Explaining civil war persistence in afghanistan

! "! # % & ' # ' ) * + + # #$ ( Thesis Abstract: “Explaining Conflict Persistence in Afghanistan” This study asks why the civil war in Afghanistan persists. Put slightly differently, what is preventing the state/government from achieving outright victory, against the rebel organization/forces? A central theme in civil war research is that ‘weak states’ are especially prone to (prolonged) civil war; state-weakness seems to be the variable around which there is the most theoretical agreement. There is a strong sense that state failure – whether defined as failure to monopolize legitimate violence or failure to deliver development, good governance and basic services – is a principal driver of contemporary civil conflicts, often resulting in prolonged crises. In investigating the puzzle, the study tests the weak state thesis. The study explores the relationship between state-weakness and the particularities of insufficient institutional capacity (including governance) in the conflict-ridden country of Afghanistan. The study argues state-weakness deprives the state/government from ensuring a favorable war-outcome; state-weakness robs the state/government of societal support and thereby, political legitimacy. The culmination of this project is the product of two years (albeit scattered) of hard work. A sometimes frustrating process, I questioned my objectives and goals, indeed the entire academic and philosophical undertaking. Yet, the knowledge and expertise I have accumulated within that period trumps moments of doubt. In particular, the process has fuelled my desire to pursue further research in the area. First and foremost, I thank my advisor Dr. Terence Lee for being patient (above all else) with me. Though a somewhat uneasy relationship, he has been central in getting me to the finish line. At NUS, it has been a pleasure and privilege to be given the opportunity to converse and learn from excellent teachers and senior colleagues. Special mention to Dr. Daniel Pellerin (his eccentric views energised me); Prof. Paul Buchanan (his support has been second to none); Drs. Kilkon Ko, Karen Winzoski and Brad Williams (their warmth shielded me). And finally, Prof. Terry Nardin, whose unparalleled wisdom encouraged me to continue to (want to) learn, and not just within the confines of the classroom. My rejuvenated interest in Ethics I attribute solely to him. My peers, Jimmy Lim, Kerstin Duell, Kai Ostwald and Bjorn Gomes – have enriched my time spent at NUS. They taught me more than I can appreciate. Significantly, they gave ear to my academic rants, and showed keen interest in my research. ii ! " ' # $ % & ( ) * $ + , ( $ # . /$ $ $ . # /4 4 . 4 .( / 11 1! 03 5 2 6 # 1 4 # ." 18,9: - 7 % , , 7 % )1 % . ; .< " # > 7 7 % 18,9 : * ! 12 03 %$ 18,9: 0 =# )+ $ - ) % % 4 Will a Political Settlement Lead to the Termination of Conflict? 3 ) 64 !2 iii & ' % ! " ! ? !, $ $ )8)9: " < )8)9 : " < " , ,1 " ,+ ,, 6 # 9: # &1 22 )8!9: . )8!9 : ' )8!9: 2 7 21 * 2) $ /' 9 4 4 70 2! : 4 .( @AB # ! & ( ) % 12 " 819: 11 A - 1! # 2 8 9: $ # A7 1 8 9: " 8 9: ) % 8 9: 0 ' ; # " $ . + 3 )2 )! 149 * )& ' " $ 2 $ ' + ) % iv ! " ) # ) * $ # $ %& '( ) - +, ./ v " & ABC Australian Broadcasting Corporation ANA Afghanistan National Army ANP Afghanistan National Police ARD Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Consortium of public-law broadcasting institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany) BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CIA Central Intelligence Agency, United States of America DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; an Government of Afghanistan initiative DIAG Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups; an Government of Afghanistan initiative FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ISAF International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan ISI Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Islamic Republic of Pakistan JUI Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Government Organization OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development UN United Nations UNICEF United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund US United States of America vi Why does the civil war1 in Afghanistan persist? Specifically, what is preventing the Afghan Government – a protagonist in the conflict – from achieving outright victory (a decisive outcome) that will inevitably end conflict?2 Understanding the causes of persistence may reveal possible avenues (solutions) to concluding the conflict. A cursory overview of the shape of recent civil war endings illustrates the inherent difficulties of generalization. The way in which these wars have moved towards a conclusion have been so varied – not to mention observers and policymakers have touted a laundry-basket of reasons – that determining either the necessary or sufficient conditions for war termination becomes rather difficult, if not impossible. The questions raised in the introductory paragraph are crucial in so far as to contribute to understanding the structural, political or perceptual elements (or relationships) of war-fighting, i.e. the incentives or disincentives for compromise which arise during the course of the conflict itself and which can inhibit the willingness of the rival participants to terminate hostilities. These may include: the political and/or identity-related interests at stake – a 1 The ongoing conflict in Afghanistan can be defined as Civil War because it involves interactions between at least two actors – the Afghan government and the Taliban opposition – who compete for political power and the loyalties of non-combatant populations. Furthermore, following the Correlates of War (COW) Project, I define the conflict as Civil War because it has annually claimed the lives of over 1000 combatant and non-combatant individuals, over the course of the past nine years. Among other sources, various casualty figures are listed in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan website, available at http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx?/, accessed 02.02.2009. 2 Examined from a slightly different perspective, one may ask: what is preventing the belligerent parties from renouncing violence, conducting talks or implementing strategies that may lead to a cease-fire agreement, or a peace settlement – a positive-sum game? I acknowledge that cease-fire agreements and peace settlements are phenomena which terminate conflict. Yet, they are phenomena different from ‘zerosum’ outcomes. The present study will focus on outright victory, for two reasons. First, the study is limited in scope; and second, preliminary investigation reveals the inherent hostilities between, and the divergent political goals of, the belligerents makes any sort of political compromise unviable/unforeseeable. 1 ‘grievance narrative’ emphasizing cultural and/or ideological differences between marginalized peoples and the domineering tendencies of the central state; the military situation on the ground; the role and efficiency of state-institutions in managing conflict; and the role of foreign interveners – ‘spoilers,’ among others. Understanding the relationships of war-fighting may provide observers, and the competing participants, with the insights necessary to attempt to bring the conflict to a conclusion (though not necessarily a peaceful one). This leads to an examination of current theories of civil war termination. Current explanations are dominated by ‘rational’ or ‘material’ theories. These theories reveal much about the conditions likely to bring participants and combatants to renounce hostilities (note: outcomes could be ‘zero-sum’ or ‘positive-sum’). My overarching aim in this study is to understand why the Afghan civil war persists. Toward such an objective, the following study will outline three plausible “competing’ explanations” – to be mentioned in due course – and then contrast them with an original explanatory framework (understood as a problem of state-building – or, a ‘weak-state’ model). The objective is to show that a failure in governance best explains a) the failure of the Afghan government to comprehensively defeat the Taliban insurgency, and as corollary b) the persistence of hostilities in Afghanistan. 2 According to its formal definition, insurgency involves “a popular movement that seeks to overthrow the status quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict and terrorism.”3 Here one may expand on this definition to include specific objectives, such as, most commonly, the overthrow of a state, pursuit of independence for a particular territory, or departure of occupying forces.4 Such a definition understands the Taliban organization (together with its local affiliates) to be the foremost rebel (indeed rival) organization challenging the writ of the Afghan central government. While most incidents of violent acts can be attributed to the Taliban, some counterinsurgency and security experts note that up to a third of all violent attacks involve power tussles between communities and tribes – which perceive themselves as marginalized in the distribution of political power, land, water, and other governmentcontrolled resources – and the local governing institutions, not necessarily Taliban members or insurgents.5 This suggests, at its core, the tussle involves competition for allegiance and authority: poor performance and failure to gain legitimacy have regularly plagued instrumentalities of the Afghan state and furthered the masses sense of alienation. Taken together, they indicate that the central issue of concern in Afghanistan is governance, and violence is aimed at gaining greater access to the state and to public goods via the toppling of national or even sub-national government institutions. 3 David Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, Iss. 4, August 2005, p. 603. 4 Seth G. Jones, ‘The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad,’ International Security, Vol. 32, Iss. 4, Spring 2008, pp. 9-10. 5 Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, Thwarting Afghanistan’s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, September 2008, p. 6, available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr212.pdf, accessed 20.09.2009. 3 The motives of the insurgency are, thus, in some ways, less oriented around rational self-interest and regional political agendas. The growth of the Taliban-led insurgency from a relatively small and scattered band of fighters in early 2002 to an over 20,000-person movement has been fueled by the recruitment of fighters regardless of their ideological orientation. As such, only a small proportion of today’s insurgents are influenced by a strict adherence to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam that mandates a holy war against the West, and very few have goals that extend beyond their district let alone beyond the borders of Afghanistan. What then, for instance, explains the appeal of the Taliban organization/movement, and the seemingly bottom-less pool of insurgent recruits? This project will attempt to provide an argument that is sufficiently capable of explaining conflict persistence, the seemingly unlikely progress (and appeal) of the Taliban insurgency, and the myriad failures of the Afghan government in securing a stable, conflict-free nation. These are the challenges that this study has attempted to unpack. 4 The terrible costs of war have inspired countless works on its prevention; it seems worthwhile to devote sometime to its termination. The Uppsala Project focuses on the termination of warfare (defined as a period of twelve months without violence), but in reality, this may often be subject to a degree of yo-yoing in and out violent conflict, and war termination is not necessarily the same as war ending in any permanent sense. Nevertheless, in this study I define war termination as the process or act of stopping the fighting. Scholars addressing this matter have struggled with the concept; war termination is a difficult concept because it can not be treated as a discrete subject: the initiation, conduct, and dynamics of conflict itself impinge upon war termination in ways that defy setting analytic boundaries. Yet the act or process of stopping the fighting must be implemented through decisions, and logic suggests that such an act or process might be isolated for analysis. For purposes of this study, I will adopt a definition of war that encompasses armed conflict involving two belligerents (a dyadic relationship). To concentrate on the difficulty of terminating conflict and to avoid ranging too far afield into behavioral concepts of conflict resolution, the definition here encompasses only shooting wars – actions involving combat between organized forces. Broadly construed under this definition, planning and executing war termination can cover a lot, from planning before a war starts to the negotiations following a truce. Narrowly construed, war termination might be the process of defining when and how to stop the fighting when it becomes evident that war-fighting objectives have been met or, perhaps are no longer achievable. 5 If war termination is an ‘event,’ one that comes about because of other events, it does not require too much thought. But while war might be ended by the exhaustion or disappearance of one of the belligerents – an event – war termination as a ‘process’ implies that fighting can be stopped before exhaustion or annihilation of one or both belligerents. In this latter sense, war-termination is political choice. It is a cost-avoidance process employing a rational approach, a rational relating of objectives and the measures to achieve them. It is this process that begs examination. US doctrine holds that the goal of military operations is to set conditions that compel belligerents’ decision makers to end hostilities on terms favorable to the US and its allies. US joint doctrine and NATO doctrine state: “If the conditions have been properly set and met for ending the conflict, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the adversary from renewing hostilities.”6 The above definition focuses on conflict termination, not conflict resolution. The military fight may stop without the causes of the conflict being resolved. War termination, however, is not solely about military strategy – the attempt to get your opponent to quit fighting. In terms of grand strategy, war termination is more than concluding hostilities. How the war is terminated, when the war is terminated, and why the war is terminated are important questions with respect to the attainment of political objectives and to the kind of peace achieved/envisioned. 6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington: The Joint Staff, 10 September 2001), pp. III-24; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Operations, Allied Joint Publication 3, Ratification Draft 1 (Brussels: NATO, 2000), p. 6. 6 ! "# Paul pillar notes six ways in which interstate and civil wars end: a) by capitulation, in which one belligerent imposed a solution on another; b) by extermination or expulsion, in which one belligerent simply ceased toe exist; c) by absorption into a larger conflict; d) by withdrawal of one of the belligerents; e) by the intervention of a third party; and f) by negotiation.7 Patterns of termination reveal that most civil wars end in extermination or capitulation. Significantly, however, strategies aimed at imposing a solution are becoming less applicable, as the Afghan case-study will reveal.8 One can, however, cite a myriad of theories that attempt to explain conflict persistence in Afghanistan.9 While there is no doubt that the Taliban are waging a war to impose its brand of political-religious ideology, the causal pathway tracing conflict persistence reveals a host of additional mechanisms (endogenous and/or exogenous) at work. A review of these mechanisms will be limited to the examination of ‘single-factor’ arguments. With regard to the Afghan case-study, plausible single-factor explanations include (although not limited to): the role of ‘spoilers’ in conflict persistence: the strategic interests of external actors such as Pakistan and the US in perpetuating the conflict; ‘co-optation’ (or rather, the lack thereof) of the insurgent organization and its leaders into the state-apparatus: the (im)plausibility of integrating the Taliban into a legitimate and peaceful political process; and finally, the role of ‘foreign occupation’ in 7 Paul Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 11-30. 8 Barbara Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,’ International Organization, Vol. 51, Iss. 3, 1997, p. 335. 9 Due to the limitations of this project I shall not attempt to examine all plausible explanations – specifically the arguments that wars fought in the name of ideology, ethnicity, or religious or cultural primacy tend to be value-based and reflect demands that are seldom negotiable. 7 conflict persistence: the presence of an occupation ‘infidel’ force – and the subsequent military solutions preferred – enabling and fueling the cycle of conflict. All of the above explanations/theories have merit and deserve adequate examination, but, as will be argued through the course of this study, fail to convincingly explain the puzzle. Moreover, most observers tend to portray all the above-mentioned explanations as being equally crucial to understanding continued warfare – a ‘laundrybasket’ of explanations, so to speak. Such an approach, however, does not reveal which explanation is actually doing most of the explanatory work; instead, such an approach fails to appreciate the causal process of protracted warfare in Afghanistan. A thorough review of the “competing explanations” should confirm my suspicions. Instead, the crucial factor, I argue, is ‘poor governance’ (a product of weak institutions-of-state) which leads to loss in ‘societal support’ and political ‘legitimacy’. The concepts are introduced below, and discussed in great detail in Chapter II. 8 $ % & "# ' ( A central theme in civil war research is that ‘weak states’ are especially prone to (prolonged) civil war; state weakness seems to be the variable around which there is the most theoretical agreement. There is a strong sense that state failure – whether defined as failure to monopolize legitimate violence or failure to deliver development, good governance and basic services – is a principal driver of contemporary civil conflicts.10 Empirically, however, tests of this proposition have relied on proxy measures of state weakness such as Gross Domestic Product/capita,11 mountainous terrain,12 none of which directly measure (or critique) features and structures of the state itself. Other works point to particular practices by such regimes – especially the use of repression – as triggers for the onset or duration of civil war. Elsewhere, others have emphasizing the importance of building capable (strong) states and structures of governance to prevent the collapse (or recurring collapse) into civil conflict and facilitate sustainable recovery from violence.13 Theories of conflict-termination (including counter-insurgency) which examine the roles and functions of institutions in civil war-endings are ubiquitous. These approaches argue it is the lack of legitimate institutions-of-state that account for continued instability, particularly the failure of the central government to impose its writ 10 It follows that statebuilding designed to create effective, prosperous, legitimate and accountable states, that is, ‘good’ states in relation to their subjects, is a critical ingredient of conflict-outcome. Astri Suhrke, Torunn Wimpelmann and Marcia Dawes, “Peace Processes and Statebuilding: Economic and Institutional Provisions of Peace Agreements,” Chr. Michelsen Institute, report prepared for the World Bank and UNDP, March 2007, p. 3, available at http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/we_do/Peace_agreements_Study_Final.pdf, accessed 22.09.2010. 11 See James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 1, 2003; Nicholas Sambanis, “Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, Iss. 2, 2004. 12 See James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, insurgency, and Civil War.” 13 See Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnahan, “Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building,” Working Paper 253, Overseas Development Institute, September 2005, available at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1819.pdf, accessed 12.01.2010; Barnett Rubin, “Constructing Sovereignty for Security,” Survival, Vol. 47, Iss. 4, 2005. 9 on the concerned territory and population. Most state-building research thus focuses on developing/supporting generic state structures, rather than on building capacities most relevant to stemming rebel threats.14 Thus, few experts have adequately explored the relationship between state weakness and the particularities of insufficient institutional capacity in conflict-ridden states that deprive the state (and the representative government) of ensuring a favorable war-outcome. State-building research is also insufficiently concerned with the quality of statecapacity. For instance, if we consider the state to be the set of institutions (structures) through which citizenry is governed then we must also examine the state in instances when governance (‘responsiveness’ and ‘efficiency’) fails. Some observers have identified poor governance and a weak state as important causal factors in insecurity across a variety of cases, ranging from Georgia to Mozambique to the Balkans. As Seth Jones notes, “A growing body of literature suggests that weak and ineffective governance is critical to the onset of insurgencies” – and that improved governance is critical to the ending of civil wars.15 In similar vein I argue that state weakness leads to poor governance – including shortcomings in core areas of state-function, namely security, the proviso of public goods and justice – which in turn affects the duration of civil war by depriving the state of valuable societal support and political legitimacy. I will test this theory with a detailed case-study analysis of the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan. This study will argue that rather than attributing the persistence of conflict to either the foreign occupation or inability to co-opt an aggrieved movement/organization st 14 See Francis Fukayama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21 Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Marina Ottaway, “Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States,” in Jennifer Milliken (ed.) State Failure and Reconstruction (London: Blackwell, 2003). 15 Seth G. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad,” p. 15. 10 into the state apparatus, we should be examining the capacity and quality of the instruments-of-state, therein. Both Samuel Huntington and Joel Migdal have drawn attention to the absence of authority, effective organization, and lack of political competence in accounting for instability in developing/failing countries.16 Similarly, according to Robert Bates, in addressing the sources of disorder, “the concept of the state provides a natural point of departure.”17 What advantages are there, then, in problematizing the conflict in Afghanistan as a manifestation of ‘state weakness’? The concept of state failure draws attention to the inability of weak states, such as Afghanistan, to successfully implement policies and programmes, maintain social and political order, provide security and good governance, and mobilize resources (including manpower). The persistence of conflict in Afghanistan can be traced farther back in time. The inability of the Afghan state (and its agencies) to perform core functions as analyzed by various theories of the state – monopolize legitimate power, protect citizens, and influence social and economic behavior – is not a new phenomenon, but one that is endemic: competition for allegiance and authority between state and non-state actors – tribe or warlord; government failure to implement social order through institutional agencies; failure to provide public services such as security from external threats and imposition demanded of a modern sovereign state, have severely affected state-society relations. Coupled with an endemic failure in governance, state-weakness manifests itself in a situation where, as William Zartman notes in a different context, “Organization, 16 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 2; see also Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 17 Robert Bates, “Probing the Sources of Political Order,” CID Working Paper no. 110, Harvard University, 2004, p. 5, available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centersprograms/centers/cid/publications/faculty/wp/110.pdf, accessed 06.10.2009. 11 participation, security and allocation fall into the hands of those who will fight for it.”18 Thus areas of intense competition between non-state actors and the state – sites of intense mobilization and counter-mobilization – the so-called ‘contested’ areas, are sites of neverending violence. The contemporary and present state-of-affairs is consistent with the country’s historical record and bears several parallels. As a consequence, the state-system in many provinces to the south and east of Afghanistan has become peripheral to the working of society and is left with little legitimacy. By contrast, the clearest insight that emerges from contested provinces in Afghanistan is the somewhat positive public reception of Taliban agencies there, and the ability and willingness of Taliban commanders to provide security, intervene to govern society and resolve local disputes, all while disrupting the government presence. Journalistic accounts (and opinion polls) indicate that the Taliban are seen as being able to deliver and be accommodative to group demands. The Taliban in such instance enjoy the sorts of legitimacy that agencies of the state do not (but crave).19 The Taliban leadership’s political aim is to reestablish their Islamic Emirate. In order to achieve this they are attempting to force the international forces to withdraw, and the Kabul government to collapse, by disrupting and curbing their rivals’ access to increasing areas and populations. Additionally, they try to build up political pressure on the governments of the troop-providing countries through their voters. Currently, the 18 William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995), p. 8. 19 See Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace (London: Zed Books, 2008); The Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People,” available at http://asiafoundation.org, accessed 21.04.2010. 12 Taliban do not strive for permanent territorial control.20 In rural areas, they force the weak government representatives to strike deals in order to survive and to hand over weapons and money. District centers are only taken over temporarily, to show presence and maintain uncertainty amongst locals. In areas still not under their influence they rely on a step-by-step strategy: first spread propaganda in mosques and bazaars through unarmed activists, and then create small groups of unarmed sympathizers who report about government collaborators and finally create groups of armed fighters.21 By these means, they effectively block the physical and institutional reconstruction process and create permanent instability. Afghanistan’s governance and public-service institutions are in shambles. The country’s general challenge of state-building squarely lies in creating and building effective institutions to run a modern government. The influx of hundreds of foreign NGOs to Afghanistan is due to lack of local capacity to deliver essential services to the people, the majority of whom are yet to benefit from the peace dividend. Similarly, the continued presence of foreign military forces (an occupation force) is due to the inability of the Afghan state to provide security – both external and internal – and combat the insurgency and extremist threats.22 The following study understands governance as a conflicttransformation process: the literature stresses attention to security, followed by other democratizing measures.23 Thus, in contrast to, and indeed challenging, the “competing explanations” alluded to previously, investigation revealed that the institutional weaknesses 20 This, however, does not imply that the Taliban does not conduct campaigns for territorial gain. They do; but they also realize, faced with the overwhelming military might of the Coalition forces, they will be unable to hold on to districts and villages for lengthy periods of time. 21 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla (London: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 58-59. 22 This point is elaborated on in Chapter V. 23 For instance, the results of the influential 2003 RAND Corporation project on “America’s Role in Nation-Building.” James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003). 13 of the Afghan state and the resulting decline in governance, help best explain conflict persistence, and at remarkably great length. Addressing the institutional and governance weaknesses provide the most viable and plausible policy solutions, yet. Afghan governments suffer endemic legitimacy deficits, a primary cause of perpetual civil war. In this scenario, Afghanistan suffers from manifestations of stateweakness, mentioned above. Many of the problems arising therein can be avoided if the present government and its allies overcome the said weakness by salvaging the statebuilding effort. 14 )* + The current war in Afghanistan is into its ninth year and shows no concrete signs of conclusion (peaceful or otherwise). In order to examine whether the Afghanistan war is beyond the explanatory capacity or capability of the state-building/weak state (vis-à-vis poor governance) models, we must first subject the case to systematic analysis. There are several reasons why a case-study of Afghanistan is useful. First, the outcome of the insurgency in Afghanistan is of such intrinsic importance to both the myriad of indigenous actors and to the international community that its lessons are particularly important. Second, a single case-study provides a good opportunity to carefully examine what worked and what did not (and why). It allows the researcher and reader to infer and test explanations of how Afghan government strategies affect counterinsurgency outcome. The focus of this project is on the Afghan state’s (insufficient) state-building capabilities, and the Afghan government’s (poor) governance strategies. Finally, an in-depth and detailed examination of the Afghan case will help not only help build on the causal theories of civil war termination, but provide possible solutions to the quagmire that is Afghanistan. I note, however, that using a single case study has its limitations. The absence of a comparative case-study means there is no variation in the ‘independent’ or ‘dependent’ variables. Yet, this study represents a first step into (re)examining civil war termination from the vantage-point of ‘good governance.’ The study itself could be utilized as a first step for further, more sophisticated, examinations into the puzzle introduced in the introductory paragraph. 15 ,- ' This study is organized into six chapters. Chapter II outlines an original argument (framework) – in contradistinction to the previously-mentioned “competing explanations.” In particular, the chapter examines the concepts of political legitimacy and societal support. The chapter investigates the relationship (correlation) between the two concepts, and how they determine conflict outcome: I argue state weakness – exemplified by the absence and/or loss of legitimacy and societal support – leads to conflict persistence. The Chapter also operationalizes the concepts of state weakness (and poor governance) by outlining various political and security-related indicators (the indicators and their corresponding measures will be examined in detail in Chapter IV). Chapter III provides an overview of the existing literature that attempts to explain conflict persistence in Afghanistan. The Chapter introduces the “competing explanations,” and reveals their deficiency – in contrast to my ‘weak-state’/’poor governance’ models – in explaining the cause(s) of conflict persistence; specific weaknesses of the literature are acknowledged, highlighting the significance of the current research project. Chapter IV investigates the relationship between societal support/legitimacy and state weakness, and traces how the lack of governance has denied victory to the Afghan central government. The chapter shows that the government’s failure (in contrast to the insurgency’s relative success) to provide services has denied them overwhelming political legitimacy, in the process prolonging the need for warfare. Detailed analysis of the indicators of state weakness confirms that a weak state-governance theory is best positioned to explain why conflict in Afghanistan persists. Situating the state weakness argument within a larger historical context, Chapter V situates the weak state/poor governance argument in the 16 context of Afghanistan’s political landscape, discussing in particular the country’s political organization, the sources of state/government legitimacy and the various corollary tensions in state-society relations. The chapter articulates a narrative of historical state-weakness: various challenges to the state – be they domestic (competing sources of authority and legitimacy), or international – threaten the country’s sociopolitical order, prevent governments from generating popular support, which in turn result in the government of Afghanistan suffering from a legitimacy deficit. This history of legitimacy deficit(s) reinforces the theoretical argument and empirical chapters of the project. Finally, Chapter VI – via a conclusion – reviews the theories and the findings; it ends by outlining the implications the study may have for the actors and policy-makers engaged in the conflict, in so far as pursuing the pressing question of how to terminate hostilities in Afghanistan. 17 Success in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations requires establishing a legitimate government supported by the people and able to address the fundamental causes that insurgents use to gain support.24 The present chapter strives to articulate the nature of the causal relationship between weak states and conflict persistence. Toward such end I entertain two objectives. First, I introduce two key concepts – ‘societal support’25 and ‘legitimacy’ – which I posit to be integral to the causal pathway between state-weakness and conflict persistence. I premise that societal support for a political actor grants said actor legitimacy of purpose and action. Legitimacy earned by the actor deprives the opposition of its own legitimizing logic; legitimacy earned, permits the actor to wield authority and implement policies that could shape the outcome of conflict away from protraction. Conversely, legitimacy lost, prevents the same actor from wielding authority and implementing specific courses of action that could otherwise bring about a favorable outcome. For both incumbent and insurgent groups, loss of societal support and political legitimacy leads to non-cooperation (with civilians preferring opposition intervention), denial of access to resources (in particular, resources vital to a group’s war-effort), and specifically, the loss of a recruitment base (unable to replenish the ranks, an insurgent or government organization is bound to fail). For this reason, rival parties fight to earn/maintain support of the citizenry (often through the use of coercion, and/or via good 24 United States Department of the Army and United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Counterinsurgency 3-24 (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army), 2006, pp. 6-1. 25 Here on, I use the terms ‘societal support’ and ‘societal approval,’ interchangeably. 18 governance): the citizenry, as the object of contestation, becomes the endogenous source of conflict persistence. Repeated attempts (and subsequent failures) to secure societal support necessitate continued warfare. My second objective is to trace the causal process describing how support/legitimacy is lost (or earned). The model I introduce attempts to explain the above-mentioned ‘weak state-conflict persistence’ correlation. The model suggests that rival parties in a conflict are locked in a vicious cycle of contest and violence wherein each actor attempts to ‘control’26 the target population. The model also suggests overt military strategies (often erroneous and grossly deficient) prevent the state and government from acquiring support, highlighting in the process the benefits of a nonmilitary – ‘Hearts and Minds’ – approach. In civil wars and insurgencies, the focus must be on the population. Weak states, unable to secure overwhelming support (and thereby the political legitimacy it engenders) and unable to exercise meaningful ‘control’ over society, are trapped in a perpetual cycle of violent conflict. Therefore, throughout the chapter (indeed the project) I suggest the Clausewitzian objective of ‘defeating the enemy’ has to be replaced by a responsible attitude toward the citizenry. 26 I limit the definition of control to the means available to social organizations – including institutions of the state – to deny individuals or social groupings a livelihood (i.e. decisions pertaining to the production and distribution of goods) and offer organized physical defense. 19 According to Stathis Kalyvas, rival political actors face three distinct population sets: populations under their complete ‘control’; populations they must ‘share’ with their rival(s); and populations completely outside their ‘control’. These three situations constitute two general types of sovereignty (sovereignty understood as the monopoly of violence): fragmented and segmented. Sovereignty is fragmented when two or more political actors exercise limited sovereignty over the same part of the territory of the state. It is segmented when two or more political actors exercise full sovereignty over distinct parts of the territory of the state.27 Thus the boundaries separating rival actors in a civil war are often blurred and fluid. A fragmentation of space, so to speak. This fragmentation reflects the fact that civil war alters the very nature of sovereignty in a fundamental way. At its core lies the breakdown of the monopoly of violence by way of territorially based armed challenge. The simplest way to conceptualize the division of sovereignty is to distinguish between areas of incumbent ‘control’, areas of insurgent ‘control’, and areas in which ‘control’ is contested (i.e. areas where the monopoly of violence is divided). Because control over territory is fragmented, there are often strong incentives for civilians to defect to the other side, even in places where support for the insurgent group (or government) is strong. Rival political actors offer material and non-material benefits to civilians to induce defection in the hope of shifting societal support and gaining information that may be useful in weakening the opposition.28 27 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 88. Jeremy J. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 203. 28 20 The population is particularly critical to insurgents because of their relative weakness. Insurgents generally cannot attack their opponents in a conventional manner, as the government forces are usually much more capable of waging conventional warfare. This asymmetry in power forces insurgents to carry the fight to an arena of fragmented ‘control’ in which they have a better chance of success. To many insurgents, the population offers a level playing field. If insurgents manage to alienate the population from the government and acquire its active support, they are more likely to win the war. ‘Control’, then, is the currency over which rival political actors compete, especially in an environment of conflict/hostility. With high levels of ‘control’, actors – particularly the state – is able to mobilize populations, skim surpluses effectively from society and gain tremendous strength in facing external and/or internal foes. Institutions (agencies) can also dictate the rules of society (and carry out their preferences). By monopolizing coercive means actors and agencies are able to enforce these rules.29 In the end, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population – or, at worst, on its submissiveness.30 29 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, p. 32. 30 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (St. Petersburg, Fla.: Hailer Publishing, 2005), pp. 7-8. 21 !" ## $ Societal support is a common goal for all competing actors in an insurgency. Winning support and preventing insurgents from gaining support are critical components of any counterinsurgency.31 General Frank Kitson, who participated in several counterinsurgency campaigns in Africa, Europe, and Asia, argues that one of the most important groups that a successful counterinsurgency campaign needs to take into account is the indigenous population. Building on Mao Tse-tung’s argument that the guerrilla must move among the people as a fish swims in the sea, Kitson argued that the population is the critical element in counterinsurgency operations as “this represents the water in which the fish swims.”32 Kitson thus argued that external or incumbent forces need to focus on defeating the insurgent’s political and military infrastructure by winning the support of the population. It is at this juncture that the incumbent-insurgent contest for ‘control’ becomes apparent. Central to the story of civil and irregular war is the interaction between insurgent groups, the armed forces of the state (including foreign allies), and civilian populations. Fighting is conducted through the people – political actors are compelled to make civilians participants in combat. Thus armed groups compete with one another for the affection and loyalties of non-combatant populations. It is widely acknowledged that the outcome of insurgencies therefore hinges on the behavior (and attitudes) of civilians; non-combatants are in a position of power, able to shift their support from one side to another, provide political legitimacy to armed groups, to provide or withhold resources 31 See Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004); Robert Wilensky, Military Medicine to Win Hearts and Minds: Aid to Civilians in the Vietnam War (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2004). 32 Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), p. 49. 22 necessary for the groups’ operation, and to provide information to combatants about who is supporting the opposition. Societal support is therefore the sine qua non of victory. Almost all scholars and observers agree that no insurgent movement can survive, let alone achieve objectives, without civilian support (neither can incumbent victory be achieved without it).33 Eamon Collins, a former Irish Republican Army veteran pointed out that the local community in contested Northern Ireland often shielded IRA insurgents – feeding them, hiding them, turning a blind eye to their operations – thus enabling and prolonging the resistance.34 Societal support, therefore, is crucial to maintain ‘control’. In working on resolving protracted conflicts, one or more groups may not be sufficiently established to have political legitimacy. In this case, it is not a question that a group is considered illegitimate; it simply does not have sufficient recognition and legitimacy to negotiate agreements. These groups, in such cases, must be concerned with the restoration and extension of legitimacy. While some scholars exclusively associate legitimacy with balance and inclusiveness in institutional representation,35 I posit that citizens’ support is crucial to establishing legitimacy. In the legal system, for instance, some people obey the laws simply because they believe in the rule of law and the appropriateness of the state making and enforcing the laws. In fact, if the majority did not accept this, it would take massive amounts of time, weaponry and energy to enforce it. Thus the rule of law itself is 33 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, pp. 91-92; Jeremy J. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence, p. 203. 34 Eamon Collins and Mick McGovern, Killing Rage (New York: Granta Books, 1999), p. 225. 35 Some scholars argue that a group seen as representative will have legitimacy that a group that is seen as excluding interests will not have, and any agreement will be less likely to be attacked. Randy Barnett, “Constitutional Legitimacy,” Boston University School of Law Working Paper 01-19, November 2001, p. 24, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=291145, accessed 02.02.2010. 23 sufficient for the vast majority of ‘law abiding’ citizens. Beyond this, it is largely their support that allows the state to enforce the law on those who do not accept its legitimacy. In Afghanistan, entering and capturing cities is relatively easy, as was witnessed by the capture of Kabul first by the Taliban in 1996, and then the US-led Coalition in 2001; holding the country and securing the population is much harder – as the Soviets discovered to their cost, like the British before them. The Taliban movement’s phenomenal resurgence and the resulting continuation of the conflict underline this point: much of their success seems due to the failure on part of the Afghan government (and its Western allies) to acquire local support in areas of contested ‘control’. There is, however, disagreement amongst observers on how to perceive such (societal) support. Is support a consequence of allegiance (people share the values and ideals of the insurgent or incumbent), or is it an endogenous result of war itself? Perhaps support is coerced, as opposed to support earned via non-violent persuasion (economic incentives)?36 The queries are significant in so far as to understand the methods employed by the rival actors in ensuring consent and control. Examining the methods (and their shortcomings) generate further insights into the causes of conflict persistence in the contested areas of control. According to a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ argument, substantial segments of a population (caught in the midst of a civil war) are intensely opposed to the incumbent regime and its state-building project. Consequently, they reallocate their support toward rebels.37 Loss of legitimacy, however, need not be restricted to the relationship between 36 After all, at the most elementary level, ‘control’ is reflected in the conformance to an actors demand(s) by the population. Compliance often first comes with the use of the most basic of sanctions, force. Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, p. 32. 37 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), p. 143. 24 populations and the incumbent; insurgent organizations, too, can witness loss of societal support in favor of the incumbent. The implication here is that people actually choose what faction to support based on political/social profile or ideology, and this choice has tremendous impact on the outcome (persistence) of military conflict. Thus Vladimir Brovkin states: Military and strategic factors are far less important than popular attitudes in a civil war. If an army is welcomed by the local population, its resources and strength are automatically increased. If, on the other hand, it is unwelcome, its strength is tied up in pacifying and policing the conquered territory.38 But, as Stathis Kalyvas has observed, people may join a movement less because of ideological commitment than to save their own lives.39 Although several motives may influence support, most observers cite security (survival) and sustenance (economic considerations) as the chief motivators.40 Ordinary citizens appear to display a combination of weak preferences and opportunism, both of which are subject to survival considerations: their association with hardcore insurgents – the ideological ‘purists,’ so to speak – tends to be subject to the fortunes of the war and its impact on one’s welfare.41 Societal support can then be disaggregated into a) genuine support – understood as arising from an ideological affinity/allegiance with a political actor/organization, or a strong approval and preference for the said actor’s policies; and b) prudential support – understood as acquiescing to an actor’s demands, a result of individual/community survival considerations. 38 Vladimir Brovkin, Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 91. 39 Kalyvas refers to several endogenous mechanisms – economic motivations, fear, and revenge, among others – arising from warfare that helps explain the allocation of support. Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, p. 93. 40 Ibid, p. 104. 41 Ibid, p. 103. 25 However, regardless of this analytic distinction, it hardly alters the fact that the state needs to improve the capacity of its institutions in order to successfully control the population, and ensure its continued support. Weak states often suffer from poor governance because without the requisite functioning and capable institutions to implement policies, public goods – such as security, law and order – cannot be delivered.42 If, suppose, an insurgent organization coerces citizens into joining or aiding the insurgency (using the threat of physical violence, amongst others), the state must be in a position to ensure that the rebels are incapacitated from acting on their threats. Weak and inefficient coercive institutions will not be able to stem the rebel challenge. Similarly, when inept security institutions leave a security vacuum – which contributes to political instability – the insurgent organization usurps the functions and responsibilities of the institutions-of-state via engaging in the distribution of various goods and services, earning the approval of the citizenry in the process. In such instance, the state needs to be able to improve its capacity for action – so as to stem the loss of support and political legitimacy. In Afghanistan, the state is neither able to secure the non-politicized citizenry from physical harm (or the threat of such), nor is it able to adequately ensure the provision of goods and services. Taken together, the Taliban have been able to successfully thwart the appeal of government rule, and keep the population interested in the prospect of an alternate authority. 42 I note, however, that not all ‘strong states’ result in good governance. For instance, China is a strong state, but many parts of the country suffer from poor governance. Likewise, in southern Thailand where there is an active insurgency, the central state is regarded as strong and yet governance is lacking. 26 %& ## In any insurgency, joining or collaborating with the insurgent movement results from variable and complex sets of heterogeneous and interacting motivations, which may be affected by preferences (the desire for Taliban rule) over outcomes, the networks into which people are embedded (kinship ties are strong among Afghan Pashtuns; Pashtuns also provide the bulk of Taliban recruits), and security considerations (this may include protection against indiscriminate or selective violence from the rival side). Criminal motives or access to public goods (such as dispute resolution, or protection against common crime and warlords, which explodes when state authority wanes), a response to emotions such as anger, moral outrage caused by public/private humiliation at the hands of foreign actors, are some additional motivations.43 Yet, the role of ‘coercion’ in securing and maintaining support is crucial. After all, non-collaboration or defection, if left unpunished, may trigger cascades of more serious instances of non-collaboration that effect war-outcomes. One school of thought singles out coercion as the source of generating ‘control’. According to such a view, coercion is rational – that it is both intentional and a part of the war-aims of the party that commits it. In fragmented and contested areas, opposing rivals are locked in a battle for ‘control’: toward such end, rivals use intimidation and/or provide incentives. An Afghan provincial governor states the Taliban coerce ordinary tribesmen into joining the movement against the state. These ordinary people do not share the Taliban ideology, but fight for Pashtun honor, loyalty, and personal or group profit.44 43 David Kilcullen, “Taliban and Counter-Insurgency in Kunar,” in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.) Decoding the New Taliban (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 240. 44 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, p. 39. 27 Thomas Ruttig suggests the Taliban have turned to instilling fear in the mindset of the local citizens. The Taliban have burnt schools and publicly executed civilians – particularly those who collaborate with the government (or its allies) or serve as government informants – to serve as a warning.45 Not even non-governmental (NGO) persons are spared. The cold-blooded assassination of several NGO workers (of both foreign and indigenous origin) delivered the uncompromising message that the Taliban had no compunctions about terrifying the local populations.46 There have also been an increased number of assassinations of Afghans supportive of the government and significantly of those who wield influence at local levels who may not be supportive of the government but do not agree with the Taliban. Since 2007 an average of 40-50 people have been killed for political reasons every month. This is occurring regularly in the south and southeast and irregularly in expansion areas like Farah, Badghis, Loghar and Kunar. Targets include provincial council members, mullahs and elders. These events often take place in public when people are going to or returning from the mosque or in front of their families sending a clear public message. There is also a tribal element to coercion. The insurgents’ knowledge and exploitation of tribal rivalries and disputes has long been a tactic in prosecuting objectives in the south and east. This tactic is now being employed in the northwest. In Badghis province, in 2007, the Taliban sought to ignite existing tensions between the Aimaqs and Pashtuns. When the district center in Gulistan was taken some of the police 45 See Thomas Ruttig, “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency,” Report of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2009, available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=114, accessed 06.08.2009; also see Astri Suhrke, “A contradictory Mission: NATO from stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, Iss. 2, 2008. 46 For instance, in early 2003, the cold-blooded assassination of an ICRC official had an enormous impact nationwide. Afghans were acutely aware of the fact that the ICRC had continued to provide medical care to Afghans during the Taliban regime when other Western NGOs had left. Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos (New York: Viking Penguin Group, 2008), pp. 245-246. 28 were unable to escape and reportedly eight to ten of them were beheaded and/or mutilated to alienate the tribe from which most of the police came from (i.e. the Aimaqs).47 By utilizing factional tensions to galvanize conflict, people are forced to choose sides and the insurgents’ overriding objective of gaining support (read recruits) is attained. 47 Barbara J. Stapleton, “Security and PRTs,” in State, Security and Economy in Afghanistan: Current Challenges, Possible Solutions, Lichtenstein Colloquium Report, Volume III, p. 31, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~lisd/publications/afgh2008_lcm3.pdf, accessed 08.15.2009. 29 ' !" ( $ Discussions of legitimacy tend to be complicated. The term is used in many different ways, to refer to very different situations. On the one hand, legitimacy has to do with rights: whether a government has the right to rule, whether a spokesperson has the right to speak on behalf of the entity she/he is representing. A second meaning of the word ‘right’ – correct – is also pertinent to questions of legitimacy: whether the leader has been duly installed, whether correct procedures have been followed in enacting a law. Finally, a normative meaning – right as moral – can also be operative: whether a policy serves ‘the good’ of all concerned. The following chapter (indeed, the entire project) understands legitimacy to incorporate the concepts of ‘quality of government, ‘right to rule,’ and the monopoly of ‘legitimate coercive power.’ The absence of good governance creates space for unrest and opposition challenge. It is this space that the insurgent parties are exploiting to their advantage. Practically, legitimacy will affect the population’s receptivity to state-led initiatives, the degree of passive or active support provided to government forces or insurgents, political participation in elections, and the relationship between the central government and the provinces. Without positive perceptions of state legitimacy, the citizenry will not believe that they ought to follow rules or commands issued by their state. As legitimacy of the government decreases individuals become increasingly less likely to follow the rule of law which could lead to higher levels of violence, or even conflict.48 I argue that the decades-old persistence of civil war in Afghanistan can therefore be explained in part by Afghan governments’ repeated attempts – and failure – to (re)gain 48 Matthew Kirwin and Wonbin Cho, “Weak States and political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 111, August 2009, p. 7, available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/AfropaperNo111_2.pdf, accessed 10.03.2010. 30 long-term civilian favor, and thereby the right to rule. The Afghan government (aided by its Western allies) and the Taliban organization are embroiled in a violent contest to earn political legitimacy, reflected in their twin attempts to provide good governance, and control the populations. I suggest that the absence of good governance in Afghanistan creates a crisis of legitimacy wherein rival political parties do not enjoy a right to rule; in other words, the governed reject the political actor’s claims to legitimate authority. Poor performance (the inability to provide services to the civilian populations) forces civilians to withdraw/withhold their support, and thereby political consent. The Taliban, meanwhile, aim to rob the government of any semblance of political legitimacy by disrupting their rule. The Taliban movement was able to revive because it was not defeated when delegitimized and, when it reappeared, was re-legitimized because more and more Afghans see its competitive advantages in security, justice and ‘Islamic’ credentials when they compare it with its successor regime. The growing popular disaffection and the sidelining of important tribal groups, combined with the increased antiWesternism, fed the impression amongst the Taliban that history was repeating itself and that they could get a second chance to establish their Emirate. This provided the fertile ground for its metamorphosis into a much broader insurgency. The growing civilian casualty figures caused by Western military operations added popular anger that turned into support in some areas. International and governmental failure to appease and provide for the populations is therefore the real reason behind insurgent support and recruitment. In contrast, the Taliban ideology and their narrow-minded and exclusive reading of Shari’a or al-Qaeda’s internationalist jihadism are of less importance in pulling Afghans into the insurgency. 31 )( * + Political Science literature seems to give the following four ideas of what makes a government legitimate. People may accept the political authority in their country out of a) tradition, b) because the political leader(s) have a certain personal appeal or style (charisma), c) because their political leaders bring a certain amount of good things (services and benefits) to them, or d) because the leaders have been selected in some procedural way that the people deem legitimate.49 I will have nothing to say about the first two points in this study. Choice D is usually understood as procedural constitutional representative democracy. People will accept a political authority because they have been given the right to take part in ‘free and fair elections,’ resulting in a government that represents the majority of the people that have used their right to vote and thus become legitimate members of the ‘demos’ in democracy. Those who are not part of the majority will accept the outcome because they have a fair chance of becoming the majority in the next election. This procedural package comes with a bundle of other rights, such as the right to stand for office, the right to organize, freedom of expression, etc. Choice C is interesting because it comes in two forms – one is that a government can achieve political legitimacy because it serves some notion of the ‘common interest’ in coordinating citizens’ activities in a socially beneficial way thereby gaining 49 Michael Bhatia, “The Future of the Mujahideen: legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14, Iss. 1, 2007, pp. 92-93; Joseph Bensman, “Max Weber’s Concept of Legitimacy: An Evaluation,” in Arnold and Ronald Glassman (eds.) Conflict and Control: Challenge to Legitimacy of Modern Governments (London: Sage, 1979), pp. 18, 50-51. 32 acceptance for some of its policies from a very large part of the population.50 This consent-reciprocity model sources legitimacy as a consequence of the institutionalization of the long-term provision of security and protection. Or, it can obtain legitimacy by a just large-enough part of the population or a large segment of powerful interest groups because the government in question decides to give them special benefits.51 It is these last two forms that are of interest to analyzing the puzzle of conflict persistence in Afghanistan. While arguable that the failure (or reluctance) of the international and Afghan political communities to include the Taliban in the 2001 Bonn political process led to a failure in representation52 – the Taliban were not given the right to take part in the electoral or constitution-framing processes – such failure need not account for continued conflict.53 My aim, then, in this project is to challenge the widely held idea that it is electoral democracy (choice D) that is the key to creating political legitimacy, and present the alternative. Needless to say, this is not an argument against electoral democracy – which is an indispensable part of democracy – but against the idea that it can serve as the main pillar for creating political legitimacy in Afghanistan. In brief, this study argues that electoral democracy is highly overrated when it comes to creating political legitimacy, which instead is related to what takes part in the exercise (or stage of implementation) of public policies. In other words, legitimacy is 50 See Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin, “Introduction” and “Elections and Representation,” in Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin (eds.) Democracy, Accountability and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 51 Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), p. 246. 52 The former UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, has stressed however that even if the Afghan negotiations in Bonn were unrepresentative, the process agreed upon could lead to a legitimate and representative government. Simon Chesterman, “Tiptoeing through Afghanistan: The Future of UN State-Building,” International Peace Academy, 14 September 2002, pp. 3-6, available at http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/afghanistan0902.pdf, accessed 17.03.2009. 53 This point is elaborated in sections 3.3 and 5.3(d) of this dissertation. 33 created, maintained and destroyed not at the input (i.e. on whether or not citizens democratically determine policy) but at the output (implementation of policy by officials) side of the political system. That is, political legitimacy depends on the quality of government – the capacity of the state to dispense its core functions, including the proviso of good governance – and not on the quality of elections or representation.54 Conversely, I show how the inability to perform core state functions robs the actor societal support and thereby political legitimacy. Following the economist Anwar Shah, I conceptualize ‘quality’ to imply the incumbent’s (vis-à-vis insurgent’s) capacity for action – i.e. their (in)ability to address the various economic and survival needs of those it purports (or wishes) to govern.55 Hence, I consider two features of government performance: ‘responsiveness’ (whether the public manager is delivering services consistent with citizens’ preferences and needs) and ‘efficiency’ (whether the public manager is providing services of a given quality in the least-cost manner). The ‘quality’ of governance is thus determined by the impact of the exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed by a state’s citizens.56 54 See Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell. “What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions,” Governance, Vol. 21, Iss. 2, 2008; Christopher Anderson and Yuliya Tverdova, “Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes toward Government in Contemporary Democracies,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, Iss. 1, 2003. Anderson and Tverdova argue the ‘quality of government’ factor has significant effect on citizen support for government. 55 I acknowledge that my economic conceptualization of ‘quality of government’ suffers from a functional slant. As is well-known, functionalist approaches border on tautologies. Yet, my interest is not to work out a general theory of ‘quality of government;’ instead, my aim is to show how good governance (or rather the lack of it) contributes to conflict persistence in Afghanistan. See Anwar Shah, “Overview,” in Anwar Shah (ed.) Public Services Delivery (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005), p. xxiii; see also Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, “The Quality of Government,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 15, Iss. 1, 1999. 56 Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, “A Simple Measure of Good Governance,” in Anwar Shah (ed.) Public Services Delivery (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005), p. 40. 34 ,( & # ( -. Deciding which actor/party should have monopoly of force is most fundamentally what civil wars are about. In discussing state-building, however, some confuse the monopoly of force with the monopoly of legitimate force. While many weak states – including Afghanistan – may struggle to acquire a monopoly of force (autonomous of international assistance) far into the future, it can acquire a monopoly of legitimate force far more quickly. But what is necessary to establish a ‘legitimate monopoly of force’? An efficient security apparatus is generally regarded as critical, but the rule of law to guard against arbitrary and hence illegitimate exercise of force is also essential.57 According to Max Weber, a modern state is able to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a territory.58 Jeffrey Herbst argues that the inability of weak (African) states to project power through a strong presence contributes to their weakness. Many African states are weak in the Weberian sense and as result they are, in some cases, unable to prevent violent conflict. Violence becomes the foremost option in stateless societies.59 I argue, then, it is precisely the Afghan government’s inability to acquire legitimate monopoly that creates the space for continued competition with their rivals, perpetuating conflict in the process. Afghanistan has yet to achieve the Weberian condition; it, like many other weak states, is unable to adequately project power. The issue can be explored according to two (potentially competing) dimensions: national initiatives and local legitimacy. This relationship is evident in the following 57 Some scholars even argue that the state cannot maintain a legitimate monopoly of force in the absence of a democratic framework. 58 Max Weber, “Legitimacy, Politics and the State,” in William Connolly (ed.) Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), p. 37. 59 Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 35 programmes: national legislation on DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration), the DIAG (Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups) process, the Afghan National Army’s development and the use of local militias by the Coalition. As discussed previously, legitimacy can be an institutional by-product of the ability of strongmen or states to provide protection. For the state to appropriate legitimacy from local Taliban commanders, it must create viable security institutions (which are able to meet local demands), while also developing a legal structure that both criminalizes non-state armed groups, holds state security institutions to account, and serves as a neutral arbiter in local disputes. In seeking to achieve these aims, DDR and DIAG are not singular programmes to be implemented technocratically. Rather, they require a multi-sectoral approach that strikes at the very heart of the state and its functions, involving legal development and execution. And it requires action across all Security Sector Reform pillars: the judiciary, police and army. Pure coercive power requires no legitimacy. Brute force is its own only justification. Might, at least in the eyes of its wielder, makes right. But, as the mighty often find out, it is one thing to assert one’s dominance by force of arms and another thing to maintain ‘control’ – and achieve stability – through force. In the case of colonial rule, for example: The growing legitimacy problems of imperial rule made the imperial power take on a substantial and, generally, an increasing share of the total expenses involved in maintaining the empire. The subsidies which imperial capitals often came to supply to the provinces represented an attempt to stop the erosion of imperial legitimacy. Yet, the growing costs in turn undermined domestic support for the continuation of imperial rule.60 60 Geir Lundestad, “The Fall of Empires: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy,” in Geir Lundestad (ed.) The Fall of the Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1994), p. 390. 36 But all political governances exert some degree of coercive power. They need their citizens to perceive that they have the right to do so. According to Otfried Hoffe, coercive force “reduces freedom of action, which is a cost or disadvantage to the affected party and which thus requires legitimation.”61 To put it in other terms, because the legitimation of coercive powers depends on the welfare of the affected parties, these powers can only be defended if they bring more advantages than disadvantages for each individual and/or community. However, even if a coercive social order brings about coordination, efficiency, security and stability, and thereby the collective welfare, of a society, it lacks legitimacy if this is accomplished by disrespect for the interests of individuals or groups within the society. Thus, as noted by Ashraf Ghani and Claire Lockhart – [It] is the legitimacy of the state’s monopoly on violence as perceived by the citizens of the state that is the key to using this monopoly as a criterion of statehood…. Hence the state’s monopoly on the means of violence must be balanced by the presence or creation of credible institutions that provide checks and balances on the use of force.62 Herein, the roles of the indigenous security forces are crucial to determining a conflict’s outcome. Most counterinsurgency campaigns are not won or lost by external forces, but by indigenous forces. The quality and capacity of indigenous forces and government, has significantly impacted the outcome of past counterinsurgencies.63 61 Otfried Hoffe, Political Justice: Foundations for a Critical Philosophy of Law and the State, translated by Jeffrey C. Cohen (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995), p. 36. 62 Marcus Skinner, “Counterinsurgency and State Building: An Assessment of the Role of the Afghan National Police,” Democracy and Security, Vol. 4, Iss. 3, 2008, p. 296. 63 See Daniel Byman, “Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism,” International Security, Vol. 31, Iss. 2, 2006; Daniel Byman, Going to War with the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2005). 37 / /2 3 0 - 1 . 0 . 0 State ‘strength’ is a relative concept. It can be measured by the state’s ability (and/or willingness) to provide fundamental political goods associated with statehood, notably: physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management, and social welfare. Around the world many states have critical capacity gaps in one or more of these four areas of governance, broadly conceived. In effect, they possess legal but not empirical sovereignty.64 State weakness is then the absence (or refusal) of government responsibilities considered core functions of statehood. Hence, weak states can be defined as countries lacking the capacity and/or will to foster an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; to establish and maintain legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; to secure their populations from violent conflict and to control their territory; and to meet the basic human needs of their population.65 I also draw attention to ‘topography’ as contributing to state weakness. James Fearon and David Laitin argue rough terrain aggravates state weakness because of the expensive infrastructure investment necessary to control thinly populated territories and the easy cover it offers insurgents.66 In the absence of a well-developed transportation (road and rail) infrastructure, difficult terrains dictate the terms of combat to a large degree: lacking a serious road/rail network, the mobility of modern mechanized and 64 Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), p. 13. 65 Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick, “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World,” Brookings Institution, 2008, p. 8, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index/02_weak_states_index.pdf, accessed 11.12.2010. 66 James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” p. 80. 38 motorized armed forces in rugged terrains have proven to be exceedingly difficult and vulnerable to guerilla attacks. David Kilcullen, amongst other analysts, alludes to the difficulty in negotiating Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain and harsh climatic conditions.67 This has forced the Afghan government and Coalition forces – much like Soviet forces before them – to take the war to the Taliban insurgency by conducting air operations in rebel-controlled or contested areas, often causing wide-spread devastation and collateral damage. Another popular explanation – ‘resource mobilization theory’ – attributes prolonged civil war to the resources available to rebel groups. James Fearon suggests asymmetries in resources between the state and the rebellious groups result in short wars. Wars do not last long when states are strong and rebels are weak (or vice versa). Conversely, the presence of ‘contraband’ prolongs civil wars.68 Contraband refers to lucrative resources such as opium or diamonds, which rebel groups can harvest/sell to procure additional funds or weapons. Indeed, the above argument fits well into the rubric of the weak state model. Weak states lack the capacity to monitor and stem the flow of contraband, thereby allowing rebels to harvest, buy and sell lucrative resources which fuel the conflict. Subsumed in the weak state thesis is the role of (good) governance. Governance is not only widely viewed as one of the core functions of the state, but also crucial to stabilizing the transition from war to peace. I use the term ‘good’ in this study to stand for good-for-economic-development. Good governance involves the provision of essential 67 See David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla. See James Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 41, Iss. 3, 2004. 68 39 services – what Francis Fukuyama calls “pure public goods”69 – to the population by a central authority in a timely manner, including defense and security, law and order, health care, power, transportation infrastructure, and other basic services.70 Conversely, poor governance is the failure of the governing institutions to deliver essential public services to the governed. Here, I consider two features of government performance: ‘responsiveness’ (whether the public manage to deliver services consistent with citizens’ preferences and needs) and ‘efficiency’ (whether the public manage to provide services of a given quality in the least-cost manner). Measures of good governance are therefore closely linked to measures of state weakness. Indicators of state weakness are usually bracketed into four ‘baskets’. These are: security indicators; political indicators, economic indicators and social welfare indicators. In the security realm, weak states struggle to maintain a monopoly on the use of force, provide security from external and internal threats, control borders and territory, ensure public order and provide safety from crime. Security indicators therefore evaluate whether a state is able to provide the above-mentioned and physical security for its citizens. They measure the occurrence and intensity of violent conflict or its effects (e.g., casualties), widespread perceptions of political instability, territory affected by conflict, and state-sponsored political violence and gross human rights abuses. In the political realm, weak states lack legitimate governing institutions that provide checks on political power and corruption, protect basic rights and freedoms, hold leaders accountable, deliver impartial justice and efficient administration, and permit broad citizen participation. Political indicators therefore assess the quality of a state’s 69 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, p. 9. The fact that some analysts generally equate the Afghan government ‘presence’ with infrastructure, projects and services, signals a belief (erroneously) that a quick gesture can eliminate long-term resentment. 70 40 political institutions and the extent to which its citizens accept as legitimate their system of governance. In the economic realm, weak states strain to carry out basic macroeconomic and fiscal policies and lack a legal and regulatory climate conducive to entrepreneurship, private enterprise, open trade, natural resource management, foreign investment and economic growth. Economic indicators therefore assess a state’s ability to provide its citizens with a stable economic environment that facilitates sustainable and equitable growth. They take into account recent economic growth, the quality of existing economic policies, whether the environment is conducive to private sector development, and the degree to which income is equitably distributed. Lastly, weak states are unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs of their populations by making even minimal investments in health, education and other social services.71 Thus, indicators in the social welfare basket measure how well a state meets the above-mentioned basic human needs of its citizens. 71 These four categories correspond to the broad components of state capability that USAID use to measure ‘fragility.’ United States Agency for International Development, Fragile States Strategy, January 2005, p. 4, available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf, accessed 08.01.2010. 41 /2435# 6 . 0 Following from the preceding discussions, I will now proceed to identify and operationalize security and political indicators of state weakness. These indicators measure the degree of ‘control’ the state exercises over the population/society. Due to the limited scope of this project, economic and social welfare indicators have been omitted. The indicators, distinguished by their respective brackets: Security indicators: i) violent conflict and ii) political instability. Political indicators: i) government (in)effectiveness, ii) rebel challenges, iii) rule of law and iv) corruption (and cronyism). ‘Violent conflict’ measures the state’s ability to maintain peace within its borders and provide basic physical and human security. The indicator itself can be further divided into: a) territory affected by conflict, b) indiscriminate violence and c) shortcomings in the security apparatus. ‘Political stability’ measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized. ‘Government (in)effectiveness’ is among the most direct measures available of the strength and quality of state institutions (and resources), which are essential for the provision of public goods and the formulation and implementation of sound polices. ‘Rebel (socio-political) challenges’ to government rule/authority complements any analysis of government (in)effectiveness. ‘Rule of law’ measures the efficiency and extent to which agents abide by the rules of society, in particular the police and courts. ‘Corruption (and cronyism)’ measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, as well as the ‘capture’ of the state by elites. 42 /2 3 0 # The theoretical literature alludes to three essential elements of overlapping statefunction, the absence of which contribute to instability and resulting loss in societal support. First, the loss of active control of territory, or deficiencies in security/law enforcement, provides space where instability can fester. Second, lacking physical security, other state functions are compromised. Thus, weak states are hampered by poor governance (including corruption) and inadequate provisions of fundamental public services to its citizens. Third, lacking in public service provisions (of which physical security is part) weak states lack the conditions to achieve lasting economic development. Combined, these three elements are likely to: a) lead to public/civilian resentment; and b) incite destabilizing elements within the state who violently challenge the incumbent’s authority.72 As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the persistence of the Afghan civil war can, and should, be regarded as an expression of the endemic problem of state weakness. The lack of functioning, efficient and legitimate institutions-of-state prevents the central government from imposing their writ and achieving a stable polity. In the midst of political instability and flailing security, the state is not able to negotiate the mutual demands between state and societal groups – poor (or negligible) governance leads to a decline in societal support. Failure to dispense with the functions-of-state leads to shifts in societal support in favor of the rebel (rival) actor – best exemplified by rebel recruitment: by joining the rebel organization and rebellion, recruits signal the craving for a new and improved socio-political system. At this juncture, a space emerges – a vacuum, 72 See Jack Goldstone, “State Capacity: The Dynamics of Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Government Action in Fragile States,” US AID Working Papers on Fragile States No. 2, 2005, available at http://www.irisprojects.umd.edu/ppc_ideas/FS_Assessment/Secure/progress_pdf/state_capacity.pdf, accessed 17.09.2009. 43 so to speak – where the various institutions-of-state compete violently with the rebel actors to secure ‘control’ and earn legitimacy. The causal pathway suggests that in societies with weak states, the inability to impose meaningful ‘control’ engenders popular grievance. Such a scenario leads to loss of societal support and legitimacy for the incumbent actor. Conversely, the local population acquiesces to rebel governance. Logic therefore dictates that if the state was the dominant (i.e. strong) actor, and met (or in the least was in a position to meet) the population’s needs – i.e. improved government intervention – it would go a long way in legitimizing the state’s position of power, especially in regard to the use of legitimate coercion. Joel Migdal’s work and insights are of great value in this schema. He argues that in weak states, strong societal groups (but not the state) are in the best position to address the various needs of the population. This in-turn robs the government of its legitimacy, often fueling a vicious conflict for power and resources. During the course of violent competition, however, the rebel actor seeks to challenge state-authority by establishing ‘shadow’ institutions that mirror state institutions. These institutions attempt to provide various services which the state itself is unable (or unwilling) to, in the process gaining societal approval. In such societies, compliance (and/or participation) accorded by the local populations to the strong societal group legitimizes the latter’s actions and policies, including war-effort.73 Of particular importance in this schema is the functional role of governance. Strong governments deliver substantial services such as the protection of citizens, the 73 See Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. 44 enforcement of legislation, and the relatively fair dispensation of justice. Unresponsive and inefficient governance, however, only serves to compound the central government’s inability to impose meaningful societal ‘control’. In fact, repeated government failures can lead isolated public censures to snowball into widespread mass criticism of government (in)action, perhaps even fueling insurgent recruitment in the process. For instance, the failure of the state to provide security and justice, coupled with the local people’s experience of predatory and oppressive security sector institutions (including the police), are influential drivers towards extremism. Likewise, the perception of the government as corrupt (and even negligent) means people look elsewhere for a more moral form of governance.74 Similarly, Francis Fukuyama alludes to the disparity between the state’s ‘scope’ (i.e., the range of activities it undertakes) and its relative ‘strength’ to execute those activities and effectively enforce laws.75 Weak states often adopt the trappings of the imagined state without having the underlying (institutional) capacities to carry out the promises implied by such structures and policies. In such instance, the functional aspects of the state may substantially depart from the implied promises of the imagined state. Essential government services are unavailable or corrupt. Weak state governments are unable to protect their own citizens from criminal elements, guerilla rebels or even the state-run army and police forces.76 74 Stephen Carter and Kate Clark, “No Shortcut to Stability: Justice, Politics and Insurgency in Afghanistan,” Chatam House, December 2010, p. 5, available at http://chathamhouse.org.uk/files/18074_1210pr_afghanjustice.pdf, accessed 09.01.2011. 75 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, pp. 8-11. 76 Ann Hironaka, Neverending Wars: The international Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 55-56. 45 78 - 9 : - The primary aim of this project is to articulate an argument (framework) that best explains (more than sufficiently) conflict persistence in Afghanistan. Such a framework should possess the necessary theoretical and empirical rigor to also go beyond explaining the puzzle and articulate solutions – solutions that adequately address, combat and finally overcome conflict persistence. This necessitates articulating a counter-factual: ‘good governance will engender conditions that facilitate war termination.’ I have hitherto argued that institutional, governance and overall state weakness creates the space and conditions for conflict persistence. According to such a hypothesis, it is the shortcomings in national and local governance – i.e. the myriad failures in addressing citizens’ insecurities and needs – and the tensions in state-society relations that allow rebels to legitimately mount challenges to state authority. Challenges to state authority inevitably lead to rejuvenated cycles of prolonged and persistent conflict: the contested space then becomes the battlefield, the desired object.77 It is not only the existence of such space left vacant by the absence of government, but the exploitation of such space by rebels that explains conflict persistence. The incumbent (and its allies), in turn, escalate their war-effort in order to redress insurgent advances. Within such a framework, two interlocking factors do most of the explanatory work: a) failure to secure societal support, b) failure to garner legitimacy for the war-effort. To elucidate: the failure to deliver essential services (physical security/protection, livelihood creation, law and order, among others) leads to loss of public support. For rational populations, there is no utility in supporting an actor who cannot 77 Conditions of civil war are structurally similar to international anarchy because institutions and norms are weak and/or contested. The challenge to creating a framework to end civil wars – in general – is the difficulty in creating enforcement mechanisms. 46 provide/guarantee their basic needs, especially after decades of warfare and destruction. Dissatisfaction/grievance, then, has a two-fold effect: it robs the incumbent of local support and by consequence legitimacy – the mandate to govern. This in turn increases the insurgency’s appeal in the eyes of many. The insurgency is now able to ‘rescue’ (read ‘recruit’) aggrieved souls from the depths of insecurity and want.78 The insurgency achieves this by awarding financial and security incentives: physical protection for insurgent fighters and sympathisers, and the opportunity to earn a living as combatants and/or participating in the drug and arms trades. The fundamental challenge in war-torn countries, then, is to build an effective state structure. Insurgency, governance problems, economic weakness, corruption, the drug/arms trades are all symptoms of underlying state weakness, including the dearth in support of the incumbent’s objectives. Any effective counterinsurgent strategy must seek to first build the state. Simultaneously, efforts should be aimed at keeping insurgents, warlords, infiltrators and other security threats from overwhelming the state while it is being built. The various institutional mechanisms of coercion and restraint, then, are crucial for conflict avoidance/termination. The ultimate goal here is to build a state capable of managing its own problems. In war-torn societies, coercion is not the sole (let alone most effective) source of motivation. I argue that coercion is at best an insufficient (short-term) mechanism in securing the compliance and support of target populations. In fact, the over-use of 78 My hypothesis is consistent with Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis’ 2000 study on the duration of civil war. An inference from Elbadawi and Sambanis’ model is that an external intervention or government policy initiatives that addresses the needs (ala poverty, security) of local populations will make rebel/insurgent mobilization and recruitment more difficult, thereby shortening the length of conflict. In such instance, a decisive outcome (in favor of the incumbent) will be achieved more quickly. See Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, “External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars,” The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper no. 2433, September 2000, available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/09/30/000094946_00091405494827/Rendere d/PDF/multi_page.pdf, accessed 05.09.2009. 47 coercion in specific cases has left populations craving for ‘enemy’ intervention – often perceived to be a more rational (utility maximizing) and humane alternative. Typically, political actors employ a mixture of incentives and sanctions to achieve an acceptable level of ‘control’.79 Herein, economic motivations serve as incentives. More often than not, ordinary folk explain they joined an insurgency to earn a living. Both phenomena have been repeatedly confirmed by international organizations. Persuasion and coercion, then, are used in tandem to target the fence-sitters and get them to actively support the actors’ cause. Regardless of how the attitudes (preference or allegiance) of local individuals and communities are inferred, an implication of the focus on attitudinal support is the twin claim that victory requires attitudinal shifts – ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’ – which can only be achieved through non-violent persuasion: a genuine and timely effort to satisfy the grievances or wants of the people is required since the people’s support for the guerilla or incumbent is predicated upon the moral alienation of the other. According to such a view, force of arms alone will not prevail. Take, for instance, the Coalition governments’ hitherto refusal to negotiate ceasefires with the Taliban that could ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations at risk. Such refusal – stemming from the fear that military ceasefires may accord their rivals a measure of political recognition – has cost the Afghan government the peoples’ support. Instead, the burden of securing access has fallen to international and local humanitarian organizations. Both the UNICEF and 79 Note, military and political responses to insurgencies often go together, since political programmes cannot be implemented in insecure environments. Put slightly differently, for the incumbent to acquire the consent and support of local populations, the twin approach of ‘carrots and sticks’ must be implemented. 48 ICRC have been known to negotiate with the Taliban to conduct vaccination days.80 The Taliban, of course, are keen to interpret the actions of the international military presence in a light which will mobilize people to support them and join their ranks. Vaccination days were not unusual before 2001 – they were seen by warring parties as an opportunity to boost local popularity and legitimacy, fulfill part of their moral obligation as Muslims to assist vulnerable children, but most importantly to take the moral high ground against the rival. Incidentally, such humanitarian measures have been reportedly disrupted on several occasions by the coercive activities of the international military rather than the Taliban. The main policy implication of non-violent persuasion, then, is that incumbents need to persuade hostile or suspicious and non-cooperative populations to switch their sympathies through programs of economic development (including job and livelihood creation) in conjunction with adequate physical security guarantees (via substantial military or police presence), and civic action. Winning hearts and minds is therefore key to securing a zero-sum outcome: societal support in favor of a political actor denies its rival(s) the means and justification to continue to mount serious challenges – particularly those of a military and violent nature. Hence, in the Afghan case, when the Taliban gain support, the Afghan government loses support and vice versa. One way to reverse the trend in the state’s favor is to identify and understand the needs of the citizens, and then do a better job of meeting those needs than the rival. In an approach similar to the ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’ framework, Mark Lichbach identifies a range of possible private goods that might be offered to potential 80 British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group, “Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds: Exploring Afghan Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations,” BAAG Monthly Report, June 2007, pp. 24-25, available at http://www.baag.org.uk/publications/category/2007, accessed 12.04.2010. 49 recruits, from money, loot, and land to protection and positions of authority, among others.81 Acceptance of the role of selective incentives in motivating participation or collaboration is now widespread, leading Jeffrey Goodwin and Theda Skocpol to conclude that “it is the on-going provision of such collective and selective goods, not ideological conversion in the abstract, that has played the principal role in solidifying social support....”82 Thus support – understood as preference – earns the concerned political actor much needed legitimacy to implement policy. This relationship between support and legitimacy – or rather the lack thereof – is crucial to explaining conflict persistence. 81 Mark Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), pp. 217-226. Jeffrey Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, “Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World,” Politics and Society, Vol. 17, Iss. 4, 1989, p. 494. 82 50 ; Chapter II began by examining the concepts of political legitimacy and societal support. Throughout, the chapter investigated the relationship (correlation) between the said concepts and how they determine conflict outcome: I suggested that the failure to secure legitimacy and societal support leads to violent conflict between rival actors, particularly in hotly contested areas where government presence is weakest. The chapter then argued that institutional, governance and overall state weakness creates the space and conditions for conflict persistence. According to such a hypothesis, it is the shortcomings in national and local governance – i.e. the myriad failures in addressing citizens’ insecurities and needs – coupled with a long history of tense statesociety relations that allows insurgents to legitimately mount challenges to state authority. Challenges to state authority inevitably lead to rejuvenated cycles of prolonged and persistent conflict. For rational populations, there is no utility in supporting an actor who cannot provide/guarantee their basic needs, especially after decades of warfare and destruction. Dissatisfaction/grievance, then, has a two-fold effect: it robs the incumbent of local support and by consequence, legitimacy – i.e. the mandate to govern. This in turn increases the insurgency’s appeal in the eyes of many. The insurgency is now able to extend its appeal and influence by awarding financial and security incentives: physical protection for insurgent fighters and sympathizers, and the opportunity to earn a living as combatants and/or participating in the drug and arms trades. The chapter concluded by highlighting the strategic significance of the ‘Hearts and Minds’ approach to war termination. Actors need to persuade hostile or suspicious 51 and non-cooperative populations to switch their sympathies through programs of economic development (including job and livelihood creation) in conjunction with adequate physical security guarantees (via substantial militia, military or police presence), and civic action. By manipulating popular opinion, actors will be better positioned to determine conflict outcome. 52 The following chapter seeks to survey some of the a . The chapter introduces two explanations – alluded to as “competing explanations,” in the introductory chapter – that attempt to explain why the Taliban and Afghan government continue to resort to violence. While there are several discernable gaps in the literature, the chapter will only identify two pertinent weaknesses. The foremost shortcoming (indeed the raison d’être for this study) is that these so-called “competing explanations” have all tended to under-emphasize the role/function of the state – and resistance to it – in the continuation of violent conflict and are worryingly rebel-centric. This has resulted in the disregard of the explanatory value of the weak state/good governance model, in particular its applicability when analyzing Afghanistan’s endemic history of weakness. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to contextualize these key weaknesses vis-à-vis the research model elaborated in Chapter II, and reinforce the earlier theoretical argument. 53 Drawing on the history of the Afghan-Soviet crisis of the 1980s, some observers opine that foreign military occupation effectively makes conflict intractable, encouraging locals to take up arms against the perceived foreign ‘threat’:83 a reinforced (foreign) military presence in Afghanistan risks provoking a backlash in which religion combines with nationalism to oppose foreign occupation.84 Moreover, dissenters and insurgents view the US-led international mission as partial to one faction – the incumbent Afghan government, presently led by Hamid Karzai. This heightens the insecurity of the Taliban. Gert Jan Hofstede, a leading expert in cross-cultural management, argues that the cultural disposition of Afghans is to unite against foreign strangers:85 fighting is seen as an affirmation of (Taliban, or Pashtun) identity. Hofstede’s analysis is consistent with Patrick Regan’s 2000 study – Civil Wars and Foreign Powers – which argues foreign intervention (of which occupation is the extreme form) prolongs fighting.86 The foreign occupation thesis is therefore an indictment of the hitherto uncompromising nature of the Western-led military mission. A military solution spearheaded by foreign forces is thought to be counter-productive as it (allegedly) undermines the political objectives the solution is intended to achieve – i.e. legitimacy and popular support for the new central government. Instead, the insurgency is fed by what is perceived by the Pashtun people as a continued and sustained assault, going back 83 Lucy Morgan Edwards, “The West Needs to Open Itself to the Potential of Tribal Solutions in Resolving the Conflict in Afghanistan,” April 2009, available at http://www.the-beacon.info/afghan-presidentialelection.html, accessed 02.04.2010. 84 It is this that has been the real strength of movements like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Mehdi Army in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. David Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,” International Security, Vol. 29, Iss. 1, Summer 2004, p. 51. 85 Daniel L. Davis, “The Afghan Mistake: Why Sending More Troops Won’t Work.” 86 Patrick Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000). 54 centuries, on Pashtun land, culture, traditions and religion by internal and external enemies. The US-led presence in Pashtun valleys and villages, as well as Afghan army and police units that are led and composed of significantly large numbers of non-Pashtun soldiers and police, provide an occupation force against which the insurgency is justified. Recently resigned US State Department official Matthew Hoh suggests a similar hypothesis: scores of localized Afghan groups are fighting foreign forces not because of ideological ties to the Taliban, but as a bid to maintain their local power bases. Hoh explains that the insurgency in Korengal valley (Zabul province) – a remote region on the south-west – arrived only after foreign forces did, thus implying a need to reassess foreign military presence.87 Many thus opine there is no military solution to the conflict, at least not through Western military intervention. Despite increased troop levels on the ground, international military and political leaders are becoming increasingly pessimistic about their ability to beat the Taliban. For example, US Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Admiral Mike Mullen, was repeatedly quoted in September and October 2008 questioning whether the war in Afghanistan was being won. In addition, a leaked French diplomatic cable also reported that the British ambassador to Afghanistan stated that the war in Afghanistan could not be won militarily.88 Following from the above, the argument that more foreign troops are the solution – and this would include the Obama administration’s November 2009 decision to authorize a troop surge – is untenable. There is substantial evidence to suggest that the 87 Karen DeYoung, “US Official Resigns Over Afghan War,” Washington Post, 27 October 2009. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Study Is Said to Warn of Crisis in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 8 October 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/world/asia/09afghan.html, accessed 29.01.2009. 88 55 brutality of the occupying forces has been one of the main sources of recruits for the Taliban (thus providing the manpower to fuel the insurgency). There is widespread fury among Afghans at the number of civilian casualties, many of them children.89 There have been numerous incidents of rough treatment of women by ISAF soldiers, as well as indiscriminate bombing of villages and house-to-house search-and-arrest missions.90 All this creates a thirst for dignity that can only be assuaged by genuine independence. In Afghanistan: Mirage of the Good War Tariq Ali argues the unpopularity of the Afghan government and the disrespectful behavior of the occupying troops have had the effect of creating nostalgia for the time when the Taliban were in power. The repression thus leaves people with no option but to back those trying to resist.91 Such a situation can be reversed, however, if instead of foreign militaries, indigenous security forces are given a lead (if not the only) role in the counterinsurgency campaign. A lead indigenous role can provide a focus for national aspirations and show the population that they – and not foreign forces – control their destiny. Competent governments that can provide services to their population in a timely manner can best prevent and overcome insurgencies. Within such context, some suggest a troop withdrawal from Afghanistan will help facilitate a serious peace process. It is suggested that such a process alone will not directly address the Taliban threat, but reduce the oppressive forces (mentioned in the 89 The Karzai government faces cross-pressures between the international community’s attempt to thwart the Taliban threat and the domestic political fallout from civilian deaths caused by international forces. The political fallout – mass anger – emerging from civilian casualties prompted Karzai to order the ministries of defence and foreign affairs to review and regulate the operations of international troops in Afghanistan, including limiting their use of air strikes in civilian areas and issuing more stringent guidelines for detaining civilians. 90 Peter Marsden, Afghanistan: Aid, Armies and Empire (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), pp. 109-111; Thomas Ruttig, “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency,” Report of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2009, pp. 7-8, available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=114, accessed 08.2009. 91 Tariq Ali, “Afghanistan: Mirage of the Good War,” New Left Review, Vol. 50, March/April 2008, p. 15. 56 previous section) at work, and potentially reduce the legitimacy of the Taliban leaders and the motives driving their movement. With international (particularly US) troops gone, the Taliban’s raison d’être inside Afghanistan will be greatly weakened. Lacking a justification for continued resistance following withdrawal, the Taliban could be forced to seek a political (power-sharing) compromise. Such a process would witness Taliban leaders opting to switch allegiances in exchange for assured benefits/incentives, or could even see the Taliban organization being co-opted in entirety into the state-mechanism. This, of course, is provided both the incumbent and the insurgent are willing, and can agree, to share power.92 Withdrawal could then witness various anti-Taliban actors who are also antiintervention93 coalesce together in a common fight against the Taliban threat. Somewhat idealistically, it is hoped such a scenario will eventually lead to a Taliban defeat. In such a scenario, if the US were to take the lead, post-withdrawal, in regional talks which include Afghanistan’s neighbors, it could go a long way in undermining the Taliban. Former CIA analyst and scholar James Dobbins argues convergent pressures from foreign sponsors and supporters could help Afghans reconcile their differences and combat the Taliban threat.94 Proponents of withdrawal, however, neglect two alternate outcomes. First, failure to agree to share power could lead to resumption in fighting, with the Taliban reasserting control over vast swathes of territory; in such a scenario, foreign troop withdrawal will 92 Power-sharing and/or co-option often create fear among the parties to the conflict. Parties fear their former enemies may renege on their word/deal. This generates a ‘credible-commitment’ problem. The presence and involvement of external third parties may be made necessary, in such instance, to provide credible security guarantees to the concerned parties. In this sense, third parties serve as institutions who perform a specific function – observe, monitor and if need be, enforce. 93 The Afghan warlord General Dostum was one such actor – anti-Taliban, yet furiously anti-Western intervention. 94 James Dobbins, “Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War,” pp. 7-8. 57 lead to the capitulation of Kabul. This scenario is considered plausible since many observers question the incumbent’s ability to repel Taliban advances without Western military support.95 Equally plausible, in the absence of occupying troops, hostilities between the incumbent and insurgent groups could continue for the foreseeable future, a stalemated war so to speak. In this second scenario, the government’s (in)ability to muster societal support becomes crucial: in the period following withdrawal, Afghan civilians will expect the government to provide essential services (including security). Government failure to provide such will force civilians to opt for the Taliban alternative. Perhaps the most damning indictment of the withdrawal thesis, yet, is the fact that an insufficient international military presence in the immediate aftermath of Taliban defeat in 2001 (the international community holed up in Kabul) led to the resurgence of the Taliban. Failure to a) capture/kill Taliban hard-line leaders, b) disarm armed groups, b) extend the physical presence of international forces beyond the immediate vicinity of Kabul, c) secure the international border with Pakistan, among others, allowed the Taliban to creep back into power. One has to wonder, if the Taliban are arrogant enough to (be able to) mount a significant challenge even in the midst of an international occupation, what of their intent and capability following withdrawal? Some observers suggest that unless the Taliban are incorporated into the state mechanism – a precarious and unlikely proposition in itself – withdrawal will only witness a continuation of hostilities between the incumbent and insurgent groups. 95 Interestingly, most US officials and proponents of war have used this scenario to justify a continued presence (and combat operations); it is not in US interests to permit the Taliban victory. 58 There is also the issue of how Afghans perceive the occupation and the occupying forces. In areas of severe contest and violent activity, local civilians appear to increasingly question government and international effectiveness. Yet, in a majority of provinces – particularly in the north and northwest – where government presence is strong, civilians continue to view foreigners favorably. This suggests a correlation between state strength and societal support accorded to the state. Unfortunately, this continued support for international forces has been overlooked, with some observers even suggesting the international community has outstayed their presence and are no longer considered welcome.96 This mischaracterization of many Afghans’ attitude toward foreign troops is a mistake frequently made by policy analysts in the West. They hardly acknowledge that while Afghans perceived Soviet forces as occupiers in the 1980s, today many perceive American and NATO forces as Afghanistan’s liberators – a view probably informed by very broad rejection of the likely alternative, the Taliban. A January 2010 poll conducted by ABC News, the BBC, and ARD German TV, found a sharp increase – a 14-point gain from 2009, to 83 percent – in the view among Afghans that it was right for the US to invade and overthrow the Taliban.97 Favorable popular disposition toward the foreign presence is essential for success in the fight against the Taliban. 96 Successive and periodic polls conducted by the Asia Foundation and ABC News attest to Afghan civilians’ favorable outlook toward the foreign presence. 97 ABC News, BBC and ARD Poll, “Afghanistan – Where Things Stand,” 11 January 2010, available at http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1099a1Afghanistan-WhereThingsStand.pdf, accessed 30.03.2010. 59 In one key shift, the ABC News poll found that more Afghans now see the Taliban as the main source of their country’s strife, while many fewer blame the US or its allies.98 The table below (Figure 1.) reveals this trend. Figure 1. – Actors Mainly Blamed for Violence by Afghan Citizens. (Source: ABC News, BBC and ARD POLL, “Afghanistan – Where Things Stand,” http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1099a1Afghanistan-WhereThingsStand.pdf) Concurrently, following steep declines in recent years there has been a 30-point advance in views that the country is headed in the right direction; 70 percent now say so, the most since 2005. Afghans’ expectations that their own lives will be better a year from now have jumped by 20 points, to 71 percent, a new high. And there’s been a 14-point 98 This poll was conducted via face-to-face interviews with 1,534 randomly selected Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces from December 11-23, 2009, with field work by ACSOR, the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research, in Kabul. ABC News, BBC and ARD Poll, “Afghanistan – Where Things Stand.” 60 rise in expectations that the next generation will have a better life, to 61 percent (see Figure 2, below). Critical from the US perspective is that, despite poor views of its overall performance, 68 percent of Afghans continue to support the presence of US forces in their country – and nearly as many, 61 percent, favor the coming surge of Western troops initiated by President Obama.99 Figure 2. – Afghans’ Expectations of Life in Afghanistan. (Source: ABC News, BBC and ARD Poll, “Afghanistan – Where Things Stand,” http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1099a1Afghanistan-WhereThingsStand.pdf) There is some ambivalence, however, about how long international forces should remain in the country – 22 percent said they should leave within the next 18 months, and 21 percent said they should stay longer than 18 months from now. Crucially, 29 percent 99 ABC News, BBC and ARD Poll, “Afghanistan – Where Things Stand.” 61 said it really depends on the security condition. This last view suggests Afghans are aware, that in the absence of a capable and mature indigenous security apparatus, a continued foreign troop presence is perhaps the only defense against Taliban insurgents. Most Afghans, particularly the non-Pashtun minorities, are acutely aware that the Taliban alternative would spell a renewed cycle of fear, mistrust and tyranny. According to Shaida Abdali (Deputy National Security Advisor of Afghanistan and Special Assistant to President Hamid Karzai), Afghans hardly have high expectations from the international community. Their most basic demand is physical security and peace: “give us amenyat (or peace), and the rest we will take care of,” they shout.100 Still, when it comes to choosing between the foreign occupation or Taliban rule – based on performance and security provided – there are significant regional differences. The degree of fear (of safety) is more pronounced in the regions where insecurity is identified as an important local problem such as the southeast (65 percent), west (62 percent) and southwest (62 percent), where around two-thirds of respondents say they sometimes or often fear for their safety. Support for US and the overall international effort are sharply lower in the rural south and east of the country, where the fighting is heaviest. Local support for the Taliban rises to 27 percent on its home turf, in the country’s southwest, versus 10 percent in the rest of the country. And views of the country’s direction are markedly less bright in some high-conflict areas, such as Helmand and Kandahar. The findings are buttressed by further polls that indicate respondents from rural and urban areas have significantly different perceptions of governance, particularly 100 Shaida Abdali and Ashraf Haidari, “Winning the Elusive Peace in Afghanistan,” Ariana Afghan Television, available at http://www.eariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allArticles/EE3920DABCAAD1BE8725760300697F73?OpenDoc ument, accessed 30.03.2010. 62 local security. A higher proportion of urban residents (79 percent) say the security situation in their local area is either quite good or very good compared to their rural counterparts (60 percent). On the other hand, more than a third of respondents in rural areas (39 percent) say security in their local area is quite bad or very bad compared to only one-fifth of urban residents (20 percent). This is consistent with the finding that nearly twice as many rural residents identify insecurity as one of the biggest local problems compared to those in urban areas.101 Thus, for locals in remote Taliban strongholds, liberal democracy is not the craving; instead, a secure environment – wherein people can go about with their lives and provide for their families – is the demand, and the Taliban provide such.102 The challenge for the international community, then, is to continue to be regarded as liberators and preservers of the peace. Such perception can only be engendered if the international presence together with the Afghan government make genuine strives toward making Afghanistan a strong state capable of providing adequate services to the populace. Only better governance will make the government (and the foreign presence) legitimate in the eye of the locals. 101 The Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People,” p. 28, available at http://asiafoundation.org, accessed 21.04.2010. 102 Polling statistics are much more ambiguous in these high-conflict regions of the south and east. Here, government presence is at its weakest. Here, there is a co-relation between poor government performance and a poor review of government and international forces. It is this co-relation that often leads analysts to mistakenly argue that the populations demand withdrawal in favor of the Taliban option. This ambiguity should force us to shift our gaze to the population’s perceptions of government performance. The same polling that reveals a regional divergence in popular perceptions of the occupation, also indicate significant mass dissatisfaction with local-level governance. An argument could be made, then, that the government’s poor track-record, combined with the international community’s indifference, sows seeds of resentment in the hearts and minds of the indigenous populations. 63 ! ! Many Taliban, including those at the higher echelons, initially viewed a resurgence of violence as a means of gaining admission to the government after the Bonn Agreement had excluded their formal participation. This raises the question: is the failure to reach a political settlement with the Afghan government the cause of conflict persistence? International experience suggests that unless a conflict is resolved without a reconciliation process, it is more likely to persist/reappear.103 A shallow examination indicates that the ‘failure’ to reach a political consensus led to a renewed cycle of violence: according to former Taliban members, when the Afghan government’s anticipated gestures of goodwill failed to materialize, the hopes for a collaborative coexistence subsided.104 This leads some observers – who feel power-sharing is Mullah Omar’s priority – to argue that negotiating a broad agreement with the Taliban leadership to form a national unity government (with guarantees against al Qaeda’s return to Afghanistan) would bring an end to the civil war.105 Since the beginning of his second term as President, Hamid Karzai has focused his attention overwhelmingly on negotiating with the Taliban to bring stability through a political settlement.106 This has proven to be a complex and challenging task for the 103 See Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” and Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 104 Sultan Barakat and Steven Zyck, “Afghanistan’s Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Iss. 3, 2010, p. 200. 105 See Gilles Dorronsoro, “Afghanistan: Searching for political Agreement,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2010, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/searching_polit_agreement.pdf, accessed 28.05.2010; Fotini Christia and Michael Semple, “Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Iss. 4, July/August 2009. 106 Hoping to enlist the support of tribal elders in beating back the insurgency, President Karzai (along with former Pakistani President Musharraf) first agreed to hold jirgas (or tribal councils) in the border areas of 64 government. For instance, it took Karzai more than a year to organize a peace jirga (Afghans’ traditional assembly) and to decide on 68 members of the peace council to conduct the negotiations. Membership of the council includes mostly ex-mujaheedin leaders and commanders, a few moderate Taliban leaders, and eight women. As a goodwill gesture, the names of dozens of Taliban leaders were removed from the UN Security Council’s blacklist, but the response from the Taliban had been negative. As a precondition for any negotiation, the Taliban have demanded the immediate withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan and increased their attacks on the negotiation initiative. This follows the Taliban’s pre-election strategy of warning people not to participate in the September 2010 parliamentary elections, and their attacks on the polls. The Taliban leaders have also recently announced that members of the peace council are “useless,” having been the cause of the previous conflicts.107 The viability of political parties plays a role with relation to war termination: a successful demilitarization of politics includes processes to encourage the transformation of militias and single party organizations into political parties that can operate in a competitive, multiparty system. The creation of political parties able to represent key constituencies and compete effectively in an electoral process is therefore an important component of any post-conflict (democratic) transition – to the extent that powerful leaders and their followers perceive that they have the option to operate as a legitimately Afghanistan, in 2006. The jirgas – open forums traditionally used to reconcile conflicts by bringing the disagreeing parties to a consensus – would involve leaders of Pashtun tribes, who share ethnic ties with the Taliban. Karzai has also courted former Taliban officials for some time now. In 2004, for instance, he launched a reconciliation program, saying all but a core of 150 militants wanted for human-rights violations would be able to join the political process. About 2,300 former members of the Taliban (and other Islamist insurgency groups) took advantage of the program and yet, by 2006 the insurgency was at its most virulent and strongest. 107 Nematullah Bizan, “Afghanistan’s Uncertain Road to Stability,” Asian Currents, October 2010, p. 8, available at http://asaa.asn.au/publications/ac/2010/asian-currents-10-10.pdf, accessed 10.10.2010. 65 recognized political party rather than as a militia (or military government), the chances of a successful transition are increased. For the rebels, agreeing to negotiate gains for them a certain measure of domestic legitimacy. If they do eventually agree to a settlement, the terms of that agreement will give them access to administrative and financial resources that they had no claim to prior to negotiations. Consequently, should they choose to resume armed conflict at some time in the future, they would do so from a position of greater strength. There are, however, no guarantees that negotiations would succeed, or even that they might occur. The Taliban are particularly aware that in a post-conflict pluralist society, without the instrumental use of coercion, their appeal amongst Afghan constituencies may lessen dramatically; an electoral victory in such instance will be unlikely. Thus, it is not necessarily the Taliban aim of reviving the theocratic state of the mid-late 1990s that leads to conflict persistence (rendering democratized politics unforeseeable), rather it is the perceived (indeed palpable) threat to the organization’s viability and survival – expressed in terms of electoral defeat – that may explain conflict persistence. It is not in the Taliban’s interest to contest elections. The incumbent is not immune to potential costs either. By agreeing to negotiations (and thereby the prospect of a settlement), the government grants recognition as a de facto equal to the rebels. Agreeing to negotiate with the rebels can have audience costs for the government, among its own constituents and among other domestic groups who may consider rebellion in the future.108 In short, agreeing to negotiate, or powersharing, implies a decline in the government’s power relative to the rebels.109 108 If the negotiation process provides the Taliban equal status with the government, which received its legitimacy through democratic elections (howsoever contentious), the Taliban will also be legitimized as a 66 The above discussion appears to suggest that the status quo (war) is preferred over costly political settlements. The analysis, however, does not offer a complete picture. Simply avoiding audience costs – by rejecting power-sharing – will not award the incumbent victory: if this were the case, the Afghan government should have emerged victorious by now. If, however, the potential of audience cost (resulting from settlement) motivates the government to improve and expand their strategy to win over societal support, then the two concepts – ‘good governance’ and negotiation/political settlement – are intricately intertwined. Yet, the strategy of negotiating with the Taliban lacks an essential rationale on how to negotiate and integrate the insurgents into the political system within the current environment of political distrust and public discontent. In particular, if attempts by the Karzai Government to negotiate with the Taliban are to have any chance of success, the government will first need to win the trust of the Afghan people. But, as was argued in Chapter II, Afghanistan suffers from weak state-societal relations – with the population lacking confidence in the government’s ability to deal with the Taliban and other crises. Conversely (and although information concerning the attitude of the Taliban is scant) the Taliban’s positioning during 2009 seemed to indicate at least some interest in negotiations: consultations with district and community elders and mullahs, attempts to improve the image of the Taliban,110 particularly in terms of concerns for the plight of consequence. This will further undermine the government’s already weak legitimacy and fuel growing public discontent. It will also add to the lack of societal cooperation with the state. The majority of Afghans, especially the youth and women, are legitimately concerned that the government will make dubious policy compromises with the Taliban that will have immediate and long-term consequences for their welfare and future. 109 Isak Svensson, “Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, 2007, p. 180. 110 The Taliban high command is cognizant of projecting a re-fashioned image of themselves as a standard insurgency group, flaunting a centralized command structure and a strong (present and potential) support 67 civilians caught in the crossfire, and so on, all indicate a counter attempt to allay the fears of the population. Today, the Taliban have adopted a secondary strategy to carve out substantial portions of land beyond the control of the central government. Why (or, when) would the Taliban willingly cede control to the government? Recalling the concept of ‘stalemate,’ I have previously argued that unless the Taliban perceive that their ability to comprehensively achieve victory is severely thwarted they will not be willing to enter talks. Consequently, it is the Afghan government’s inability to precipitate a sense of ‘stalemate’ that leads to conflict persistence. Despite its projected strength, the insurgency has grown in size and impact primarily through the amalgamation of several independent opposition groups and the recruitment of individuals seeking, most notably, pride, income, retribution for civilian deaths, and a sense of purpose. As such, its support is broadening but remains shallow, and improved Afghan government interventions could lead to conditions that are ‘ripe’ for a negotiated political settlement. Although the Afghan government is (as of yet) in no position to militarily defeat an increasingly widespread insurgency, the key to bringing the war to an end lies in empowering the state to carry out core and basic functions, thereby precipitating a sense of ‘stalemate.’ Only with a strong perception of ‘stalemate’ base. Herein, the Taliban’s 2009 Code of Conduct (titled, The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Rules for Mujahideen) pertaining to the applicability of suicide bombings – and a corollary pledge to minimize civilian casualties – is particularly illuminating. Additionally, ‘terrorism’ is routinely characterized by the disjunction between the target of the action and the target of purpose. Mullah Omar seems to be attempting to re-paint such a characterization. I argue the motivation behind such is two-fold: a) the oft-cited ‘hearts and minds’ agenda – the engaging in actions that will help bring the hearts of civilians closer to the Taliban; and b) perhaps more importantly, to signal to the opposition that the Taliban are a genuine insurgent group – as opposed to a mere terrorist entity – one that can be reasoned with. See Kate Swanson, “The Business of Being the Taliban,” The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Article No. 2932, New Delhi, 7 August 2009, available at http://www.ipcs.org/article/south-asia/the-business-of-being-the-taliban2932.html, accessed 09.08.2009; Srinjoy Bose, “Code of Conduct: Campaign of Misinformation?” The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Article No. 2947, New Delhi, 17 August 2009, available at http://www.ipcs.org/article/south-asia/code-of-conduct-campaign-of-misinformation-2947.html. 68 hanging overhead will the Taliban consider negotiations. This view is supported by Ahmed Rashid who argues that the Taliban’s influence (and power) has reached its zenith, implying that the Afghan government (and its western partners) would be in a stronger position in the future.111 The feasibility of pursuing a negotiated political settlement with the Taliban is aided by the basic fact that many of the current national priorities will be critical in softening up the ground for power-sharing discussions and discouraging the Taliban’s belief, as reflected by Adam Roberts, that “they are in a position of strength.”112 The Taliban must perceive a tide shift against them if they are to seriously entertain political negotiations and ratchet down any lingering hopes for returning to the early 2001 status quo ante. Doing so will require a three-pronged approach involving military victories, the reduction or even reversal of Taliban recruitment, and the promotion of good national and local governance. Government interventions may involve a combination of expanded but targeted military activity, increased economic development assistance, strengthened anticorruption measures, and community self-defense programs. Such an approach would have the effect of fostering a ‘hurting stalemate’ by reducing insurgent recruitment while, at the same time, military and reconstruction activities reach contextually appropriate levels.113 111 Gilles Dorronsoro, “Afghanistan: Searching for political Agreement.” Adam Roberts, “Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan,” Survival, Vol. 51, Iss. 1, 2009, p. 53. 113 See William Zartman, “Ripeness Revisited,” in Paul Stern and Daniel Druckman, eds., International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 2000). 112 69 " Chapter III reviewed the “competing explanations,” and highlighted their deficiency – in contrast to the ‘weak-state’ model, outlined in Chapter II – in explaining the cause(s) of conflict persistence; specific weaknesses of the literature were acknowledged, highlighting the significance of a state-centric study. Current military and civilian operations in Afghanistan have been severely hindered by a lack of appreciation for those factors that facilitate rebel recruitment efforts. These studies have been driven by singular causes drawn vaguely from the antiSoviet jihad. Many scholars have posited that instinctive opposition to foreign intervention (and modernization), Islamic fundamentalism, or poppy-driven greed play key roles. However, local Afghan fighters’ and groups’ motives are multifaceted and, in particular, far more parochial, often related to issues of security, retribution, and access to resources. The chapter compliments the central thesis of this project by suggesting if and when state strength and capacities are sufficiently improved, the state will be better positioned to determine conflict outcome. 70 The persistence of violent conflict and a corollary loss in societal support for the incumbent Afghan government is a major source of concern. Since 2003 the Taliban have re-emerged and have consistently gained influence over swathes of territory, effectively re-igniting a full-scale civil war. To many analysts it is the myriad failures of the Afghan government to successfully dispense with the functions of government – including ensuring the population’s safety, and implementing successful counter-insurgency operations – that accounts for the persistence of the civil war. In The Accidental Guerrilla David Kilcullen notes that traditional counterinsurgency operation uses improved governance and legitimacy to build alliances with local communities in order to marginalize and defeat insurgents.114 But building political alliances first requires a high level of trust and security guarantees between the actors. Throughout most of its history, lacking in resources and beset with corruption and nepotism, Afghanistan’s institutions have seldom been able to deliver services that are demanded of a modern state. Since 2003/4 the Karzai Administration has failed to provide the necessary guarantees and services to its citizenry, and is often perceived as an incompetent or unwilling sovereign. The resumption and continuation of war in Afghanistan can then be explained by the failure to address the root causes (and political realities) of war, in particular the absence of a fully functional central government that enjoys widespread legitimacy. 114 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, p. 14. 71 The following chapter locates shortcomings in the capacities of the state as the foremost source of instability in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the state-building agenda in Afghanistan has been made subservient to the military considerations of the Afghan government and international community, often at the expense of facilitating positive state-society relations. The administration’s failure to provide the benefits of good governance to local populations has consequently allowed the Taliban to increase their appeal, in turn leading to combatant recruitment and other forms of support.115 Furthermore, rebel strategies and advances have contributed to increased violence and militarism in society. In such manner, state weakness directly contributes to the persistence of conflict. 115 A caveat: I note that an indictment against the international community or Afghan government’s failures does not necessarily imply the Taliban are better able to provide (better) governance and services; in fact, with the exception of certain cases, the Taliban are not particularly adept at governance. 72 Western observers regularly report that almost anywhere you travel in Afghanistan ordinary folk wish for a ‘strong state’. It lies at the forefront of people’s longings; a strong state that will deter foreign powers from intervening (for whom people blame much of the troubles of the past quarter of a century), put an end to the warlords (whom they hold equally guilty), and stamp out corruption, among others. However, facing a wide range of challenges, the Afghan government’s writ is largely confined to Kabul and lacks the resources to implement any necessary policy/strategic change. A quick glance at a map detailing areas of insurgent activity informs the observer that much of Afghanistan is the site of contested control: sovereignty appears most fragmented at the village and district levels. By mid-2009, the Taliban insurgency had increased its geographic spread and level of violence. According to statistics released through the course of 2008/2009, insurgent-initiated violence in 2009 and 2008 followed an almost identical seasonal pattern to the previous years of 2007 and 2006. With every passing year, however, there is a significant overall increase in insurgent-initiated violence. According to UN and independent assessments, the insurgency has spread into western Afghanistan, particularly Baghdis Province, and into interior provinces like Lowghar, Kapisa, and Wardak that used to see very little insurgent activity. Although the Taliban have suffered a number of tactical defeats – most notably the failed 2007 ‘Spring Offensive’ and the failure to take the city of Kandahar; the 2010 Taliban defeat in the district of Marja in Helmand province – they have nonetheless made strategic progress. Despite suffering tremendous casualties including a record number of leaders, the Taliban continue to expand their control over the Afghan population, and continue to actively contest for territory across the country. Setbacks, therefore, seem to do little to halt the 73 insurgency’s spread. The map (Figure 3.) below shows the areas of Taliban presence and ‘activity’116 as of 2010. Figure 3. – Map of Afghanistan Showing Areas of Taliban Activity, 2010. (Source: The International Council on Security and Development, http://www.icosgroup.net/) It is these areas of contested control that is of special interest to this project; they hold the answer to the puzzle presently under investigation. The Taliban agenda, after all, comprises of concerted efforts aimed at disrupting the state’s monopoly on control, denying the government societal support and political legitimacy so as to perpetuate the war. Perpetuating the war, it is hoped, will eventually lead to a loss of international and local support for the incumbent, paving the way for Taliban military and political victory. 116 ‘Activity’ is understood as violent incidents. 74 In The Accidental Guerilla and Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, David Kilcullen and Antonio Giustozzi respectively argue that the failure of the central government (to impose its writ), to a large extent, has allowed the Taliban to make inroads into the country.117 Giustozzi argues that the insurgency would not have succeeded in becoming anything more than a mere annoyance if it had not been able to exploit the weaknesses of the Afghan state, especially after it was ‘rebuilt’ post-2001.118 As a corollary, both scholars appear to be arguing regime type contributes significantly to conflict persistence: the ‘rebuilt’ semi-democratic state – flaunting democratic features, yet plagued by undemocratic characteristics – lacking in resources to combat the insurgency.119 Today, dedicated Taliban insurgents function fairly freely across the border in Pakistan and in remote regions of Afghanistan’s Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, Zabul, Paktia and Kunar provinces. This situation has convinced many in the US armed forces, particularly General McChrystal, to request the US administration to send more troops; in late November 2009, president Obama took the decision to deploy 30,000 additional troops, affective immediately.120 Giustozzi’s simple logic suggests that the inability to thwart Taliban advances has prolonged hostilities – in other words, the inability to secure victory necessitates warfare. Given the vacuum left by the absence of the state, Afghanistan’s local leaders (including so-called ‘warlords’) have re-armed quickly. These leaders are generally 117 See Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). And, David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla. 118 In Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler emphasize factors they believe strengthen the state’s challengers – large numbers of unemployed men, porous borders, dispersed populations, general low institutional strength – all of which characterize the Afghan civil war/insurgency. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers,” Vol. 56, Iss. 4, 2004. 119 Fearon and Laitin argue democratic and autocratic states are better able to combat insurgencies than semidemocracies (anocracies) because of the former’s ability to mobilize resources better. See James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” 120 Eric Schmitt, “Obama Issues Order for More Troops in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 30 November 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/world/asia/01orders.html, accessed 02.12.2009. 75 concerned with maintaining maximum local autonomy (influence and income). Centralization of the polity goes against their interests, but they might accept becoming loyal clients of the regime so long as they are beneficiaries of its generosity. Out of force, then, the central government has de facto accepted as strategic realities the authority of warlords – the centre’s weakness allows warlords to operate as independent territorial rulers – their destructive territorial and ethnic wars, and their drug related activities.121 In addition, in the absence of reliable government-sponsored sources of employment, opportunities offered by warlords are a reliable source of income. The situation, in turn, weakens the power of the government and contributes to lawlessness. Such factors not only result in economic paralysis but guarantee, for instance, the continuation of the drug industry, the profits from which the warlords use to consolidate their position as independent local rulers at the central government’s expense. This ‘acceptance’ of the strategic realities is notwithstanding the destructive impact of these realities on the central government’s legitimacy and on peace and stability in Afghanistan. Taliban attacks against ordinary Afghan folk and foreign and/or government troops are the most palpable threat to security. Attacks on aid workers, travelers, ethnic minorities and school teachers are politically potent not because the victims are politically important, but because the very fact that the attack occurs symbolizes the inability of the state to discharge a core function – namely to protect civilians from attacks. Moreover, development and reconstruction efforts do not reach rural areas – regions most susceptible to insurgent recruitment – because of the deteriorating security environment. The irony in this situation is that rural areas, which are most at risk from the Taliban, and where unhappiness at the slow pace of change is greatest amongst the 121 Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 273. 76 indigenous population, receive little attention. Thus, Seth Jones of the RAND Corporation argues the counterinsurgency will be lost or won in the local communities of rural Afghanistan, not in urban centers such as Kabul.122 122 7. Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), pp. xiii and 77 I have previously – section 2.4 – discussed the significance of coercion to the rebel movement’s war-effort. Coercion, however, is not particular or unique to the insurgent. Empirical evidence suggests frustrated central governments use an overwhelmingly coercive – often indiscriminate – strategy to earn societal control. The coercive strategy alienates the population, thereby directly contributing to the persistence of conflict. To elucidate: counterinsurgency operations usually impose significant costs on non-rebels. Because the insurgents cannot match the state in a conventional military battle, they must blend in with the population. The central tactical problem of counterinsurgency, then, is to discriminate between rebels and non-rebels, and weakstates are generally not too adept at performing such a task. They lack the capacity to be physically present (in particular, weak states face an acute shortage in manpower; manpower which is required to police and monitor populations) amongst the contested populations. Unable to tell civilian from insurgent, indiscriminate violence is (erroneously) perceived as the solution. Evidence from case studies suggests that the more indiscriminate is counterinsurgency, the more angry and alienated the population become, with higher levels of violence all around as the result.123 In government controlled territories of Afghanistan, ordinary folk who object to foreign or government presence (and their humiliating methods) are often suspected and accused of being Taliban sympathizers, and are subsequently imprisoned and/or tortured. 123 See for example, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland (London: Longman, 1997). Thus it is often observed that counterinsurgency campaigns that seem brutal and indiscriminate are counterproductive. Prominent examples are Indonesia in East Timor and Aceh, Britain in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, and Southern Sudan. 78 International forces have repeatedly bombed villages and districts ostensibly to root out insurgents, but have resulted in mass collateral damage. Human rights organizations documented 230 cases of civilian deaths from artillery fire or air raids conducted by US and NATO forces in the first quarter of 2007.124 At the village level, NATO forces seem to cause as much death and damage as the Taliban. In a 2007 poll sponsored by the BBC, ABC News and the German news unit ARD, 24 percent of the Afghans interviewed said that civilians in their area had been killed or injured by Coalition forces through the course of that year. By comparison, 27 percent said the Taliban had caused similar injury.125 In the southern provinces, the same poll found that nearly two-thirds of the respondents rated the US and NATO negatively. It is now widely accepted that such collateral damage (and military insensitivity toward civilian populations) is a source of insurgent recruitment/sympathy. One of the principal and least commonly noted motives for joining a rebel movement is retribution or what Stathis Kalyvas terms ‘personal vengeance.’126 Errant air strikes that have killed hundreds of civilians since the war’s beginning draw immense revulsion, rage, and fear, particularly when the deaths are denied or downplayed by military commanders. Worse yet, they make the Afghan government appear, albeit correctly, unable to effectively influence the international forces and their strategies. Each misguided attack, door-to-door search, or seemingly reckless military convoy 124 British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group, “Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds: Exploring Afghan Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations,” BAAG Monthly Report, June 2007, p. 2, available at http://www.baag.org.uk/publications/category/2007, accessed 12.04.2010. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission estimated that some 600 civilians had been killed in the first half of the year alone. 125 ABC News, BBC and ARD Poll, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Interntional/PollVault/story?id=1363276, 2007, p. 10, accessed 12.04.2010. At the same time, regional breakdowns of responses showed growing hostility to NATO forces in the southwest. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Afghan–Pakistan War: A Status Report, Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 2007, pp. 11 and 23, available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081021_afghanthreat.pdf, accessed 12.04.2010. 126 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War. 79 generates fear and resentment and pushes men and women in the area closer toward joining the insurgency for, at least, an opportunistic, retributive attack. This lesson was most clearly learned in Wanat (in Nuristan province), where nine American soldiers were killed in July 2008 after, the week prior, 36 civilians had been killed in Coalition air strikes. Twenty-one of the civilians were killed while burying 15 neighbors killed the previous day in a series of tragedies that could not have been better planned by Taliban recruiters.127 Empirical evidence also suggests that motives other than coercion (but linked to it) appear to inform decisions by Afghans to engage the protection of the Taliban or even take up arms and join them. The Globe and Mail conducted a survey of 42 Taliban foot soldiers (in the province of Kandahar) in 2007, finding the overwhelming majority turned to the Taliban after their poppy fields had been targeted by government poppy eradication teams.128 There are signs that ubiquitous eradication policies tend to benefit rich landowners and those close to the federal power structure. There is evidence that southern Afghan tribes allied to Karzai tend to suffer less eradication, while rival tribes, often harassed, are pushed into the arms of the insurgents; this has divided communities across the southern poppy belt and driven scores of farmers into the arms of the Taliban.129 Alarmingly, then, government ineptitude at checking their own coercive methods including collateral damages, serves to reinforce the people’s perceived notion that the state is not mindful of their interests and fears. The perception leads to significant shifts in societal support in favor of the insurgent organization. 127 Carlotta Gall and Taimoor Shah, “Civilian Deaths Imperil Support for Afghan War,” New York Times, 6 May 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/07/world/asia/07afghan.html, accessed 07.05.2009. 128 Gretchen S. Peters, “The Taliban and the Opium Trade,” in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.) Decoding the New Taliban (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 11-12. 129 Ibid, p. 12. 80 The preceding analysis highlighted the weaknesses of the Afghan state, and the consequent failure to impose government writ. The following section analyzes the failure of afghan security forces – the state’s enforcement arms – to address the Taliban challenge; failure to do so not only creates the space for widespread instability to fester, but also handicaps the government from achieving the mobilization of the Afghan population directly into the state’s institutions. While some analysts/scholars equate government presence with infrastructure, projects and services, most Afghans disagree, linking security to improved governance instead. Security is a priority for ordinary Afghans who cannot even perform the basic functions of life in many areas due to current levels of insecurity, where criminality is rife and it is increasingly more difficult for locals to distinguish between the Taliban and criminal elements. The government has an important role in not only providing security, but in protecting people’s namus (honor), an important part of human security for Afghans and a critical aspect of Pashtun customary law. However it has so far failed to protect ordinary Afghans from corrupt government elements, warlords, criminals, the Taliban and the international military in different scenarios.130 The opinion is most emphatically stated by former Afghan Interior Minister, Ali Jalali, who laments that both the Afghan government and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have failed to establish legitimate government services that support the people and thereby address the root causes that the Taliban use to gain support.131 130 Hence, most Afghans see the international military presence almost as a “necessary evil,” due to Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) inadequacy in tackling insurgency, terrorism, crime and outside interference. See “Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People.” 131 Ali A. Jalali, “Winning in Afghanistan,” Parameters, Vol. 39, Iss. 1, 2009, p. 5. 81 !" # $ As one of the most visible faces of the state, police action and behavior does much to determine the population’s attitude toward local and central authorities. As one expert points out: A police force whose primary business is serving the disaggregate public…enhances the legitimacy of government by demonstrating that the authority of the state will be used practically and on a daily basis in the interests of the people. In most countries today, this sort of responsive, service-oriented policing would be a revolutionary departure from traditional behavior. It would, however, do more for the legitimacy of government than any other reform program, and its effects would immediately be felt.132 This applies not just to peacetime policing. ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’ is even more important during conflict. In the midst of the Malayan insurgency in late 1952, ‘Operation Service’ was launched, which emphasized the police undertaking acts of public service. Internal policing and security strategies in Afghanistan do not stress fighting crime against average citizens which often has a greater impact on their sense of security than the insurgency. Instead, many communities view the police as predatory. Hearts and minds are being lost, not won.133 While hard to measure given a lack of crime statistics, there is a general perception in Afghanistan that lawlessness is on the rise. Widespread kidnappings of business owners for ransom have eroded confidence and encouraged capital flight. Even the western city of Herat, which is generally described as stable, has seen a spate of crimes that provoked demonstrations. An editorial in a prominent independent newspaper 132 David H. Bayley, Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 21. 133 International Crisis Group, “Reforming Afghanistan’s Police,” Asia Report No. 138, August 2007, p. 16. 82 in Kabul captured, if in a somewhat exaggerated fashion, a tendency by some to view the Taliban era through rose-tinted glasses: [C]riminal activities, such as group sexual assaults on children, kidnappings and extortion by gangs of abductors have now become a more serious threat than that of the Taliban…senior government officials in Kabul should beware of this danger. If people have to choose between a life under the extremely violent and horrible rule of the Taliban and a life under a democratic government but exposed to threats against their family members, sexual assaults on children, kidnappings, murders, extortions and being forced into giving ransoms to rescue family members, they may prefer the deadly rule of the Taliban…[T]his is because under Taliban rule it is only their life that is in danger, but when the law is not implemented in a democratic government, their dignity, reputation, property and female members of their families are threatened.134 In many cases, the police are involved in criminal activities themselves. One senior interior ministry official stated: “Police are often the facilitator or mediators with kidnappers. If they were not involved it could not happen [so frequently].”135 Bribetaking on public highways remains a frequent complaint with 35 police reportedly removed from duty on the Herat-Delaram highway after a truckers’ strike over illegal tolls. It would be unrealistic to expect a drastic turnaround in police behavior and hence a change in public perceptions over a single-year period. Kabul (and its international supporters) must, however, understand the growing public disillusionment, as well as the appetite for law enforcement and its importance to state legitimacy. The US army’s counter-insurgency handbook notes: “The host nation will not gain legitimacy if the populace believes that insurgents and criminals control the streets.”136 A former Afghan policeman complained, like many, that the system simply does not provide justice: “They arrest thieves on one hand and release them with the other. Murderers are captured today 134 International Crisis Group, “Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy,” p. 6. Ibid. 136 Marcus Skinner, “Counterinsurgency and State Building: An Assessment of the Role of the Afghan National Police,” Democracy and Security, Vol. 4, Iss. 3, 2008, p. 294. 135 83 and seen walking freely in the street tomorrow.”137 The Taliban’s mass jailbreak in Kandahar in June 2008, with some 900 inmates escaping, provided a clear example of the failure of a streamlined ‘cops, courts and corrections’ system.138 Not one of the prisoners had been fingerprinted or photographed, preventing police from locating the inmates again. Shortcomings in Police behavior notwithstanding, the Afghan National Police (ANP) is plagued by serious logistical problems. To begin with, the ANP has hitherto been grossly neglected (particularly the years 2001 to 2007) by the international community and Afghan government. Today, there continues to be a mismatch between the rhetoric emanating from the international community and actual reform (comprehensive strategy and adequate resourcing) of the ANP. Lightly armed and poorly trained, ANP deaths are three times higher than those of the ANA.139 Between 2007 and 2009, the average annual police casualties (mainly in the South and East) numbered 600; the numbers are on track to be the same in 2010. This impacts police morale and will ultimately undermine recruitment. Since 2007, there have been steady reports of police defections to the Taliban, often, it would appear, the result of demoralization and the threat of death rather than the deliberate infiltration of the ranks by anti-government elements. 137 International Crisis Group, “Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy,” p. 6. Ibid. 139 United States Government Accountability Office, “Afghanistan Security: US Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation,” GAO-09-280, March 2009, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09280.pdf, accessed 17.09.2009. 138 84 Attrition continues to be an associated problem, estimated at 21 percent annually, with insurgency-related casualties and a major factor in defection.140 The Taliban has singled out the police for attack through targeted killing of senior officials and frequent assaults on police facilities and personnel. Some 17 percent of police on the books are believed to be dead or wounded. According to the US Department of Defense, at least 3,400 police were wounded or killed in action between January 2007 and November 2008. Defense data indicate that the ANP suffered between 19 and 101 fatalities per month over the same 23-month period – an average of 56 police killed in action per month.141 Logistical and behavioral shortcomings have allowed the Taliban (and affiliated warlords) to not only wage a war of protraction, but to also contest for legitimacy. The Taliban use perceptions of the police’s poor performance and standing as a propaganda tool. They target the police not just with violence but also with morale-sapping vitriol. Taliban leader Mullah Omar demanded in a communiqué: “If the police of a state consist of people who are immoral and irreligious, who are drug addicts and whom their families turn away, how can they protect the property, dignity and honor of the people?”142 140 International Crisis Group, “Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy,” Asia Briefing No. 85, December 2008, p. 3, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/B085policing-in-afghanistan-still-searching-for-a-strategy.aspx, accessed 17.09.2009. 141 United States Government Accountability Office, “Afghanistan Security: US Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation,” GAO-09-280, March 2009, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09280.pdf, accessed 17.09.2009. 142 Ibid. 85 !" # Like the ANP, the Afghan National Army is not spared of logistical shortcomings. As of January 2010, the strength (in terms of manpower) of the ANA was approximately 100,000 (target strength is 171,000, to be achieved by October 2011).143 The population to army personnel ratio is dismally low,144 and the trend does not appear to improve any time soon. Various problems plague the functioning of the ANA, not least of which is a lack of professionalism, and insufficient incentives to join the forces – analysts say soldiers/patrolmen are paid more to fight for the Taliban – US$100 per month from the Afghan government, versus US$300 a month from the Taliban. Despite the West’s efforts to bolster the numbers and ranks, the ANA remains an inwardly-oriented military, often forced to navigate a broad transition in operations quickly, moving within days from being war-fighters to serving as traffic police. As noted by the Minister of Defence, General Rahim Wardak, the government has no wish to compromise the popularity of the army by continuing its internal orientation. Despite this welcome insight, the ANA does not enjoy sufficient local popularity. Like the ANP, the lack of confidence – or, illegitimacy – in the ANA is in no small part due to the public’s perception that the Army is not independent from local networks, its scope ambiguous, is corruptible and is self-indulgent in action. The presence of warlords in the cabinet and the role of the state-controlled (allegedly) ANA in siding with regional opponents have further weakened its legitimacy. The Afghan government’s ability to monopolize legitimate violence must involve a shift 143 “International Security Assistance Force and Afghan National Army Strength & Laydown,” NATO Headquarters Media Operations Centre – Afghanistan, 1 February 2010, available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf, accessed 07.03.2010. 144 As of 2009, the population of Afghanistan is approximately 29,802,724. This statistic puts the police to population ratio at 1:298. The World Bank, available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan, accessed 07.03.2010. 86 to the idea of restrained response to local rebellions. If the government is seen to be implicated in local violence, it may further locally legitimize the Taliban and affiliates, as may have occurred as a consequence of government actions against the warlord-turnedgovernor Ismail Khan (of Heart province) in 2004. In the future, local uprisings may occur, in response to an unpopular government policy or for the removal of a centrallyappointed official. If such uprisings are met with restraint, the ANA will gain immense popularity. 87 %$ Promoting disorder among the population is a key objective of Taliban insurgents. Disrupting the economy and decreasing security helps produce discontent with the indigenous government and undermines its strength and legitimacy. This increases public perception that the government (perhaps even the state) will be destabilized. Within this milieu, the Afghan government’s performance leaves much to be desired. Mohammad Elias, a former Afghan government official confirms the shortcomings; these include: a) the arrest and torture of former commanders and religious scholars by security institutions of the state without any evidence (i.e. in contravention to the ‘rule of law’); b) corruption of state institutions, including the judiciary; c) poor local governance; and d) weak and non-committed security forces with imbalanced ethnic composition. He further argues the above factors account for not only the widening gap between the people and the government, but also civilian perceptions – mostly negative – of government success against the Taliban.145 The most recent civilian assessments of the performance of the central (including representative bodies) government146 suggest the most commonly mentioned government failings are insecurity (31 percent), administrative corruption (29 percent), lack of job opportunities (20 percent), weak economy (15 percent) and weak government (13 percent). Unemployment continues to feature amongst the most important problems at both national (35 percent) and local (26 percent) levels. In terms of local amenities and services, the major shortcomings concern basic infrastructure and services such as electricity (26 145 Mohammad Osman Tariq Elias, “The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul: Logar and Wardak,” in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.) Decoding the New Taliban (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 46. 146 All figures (percentages) mentioned in the following section are as reported in the 2009 Asia Foundation Polls. “Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People,” The Asia Foundation, available at http://asiafoundation.org, accessed 21.04.2010. 88 percent),147 roads (24 percent), water (22 percent) and lack of health care/clinics/hospitals (20 percent). They even show less confidence in the likelihood of democracy delivering more tangible benefits such as less corruption (17 percent) or prosperity (15 percent). Security continues to remain a key concern for Afghans and a critical factor by which they judge not only the progress and direction of their country’s development, but, which actor to lend allegiance to (even affecting views on government-Taliban reconciliation148). The presence of two actors competing for a monopoly over the use of force leaves populations deeply insecure, constantly having to (re)calculate the costs of non-compliance. Curiously, and perhaps for this very reason, the majority of Afghan respondents (71 percent) support the idea of government-Taliban negotiation – the possibility of reconciliation offering citizens an escape from having to ‘sit of the fence,’ so to speak. While the Asia Foundation explains (the high level of) support for such an approach as likely to be influenced by the fact that a majority of respondents indicate they have some level of sympathy with the motivations of the Taliban (and other insurgent/opposition groups), this may only be partly true. Most civilians realize they are but mere pawns in the on-going conflict – the civilian space is the ‘contested space;’ the ordinary citizen is extremely war-weary, and simply desires a durable peace, even if this involves political compromise. These citizens feel that a political compromise would help improve and increase survival and income-generating conditions: reconciliation, it is 147 Around two-thirds of respondents (65%) say that the supply of electricity in their local areas is bad and a third of respondents (33%) report having no access to any kind of electricity. This is significantly lower than in previous years. 148 Christia and Semple suggest for reconciliation to work, ordinary Afghans will first need to feel secure. They argue many ordinary Afghans (particularly in the south; and those plagued by haunting memories of Taliban atrocities) are put off by notions of compromise because the conditions are not yet ripe for reconciliation. In other words, Afghans crave security which has hitherto not been forthcoming from the government; the absence of which prevents meaningful large-scale reconciliation attempts with Taliban fighters. Fotini Christia, and Michael Semple, “Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Iss. 4, July/August 2009, p. 39. 89 hoped, will allow access to essential governmental services which are otherwise not forthcoming. The theoretical literature contains evidence of correlation between government competence (in counterinsurgency) and success. Research conducted by the RAND Corporation indicates governments with competent security forces won in two-thirds of all completed insurgencies, but governments defeated less than a third of the insurgencies when their competence was medium or low.149 Good governance is therefore critical to effective counterinsurgency operations over the long run, because it helps to ensure sustained societal support for the government. As an Afghan National Directorate for Security report concluded, “The first requirement of countering Taliban at the village level requires good governance, honest and competent leaders leading the institutions.”150 However, as a 2006 German assessment of the border police concluded, “Neither the Afghan border police nor the customs authorities are currently in a position to meet the challenges presented by this long border.”151 Similarly, a report by the Offices of Inspector General of the US Departments of State and Defense concluded that the “ANP’s readiness level to carry out its internal security and conventional police responsibilities is far from adequate. The obstacles to establish a fully professional ANP are formidable.” It found that key obstacles included “no effective field training officer program, illiterate recruits, a history of low pay and pervasive corruption, and an insecure environment.”152 149 Seth G. Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” p. 16. Amrullah Saleh, “Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in Afghanistan,” National Directorate for Security, 2006, p. 3. 151 Government of Germany, “Doha II Conference on Border Management in Afghanistan: A Regional Approach,” Berlin, 2006. Also see US Department of State, “Border Management Initiative: Information Brief,” Afghanistan Reconstruction Group, Kabul, 2005. 152 Offices of Inspector General of the Departments of State and Defense, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness (Washington, DC: Offices of Inspector General of the Departments of State and Defense, 2006), p. 1. 150 90 Evidence that the government is losing the confidence of the populace is indicated by the forging of local alliances between disaffected tribes (and tribal Elders) and the Taliban who pose as defenders of the population against misrule. An example was witnessed following declining relations between the Mangal (Pashtun) tribe of Khost province and the Afghan government. In 2003, the Mangal tribe took the decision to disallow poppy cultivation on its territory, and even went so far as to agree to defend their territory against Taliban incursions. This positive behavior, however, was not rewarded by either the central government or the Coalition members. Forgetting the lessons of history (tribes had provided the basis of government since the mid-eighteenth century), to the post 2001 government (and its allies), the tribe (and the corresponding geographic area) was considered peripheral to the government’s war-effort, and thus neglected – politically and economically. Such neglect proved to be counterproductive in the long-run; instead it has been instrumental in allowing the Taliban to increase their appeal. Today, the Mangal tribe has given the Taliban permission to conduct their affairs and activities within their territory.153 This is possibly a sign that this tribe, after years of neglect by the centre (and international donors), has decided to take chances with their ‘brethren.’ 153 Thomas Ruttig, “Loya Paktia’s Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” p. 86. 91 &' ( ! ") ( District and local level governance is a key ‘contested’ space.154 One of the major factors behind the success of the Taliban insurgency is the absence of efficient administration at the district level (uluswali) and the acceleration of political fragmentation in the past few years. President Karzai, as a compromise candidate during the Emergency Loya Jirga after the fall of the Taliban (2001), lacked a strong tribal support base and had only a modest personal following (this is arguably still the case). Thus he showed – [A]n inclination to pacify potential trouble makers (in both Kabul and beyond) by offering them positions in the state, which naturally annoyed those who argued that disloyalty was attracting rewards and that Karzai had devalued competence as a criteria for advancement.155 The primary factor behind the Taliban’s resurgence, then, is the increasingly poor governance of the Karzai administration in which so many Afghans had put their hope and votes. Because the Afghan campaign was originally conceived as a reconstruction rather than a counterinsurgency effort, some Western countries initially adopted a pure developmental approach, treating governance and economic assistance as politically impartial, needs-based activities. Such an approach is not suitable for official development agencies and state institutions in an active counterinsurgency – government aid agencies under these circumstances are not impartial actors but are representatives of the government. They are certainly not regarded by the population as impartial.156 154 The World Bank, Service Delivery and Governance at the Sub-national Level in Afghanistan, July 2007, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/448813-1185293547967/440248141185293572457/report.pdf, accessed 12.02.2010. 155 William Maley, Rescuing Afghanistan, pp. 34-35. 156 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, p. 66. 92 Counterinsurgency theory, as well as observed reports emanating from Afghanistan suggests that a minority of the population will support the government come what may, and another minority will back the Taliban under any circumstances, but the majority of Afghans simply want security, peace, and prosperity and to meet these needs.157 In insurgencies and other forms of civil war, community leaders and tribal elders find themselves in a situation of terrifying uncertainty, with multiple armed actors – insurgents, warlords, the security arms of the state – competing for their loyalty and threatening them with violence unless they comply. Civilians attempt to identify consistent rules they can follow in order to keep individual selves and their communities safe. If these rules, or an actor capable of enforcing them, are not consistently present, they tend to swing to the side of whichever force/actor is present at any given moment.158 The allocation of good governance (including unfettered economic development assistance) allows both individuals and communities to do this: but since a fundamental element in counterinsurgency is gaining political control over a disputed or contested population and denying that control to the enemy, counterinsurgency measures must be designed to help the population to choose between the government and the insurgent, and to enforce that choice once made. This also implies the paramount moral obligation to protect and defend populations that have made the dangerous choice to side with a given actor over another: thus the symbiosis between politics, governance and security in insurgency warfare. 157 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, pp. 75-76. Thus, the natural tendency of the Afghan population is to triangulate between the government and the Taliban – a phenomena known in civil war literature as ‘fence-sitting.’ Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, p. 40. For a detailed description of this phenomenon during the Vietnam War, see Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). 158 93 Good governance, tied to a robust security strategy that gives the population incentives to support a political actor, is thus an extremely powerful counterinsurgency tool that cannot afford to be neglected. Historical studies have shown that in civil wars and insurgencies, societal support tends to accrue to locally powerful actors rather than to those actors the population sees as more congenial: the more organized, locally present, and better armed an actor is, the more likely it is able to enforce a consistent system of rules and sanctions, giving the population the order and predictability it craves.159 As Stathis Kalyvas puts it: [A]s the conflict matures, control is increasingly likely to shape collaboration [with the principal locally present actor] because political actors who enjoy substantial territorial control can protect civilians who live in that territory – both from their rivals and from themselves – giving survival-oriented civilians a strong incentive to collaborate with them, irrespective of true or initial preferences. In this sense, collaboration is largely endogenous to control though, of course, high rates of collaboration spawned by control at a given point in time are likely to reinforce it in the future…. In the long run, military resources generally trump prewar political and social support in spawning control.160 It is important to remember, however, that population groups in a traditional society exercise choices collectively – not individually – unlike Western societies which tend to be relatively atomized and in which individuals exercise a relatively greater degree of personal choice independent of their social groups. In traditional Afghan society, choices tend to reflect group consensus based on what sociologists call ‘primary group cohesion.’161 In Afghan society, individuals surrender their prerogatives to the 159 See Karl D. Jackson, Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian political Behavior (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Roger D. Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion: Lesson from Eastern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War. 160 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, p. 12. 161 See Alan Clarke, “Tribal Identity and Conflicts with Tribes,” U.S. Army War College, unpublished Masters Dissertation, 2008, available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA478534, accessed 20.4.2010. 94 wisdom and decision-making of the collective (the shura162) – usually represented by a council of village Elders and religious leaders whose judgments and rulings enjoy sovereign-like status – breaches of which are rarely considered. This tendency is even more pronounced in tribal societies under the stress of insurgency, when an individual decision to go against the group consensus could prove fatal.163 In other words, social influences on the individual should be taken into account by the government. Yet, in encouraging Afghan society to choose to support the government rather than the insurgents there is a natural tendency to focus on incentives to the individual, in the hope that individuals will perceive their interests as best served by supporting the government. This is evident in several of the Afghan government’s developmental and governance extension programs, and in the Alternative Livelihoods Program.164 The programs are fine as far as they go, but it must be recognized that in a traditional and tribal society, choices are made collectively – by family, section, clan, or village units – and the focus of programs on the individual may ultimately prove a miscalculation, if not by and large counter-productive. Since 2001 the tribal option is one that the Kabul government (and its Western allies) has utterly failed to grasp. Instead, they have stuck with what they know; installing Western friendly technocrats to run the government, and equating ‘success’ with Western 162 A shura is a group of individuals which meets only in response to a specific need in order to decide how to meet the need. In most cases, this need is to resolve a conflict between individuals, families, groups of families, or whole tribes.’ This description would seem to indicate that shura and jirga are fundamentally very similar Afghan informal (non-state) mechanisms of conflict resolution that operate in varying social and tribal contexts. 163 Timur Kuran’s work on ‘preference falsification’ provides an alternative (though, not antithetical) explanation to the workings of group dynamics. He argues individuals, keen to avoid social disapproval, take to speaking and acting as if they share, or at least do not reject, what they view as the dominant belief/custom. This insight into individual rationality may help explain why individual tribal members are wont to disregard traditional village customs and consensus. See Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of ‘Preference Falsification (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). 164 European Union, Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and GTZ International Services, “Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan (PAL),” January 2009, available at http://www.palinfo.org/, accessed 27.04.2010. 95 metrics: i.e., swiftly punctuated elections (despite a lack of concurrent reform needed to support the democratic process), an ill-conceived military campaign and reconstruction that has too often been more about buying ‘force protection’ for Coalition troops than the longer term needs of Afghans. There has been virtually no meaningful dialogue with the tribes, the absence of which has spawned alienated communities and citizens.165 At the same time, the Kabul government has neglected and failed to support initiatives of key Pashtun tribes that aimed at re-establishing tribal solidarity. This left those (non-Islamist) tribal forces isolated, deprived them of funds and weakened them vis-à-vis the resurging Taliban.166 The focus of government efforts should therefore shift toward winning over key traditional leaders (mullahs and tribal Elders) who wield much influence among local populations. This is precisely where the Taliban have been so effective – and the Afghan government (and its allies) so terribly dismal – in securing societal support. The Taliban have followed this approach effectively in the southern and eastern provinces, forging alliances with disaffected tribes and posing as defenders of the population against (government) corruption and misrule. This has enabled the Taliban to penetrate vast areas of the country, in the process gaining political legitimacy, especially from village Elders and leaders. The progress of the insurgency is driven by a clever exploitation of three political problems in Afghanistan. Pashtuns – particularly rural Pashtuns of the southern provinces – the most numerous ethnic group in Afghanistan, around 42 percent of the population, 165 Lucy Morgan Edwards, “The West Needs to Open Itself to the Potential of Tribal Solutions in Resolving the Conflict in Afghanistan.” 166 Thomas Ruttig, “How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan’s Largest Insurgent Movement between its Tribal Roots and Islamist Ideology,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, Thematic Report 04/2010, April 2010, p. 9, available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/20100624TR-HowTribalAretheTaleban-FINAL.pdf, accessed 02.05.2010. 96 are alienated from various central and provincial government positions and services, which they believe is unfairly influenced by non-Pashtun leaders and interests. Hence, the public increasingly doubts the intentions and effectiveness of the central government and international community. And people are deeply frustrated by and frightened of the insecurity created by the absence, fecklessness, and corruption of state institutions (including foreign security forces) at the local levels. The above sentiments are captured rather aptly by successive annual surveys: the figure below (Figure 4.) indicates the Afghan people’s worsening opinion of government performance. The ‘blue’ worm indicates that the people’s opinion of the country moving in the right direction has dropped dramatically from 77 percent in 2005 (prior to the Taliban resurgence) to 46 percent in 2009. Concurrently, opinion of the country moving in the wrong direction – represented by the ‘pink’ worm – has significantly increased from six percent to 38 percent during the same time-period. 97 Figure 4. – Afghans’ Perception of Government Performance. (Source: Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); Vern Liebl, “Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam and Taliban,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 18, Iss. 3, 2007, p. 492) The Taliban have been most successful at gaining the support of rural people, particularly Pashtuns.167 Yet the Taliban’s success has not come from employing counterinsurgency techniques better than the Afghan government or Coalition; Taliban success has come from understanding the local environment and tailoring strategy to the critical needs of each Pashtun community. Compared to the Afghan government (or Coalition) the Taliban have very little to offer rural Afghans in term of services or resources. They are not building roads or schools, drilling wells, providing medical services, or creating jobs. The Taliban are instead gaining support because they are preserving the conservative Pashtun way of life and administering justice where government officials and police are corrupt. The Taliban have also wisely capitalized on 167 Mark Moyar, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 197. 98 the greatest failure of the Afghan government and its coalition partners: the inability to field legitimate police that serve the interests of both local communities and the central government. 99 * From the preceding analyses one is able to glean that poor governance and inadequate state capacity has led to a situation where apart from important government functions being neglected, it has also resulted in the gradual and now complete erosion of faith in the goodness of the establishment. In most of Afghanistan’s provinces, no district-level institutions are functioning. In this administrative and security void, the Taliban are building an alternative administration, discrediting the central government, and extending their influence into areas where they initially had no support. The incumbent’s legitimacy deficit is sought to be filled by the Taliban organization. Taliban institutions and norms, just as those of a state, can and do perform the political tasks of interest mediation, dispute resolution and military organization. Questioning the authority of the Afghan government and established institutions, the Taliban have taken it upon themselves to police social life, administer rough-and-ready justice, and act as watchdogs against corrupt officials, amongst others. Such measures have earned the Taliban a measure of popularity and approval, all while cutting back the role of formal institutions of the state in the lives of the people. According to George Varughese of the Asia Foundation, just as Osama bin Laden had exploited the vacuum in state-governance to ‘buy’ his place amongst the populace, the Taliban today are attempting to exploit the very same shortcomings.168 As long as the Afghan people consider the Taliban to be a viable alternative to the central government, the civil war and insurgency in Afghanistan will not abate.169 Failure to stem the 168 “Trends in Afghan Public Opinion,” Commentary by George Varughese, The Asia Foundation, available at http://asiafoundation.org/media/view/video/RFwfqwj_zPM/trends-in-afghan-public-opinion, accessed 06.09.2009. 169 Here I draw on the seminal work of James Fearon and David Laitin. I argue that the Afghan government’s failures to provide services render the Taliban insurgency more attractive (and feasible) due 100 Taliban’s appeal will only continue to pit the rival parties against each other in battle. The above argument may be state-centric, but it shifts the locus – or ‘site’ – of the conflict to the indigenous populations. *! " Rebel institutions for governing civilians emerge as insurgent groups begin to hold territory. Territorial control allows insurgents to move freely than remain in hiding, offers the prospect of regularized interaction with civilians, and sends a strong signal of rebel strength. In managing civilians, rebel groups must take into account their desire for security, their need for food, shelter (and money), and their incentives to choose one rival actor over the other. The control of civilian populations, then, creates new organizational challenges for rebel leaders. According to NATO sources, Taliban provincial governors exist in 33 of 34 provinces.170 In the post-2001 period, even if much of the former state-like structures do not exist permanently on the ground outside the southern region and many state functionaries are temporary absentees in their designated areas, they constitute a shadow or parallel government. This ‘government’ is embodied in the Taliban’s Leadership Council. The Taliban central institutions, including the name of their committees, resemble those of regular Afghan governments, although in a rump form; the committees being the Taliban ‘ministries’. The same was the case during the Emirate period. Not recognizing the Karzai Government’s legitimacy on grounds of its ‘puppet’ (and foreign ‘imposed’) character, the Taliban claim continuing legitimacy as a (parallel or to the limited policing or inept and corrupt government practices. James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” pp. 75-76. 170 “Taliban Have Expanded Their Influence Across Afghanistan: NATO Official,” Daily Times, 28 December 2009, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C12%5C28%5Cstory_28-12-2009_pg7_37, accessed 13.02.2010. 101 alternative) state and use the title ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ on all their documents and publications. This pattern is reproduced at the sub-national levels. In most areas they are operating in, with the exception of a few provinces north of Kabul, the Taliban have set up parallel provincial, district and even village structures. On the provincial level, there usually is a governor with two deputies (one responsible for military operations, one the police chief), a chief judge and a head of the vice and virtue department. The deputies for operational affairs are, theoretically, in charge of the Taliban fronts in a province which, in turn, are subdivided into operational groups of a handful up to 20 people each.171 *! "+ , ) The Taliban’s relationship with community representative, Elders as well as the (Pashto) people in general is correlated to the structure of the tribes in a province or district – whether they are unified and well structured or fragmented. In Loya Paktia Province, for instance, the Taliban strongly consider the historical and traditional power of tribal Elders and will not be very free in their actions within the communities.172 In most other provinces where there is no strong tribal structure – decades of warfare have significantly reduced the power-structures of tribal hierarchies, in some places even eradicating them173 – the Taliban have more freedom to impose what they want on Elders and people, although they could be limited by the extent of sympathy that they receive. This sympathy is derived from the conviction of Elders that although the Taliban are not 171 Thomas Ruttig, “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency,” Report of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2009, p. 16, available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=114, accessed 06.08.2009. 172 Mohammad Osman Tariq Elias, “The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul: Logar and Wardak,” p. 50. 173 Thomas Ruttig, “How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan’s Largest Insurgent Movement between its Tribal Roots and Islamist Ideology,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, Thematic Report 04/2010, April 2010, pp. 8-10, available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/20100624TR-HowTribalAretheTalebanFINAL.pdf, accessed 02.05.2010. 102 able to provide them basic services, at least they provide the most needed physical security. There will be no corruption or illegal impositions, as practiced by state officials. There are also Elders who believe that the Taliban will give them back the political rights usurped by minor/smaller ethnic groups favored by President Karzai.174 Often the first demand placed on elders when the Taliban achieve influence in an area is to take over dispute resolution. This is reflected in the establishment of a Taliban court (if and where the environment is conducive for such a set-up) or the deployment of mobile judges. For instance, in the summer of 2008 in Sayed Abad district of Wardak Province, the Taliban asked community representatives to congregate at the local mosque at a given time. When the representatives met, the local Taliban commander asked the representatives to henceforth not go to the state courts; instead, he asked the representatives to have disputes resolved by elders and ulema. When the Taliban approaches them, Elders can either choose to accept what is asked of them and assist the Taliban, or refuse and leave the area and move to a place where the Taliban presence is weak. In this regard, the attitude of the Taliban toward the Elders and local authorities depends on whether the former have good relations with individuals (or not). If they have, the Elder/official can stay on with a guarantee that he will not be physically harmed or intimidated. If not, he will be targeted in an assassination campaign.175 174 175 This issue is discussed in greater detail in section 4.9(c) of this chapter. Mohammad Osman Tariq Elias, “The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul: Logar and Wardak,” p. 50. 103 *! " Examining how the illicit drug trade helps the Taliban maintain control and earn profit, and how such control and profit help to inform the citizen and villagers’ decision to support and/or join the Taliban resistance, sheds important light on the causes of conflict persistence in Afghanistan. Although it is impossible to calculate an accurate total figure, Taliban commanders at the village level appear to receive each year millions of dollars worth of material supplies collected as tax from villagers and smugglers involved in poppy cultivation and distribution. These often include vehicles. Other supplies they take as payment include weapons, ammunition, petrol, food, shelter and even medical care for wounded soldiers. In addition, Opium is routinely traded as a form of currency across the poppy-rich south. A shopkeeper, for example, might accept payment for groceries, petrol or other supplies in the form of a chunk of opium, and some keep weights and measures to calculate the correct rate. A central source of revenue comes from the ushr, the 10 percent tithe collected from poppy farmers in kind.176 At the village level, where each Taliban sub-commander carts off his share of opium, every farmer will receive a receipt for the amount of tax paid. Poppy farmers say they do not get charged more than once, since the Taliban hierarchy is strict in assigning regions of influence, but importantly since they do not want to alienate the populations. Several analysts have alluded to multiple instances where farmers complained to the Taliban hierarchy over being charged twice by rival sub-commanders or non-Taliban criminal elements; in most cases, the Taliban leadership 176 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates there are 2.4 million people involved in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2008/2009, or 10 percent of the population. “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, September 2009, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/cropmonitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2009_summary.pdf, accessed 29.03.2010. 104 responded by punishing the sub-commanders and providing security to farmers from the reach of criminal elements.177 Many government officials thus complain that the Taliban system appears to work more smoothly and with less corruption than the Afghan government network. The Taliban (in collaboration with traffickers) also appear to dictate farm output. As early as 2004, the Taliban began distributing night letters offering protection to farmers who grew poppy and threatening dire consequences for anyone who did not. “The one who is not cultivating poppy in their lands and accepting the governor [sic] order for destroying their poppy cultivations will be killed by Taliban,” read one message found pinned to a mosque door and later obtained by UN officials. Apart from coercion, a complex blend of motives appear to inform decisions by Afghan villagers to engage the protection of the Taliban or even take up arms and join them. Toronto’s Globe and Mail conducted a video survey of 42 Taliban foot soldiers in Kandahar in 2007, finding the overwhelming majority were poppy farmers. About half said that their fields had been targeted by government-led poppy eradication units.178 The critical question, then, is whether the farmers joined the Taliban because their fields were targeted or whether their fields were destroyed because they were suspected Taliban, or suspected of being so. There are also signs that the eradication policies tend to benefit rich landowners and tribal federations close to the provincial and federal power structures. This has 177 See Barnett Rubin and Omar Zakhilwal, “A War on Drugs or a War on Farmers,” Wall Street Journal, 11 January 2005, p. A20. Also see Barnett Rubin, “Road to Rubin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry,” Center on International Cooperation Report, 7 October 2004, available at http://www.cic.nyu.edu/pdf/RoadtoRuin.pdf, accessed 29.03.1010; Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). 178 Graeme Smith, “Air Strikes and Drug Eradications,” in “Talking to the Taliban: Globe Special Report,” The Globe and Mail, 24 March 2008, available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/talkingtothetaliban, accessed 29.03.2010. 105 divided several communities across the southern poppy belt and driven the poor into the arms of the Taliban. Southern Afghan tribes allied with the Karzai administration tend to suffer less eradication; rival tribes are often pushed into the arms of the insurgents. Many of the fighters interviewed acknowledged that Islam forbids growing or trading narcotics but said they were financially desperate, and the government was not interested in addressing their plight.179 Thus the high sale-price and poverty alleviation were the dominant reasons farmers gave in 2008 for the decision to cultivate opium.180 179 Abubakar Siddique and Mohammad Salih, “Afghanistan: Poor Helmand Farmers Find Themselves in Eye of Drug Storm,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 10 October 2007, available at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1078915.html, accessed 29.03.2010. 180 “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, August 2008, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf, p. 17, accessed 29.03.2010. 106 . /+ 0 ,1 In addition to functioning and capable indigenous security institutions, the containment, persecution and eventual defeat of insurgent (and extremist) groups cannot be assured without (the institutionalized) rule of law. Such a view stresses the mutually reinforcing nature of various aspects of state-building, e.g. the interdependence between an efficient police and a functioning justice system. In this sense, the preceding analysis (which analyzed the shortcomings in Afghanistan’s security apparatus) dovetails into the present. It has often been noted that good governance and the rule of law should be the bulwark against the Afghan insurgency (and for that matter, most insurgencies). The problem is how to make them effective in areas where the insurgency continues to take hold. In Afghanistan, the application of the rule of law has been partial and subject to the political demands of the ‘war on terror’ rather than the requirement for justice and reconciliation among Afghans. If we understand state security (external) and human security (internal) to be co-dependent, then human security should be an outcome of military stabilization and the establishment of good (if not democratic) governance, rather than the actual aim of the international mission.181 Human security, in this sense, has been secondary to the ‘war on terror’. According to Barnett Rubin, the US’ pursuit of security from terrorism has different implications than the pursuit of human security 181 “By virtue of the political context in Afghanistan, state-building has, by corollary, become the default solution. This is because the laws that protect human rights cannot be enforced without government (unless peace enforcement is used for this purpose), nor can public services be sustained or poverty eradicated without social and economic development. These latter functions are still largely handled by UN and NGO aid programmes. The initial requirement then, becomes political development of a governing authority that is dependent on externally supplied security. Similarly, the containment and persecution of insurgent groups cannot be assured without rule of law, which in turn is unsustainable without the economic means to bind loyalty to the state and participation in the market protected, taxed and regulated by the state. The requirements here are economic development and institutionalized rule of law, brought forward by the allied government.” Christopher Freeman, “Security, Governance and Statebuilding in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14, Iss. 1, 2007, p. 4. 107 through processes of governance.182 From an idealist perspective this usually means that counter-terrorism and the strengthening of the internal security forces of Afghanistan for this task are not likely to succeed unless the drivers of conflict and extremism – human insecurity, economic dilapidation etc. – are mitigated. As Afghanistan’s former Minister of Interior, Ali Jalali, points out, the resurgence of the Taliban (and thereby conflict persistence) is due more to the lack of government presence than the ability of the insurgents.183 In response, the idea of creating ‘pockets of competence’ where the rule of law could be effective and work as an example for the rest of the country has been raised on a number of occasions by analysts. It was proposed by the Lichtenstein Colloquium (2007) that this would be most effective in combination with a strategy of provincialization and localization.184 This issue is also related to the point concerning the need for greater subnational governance. I have previously discussed the importance of the ANP in providing security. The ANP, however, cannot provide security without courts. The judiciary is the sole part of the Afghan state still dominated by the ulema (the learned clergy) who play a central role in determining – and undermining – the legitimacy of the government and its institutions.185 The Taliban are cognizant that the lack of judicial reform has greatly benefitted their cause. Indeed, the lack of judicial reform has become a bottleneck for 182 Barnett Rubin, “Constructing Sovereignty for Security,” Survival, Vol. 47. Iss. 4, 2005, p. 94. Ali A. Jalali, “The Future of Afghanistan,” Parameters, Vol. 36, Iss. 1, 2006, p. 9. 184 Alexander Thier, “Governance and the Rule of Law,” in State, Security and Economy in Afghanistan: Current Challenges, Possible Solutions, Lichtenstein Colloquium Report, Volume III, pp. 36-37, available at, http://www.princeton.edu/~lisd/publications/afgh2008_lcm3.pdf, accessed on 08.15.2009. 185 According to Barnett Rubin and Humayun Hamidzada, in the recent past, the grudging consent of the clergy to the Western-imposed system of government and the international occupation has been crucial toward obtaining a sense of legitimacy. In fact, former Chief Justice Shinwari used his Islamic credentials to negotiate with various moderate Taliban leaders wishing to defect. Barnett Rubin and Humayun Hamidzada, “From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of State-Building in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14, Iss. 1, 2007, p. 16. 183 108 security, governance, and economic development. Reform, however, involves changes at both the central and local levels. Since the 2001 invasion, local communities have cried out for external mediation in settling local disputes: along with security for person and property, dispute resolution is a public service that tribal and community leaders desperately crave. The international community, however, has exclusively focused its efforts on Western-style judicial reform (and that too reform has not been forthcoming). A great many potentially serious disputes, relating to domestic violence, divorce, inheritance and marriage are normally settled within the ‘private’ sphere of the Afghan extended family without the involvement of state institutions. However, those disputes that are considered ‘public’ are resolved by public institutions at local and tribal levels. The main institution that has traditionally operated as a mechanism of dispute settlement (at village and tribe levels) is the jirga among the Pashtuns and its approximate equivalent – shura – among the non-Pashtuns of Afghanistan.186 Reform initiatives involve building a nation-wide Afghan system based on the 2001 constitution, but local judges, prosecutors, and police are known to be corrupt. Local courts barely enjoy authority in most parts of Afghanistan, especially the remote and far-flung corners;187 without adequate enforcement mechanisms – i.e. a corrupt-free and large enough police force – predatory warlords and insurgents reign free. Add to this the backlog of cases that the local courts just do not have manpower (judges and 186 Ali Wardak, “Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan,” unpublished paper, p. 9, available at http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Contributions/Projects/AliWardak/Law%20and%20Social%20Change%204.doc, accessed 09.05.2010. 187 The role of formal institutions of justice (courts, police) in maintaining social order in Afghan society has always been limited. This particularly applies to rural Afghanistan, where it is estimated that over 80 percent of the Afghan population live. In some southern and eastern parts of the country, formal institutions of justice have no (or just nominal) existence. Ali Wardak, “Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan,” p. 9. 109 prosecutors) to sort. All this creates the desire for an alternate actor who is willing and will be capable of meting out quick and timely judgements. Keenly aware that a lack of law enforcement undermines the basic legitimacy of any government, Barnett Rubin recognizes that – [T]he only capacities for dispute resolution and law enforcement that actually exist in much of Afghanistan consist of informal or village councils or mullahs who administer a crude interpretation of shari’a. Community leaders complained constantly about judicial corruption. Many demanded the implementation of shari’a law, which they contrast not to secular law, but to corruption. During the years required for [judicial reform] the only genuine alternatives before Afghan society will be the enforcement of customary or Islamic law, or no law.188 Contrast the failures of the international mission with that of the Taliban effort. Aware of the central role of civilian populations in the insurgency, the Taliban have started rebuilding (competing) governing structures that mobilize political support amongst non-combatants. By mid-2008, the Taliban were operating 13 guerrilla law courts (in two dozen districts, out of 400) throughout the southern part of Afghanistan – a shadow judiciary that expanded Taliban influence by settling disagreements, hearing civil and criminal matters, and using the provisions of Islamic shari’a law and their own Pashtun code to handle everything from land disputes to capital crimes.189 The Taliban may be cruel – everyone acknowledges this – but they are seen as fair and swift. In addition, in 2008, a new commission under the Taliban central leadership reportedly carried out a long-term administrative review in some southern provinces. Apparently, this was preceded by popular (civilian) complaints about misconduct of certain Taliban commanders but also by commanders’ complaints about inactive 188 Barnett Rubin, “Still Ours to Lose: Afghanistan on the Brink,” testimony given to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington D.C., 21 September 2006, p. 10, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/11486/still_ours_to_lose.html, accessed 21.09.2009. 189 Antonio Giustozzi, “The Neo-Taliban: A Year On,” Open Democracy, November 2008, available at http://opendemocracy.net/article/the-neo-taliban-a-year-on, accessed 22.04.2010. 110 ‘governors.’190 In Zabul province, pairs of auditors were seen questioning the local population in Taliban-controlled areas about the behavior (and performance) of local commanders. They took notes and reported back to Quetta. It is possible that this was an ad-hoc body although, according to the political scientist Thomas Ruttig it continues to exist and to deal with judicial matters. As a result, non-local commanders and fighters were withdrawn from some areas, like Helmand and Wardak, and were replaced by local ones who are supposed to be more tolerant vis-à-vis the local population. In late 2008, an internally announced reshuffle of some ‘governors’ of southern provinces followed. By mid-2009, the changes had been implemented in Ghazni, Uruzgan and Zabul.191 Thus, we see the Taliban are attune to local demands and concerns. Although lacking in data, it is plausible that the Taliban polling and swift response (i.e. the reshuffle) appealed (and continues to do so) to large numbers of war-weary civilians. Complementing the above strategies, the Taliban constantly present a rosy view of conditions under their last administration (glossing over corruption and nepotism under their short-lived regime) – overlooking the paradox that it is the Taliban that is responsible for much of the current insecurity – and how the return of Taliban rule ‘will’ lead to prosperity. Toward such end, harking back to the rough justice of the former Taliban period has become an increasingly common sentiment on the streets of Afghanistan.192 The checklist below (Figure 5.) – appearing in an article in Al Emarah – encapsulates many of the major messages it highlights, albeit overwrought and exaggerated, but grounded in deep-seated feeling over the current absence of the rule of law. 190 Thomas Ruttig, “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency,” p. 17. Ibid, p. 18. 192 Joanna Nathan, “Reading the Taliban,” in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.) Decoding the New Taliban (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 36. 191 111 Activities of the Islamic Emirates of The circumstances of the current Afghanistan imported administration Afghanistan was an independent Islamic Everything is under the control of country and had absolute Islamic rule foreigners; the name of Islam is only used to deceive people Everyone’s life, property and honor No one’s life, property or honor is secure, (namoos) was secure, there was no stealing kidnapping, stealing and sexual assaults or abductions happen not only on adults but on children Everyone’s rights were protected in the “Right” is now in the hands of those with light of Shari’a law and everyone had equal money and power, those who do not have privileges and punishment before the law financial means are deprived of their rights Sovereignty was enforced – the entire The current administrative corruption has system was administered from a single also surprised the foreigners. Moral centre in accordance with the law, and all corruption has increased to the level that decisions were made by the Afghans cases of AIDS have jumped to thousands in themselves the last few years – and this is only the people whose blood has been checked There was no moral or administrative The mines of the country are exploited in corruption at all various ways because the aim of the foreigners is to seize the mines. On the other hand the so-called aid money goes in the pockets of foreigners and the little that remains goes into the bank The interests of the country were protected and socially uplifting underway. Those activities mines for were whose exploitation Afghans lacked equipment were kept as country’s [future] capital There was security at that time 2 %3 $ 4 + 0 , (Source: Joanna Nathan, “Reading the Taliban,” in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.) Decoding the New Taliban (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 36-37) 112 5 ! " The Afghan state is swarming with instances of corruption, favoritism and cronyism. At the highest echelons of power, President Karzai, as a member of the Popalzai tribe, has tended to appoint provincial governors who would be likely to threaten his influence by building strong tribal bases of their own. Thus, especially in the south, he appointed tribal outsiders or members of minority tribes as provincial governors, leaving the stronger majority tribes effectively disenfranchised – a situation that was exacerbated by first the failure to hold promised district-level elections, and then, massive and gross manipulation (fraud) of district and national during the 2010 elections.193 Little wonder observers chide the Karzai administration as a “family business.”194 Perhaps it is this favoritism that accounts for the skewed representation of the Popalzai tribe amongst the ranks of the Taliban movement: research conducted by Toronto’s Globe and Mail indicates only four to five percent of insurgents identify themselves as Popalzai.195 Karzai’s strategy, however, has backfired since. The elimination or weakening of local leaders produced further political fragmentation. William Maley points out that this pattern of installing former warlords,196 potential rivals and competitors in positions of 193 See Thomas Ruttig, “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency. Graeme Smith, “Tribal Animosity Drawing Taliban Recruits.” 195 The Globe and Mail survey was small (42 interviewees) and did not include enough interviews to draw firm conclusions about the tribal makeup of the Taliban. Nevertheless, the findings appear to support the impression of many analysts that the insurgency in the south draws fighters most heavily from the disenfranchised outside of the Zirak Durrani tribal federation (the umbrella group for the Popalzai tribe), which dominates the local government. Graeme Smith, “Tribal Animosity Drawing Taliban Recruits.” 196 For instance, the warlords of Helmand were mostly ejected during the Taliban period, but re-emerged as allies of the Karzai Government after 2001. Several were rewarded with senior provincial government positions: Sher Mohammad Akhundzada of the Alizai tribe was made provincial governor, and Abdul Rahman Jan from the Noorzai tribe was made police chief. Tom Coghlan, “The Taliban in Helmand: An Oral History,” in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.) Decoding the New Taliban (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 122. 194 113 authority, treating administrative authority as political goods to be traded for loyalty, had sharply negative effects on government legitimacy: An insidious – although not widely publicized – consequence of all this has been that elite politics has been marked by ferocious rivalries, competition for the President’s attention and favor, and denigration of opponents as a way of reducing their influence. As a result, some very gifted Afghans have left government…. Beyond Kabul, the results have been more destructive. It cannot be said too often that awarding offices to undeserving figures at the provincial and local level is a recipe for dramatically poor governance and the progressive erosion of the legitimacy of the state.197 Government-appointed leaders – who enjoy very limited influence amongst the populations – unable to reach out to the aggrieved peoples and disenfranchised tribes turn instead to their economic might in an effort to consolidate their new-found positions of power. Thus we see these leaders (albeit not all government-appointed leaders) ironically linking up with the drug trades that they are supposed to combat, using drug money to expand into illicit and licit businesses.198 These same leaders are often the ones who monopolize reconstruction projects and siphon aid money. Many provincial governors have, at times, had an incentive to channel or divert state benefits (construction contracts, development assistance, and security, among others) to their tribal or personal supporters,199 further alienating the majority tribes, and local populations in general. This in turn, further limits access to resources for the communities/tribes (leaders included) pushed out of the political process. Since this dynamic has been most noticeable in the south, it is here that the risk of a rival competitive power base emerging is greatest. Once again, in response to the threat, Karzai has appointed local strongmen of minority tribes to various positions of power. 197 William Maley, Rescuing Afghanistan (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2006), p. 35. Thomas Ruttig, “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency,” p. 7. 199 These accounts point to the ‘rent-seeking’ activities of provincial leaders that make use of the vast networks of collusive arrangements they have established with state agents as well as with formal and informal economic actors. 198 114 In several local districts, many if not most insurgents are motivated by their rejection of and exclusion by neglectful and corrupt central government – some analysts call them ‘anti-corruption Taliban.’ This is particularly true in most provinces of the south. Here, initially broad tribal coalitions had supported the Karzai administration. These coalitions were later broken by local strongmen who increasingly monopolized power in the name of certain tribes, even the central government, while others were pushed out. A number of these strongmen are either members of the Karzai family, linked to it tribally or through other personal relationship, a fact that helped them to legitimize their actions.200 At this juncture, the Taliban’s relationship with local tribal allies is important to understand the decline in societal support of the ruling government. The Taliban exploited Karzai’s erroneous judgments, posing as defenders of the local tribes against corruption and misrule by unrepresentative appointed provincial and district governors, and seeking alliances with dispossessed and disenfranchised tribal power brokers. The Taliban have been successful in exploiting such developments – garnering support against the exploitative and power-hungry (demonized as foreign ‘puppets’), all the while courting alienated leaders – whereas the international community and Afghan government have systematically attempted to overcome the problems by favoring and legitimizing Karzai-affiliated commanders. This plays directly into the Taliban’s scheme. As one Afghan National Directorate for Security concludes: 200 The best known examples are Karzai’s brother Ahmad Wali, the head of the Kandahar Provincial Council, and former Helmand and Uruzgan governors Sher Muhammad Akhundzada and Jan Muhammad Khan who still exert enormous influence in their respective provinces. See Graeme Smith, “Tribal Animosity Drawing Taliban Recruits,” in “Talking to the Taliban: Globe Special Report,” The Globe and Mail, 24 March 2008, available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/talkingtothetaliban, accessed 29.03.2010. 115 [The Taliban’s use of] recruitment techniques in the ongoing stage is becoming sophisticated. They approach tribes, sub-tribes and communities in the villages. They want them to sever their relationship with the government and also preach to the population to support the jihad against the Americans and the government which they consider the infidel.201 Following on from the above discussions, Helena Malikyar and Barnett Rubin advocate the need for alternative centers of power where local leaders feel they can exert a measure of control and influence.202 A centralized state that reduces the status of tribal and other local leaders will quickly find out that it has no means of governing. In similar vein David Kilcullen suggests a localized approach – working by, with, or through genuine alliances and local partnerships – would be much more successful in governance.203 Thus, in areas where the local Afghan government representatives have shown themselves to be efficient, have governed with genuine care for the welfare of the people or represent majority tribes this Taliban approach has had limited success. But in areas where the local government is seen as illegitimate, oppressive, corrupt or weak, there has developed a governance vacuum at the local level that the Taliban have been able to exploit, while tribal leaders who have allied themselves to the Taliban have largely done so for reasons of self-interest and disillusionment with the government, not from any strong ideological commitment to the Taliban agenda. 201 Amrullah Saleh, “Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in Afghanistan,” p. 3. Helena Malikyar and Barnett Rubin, cited in Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace (London: Zed Books, 2008), pp. 178-179. 203 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, p. 15. Such a solution, however, will be undermined rather than moved along by a surge of more third-party hard power into Afghanistan; hence, an end to foreign occupation (if not outright presence) is viewed as a vital pre-condition. An alternative possibility advocates co-opting insurgent organizations within the state apparatus. 202 116 60 7 894 $ ( The Coalitions’ last armed offensive sought to capture (and hold) the city of Marja in Helmand Province.204 In Marja, following the offensive, encouraging the population to accept, much less support, the outside (or ‘alien’) government presence, turned out to be an unenviable task. “We have a fleeting opportunity to earn limited trust,” said US Colonel Randall Newman, who commands US ground forces in Helmand Province. He summed up the state of relations with the local populations: “They don’t trust us.”205 Much of the suspicion is related to the military’s overwhelming coercive strategy and the ANA’s significant participation therein. A high level of resentment felt by Marja residents is a marked deterioration in attitudes. Surveys conducted in March 2010 revealed that 67 percent of the local population interviewed believed the military operation was bad for the Afghan people.206 Recent experience has taught that military action cannot be successful without local backing, so securing the support of the Afghan people is key. Securing local support, however, proved to be difficult following weeks of fighting, house searches, artillery fire and air strikes. But another element of the disaffection reaches back further, to previous pledges by the Afghan government to provide services and improve living conditions in Helmand. The augmentation of negativity in the city and province, over such a short time frame, indicates that in situations where development, aid, and counter narcotics are not accorded the same level of political and financial support as military force, outcomes can be counter-productive in 204 It should be noted, of the 20,000 troops involved in the concerned operation, over 18,000 were Afghan army and police personnel. The operation was also under the command of the Afghan army/government. 205 Thom Shanker, Helene Cooper and Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Elite US Unites Step Up Effort in Afghan City before Attack,” New York Times, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/world/asia/26kandahar.html?pagewanted=2&hp, accessed 24.04.2010. 206 The International Council on Security and Development, “Research Findings – Bad News: Struggling to Secure Popular Support in Southern Afghanistan,” available at http://www.icosgroup.net/modules/reports/afghanistan_relationship_gap/bad_news, accessed 17.04.2010. 117 terms of local resident’s perceptions of the government. The two concerns are not mutually exclusive. Gaining most from the negative fallout is the Taliban. The Taliban themselves use coercive methods to intimidate people, further alienating them from the central government. In northern Marja, for instance, a local man hired to supervise the government work programs was beaten by the Taliban and refused to help foreign or government troops any more.207 Helmand Province (not to mention the rest of the country) is replete with similar stories of intimidation.208 Intimidation and violence serves to erode support for the government and foreign forces among populations who fear continuing conflict and the palpable threat of insurgent punishment. The Taliban strategy is plain for all to see: to ‘teach’ the government and its allies that they cannot protect the people and to inform the populations that the Coalition is failing to guarantee them security. The result (as captured by a poll commissioned by the US Army) show people, especially Elders, in various Afghan districts to favor negotiations with the Taliban over continued fighting.209 207 Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Violence Helps Taliban Undo Afghan Gains,” New York Times, 3 April 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/04/world/asia/04marja.html, accessed 24.04.2010. 208 See for example, Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Taimoor Shah, “A Killing Further Erodes Faith in Afghan Leaders, New York Times, 20 April 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/world/asia/21afghan.html, accessed 24.04.2010. 209 The survey was commissioned by the US Army’s Human Terrain System, a program intended to help the US military better understand the social and cultural underpinnings of regions where troops are deployed. The survey was conducted by Glevum Associates, a Massachusetts research firm. 118 Chapter IV has highlighted the correlation between government incompetence (in contradistinction to the proviso of ‘good’ governance) and loss in societal support. The chapter painstakingly reveals how the Afghan citizenry are compelled, or come to choose between the state and insurgent movement. The chapter argues endemic political and security-related instability in Afghanistan provides the Taliban with the excuse (and legitimacy) to wage war, all the while robbing the state of its own legitimizing logic. Shortcomings of the Afghan security apparatus and deficiencies in the justice sector are of particular import, therein. The chapter also reveals how the Taliban achieve protraction: by manipulating local politics and honing insurgent tactic/strategies. In particular, the Taliban are adept at securing political allegiances at the district levels, whilst offering deprived communities much needed order, security and justice – albeit on their own terms. The chapter concurrently shows the areas (of governance) where the Afghan central government has failed (or in certain instances, refused) to shoulder civic responsibilities. 119 Hitherto, this project has highlighted several of the advantages in articulating the current puzzle/investigation as a manifestation of ‘state weakness.’ In order to fully appreciate these advantages, however, one must situate the thesis within the broader historical context of Afghanistan’s past. As has already been established, poor performance and failure to gain legitimacy has plagued instrumentalities of the Afghan state. The state-of-affairs is consistent with Afghanistan’s historical record. As in the present, past attempts at engendering political legitimacy were severely hindered by competition for allegiance and authority with primordial solidarity groups or anti-government movements, with the centre frequently alienating the latter. Governments of Afghanistan have historically lacked the capacity to implement policies that challenged entrenched (and fragmented) local interests. Lacking in resources, beset with corruption and nepotism, the country’s institutions have seldom delivered services – such as security – demanded of a modern state.210 Critically, aware of their limited capacity, past regimes have at various times steered clear of conflicts with locals, refusing to implement social order, collecting instead what small amounts of taxes the government demanded. Government officials were not even encouraged to engage in social action projects that might require greater local cooperation than the government was able to muster. As a result, governments were severely handicapped in achieving the 210 To the extent that protections against threats of lawlessness and injustice were realized, solidarity groups (qawms) to which individuals belonged provided what little resource was available. 120 delegitimization of social organizations with ‘other’ sets of rules and the mobilization of the Afghan population directly into the state’s own institutions. Such a history suggests that a long drawn-out conflict between reform-oriented agencies-of-the-state and traditional inward-looking communities has resulted in a stalemated state of affairs whereby the state and its representatives have lost popular legitimacy, over time. The resulting loss in authority has rendered the state (and its institutions) weak, amplifying governance failures and shortcomings, which in turn have directly engendered conflict persistence. 121 Afghanistan is by no means a unitary state. With the exception of two short periods 211 when the Afghan state enjoyed a measure of political and territorial coalescence, with a central government in Kabul capable of exercising influence over other power centers in the country – i.e., the state exercised a noticeable degree of regulatory and distributive capacity – power and politics in Afghanistan have by and large been personalized rather than institutionalized.212 It is a state which has historically co-existed uneasily with a fragmented, decentralized and traditional society, operating under the aegis of autonomous local actors and institutions – all with their own ideas of norms, values, rules, structures and functions. The authority of successive central governments has remained weak for over two hundred years, and in comparison to the strength of micro-societies which have functioned more or less as autonomous enclaves shaped by ethnic, tribal, sectarian and linguistic allegiances and the role of dominant personalities. Although the upheavals since the 1970s affected these micro-societies and rendered Afghanistan a severely disrupted state, they do not appear to have deformed the micro-societies to the extent that would permit a strong state to emerge easily. In Huntington’s classic institutional definition, ‘political order’ is maintained through stable ‘institutions as intermediaries’ that moderate opposing political claims made by different interest groups, socialize behavior and allow for negotiated outcomes. 211 The first period was marked under the British-backed autocratic rule of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan (1881-1901) and his son Habibullah Khan (1901-1918). The second period was marked under the Musahiban dynasty (1930-1978). 212 Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan’s Weak State and Strong Society,” in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur (eds.) Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), p. 193. 122 They are characterized by their degree of stability,213 the importance attached to them by actors and thus their ability to bring about a particular type of behavior.214 For most of Afghan history, political power was based on unstable, frequently changing personal loyalties that never achieved the degree of institutionalization that, according to Huntington, can produce ‘order’. Very few recurrent, stable and valued institutions existed, the most important probably being the Loya Jirga which has its origin in Pashtun tribal culture. While it is certainly possible to see the Loya Jirga as a loose form of parliamentary representation, the main difference lies in the fact that the Afghan state was never able to effectively penetrate society, remaining exceedingly weak throughout its existence. Form its birth in the late eighteenth century the Afghan state was decidedly premodern in the sense that it was built upon existing tribal loyalties and laws, mimicking on the national level the traditional power structure of personified leadership complemented by a council of elders that existed on all levels of Pashtun tribal organization. Tribal tradition saw the jirga as the embodiment of the sovereign power of the community, being the carrier of both legislative and adjudicating powers. 215 The leader on each hierarchical level, the khan, was seen as the executive power of the community subject to the will of the collectivity and the customary law of the tribe to be elected from among 213 ‘Stability’ is not mere longevity, but a system’s ability to withstand shock and failure because a solid level of support from its subordinates can be guaranteed. David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 33. 214 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 12. 215 The use of such quintessentially modern terms (legislative, adjudicating) in the context of a pre-modern society is problematic. A society dominated by an ancient tribal customary law such as the Pashtunwali is obviously not easily inclined towards the concept of making new laws. Still the jirgas could impose new binding rules, which is the essence of legislative power. 123 the dominant family.216 The system shows the relatively weak claim to power exercised by the first king Ahmad Khan Abdali, who from the very beginning left the tribes largely to their own devices in the regulation of their internal affairs. The state’s jurisdiction, since, has been poised against tribal autonomy, making it exceedingly difficult for the former to achieve social control. Instead, tribes had provided the basis of power for government since the mid-eighteenth century. The state was – and arguably still is – itself dependent on the tribes for its own legitimacy. This legitimacy, which stretched from the eighteenth century down to the socialist coup of 1978, reflected a tribal settlement of national leadership. Legitimacy did not follow any rule of primogeniture but rather, in accordance with Pashtun custom, fell on the most able and acceptable member of the chiefly lineage.217 Moreover, since the creation of the state, Afghan citizens were rarely called upon to finance the state’s expansion with taxes derived from their own productive activity.218 Instead, tribes were taxed on a collective basis, with collection severely hampered by rulers’ need to allow exemptions and allowances to privileged tribes. Even in regions where government authority was established fairly firmly, tribes continued to hold on to their privileged position.219 Rather than try to penetrate the countryside and govern it, successive rulers and regimes pursued a “cover-over” strategy of “encapsulating” local 216 The khan performs for the tribe the public service of representing and mediating between groups so as to build more inclusive unities within the tribe. 217 Rob Hager, “State, Tribe and Empire in Afghan Inter-Polity Relations,” in Richard Tapper (ed.) The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), pp. 106-107. 218 Although reformer rulers attempted to levy tax and implement conscription, they were met with great hostility from tribal communities, even leading to the rebellion of 1929 which forced then King Amanullah to abdicate. Successor rulers, aware of the negative consequences of social reform, refrained from penetrating society. Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 181-195. 219 Christine Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997), p. 221. 124 institutions with an administration laid over the existing society.220 The state elite did not rule the people of Afghanistan by representing them and managing the conflicts among them. Nor had it mobilized networks of clientelism into a national organization for a political struggle against British imperialism. Instead, aspirants to power have relied on tribal support, while established rulers cultivated the tribes as sources of revenue, military levies, and agricultural produce. But tribes were also feared as disruptive elements, prone to raiding non-tribal society, to armed opposition to government, often to dynastic ambitions of their own. This led then king Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in the nineteenth century (and later his grandson Amanullah in the twentieth century) to devote his efforts to crushing, not institutionalizing, tribal coalitions. Hence, and without restating the dynastic history of the nineteenth century that has been covered elsewhere,221 it shall suffice to point out that the main characteristics of the Afghan state was its inability, indeed unwillingness, to impose any form of national organization or identity beyond keeping the royal family nominally in power. The state as such, always remained extremely weak and did not figure prominently in the life of ordinary Afghans whose primary loyalties belonged to smaller, non-territorial groupings such as family, clan, and tribe. The state and its territorial space carried only a very abstract, often negative connotation because it only made itself felt through the sporadic attempt to impose levies and custom duties, military and labor service. 220 Encapsulating refers to a degree of cultural and political autonomy allowed to tribal groups located within the territorial boundaries of the state. Policies towards encapsulated groups range from nominal or geographical inclusion, through ‘indirect rule’, to ‘integration’ which breaks down the encapsulation. Barnett Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 23; Richard Tapper, “Introduction,” in Richard Tapper (ed.) The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), p. 52. 221 See Christine Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan; Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. 125 The entire process of state-building and state-functioning in Afghanistan has been heavily influenced by the inability of national leaders to create a coherent central core and to forge a coalition of micro-societies with dynamic relationships among themselves and with the central core. This has been critical in determining the authority, power and legitimacy of central governments. The more relations between the core and the microsocieties and among the latter have been interactive and cooperative, the greater the chances of creating a stable political order. In fact, this was the case during the rule of Ahmed Shah Durrani in the mid-eighteenth century when, together with military expeditions he helped core and micro-societies interact and was successful in keeping elements within both core and micro-society preoccupied.222 Such a process, however, was inherently disintegrative. It depended too much on personalized politics and charismatic leadership; it lacked the necessary degree of legal-rational norms and practices, participatory mechanisms and inner elasticity to enable it to absorb internal/external shocks. More recently, such a process failed to promote pluralist participation through either integrative or federative mechanisms, or the pursuit of foreign policy objectives and priorities that would reduce the concerned regime’s vulnerability to internal (or external) threats without antagonizing them. 222 Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan’s Weak State and Strong Society,” p. 196. 126 Historians of renown such as Glatzer and Gellner suggest that uncentralized, diffusely organized tribal groups are found either in the absence of state control or within a strong state. Garthwaite adds that tribes form strongly centralized confederacies in order to confront the state, and are able to maintain such strength so long as the state bureaucracy is weak.223 In Afghanistan, tribal institutions and norms, just as those of a state, can and do perform the political tasks of interest mediation, dispute resolution and military organization. Their political independence is expressed through the autonomous enforcement of the tribal legal order – pashtunwali. Inter-polity relations between tribes and the central government have been structurally characterized by their fundamentally different kinds of legal orders, based respectively on the pashtunwali and central state institutions and ideologies. The creation of state institutions in Afghanistan did not always keep pace with the claims to sovereignty extended by the central ruler. The difficulty of any modern Afghan government has been that Afghan society has no limited territory and power structures on which the state could adopt a strategy to take possession. Afghan society is not feudal and power structure in Afghan society is not a defined place or person, but a multitude of elusive and constantly renegotiated ‘networks of solidarity’ (qawms). While the state apparatus has tried, at various times, to delineate village communities that can be managed by headmen (malek, qariadar, khan, kad khida or arbab), society has responded by trying to link its qawms to the state apparatus in order to access resources. Favoritism and corruption have constituted effective forms of rejection of the government by society. 223 Richard Tapper, “Introduction,” p. 50. 127 In rural areas, the societal structure is tribal or arranged around family lineages. The strongest form of solidarity is therefore based on tribal or family lineage, yet, other forms of solidarity may exist. Therefore, the qawm in rural Afghanistan relates mostly to family/clan relations. Solidarity networks may however be related to profession (trade corporation, merchants, people involved in smuggling, etc.), to life experience (i.e. same school, same group of Mudjahedeen, Taliban, etc.). The stronger the identification of individuals to the identity of a certain social group, the more cohesive is the solidarity network. Given the various forms and level of solidarity (from the extended family to ethnic nationality or the supra national umma/Islamic community), the qawm is an intricate structure. Shaped by qawms, Afghan society is a fragmented network society in which individuals keep referring to different level of self-representation (familial, tribal, national, local, religious, etc.) in order to adapt to changing situations. The fragmentation of Afghan society and its network links makes it a challenge (if not hardly impossible) to target assistance and for any authority to rule.224 Moreover, through much of its modern (and recent) history, the rural population’s alienation from the Kabul-based administrations was increased by its lack of participation in it. Persian and Turkish-speaking regions particularly resented being governed almost exclusively by Pashtuns. Whether Pashtun or not, government officials were invariably outsiders with little knowledge of the areas under their jurisdiction. They were part of a highly centralized administrative system in which decisions on appointments for provincial posts were made by ministries in Kabul. Because each ministry maintained its own chain-of-command, it demanded that critical issues be referred back to Kabul. Such 224 Joel Migdal acknowledges in such societies the state has encountered several difficulties in displacing patterns of fragmented social control. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, pp. 39-40. 128 parallel lines of administrations tended to make each part of government a separate fiefdom, making cooperation at the local level difficult.225 Officials were therefore more concerned with maintaining good relations with their superiors in Kabul than in forging good relations with the local population. Within such context, governors often took a predatory approach in their dealings with locals, particularly when levying taxes. There was also a burgeoning psychological gap between government officials and the rural population based on differences in social class, education, and the degree of urbanization. Officials were almost always city people who disliked service in the provinces. They dressed in Western suits, which set them off from the turban-wearing residents of rural Afghanistan. 226 Often government officials expressed their embarrassment at rural Afghanistan, stating it was a backward place full of backward people. Such contempt was reciprocated by the rural population, which found the officials overbearing and congenitally corrupt. More importantly perhaps, villagers expressed their doubts about the religiosity of government officials, particularly over such matters as drinking alcohol and praying regularly. 225 226 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, p. 223. Ibid, p. 224. 129 !" # Repeated foreign interventions and invasions have been a major source of crisis for Afghanistan – especially since its emergence as an identifiable (Western) political unit – and have seriously fractured or disrupted the political entity. Perhaps for this reason, for the bulk of the nineteenth century, it functioned as little more than a cluster of divided principalities, with Kabul, Kandahar and Heart serving at times as capitals of rival power groups. Significantly, however, it is the interaction between repeated interventions and various internal factors (not to mention the Afghans’ approach to managing these dynamics) that has held the state back from becoming a viable, coherent and peaceful state. The state of Afghanistan took shape within its current borders as imperial powers sought to transform a turbulent dynasty into a buffer state. Afghanistan formally entered the modern state system after the second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880) as a buffer between the British and Russian empires. This externally promoted transformation inevitably entailed interaction between international and domestic politics. Because Afghanistan fulfilled strategic functions for imperial or hegemonic powers, those powers sustained Afghanistan’s existence even when its rulers (whether juridically subordinate or sovereign) had few, if any, of the capacities that characterized those states that survived the wars of seventeenth century Europe. British and Russian empires supported the state of Afghanistan by providing the ruling elites with ideologies, organizational models, and financial and coercive resources. With the advent of the Cold War, the rulers of Afghanistan exploited its location to make it into a borderline ‘rentier’ or ‘allocation’ state, financing more than forty percent of its 130 state expenditures in every year from 1958 to 1968 and again from the mid-1970s from revenue accruing directly from abroad.227 Foreign revenues enabled the state leadership to expand that apparatus under its control without bargaining with or being accountable to its citizens. More significantly perhaps, it lent to the erroneous belief that the central government could extend its reach without establishing a country-wide administrative system. Rather than integrate various parts of the population into a common, national political system, the state elite acted as an ethnically stratified hierarchy of intermediaries between the foreign powers who provided the resources and groups who received them. Most of the population considered the government merely as a source of kinship-linked patronage. Each local kinship-based group remained isolated, tied to the state only by personal ties to individuals in the state apparatus. The absence of a nation corresponding to the state is not peculiar to Afghanistan, but has been a dominant characteristic particularly of African post-colonial states. In Afghanistan, however, even the attempt to foster national unity – cultural or administrative – was not undertaken as the state throughout its existence depended on received income in the form of external economic and military aid and was thus not dependent on tapping national sources of power. What Rubin says about the reign of King Abdul Rahman Khan is quite symptomatic of most Afghan governments throughout its modern history: Abdul Rahman Khan used these coercive resources to establish the basic state structures that endured until the fall of Najibullah in 1992: a Pashtun 227 Barnett Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 22. 131 ruler using external resources to reign over an ethnically heterogeneous society while manipulating that social segmentation to weaken society’s resistance.228 ! $# % At the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, Afghanistan became a proxy battlefield of the Cold War, with the two superpowers of the time vying for influence through economic assistance. A political (and border) dispute with the newly created state of Pakistan (an ally of the United States at the time) forced the Afghan government to the Soviet Union for military assistance – a decision that would severely impact the country’s future; for, the fall of the old regime to a pro-Soviet communist coup in 1978 opened a long period of violence that turned Afghanistan into the hotbed of the Cold War. The Soviet policy of ‘divide and rule’ created and armed local and ethnic militias in support of Moscow’s client regime in Kabul – a strategy that militarized Afghan society by popularizing the “defense of the revolution” and creating ethnic and tribal militias. These militias would go on to resist state authority and penetration.229 The Afghan violence that began as an anti-state insurgency against the communist coup soon turned into a wider conflict, culminating in the 1979 Soviet military invasion. During the invasion and following it, various powers pursued their competing strategic interests by engaging and supporting rival Afghan factions and micro-societies that were locked in a ferocious power struggle. The powerful Uzbek militia of General Dostum – who later went to dominate several northern Afghan provinces – is a product of this 228 Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 19. Ali Jalali, “The Legacy of War and the Challenge of Peacebuilding,” in Robert Rotberg (ed.) Building a New Afghanistan (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 25. 229 132 policy. Similarly, the US provided aid to Islamic-led anti-regime resistance forces. The process marginalized mainstream Afghans and groups who were not only moderate in religious terms, but entertained some sense of nationalist sentiment. The US policy, similar to that of the Soviet, succeeded in only cementing the influence of the mujahideen and militants. The Soviet war had two leading consequences. Foremost was the unravelling of the power structure, the national framework, and the interactive relationships between central authority and micro-societies that the Nadir regime had built in the early twentieth century. Another was the fragmentation of power and the emergence of various local power holders and their disintegrative manipulation of micro-societies for their personal interest. It was no longer the traditional tribal, religious and ethnic leaders around whom the micro-societies revolved, but rather a new breed of leaders, in the form of armed commanders or local hegemons – commonly known as ‘warlords.’ Although wearing the mantle of the traditional leaders, the news breed acted as security providers, with distributive and patronage powers, thereby usurping (and supplanting) the functions and roles of the state itself. With the end of the Cold War, the superpowers walked away leaving the competing domestic actors to continue the destruction. The resulting civil war – and the absence of a central authority – blocked the emergence of broad-based legitimate institutions of state capable of administering society at large. In fact, the Afghan mujahideen – successors to Soviet rule – encountered two problems. First, they inherited the symbols of a state (notably a capital city) but not functioning state mechanisms: bureaucrats had scattered or fled, the army had split along ethnic and regional lines, and 133 there were simply no longer agencies available to extract and redistribute resources. Second, but just as seriously, the divisions between the mujahideen themselves intensified and resulted in brutal armed conflict.230 Since the Soviet war, Afghan society had to organize itself without the presence of a functional government. The collapse of the state structure in Afghanistan, however, strengthened the solidarity networks in which resources are channeled along social lines. I have previously noted the antagonist relations between the qawm and state structures; during the Soviet war, observers noted that traditional society and its networks were more effective than the military resistance to the penetration of the central government at different levels of society. It can be argued, then, that qawms have had and continue to hinder government/administration initiatives to govern and promote modernity in the country, and yet on the other hand it is an essential social capital that highlights the resilience of Afghan society to external shocks and failed governance. ! The Afghan state and its institutions have been vulnerable to various forces. In the modern era, tribal and religious forces brought down a reformer king in 1929. A successor monarchy that yielded many years later to a republican government was a victim of ideological forces spawned from external influences. Over the 1980s, a foreignassisted Islamic resistance wore down communist Afghan regimes and their foreign protector, the Soviet Union. Inheriting power in 1992, contesting political factions surrendered Kabul in 1996 to a more cohesive Islamic force (Taliban), which in turn, succumbed to an American-led military intervention in 2001. 230 William Maley, “Afghanistan: An Historical and Geographical Appraisal,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 92, Iss. 880, December 2010, pp. 10-11. 134 However, aside from the Soviet invasion of 1979 and the more recent US-led international invasion of 2001, the security of the modern Afghan state has been threatened from within, not without. For instance, at the critical moment in 1929 when King Amanullah tried to defend Kabul against conservative religious leaders and rural khans, the army refused to fight. Following his abdication, the national army dissolved, leaving a reactionary Tajik bandit to try to consolidate power.231 When several months later a military campaign by an exiled critic of Amanullah, Nadir Khan, restored the monarchy, he owed his crown to British-sponsored Pashtun tribesmen. The necessity of calling on the tribes for military assistance only served to heighten the perception that the government was weak. Afghanistan’s status as rentier state – dependent on foreign subsidies – didn’t help stem this perception. The fragility of the Afghan state, and its dependence on retaining military superiority over the tribes, was revealed when Amanullah, having lost an annual British subsidy of 180,000 Pounds, was forced to weaken his army and was subsequently overthrown.232 The royal court thus understood the importance of a professional army able to counter tribal power, one with modern training, organization and equipment. 233 A centrally controlled system of military conscription was intended to assure the national government’s ascendency over the tribes that continued to be viewed as the major threat to Kabul’s rule, though security against a foreign enemy was used to justify maintaining a large force. In this (among other factors) as well as the monarchy’s urban character, there 231 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, pp. 191-192. Rob Hager, “State, Tribe and Empire in Afghan Inter-Polity Relations,” in Richard Tapper (ed.) The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), p. 105. 233 Richard Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 72. 232 135 was a disconnection with most of society. Much of the time, Nadir Khan and his successors seemed out of touch with the countryside. By the 1960s, the Afghan army was in many respects the country’s most modern institution. But financing the army took a large portion of the budget and placed the government in a position of considerable reliance on the Soviet Union, to which Afghanistan was in debt for equipment, spare parts and training. From 1955-1978 the Soviet Union provided US$1.2 billion in military aid and helped recruit and equip an army 100,000 strong. 234 Yet, despite this help, an insular Afghan society remained suspicious of outside help (many perceived the military aid as a concerted effort to subdue the authority and autonomy of tribes) with the institution itself suffering from several structural weaknesses. ! & '( # $) In the wake of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the US failed to play an effective role in the management of post-communist Afghanistan, making the country vulnerable to regional actors. Pakistan emerged as the foremost interventionist, indeed ‘spoiler’,235 given its extensive cross-border ethnic Pashtun ties, its alliance with the US during the Soviet occupation and its regional ambitions. Pakistan’s support of, at first, the destructive mujahideen leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and then the Taliban (and an alliance between this militia and al Qaeda), which brought the Taliban money and Arab fighters as a mechanism of control in Afghanistan, triggered unanticipated disasters. 234 Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 20. The role of ‘spoilers’ has been well documented in war termination literature. Every peace process creates losers along with winners, and ‘spoilers’ often derail (or resist) co-operative measures/peace. Examining the Afghan civil war, various scholars have focused on Pakistan’s role as ‘spoiler’ – financier and supporter of, even providing sanctuary to various forces, including the Taliban – as a deliberate means to keep Afghanistan weak. 235 136 Under Pakistan’s patronage, Afghanistan became a hub for religious and political extremism. Pakistan’s policy objective in Afghanistan – a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul which would sway to Pakistan’s wishes; the so-called ‘creeping invasion’ of Afghanistan – was designed to keep the Afghan state necessarily weak. A weak state, it was assumed, governed not by a legitimate sovereign, but rather by warlords and militias, would not be able to challenge and unsettle Pakistan’s long-term objectives. In no small due to Pakistan’s interventionist policy, then, Afghan institutions have failed to impose their writ. Where public security and the maintenance of law and order should have been the preserve of the Afghan police and army – both institutions of the sovereign state – militias, warlords and local hegemons have usurped the role and act as security providers with distributive and patronage powers. These actors benefit from their dealings with Pakistan and Islamist organizations, facilitating in the process extremist incursion into Afghan territory and society. The long years of conflict and anarchy (beginning with the mujahideen-led civil war of 1992 and continuing through long after the Taliban assumed control of Kabul) led not only to the unraveling of the power structure and national framework, but also the fragmentation of power and the emergence of several (and various) local power holders and their manipulation of micro-societies for their own interests. The state of affairs did not change following the US invasion of 2001. The invasion saw Taliban power crumble and opened the space for various leaders and micro-societies to become re-assertive in post-Taliban Afghanistan. In the absence of a credible and powerful central authority, the US found it expedient to support some of the old and new hegemons with money and arms in order to achieve its goals. 137 Analyzing the roots of the present insurgency, James Dobbins argues that it does not arise from a profound disaffection among large elements of the Afghan population with the ineffectiveness (or composition) of the central government. Instead, the Taliban insurgency is organized, funded, trained and directed from Pakistan. Intelligence reports indicate that the Taliban’s ability to use Pakistan as a sanctuary (safe-haven) has been critical to its resurgence and success – contributing directly to the weakening efficiency and authority of Afghan institutions and thereby conflict persistence. The Taliban regularly ships arms, ammunition and supplies into Afghanistan from Pakistan. Most suicide bombers come from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. In short Dobbins argues it is nearly impossible to suppress an insurgency which enjoys external support and neighboring sanctuary.236 Echoing Dobbins, William Maley argues that conflict persistence cannot be explained away as a local reaction against the ineffectiveness of the government in Kabul alone, or as evidence that the US and its allies have outstayed their welcome. He offers two alternate – opportunity oriented237 – explanations: First, according to Maley, a more plausible account of conflict persistence is largely transnational in character, a combined product of Pakistan’s alarm at the influence in the Afghan government of nationalist Pashtuns, and the need for ‘strategic depth’ vis-à-vis India. Pakistan fears nationalist Pashtuns may revive the old ‘Pashtunistan’ debate which plagued inter-state relations in the 1960s and ‘70s. These nationalists envisaged ‘Pashtunistan’ to be borne from Pashtun-inhabited territories in both Afghanistan and 236 James Dobbins, “Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War,” Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, 30 January 2007, pp. 5-6, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT271.pdf, accessed 16.01.2010. 237 That is, the perceived benefits of spoiling. 138 Pakistan. Thus, for Maley, driven by territorial and strategic insecurities, Pakistan seeks to dominate a compliant Afghanistan governed by a friendly regime. Toward such end, having assessed the costs and benefits of an opportunity to spoil, Pakistan has consistently supported Taliban efforts.238 Second, Maley argues Pakistan has a vested interest in the continuation of the War on Terror (vis-à-vis Taliban resurgence), rather than its concluding with the capture of Osama Bin Laden.239 He explains, without such a factor at play, the US is likely to give increasing weight to its relationship with India, a threshold great power with much more to offer the US in terms of trade and the supply of human capital. A pro-Pakistan solution to the Kashmir issue may hinge on US support to arch-enemy India. In addition, a favorable outcome for the US may result in a significant drop in (much required) economic and military aid. This explains why during President Musharraf’s reign, Pakistan’s attempts to control indigenous radical groups with strong connections to the Afghan Taliban had been sporadic at best; as a result, the re-emergence of the Taliban – the so-called ‘neo-Taliban’ – went largely unchecked.240 Undoubtedly, Pakistan’s role has been extremely important in the birth of the Taliban; it was one of only three countries that had recognized the Taliban government in 1996. Pakistan believed that Afghanistan would be useful in a war with India and should therefore ensure that a pro-Pakistan government ruled Afghanistan.241 This tragic fixation on Afghanistan and India induced the Pakistani military to gridlock policy into seeking 238 Maley’s argument echoes Stephen John Stedman’s analysis of spoilers’ beliefs that peace is contrary to their interests. William Maley, Rescuing Afghanistan, p. 61. 239 Ibid, Rescuing Afghanistan, p. 106. 240 Ibid, Rescuing Afghanistan, p. 61; Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan,” Orbis, Vol. 51, Iss. 1, 2007, pp. 71-89. 241 Peter Tomsen, “Geopolitics of an Afghan Settlement,” Perceptions, Vol. 5, Iss. 4, February 2001. 139 questionable goals. Pakistan’s intelligence agency – the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been accused of collaborating with, supporting, and financing Taliban militants in Afghanistan. A 2007 secret report compiled by the US, NATO and Afghan intelligence services states: ISI operatives reportedly pay a significant number of Taliban living/operating in both Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight…. A large number of those fighting are doing so under duress as a result of pressure from ISI. The insurgency cannot survive without its sanctuary in Pakistan, which provides freedom of movement, safe havens, logistic and training facilities, a base for recruitment, communications for command and control, and a secure environment for collaboration with foreign extremist groups.242 ! * ) + If foreign interventions and a turbulent regional environment have weakened the Afghan state, the international community’s grand state-building project – via the Bonn Agreement of 2001 – has achieved little different. Several of Bonn’s provisions relating to institutions and mechanisms – the establishment of an interim administration, a transitional government and eventual elections, with its commitment to principles of constitutionalism, centrally controlled institution-building, an independent judiciary, observation of human rights and democratization – whereby a legitimate political order could be created, suffered from two major shortcomings: a) despite the initial euphoria, the above concepts were largely 242 “Insurgency and Terrorism in Afghanistan: Who is Fighting and Why?” Special Security Initiative of the Policy Action Group, June 2006, quoted in Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos (New York: Viking Penguin Group, 2008), p. 270. 140 alien to Afghan socio-political orders, and added to the widespread perception of yet another foreign imposition; and b) the statebuilding project did not enjoy a strong mandate, witnessing instead precarious power compromises and accommodations with local hegemons, often at the expense of excluded factions. With regard to the first shortcoming, one of the main differences between the Bonn enterprise and earlier attempts by Afghan rulers to forge a strong state is that the earlier reforms were undertaken as endogenous initiatives and the policy process largely remained under national control. Indeed, the main rationale for ‘modernization’ was to selectively imitate the West in order to ward off threats of imperialism. Nationalism was the ideological driving force behind the import of ‘modern’ institutions designed to strengthen the state and the economy, as well as regulating public life.243 Ironically, then, the new Afghan state has not able to acquire credible legitimacy because many sections of society – particularly Pashtuns – considered Bonn’s concepts to be a foreign imposition and viewed the provisions therein with suspicion, fearful that their timehonored ways of organization, communication, and state-society relations will be supplanted. Constitutional democracy (with a Presidential system of rule), for instance, was not wrested by the people of Afghanistan from the state; it was given to them by the political choice of a foreign intellectual elite. The Constituent Assembly – with the blessing of the international community – itself was a remarkably unrepresentative body, with no organized representation of Afghanistan’s minority (Hazara, Shia) or major (Pashtun) groups; warlords and people suspected of war crimes were elected under dubious circumstances, critically striking a blow to the psyche (and patience) of many 243 Astri Suhrke, “The Limits of Statebuilding: The Role of International Assistance in Afghanistan,” paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, San Diego, 21-24 March 2006, p. 3, available at http://www.svet.lu.se/conference/papers/suhrke.pdf, accessed 13. 04. 2011. 141 ordinary citizens seeking justice and a break from their violent past. In addition, the presence of foreign troops leading the fight against the Pashtun-dominated Taliban insurgency did not help ease such suspicions; modernizing the state, yet again, will come to nothing if Afghanistan is perceived by sections of society to remain subservient to Western powers. While the Agreement attempted to underline the importance of indigenous mechanisms of legitimation (hence calling for the convening of a loya jirga which, it was hoped, would legitimize the creation of a transitional administration), it failed to fully appreciate Afghan history, the nature of Afghanistan’s mosaic and fragmented society, and particularly the tensions in relationships between: a) the idea of a ‘common society’ (marked by the increasing acceptance of key norms and institutions) and many ‘microsocieties’ (defined by the persistence of norms and institutions particular to a microsociety);244 and b) the authority of a central sovereign actor as opposed to the authority of local hegemons, such as warlords, or elected leaders of particular qawms. Whether the political process outlined at Bonn had any real meaning for the majority of Afghans was never asked. It was simply assumed that the loya jirga process would do the trick, and that its approval of a constitution would give the government legitimacy. In fact, when the ‘Emergency Loya Jirga’ was assembled in 2002 to ratify the decisions made at Bonn, the international community and Karzai maintained that this was the way Afghans had historically selected their leaders and set policy. This assertion was an excellent example of an “invented tradition” – one that was believed to be deeply rooted in time but in fact was of recent origin or altered in a way that changed its original 244 Alternatively, this dichotomy can be understood as the centralization versus federal autonomy debate. 142 purpose.245 There were no loya jirgas held in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries either to select a ruler or set policy. Furthermore, the international community neglected the fact that decades of war had made Afghan provinces more autonomous and less likely to take orders from Kabul that they disagreed with. While modernists and supporters of a centralized political system countered that any devolution of power away from Kabul would pave the way for the country’s future dissolution, many favored a federal system. The international community, with their own objectives and in their haste, was strongly supportive of the former and adamantly opposed devolving power to the regional or provincial level. For all their talk of inclusivity and consultation, representatives of the international community in Afghanistan were happier working with a centralized bureaucracy than they were with regional power structures. Thus, the appointment of governors, the right to taxation, the provision of government services, all remained monopolies of the central government. And while Bonn and the international community focused on process, Afghans wrestled with a more basic question about whether the new government could provide the necessary level of law and order to be considered a state. With regard to the second shortcoming, many local power holders, who draw on various kinds of micro-societal support and legitimacy, reject the state’s distributive functions and are in fact capable of acting independently or in defiance of the centre. Little has been achieved in relation to integrating local hegemons into some kind of national frame. During the Soviet occupation, the emergence of militias guaranteed local commanders and leaders a seat at decision-making tables. These same leaders – at Bonn 245 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, pp. 294-295. 143 – entered into negotiations to create a new Afghan state so firmly entrenched at the local level that they no longer feared being displaced by a restored central government.246 From Kabul’s (and the international community’s) perspective, these leaders were oppressive warlords who needed to be removed from power. But from a local perspective, particularly in the non-Pashtun regions of the country, commanders had their own political bases among their co-ethnics, who were willing to overlook their excesses because they provided them security and livelihoods. 247 The existence of these armed militias led by men how expected to have a future in a new government complicated any process of statebuilding, particularly one that saw a highly centralized government as its goal. The political milieu forced Karzai to compromise with such leaders. A corollary outcome of such compromise was that Pashtuns, who had historically enjoyed a monopolistic control of the Afghan state, were forced into becoming an actor, but not the dominant actor – the Pashtuns had poorer representation than they would have normally expected, not least because of their links to the Taliban – at least for the time being. The conclusions of a recent OECD study are revealing; it suggests the absence of key warring factions, not least the Pashtun Taliban, made the Bonn conference (and subsequent agreement) a “winner’s conference.” 248 While the Pashtuns initially grudgingly accepted the reality that Bonn was unlikely to restore their dominance of government institutions that was the hallmark of the status quo ante, it alienated a key constituency and laid the seeds of future discontent. 246 Ibid, p. 279. The Pashtun regions were more fragmented, but gradually they too came to see their own militia leaders in similarly favorable light. 248 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Statebuilding in Fragile Situations – How Can Donors ‘Do No Harm’ and Maximise Their Positive Impact?” (London: 2010), p. 3, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/55/45582618.pdf, accessed 06.11.2010. The conference had also excluded a range of smaller organizations and political movements that had emerged underground or in the diaspora during the Taliban era. 247 144 Finally, today, as in previous modernization initiatives in Afghanistan in the twentieth century, bureaucrats and state officials are drawn almost exclusively from the educated classes and especially from the urban areas. Unlike their predecessors, however, the present modernizers have collectively spent long periods in exile brought on by the general upheavals of the past twenty five years. Most of the high-level government officials have higher education and work experience from modern industrialized countries, primarily in Europe and North America. This applies to political appointees in the government administration and their advisors as well as high-level civil servants recruited under the Preferential Salary System, established to attract skilled Afghans to build a merit-based cadre of civil servants at the head of the state bureaucracy.249 The modernizers in the transitional administration formed in December 2001 initially had to share political space with military and religious leaders who with Western and Arab assistance had built their political base during the war against the communists – a diverse group sometimes collectively referred to as the jihadis. Over time, however, the modernizers have gradually increased their representation in the cabinet and their hold on the state apparatus. The sociological difference between the modernizers and much of the rest of the population, therefore, is vast. Capacity-building has been largely mismanaged. Whereas the role of outsiders should be to empower the Afghans themselves to build the capacity for long-term change and development, foreign assistance – whether in the form of knowhow and managerial skills or technical and industrial development – is often perceived by 249 Astri Suhrke, “The Limits of Statebuilding: The Role of International Assistance in Afghanistan,” p. 8. 145 non-urban Afghans as an insult, making them feel inferior and culturally irrelevant.250 Political stability has always been conditional upon the establishment of a government with a widespread writ, the generation of nationwide security and reconstruction. However, the Karzai Government has remained weak, in no small part due to the widespread societal view of it being imposed, elitist and a puppet regime. 250 Simon Chesterman, “Walking Softly in Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-building,” Survival, Vol. 44, Iss. 3, Autumn 2002, pp. 37-45. 146 ,- ! ! #$ " %&&' () ") * " + ) "the state’s jurisdiction has been poised against tribal autonomy, , making it exceedingly difficult for the former to achieve social control. $ " " " " " " " - , + " ) 147 " ! , " " / . / ! / 148 ! ! After almost ten years and billions of wasted dollars the Afghan government and international Coalition risk failure in Afghanistan. The population is disaffected with the corruption of the Karzai regime and angered by mounting civilian casualties. The vast majority of Afghans seek safety, sovereignty, and, although widely overlooked, strong bargaining chips through which to enter (if not topple) the Afghan government. On top, Taliban activity has effectively spread to over 80 percent of the country, and insurgent recruitment remains alarmingly high. With many returning to the fold of the Taliban, the outlook for Afghanistan is dire. Within such milieu, this project has attempted to provide an argument that is sufficiently capable of explaining conflict persistence, the seemingly unlikely progress (and appeal) of the Taliban insurgency, and the myriad failures of the Afghan government in securing a stable, conflict-free nation. These are the challenges that this study has attempted to unpack. 149 While most observers cite the lack of meaningful reconciliation efforts, duplicitous actions of ‘spoiler’ actors, and/or the presence of foreign troops to fuel the Taliban insurgency, this thesis has argued that Afghanistan’s endemic institutional weaknesses have allowed the Taliban insurgency to replenish its rank-and-file, spread geographically, and contest for political legitimacy, thereby effectively continuing the civil war. How has the Taliban achieved protraction? Strictly speaking, it is not that the Taliban achieved protraction by their own doing, but that the state’s weaknesses allowed them to disrupt (and deprive) state authority and capacity. This project has argued that the Taliban have been successful in fending off enemy military (and non-military) advances because it has been able to exploit the myriad shortcomings and gaps in state-society relations and state- and government-function. Post-2001 Afghanistan has had to contend with existing power holders as well as reluctant subjects; effective penetration of the realm typically reduces the power of the first and increases the demands on the latter in the form of taxes, regulation and conscription. If the demands of change are upfront but the benefits are deferred, and, in addition, unequally divided, the legitimacy of the government and state is undermined. Within this context, chapter II examined the concepts of political legitimacy and societal support. It investigated and articulated the relationship (correlation) between the said concepts and how they determine conflict outcome: suggesting that the failure to secure legitimacy and societal support leads to violent conflict between rival actors, particularly in hotly contested areas where government presence is weakest. 150 For the incumbent, loss of societal support and/or legitimacy leads to noncooperation (with civilians preferring opposition intervention), denial of access to resources (in particular, resources vital to a group’s war-effort), and specifically, the loss of a recruitment base. For this reason, rival parties fight to earn/maintain support of the citizenry (often through the use of coercion, and/or via services provided): the citizenry, as the object of contestation, becomes the endogenous source of conflict persistence. Repeated failures to secure societal support necessitate continued warfare. Next, following an in-depth review of alternative explanations that attempt to offer solutions to the conundrum that is Afghanistan, Chapter III critiques the shortcomings in such analyses, re-iterating in the process the centrality of the ‘weakstate’ and ‘governance’ models in understanding conflict persistence in Afghanistan. The chapter compliments the central thesis of this project by suggesting if and when state strength and capacities are sufficiently improved, the state will be better positioned to determine conflict outcome. Chapter IV – via case-study – traces the causal process (framework) describing how support/legitimacy is earned (or lost) by both the incumbent and rival rebel organization. The chapter reveals why Afghan citizens consider the government presence (vis-à-vis the ANA and ANP) inadequate, inefficient, and ambivalent to their (security and economic) needs. In particular, pitiful progress on reform of the Afghan justice sector – particularly the widely held view of the ANP and Karzai administration as endemically corrupt – has given the Taliban the opportunity to present themselves as a better alternative. As with their spectacular rise to power during the early 1990s, the Taliban have been able to represent themselves as providers of security, law and order and their 151 politicized version of Sharia as Islamic law. This has enabled them to penetrate vast areas of the country. Societal support and political legitimacy, then, are balanced on a knife’s edge – with both the government and insurgent vying for its acquisition. Finally, Chapter V concludes the investigation by situating the state-weakness thesis and empirical chapter within the broader historical context of the country’s sociopolitical landscape. It shows that the Afghan state’s jurisdiction has historically been contested by a) non-state actors – tribes, clans, organizations, etc. – with other sets of rules, which often left the state at the periphery of social and political life, and b) foreign interveners. Together, they have challenged the state’s authority and sovereignty, all the while making it exceedingly difficult to achieve societal control and/or support. The resulting legitimacy (indeed governance) deficit is further compounded by the state’s historical unwillingness to institutionalize tribal (and other forms of societal) coalitions and forge dynamic relations between them and the central core. When analyzed alongside the contemporary crisis (vis-à-vis the theoretical and empirical chapters), it is immediate and clear to the observer that not much has changed since the early decades of the nineteenth century. 152 6.3: Significance of Study The present study marks a first step in examining not just the driver(s) of conflict persistence in Afghanistan, but broadly, theories of civil war termination. Herein, the ‘weak state’ model articulated provides a platform (a reference point, so to speak) from which to further examine concepts which may be driving the war/insurgency – ‘legitimacy (deficits)’ and ‘societal support’ being but only two such concepts explored in this project. Particularly insightful is the narrative describing how rebel actors rob the state of its legitimacy by mirroring the institutions-of-state; such a narrative dovetails well into the emerging literature on “Twilight Institutions” which conceives of political authority as not being the sole preserve of the state.251 Next, using a sole case study has not only allowed a novice researcher to argue – in an in-depth manner – a cause of conflict persistence, but has also prevented me from undertaking erroneously conceived comparative studies that attempt to test the validity of a particular theory/model. By first understanding the role of governance (vis-à-vis shortcomings in state capacity) in Afghanistan, I am better able to appreciate state-centric theories explaining conflict persistence and/or termination. 251 See Christian Lund (ed.) Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007). 153 6.4: Policy Recommendations The fundamental challenge in Afghanistan is to build an effective state structure. Insurgency, governance problems, economic weakness, corruption, the drug trades are all symptoms of underlying state weakness, including the dearth in support of government strategy/objectives. Any effective counterinsurgent strategy, then, must seek to first build the Afghan state. Simultaneously, efforts should be aimed at keeping insurgents, warlords, infiltrators and other security threats from overwhelming the state while it is being built. The various institutional mechanisms of coercion and restraint, then, are crucial for conflict avoidance/termination. The ultimate goal here is to build a state capable of managing its own problems. Within this context, the role and function of legitimacy, earned via enjoying local support, is crucial to any counter-insurgency or governance-focused solution. Building the political legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government (and international presence – particularly the US) in the eyes of the Afghan people is fundamental. To explain: as the Afghan institutions (and foreign military presence) gains legitimacy, it will deprive the insurgency of its own legitimizing logic, in fact delegitimizing the Taliban war-effort. Deprived of its local base of support – and thereby unable to recruit combatants – the insurgency is bound to fail with the passage of time. Plainly, a longterm counter-insurgency effort must earn the approval, and legitimacy, of the Afghan people. This requires, first and foremost, genuine improvements in local institutions and governance, reducing corruption and abuse, and putting in place mechanisms that uphold the interests of local populations and give them a well-founded feeling of security. Such a 154 political strategy is designed to undermine support for insurgents, win over the sympathizers to the government side, and co-opt local community leaders to ally themselves with the government. Reforms targeting state/government effectiveness are therefore essential to end the instability and conflict. Population-centric security is critical. The Afghan security agencies (and its international allies) must focus on providing security to the Afghan population, 24 hours a day. This, rather than destroying the enemy, is the central task in counter-insurgency. It demands the continuous presence of security forces that protect population centres, local alliances and partnerships with community leaders, the creation of community-based security through local councils, neighborhood watches and guard forces, and small-unit ground forces that operate in tandem with local security forces, developing pervasive situational awareness, quick response times, and unpredictable operating patterns that keep the insurgents off balance. Thus, if government forces and allies can marginalize the insurgents politically, root out insurgent infrastructure, and make local communities selfdefending, then they can inoculate the Afghan population against the Taliban and prevent their return. The contrary, enemy-centric approach simply wastes lives, time, and firepower on the pursuit of an adversary who has no fixed installations to hold and can therefore melt away to fight another day. Effective, legitimate indigenous security forces are an important aspect of this approach. First and foremost, as widely acknowledged, effective counter-insurgency requires indigenous security forces who are legitimate in local eyes, operate humanely under the rule of law, and effectively protect local communities against insurgents. Building such forces takes vastly more time and resources than is usually appreciated. 155 While they are being built, the Coalition must be willing to continue engaging the Taliban in direct combat. Toward such end, however, they must strive to minimize collateral non-combatant casualties, ensure flexible responses to complex ground situations, and allow rapid political and economic follow-up after combat action. 156 Ali, Tariq. “Afghanistan: Mirage of the Good War.” New Left Review. Volume 50. March/April 2008. Anderson, Christopher and Yuliya Tverdova. “Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes toward Government in Contemporary Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science. Volume 47. Issue 1. 2003. Barakat, Sultan and Steven Zyck. “Afghanistan’s Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Volume 33. Issue 3. 2010. Bhatia, Michael. “The Future of the Mujahideen: legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn Afghanistan.” International Peacekeeping. Volume 14. Issue 1. 2007. Byman, Daniel. “Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism.” International Security. Volume 31. Issue 2. 2006. Chesterman, Simon. “Walking Softly in Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-building.” Survival. Volume 44. Issue 3. Autumn 2002. Christia, Fotini and Michael Semple. “Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan.” Foreign Affairs. Volume 88. Issue 4. July/August 2009. Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers.’ Volume 56. Issue 4. 2004. Edelstein, David. “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail.” International Security. Volume 29. Issue 1. Summer 2004. Fearon, James and David Laitin. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American Political Science Review. Volume 97. Issue 1. 2003. 157 Fearon, James. “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?” Journal of Peace Research. Volume 41. Issue 3. 2004. Freeman, Christopher. “Security, Governance and Statebuilding in Afghanistan.” International Peacekeeping. Volume 14. Issue 1. 2007. Goodwin, Jeffrey and Theda Skocpol. “Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World.” Politics and Society. Volume 17. Issue 4. 1989. Jalali, Ali. “Winning in Afghanistan.” Parameters. Volume 39. Issue 1. 2009. Johnson, Thomas and Chris Mason. “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan.” Orbis. Volume 51. Issue 1. 2007. “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad.” International Security. Volume 32. Issue 4. Spring 2008. Kilcullen, David. “Countering Global Insurgency.” Journal of Strategic Studies. Volume 28. Issue 4. August 2005. La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. “The Quality of Government.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. Volume 15. Issue 1. 1999. Liebl, Vern. “Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam and Taliban.” Small Wars & Insurgencies. Volume 18. Issue 3. 2007. Maley, William. “Political Legitimation in Contemporary Afghanistan.” Asian Survey. Volume 27. Issue 6. 1987. -------------------. “Afghanistan: An Historical and Geographical Appraisal.” International Review of the Red Cross. Volume 92. Issue 880. December 2010. 158 Newell, Richard. The Politics of Afghanistan. Ithaca. Cornell University Press. 1972. Putnam, Robert. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization. Volume 42. Issue 3. Summer 1998. Roberts, Adam. “Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan.” Survival. Volume 51. Issue 1. 2009. Rothstein, Bo and Jan Teorell. “What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions.” Governance. Volume 21. Issue 2. 2008 Rubin, Barnett and Humayun Hamidzada. “From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of State-Building in Afghanistan.” International Peacekeeping. Volume 14. Issue 1. 2007. Rubin, Barnett. “Constructing Sovereignty for Security.” Survival. Volume 47. Issue 4. 2005. Sambanis, Nicholas. “Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War.” Perspectives on Politics. Volume 2. Issue 2. 2004. Skinner, Marcus. “Counterinsurgency and State Building: An Assessment of the Role of the Afghan National Police.” Democracy and Security. Volume 4. Issue 3. 2008. Stedman, Stephen John. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.” International Security. Volume 22. Issue 5. 1997. Suhrke, Astri. “A contradictory Mission: NATO from stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan.” International Peacekeeping. Volume 15. Issue 2. 2008. Svensson, Isak. “Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace.” Journal of Peace Research. Volume 44. 2007. Tomsen, Peter. “Geopolitics of an Afghan Settlement.” Perceptions. Volume 5. Issue 4. February 2001. 159 Walter, Barbara F. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” International Organization. Volume 51. Issue 3. 1997. Anderson, Jon. “Of Khans and Khels: Dialectics of Pakhtun Tribalism.” In Richard Tapper. Ed. The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan. New York. St. Martin’s Press. 1983. Azar, Edward. “Protracted International Conflict: Ten propositions.” In Harvey Starr. Ed. The Understanding and Management of Global Violence: New Approaches to Theory and Research on Protracted Conflict. New York. St. Martin’s Press. 1999. Barakat, Sultan. Ed. Reconstructing War-Torn Societies: Afghanistan. London. Palgrave. 2004. Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 2010. Bayley, David H. Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad. New York. Oxford University Press. 2005. Beetham, David. The Legitimation of Power. London. Macmillan. 1991. Bensman, Joseph. “Max Weber’s Concept of Legitimacy: An Evaluation.” In Arnold and Ronald Glassman. Eds. Conflict and Control: Challenge to Legitimacy of Modern Governments. London. Sage. 1979. Brovkin, Vladimir. Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War. Princeton. Princeton University Press.1994. Byman, Daniel. Going to War with the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism. Carlisle. US Army War College. 2005. 160 Chayes, Sarah. The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban. New York. Penguin Press. 2006. Coghlan, Tom. “The Taliban in Helmand: An Oral History.” In Antonio Giustozzi. Ed. Decoding the New Taliban. New York. Columbia University Press. 2009. Collins, Eamon and Mick McGovern. Killing Rage. New York. Granta Books. 1999. Creveld, Martin van. The Transformation of War. New York. Free Press. 1991. Darby, John and Roger MacGinty. Eds. Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes. New York. Palgrave Macmillan. 2003. Dobbins, James et al. America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq. Santa Monica. RAND. 2003. Dorronsoro, Gilles. Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present. New York. Columbia University Press. 2005. Elias, Mohammad Osman Tariq. “The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul: Logar and Wardak.” In Antonio Giustozzi. Ed. Decoding the New Taliban. New York. Columbia University Press. 2009. st Fukayama, Francis. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21 Century. Ithaca. Cornell University Press. 2004. Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. St. Petersburg. Hailer Publishing. 2005. Giustozzi, Antonio. Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop. New York. Columbia University Press. 2008. 161 -----------------------. Ed. Decoding the New Taliban. New York. Columbia University Press. 2009. Goicaud, Jean-Marc. Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 2002. Hager, Rob. “State, Tribe and Empire in Afghan Inter-Polity Relations.” In Richard Tapper. Ed. The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan. New York. St. Martin’s Press. 1983. Herbst, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 2000. Hironaka, Ann. Neverending Wars: The international Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War. Cambridge. Harvard University Press. 2005. Hoffe, Otfried. Political Justice: Foundations for a Critical Philosophy of Law and the State. Translated by Jeffrey C. Cohen. Cambridge. UK. Polity Press. 1995. Hoffman, Bruce. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. Santa Monica. RAND Corporation. 2004. Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven. Yale University Press. 1968. Huther, Jeff and Anwar Shah. “A Simple Measure of Good Governance.” In Anwar Shah Ed. Public Services Delivery. Washington, DC. The World Bank. 2005. Jackson, Karl D. Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian political Behavior. Berkeley. University of California Press. 1980. Jackson, Robert. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. Cambridge. CUP. 1990. 162 Jalali, Ali. “The Legacy of War and the Challenge of Peacebuilding.” In Robert Rotberg. Ed. Building a New Afghanistan. Washington DC. Brookings Institution Press. 2007. Johnson, Chris and Jolyon Leslie. Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace. London. Zed Books. 2008. Jones, Seth G. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Santa Monica. RAND Corporation. 2008. Kalyvas, Stathis. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York. Cambridge University Press. 2006. Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline. The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland. London. Longman. 1997. Kitson, Frank. Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping. London. Faber and Faber. 1971. Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerilla. London: Oxford University Press. 2009. --------------------. “Taliban and Counter-Insurgency in Kunar.” In Antonio Giustozzi. Ed. Decoding the New Taliban. New York. Columbia University Press. 2009. Lichbach, Mark. The Rebel’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press. 1995. Lundestad, Geir. “The Fall of Empires: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy.” In Geir Lundestad. Ed. The Fall of the Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy. Oslo. Scandinavian University Press. 1994. Lund, Christian. Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa. Oxford. Blackwell Publishers. 2007. Maley, William. Rescuing Afghanistan. Sydney. University of New South Wales Press. 2006. 163 Marsden, Peter. Afghanistan: Aid, Armies and Empire. London. I.B. Tauris. 2009. Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 1988. Moyar, Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq. New Haven. Yale University Press. 2009. Nathan, Joanna. “Reading the Taliban.” In Antonio Giustozzi. Ed. Decoding the New Taliban. New York. Columbia University Press. 2009. Noelle, Christine. State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan. Richmond. Curzon Press. 1997. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Allied Joint Operations. Allied Joint Publication 3, Ratification Draft 1. Brussels. NATO. 2000. Offices of Inspector General of the Departments of State and Defense. Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness. Washington, DC. Offices of Inspector General of the Departments of State and Defense. 2006. Ottaway, Marina. “Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States.” In Jennifer Milliken. Ed. State Failure and Reconstruction. London. Blackwell. 2003. Paris, Roland. At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict. New York. Cambridge University Press. 2004. Petersen, Roger D. Resistance and Rebellion: Lesson from Eastern Europe. New York. Cambridge University Press. 2001. Pillar, Paul. Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 1983. 164 Przeworski, Adam, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin. “Introduction” and “Elections and Representation.” In Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin. Eds. Democracy, Accountability and Representation. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1999. Race, Jeffrey. War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province. Berkeley. University of California Press. 1973. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos. New York. Viking Penguin Group. 2008. ------------------. Taliban: Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven. Yale University Press. 2001. Regan, Patrick. Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict. Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press. 2000. Rubin, Barnett. The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State. New Haven. Yale University Press. 1995. ------------------. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. New Haven. Yale University Press. 2002. Ruttig, Thomas. “Loya Paktia’s Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity.” In Antonio Giustozzi. Ed. Decoding the New Taliban. New York. Columbia University Press. 2009. Saikal, Amin. “Afghanistan’s Weak State and Strong Society.” In Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur. Eds. Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance. Tokyo. United Nations University Press. 2005. Shah, Anwar. “Overview.” In Anwar Shah. Ed. Public Services Delivery. Washington, DC. The World Bank. 2005. 165 Sinno, Abdulkader H. Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond. Ithaca. Cornell University Press. 2008. Stedman, Stephen John. “Peace Processes and the Challenges of Violence.” In John Darby and Roger MacGinty. Eds. Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes. New York. Palgrave Macmillan. 2003. Tapper, Richard. “Introduction.” In Richard Tapper. Ed. The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan. New York. St. Martin’s Press. 1983. Their, Alexander and Jarat Chopra. “The Road Ahead: Political and Institutional Reconstruction in Afghanistan.” In Sultan Barakat. Ed. Reconstructing War-Torn Societies: Afghanistan. London. Palgrave. 2004. Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1990. Cambridge. Basil Blackwell. 1997. Trives, Sebastien. “Roots of the Insurgency in the Southeast.” In Antonio Giustozzi. Ed. Decoding the New Taliban. New York. Columbia University Press. 2009. United States Department of the Army and United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Counterinsurgency 3-24. Washington DC. Headquarters, Department of the Army. 2006. Walter, Barbara F. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 2002. Weber, Max. “Legitimacy, Politics and the State.” In William Connolly. Ed. Legitimacy and the State. Oxford. Blackwell. 1984. Weinstein, Jeremy J. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York. Cambridge University Press. 2007. 166 Wilensky, Robert. Military Medicine to Win Hearts and Minds: Aid to Civilians in the Vietnam War. Lubbock. Texas Tech University Press. 2004. Zahar, Marie-Joelle. “Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes.” In John Darby and Roger MacGinty. Eds. Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes. New York. Palgrave Macmillan. 2003. Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York. W.W. Norton & Company. 2003. Zartman, William. “Ripeness Revisited.” In Paul Stern and Daniel Druckman Eds. International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War. Washington, DC. National Academy of Sciences. 2000. ----------------------. Collapsed States: The Disintegration and restoration of Legitimate Authority. Boulder. Lynne Reinner Publishers. 1995. ABC News, BBC and ARD Poll, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Interntional/PollVault/story?id=1363276. 2007. Accessed 12.04.2010. ABC News, BBC and ARD Poll. “Afghanistan – Where Things Stand.” 11 January 2010. available at http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1099a1Afghanistan-WhereThingsStand.pdf. Accessed 30.03.2010. Abdali, Shaida and Ashraf Haidari. “Winning the Elusive Peace in Afghanistan.” Ariana Afghan Television. Available at http://www.eariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allArticles/EE3920DABCAAD1BE872576030 0697F73?OpenDocument. Accessed 30.03.2010. 167 “Agreement of Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions.” 5 December 2001. Available at http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/Bonn-agreement.pdf. Accessed 02.02.2009. Barnett, Randy. “Constitutional Legitimacy.” Boston University School of Law Working Paper 01-19. November 2001. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=291145. Accessed 02.02.2010. Bates, Robert. “Probing the Sources of Political Order.” CID Working Paper 110. Harvard University. 2004. Available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centersprograms/centers/cid/publications/faculty/wp/110.pdf. Accessed 06.10.2009. Bose, Srinjoy. “Code of Conduct: Campaign of Misinformation?” The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Article No. 2947. New Delhi. 17 August 2009. Available at http://www.ipcs.org/article/south-asia/code-of-conduct-campaign-of-misinformation2947.html. Bizan, Nematullah. “Afghanistan’s Uncertain Road to Stability.” Asian Currents. October 2010. Available at http://asaa.asn.au/publications/ac/2010/asian-currents-10-10.pdf. Accessed 10.10.2010. British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group. “Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds: Exploring Afghan Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations.” BAAG Monthly Report. June 2007. Available at http://www.baag.org.uk/publications/category/2007. Accessed 12.04.2010. Carter, Stephen and Kate Clark. “No Shortcut to Stability: Justice, Politics and Insurgency in Afghanistan.” Chatam House. December 2010. Available at http://chathamhouse.org.uk/files/18074_1210pr_afghanjustice.pdf. Accessed 09.01.2011. Chesterman, Simon. “Tiptoeing through Afghanistan: The Future of UN State-Building,” International Peace Academy, 14 September 2002, pp. 3-6, available at http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/afghanistan0902.pdf, accessed 17.03.2009. 168 Clarke, Alan. “Tribal Identity and Conflicts with Tribes.” U.S. Army War College. Unpublished Masters Dissertation. 2008. Available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA478534. Accessed 20.4.2010. Coll, Steve. “Baradar: Why Now?” New Yorker. Available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2010/02/baradar-why-now.html. Accessed 02.03.2009. Commentary by George Varughese. “Trends in Afghan Public Opinion.” The Asia Foundation. Available at http://asiafoundation.org/media/view/video/RFwfqwj_zPM/trends-in-afghan-publicopinion. Accessed 06.09.2009. Cordesman, Anthony H. The Afghan–Pakistan War: A Status Report, Center for Strategic & International Studies. December 2007. Available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081021_afghanthreat.pdf. Accessed 12.04.2010. Davis, Daniel L. “The Afghan Mistake: Why Sending More Troops Won’t Work.” Armed Forces Journal. 12 November 2009. Available at http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/04/3939847/. Accessed 24.11.2009. Dobbins, James. “Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War.” Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee. 30 January 2007. Available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT271.pdf. Accessed 16.01.2010. Dorronsoro, Gilles. “Afghanistan: Searching for political Agreement.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. May 2010. Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/searching_polit_agreement.pdf. Accessed 28.05.2010. -------------------------. “Kabul at War (1992-1996): State, Ethnicity and Social Classes.” South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal. http://samaj.revues.org/document212.html. Accessed 04.04.2010. 169 2007. Available at Edwards, Lucy Morgan. “The West Needs to Open Itself to the Potential of Tribal Solutions in Resolving the Conflict in Afghanistan.” April 2009. Available at http://www.the-beacon.info/afghan-presidential-election.html. Accessed 02.04.2010. European Union, Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and GTZ International Services. “Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan (PAL).” January 2009. Available at http://www.palinfo.org/. Accessed 27.04.2010. Gall, Carlotta and Taimoor Shah. “Civilian Deaths Imperil Support for Afghan War.” New York Times. 6 May 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/07/world/asia/07afghan.html. Accessed 07.05.2009. Ghani, Ashraf, Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnahan. “Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building.” Working Paper 253. Overseas Development Institute. September 2005. Available at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1819.pdf. Accessed 12.01.2010. Giustozzi, Antonio. “The Neo-Taliban: A Year On.” Open Democracy. November 2008. Available at http://opendemocracy.net/article/the-neo-taliban-a-year-on. Accessed 22.04.2010. Goldstone, Jack. “State Capacity: The Dynamics of Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Government Action in Fragile States.” US AID Working Papers on Fragile States No. 2. 2005. Available at http://www.irisprojects.umd.edu/ppc_ideas/FS_Assessment/Secure/progress_pdf/state_ca pacity.pdf. Accessed 17.09.2009. International Crisis Group. “Reforming Afghanistan’s Police.” Asia Report no. 138. August 2007. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/138reforming-afghanistans-police.aspx. Accessed 02.02.2010. -------------------------------. “Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy.” Asia Briefing no. 85. December 2008. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/B085-policing-inafghanistan-still-searching-for-a-strategy.aspx. Accessed 17.09.2009. 170 “International Security Assistance Force and Afghan National Army Strength & Laydown.” NATO Headquarters Media Operations Centre – Afghanistan. 1 February 2010. Available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf. Accessed 07.03.2010. Kirwin, Matthew and Wonbin Cho. “Weak States and political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 111. August 2009. Available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/AfropaperNo111_2.pdf. Accessed 10.03.2010. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. “Statebuilding in Fragile Situations – How Can Donors ‘Do No Harm’ and Maximise Their Positive Impact?” London. 2010. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/55/45582618.pdf. Accessed 06.11.2010 Malikyar, Helena and Barnett Rubin. “The Politics of Center–Periphery Relations in Afghanistan.” Center on International Cooperation. April 2003. Available at http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/oldpdfs/WBCPAfgh.pdf. Accessed 21.09.2009. Mazzetti, Mark and Dexter Filkins. “Secret Joint Raid Captures Taliban’s Top Commander.” New York Times. 15 February 2010. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/world/asia/16intel.html?hp. Accessed 16.02.2010. Mazzetti, Mark and Eric Schmitt. “U.S. Study Is Said to Warn of Crisis in Afghanistan.” New York Times. 8 October 2008. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/world/asia/09afghan.html. Accessed 29.01.2009. “Mullah Baradar: In His Own Words.” Newsweek. 25 July 2009. Available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/208638. Accessed 02.03.2010. Rice, Susan and Stewart Patrick. “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World.” Brookings Institution. 2008. Available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index/02_weak _states_index.pdf.Accessed 11.12.2010. 171 Rubin, Barnett. “Road to Rubin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry.” Center on International Cooperation Report. 7 October 2004. Available at http://www.cic.nyu.edu/pdf/RoadtoRuin.pdf. Accessed 29.03.2010. ------------------. “Still Ours to Lose: Afghanistan on the Brink.” Testimony given to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Washington D.C. 21 September 2006. Available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/11486/still_ours_to_lose.html. Accessed 21.09.2009. Ruttig, Thomas. “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency.” Report of the Afghanistan Analysts Network. July 2009. Available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=114. Accessed 06.08.2009. ------------------. “How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan’s Largest Insurgent Movement between its Tribal Roots and Islamist Ideology.” Afghanistan Analysts Network. Thematic Report 04/2010. April 2010. Available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/20100624TR-HowTribalAretheTaleban-FINAL.pdf. Accessed 02.05.2010. Schmitt, Eric. “Obama Issues Order for More Troops in Afghanistan.” New York Times. 30 November 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/world/asia/01orders.html. Accessed 02.12.2009. Smith, Graeme. “Tribal Animosity Drawing Taliban Recruits.” In “Talking to the Taliban: Globe Special Report.” The Globe and Mail. 24 March 2008. Available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/talkingtothetaliban. Accessed 29.03.2010. Stapleton, Barbara J. “Security and PRTs.” in State, Security and Economy in Afghanistan: Current Challenges, Possible Solutions. Lichtenstein Colloquium Report. Volume III. Available at http://www.princeton.edu/~lisd/publications/afgh2008_lcm3.pdf. Accessed 08.15.2009. Stanekzai, Mohammad Masoom. Thwarting Afghanistan’s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation. Washington, DC. United States Institute of 172 Peace. September 2008. Available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr212.pdf. Accessed 20.09.2009. Suhrke, Astri, Torunn Wimpelmann and Marcia Dawes. “Peace Processes and Statebuilding: Economic and Institutional Provisions of Peace Agreements.” Chr. Michelsen Institute. Report prepared for the World Bank and UNDP. March 2007. Available at http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/we_do/Peace_agreements_Study_Final.pdf. Accessed 22.09.2010. Suhrke, Astri. “The Limits of Statebuilding: The Role of International Assistance in Afghanistan.” Paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting. San Diego. 21-24 March 2006. Available at http://www.svet.lu.se/conference/papers/suhrke.pdf. Accessed 13.04.2011. Swanson, Kate. “The Business of Being the Taliban.” The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Article No. 2932. New Delhi. 7 August 2009. Available at http://www.ipcs.org/article/southasia/the-business-of-being-the-taliban-2932.html. Accessed 09.08.2009. “Taliban Have Expanded Their Influence Across Afghanistan: NATO Official.” Daily Times. 28 December 2009. Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C12%5C28%5Cstory_28-122009_pg7_37. Accessed 13.02.2010. The Asia Foundation. “Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People.” Available at http://asiafoundation.org. Accessed 21.04.2010. Their, Alexander. “Governance and the Rule of Law.” In State, Security and Economy in Afghanistan: Current Challenges, Possible Solutions. Lichtenstein Colloquium Report. Volume III. Available at http://www.princeton.edu/~lisd/publications/afgh2008_lcm3.pdf. Accessed 08.15.2009. The International Council on Security and Development. “Research Findings – Bad News: Struggling to Secure Popular Support in Southern Afghanistan.” Available at 173 http://www.icosgroup.net/modules/reports/afghanistan_relationship_gap/bad_news. Accessed 17.04.2010. The World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper no. 2433. September 2000. Available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/09/30/000094946_000914 05494827/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. Accessed 05.09.2009. ---------------------. Service Delivery and Governance at the Sub-national Level in Afghanistan. July 2007. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/4488131185293547967/44024814-1185293572457/report.pdf. Accessed 12.02.2010. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Available at http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx?/. Accessed 02.02.2009 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009.” September 2009. Available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/cropmonitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_surve y_2009_summary.pdf. Accessed 29.03.2010. United States Agency for International Development. Fragile States Strategy. January 2005. Available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf. Accessed 08.01.2010. United States Government Accountability Office. “Afghanistan Security: US Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation.” GAO-09-280. March 2009. Available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09280.pdf. Accessed 17.09.2009. 174 Waldman, Matt. “The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship Between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents.” Crisis States Discussion Paper no. 18, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard University. June 2010. Available at http://www.crisisstates.com/download/dp/DP%2018.pdf. Accessed 08.07.2010. Wardak, Ali. “Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan.” Unpublished paper. Available at http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Contributions/Projects/Ali- Wardak/Law%20and%20Social%20Change%204.doc. Accessed 09.05.2010. 175 [...]... focuses on the termination of warfare (defined as a period of twelve months without violence), but in reality, this may often be subject to a degree of yo-yoing in and out violent conflict, and war termination is not necessarily the same as war ending in any permanent sense Nevertheless, in this study I define war termination as the process or act of stopping the fighting Scholars addressing this matter... and the US in perpetuating the conflict; ‘co-optation’ (or rather, the lack thereof) of the insurgent organization and its leaders into the state-apparatus: the (im)plausibility of integrating the Taliban into a legitimate and peaceful political process; and finally, the role of ‘foreign occupation’ in 7 Paul Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton: Princeton University... actors offer material and non-material benefits to civilians to induce defection in the hope of shifting societal support and gaining information that may be useful in weakening the opposition.28 27 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p 88 Jeremy J Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge University... can incumbent victory be achieved without it).33 Eamon Collins, a former Irish Republican Army veteran pointed out that the local community in contested Northern Ireland often shielded IRA insurgents – feeding them, hiding them, turning a blind eye to their operations – thus enabling and prolonging the resistance.34 Societal support, therefore, is crucial to maintain ‘control’ In working on resolving... significant in so far as to understand the methods employed by the rival actors in ensuring consent and control Examining the methods (and their shortcomings) generate further insights into the causes of conflict persistence in the contested areas of control According to a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ argument, substantial segments of a population (caught in the midst of a civil war) are intensely opposed to the incumbent... existing literature that attempts to explain conflict persistence in Afghanistan The Chapter introduces the “competing explanations,” and reveals their deficiency – in contrast to my ‘weak-state’/’poor governance’ models – in explaining the cause(s) of conflict persistence; specific weaknesses of the literature are acknowledged, highlighting the significance of the current research project Chapter IV investigates... this definition, planning and executing war termination can cover a lot, from planning before a war starts to the negotiations following a truce Narrowly construed, war termination might be the process of defining when and how to stop the fighting when it becomes evident that war- fighting objectives have been met or, perhaps are no longer achievable 5 If war termination is an ‘event,’ one that comes... Capabilities in the Third World, p 32 30 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (St Petersburg, Fla.: Hailer Publishing, 2005), pp 7-8 21 !" ## $ Societal support is a common goal for all competing actors in an insurgency Winning support and preventing insurgents from gaining support are critical components of any counterinsurgency.31 General Frank Kitson, who participated in several... adopt a definition of war that encompasses armed conflict involving two belligerents (a dyadic relationship) To concentrate on the difficulty of terminating conflict and to avoid ranging too far afield into behavioral concepts of conflict resolution, the definition here encompasses only shooting wars – actions involving combat between organized forces Broadly construed under this definition, planning and... point is elaborated on in Chapter V 23 For instance, the results of the influential 2003 RAND Corporation project on “America’s Role in Nation-Building.” James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003) 13 of the Afghan state and the resulting decline in governance, help best explain conflict persistence, and at remarkably great length Addressing ... Abstract: Explaining Conflict Persistence in Afghanistan This study asks why the civil war in Afghanistan persists Put slightly differently, what is preventing the state/government from achieving... planning and executing war termination can cover a lot, from planning before a war starts to the negotiations following a truce Narrowly construed, war termination might be the process of defining... opponent to quit fighting In terms of grand strategy, war termination is more than concluding hostilities How the war is terminated, when the war is terminated, and why the war is terminated are important