formation” consisting of capitalists, state bureaucrats and military officers, intellectuals, professional groups and technocrats – in affecting the power 
 47
 
 balance of the state (Surin, 1997). The Thai political sphere, for the first time, saw businesspeople running for, and winning, parliamentary seats during this period as vote-buying began to spread widely as a means of mobilizing electoral support (ibid; see also King and LoGerfo, 1996). This period also saw the entry of young, well educated and politically idealistic ʻmiddle classʼ into influential roles in Thai politics, some of which had migrated to Bangkok from the rural areas. This was especially significant as their presence meant that they were no longer under a feudalistic-authoritarian state apparatus and more importantly, they say saw democracy as an accessible tool to express their opposition against state power (ibid). In short, while Prem and his alliance effectively controlled both the economy and the state, the idealistic new ʻmiddle classʼ continued to pose political opposition from time to time. This was especially so in the late 1980s and early 1990s where the ʻmiddle classʼ began to demand their inclusion into the system. Premʼs “grand alliance”, by virtue of its exclusionary nature, had failed to incorporate the politically volatile ʻmiddle classʼ during its sovereignty. This led to pressures from the ʻmiddle classʼ who wanted to be included. It did not help that Premʼs view of democracy was merely a show of tokenism, with his perceived contempt for democratic institutions and a lack of commitment to the ideology of democracy (Surin, 1997). It was no surprise, then, that the populist Chart Thai Party, fronted by General Chatichai Choonhavan, was elected into power in the 1988 elections. 
 48
 
 3.2.5 1990s: The shift towards civilian governments and the 1997 Economic Crisis Chatichai was a former general in the army who was later appointed as diplomat to several European countries. Returning to Thailand to take up the position of Deputy Foreign Minster in 1972, Chatichai became prime minister after Prem stepped down and allowed elections in 1988 (The New York Times, 7 May 1998). It was because Chatichaiʼs party coincided with the prodemocratic ʻmiddle classʼ scheme, that he was able to ride on that wave to power (Surin, 1997). Furthermore, the rise of Chatichai rested largely upon the prevalent anti-Prem, pro-democracy sentiment of that time, which was so strong that practically anybody in parliament could be accepted as the prime minister. In other words, support for Chatichai was, in part, an effort to usurp power, albeit democratically, away from Premʼs “grand alliance”. However, the Chatichai government was inundated with blatant corruption – earning the name of a “buffet cabinet”, where ministers were excessively corrupt (ibid; also in Hewison, 1993). The parochialism within the Chatichai government – where Jao Poh (or godfathers) and local influential people were dominant (Surin, 1997: 161) – sought to consolidate public power and wealth among members of the “alliance” and contributed to an overarching atmosphere of disdain among the ʻmiddle classʼ (ibid; also in Hewison, 1993). What infuriated the people even more was Chatichaiʼs final reorganization of the cabinet, which further promoted the financial interests of the various coalition members while marginalizing those who are not part of the group even more (Hewison, 1993; Surin, 1997). This led to the eventual 
 49
 
 downfall of Chatichai just two years and seven months after he first ascended into premiership as a new political alliance emerged. This coalition consisted mainly of state bureaucrats and “enlightened capitalists”, but was legitimated by the ʻmiddle classʼ (Surin, 1997; see also Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001). It should be noted here, though, that there were variations among the ʻmiddle classʼ as up until the mid-1980s, the ʻmiddle classʼ as a whole benefited greatly from the export-oriented growth under the Chatichai government. Nonetheless, the military quickly capitalized on the prevailing discontent and staged a coup in February 1991 (Neher, 1992a; King and LeGerfo, 1996; Leow, 2002). This coup was particularly significant in demonstrating that members of the ʻmiddle classʼ are not necessarily supporters of democracy (Hewison, 1996; see also Bellin, 2000) – as opposed to Lipsetʼs (1959) famous thesis that economic development was a precursor to democracy. In fact, it was certain groups within the ʻmiddle classʼ and business sector that were most supportive of the militaryʼs actions in the 1991 coup (Cook, 1997). Support for the coup, as Hewison (1996) notes, was an attack on the Chatichai government that was seen as threatening the balance constituting the state and the political space. More importantly, the coup represented also, the manifestation of “inter-clique rivalry13” as well as an attempt to reinforce the militaryʼs increasingly archaic position in relation to the advent of the new 























































 13
The
1991
coup
was
widely
recognized
as,
partly,
a
result
of
conflict
between
different
cohorts
 of
graduates
of
the
Chulachomklao
Military
Academy,
starting
as
early
as
in
the
1980
and
finally
 culminating
in
a
major
division
between
the
military
and
the
government.
In
addition,
leaders
of
 the
National
Peace
Keeping
Council
(NPKC),
which
staged
the
coup,
were
known
to
have
concrete
 political
ideas
and
ambitions
and
wanted
a
larger
share
of
the
corruption
pie
(Ukrist,
2008;
King,
 1992).
 
 50
 
 ʻmiddle classʼ (ibid). Following the coup, the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC) set up an interim government led by Anand Panyarachun (Leow, 2002). However, it was the council that held onto the power while preparation was made for the elections in March (Hewison, 1993). During that election, many pro-military parties as well as opposition parties participated but it was the former that won, putting Narong Wongwan in the prime minister seat (Leow, 2002). However, Narongʼs past – having being involved in a drug trafficking case in the past (King, 1992) – returned to haunt him and cost him the support of the military. The subsequent nomination of General Suchinda Kraprayoon by the military leaders faced much criticism from the public as it indicated a return to military rule (ibid). More importantly, it was a direct violation of Suchindaʼs earlier promise that things would be turned back over to the civilians to resume democracy with new leadership. While the vocal and aggressive ʻmiddleʼ-business class alliance that brought Chatichai down earlier played a similarly significant role in opposing the Suchinda regime in May 1992 (Surin, 1997; Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001), it is important to note that for certain groups within the ʻmiddle classʼ, economic growth and democracy were the perfect complements and the 1991 coup only interrupted this progression. For them, the coup had direct and undesirable impact on the ʻmiddle classʼ economic interests. Thus, the appointing of Suchinda became the tipping point in a long process of the military manipulating its dominance in politics. Consequently, these ʻmiddle classʼ rode on the prevailing ʻdemocratizationʼ wave and opposed the military- 
 51
 
 appointed Suchinda government. In other words, democracy was not the end point. Instead, members of this ʻmiddle classʼ advocated democracy insofar as it provided the political stability and economic development that they desired. Ultimately, the ʻmiddle classʼ was fighting to protect the source of its privileges – capitalism and development (Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001). It was no surprise, then, that the May 1992 uprising – also known as the “Black May” incident – came to be seen as a revolution of the ʻmiddleʼ and business classes. Popular images from the protests depicted wealthy demonstrators – some carrying mobile phones and arriving in cars (Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001) – taking to the streets and challenging armed troops (Hewison, 1996). From a political viewpoint, it implied that ʻclassesʼ that emerged during the post-war economic growth were driving Thai sociopolitical change. Also, the protest appeared to be a revolt against a “conservative, authoritarian, technocratic and military-dominated coterie” in order to reinstate legitimate political space and a democratic parliamentary system (ibid). Indeed, it is easy to overlook the underlying workings behind the rise of the ʻmiddle classʼ against the government, and simply regard it as a movement for democracy. Following the violent suppression of demonstrations, another election was scheduled in September 1992. This time, Chuan Leekpai emerged victorious. The triumph of a civilian government confirmed the end of military rule in Thailand (Leow, 2002). While this meant that the military elites no longer dominated politics directly, they maintain firm influence in the area of national defense and security while the ties between them and their 
 52
 
 associates in the business sector remained intact (Suchit, 1996). However, soon after the Chuan administration assumed office, they faced accusations of having abused a land distribution scheme in Phuket (King, 1996). With increasing pressure from the media – an institution owned by the business class – and the lack of support from its own coalition members, Chuanʼs government was eventually brought down in May 1995 (Pasuk and Baker, 1997) after the parliament was dissolved. A subsequent snap election was scheduled for July 1995 (King, 1996). That particular election saw extensive vote-buying despite efforts from the Poll Watch Committee to curb such actions (ibid). Eventually, Banharn Silapa-archa became the new prime minster. However, almost as soon as he and his cabinet took office, criticisms began to surface – again, from the privately owned media – claiming that they lacked the technical expertise and qualifications, claiming “infighting among and within government coalition parties” as well as criticizing Banharnʼs lack of international stature and sophistication (King, 1996: 137). Meanwhile, shuffles were made within the military as the Defense Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyut balanced out the internally competing factions (ibid). On one hand, it demonstrated the extent of civilian control over the military. On the other hand, this was in largely motivated by Chavalitʼs attempt to build up support for himself among the military officers as he prepared for a shot at the premiership in the future (ibid). True enough, Chavalit took the premiership in the November 1996 election after increasing pressure and conflict within Banharnʼs coalition took its toll on the Banharnʼs government, forcing him to resign (ibid). 
 53
 
 The Chavalit government did not last long, however, due to a combination of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and his failure to manage the country in the midst of the financial crisis (Suchitra, 1998) and Chuan regained the seat of prime minister. It was toward the end of this decade of political instability – where the premiership changed seven times – that Thaksinʼs Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party was formed and eventually rose to power. 3.2.6 Rise of Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai Party One impact of the financial crisis was the aggravation of sentiments towards political reform due to the failure of the government to manage the economy. Yet another effect of the crisis was the spread of skepticism about the neoliberal globalization project and, in relation to that, a revival of economic nationalism in response to the economic meltdown (Kasian, 2006). Coupled with the fear of potential social conflict, the Bangkok-based elites were convinced that a new form of social contract was necessary to safeguard their economic and political position. This was perceived to be achievable through the advancement of social welfare (Hewison, 2004; 2008). The rationale underlying such a move was simple: in the face of the volatile political climate, the old ruling elites were seen as having failed to protect the interests of big businesses. Hence, it was no longer enough for the capitalists to accommodate a government that “worked on their behalf and yet was run by others, be it the military, the technocrats or the electocrats” (Kasian, 2006: 24). In this overarching socio-political climate, Thaksinʼs Thai 
 54
 
 Rak Thai Party, founded in July 1998 (Somchai, 2008), rose to power as they sought to take control of the state and “re-manage the risks and opportunities of economic globalization for themselves and their cronies” (Kasian, 2006: 24). From the onset, the Thaksin government was focused on economics. The main underlying objective was to strengthen Thailandʼs economic dynamism, which had suffered much constraint following the 1997 crisis (Warr, 2009). On one level, he did accomplish this, as Thailandʼs economy made a remarkably quick recovery after the 1997 crisis with “impressive rates of economic growth” (Thitinan, 2009: 142). However, to emphasize this aspect would be to overlook the fact that Thaksin was no better than his predecessors at reducing poverty (Warr, 2009). Nevertheless, the favourable economic recovery ensured that Thaksin would stay in power for yet another term. The election in January 2001 saw Thaksinʼs TRT party winning more than 250 of the 500 seats available (McCargo, 2002; Nelson, 2007). Some candidates, however, were accused of vote-buying and a re-run of the election was held eight days later. This time, TRT walked away with 248 seats (McCargo, 2002). Thaksin looked set to the “Thailandʼs greatest leader of modern times” (Thanong Khanthong in The Nation, October 2, 2006 in Nelson, 2007: 1). The TRT party amassed greater political power as they merged with other parties and formed coalitions with the Seritham Party and Chart Thai Parties, among others (McCargo, 2002). 
 55
 
 It seemed that Thaksin and the TRT could do no wrong but the War on Drugs launched in 2003 claimed over 2000 lives – some of which were believed to be vote canvassers for the Democrat party (Connors, 2007). Sentiments against Thaksin began to stir as a result of this, further compounded by the fact that Thaksin appeared to have lost control over the insurgency in the South. On 28 April 2004, 100 Muslim men attacked state institutions such as police stations, army bases and checkpoints. In the crackdown that followed, 107 were killed. Two months later, the unrest in Tak Bai, Narathiwat province saw peaceful demonstrators shot and arrested with 78 dead (Connors, 2007; also in Kengkij and Hewison, 2009; see also McCargo, 2008). The lack of concrete actions on the part of Thaksin only fanned the flames of dissent among the Bangkokians. By 2005, the death toll for the conflict in the South had risen to over 1000 (Connors, 2007). Public opinion of Thaksin began to decline but the TRT party appears to retain the support of the public by emerging victorious, and by the largest margin in Thai history, in the February 2005 election (Thitinan, 2008). By now, Thaksin already dominated both the economic and political spheres while implementing policies that began to alienate the general Thai population. Thaksin again drew unwanted attention to himself just two months after he was re-elected. Presiding over a ceremony at the Emerald Temple, Thaksin allegedly sat in the position of the king. This was later construed as an act of disrespect and that “the Thai monarchy was at risk of becoming a rubber stamp” (Connors, 2008a: 153). Accusations against Thaksin also stirred up nationalist and royalist sentiments by insinuating that in supporting 
 56
 
 Thaksin, the people “faced a choice of supporting royal prerogatives or supporting a new form of government that usurped ʻthe good thingsʼ” (ibid). Even though discontent with Thaksin was growing, it was not until September 2005 that the PAD movement emerged. 3.3 The Formation of the PAD Officially founded in February 2006, the PAD is recognized by many, academics and public alike, as a mass movement started by Sondhi Limthongkul in retaliation against the Thaksin government for taking his media programme off the air some six months earlier. Sondhiʼs criticisms of Thaksin on his media programme began after Thaksin refused to offer help to Sondhi, his former business partner (Kasian, 2006; Nelson, 2007; Hewison, 2008; Montesano, 2009b). Following the censorship of Sondhiʼs programme, Sondhi and his partners launched a mass movement that capitalizes on mobilizing popular resistance against Thaksin, accusing him of not respecting democratic norms such as freedom of speech and the rule of law. As Sondhi continued his campaign to criticize Thaksin, it was clear that the focus had shifted from highlighting Thaksinʼs disregard of democratic values to his alleged interference with rachaprachasamasai14 and for promoting unrestrained consumerism through his populist policies (Connors, 2008a: 155). The allegations of Thaksinʼs disregard for rachaprachasamasai surfaced mainly after the Temple of Emerald Buddha incident. At a rally on 11 November 2005, Sondhi read a pledge to fight for the king against Thaksinʼs 























































 14
Rachaprachasamasai refers to the relationship between monarch and the people.
 
 57
 
 challenge to the rachaprachasamasai and also called for the appointment of a “neutral figure to initiate political reform to address the centralization of power under Thaksin” (ibid). The adoption of yellow shirts as part of the declaration of a pro-royalist stance eventually became not only a symbol for the antiThaksin movement (McCargo, 2007), but also its political identity15. 3.3.1 Protests and the Ousting of Thaksin As the protests and rallies continued, the recurrent allegations against Thaksin began to lose its appeal among the masses. Connors (2008) notes that the first rally held on 13 January 2006 drew less than a quarter of the peak numbers in 2005 and saw a further decline in the week after. Interestingly, the tide turned just ten days later when news of the sale of Shin Corp16 to Temasek Holdings refueled anti-Thaksin sentiments. Amidst claims that Thaksin “sold the country” (Nostitz, 2009: 8), some argued that because the company consisted of a large proportion of mobile phone business in Thailand and that it included major satellite linkage in Southeast Asia, Shin Corp was seen as having ownership of ʻnational assetsʼ that should not be 























































 15
Tilly
(2002)
defines
political
identities
as
boundaries
that
define
categories
of
people,
 relations
among
people
on
each
side,
across
such
boundaries
and
“shared
stories
about
all
these
 elements”.
The
identity
becomes
political
when
they
involve
ties
–
hostile
or
not
–
to
 governments.

 16
The
Thai
Telecommunication
Act
(2006)
raised
the
limit
on
foreign
holdings
in
telecom
 companies
to
49%.
This
Act
replaced
the
Telecom
Business
Law
(2001),
which
put
the
foreign
 investment
cap
at
25%.
On
January
23,
2006,
the
same
day
the
Thai
Telecommunication
Act
 (2006)
was
passed,
Thaksin
sold
its
remaining
49.6%
stake
in
Shin
Corporation,
a
leading
Thai
 telecommunications
company,
to
Singapore
owned
Temasek
Holdings.
Thaksin
allegedly
netted
 about
73
billion
baht
for
the
deal.
Following
Thai
tax
laws,
he
avoided
paying
capital
gains
tax
on
 the
grounds
that
the
transaction
took
place
through
the
stock
market.
Although
legal,
the
sale
 drew
heavy
criticism
towards
Thaksin's
for
the
fact
that
that
Shin
Corp,
a
dominant
player
in
 Thailand's
information
technology
sector,
was
sold
to
an
investment
arm
of
the
Singapore
 Government.
 (http://medlibrary.org/medwiki/Sale_of_Shin_Corporation_to_Temasek_Holdings#cite_note‐0)

 
 58
 
 transferred to non-Thais (Albritton and Thawilwadee, 2007). Many were also outraged that Thaksin avoided paying taxes for the sale because of a law “exempting capital gains from taxation when acquired by sales through the Securities Exchange of Thailand” (ibid). This was interpreted as both corruption and an abuse of power. Perhaps more importantly, for the rest of Thai society that did not have the ability to do what he had done, the actions of Thaksin came to be seen as a monstrosity. Utilizing these accusations and sentiments, the PAD movement regained a critical thrust as accusations of Thaksin proliferated rapidly (Thitinan, 2008; Hewison, 2008). Charges against Thaksin now began to highlight instances of his corrupted practices in addition to his alleged lest-majesté actions – most of which occurred in the past. In the month that followed its official formation, the PAD – under the motto, “Save the Nation” – staged a continuous demonstration that saw its supporters marching and setting camps in various places of Bangkok (Connors, 2008). One particular demonstration during this period saw 100,000 persons take to the streets, marching to the Government House where they camped as a means to force Thaksin to resign before his referendum-style election to be held in April (Kasian, 2006). By the last week of March 2006, the protests had reached a point where Thaksin tried to urge General Sonthi, then Commander-in-Chief, to declare a state of emergency in the capital and employ force in cracking down on the protesters (The Nation, 23 March, 2006; Ukrist, 2008). The PAD continued to step up its efforts as they organized a rally on March 29 2006 at Siam Square, occupying the commercial and tourist 
 59
 
 centre for two days, so as to put pressure on the “largely reticent big commercial interests” to support their cause (Kasina, 2006:9). Following the snap elections in April 2006, where Thaksinʼs Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party won 56% of the ballot, the PAD continued its protests, aiming to put more pressure on the government. Still, the persistent protests and rallies held by the PAD over the five months after the election had taken its toll. It was not the government, however, but the military that sprang into action. Claiming that the political dissents had led to divisions in Thai society, and to avoid violence as well as to end corrupt politics (Nostitz, 2009), the military staged a coup that put an end to the Thai Rak Thai-dominated government (see also Thitinan, 2008 and Funston, 2009: xiii). On 19 September 2006, while Thaksin was overseas, tanks and armed troops moved into the capital, occupying television and radio stations while staking out strategic buildings including the parliament. Roadblocks were set up on the outskirts of the city and martial law was declared as the military coup toppled the government (Hewison, 2008: 200). An interim government was formed after the coup with former commander-in-chief Surayud Chulanont appointed as the prime minister on October 1st 2006 (Wit, 2010). This interim government held the fort for slightly longer than a year. During this period, the TRT was charged with electoral fraud during the 2 April 2006 elections and dissolved on 30 May 2007 (Chairat, 2009; Ockey, 2008). In the mean time, PAD protests abated just as the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), otherwise known as the red shirts, sprung up in protest against the coup (Wit, 2010). 
 60
 
 3.3.2 Protests against the People Power Party In December 2007, the People Power Party (PPP), recognized as the reincarnation of the TRT Party, won the majority vote in the general election (Wit, 2010), frustrating the hopes of the outgoing military government by returning power to the side aligned with Thaksin (Nostitz, 2009; Montesano, 2009cl Funston, 2009). Samak Sundaravej of the PPP was then appointed as the new Prime Minister. The PAD soon began to rally its supporters after the PPP came to power. In early 2008, the PAD alliance began to expand its base by recruiting provincial networks to its existing mix of civil society, labour activists, NGOs and urban intellectuals with roots in the 1992 anti-military protests (Thitinan, 2008: 143). By 25 May 2008, the PAD had revived its street demonstrations, response against the government and partly because of Thaksinʼs return from his self-imposed exile in February 2008 (ibid; see also Kengkij and Hewison, 2009). This was the start of the PADʼs (in)famous 193-day rally. The objectives of the PAD had, by now, changed to two overlapping aims. Firstly, it aimed to challenge the 2007 constitution, passed on 19 August 2007 with a national referendum of 57% approval rating (Wit, 2010), and secondly, to remove the PPP government which was perceived as being led by Thaksin loyalists (Funston, 2009; Kengkij and Hewison, 2009; see also McCargo, 2009). The street protests began spilling over into the occupation of key state institutions as well. As part of its plan to remove the PPP government, the PAD stormed and took over the Government House in a bid to cripple the administration. Claiming that the post-coup PPP government led by Samak 
 61
 
 was a “revived form of Thaksin proxy rule” (McCargo, 2009: 12), the PAD demonstrations embodied a deep sense of anti-Thaksin sentiments (see also Thitinan, 2008). Crucial non-state institutions were not spared either as the PAD occupied the NBT television station for about eleven hours before the protestors returned to the Government House (McCargo, 2009). A strange turn of events in a month later saw Prime Minister Samak being forced to resign after the Constitutional Court found him guilty of having violated constitutional provisions against a conflict of interest for hosting two commercial television cooking programmes. Subsequently, Somchai Wongsawat succeeded Samak as the new head of the PPP dominated government (Funston, 2009; see also Montesano, 2009c). However, this only served to fuel the PAD as its campaign escalated. About three weeks after Somchaiʼs appointment, the protestors tried to prevent him from presenting a new governmental policy statement by barricading the Government House (Funston, 2009). 3.3.3 Occupation of Suvarnabhumi and Don Mueang Airports After the clash with the Thai police where two were killed and hundreds were injured (Funston, 2009), the PAD changed its strategy and headed to the airports in November. By 28 November, the PAD had full control over both Suvarnabhumi and Don Mueang airports with the initial aims of preventing Somchai from returning from his overseas trip (Funston, 2009; Kengkij and Hewison, 2009). This seizure of the airports targeted the government while trying to evoke the involvement of the military again by crippling the Thai 
 62
 
 economy. Slightly more than a week later, the constitutional court dissolved the PPP and disqualified all its party execution members for electoral fraud (Funston, 2009). This was the very result that the PAD was looking for (Montesano, 2009c). As such, they claimed victory and ended the rally (Wit, 2010). By 15 December 2008, Prime Minster Abhisit Vejjajiva of the Democratic Party came to power following the sustained demonstration by the PAD supporters and their brief occupation of the airports (Montesano, 2009c), putting a temporary halt to the PAD movement that had started since 2005. 3.4 Conclusion: Recognizing the Historical Antecedents The interplay of power among the key players in Thai politics remain deeply intertwined and demonstrates the dynamics of social closure through exclusion by those in power, and social closure through usurpation by those marginalized as a consequence of this exclusion. Given the history of Thai politics it is easy to view the 2006 coup as yet another instance of struggle within the military and the capitalists. However, I have also attempted to highlight the heterogeneity within each ʻclassʼ – such as the ʻmiddle classʼ which featured strongly in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s and the division of the military following Premʼs rise to the premiership. In doing so, this chapter questions the notion of the recent anti-Thaksin movement as an intra-elite struggle for it would mean that the Thai ʻmiddle classʼ were pawns manipulated by the elites to support their own cause. This is, in fact, contrary to what history suggests: that Thai politics has more to do with struggle by 
 63
 
 groups in society trying to secure or improve their own advantages. Hence, I assert that the framework of social closure has both relevance and precision in explaining the rise of the PAD movement. In addition, I have suggested that these groups have an agenda of their own, seeking to preserve their own interests through the state and the economy. To this end, democracy then becomes an ideological tool to legitimize the advancement of both these interests, instead of the end point. As outlined, it was the exclusion of the ʻmiddle classʼ in the 1970s and 1980s from both the economic and political domain that sparked off the usurpationary act of toppling a government perceived to be marginalizing and excluding sections of the Thai population. Of more immediate concern is how the corruption and alleged misuse of power by Thaksin illustrates the social closure enacted by the exclusion of political and economic opportunities from the Thai populace not within the ex-premiereʼs proximity. Thus, this exclusion has the important effect of inciting the excluded or dispossessed groups to amass opportunities for themselves. The PAD movement then, has to be conceptualized as a movement that manages to galvanize these groups under one unifying aim – the opposition of Thaksin. To summarize, this chapter argues that the recent 2006 coup and the preceding PAD movement have strong historical antecedents in the developments within Thai politics but remains distinctly contemporary. The next chapter will look at some of the motivations of the participants, as members of different groups occupying similar economic position as well as the process by which they have been excluded. 
 64
 
 Chapter 4: Uncovering the Motivations of Mobilization 4.1 Introduction The previous chapter demonstrated how the contestation between key actors in the recent PAD movement has strong historical links in the Thai political arena. Despite this, there are important differences between the historical antecedents outlined in the preceding chapter and the recent emergence of the PAD. This chapter attempts to explicate the similarities by arguing that the mobilization of participants is a consequence of social closure, complicated by structural changes as well as emotions arising from the exclusion. To demonstrate this, this chapter first considers the importance of structural changes that laid the foundation for the process of social closure as exclusion brought about by Thaksinʼs actions. I then illustrate the corresponding exclusion of the Thai economic middle class. I contend, essentially, that this exclusion of opportunities from the political and economic spheres sets the stage for usurpationary actions by both the elites and economic middle class that had been excluded. However, exclusion alone is insufficient to account for why the movement has emerged. Therefore, this chapter shows that emotions associated with corruption and Thaksinʼs alleged interference with rachaprachasamasai, are closely intertwined with the insecurity of social closure. These, in turn, serve as important motivational factors. In other words, this chapter lays out a fundamental mobilization factor in the PAD movement and argues that marginalized groups in Thai society – as a result 
 65
 
 of Thaksinʼs power and monopolization of opportunities and resources – attempt to usurp these opportunities that have been hoarded. 4.2 Incentives for Mobilization: Structural Change and Social Exclusion In the previous chapter, I have suggested that the Thai economic middle class experienced significant exclusion as a result of Thaksinʼs rise to power and the policies he implemented. In this section, I qualify and add that this exclusion did not appear in a socio-economic void but has important structural antecedents as well. The economic crisis in 2007 and its impact on the Thai economy play an important part in spurring the movement by generating uncertainty among the populace. This uncertainty, coupled by social closure, lays the foundation, or incentives, for the mobilization of the affective middle class. Accordingly, this section first explores the impact of both the 1997 and 2007 economic crises before considering the extent and significance of the social closure experienced. In addition, this section maintains that it was the structural conditions that proved more influential than the identities of the participants themselves in serving as incentives for mobilization. 4.2.1 Structural Change: Economic Depression and Dissent One of the most significance impacts of the 1997 economic crisis is that it reversed the trend of notable growth experience by Thailand in the 1980s. Exchange rates fell, rate of poverty rose, the government was forced to accept an IMF bailout package and more importantly, confidence in the 
 66
 
 countryʼs economic institutions suffered a severe setback (Warr, 2009). Statistically, the 1997 crisis bought about substantial economic damage that undermined the growth Thailand had achieved during the period of expansion prior to the crisis. Since that crisis, however, its general economic recovery has been moderate at best. Figure 1.1 illustrates how the rate of real GDP growth post-crisis lingered below the trend recorded in the late 1980s, before reaching similar pre-crisis level of 7.5% in 2003. Even then, the economy declined to about 5% in 2005 and remained relatively stagnant until the economic crisis of 2007, where it suffered yet another upset. Figure 1.1 Thailand: Real GDP Growth Rate (Annual %), 1980 to 2008 Source: International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php) Montesano (2009: 222) argues that the “shape of the post-crisis economy altered structures of economic opportunity” on two levels. Firstly, the Thai agricultural sector has lost its competitiveness following the 1997 crisis. This was complicated by an employment trend that accompanies a compromise in the quality of skilled labour mirroring this decline. Secondly, the adverse reaction of local enterprise towards risk meant that foreign 
 67
 
 investment contributed to the growth of the Thai industrial sector and indirectly to higher levels of employment. Furthermore, the gains in employment, founded on a “dependence on a continued steady supply of inexpensive, relatively uneducated labour” provided Thailand with an “actual incentive to maintain the skewed income distributions” obtained by such economic growth (ibid: 221). The consequence of this was that the middle class, reliant on foreign investment, and caught in the middle, had reasons to secure its unstable position. While it is true that under Thaksin, Thailandʼs economy made a remarkably quick recovery after the 1997 crisis with “impressive rates of economic growth” (see Figure 1.1) (Thitinan, 2008: 142), this was only one aspect of it. Thailandʼs aggregate growth over the period of 1981 to 2002 was characterized by an overall deficit in aggregate demand and the private savings of Thais became the most important source of financing for the country. In addition, during the 1997 crisis, the share of investment in Thailandʼs GDP fell by 13% in relation to the boom period of 1980s (Warr, 2009: 159). This is significant for two main reasons: firstly, the foreign investment into Thailand had spurred employment rate during the immediate recovery period of the post-1997 economic crisis. This was not sufficient in restoring the nationʼs long-term growth rate neither did it instill trust among investors and consumers. It would not be too far-fetched to claim that the less than ideal economic performance by Thailand post-crisis came to be perceived by the new middle class – most of whom had emerged as a result of the boom in 1970s and 1980s (see Robison, 1995; Robison and Goodman, 
 68
 
 1996) – as a serious disturbance to their economic status and position. Secondly, although it appears that Thailandʼs economy performed neither better nor worse than most of its regional neighbours, the incidence of poverty during the post crisis period had, in fact, decreased in proportion to economic recovery (Warr, 2009). In short, the 1997 crisis inflicted a severe blow economically to the Thai middle class and their relatively new social positioning. The lackluster performance of the Thai economy simply reinforced this perception. The overall degradation of economic status and performance by the Thai middle class has an important effect of contributing to a perceived loss of power and frustration among the people – even if this effect was unrecognized. 4.2.2 Social Closure: Political, Economic and Social Exclusion In this section, I outline only the main antecedents and key developments of Thaksinʼs gradual monopolization of the political and economic sphere as these have been covered in greater details elsewhere. In addition to the insecurity engendered by the economic crisis, the social closure brought about with Thaksinʼs increasing monopoly over both the economic and political spheres further aggravated the dissatisfaction among the people and provided incentives for mobilization. Broadly speaking, Thaksinʼs populist policies that resonated with, and benefitted the poor meant that they were no longer marginalized. As witnessed by the power of Thaksinʼs supporters to re-elect him into power in the 2005 elections, the implication of this support was that the middle classʼ votes no longer carried 
 69
 
 as much influence as it used to. As widely documented and suggested, Thaksinʼs populist policies translated into mass support and manifested in election votes (see Pasuk and Baker, 2009; Thithinan, 2008). While this meant that politically and socially, the rural poor were gaining more recognition and regard by Thaksinʼs government. It was clear that politically, the middle class had suffered a loss in being able to exert its voice; economically, it could neither transform its economic wealth to political or social power, nor could it depend on political support to attain economic success. This loss of social and political power together with the declining economy indicated to the middle class that their social position and status was at risk – or more accurately, it was indicative of the exclusion they were subjected to. Accordingly, I contend that this perceived restriction of access to opportunities by the Thai middle class constitutes the basis of their social closure, or exclusion, from both political and economic spheres, which has come to be monopolized by Thaksin and those close to him. The exclusion of the economic middle class did not occur immediately. In fact, Thaksin rode on the support of these people into power, citing the principal objective of the Thai Rak Thai to be rescuing Thai businessmen from the 1997 financial crisis and to reinstate economic growth (Pasuk and Baker, 2008b; The Nation, 15 July 1998). Also, Thaksin introduced policies that supported the revival of local businesses and capitalists, offering protection from foreign competition and increasing their competitiveness. Not only was this popular with the capitalists but it also ensured that the TRT party received substantial support during its time in government (Kengkji and Hewison, 
 70
 
 2009). Later, these policies were broadened to include reforms that would help modernize Thailand, particularly the bureaucracy and political system so as to prevent future crises of a similar sort to that of the 1997 economic crunch (Pasuk and Baker, 2008b). Adopting an agenda that emphasized economic growth and stability, Thaksin came to be seen as a populist and nationalist politician (Hewison, 2005) who drew on extensively on his experience in the corporate world as he sought to understand the preferences and aspirations of the people (Case, 2007). From then on, it was a matter of articulating campaigns to meet these preferences. Thus, it was clear that from the onset, the middle class was not socially excluded and that opportunities, both economic and political, were available to them. However, as the economy and domestic capital picked up, Thaksinʼs style of governance shifted from a nationalistic to a neo-liberal one. This led to accusations that Thaksin and his cronies were benefitting from the sale of state enterprises (Hewison, 2008). Simply put, it was evident that Thaksin and his associates were beginning to enforce some social closure on the economic and political power they had access to. But because access to economic and political opportunities were still available to the masses, support for Thaksinʼs party remained fairly stable and strong: those in the rural areas appreciated his policies while the middle class seemed satisfied with the actions taken in the handling of the uprising in the South and against alleged drug dealers (ibid). Thaksinʼs attempt to reinforce his own access to power was first seen in his authoritarian style of governance, where he controlled big capital and 
 71
 
 state agencies via the cabinet (Connors, 2006). Furthermore, Thaksin was not above appointing his close associates into important positions of power – the appointment of his cousin General Chaisit Shinawatra as the Commander-inChief of the Royal Thai Army best illustrates this (Connors, 2007). It was acts such as these that signaled Thaksinʼs increasing monopolization of the political domain. With growing dominance and influence, backed by supporters in the military and the police, Thaksin began attacking his critics and gaining control of sections of the media. The extent of his power became further evident in the way he responded to criticisms, using state power unabashedly and treating his opponents with contempt (Hewison, 2008; see also Case, 2007). Not only was Thaksin monopolizing political power through his influence in the economy but he was also hoarding alternatives voices to his rule. Another key development alongside Thaksinʼs growing monopoly was the fact that the low-income group were benefitting from the various populist policies designed and implemented by Thaksin. These include the famous 30 Baht universal healthcare, the 1 million village investment development funds, cheap loans and other policies that were extremely popular with the electorate (McCargo, 2002; see also Chairat, 2009; Funston, 2009). A crucial consequence of this particular approach was the loss of support from the urban middle class who found that they gained nothing from these policies but were paying taxes to support them. This led Thaksin to further intensify his populist approach, sparking off a dialectical cycle. On the one hand, while the policies appeared to favour the poor; on the other hand, Thaksinʼs 
 72
 
 administration presented itself as one that was “by and for the rich” with the aim of helping local businesses through the strengthening of the government and by protecting and reorganizing these business (Hewison, 2005: 320). This populist approach, coupled with his foreign policies (see Pravin, 2010), and Thaksinʼs propensity to aggrandize himself alienated a number of business groups who later came together to support the PAD movement (Ukrist, 2008). The eventual outcome was that as Thaksinʼs populism became more prevalent, the middle class became more alienated by these policies (Pasuk and Baker, 2008b). In short, not only were they beginning to be excluded from the political sphere, opportunities for them to voice their discontent were also dominated by Thaksin. Because of the tremendous power Thaksin wielded, it was obvious that he would ultimately dominate and monopolize the electoral system, manipulating both the constitution and the system to the extent of “usurpation” (Thitinan, 2008: 142). This control over political and economic policies not only restricted the access of resources and opportunities available to groups not within Thaksinʼs circle but was, arguably, also the source by which he secured the position of privilege at the expense of everyone else. Thaksinʼs “policy corruption”, for instance, was clearly aimed at benefitting his personal concerns and those closest to him (Pasuk and Baker, 2009; Montesano, 2009c). Perhaps the most appropriate of examples is the sale of Shin Corp immediately following the raising of the limit on foreign ownership of telecommunications firms from 25% to 49% (Montesano, 2009b). In essence, through his control over the state, the media and economy, Thaksin effectively 
 73
 
 limited the ability of key groups in Thai society from influencing politics and opposing him. His dominance over the economy, coupled by his power to change economic policies, kept the businessmen in check; his control of public space placed a limit on the extent by which independent media and intellectuals could question him or his policies; his authority in the state allowed him to control bureaucrats through both position and tradition (Pasuk and Baker, 2008b). This thorough monopoly meant that in order for any groups – be it the capitalists, economic or affective middle class – to obtain a share of the economic and political pie, usurpationary actions, such as social movements, were the best option available. In sum, Thaksin, in adopting populist policies, lost the support of the urban middle class. But more importantly, Thaksin effectively enforced a social closure, alienating and excluding of groups in this social stratum. Underlying this exclusion is the fear that these groups in the middle stratum no longer had any form of influence on state agenda, as the government need not depend on this section of the electorate for their mandate. In other words, the economic middle class had been effectively marginalized from the political domain. Groups in the middle class were not the only ones to be excluded. Thaksinʼs tendency to appoint his cronies into seats of power meant that the old power group – “a network based around the palace, Prem, elements of the Democrat Party, members of prominent establishment families and senior bureaucrats” (Connors, 2007: 252) – was slowly but surely being pushed to the periphery as well. For them, the option was obvious too: (1) submit to 
 74
 
 Thaksin but forgo the opportunity to get the most out of their own rewards by limiting access to resources, opportunities and securing for itself a privileged position; or (2) stand up to Thaksin, “be harassed, elbowed out of the way, marginalized, losing their status and opportunities as a result” (Kasian, 2006: 35). This increasing monopolization of political and economic spheres by Thaksin and the resulting exclusion of the middle class, as well as other groups in Thai society, demonstrate clearly the conditions for mobilization through dissent. In other words, the process of social closure gives us an important insight to the important question posed by this thesis: why the middle class mobilized against Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai – or the motivation behind their involvement. However, merely understanding the incentives for mobilization is neither sufficient to account for the form the movement had taken, nor is it adequate in explaining how the people were mobilized and along what lines. That is to say, what we have at hand is, at best, a structural explanation. This leaves us poorly equipped to explain the precise reasons and factors that motivated so many people to mobilize. To address this issue, I argue that the PAD movement ought to be seen as an “affective middle class” movement due to the group emotion displayed. I will illustrate more explicitly later that while members of this ʻclassʼ occupy dissimilar locations within this stratum and display different priorities in their interests, the reaction to the closure produced similar emotions and feelings. Specifically, it is the social closure brought about by Thaksin that help determine the members of this “affective middle class” – those with 
 75
 
 neither socio-political influence nor economic power. For even though the capitalists were slowly being edged out of the political sphere, which has been monopolized by Thaksin and his cronies, they had the economic wealth to secure their interests in other ways. Similarly, the poor may lack economic prowess but they were climbing up the social ladder with Thaksinʼs policies that advantages them above the rest. Hence, the limiting of access to resources and opportunities, or social closure, affects those who are caught in the middle the most. The next two sections examine these issues further. Let us first turn to look at how emotions come to complement the structural changes and exclusion before examining the “middle class” in greater detail. 4.3 From Political Opportunity to Emotions An important argument put forth by the political opportunity structures school of thought is that the conditions for mobilization are influenced by the environment in which grievances emerged and mobilized to the advantage of the movement. As we have seen in the earlier section, the important combination of social closure and discontent with the Thaksin administration provides the opportunity structure for mobilization. Social movements scholars contend “favourable environmental circumstances…will not produce a movement in the absence of heightened emotions” (Aminzade and McAdam, 2001: 17). Thus, to fully account for the mobilization, I argue that the recent PAD movement finds an important motivational factor in the fear, anger and hope of social groups located in Thai society – the fear of Thaksinʼs 
 76
 
 increasing monopolization of power, anger against Thaksinʼs alleged interference of rachaprachasamasai, and the hope of usurping these opportunities back. These feelings, as this section will illustrate, shapes the fundamental motivation for both participation and support for the PAD movement. I will first consider the significance and importance of emotions in social movements, particularly in mobilization, before delving into the empirical evidence. In doing so, I aim to construct an analysis of the role emotions play in the emergence and momentum of the PAD movement. 4.3.1 Emotions and Social Movements Emotions have played a significant role in many of the concepts scholars have used to understand social movements. As mentioned in Chapter 2, “motivational framing” is particularly significant in explicating the development of social movements that are insufficiently accounted for by simple cognitive agreement. In addition, emotions are important in the emergence and growth of social movements (Flam, 1990a, 1990b) insofar as it often provides the first step towards participation in any movement as a result of “moral shocks” – whereby an unforeseen event or new raises in one a sense of outrage such that one becomes inclined towards political action (Goodwin, et al, 2001; see also Jasper and Poulsen, 1995; Jasper, 1997). By framing the issue and providing a target against which the outrage is directed towards, powerful emotions such as hatred, fear and indignation, can be generated to mobilize people and to sustain a movement (Goodwin, et al, 2001). 
 77
 
 The PAD movement demonstrates a clear case of how strong emotions such as fear, hatred and hope come to serve as the motivations for the mobilization and participation of the ʻmiddle classʼ. I contend that: (1) the fear of Thaksin, due to his repressive style of governance and the loss of opportunities and access to resources and benefits, culminates into a hatred for him because of his alleged contempt for the king; (2) in turn, the movement to unseat Thaksin illustrates the hope for social inclusion through the usurpation of socio-economic and political power. Drawing on interviews done, the next section looks at the major emotions and aspirations involved in the mobilization of the PAD movement. 4.3.2 Towards Mobilization: Hatred and Hope Hatred: Anger and Fear One important emotion that was particularly salient in almost all the interviews conducted was a deep detest for Thaksin. Kemper (1978) points out that hatred is an emotion built up from a mixture of fear and anger. Anger, as ʻreal emotionʼ, is experienced when people are faced with power that limits oneʼs freedom and the responsibility for this loss is attributed to the powerholder (Kemper, 1978; Flam, 2005). In hatred, when fear is the dominant emotion, violence is less likely to result from anger. On the other hand, if anger is prevalent, fear will tend to be suppressed (Kemper, 2001). Thus, I first explore the emotion of hatred, as articulated by the interviewees, in two parts – (1) the outrage, and resulting anger, against Thaksinʼs corruption and contempt for the king; (2) the fear of exclusion from opportunities and 
 78
 
 resources. I contend that the outrage resulting from charges of corruption and contempt culminates into a sense of hatred for the former prime minister. This is complemented with an important hope for inclusion via the removal of Thaksin. A critical reader familiar with the movement will note that the responses of the interviewers corresponded closely to the rhetoric and discourses of the PAD movement and may question the extent to which these were a consequence of the PADʼs tools of mobilization and framing, or propaganda. Moreover, given that the interviews were conducted close to two years after the peak of the PAD movement, one is certainly justified in questioning the possibility that these sentiments are influenced by exposure to these discourse and rhetoric of the PAD leadership. We will soon see, however, that these are not simply a reproduction of rhetoric but are often accompanied by accounts of personal or close, if indirect, experience with Thaksin. More importantly, Reddy (1997) suggests that emotional utterances, or “emotives” as he calls it, fail to accurately reflect the actual emotion felt because language is inadequate in representing or characterizing a subjective state of feeling. Any attempt to articulate an emotion is an attempt to “name and categorize a subjective feeling state, making legible what was previously nonverbal” (Gould, 2004: 170). In line with these contentions, I maintain that these opinions reflect how political rhetoric and discourses are accepted and appropriated in motivating and transformative in the context of a movement. Thus, such opinions reveal to us the underlying motives, and motivations for oneʼs actions. More importantly, they tell us that some aspects of these 
 79
 
 respondentsʼ feelings may not be brought up to the surface. Thus, it is imperative to consider the context from which these respondents are coming from. Anger at Corruption One of the main accusations against Thaksin was his corrupted practices and abuse of office. In 2000, Thaksin had been accused by the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) for not reporting his assets accurately in the statutory declarations he made during his term as Foreign Minister in the 1990s (Pasuk and Baker, 2008b). Although he was acquitted of that charge, incidents such as the purchase of the land in Ratchadaphisek by his wife and the sale of Shin Corp to Temasek Holdings came to be construed and representative of some of his corrupt practices. That politicians are corrupt has come to be an accepted norm in Thailand (Thongchai, 2008), but what was particularly infuriating to the people was that Thaksin exercised his state power, utilizing legislation and policies to do so. Pela, a rentier, recounts the Ratchadaphisek incident to illustrate his opinion of Thaksin: “The land [in Ratchadaphisek]…something about selling state land to his family. He [Thaksin] used his wifeʼs name. He did something…something about changing the building height policy to cause the land price to fall. Then he tried to put other surrounding land into the same plot. And made the starting auction price low. Then when the wife came to bid, other people stepped aside. The law forbid politicians to bid. The price also dropped because demand for the land fell. The auction was on 31 December. Instead of a usual holiday, he made it a working day so he could pay for the taxes before the tax rose on 1st Jan of the new year…Then after that, he changed the building policy again that allowed it to build high-rise. Then he used his influence to try to say that if his wife buys itʼs not against the law…You canʼt do that!” – Pela, 41, Rentier 
 80
 
 In addition to this, it was expressed plainly by several respondents that Thaksin had the tendency to implement policies that benefitted himself and his associates: “[Thaksin] does not think of the country…[his] corruption policy [are] made for personal gain and partisan.” – Pu, 55, Private Restaurant Owner “Thaksin wants the treasure of the nation to his own (sic)… Iʼm not satisfied with the actions of Thaksin and his political party…the corruption policy [sic]…[which] act to benefit their own business and partisan…” – Ou, 24, Graduate “Having Thaksin was bad for Thailand. Look at the corruption.... Everything is terrible! He makes [policy] decisions very quickly yes. But these decisions are for his own benefit…He does everything for himself. OK, Taksin did many things. But he was never really sincere. He used his position in politics to help his business interests.” – Sung, 62, Principal of Private School These accounts and opinions are indicative of the sentiments among the ʻmiddle classʼ informants interviewed. The consensus on the relation between Thaksin implementing certain policies and how it furthers his own advantage is also clear. Unlike other politicians, “[Thaksin] is corrupt in a different way – people cheat by taking money under the table but Thaksin changes the system to make it not wrong. I cannot remember [the details]…[but it was] something about him not being required to pay taxes to the government. He has a company overseas and moves things around so that he doesnʼt need to pay tax. This is the first point that made the people angry – selling the company [referring to Shin Corp] to Temasek and not paying taxes.” – Tok, 46, small business owner There is no doubt that supporters of the PAD saw Thaksin as a corrupted man. Yet the outrage against Thaksinʼs corruption can also be seen as a dissatisfaction with the fact that the people were powerless in the face of a prime minister who was able to change and implement policies to suit his 
 81
 
 fancy. In other words, the general indignation towards corruption points to an underlying frustration emerging from the social closure represented by the lack of access to opportunities that may effect changes to the system. That is to say, unless one was part of Thaksinʼs inner circle, one would be subjected to the policies introduced and implemented without recourse. Furthermore, the anger that arose from his abuse of power is closely associated with Thaksinʼs character. This relation is best seen in accusations, irately expressed, such as: “[Thaksinʼs] not a good guy. He did everything for his own, for his family and for his friends. Not for the country…He always changed the all kind of things to get the benefit to him and his family.” – Silpa, 26, Hotelier “When he got Thaicom for himself. He gave away scholarships for kids from Thaicom. I think it was 500 Baht or something. We were happy for the kids and we opened bank accounts for them but he only gave one year. We checked the bank accounts we realized it was only one year. He is not sincere.” – Sung, 62, Principal of Private School Importantly, Sungʼs account also prompts us to consider incidents not well publicized by both the media and movement leaders: “You want to hear a fact about Thaksin? I tell you a story, I was there so I can tell you itʼs fact! You know the UBC [United Broadcasting Corporation, the previous name for True Visions cable provider] satellite dish? You can see all over, the red one…it was actually locally produced! But Thaksin say itʼs imported from the U.S. so the price is very high…I know this because many years ago, in my previous job, I was invited to take a tour of my clientʼs factory…this was before Thaksin became Prime Minister…I used to work for a chemistry company…this person [referring to the factory manager], he was very proud of his factory and wanted to show everybody. He invited me and I went. He show off the satellite that he made…my companyʼs products was use as a raw material to manufacture the satellite dish that Thaksin claim is imported from the U.S.! From then on, when people tell me that Thaksin is not corrupt, I don't believe...I seen it with my eyes! He's corrupt!” – Pela, 41, Rentier 
 82
 
 “The 30 Baht medical insurance was not [Thaksinʼs] idea. It was the previous minister Lekchuanʼs, from research from a doctor in Samut Songkran. It was actually 40 Baht from the research…But due to the elections, Thaksin got in. Then the senate needed 50,000 signatures to pass it because they didnʼt want it to go under him [Thaksin]…They said they were afraid Thaksin would take it. This was done one year before he won the election in Samut Songkran….Dr Puay, I know him. He knows my younger sister… Dr Puayʼs son is a senator and wanted to pass this bill before Thaksin got his hands on it. Unfortunately, they didnʼt get enough signatures and Thaksin got it. He did. Then he made it part of his campaign strategy.” – Cewai, 58, Teacher “Take his telecommunications company. That time with the mobile phones. He actually needs to pay taxes to TOT (a state-owned telecommunications company) for his usership. But he put the mobile usership he placed under duty-free items like tobacco, etc. This is dangerous for the country because he basically cheated the government of taxes. I remember sitting with someone from TOT. No one was able to handle the situation because he changed the laws…He said our telephone company to make it… public, so as not to pay taxes.” – Nan, 31, Real Estate Agent “Many plots, many things too long ago, many people cannot remember. It was very expensive but he did stuff [like changing policies] to make it cheap. He has a project to buy land in Bangkok. To build residential estates. If he is still PM, he would change the land around Suvarnabhumi to make it freehold so no one can take it back…Make it a free-trade zone. He must be the one in control. Or his family can control that area but we donʼt know how. Other people cannot go in.” – Tok, 46, Small Business Owner These accounts convey an important and clear message: Thaksinʼs corruption was not limited to his term in power and hence cast serious doubt on the integrity of his character. In short, Thaksin came to be recognized as “rotten inside”, as Pela sums it up. This idea is especially crucial when we consider the next allegations targeted at the former-premiere – perceived contempt for the monarchy. 
 83
 
 Anger at Perceived Contempt for the Monarchy Seen as competing with the king for symbolic moral authority, the incident of Thaksin insinuating himself into the seat usually reserved for the king during the monarchʼs 60th year of accession has come to be one of the key defining moments of Thaksinʼs perceived intent (see Albritton and Thawildawee, 2007). It did not help that Thaksinʼs forthrightness in stating that, “if he had a problem he would talk directly to the king”, signaled to both royalists and the rest of Thai society his implicit disrespect of the monarch by implying that he could speak to the king as a contemporary (Connors, 2008). For many Thais, this represented a bold challenge to one of the three pillars – Religion, Nation and Monarchy – of Thai society (see Ukrist, 2008), interpreted by some as an insult to the king. Together with the notion that Thaksin is a man of flawed character, the perception that he was challenging the king is clearly seen in several responses: “…I noticed he tried to make himself like the king. He tried to make himself, everything, like the king…he did many things which made me feel that he wanted to be king…” – Sung, 62, Principal of Private School “Thaksin insult[ed] the monarchy.” – Cewai, 58, Teacher “[Thaksin] discredited the monarchy. He also has links with other countries and we donʼt know what he says in these countries.” – Tok, 46, Small Business Owner It is clear that on the one hand, the perceived challenge to the king abhors the people; on the other hand, it indicated an attempt to contest the dominance of the institution of the monarchy – which has been influential in compromising and marginalizing elected politicians (McCargo, 2009). This 
 84
 
 was particularly salient and pivotal to members in the military and business world who have been marginalized by Thaksin over the years. To them the supremacy of the monarchy was probably their last protection against the monopoly Thaksin was gaining. Thus, it was particularly vital that the monarchy be protected – providing legitimacy to the use of royalist discourse in justifying the movement. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. Additionally, Thaksinʼs corruption through the use of policies clearly signaled the closure of opportunities to those not in his circle. Here, a glimpse of the underlying sense of fear among the military and businessmen is particularly prominent. Yet this is not restricted to these elites. The next section looks at the fear that underscores the anger and outrage felt among the economic middle class. Fear of Thaksinʼs power According to Weberʼs concept of domination, fear is an inherent feature. This includes the fear of oneʼs life chances, physical freedom and life, particularly in repressive states (Flam, 2005). The fear of Thaksin included these elements. It was a consequence of Thaksinʼs control over the media and other state apparatus as well as anxiety over the impending closure of resources and opportunities. His blatant use of media to attack his opponents was well known and on top of this was the fact that he also manipulated supposedly independent regulatory organizations for his own advantage (Kasian, 2006; Thongchai, 2008). Thaksinʼs authoritarian style of governance, 
 85
 
 coupled with his control and dominance over these institutions indicate to the people that “Thaksin was getting too powerful…too powerful for his own good. Many people were afraid of him, and his power.” – En, 45, Businessman “[Thaksin had] a tremendous amount of power itself to corruption…” – Ou, 24, Graduate However, it was not just this symbolic power that people feared. Rather, following the “extra-judicial killing” of more than 2000 people during the suppression of the insurgence in the Malay-Muslim region of Southern Thailand (ibid; see also McCargo, 2008), a climate of fear was promulgated and circulated widely among the people. This is best captured in Pelaʼs response when asked why he did not report or spread the news of Thaksinʼs impropriety in the satellite dish incident: Interviewer: “Why didnʼt you tell people about this incident? [the satellite dish incident, as mentioned above.] Pela: “Who will believe me? And I donʼt know what will happen to me if I say!” This unwillingness to speak up against Thaksin, at least on the individual level, further propagated a culture of fear among the people, explaining why Thaksin was able to go unchallenged for such a significant period of time. From Anger and Fear to Hatred As I have shown earlier, things took a turn after the sale of Shin Corp, which served as a triggering event leading to the emergence of the PAD movement. Perhaps on its own, the sale of Shin Corp to Temasek Holdings may not have resulted in the public outrage it garnered, given that it was not 
 86
 
 the first time Thaksin had manipulated policies for his own gain. Yet, for many, it was arguably the proverbial ʻlast straw on the camelʼs backʼ of corrupted practices and abuse of power. When it was clear that almost nothing parliamentary could be done to stop Thaksin, the combination of outrage against Thaksinʼs corruption in addition to the perceived contempt for the Thai King matured into a deep sense of hatred: “I donʼt like Thaksin, I hate him…He do everything for his own, for his family and for his friends. Not for the country.” – Silpa, 26, Hotelier This intense emotion of hatred is particularly significant in the emergence of the PAD movement for two reasons: first, it was indicative of the grievances on the ground, a crucial ingredient in facilitating the emergence of social movements; second, it represented, and aided, the successful conception of an “injustice frame” – “a way of viewing a situation or condition that expresses indignation or outrage over a perceived injustice and which identifies those blameworthy people responsible for it” (Goodwin, et al, 2001: 8). Gamson (1992: 32) says that injustice is likened to “the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul”. This, in turn, could result in a situation whereby the role of the human actor(s) is exaggerated and structural constraints are overlooked. The consequence is often one where this anger is (mis)targeted towards “easy and inappropriate targets” (Goodwin, et al, 2001: 8; Gamson, 1992). In this case, the structural exclusion of groups in the ʻmiddle classʼ, members of the military and the businessmen has come to take a backseat in relation to the emotion of hatred and injustice. This could also explain the prevailing focus on the movement being an intra-elite conflict. In 
 87
 
 short, strong emotions of anger and fear culminate into hatred and prompts people towards mobilization. However, it is worth noting that anger will not be shown when punishment is expected for its expression (Kemper, 1978). Furthermore, the crippling climate of fear parallels the repression of an authoritarian regime. Thus, despite the deep hatred, mobilization did not occur immediately. 4.4 Groups in the Middle Class: Interests and Emotions A major criticism of the existing literature on works on the movement, as mentioned in Chapter 1, is the tendency to present the PAD movement as a heterogeneous middle class movement. In the process, group interests are overlooked and the movement has been identified as simply a movement for democracy, or even worse, as an intra-elite struggle. I argue, however, that the heterogeneity of the middle class must be understood in order to fully appreciate the movement as a consequence of social closure. More importantly, it is necessary to understand how the leaders of the PAD movement managed to galvanize and unite groups with such a diverse, albeit similar, social background. This section aims to illustrate how members of the middle class has differing, immediate, interests and how this is reflected in their dissatisfaction. Specifically, I aim to show the presence of various groups found in this social stratum through the different interests and emotions displayed. I contend that despite these differences, the display of similar emotions suggests that they occupy similar social status and position. 
 88
 
 As I have argued in Chapter 2, emotions arise from the “structure of relations of power and status in which [people] are implicated” (Barbalet, 2002: 4). In other words, emotions are embedded in social relationships (ibid). Thus, people sharing similar structural positions may experience common emotions (Kemper, 1978). Furthermore, individuals, in their relationships with others who occupy similar social situation, contribute to “the feelings of the group qua group” (Barbalet, 2002: 5). In other words, members of the Thai middle class may have different interests and priorities but because they are subjected to a similar process of social closure, they experience and display similar emotions. With this in mind, I contend that one reason the PAD movement has been identified as a middle class movement is not merely the fact that its supporters occupy positions in the middle stratum of Thai society but that they displayed similar emotions that arose due to the closure they experienced. The previous section has identified the main emotions that emerged with the allegations of Thaksinʼs corruption, abuse of power and his perceived contempt for the king. It is interesting to note that while these emotions of anger and fear were found across the middle class, closer examination reveals that within this social stratum are groups having different priorities that reflect their interests. While the emotions displayed are common, the specifics of discontent points to the presence of various groups occupying the same social, middle class, position. Broadly, respondents who were concerned with the state of the economy as a result of the political turmoil were predominantly those with their 
 89
 
 own business or those who were most directly affected by the state of the economy. “I think right now [political conflict] should stop that now. To should unite each other and build the economy for the country to go to the like…good situation. The situation right now is getting better than the past. But thereʼs still some bombs in Bangkok… for me I believe that if people are united, no colour, and help each other, the country as a whole will be getting better. Like… as I say, if you have the mob in Bangkok in Thailand, the foreigners will not come to Thailand for sure. They will say this country is in the crises. They fight each other, why we have to come to Thailand to travel. It [political conflict] is stop and make country beautiful. I think people from abroad will come to Thailand and the economy will grow because there will be lot of investments in Thailand. Maybe help in that thing.” – Silpa, 26, Hotelier (emphasis mine) As I have highlighted, Silpaʼs concern for the economy is closely linked to his family-run hotel business. It would not be too difficult to look beyond the surface and understand his economic interests. With this in mind, when Silpa claims that Thaksin does “everything for his own…not for the country”, we must consider that this has important underlying meanings – that Thaksinʼs self-interests disadvantages others, especially small businesses such as Silpaʼs. This was also seen in Pelaʼs account, “I think the economy now is better, but not best…this political fighting has not been good for us, for the country.” – Pela, 41, Rentier We must take into account that Pela may have other underlying interests as well. In his account earlier, Pela expressed explicit concern against the fact that Thaksin “did something…something about changing the building height policy to cause the land price to fall. Then he tried to put other surrounding land into the same plot. And made the starting auction price low. Then when the wife came to bid, other people stepped aside… The price also dropped because demand for the land fell…Then after that, he changed the building policy again that allowed it to build high-rise.” – Pela, 41, Rentier 
 90
 
 Pela has his own block of condominium that he rents out as his main source of income. While he disclosed that he has investment in other areas, the fact that policy changes pertaining to land would affect him directly is clear. Hence, Pelaʼs fear and anger towards Thaksinʼs actions must be taken into consideration in the context of his immediate interest. In other words, his vulnerability as a small-time rentier is contingent on policy changes that, in turn, affect the laws of demand and supply. Thus, even though people like Pela and Silpa were both concerned with different aspects of the economy, their reaction and emotions towards Thaksin were similar – that of fear, anger culminating into hatred. On the other hand, respondents who identified themselves as middle class but were not involved in businesses, in other words, public servants, were less concerned with Thaksinʼs domination of the economic sphere. It is clear that while they were not directly dependent on the economy they displayed a sense of outrage against the fact that Thaksin “…perverted the system so that what was wrong became legal. So if he wanted to do something illegal, he would just change the system so that it would allow him to do that and he would not be guilty of breaking any laws. He is very intelligent. If he was like Lee Kuan Yew, he would make a great leader. Lee Kuan Yew looked after everyone. His [Thaksinʼs] greatest weakness is his intelligence and savvy. He used his intelligence to be-little others and to make fun and hurt other people. This is also how he creates enemies…There are many things I like about him like how he developed Thailand and how he looked after the civil service. But then I ask myself, this is how much you give me, but how much have you taken from me? Those who are ignorant would just look at what he gives and say he is good but they donʼt realize that he has taken a lot more from the system than what he has put in.” – Pa, 38, Medical Service Personnel 
 91
 
 In this case, the concern for Pa was not that she had been impacted by Thaksinʼs dominance in the economic sphere. Instead, it was Thaksinʼs corruption that that allowed him to “tak[e] a lot more from the system than what he has put in” which irate Pa. This discontent can be interpreted as a reflection of the powerlessness experienced by the group of public servants in the middle class, who are subjected to any and every policy changes implemented. Furthermore, the lack of alternatives for them to assert their own dominance or secure their social positions other areas, such as the economy, means that this group is particularly vulnerable to structural changes that disadvantage them. Thus, this group has, arguably, invested interests in both the political and economic sphere for these aspects will impact their overall status as well. In other words, the fear of Thaksin having the autonomy and monopoly to dictate policy changes without regard for the middle class who would be most affected by these policies fuels the discontent against the ex-prime minister. In short, the PAD mobilization can be understood in terms of the galvanization of an “affective class” at a particular moment of Thai history where momentous structural change, in the form of the economic crisis. This “affective class” that constituted the core of PAD supporters was made up of individuals with convergent emotional reactions to the Thaksin regime. More importantly, this display of similar emotions, as seen in the previous section, suggests that they occupy different social status – for instance, businessman, public servant and student – but similar social position – they were excluded 
 92
 
 from social, political and economic resources and opportunities which have been hoarded by Thaksin. 4.5 Conclusion: From Closure to Emotions The underlying motivation for mobilization finds its roots in the rapid changing economic and political structures in the period during Thaksinʼs reign. In outlining the structural changes that disadvantages the middle class, I have argued that the economic crisis lays the stage for the total exclusion of groups in Thai society that are not in Thaksinʼs circle. In addition, I contend that this social closure led to a deep sense of dissatisfaction with Thaksin, seen in the form of anger, fear and hatred. As demonstrated above, the middle class consists of different groups with differing interests and points, firstly, to group diversity in Thai society, second, to the fact that opponents of Thaksin are not homogenous. However, because of the social closure they experience, they have come to display similar emotions. In turn, they are unified by these emotions and mobilized into action. Again, it must be noted that the emotions seen does flow from a loss of material power and this thesis maintains that it is not advocating an approach that diminishes the material approach. Instead, it is by recognizing that emotions are consequences of power relations that we are able to understand how and why people from seemingly diverse socio-economic background have come to be classified as belonging to the same social group. The next chapter will examine the process by which these emotions, such as anger, are re-appropriated, or used 
 93
 
 to frame the movement, so as to counter fear and draw on optimism to mobilize the people. 
 94
 
 Chapter 5: Mechanisms of Mobilization 5.1 Introduction In the previous chapter, I showed how structural changes facilitated Thaksinʼs exclusion of certain members of the economic middle class and other groups in Thai society. In addition, I have argued that emotions such as fear and anger directed towards the former prime minister arose both in response to his alleged corruption and perceived contempt for the monarchy, but also as a consequence of the social exclusion enforced by Thaksinʼs monopoly over power. Having now gained an insight to the conditions and motivations for participation in the PAD movement, this chapter examines the processes by which grievances and emotions are capitalized on to unite the various groups found in the middle of the socio-economic stratum and mobilize them into action. This chapter is particularly concerned with understanding how these emotions of fear and anger, found among the different groups of the middle class were transformed into hatred. However, hatred alone does not necessarily translate into mobilization, especially when the regime is repressive (see Tarrow, 1998). Hence, the questions we ought to address is how did the movement eventually emerge? What types of identities were played out in order to mobilize these people to join the PAD movement? Does a class identity centred on political slogans emphasize the common interests of the “middle class” play out? 
 95
 
 I suggest that it is the hope for inclusion and change that allowed the ʻmiddle classʼ to overcome their fear and act on the hatred they harboured. Thus, this chapter looks at how both hatred and hope were used to galvanize participation in the movement. This is accompanied by the strategic use of resources such as ideology and communications which allowed for both organization and mobilization. In accordance to these, this chapter argues that the process of frame alignment – through the demonization of Thaksin and the construction of a pro-royalist discourse – as well as the utilization of resources such as the media – while conveying a sense of hope – contributed largely to the emergence and rapid growth of the PAD movement. More importantly, the fact that these PAD supporters were galvanized in such a similar manner hints to the notion that they occupy similar position, or at the very least have similar experiences, influenced by their structural position. This chapter is thus structured in the following manner: in the first section, after briefly articulating the relation between frame alignment and mobilization, I show that emotions are a fundamental component of the frame alignment process. I then explore the role emotions play and how they are channeled to generate the necessary conditions for mobilization in the PAD movement. Next, I examine the rhetoric used to shape the frames articulated and presented to the public; as well as how this process allowed hatred to emerge from the primary emotions of fear and anger. In addition, I contend that the mobilization of colours – an iconic representation of the movement – facilitated this process through the creation of an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991) underscored by a pro-royalist sentiments conveyed in the 
 96
 
 colour Yellow. Through this symbolic association with the king, the movement gains further legitimacy via the framing of itself as a movement that stands for the monarch. Finally, I add that the successful mobilization of the movement was also contingent on the important resources such as sponsorship and the media. More importantly, the use of media also served an important ideological framing tool by portraying a picture of small victory to the people, creating a sense of hope among them. 5.2 Frame Alignment and Mobilization First, it is essential to establish that a fundamental function of frames is to “selectively punctuat[e] and encod[e] objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within oneʼs present or past environment” (Snow and Benford, 1992: 137). Snow and Benford (1988; see also Noakes and Johnston, 2005) outline three fundamental framing tasks – diagnosis, prognosis and motivation – and argue that together, these help ensure the success of framing activities through the identification of a political or social problem, the parties responsible and a solution. Diagnosis frames tells people what is wrong and why. The emotional component of this framing task involves telling people why they should be upset about the problem as well. Prognosis framing, on the other hand, offers a solution – it tells people what they can, and should do, as well as the possible outcomes. Implicitly, this form of framing implies that “hope for change or destructive hate are called for” (Flam, 2005: 24). However, the problem identified in diagnosis and the solution offered in prognosis may not be enough to mobilize people. 
 97
 
 Hence, motivational framing is necessary in offering people a legitimate reason for joining the movement. Framing activities always include an emotional element (Jasper, 1998; Flam, 2005). Among the tactics and strategies for the mobilization of participants, emotions and the manipulation of emotions feature rather prominently. Emotions allow us to see the different ways in which movement participants are motivated, attain solidarity with each other, and shape their actions (Calhoun, 2001). Most social movements derive a large part of their power from the strong emotions evoked among participants (Goodwin and Pfaff, 2001). However, while the mobilization of intensified emotion is essential, it is insufficient to result in occurrences of contention (Aminzade and McAdam, 2001). Nevertheless, emotions are especially significant in social movements for the fact that, as Flam (2005: 24) notes, one of the primary objectives of social movements is to “re-socialize their (potential) members and the larger public” (see also Aminzade and McAdam, 2001). This is done through a re-direction of emotions towards themselves and the opponents, often through the important process of “frame alignment” (Snow and Benford, 1988). Essentially, self-defeating emotions are suppressed while new and assertive emotions are proposed (Flam, 2005). In other words, this new “feeling rules” (Hochschild, 1983) come to constitute an “alternative ideological account” which shifts the blame from the individual to the system (Britt and Heise, 2000) – in this case, a system created by Thaksin. Therefore, emotions allow for the connection between macro-politics and the micropolitics of social movements by bridging the gap between ʻcause and effectʼ. 
 98
 
 In addition, Barrington Moore, Jr (1978) notes that the emergence of moral outrage must not be taken for granted for injustice alone does not necessarily translate into anger. Instead, he argues that it is the combination of a change in the distribution of resources and rewards, coupled with the realization that its source is ʻman-madeʼ that infuriates people. This, however, is possible only after a “complex, contingent and time-consuming process of developing new standards of injustice and condemnation comes to its conclusion” (Moore, Jr, 1978 in Flam, 2005:27). This new “standard” is often facilitated by frame alignment processes – which aim to accord meaning to events or incidents, helping to organize experience and guide individual and collective action (Snow, et al, 1986). In short, emotions and framing activities often work together to result in successful mobilization. Accordingly, it is crucial that we understand the process in which emotions contribute to participation and mobilization in the PAD movement. On one level, emotions have the power to shape the assessment of costs and benefits involved in any actions to be undertaken (Aminzade and McAdam, 2001). For instance, extreme fear can trigger actions even in the face of great risks and a lack of hope of success (ibid). Also, opportunities occur at moments when the resources acquire more value due to changes in the environment in which the social movement is situated (Ganz, 2004). Thus, it is not surprising that movement leaders would choose to capitalize on this emotional aspect in their attempt to generate support and mobilization. Therefore, my argument in this section is this: the demonization of Thaksin and the simultaneous construction of his alleged challenge to the monarchy 
 99
 
 aims to exacerbate the existing anger and fear among the ʻmiddle classʼ. In other words, while the strategy of framing discourse is a conscious effort of the movement leaders to mobilize support, I contend that this must be understood in relation to the broader historical contingencies. 5.2.1 Framing Discourse: Mobilizing Fear and Hope Demonizing Thaksin: Liar, Terrorist and Challenger of Rachaprachasamasai In the previous chapter, I touched briefly on how strong emotions are a necessary component of injustice frames. Essentially, these frames aim to dramatize the illegitimacy of social situations and to accord the blame to others for this ʻinjusticeʼ (Gamson, 1992). According to Gamson, the ʻpersonalizationʼ of injustice appears to be one of the keys to mobilizing anger at the onset of a movement. As such, movement leaders need to bridge the gap between “abstract notions of unfairness to the emotion of moral indignation and to sustain emotions that will dissipate in the absence of a clear target” (Aminzade and McAdam, 2001: 34). This process is most salient in the way Thaksin is constructed to be a man of questionable character: “Thaksin Shinawatra always wants to express himself successful, smart and competent. His supporters even claims [him] to be a Thai-version of Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Aung San Suu Kyi. In fact, he is nothing but a cheap habitual liar and a boastful coward.”17 (emphasis added) 























































 17
“Triple
Standards
of
the
Coward”,
http://www.antithaksin.com/BlankForm.php?Aid=0802045
 100
 
 
 Furthermore, he was also constructed as a “terrorist”18 who had “hijacked democracy with money politics”19. This portrayal of the former TRT Party leader as a shrewd and crafty individual who manipulated things so long as they were “useful for his political objectives”20 and used his “enormous wealth…to purchase loyalty and surrogates in all areas”21, was further depicted as an individual whose “vengefulness is so intense that he is willing to see his country go down the drain at his behest. He really believes he has a right to pursue retribution against his enemies – everyone except his cronies.”22 On top of that, Thaksinʼs violent handling of the insurgency in the South came to be used against him as his opponents painted him as an “enemy of Muslims”23, adding to his “crimes”24. This reminder of how Thaksin dealt with the uprising in the South reinforces the ʻinjusticeʼ that he brought to the people. These portrayals of Thaksin as a “shrewd”, “cowardly” “terrorist” and even a “vengeful” individual serve to evoke a sense of moral outrage against him; and more strategically, keeps the image of this ʻcorrupt politicianʼ in the minds of the people. These reminders play an important function of managing 























































 18
“Thaksin
Shinawatra,
Official
International
Terrorist”,
 http://antithaksin.wordpress.com/2010/06/02/thaksin‐shinawatra‐official‐international‐ terrorist/
 19
“Thaksin
has
hijacked
democracy
with
money
politics”,
 http://antithaksin.wordpress.com/2008/10/26/thaksin‐has‐hijacked‐democracy‐with‐money‐ politics/
 20
“Fugitive
ex‐prime
minister
is
willing
to
see
the
country
destroyed
in
his
pursuit
of
revenge”,
 http://antithaksin.wordpress.com/2008/10/24/fugitive‐ex‐prime‐minister‐is‐willing‐to‐see‐ the‐country‐destroyed‐in‐his‐pursuit‐of‐revenge/
 21
ibid.
 22
ibid.
 23
“Thaksin,
the
Enemey
of
Muslims”,
 http://www.antithaksin.com/BlankForm.php?Aid=0801015
 24
“Thaskin:
Crimes”,
http://www.antithaksin.com/BlankForm.php?Aid=0805
 101
 
 
 a sense of insecurity or fear among the adherents. In doing so, the prevailing moral indignation remains close to both the hearts of the people and the movement. In addition, this portrayal of Thaksin conjures up memories of the Chatichai regime where the former Prime Minister was also seen as blatantly corrupt. This evoking of a ʻsocial memoryʼ furthers the demonization of Thaksin and accords the movement even greater momentum. Also, it was the allegations that Thaksin himself committed these acts of cronyism that allowed the movement leaders to capitalize on these, using them to their advantage. In this respect, the demonization of Thaksin must be seen in light of both the acts of Thaksin that fuels accusations, as well as the explicit attempt by movement leaders to appropriate these acts and frame them for their own purposes. However, the demonization of Thaksin alone did not translate into active mobilization. Instead, it was the evocation of a royal-nationalistic rhetoric that got the people riled up. In Chapter 3, I outlined the origins of the movement and highlighted that the PAD movement began with an attack on Thaksinʼs disregard of democratic values. However, this shifted to his challenges on rachaprachasamasai – the relationship between monarch and the people. This was due in part to his ill-advised actions at the Emerald Palace and in part an attempt to mobilize emotional effervescence through the framing of grievances that resonates with the lived experiences and beliefs of members and potential members alike (see Aminzade and McAdam, 2001). Indeed, it was the call from the PAD leaders to ʻprotect the kingʼ that got people behind the PAD and into the streets: 102
 
 
 “[I want to] participate in managing the country and the national religious institutions to protect the king.” ‐ Plar, 30, Executive “[I support PAD] because national defended [sic]. King call…” – Pu, 55, Private Restaurant Owner “[I went] for the king…[I think] should have some people support yellow shirts because of the king…I go.” – Nan, 31, Real Estate Agent “I went [to rally] because I love the king…I want him to reign…” – Cewai, 58, Teacher. “This is important to protect the monarchy. Whoever is the PM [Prime Minister] is not important but the monarchy must be protected.” - Pim, 34, Fashion Designer The notion that the King of Thailand was “inviolable by the will of the people”25 – meaning that anything said or done against the king would be “castigated by the people”26 – underlies the impetus behind the mobilization of the people. This notion has its origins, of course, in the late 1950s when the monarchy was reinserted into Thai politics, but occupying a new position of symbolic power. Briefly, the 1950s saw the Sarit regime reinstating the use of royal language and implicitly signaled to the people the importance of the monarchy (see also Handley, 2006). Furthermore, for a military-led government to display overt support for the monarchy implied that the monarchy had a position that was indeed, “above politics” – in this case, not “over and beyond” (Tongchai, 2008: 15), but superior to the military and the state. Furthermore, as Handleyʼs (2006) controversial book demonstrates, the sacredness of the monarchy was essentially a nationalist ideology that was fashioned through 























































 25
Anand
Panyarachun
in
an
interview
with
foreign
journalists
after
the
launch
of
The
King
of
 Thailand
in
World
Focus,
a
compilation
of
foreign
media
articles
on
the
life
of
King
Bhumibol
 Adulyadej,
Rama
IX
(available
at
http://antithaksin.wordpress.com/2008/11/05/the‐king‐of‐ thailand‐in‐world‐focus/#more‐1303).

 26
ibid.
 103
 
 
 years of image creation and myth making. Thus, the PAD leadership cleverly positions itself as a movement that “protects the Monarchy”27 and concurrently constructs Thaksin as an individual who “wants to launder himself through amending the laws with his proxy politicians, while trying to abolish the Monarchy and make himself a President, that is to cause turmoils and change Thailand from being a "Kingdom" to a "Republic" instead.”28 Accordingly, the movement presents itself as a crusade against Thaksin, aiming to “get rid of [him] and his proxy politicians and punish them according to the laws”29. Thus, by demonizing Thaksin and constructing a narrative that capitalizes on the use of binary opposites – Thaksin as “wrong” and “evil”, and hence, the movement as “right” and “good” – to pit the allegedly power hungry politician against the benevolent king, it is not difficult to understand how the prevailing sense of moral outrage is stirred up. In a nation that generally regards the monarchy as an infallible institution, for an individual to be seen as challenging the king is tantamount to an lèse-majesté act. More importantly, in representing the movement as one that protects the monarchy, the movement gains symbolic legitimacy. Not all supporters of the PAD, however, were mobilized by the call to protect the king: “…some people support yellow shirts because of the king, but itʼs not for me. Some people who support yellow shirts, maybe, they know they got their information, their bad information about Thaksin…I support them, but Iʼm not fully [sic] fully support the yellow shirts because I donʼt think they…what they do support the king. Sometimes yellow shirts do something to support their own thing as well. Yellow shirts try to say… ʻOh we need to protect the king because red shirts say something bad to our kingʼ. So the yellow 























































 27
“Ultimate
objectives
of
PAD”,
http://www.anti‐thaksin.com.

 28
ibid.
 29
ibid.
 104
 
 
 shirts need to have a mob to protect the king but itʼs not the good way to protect the king.” – Silpa, 26, Hotelier Yet, this symbolic legitimacy is essential for it serves as a rallying point for the ideologically and politically scattered groups in the PAD movement. The monarchy thus serves as the uniting factor for these groups who were unable to forge a coherent opposition to the Thaksin government (Kasian, 2006; see also Kengkij and Hewison, 2009). In calling for a pro-monarchy stance, not only have the movement leaders constructed a motivational frame that aims to rally people for a royalist cause; it also organizes and guide, individual and collective, action through the creation of an ʻenemyʼ against whom they ought to unite. Together, these discourses conflate and exalt the monarchy and the nation as a collective entity that must be protected. In other words, the PAD presented itself as a movement out to remove a corrupted leader and to protect the true legitimate ruler of the nation. Frames, thus, serves as the medium though which members of the movement interpret the blame that has been assigned (Snow and Benford, 1992). To say that Thaksin was a “liar” and an “enemy” is to imply that the nation cannot remain under the reign of this “terrorist”; it also suggests that the present condition is a consequence of this “coward” and hence, he ought to be opposed. Simply put, the discourse of royalism then supersedes other motives, becoming the main identifying feature of the movement. What deserves our attention too is the potency of these frames. Snow and Benford points out that while frames may be powerful, the relationship 105
 
 
 between frames and mobilization is often less direct, that is to say, “the potency of a frame is not assured by a highly elaborated frame” (1992: 140). It follows that the effectiveness of these frames is dependent on the extent to which they resonate with the ʻlife worldʼ of its partisans and bystanders. In a society where the monarchy is highly regarded, a challenge to the king would strike a chord in the hearts of almost every Thai. In addition, the image of Thaksin as a “power hungry” politician also resonates with the notion, and memory, of the exclusion experienced by the ʻmiddle classʼ while Thaksin was in power. The efficacy of these frames then, rests in the way movement leaders tapped into the prevailing sense of anger and fear against Thaksin and constructed demonized images that fit and amplify these emotions, thus reproducing and further aggravating them. In other words, because hatred is an emotion built up from a mixture of fear and anger (Kemper, 1978), the demonized portrayal of Thaksin, especially images and notions of him challenging the King, builds on the existing climate of fear and culminates in the sense of hatred agianst him. What is of greater significant in understanding the success of the PAD movement is the choice of adopting Yellow as its defining characteristic. The adoption of colours by the movement and its members reflects an attempt to adopt an identity that is readily recognized while enforcing social closure. At the same time, the use of Yellow – a colour that represents the Thai monarchy – aims to stir up culturally recognized feelings of patriotism and promonarchy sentiments – for “culture…powerfully affects what we think we should feel, what we try to feel, and sometimes what we feel” (Hochschild, 106
 
 
 1990: 122). Thus, the creation of an identity along a colour that is closely associated with the monarchy has two consequences: first, it allows for identification with an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991) that is also proroyalist. This has an important implication for mobilization on the level of networks and the notion that they are part of a larger community. Secondly, adherents subscribe to the overarching identity of the Yellow shirts, no longer as individual members of the ʻmiddle classʼ. In other words, the Yellow shirts accord them a new collective identity. 5.2.2 Colours, Identity and Boundary Work It is instructive to consider Sawerʼs (2007) proposal that visual strategies of social movements have much to inform us about how they are trying to connect with their supporters. In creating symbolic languages that allow for emotional identification, an emotional unity – often an important resource in building social movements – is forged. Thus, the selection and wearing of political colours performs that function, serving also as a statement of identity and values. Such a move facilitates emotional identification and emphasizes the organizational need for distinction. In other words, the use of colours allows a movement to enforce a social closure around itself, its members and its ideologies. On the one hand, the use of Yellow – the colour associated with King Bhumibol, or “the kingʼs colour” (Sung, 62, Principal of Private School) – not only represented the monarchy but also aimed to perform the role of uniting the people through a sense of shared pride. On the other hand, just as the creation of a collective 107
 
 
 identity demarcates cognitive boundaries, it also gives rise to an emotional affect on the grounds of membership, impacting the strength of a movementʼs identity (Jasper, 1998). In other words, it allows members to subscribe to the notion of a collective, “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991). Participants subscribe to the notion that they are fighting for the nation and more importantly, alongside their ʻfriendsʼ – even if they have not met before: “I did it because of the country. We are willing to sacrifice for the country. [My] comrades were willing to brave the heat and rain. But if we ourselves are Thai and we donʼt care about our own country, we donʼt help our friends. Itʼs shameful.” – Tok, 46, Small Business Owner “I chose to do this [participate in the street protest] because I like to support people. I want to show that I am sincere and I am not afraid. I know that just giving money or supporting in the background is possible but this cause needs numbers to succeed. So I decided that I would sacrifice myself.” – Hiw, 57, Trader It is this notion of collectivity that promotes a sense of commitment among the supporters of the PAD. The sense of commitment helps account, in part, for the mobilization and participation in the street demonstrations staged by the PAD as members of the movement feel obliged to participate in the movement due to the perceived social ties between them. Hence, I contend that the mobilization of colours – an iconic representation of the movement – serves to enact a boundary segregating groups in the PAD from others while reinforcing those in the movement. Through the creation of this identity, the movement gains further legitimacy via the framing of itself as a pro-royalist movement. In addition, the association of colours furthers purports an ideology that allow adherents of the PAD movement to perceive themselves as a collective group contesting for a 108
 
 
 nationalist cause. In addition, the incorporation of the yellow colour as part of the movementʼs identity, from a resource mobilization perspective was a clever appropriation of the fact that a large amount of yellow shirts were produced to commemorate King Bhumibolʼs 60th year of ascension (Sutakanat and Drukier, 2006; see also McCargo, 2009). Capitalizing on both the symbolism behind the colour as well as the fact that the people were encouraged to wear these shirts as a demonstration of their loyalty and love for the king30, the appropriation of such existing resources lends the movement a greater sense of legitimacy while reducing the need for the creation of new ideological and material symbols. In summary, the ideological resources mobilized by the movement involved the strategic construction of a demonized Thaksin who allegedly challenged the king. In the process, important strong emotions of anger, hatred and fear that resonate with the lived experiences of the people are generated, contributing to the overall climate that was conducive for mobilization. For the use of such ideological resources to be effective, the leadership would have to evoke emotions that are both strong and similar among the people. As we have seen, emotions are a result of power relations in social interactions. Hence, I posit that the fundamental reason these emotions were common among the participants of the PAD movement is related to the idea that they occupy similar social positions – that is to say, they come from the same “class”, or group. 























































 30
http://www.thailandqa.com/forum/showthread.php?10090‐Thais‐to‐wear‐yellow‐shirts‐ every‐Monday

 109
 
 
 With these ideological resources in place, it was the use of private media that facilitated participation in the street demonstrations. 5.2.3 Private Media: Information and Coordination Resource mobilization theorists remind us that it is insufficient for any movement to rely solely on ideological resources due to the fact that organization and coordination is a necessary component of any successful movement. Hence, material resources such as finance and communication are an important aspect of successful mobilization as well. Accordingly, this section examines the importance the media in the mobilization of the PAD movement, allowing the movement to gather momentum and strength rapidly and facilitated the mobilization process. A fundamental issue with the use of “impersonal media” such as mass media public service announcements is that the response rate is usually low (Oliver and Marwell, 1992). However, when coupled with social networks that are closely knitted, the publicity can generate discussion among the masses and result in whole networks of people participating. This was certainly true for the case of the PAD movement: “Much of this mobilisation is possible due to ASTVʼs reach, which is currently estimated at 20 million viewers… [ASTVʼs] audience has doubled since 2006, when [it] had 10 million viewers, because [it] present the political side of the news that is not available on national TV.ʼʼ31 In presenting itself as providing news that are not available on ʻnational TVʼ, it criticized the government, allegedly controlled by Thaksin via proxy, and in the 























































 31
“Satellite
TV
boosts
Anti‐Gov’t
Protests”,
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=43798.
 110
 
 
 process, reinforces its ideology. Also, it gave the public an impression that it is “challenging the old media order in the countryʼʼ32 while “offering knowledge and political information and new ideas that have never been seen on Thai TV… [ASTV] has opened a new space for TV. There is 100 percent media freedom. You can say anything against the elected government and get away.ʼʼ33 In addition, websites that support the movement also propagated the notion that ASTV was a champion for ʻreal newsʼ, citing members of the public who noted that “Those [other] stations offer little of the kind of programmes that we want to see — about politics in Thailand, corruption, how the government is abusing its power… We want to know more of the truth that is happening in our country; we want to know about the cases against this government…you cannot get this information on other channels.”34 Statements like these gives off the impression that victories against the Thaksin influenced government – which had been seen as dominating the national media arena35 – are being contested and won, creating a sense of hope while overcoming fear through these small, but nevertheless, tangible victories (Aminzade and McAdam, 2001). This is particularly significant for the fact that the creation of a sense of hope helps bolster a sense that given the right conditions, the movement can succeed. As such, supporters may be more willing to mobilize and participate. 























































 32
ibid.
 33
“Asian
Satellite
Television
(ASTV)”,
http://antithaksin.wordpress.com/2008/11/03/asia‐ satellite‐television‐astv‐boosts‐anti‐govt/
 34
ibid.
 35
“Thaksin,
the
Media
Repressor”,
http://www.antithaksin.com/BlankForm.php?Aid=0801012

 111
 
 
 5.2.4 Mobilizing Discourse: Hope Theoretically, we can understand hope as the flipside of anger resulting from a loss of autonomy. It demonstrates the optimism and desire to regain this lost power. Similarly, hope forms the final piece in the puzzle – supporters of the PAD hoped to usurp power from Thaksin and in the process, reinstate their own form of social closure. This is evident from the respondents: “Thaksin is a person that is harmful to national security…I think people do not want any evil and wicked politicians to rule over the country. I think we all want to protect the nation…Thaksin must go because we do not want people at Vote [election] buying corruption [sic]…” – Ou, 24, Graduate “If Thaksin stays [in power], we canʼt do anything…nobody can. Only if he goes then can we do something…” – Pela, 41, Rentier This recognition that change was possible in the absence of Thaksin indicated the hope that the people had and was in line with what key figures in the middle class opposition alleged – that Thaksinʼs populism was the main reason for the rejection of his leadership. Claiming that his style of leadership could result in the destruction of the nation in the event of another economic crisis (Pasuk and Baker, 2008b), Thaksin had to be overthrown in order to ensure that the economy stays afloat. In doing so, “political influence” will also be restored to the “middle class” (ibid: 78). 5.2.5 Mobilizing Resources: Media The use of media goes beyond the perpetuation of an ideology. In Chapter 2, mention was made that Sondhi Limthongkul, one of the founding leaders of the movement, owns one of the private media channels, ASTV, in 112
 
 
 Thailand, allowing the movement to communicate its ideas and crucial information to its subscribers and members of the public. This came across especially noticeably in most of the interviews conducted: more than half of the total number of respondents said that: “I found out about these [Thaksinʼs crimes] from ASTV…” – Hiw, 57, Trader “…most of my information is from ASTV and Nation cable. Other channels donʼt go in depth about these issues.“ – Pu, 55, Private Restaurant Owner “ASTV give us information that is not in the [other] news or heard before. Some of these things never made it to the mass media. The media doesnʼt tell us everything, like the details of the structures, etc especially if itʼs government controlled… If you just read the general news, you donʼt know about his corruption. Many things we heard before raised suspicion but was never really clear. But with ASTV, things became clearer and we could make our own conclusions after reading from others as well.” – Tok, 46, Small Business Owner “I think they [ASTV] give us news that is very clear to see what Taksin did and we can see how he benefitted… how he used his power to gain more money…” - Pim, 34, Designer The fact that ASTV was controlled by the PAD allowed for a clear and direct propagation of the movementʼs ideologies to its target audience. Thus, while ASTV promulgated ideas that construct Thaksin in a demonized manner, it also relayed crucial information on the plans of the movement such as the date and venue of protests – as Plar, an interviewee informed me36. Furthermore, the use of technology utilizing social media also allowed for a huge following online: 























































 36
Information
and
instructions
were
also
disseminated
through
websites
that
openly
supports
 the
PAD
movement.
For
instance,
information
on
protest
dates
and
corresponding
instructions
 can
be
found
at
http://www.antithaksin.com/BlankForm.php?Aid=0102031
and
 http://www.antithaksin.com/BlankForm.php?Aid=0101014.
 113
 
 
 “I follow forums online…we talk a lot about, discuss about bad things Thaksin did. Some people put it on Facebook [a social networking site] and we will read it…” – Ou, 24, Graduate It is obvious from these quotes that the ease at which information is transmitted is, on the one hand, aided by communication technology such as the mass media. I emphasize that because ASTV, a major player in the communication of information to the public in the PAD movement, is essentially controlled by the movementʼs leaders, problems of mobilizing financial resources for access to media. This then allowed the movement to devote its resources towards other areas such as the coordination of transport and logistics for its supporters at the demonstrations: The yellow shirt supporters in Khon Kaen will pool together and book a Chan Tour bus. We will go to the ASTV office to get a ticket. We only get a ticket per person – no cash, just the ticket to go... – Cewai, 58, Teacher This is also seen in how the station is blatant about its branding, as its managing editor commented in a news report: “Our entire programming is now totally dedicated to what is being said at the PAD rallies… It appeals to our viewers, even if the material is strong, subjective and biased. The speeches about corruption and the abuse of power are things the public will not get on other commercial TV stations.ʼʼ37 Thus, through the movement-controlled media, information about planned protests and demonstrations are transmitted on a large-scale, bypassing the issue of coordination by word of mouth. More importantly, movement ideologies are also conveyed to all who subscribed to the channel. 























































 37
“Asian
Satellite
Television
(ASTV)”,
http://antithaksin.wordpress.com/2008/11/03/asia‐ satellite‐television‐astv‐boosts‐anti‐govt/
 114
 
 
 5.3 Conclusion: Inciting Emotions through Discourse This chapter has attempted to delineate the process by which prevailing emotions of fear and anger against Thaksin were harnessed and galvanized into hatred through the demonization of the former prime minister. Emphasizing the importance of emotions and ideological discourse, this chapter demonstrated how concurrent constructions of Thaksin to be after the kingʼs position incited further outrage and dissent against him while functioning as the nexus around which support for the movement assembled. This promulgation of ideas was expedited by the use of mass media, of which the PAD movement had control. Together, these factors contributed to the rapid emergence, momentum and strength of the PAD movement. 115
 
 
 Chapter 6: Conclusion This thesis has concerned itself with the question of motivation among the participants of the PAD movement and the main contentions of this thesis can be summarized in the following broad arguments. First, in recognition of the fact that existing works on the PAD movement have failed to consider the motivation of the participants of the Yellow shirts movement, I contend that this oversight is due to the theoretical issue of “class”, as a concept, being applied in an over-generalized manner. Beginning with a Marxian premise that class is a largely immutable category inevitably means that important interactions between groups of people from similar status contesting for dissimilar interests will be overlooked. Moreover, this perspective, I argue, has only reified the concept of class, limiting our appreciation of the phenomenon. By extension, the usage of economic indicators as a way of defining class, while useful, has only allowed for a limited understanding of the PAD movement thus far. This thesis does not aim to challenge the concept of class in general but is an attempt to broaden our understanding of the phenomenon on hand. In response to this, as well as the second argument of this thesis, I advocated a neo-Weberian stance and suggest that a Weberian perspective on class relations may be more useful in shedding light on the intricacies of class conflict in Thailand, providing us with a more nuanced and dynamic understanding of class relations. In relation to this concept of class in 116
 
 
 Thailand, I employed an approach that is grounded in the Sociology of Emotions which sees emotions, and its expressions, as a function of class. Accordingly, I argue that the understanding of class in Thailand will best benefit from acknowledging that each social stratum consists of intersecting communities, or groups, with both overlapping and contesting interests. I have also demonstrated that the framework of social closure is particularly relevant and useful in the case of Thailand for two reasons: first, its ability to incorporate both historical antecedents of political conflict in Thailand. I established this process of social closure and exclusion as a historic one through the delineating of Thailandʼs political history, showing the involvement and interactions of key actors in Thai politics. Second, in capturing the dynamic struggle between forces of exclusion and monopolization on the one hand, and the forces of usurpation and opportunity hoarding on the other, as in the case of the PAD, I showed that the movement itself can be understood as a contemporary manifestation of class conflict and contestation in Thai society. This testifies to both the currency and relevance of this framework. This framework also allows for the inclusion of existing arguments of the movement being an intra-elite conflict precisely by showing that such conflicts are a result of groups contesting for power, resources and opportunities. In short, it explains contestations within and between social strata in society. By showing how structural changes brought about by the economic crisis in 2007 have an important impact on shaping the perception of the Thais, I also argued that those on the receiving end perceived themselves as 117
 
 
 losing opportunities, resources and socio-economic advantages. Hence, structural changes facilitated Thaksinʼs exclusion of groups in Thai society that were not in his networks. The conditions for the emergence of the PAD movement must then be situated in both the larger historical antecedents and the more immediate structural context prior to its rise. The PAD movement, seen from such a perspective, is an attempt by particular groups of people to secure their interests as a result of social closure and exclusion in a particular historical period of Thailand. Next, this thesis has emphasized the significance of an approach that highlights emotions in social movements. Recognizing that having grievances alone does not always result in collective action, I turned to the importance of emotions that arose, both in response to Thaksinʼs alleged corruption and perceived contempt for the monarchy, demonstrating how fear and anger, culminating in hatred, are expressions of the social exclusion brought about by Thaksinʼs monopoly of power. The expressions of discontent through the emotions of PAD supporters testify not only to the grievances but also the impetus behind their actions. Broadly, strong emotions of fear and anger may contribute to a desire for action but I emphasize that the hope of inclusion and success further motivates mobilization. In accordance to this, this thesis emphasizes the importance and usefulness of considering the role of emotions as well as the use of cultural symbols to reinforce and build up collective sentiments in the study of social movements. Additionally, in highlighting the presence and centrality of class dynamics in the Thailand case, this thesis emphasize that studies on new social movements involving 118
 
 
 the ʻmiddle classʼ must seriously consider the possibility of a class struggle disguised as a movement for ideals and other interests. Having had a better understanding of the PAD movement, its emergence and development, this thesis hopes to spur a reorientation of the reading and understanding of works on the Red Shirts that have sprouted recently (see Giles, 2009b; Forsyth, 2010; Dalpino, 2011). Using the framework of social closure and the insights provided by this thesis, it is the hope of this thesis to contribute to a rethinking of the ongoing conflict between the Red and Yellow Shirts in Thailand. 119
 
 
 References Books / Journal Articles Albrecht, Stan L. 1972. “Environmental Social Movements and CounterMovements: An Overview and an Illustration”, in Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 1 (4). Pp. 2-11. Albritton, Robert B. and Thawilwadee Bureekul. 2007. “Thailand Country Report: Public Opinion and Political Power in Thailand” in Asian Barometer: A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development, Working Paper Series: No. 34. Albritton, Robert B. and Thawilwadee Bureekul. 2009. “Are Democracy and ʻGood Governanceʼ Always Compatible? Competing Values in the Thai Political Arena” in Asian Barometer: A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development, Working Paper Series: No. 47. Aminzade, Ron and Doug McAdam. 2001. “Emotions and Contentious Politics”, in Ron R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, Jr, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (eds), Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 14-50. Anderson, Ben. 1977. “Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects the October 6 Coup”, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 9(3), pp. 13-30. Anderson, Ben. 1990. “Murder and Progress in Modern Siam”, New Left Review, no. 181, pp. 13-30. Anderson, Benedict R. OʼGorman. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso. Anek Laothamatas. 1996. “A Tale of Two Democracies: Conflicting Perceptions of Elections and Democracy in Thailand”, in R. H. Taylor (ed.), The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press. Pp. 201-223. Anek Laothamatas. 1997. “Development and Democratization: A Theoretical Introduction with Reference to the Southeast Asian and East Asian Cases”, in Anek Laothamatas (ed.), Democratization in Southeast and East Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; Chiang Mai: Silkworm Book. Pp. 1-20. Barbalet, Jack. 1998. Emotion, Social Theory, and Social Structure: A Macrosociological Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Barbalet, Jack. 2002. “Introduction: why emotions are crucial”, in Jack 120
 
 
 Barbalet (ed.), Emotions and Sociology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Pp.1-9. Beeson, Mark, Alexander J. Bellamy and Bryn Hughes. (2006) ʻTaming the tigers? Reforming the security sector in Southeast Asiaʼ, The Pacific Review, Vol. 19 No. 4. Pp. 449-472. Beeson, Mark and Alexander J. Bellamy. 2008. Securing Southeast Asia: The politics of security sector reform, New York: Routledge. Bellin, Eva R. 2000. “Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization Countries”, in World Politics, Vol. 52 (2), January 2000. Pp. 175–205. Benford, Robert D, & Snow, David A. 2000. Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. Annual Review of Sociology. Vol. 26: 611–39. Bhanupong Nidhiprabha. 2006. “The Resilience of the Thai Economy”, in Cavan Hogue (ed.), Thailandʼs Economic Recovery, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 1-25. Bhanupong Nidhiprabha. 2009. “The Thai Economy after the Coup”, in John Funston (ed.), Divided over Thaksin: Thailandʼs Coup and Problematic Transition, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. 150-171. Boren, M. E. 2001. Student Resistance: A History of the Unruly Subject, New York: Routledge. Bottomore, Tom. (ed.) 1983. A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Britt, Lory and David Heise. 2000. “From shame to pride in identity politics”, in Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J. Owens and Robert W. White (eds.), Self, Identity, and Social Movements, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Pp. 252269. Brubaker, Rogers. 2005. “Ethnicity without Groups”, in Julia Adams, Elisabeth S. Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff (eds.), Remaking Modernity: Politics, History and Sociology, Durham and London: Duke University Press. Pp. 470 – 492. Buechler, Steven M.. 1995. “New Social Movement Theories”, in The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 36 (3). Pp. 441-464. Burg, D. E. 1998. Encyclopedia of Student and Youth Movements, New York: Facts on File. 121
 
 
 Burns, Rob and Wilfried van der Will. 1988. Protest and Democracy in West Germany: Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and the Democratic Agenda, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Calhoun, Craig. 2001. “Putting Emotions in Their Place”, in Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper and Francesa Polletta (eds.), Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 45-57. Case, William. 2007. “Democracyʼs Quality and Breakdown: New Lessons from Thailand”, in Democratization, Vol. 14 (4). Pp. 622-642. Chaianan Samudavanija and Parichart Chotiya. 1998. “Beyond Transition in Thailand”, in Democracy in East Asia, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press. Chairat Charoensin-o-larn. 2009. “Military Coup and Democracy in Thailand”, in John Funston (ed.), Divided over Thaksin: Thailandʼs Coup and Problematic Transition, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 49-79. Chinwanno, Chulacheeb. 1984. “Thailand in 1983: The Parliamentary System Survives”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1984, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Christensen, Scott. 1990. “Thailand in 1989: Consensus at Bay”, Asian Survey, Vol. 30 No. 2. Pp. 178-186. Cohen, Erik. 1991. Thai Society in Comparative Perspective, Thailand: White Lotus. Connors, Michael K. 2005. “Thailand: The Facts and F(r)ictions of Ruling”, Southeast Asian Affairs, pp. 365-384. Connors, Michael K. 2006. “Thaksinʼs Thailand – to have and to hold”, in Caven Hogue (ed.) Thailandʼs Economic Recovery, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and Canberra: National Thai Studies Centre, Australian National University, pp. 26-45. Connors, Michael K. 2007. Democracy and National Identity in Thailand (2nd ed.), Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press. Connors, Michael K. 2008a. “Article of faith: The failure of royal liberalism in Thailand”, in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 38 (1). Pp. 143-165. Connors, Michael K. 2008b. “Thailand-Four elections and a coup”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 62 (4): 478-96. 122
 
 
 Connors, Michael K. and Kevin Hewison. 2008. “Introduction: Thailand and the ʻGood Coupʼ”, in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 38 (1). Pp. 1-10. Cook, Nerida M. 1993. “Democratisation in Thailand”, Asian Studies Review, 17 (1), pp. 126-134. Cook, Nerida M. 1997. “Democratisation in Thailand Revisited”, Asian Studies Review, 21 (2), pp. 157-173. Dalpino, Catharin. 2011. “Thailand in 2010: Rupture and Attempts at Reconciliation”, Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Jan/Feb 2011). Pp. 155-162. Danai Chachaochai. 2006. By the Light of Your Wisdom. King Bhumibol Adulyadej, A Wise and Righteous King, Bangkok: DMG Books. Davies, James C. 1962. “Towards a Theory of Revolution”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 27 (February 1962). Pp. 5-18. Earl, Jennifer, Andrew Martion, John D. McCarthy and Sarah A. Soule. 2004. “The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action”, in Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 30. Pp. 65-80. Engels, Frederick. 1973. “Preface to the English Edition [of the ʻManifesto of the Communist Partyʼ] of 1988”, Karl Marx: The Revolutions of 1848, D. Fernbach (ed.), London: Penguin. Evans, Grant. 2006. “Review: The King Never Smiles. A Biography of Thailandʼs Bhumibol Adulyadej”, Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 169 (7), pp. 58-62. Fairburn, Miles. 1999. Social History: Problems, Strategies and Methods. New York: McMillan. Flam, Helena. 1990a. “Emotional ʻManʼ: I. The Emotional ʻManʼ and the Problem of Collective Action”, in International Sociology, Vol. 5. Pp. 39-56. Flam, Helena. 1990b. “Emotional ʻManʼ: II. Corporate Actors as EmotionMotivated Emotion Managers”, in International Sociology, Vol. 5. Pp. 225-234. Flam, Helena. 2005. “Emotionsʼ map: a research agenda”, in Helena Flam and Debra King (eds.), Emotions and Social Movements, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge. Pp. 19-40. Forsyth, Timothy. 2001. “Environmental Social Movements in Thailand: How Important is Class?”, Asian Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 29 (1). Pp. 35-51. Forsyth, Timothy. 2007. “Are Environmental Social Movements Socially Exclusive? An Historical Study from Thailand”, in World Development, Vol. 35 123
 
 
 (12). Pp. 2110-2130. Forsyth, Timothy. 2010. “Thailandʼs Red Shirt Protest: Popular Movement or Dangerous Street Theatre?”, in Social Movement Studies, Vol. 9 No. 4. Pp. 461-467. Funston, John. 2009. “Introduction”, in John Funston (ed.), Divided over Thaksin: Thailandʼs Coup and Problematic Transition, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. xiii-xxi. Gale, Richard P. 1986. “Social Movements and the State: The Environmental Movement, Countermovement, and Government Agencies”, in Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 29 No. 2 (April 1986). Pp. 202-240. Gamson, William A. 1992. “The Social Psychology of Collective Action”, in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Meller (eds.), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Pp. 53-76. Gamson, William A. and David S. Meyer. 1996. “Framing Political Opportunity”, in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Ganz, Marshall. 2004. “Why David Sometimes Wins: Strategic Capacity in Social Movements”, in Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper (eds.), Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Pp. 177-198. Gerth, Hans and C. Wright Mills. 1958. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York, Oxford University Press. Geschwender, James. 1964. “Social Structure and the Negro revolt: an examination of some hypotheses”. Social Forces Vol. 43 (December). Pp. 248-256. Geschwender, James A. 1968. “Explorations in the Theory of Social Movements and Revolutions”, Social Forces, Vol. 47, No. 2 (December 1968). Pp. 127-135. Giddens, Anthony. 1971. Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Giddens, Anthony and David Held. 1982. Classes, Power, and Conflict: Classical and Contemporary Debates, Berkeley: University of California Press. Giles Ji Ungpakorn. 2007. A Coup for the Rich: Thailandʼs Political Crisis, 124
 
 
 Bangkok: Workers Democracy Publishing. Giles Ji Ungpakorn. 2009a. “Why have most Thai NGOs chosen to side with the conservative royalists, against democracy and the poor?”, Interface, Vol. 1 (2). Pp. 233-237. Giles Ji Ungpakorn. 2009b. “ Class Struggle Between the Coloured T-Shirts in Thailand”, in Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, Vol. 1 (1). Pp. 76-100. Gillan, Kevin. 2008. “Understanding Meaning in Movements: A Hermeneutic Approach to Frames and Ideologies”, Social Movement Studies, Vol. 7 (3). Pp. 247-263. Girling, John L. S. 1981. Thailand: Society and Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Glassman, Jim. 2010. “ʼThe Provinces Elect Governments, Bangkok Overthrows Themʼ: Urbanity, Class and Post-democracy”, in Urban Studies, 47(6), pp. 1301-1323. Goodwin, Jeff and James M. Jasper. 2003. Rethinking Social Movements, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper and Francesa Polletta. 2001. “Why Emotions Matter”, in Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper and Francesa Polletta (eds.), Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 1-24. Goodwin, Jeff and Steven Pfaff. 2001. “Emotion Work in High-Risk Social Movements: Managing Fear in the U.S. and East German Civil Rights Movements”, in Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper and Francesa Polletta (eds.), Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 282-302. Gould, Deborah B. 2004. “Passionate Political Processes: Bringing Emotions Back into the Study of Social Movements”, in Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper (eds.), Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Pp. 155-175. Gurney, Joan Neff and Kathleen J. Tierney. 1982. “Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theory and Research”, The Sociological Quarterly Vol. 23 (Winter 1982). Pp. 33-47. Gurr, Ted. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Handley, Paul. 2006. The King Never Smiles. A Biography of Thailandʼs Bhumibol Adulyadej, New Haven: Yale University Press. 125
 
 
 Hewison, Kevin. 1992. “Thai politics in the 1990s back to the future?”, Working Paper No. 4, Perth: Asia Research Center, Murdoch University. Hewison, Kevin. 1993. “Of regimes, state and pluralities; Thai politics enters the 1990s”, in Southeast Asian in the 1990s, Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison, Garry Rodan (eds), Australia: Allen & Unwin, pp. 161-189. Hewison, Kevin. 1996. “Political oppositions and regime change in Thailand”, in Garry Rodan (ed.), Political Oppositions in Industrializing Asia, London: Routledge. Pp. 72-94. Hewison, Kevin. 2002a. “Responding to Economic Crisis: Thailandʼs Localism”, in Duncan McCargo (ed.), Reforming Thai Politics, Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Hewison, Kevin. 2002b. “The World Bank and Thailand: crisis and safety nets”, in Public Administration and Policy, Vol. 13(2), pp. 1-21. Hewison, Kevin. 2004. “Crafting Thailandʼs New Social Contract”, in The Pacific Review, Vol. 17(4), pp. 503-522. Hewison, Kevin. 2005. “Neo-liberalism and Domestic Capital: The Political Outcomes of the Economic Crisis in Thailand”, in Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 41(2), pp. 310-330. Hewison, Kevin. 2006. “Thailand: Boom, Bust, and Recovery”, in Garry Rodan, Kevin Hewison and Richard Robison (eds.), The Political Economy of South-East Asia: markets, power and contestation, South Melbourne, Oxford University Press, pp.74- 108. Hewison, Kevin. 2008. “A Book, the King and the 2006 Coup”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 38 (1). Pp. 190-211. Hewison, Kevin. 2010. “Book Review: Red vs. Yellow. Volume 1: Thailandʼs Crisis of Identity”, in Journal of Contemporary Asia, No. 40 (3). Pp. 522-525. Hewison, Kevin and Surin Maisrikrod. 1997. “Thailandʼs 1996 Election. A Cheer for Democracy?”, Australian Quarterly, 69(1). Hiller, Harry H. 1975. “A Reconceptualization of the Dynamic of Social Movement Development”, The Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 18, No.3 (Jul 1975). Pp. 342-360. Hirsch, Philip. 1997. “The Politics of Environment: Opposition and Legitimacyʼ, in Kevin Hewison (ed.), Political Change in Thailand, London, Routledge. Pp. 179-194. 126
 
 
 Hirschman, Albert, O. 1981. Shifting Involvements, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hoadley, J. Stephen. 1975. Soldiers and Politics in Southeast Asia: CivilMilitary Relations in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing. Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 1983. The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 1990. “Ideology and Emotion Management: A Perspective and Path for Future Research”, in Theodore Kemper (ed.), Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions, Albany: State University of New York Press. Hong, Lysa and Huang Jianli. 2008. The Scripting of a National History: Singapore and Its Pasts. Singapore: NUS Press. Hunt, Scott A. and Robert D. Benford. 2004. “Collective Identity, Solidarity, and Commitment”, in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Pp. 433-457. Hurst, Charles E. 2007. Social Inequality Forms, Causes, and Consequences, Sixth Ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel 2005: “The Causal Link between Democratic Values and Democratic Institutions”, in Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jasper, James M. 1997. The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jasper, James M. 1998. “The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements”, in Sociological Forum Vol. 13 (3). Pp. 397-424. Jasper, James M. and Jane Poulsen. 1995. “Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests”, in Social Problems, Vol. 42. Pp. 493-512. Jenkins, Craig. 1983. “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements”, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 9 (1983). Pp. 527-553. Jessop, Bob. 1978. “Capitalism and Democracy: The Best Possible Shell?”, in Power and the State, G. Littlejohn, et al (eds.), London: Croom Helm. 127
 
 
 Kanishka Jayasuriya and Kevin Hewison. 2004. “The Anti-Politics of Good Governance: From Global Social Policy to a Global Populism?”, Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 59. Kanokrat Lertchoosakul. 2003. “Conceptualising the Roles and Limitations of NGOs in the Anti-Pak Mun Dam Movement”, in Ji Giles Ungapakorn (ed) Radicalising Thailand: New Political Perspectives, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University. Pp. 226-252. Kasian Tejapira. 2006. “Toppling Thaksin”, in New Left Review, Vol. 39. May June 2006. Pp.5-37. Katsamaporn Rakson. 2010. “The influence of the military in Thai politics since the 1990s”, Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series No. 166. Kemper, Theodore D. 1978. A Social Interactional Theory of Emotions, New York, N.Y.: Wiley. Kemper, Theodore D. 2001. “A Structural Approach to Social Movement Emotions”, in Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper and Francesa Polletta (eds.), Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 58-73. Kemper, Theodore D. 2002. “Predicting emotions in groups”, in Jack Barbalet (ed.), Emotions and Sociology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Pp. 53-68. Kengkij Kitirianglarp and Kevin Hewison. 2009. “Social movements and political opposition in contemporary Thailand”, in The Pacific Review, Vol. 22 (4), September 2009. Pp 451-477. Kent, Stephen A. 1982. “Relative deprivation and resource mobilization: a study of early Quakerism”, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 33 No.4 (Dec 1982). Pp. 529-544. Kerbo, Harold R. 1982. “Movements of ʻCrisisʼ and Movements of ʻAffluenceʼ: A Critique of Deprivation and Resource Mobilization Theories”. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Dec 1982). Pp. 645-663. King, Daniel. 1992. “The Thai Parliamentary Elections of 1992: Return to Democracy in an Atypical Year”, Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 12 (Dec., 1992). Pp. 1109 – 1123. King, Daniel. 1996. “Thailand in 1995: Open Society, Dynamic Economy, Troubled Politics”, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Feb., 1996). Pp. 135-141. King, Daniel. 1997. “Thailand in 1996: Economic Slowdown Clouds Year”, Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Feb., 1996). Pp. 160-166. 128
 
 
 King, Daniel and Jim LoGerfo. 1996. “Thailand: toward democratic stability”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7 No.1. Pp. 102-117. Kingdom of Thailand. 1997. Constitution of Thailand, retrieved from http://www.asianlii.org/th/legis/const/1997/1.html, last accessed 28 December 2010. Kitschelt, Herbert. 1993. “Social Movements, Political Parties, and Democratic Theory”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 528, Citizens, Protest and Democracy (Jul. 1993). Pp. 13-29. Kitti Prasirtsuk. 2010. “Thailand in 2009”, in Asian Survey, Vol. 50 No.1. pp. 203-210. Klima, Alan. 2002. The Funeral Casino: Meditation, massacre, and exchange with the dead in Thailand, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Koo, Hagen. 1991. “Middle Classes, Democratization, and Class Formation: The Case of South Korea”, in Theory and Society, Vol. 20 (4). Pp. 485-509. Kuhonta, Erik Martinez. 2008. “The paradox of Thailandʼs 1997 ʻpeopleʼs constitutionʼ: Be careful what you wish for”, Asian Survey, Vol. 48 No. 3. Pp. 373-392. Lee, Raymond, M. 1993. Doing Research on Sensitive Topics. London; Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications. Leow, Li Yong, Shirley. 2002. “Comparative Democratization: Elite, Civil Society and Transition Process in Thailand and Philippines”, Academic exercise, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore. Lipset, Martin Seymour. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53 (1), March. Pp. 69-105. Lockhart, Bruce. 2009. “Monarchy and Constitution in Recent Thai History”, Asia Research Institute: Working Paper Series, No. 114, April 2009. LoGerfo, James P. 2000. “Beyond Bangkok: The Provincial Middle Class in the 1992 Protests”, in Ruth McVey (ed.), Money and Power in Provincial Thailand, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Mackenzie, Rory. 2007. New Buddhist Movements in Thailand: Towards an understanding of Wat Phra Chammakaya and Santi Asoke. New York: Routledge. 129
 
 
 Maheu, Louis. 1995. Social Movements and Social Classes. London: SAGE Publications. Mannheim, Karl. 1980. Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Studies in Modern Social Structure. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Marx, G. and J. Wood. 1975. “Strands of theory and research in collective behaviour.” Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 1. Pp. 363-428. Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick. 1973. “Manifesto of the Communist Party”, in Karl Marx: The Revolutions of 1848, D. Fernbach (ed.), Harmondsworth, Penguin. Mason, Jennifer. 2002. Qualitative Researching (2ed.), London; Thousand Oaks, California : SAGE Publication. May, Ronald J., Stephanie Lawson and Selochan Viberto. 2004. “Introduction: democracy and the military in comparative perspective”, in R.J. May, and S. Viberto (eds), The Military and Democracy in Asia and Pacific, Canberra: ANU E Press. McCargo, Duncan. 2002. “Thailandʼs January 2001 General Elections: Vindicating Reform?”, in Duncan McCargo (ed.), Reforming Thai Politics, Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. McCargo, Duncan. 2005. “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand”, The Pacific Review, 18 (4), pp.499-519. McCargo, Duncan. 2006. “Thaksin and the Resurgence of Violence in the Thai South: Network Monarchy Strikes Back?”, in Critical Asian Studies, 38(1), pp. 39-71. McCargo, Duncan. 2007. “A Hollow Crown”, in New Left Review, No. 43, pp. 135-144. McCargo, Duncan. 2008. Tearing apart the land: Islam and legitimacy in Southern Thailand, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. McCargo, Duncan. 2009. “Thai Politics as Reality TV”, in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 68 (1). Pp. 7-19. McCargo, Duncan and Ukrist Pathamanand. 2005. The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press. McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory”, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82. No. 6 (May 1977). Pp. 1212-1241. 130
 
 
 McVeigh, Rory. 1999. “Structural Incentives for Conservative Mobilization: Power Devaluation and the Rise of the Ku Klux Klan, 1915-1925”, in Social Forces, Vol. 77 (4), June. Pp.1461-1496. McVeigh, Rory. 2001. “Power Devaluation, the Ku Klux Klan, and the Democratic National Convention of 1924”, in Sociological Forum, Vol. 16 (1). Pp.1-30. McVeigh, Rory. 2009. The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing Movements and National Politics, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press. Merton, Robert, and A. Kitt. 1950. “The social construction of strain and ideological models of grievance in contemporary movements”, Pacific Sociological Review (August). Pp. 411-433. Meyer, David S. 2004. “Protests and Political Opportunities”, in Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 30. Pp.125-145. Miles, Matthew B. and Michael Huberman. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: an expanded sourcebook, Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications. Montesano, Michael. 2009a. “Defending the Monarchy: Why and How?”, Asia Research Institute: Working Paper Series, No. 114, April 2009. Montesano, Michael. 2009b. “Political Contests in the Advent of Bangkokʼs 19 September Putsch”, in John Funston (ed.), Divided over Thaksin: Thailandʼs Coup and Problematic Transition, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. 1-26. Montesano, Michael. 2009c. “Contextualizing the Pattaya Summit Debacle: Four April Days, Four Thai Pathologies”, in Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 31 (2), pp. 217-248. Morrison, Denton. 1973. “Some notes toward theory on relative deprivation, social movements, and social change” in R. R. Evans (ed.), Social Movements: A Reader and Source Book. Chicago: Rand McNally. Pp. 103116. Mullainathan, Sendhil and Andrei Shleifer. 2002. “Media Bias”, in National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 9295. Available from http://www.nber.org/papers/w9295.pdf Niels, Mulder. 2000. Inside Thai Society: Religion, Everyday Life, Change, Thailand: Silkworm Books. Naruemon Thabchumpon. 2002. “NGOs and Grassroots Participation in the Political Reform Process”, in Duncan McCargo (ed.), Reforming Thai Politics, 131
 
 
 Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Pp. 183-199. Neher, Clark D. 1975. “Stability and Instability in Contemporary Thailand”, Asian Survey, vol. 15(12), pp 1097-1113. Neher, Clark D. 1992a. “Political Development and Political Participation in Thailand”, in Myron L. Cohen (ed.), Asia: Case Studies in the Social Sciences: A Guild for Teaching, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 414-426. Neher, Clark D. 1992b. “Political Succession in Thailand”, Asian Survey, vol. 32 (7). Nelson, Michael H. 2007. “Thaksin Overthrown: Thailandʼs ʻWell-Intentionedʼ Coup of September 19, 2006”, in eastasia.at, Vol. 6(1), pp. 1-16. Niels, Mulder. 2000. Inside Thai Society: Religion, Everyday Life, Change, Thailand: Silkworm Books. Noakes, John, A. and Hank Johnston. 2005. “Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a Perspective”, in Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes (eds), Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Pp. 1-30. Nordlinger, Eric A. .1977. Soldiers in Politics: Military coups and governments, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Nostitz, Nick. 2009. Red vs. Yellow (Vol. 1), Bangkok, Thailand: White Lotus Press. Ockey, James. 1992. “Business Leaders, Gangsters and the Middle Classes: Societal Groups and Civilian Rule in Thailand”, Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University. Ockey, James. 2002. “Civil Society and Street Politics in Historical Perspective”, in in Duncan McCargo (ed.), Reforming Thai Politics, Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Pp. 107-123. Ockey, James. 2004. Making Democracy: Leadership, Class, Gender and Political Participation in Thailand, United States: University of Hawaii Press. Ockey, James. 2008a. “Thailand in 2007: The Struggle to Control Democracy”, in Asian Survey, Vol. 48 (1). Pp. 20-28. Ockey, James. 2008b. “The Struggle to Control Democracy”, in Asian Survey, Vol. 48(1), pp. 20-28. Oliver, Pamela E. and Gerald Marwell. 1992. “Mobilizing Technologies for Collective Action”, in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds.), 132
 
 
 Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Pp. 251-272. Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1988. “Grievances and Participation in Social Movements”, American Sociological Review, 53(6). Pp. 853-864. Orum, Anthony. 1974. “On participation in political protest movements”, Journal of Applied Behavioural Science Vol. 10. Pp.181-207. Parkin, Frank. 1979. Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique. London: Tavistock Publications. Pasuk Phongpaichit. 2004. “Thailand Under Thaksin: Another Malaysia?”, Asia Research Centre Working Paper, No. 109. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker. 1997. Thailand economy and politics, New York: Oxford University Press. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker (eds). 2008a. Thai Capital: After the 1997 Crisis, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker. 2008b. “Thaksinʼs Populism”, in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 38 (1). Pp. 62-83. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker. 2008c. “Thailand: Fighting over Democracy”, in Economics and Political Weekly, Vol. 43 No. 50, December 2008. Pp. 18-21. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker. 2009. Thaksin, (2nd ed.), Thailand: Silkworm. Patit Paban Mishra. 2010. The Greenwood History of Modern Nation: The History of Thailand, California: ABC-CLIO. Pavin Chachavalpongpun. 2010. Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and his foreign policy, Singapore: ISEAS; Thailand; Silkworm Books. Perrow, C. 1979. “The sixties observed”, in Mayer Zald and John McCarthy (eds.), The Dynamic of Social Movements, Cambridge, MA: Winthrop. Piven, F. F. and R. Cloward. 1977. Poor Peoplesʼ Movements: Why They Succeed, Why They Fail. New York: Pantheon. Prudhisan Jumbala and Chantana Banpasirichote. 2001. “Thai Middle Classes: Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity”, in Abdul Rahman Embang (ed.), Southeast Asian Middle Classes: Propensity for Social Change 133
 
 
 and Democratization, Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. Pp. 262-291. Pye, Oliver and Wolfram Schaffar. 2008. “The 2006 Anti-Thaksin Movement in Thailand: An Analysis”, in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 38 (1). Pp. 3861. Robison, Richard. 1995. The emergence of the middle class in Southeast Asia, Murdoch: Asia Research Centre on Social, Political and Economic Change, Murdoch University. Robison, Richard and David S.G. Goodman. 1996. “The New Rich in Asia. Economic Development, Social Status and Political Consciousness”, in Richard Robison and David S.G. Goodman (eds.), The New Rich in Asia. Mobile Phones, McDonalds and Middle-Class Revolution. London: Routledge. Pp. 1-16. Rootes, Christopher. 1980. “Student Radicalism: Politics of Moral Protest and Legitimation Problems of the Modern Capitalist State”, in Theory and Society, Vol. 9 (3). Pp. 473–502. Samudavanija Chaianan. 1998. “Beyond Transition in Thailand”, in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds), The Global Divergence of Democracies, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. Sawer, Marian. 2007. “Wearing your Politics on your Sleeve: The Role of Political Colours in Social Movements”, in Social Movement Studies, Vol. 6 (1). Pp. 39-56. Silverman, David. 2006. Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction (3rd ed.), London: SAGE Publications. Smith, Miriam. 1999. Lesbians and Gay Rights in Canada: Social Movements and Equality-seeking, 1971-1995, Canada: University of Toronto Press. Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, Robert D. Benford. 1986. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation”, in American Sociological Review. Vol. 51: 464-481. Snow, David A., and Robert Benford. 1988. “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization”, in International Social Movement Research, Vol. 1. Pp. 197-217. Snow, David A., and Robert Benford. 1992. “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest”, in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds.), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Pp. 133-155. 134
 
 
 Somchai Phatharathananunth. 2002. “Civil Society and Democratization in Thailand: A Critique of Elite Democracy”, in Duncan McCargo (ed.), Reforming Thai Politics, Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Pp. 125-142. Somchai Phatharathananunth. 2006. Civil society and democratization: social movements in northeast Thailand, Copenhagen: Nias Press. Somchai Phatharathananunth. 2008. “The Thai Rak Thai Party and elections in North-eastern Thailand”, in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 38 (1), pp. 106-123. Stern, Aaron. 2007. “The Limitations on Democratization in Thailand through the Lens of the 2006 Military Coup”, in Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3 (1), pp. 127-141. Suchit Bunbongkarn. 1996. State of the Nation: Thailand, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Suchitra Punyaratabandhu. 1998. “Thailand in 1997: Financial Crisis and Constitutional Reform”, Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Feb., 1998). Pp. 161167. Surachai Sirikrai. 1982. “General Prem Survives on a Conservative Line”, in Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 11 (Nov., 1982). Pp. 1093-1104. Surin Maisrikrod. 1997. “The Making Of Thai Democracy: A Study of Political Alliances Among the State, the Capitalists, and the Middle Class”, in Anek Laothamatas (ed.), Democratization in Southeast and East Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; Chiang Mai: Silkworm Book. Pp. 141166. Suthy Prasartset. 1980. Thai Business Leaders: Men and Careers in a Developing Economy, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies. Suthy Prasartset. 1996. “The Rise of NGOs as Critical Social Movements in Thailand”, in Jayant Lele and Wisdom Tettey (eds.), Asia—Who Pays For Growth?: Women, Environment, and Popular Movements, Aldershot, England; Brookfield, Vt., USA: Dartmouth. Pp. 62-75. Swedberg, Richard. 2005. The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts, Standford, California: Stanford University Press. Synder, D. and W. Kelly. 1979. “Strategies for investigating violence and social change: illustrations from analyses of racial disorders and implications for resource mobilization” , in Mayer Zald and John McCarthy (eds.), The Dynamic of Social Movements, Cambridge, MA: Winthrop. 135
 
 
 Tamada, Yoshifumi. 1995. “Coups in Thailand, 1980-1991: classmates, internal conflicts and relations with the government of the military”, Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 33 No.3. Pp. 317-339. Tarrow, Sidney G.. 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (2nd ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press. Thak Chaloemitiarana (ed.). 1978. Thai Politics: Extracts and Documents 1932-1957, Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand. Thitinan Pongsudhirak. 2009. “Thailand since the coup”, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19 (4). Pp. 140-153. Thongchai Winichakul. 2008. “Toppling Democracy”, in Contemporary Asia, Vol. 38, No. 1 (February 2008). Pp. 11-37. Journal of Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Tilly, Charles. 1998. Durable Inequality. Berkley: University of California Press. Tilly, Charles. 2002. Stories, Identities, and Political Change. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Tilly, Charles. 2003. “Inequality, Democratization, and De-Democratization”, Sociological Theory, Vol. 21 No.1 (Mar 2003). Pp. 37-43. Tilly, Charles and Sidney Tarrow. 2006. Contentious politics, Boulder, London: Paradigm Publishers. Turton, Andrew. 1984. “Limits of Ideological Domination and the Formation of Social Consciousness “, in History and Peasant Consciousness in South East Asia, Andrew Turton & Shigeharu Tanabe (eds), Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology. Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1981. “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice.” Science Vol. 211 No. 4481. Pp. 453-458. Ukrist Pathmanand. 2001. “Globalisation and democratic development in Thailand: The new path of the military, private sector, and civil society”, in Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 23 No. 1. Pp. 24-42. Ukrist Pathmanand. 2008. “A Different Coup dʼÉtat?”, in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 38 (1). Pp. 124-142. Walker, Andrew. 2008. “The Rural Constitution and the Everyday Politics of Elections in Northern Thailand”, in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 38 (1), 136
 
 
 pp. 84-105. Warr, Peter. 2009. “The Economy Under the Thaksin Government: Stalled Recovery”, in John Funston (ed.), Divided over Thaksin: Thailandʼs Coup and Problematic Transition, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. 172-188. Weber, M. (1978 [1968]) Economy and Society (2 Volumes), G. Roth & C. Wittich (Eds.). London & Berkley: University of California Press. Wilson, K. and A. Orum. 1974. “Mobilizing people for collective action” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 4. Pp. 187-202. Internet Sources Thanong Khanthong. 2008. “Thaksin has hijacked democracy with money politics”, Thai Political Facts Info: PADʼs facts, information, anti-Thaksin Shinawatra, October 26, 2008. Last accessed May 16, 2011. (http://antithaksin.wordpress.com/2008/10/26/thaksin-has-hijackeddemocracy-with-money-politics/) Thitinan Pongsudhirak. 2007. “Why Thaksin wonʼt quit Thai politics”, Thai World: Thai monitor. February 02, 2007. Last accessed May 16, 2011. (http://www.thaiworld.org/en/thailand_monitor/answer.php?question_id=603) Marwaan Macan-Markar. 2008. “Satellite TV boosts Anti-Govʼt Protests”, Inter Press Service. September 08, 2008. Last accessed May 28, 2011. (http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=43798) Internet Sources – Unknown Author “Fugitive ex-prime minister is willing to see the country destroyed in his pursuit of revenge”, Thai Political Facts Info: PADʼs facts, information, anti-Thaksin Shinawatra, October 24, 2008. Last accessed May 16, 2011. (http://antithaksin.wordpress.com/2008/10/24/fugitive-ex-prime-minister-iswilling-to-see-the-country-destroyed-in-his-pursuit-of-revenge/) “Thaskin: Crimes”, Peopleʼs Alliance for Democracy: Against Thaksin, the International Terrorist Criminal. Last accessed May 16, 2011. (http://www.antithaksin.com/BlankForm.php?Aid=0805) “Thaksin Shinawatra, Official International Terrorist”, Thai Political Facts Info: PADʼs facts, information, anti-Thaksin Shinawatra, May 28, 2010. Last accessed May 16, 2011. (http://antithaksin.wordpress.com/2010/06/02/thaksin-shinawatra-officialinternational-terrorist/) “Thaksin, the Enemy of Muslims”, Peopleʼs Alliance for Democracy: Against Thaksin, the International Terrorist Criminal. Last accessed May 16, 2011. 137
 
 
 (http://www.antithaksin.com/BlankForm.php?Aid=0801015) “Triple Standards of the Coward”. Peopleʼs Alliance for Democracy: Against Thaksin, the International Terrorist Criminal. Last accessed May 16, 2011. (http://www.antithaksin.com/BlankForm.php?Aid=0802045) News Articles Author unknown. 2005. “Ch9 drops Sondhi for royal references”. The Nation. 16 September. Retrieved December 28, 2010. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/sondhi/r17.php Author unknown. 2005. “Policeman sues media tycoon for lese majeste”. The Nation. 9 November. Retrieved December 28, 2010. (http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/sondhi/r5.php) Author unknown. 2005. “The good old days”. The Nation. 30 November. Retrieved December 28, 2010. (http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/sondhi/nov30.php) Author unknown. 2007. “FIDF to sue ousted premier, Pojaman”, The Nation, 16 January. Retrieved January 19, 2011. (http://nationmultimedia.com/2007/01/16/headlines/headlines_30024246.php) Author unknown. 2007. “Thanomʼs sometimes turbulent life”, The Nation, 1 March. Retrieved January 31, 2011. (http://nationmultimedia.com/2007/02/26/national/national_30027889.php) Author unknown. 2008. “Thai protesters seize second airport”. The Age, 28 November. Retrieved August 4, 2009. (http://www.theage.com.au/world/thai-protesters-seize-second-airport20081127-6k3j.html) Author unknown. 2009. “Timeline: Thailand”. BBC News: Asia-Pacific. 14 April. Retrieved November 8, 2009. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1243059.stm) Author unknown. 2009. “Profile: Thailandʼs reds and yellows”. BBC News: Asia-Pacific. 17 April. Retrieved November 8, 2009. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8004306.stm) Kamol Hengkietisak. 2008. “All of Thailand Loses”. Bangkok Post, 29 November. Mydans, Seth. 1998. “Chatichai Choonhavan, 76, Ex-Prime Minister of Thailand”. The New York Times. 7 May, 1998. 138
 
 
 (http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0A14FE3E550C748CDDA C0894D0494D81) Ro, Peter. 2008. “Thai protestors band together to guard opposition TV station being taken off the air”. Media Blab. 4 September. Sutakanat, Teresa and Cindy Drukier. 2006. “Thailand Celebrates Kingʼs 60th Anniversary on Throne”. The Epoch Times. 8 June, 2006. (http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/6-6-8/42462.html) 139
 
 [...]... clash among different classes – in the case of the PAD movement, the ʻurban middle class and the ʻrural poorʼ (see Giles, 2009b) In addition, by postulating that these movements are ʻmiddle class movements, important mechanisms and processes of class formation such as “exclusion” and “usurpation” (Parkin, 1979) are glossed over while the dynamics of interaction between the various groups, as well as. .. in a Weberian understanding of class In short, it emphasizes an analytical framework centered around an understanding of social closure as the dynamic struggle between forces of exclusion and monopolization on the one hand and the forces of usurpation and opportunity hoarding on the other This would allow us to appreciate the movement as more than a push for democracy but as a movement that emerged as. .. not, the proletariats Due to their contradictory interests, these two groups were conceived as having an antagonistic relationship This became the basis of Marxʼs famous thesis on the proletarian revolution – and also the model for classical social movements However, it is important to recognize that this conception of class is a relational one That is to say, the capitalist class only exists in relation... the way movements in the last two decades of Thai history has been studied and conceptualized as a ʻmiddle class movement Specifically, I argue that these studies tend to adopt a position where class is understood as set of relatively broad and fixed social relationships revolving only around capital However, this position limits our understanding of the issue as a class conflict, presenting it as a. .. of social class and position Again, this thesis is not arguing for a stance that negates a material understanding and definition of class Rather, it aims to broaden this conception and advocates a perspective that takes into consideration the underlying social interactions and relations 2.4 Class and Social Movements – Insights from Marx, Weber and Parkin Here, it is useful to revisit existing arguments... political
when
it
involves
agents
of
governments.
In the case
of
social
movements, the state
often
 takes the role
of
either the opposition
against
which the movement is
challenging
or
an
actor the movement is
trying
to
win
over.
 
 19
 
 appears to be an important conceptual limitation: class as a concept has been applied in an unproblematized and over-generalized manner For instance, the middle class has tended to be defined in terms of income and occupational... – actors in these movements The most recent coup in 2006 has brought the attention back to these actors – namely the military, the monarchy and the economic elites10 Yet, analyses of these actorsʼ involvement has centered on the discourse of democracy and corruption Again, I argue that social movements in Thailand, particularly political movements, have less to do with social class and democracy than... sufficiently accounting for cross -class alliances among the Yellow shirts as well as accounting for the participation of the people Accordingly, in outlining the developments of the recent Yellow shirts movement, this chapter contends that the Yellow shirts movement is a contemporary manifestation of historically embedded struggles for power and recognition In addition, this chapter maintains that the history... negate the fact that there are groups of people from similar status contesting for dissimilar interests Instead, I argue that such a perspective hinders us from appreciating class as a dynamic concept Above all, it limits the appreciation of the Yellow shirts movement to a matter of intra-elite conflict Hence, I 
 20
 
 propose and alternative to the conceptualization of class in Thailand that may be more... opportunities that had been excluded from them Thus, a perspective consisting of Weber and Parkinʼs concepts allow us to re-conceptualize the PAD movement as more than an elite struggle, a middle class movement, or even a campaign for democracy Instead, we can now approach the phenomenon not only as a social movement, but more importantly, a manifestation of class conflict The difference lies in the idea that this ... thesisʼs main conceptual contention – that class as a concept has been applied in an unproblematized and overgeneralized manner Many authors, as well as popular media and pundits, have tended to assume... the movement with the notion that the Thai middle class, as a whole, supports the PAD movement Secondly, some scholars have been quick to dismiss the Yellow (and Red) shirts movement as a class. .. contend that these arguments tend to consider class as an immutable category, in tandem with a Marxian perspective – that is to say, class is seen as a set of fixed categories rather than a dynamic