explaining indonesia's participation in maritime security cooperation

Glasgow Theses Service http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ theses@gla.ac.uk Febrica, Senia (2014) Explaining Indonesia's participation in maritime security cooperation. PhD thesis. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/5429/ Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 1 Explaining Indonesia’s Participation in Maritime Security Cooperation Senia Febrica, MSc Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of PhD School of Social and Political Sciences College of Social Sciences University of Glasgow 2014 2 Abstract Indonesia’s cooperation in maritime security initiatives is vitally important because half of the world’s trading goods and oil pass through Indonesian waters including the Straits of Malacca, the Strait of Sunda and the Strait of Lombok. Consequently, Indonesia’s active engagement in maritime cooperation is a matter of some import for the international community. However, Indonesia’s varying participation across maritime cooperation arrangements is puzzling. Indonesia has joined some of these cooperation initiatives and opted out of others despite the presence of United States leadership. This thesis addresses this puzzle by carrying out a comparative analysis of 26 cooperation arrangements using government documents and elite interviews in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and New York. In addition to addressing an empirical puzzle, this thesis also contributes to the theoretical debate on international cooperation. The International Relations literature on cooperation tends to focus on great power bargaining. Whether, why and how middle powers decide to join international initiatives over which they have little influence has been overlooked. The implication of this study suggests that neither the calculation of relative gains as argued by neorealists, the constructivist expectation regarding the importance of shared identity, the neorealist or the neoliberal argument on the role of hegemonic leadership nor the bureaucratic politics approach emphasis on competing government actors’ preferences can explain the variation in Indonesia’s engagement with cooperation initiatives. I argue that Indonesia’s decision to cooperate is formed by the calculation of absolute gains. Indonesia cooperated as long as the benefits of cooperation exceeded the costs. 3 Table of Content Title Page 1 Abstract 2 List of Tables and Figures 6 Acknowledgments 8 Declaration 9 List of Abbreviations 10 Chapter 1. Indonesia’s Puzzling Participation in International Maritime Security Cooperation? 13 1.1 Introduction 13 1.2 Issues and Cases 16 1.3 Literature Review: Limits of the Existing Literature 19 1.4 Analytical Framework 34 1.5 Research Methods 37 1.6 Outline of the Thesis 39 Chapter 2. Indonesia and Maritime Security Threats 43 2.1. Introduction 43 2.2 The Importance of Indonesia in Maritime Security 44 2.3. Maritime Terrorism and Armed Robbery against Ships 48 2.3.1 Maritime Terrorism 48 2.3.1.1. The Trends of Maritime Terrorism 49 2.3.1.2 Responses to Maritime Terrorism Problem 52 2.3.2 Armed Robbery against Ships 60 2.3.2.1 The Trends of Armed Robbery against Ships 61 2.3.2.2 The Responses to Armed Robbery against Ships 68 2.4. Maritime Security Issues in Indonesia’s Archipelagic 78 2.5. Conclusion 82 Chapter 3. Indonesia’s Cooperation to Address Maritime Terrorism 84 3.1 Introduction 84 3.2 Indonesia and the United States Bilateral Cooperation 85 3.3 Indonesia and Japan Bilateral Cooperation 91 3.4 Indonesia and Australia Bilateral Cooperation 96 3.5 Indonesia’s Participation in the Brunei Darussalam- Indonesia- Malaysia- The Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) Sub Regional Cooperation 104 3.6 The Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) 110 3.7 The ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism 115 3.8 Explaining Indonesia’s Extensive Cooperation towards the ISPS Code 121 3.9 Explaining Indonesia’s Participation in the WCO SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade 127 3.10 Explaining Indonesia’s Participation in the APEC TRP 131 3.11 Conclusion 136 4 Chapter 4. Indonesia’s Non-Cooperation to Address Maritime Terrorism 138 4.1 Introduction 138 4.2. Indonesia’s Non Participation in the SUA Convention and its Protocols 139 4.3 Indonesia’s Refusal to Join the CSI 144 4.4 Indonesia’s Rejection to Join the PSI 151 4.5 Conclusion 158 Chapter 5. Indonesia’s Cooperation to Address Armed Robbery against Ship 161 5.1 Introduction 161 5.2. Coordinated Patrol Agreements: Indonesia-Singapore and Indonesia- Malaysia 163 5.3 Defence Cooperation Agreements: Indonesia-the Philippines and Indonesia- India 168 5.4 Indonesia-Japan Bilateral Cooperation 175 5.5 Indonesia-China Bilateral Cooperation 179 5.6 Malacca Straits Patrol Agreement 184 5.7 The ASEAN Regional Cooperation to Combat Sea Robbery: ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) 189 5.8 Conclusion 194 Chapter 6. Indonesia’s Non-Cooperation to Address Armed Robbery against Ships 197 6.1 Introduction 197 6.2 Indonesia’s Non-Cooperation in the RMSI 198 6.3 Indonesia’s Non-Participation in the ReCAAP 207 6.4 Indonesia’s Non-Participation in the Defence Cooperation Agreement with Singapore 213 6.5 Conclusion 219 Chapter 7. Conclusion: The Sources of Cooperation 221 7.1. Introduction 221 7.2. Findings 222 7.2.1 Relative Gains Concerns: Lack of Explanatory Purchase 226 7.2.2 Shared Identity: Not A Cause of Cooperation 227 7.2.3 Hegemonic Leadership: Insufficient Cause of Cooperation 228 7.2.4 Bureaucratic Politics: Absence of Competitive Preferences among Self- Interested Actors 229 7.2.5 The Calculation of Costs and Benefits: Absolute Gains Matter 230 7.2.6 Conclusion 233 7.3 Future Work 235 Appendices Appendix I - Overfished Fishery Stocks in Indonesia 238 Appendix II - Status of Indonesia Maritime Boundaries Agreements with Neighbouring States 239 Appendix III - List of Indonesia’s Outermost Islands 240 Appendix IV - Designated BIMP-EAGA Gateway Ports 241 Appendix V - List of Port Facilities that Have Been Visited by the United States Coast Guard 242 5 Appendix VI – Interview Methodology 244 Bibliography 253 6 List of Tables and Figures Table 1.1 - Population of All Cooperation Cases – 18 Table 1.2 - Category of Cooperation Partners Based on Comparison of Defence Expenditure - 36 Figure 2.1 - Map of Indonesia - 46 Figure 2.2 - The Indonesian Maritime Security Coordination Board 2005-2011 Budget (Percentage of the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Budget) - 54 Figure 2.3 - Armed Robbery Attacks and Attempted Attacks in Indonesian Waters (Excluding the Straits of Malacca and Singapore) 1991-2010 - 62 Figure 2.4 - Armed Robbery Attacks and Attempted Attacks in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore 1991-2010 - 63 Figure 2.5 - Violence to Crew Worldwide (Assaulted, Injured, Killed, Missing), 1991-2010 - 64 Figure 2.6 - Map of the Strait of Malacca - 65 Table 2.1 - Indonesia’s National Initiatives to Address Armed Robbery against Ships - 70 Figure 2.7 - The Indonesian Ministry of Defence Maritime Security Budget (Percentages of Total Ministry of Defence Budget) - 72 Figure 3.1 - Indonesia Self Assessment on State Compliance to the APEC Collective Action Plan - 135 Figure 4.1 - Indonesia Seaborne Trade: Percentages of National Exports - 148 Figure 4.2 - The Value of Indonesia-U.S. International Trade: Percentages of National Export and Import (in %) - 149 Figure 4.3 - Indonesian Direct Shipment to the U.S.: Percentage of Total Seaborne Export (in %) - 150 Table 7.1 - Cooperation to Address Maritime Terrorism: Variables and Negotiated Outcomes - 224 Table 7.2 - Cooperation to Address Sea Robbery: Variables and Negotiated Outcomes - 225 Table A. - Overfished Fishery Stocks in Indonesia - 238 Table B. - Status of Indonesia Maritime Boundaries Agreements with Neighbouring States - 239 Table C. - List of Indonesia’s Outermost Islands - 240 Table D. - Designated BIMP-EAGA Gateway Ports - 241 7 Table E. - List of Port Facilities that Have Been Visited by the United States Coast Guard - 242 Table F.1 - List of Interviews Conducted in Indonesia - 249 Table F.2 - List of Interviews Conducted in Malaysia - 251 Table F.3 - List of Interviews Conducted in Singapore - 251 Table F.4 - List of Interviews Conducted in New York - 252 8 Acknowledgments I have received enormous support from the following people and organizations without whom I would not have been able to complete my PhD. My supervisors Dr. Cian O’Driscoll and Professor Alasdair Young for their patience, guidance, and supervision. The Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia and the International Centre for Political Violance and Terrorism Research, Rajaratnam School of International Studies for facilitating and hosting my fieldwork. The Indonesian Ministry of Education; School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow, and Gilbert Murray Trust for providing scholarship, fieldwork and conference funding. People who were willing to share their time, ideas and knowledge with me during my field trips in Southeast Asia. Fellow PhD students at the University of Glasgow: Hua, Karen, Megan, Sam, Koen, Ahmed, Don, Scott, Ariel, David, Poppy and many others. My parents and brother for their generous support. My husband, Daniel Hammond for his understanding, love and kind assistance throughout the process. 9 Declaration I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution. Signature: Printed Name: Senia Febrica [...]... the leading institution in international maritime security diplomacy, although other ministries have input.89 The MFA organizes inter-ministerial meetings to settle Indonesia’s decision towards international security cooperation. 90 The inter-ministerial meetings involve other government agencies including the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Navy, Ministry of Transportation (MoT), the Ministry of Marine and... noncooperation.6 Others that noted Indonesia’s non -participation in some arrangements do not aim specifically to explain the way Indonesia responded to maritime security cooperation. 7 These works tend to focus on broader Southeast Asia or South China Sea maritime security and they only explain Indonesia’s non -participation in certain cooperation arrangements in passing By covering all maritime security arrangements,... Parties Indonesia and Singapore Indonesia and Malaysia Indonesia and the Philippines Indonesia and India Indonesia and China Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore ASEAN member states and 16 extra-regional states including the U.S., China, European Union and Australia Indonesia and Singapore It was intended to include all 20 countries in East Asia and Pacific ASEAN member states (excluding Malaysia and Indonesia)... sovereignty infringement explains that Indonesia is reluctant to join some cooperation agreements if it perceives that it may compromise its sovereignty 4 This argument can only explain Indonesia’s non -participation in some cooperation agreements but cannot explain Indonesia’s willingness to join some others The third line of argument on economic disinterest points to Indonesia’s lack of economic interest in. .. main source of Indonesia’s rejection of maritime security cooperation 5 The economic disinterest argument underplays the benefits of cooperation for Indonesia and, therefore, falls short in accounting for Indonesia’s engagement in some cooperation agreements Taken as a whole, the three arguments cannot explain why Indonesia joins some cooperation initiatives, but not others This thesis argues that Indonesia’s... 89 Indonesian MFA (2005b: 19; 2005a:21); Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs (2007: 31) 90 Interview IG40; Interview IG04; Interview IG05; Interview IE23; Interview IE22 91 Interview IG40; Interview IG21; Interview IG02 92 Interview IG04; Interview IG11; Interview IG12; Juwana (2008:449) 87 30 The existing literature does not pay attention to other approaches in. .. of Indonesia’s participation in maritime cooperation The term benefit in this thesis is defined as the net advantage obtained by a participant from cooperation. 117 As extensively explained in the literature on maritime security, some benefits gained from cooperation arrangements contribute directly to Indonesia’s counter maritime terrorism and sea robbery efforts These benefits include burden sharing... communities in disseminating new ideas and enabling cooperation. 31 Epistemic communities can decisively influence states’ participation in cooperation by taking part in decision making, acting as advisors or sources of information, adding new issues to domestic or international agendas, or changing how existing issues are defined and approached.32 As these epistemic communities “decisively influence the conceptual... explanatory purchase to explain why a middle power such as Indonesia would choose to join cooperation over which it has little influence In various maritime security arrangements including the ISPS Code, the WCO SAFE Framework, the SUA Convention, the PSI, the CSI and the RMSI Indonesia was not involved in the bargaining process to design the terms of arrangements In these cooperation cases Indonesia was only... note that the U.S was willing to provide selective incentives in the form of equipment and capacity building assistance - to other states in order to encourage participation. 78 In the case of maritime security cooperation, it is arguable that the U.S is willing to gain less relative to others in order to secure its objectives of establishing and promoting maritime security initiatives, as suggested . Southeast Asia or South China Sea maritime security and they only explain Indonesia’s non -participation in certain cooperation arrangements in passing. By covering all maritime security arrangements,. Indonesia join or not join a cooperation agreement? The prevailing arguments in the literature on Indonesia’s cooperation in maritime arrangements cannot account for Indonesia’s varying participation. 13 Chapter 1. Indonesia’s Puzzling Participation in International Maritime Security Cooperation? 1.1 Introduction Indonesia is a critical state in maritime security. Almost half