The japanese road to singapore japanese perceptions of the singapore naval base, 1921 41 8

Conclusion This thesis examined Japanese perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base in the period between the two world wars, by analysing how the Japanese perceived the Singapore Naval Base, how the Japanese planned and prepared for attacking Singapore, and why the Japanese attacked British Malaya and Singapore. It also made a small bridge over the gap between Western scholarship and Japanese scholarship on the study of Japanese history by examining the Japanese decision making process to the war, by using Japanese sources and studies of Japanese historians which have not been used by Western historians. The British government decided to establish the Singapore Naval Base to defend its Eastern Empire from Japan in June 1921. Until 1939, however, Japan did not have any plan to attack Singapore. Throughout the period between the two world wars, the Imperial Japanese Navy did not examine seriously any plan to attack Singapore from the sea side. The origin of the plan to attack British Malaya and Singapore was an operational plan against Britain included in the “Annual Army’s Operational Plan for 1939” designed by the Operations Section of the Army General Staff. In this plan, the Imperial Japanese Army would land in Singora in southern Thailand, advance down the Malay Peninsula, and attack Singapore from the land side. From the very beginning, the Imperial Japanese Army considered attacking Singapore from the land side. 272 In the period between the two world wars, the Singapore Naval Base did not impose a threat to the Imperial Japanese Navy. From the Washington Conference in 1921/22 to 1936, it had an agreed policy on the Singapore Naval Base. It was not desirable but acceptable on condition that Britain agreed to Article 19 of the Washington Treaty which prohibited the United States from establishing naval bases in Guam and the Philippines. The Japanese delegates to the Washington Conference accepted the British plan to establish a new naval base in Singapore in exchange for the British agreement for the Japanese proposal to maintain the status quo of fortifications in the Pacific. The Imperial Japanese Navy considered before the conference that, if the United States established naval bases in Guam and the Philippines, they would become direct threats to Japan, so it was imperative to prevent the United States from establishing bases in there. On the other hand, the distances to Hawaii and Singapore were great enough not to impose direct threats to Japan. Therefore, the Japanese delegates proposed to maintain the status quo of fortifications in the Pacific to prevent the establishment of American bases in Guam and the Philippines. Before the Japanese delegates formally proposed the plan, Real-Admiral Yamanashi Katsunoshin approached Real-Admiral Ernle Chatfield on December 1921 to sound out the British standpoint on fortifications in the Pacific. The Japanese delegates knew from the meeting that the British delegates could agree to the Japanese proposal on condition that Japan did not include Singapore in the Japanese proposal. Six months earlier, on 16 June, the British government decided to establish the Singapore Naval Base. For the British delegates, to exclude Singapore from any 273 restriction was imperative. After the Yamanashi-Chatfield meeting, the Chief of the Japanese delegates, Katō Tomosaburō, decided that they would not include Singapore in the Japanese proposal. Strategically, for the Imperial Japanese Navy, to prohibit American naval bases in Guam and the Philippines was a more important issue than the capital ships ratio in view of the fact that, with American advanced bases in Guam and the Philippines, it could not have waged any naval battle against the American fleet in the Pacific. Meanwhile, the American delegates demanded Japan accept the 60 per cent capital ships ratio and expressed disapproval of restricting fortifications in Hawaii. In the end, the Japanese delegates agreed to accept the 60 per cent ratio in exchange for American acceptance of the Japanese proposal to maintain the status quo of naval fortifications in Guam and the Philippines. Finally, the Japanese proposal was enacted as Article 19 of the Washington Treaty. Article 19 imposed on Britain the maintenance of the status quo of the fortifications in Hong Kong, on the United States in Guam, the Philippines and Aleutians, and on Japan in Amami-Oshima, the Bonin Islands, Taiwan, the Kurile, the Ryukyu (Okinawa) Islands, and the Pescadores. But, it did not restrict the strengthening of the fortifications in Singapore and Hawaii. At the Washington Conference, all delegates from Japan, Britain, and the United States accomplished what they considered to be their most important requirements. The Japanese delegates succeeded in preventing the development of American advanced bases in Guam and the Philippines, which guaranteed Japan naval supremacy in the western Pacific. The British 274 delegates succeeded in excluding Singapore from any agreement. The American delegates succeeded in imposing the 10:10:6 capital ships ratio between the United States, Britain, and Japan. As a result, the enactment of the Washington Treaty created a multilateral balance of power in combination of capital ships ratio and naval fortifications in the Asia-Pacific region between Japan, Britain and the United States. The naval forces ratio and the naval fortifications agreement enacted at the Washington Conference were interconnected. Unlike Britain, which started regarding Japan as a future hypothetical enemy, Japan did not regard Britain as its hypothetical enemy. The Imperial Japanese Navy had no policy against Britain and focused all its attention on the United States. As Asada Sadao examined in his works, there was disagreement over naval forces ratio within the Imperial Japanese Navy since the Washington Conference. Katō Kanji’s group advocated that it was impossible to defend Japan by a naval forces ratio lower than 70 per cent against the United States and thus opposed accepting the 60 per cent capital ships ratio at the Washington Conference. On the other hand, Katō Tomosaburō and his successors considered it was necessary to accept the 60 per cent capital ships ratio to avoid war against the United States and save Japan from financial bankruptcy. But what is important is that they agreed on the most important point: the hypothetical enemy of the Imperial Japanese Navy was the United States Navy. Their disagreement came from disagreement over how to defend Japan from American threats and avoid war against the United States. 275 From the Washington Conference in 1921/22 to the Second London Naval Conference in 1935, the Imperial Japanese Navy kept its standpoint that the Singapore Naval Base was not desirable but acceptable on condition that Article 19 of the Washington Treaty prohibited the United States from establishing naval bases in Guam and the Philippines. Within the Imperial Japanese Navy, there was complete agreement over this. Both successors of Katō Tomosaburō－the “treaty faction” after the London Naval Conference of 1930－and Katō Kanji group－the “fleet faction”－accepted this policy. The successors of Katō Tomosaburō considered that Article 19 guaranteed Japan naval supremacy in the western Pacific. On the other hand, Katō Kanji group considered that Article 19, which prohibited American bases in Guam and the Philippines, was advantageous in the event of war against the United States. Before the Geneva Naval Conference in 1927 and the First London Naval Conference in 1930, the Imperial Japanese Navy reconfirmed this policy. The Imperial Japanese Army, which considered maintenance of the status quo over a larger area was desirable, disagreed with the navy’s policy. It considered it was better to enlarge the restricted area of naval fortifications to Singapore. But the naval fortifications issue was basically a naval matter, so that the Imperial Japanese Navy forced the Imperial Japanese Army to accept its view. From the Washington Conference to the mid-1930s, the British “Singapore Strategy” worked reasonably well as a peace time defence policy. During this period, Britain maintained the prestige of its overstretched Empire by promising to provide security for its Dominion countries－Australia and New Zealand － under scarce resources without greatly harming 276 Anglo-Japanese relations. What was important was that the Royal Navy succeeded in getting the Imperial Japanese Navy’s substantial approval for the Singapore Naval Base at the Washington Conference. As was written in the Nomura committee report in 1928, the Imperial Japanese Navy accepted the British explanation that Britain needed the Singapore Naval Base as a promise to provide security to the globally stretched British Empire. Moreover, even though Britain had the plans to establish the Singapore Naval Base, the construction of the base hardly progressed during this period. This dilatory construction contributed to the non-exercise of the Japanese navy’s caution towards the development of the base. When considering Japanese domestic political history in the period between the two world wars, the Tōsuiken Kanpan Commotion over the ratification of the London Naval Conference in 1930 was a watershed. After that, it became difficult for the government to control the two armed forces. From then onwards, the broad interpretation of the Meiji Constitution of 1899 that the Tōsuiken was not restricted by the government or the Diet became a fait accompli. The two armed forces found rationalisation for pursuing their own policies without outside interference. Consequently, when Japan was drifting into war in 1940 and 1941, it was difficult for the government to coordinate its policies with those of the two armed forces, and for the two forces to coordinate their policies between them. Furthermore, it became hard for the Minister of War and the Minister of the Navy to rein the Army General Staff and the Navy General Staff respectively. In the critical period from the commencement of the German Blitzkrieg in May 1940 to the outbreak of the 277 Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region in December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Army, the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pursued their own policies but there was no agreed national policy between them. Generally, in the period between the two world wars, the Japanese commercial publishing media were far more hostile to the Singapore Naval Base than the Imperial Japanese Navy, and even more than the Imperial Japanese Army. The Japanese government－the Imperial Japanese Navy－ accepted the naval base at the Washington Conference. However, it was a secret decision and ordinary Japanese public did not know it. When the Japanese public knew the British plan to establish it, newspapers criticised it as being against the spirit of the Washington Treaty. Facing critical opinion in Japan towards the Singapore Naval Base, Shidehara Kijūrō, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Charles Eliot, the British Ambassador to Japan, considered it was harmful to Anglo-Japanese relations, and tried to appease the Japanese public. But whether they succeeded in this was doubtful. In the latter half of the 1920s, negative attitude towards the base calmed down but did not disappear. Some pointed their spears at the Japanese government’s policy towards the base. They could not understand why the government did not object to the British plan which appeared to regard Japan as a hostile power. During the 1920s, the Japanese commercial mass media claimed Japan should solve the problem at naval disarmament conferences. But the government had no intention to discuss the Singapore Naval Base at naval disarmament conferences, because it regarded Article 19 as being 278 advantageous to Japan. In the 1930s, the Japanese commercial publishing media became more jingoistic. After relations between Japan and the Western powers deteriorated as a result of the Manchuria Incident in 1931, the Shanghai Incident, the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932, and the withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, there was a boom of war scare literature. Books on future war(s) against the United States, the Soviet Union or both became very popular. Some of them talked future war against Britain. In these books, the Singapore Naval Base was no longer a threat the British imposed on Japan but was a military target Japan should attack. Popular Authors of war scare literatures, Ishimaru Tōta and Ikezaki Tadayoshi, claimed in their books that, if the Anglo-Japanese war did break out, Japan could easily attack and occupy Singapore. The Singapore Naval Base was described as the last bastion of the sinister British Empire remaining in East Asia. After the Sino-Japanese War became deadlocked, anti-British movements gained momentum. The Japanese public criticised Britain for backing the Chinese Nationalists. This Anti-British movement reached its peak during the Tientsin Incident in the summer of 1939. In brief, the Imperial jingoism in the late 1930s produced by the Japanese commercial publishing media played a central role in nourishing hostility towards the Singapore Naval Base and jingoistic Anglophobe atmosphere in Japan. This atmosphere laid the foundations for policy-makers to take more aggressive policies towards Britain after the Germans dominated continental Western Europe in May and June 1940. The year 1936 was a watershed when considering Japanese policies 279 towards the British Singapore Naval Base. At the end of 1936, the Washington Treaty, including its Article 19, formally expired. With the termination of the Washington Treaty, the Imperial Japanese Navy lost its reason to accept the base. As the cruising radius of naval ships in every category increased, the geographical advantage that Japan enjoyed in the western Pacific began to disappear. As a result, there appeared a possibility that Britain would become a hostile power in the future. In the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin of 1936, Japan first regarded Britain as its hypothetical enemy. To counter Army’s Hokushin Nanshu Ron (Advance to the North, Hold in the South Policy), the Imperial Japanese Navy set Hokushu Nanshin Ron (Hold in the North, Advance to the South Policy). The Imperial Japanese Navy feared that, unless it established a south-bound policy, the Imperial Japanese Army, which advocated precedence in the allocation of the budget and matériel to pursue its north-bound policy, would snatch its budget and matériel from the Imperial Japanese Navy. The government, which could not decide priority between the army’s plan to the north and the navy’s plan to the south, settled on a compromise by enacting the “Fundamentals of National Policy”. It approved both arguments which were contradictory with each other by stipulating expansion toward both north and south. In other words, it failed to formulate either strategic priority, or coordinated military policy between the two armed forces. By the enactment of the “Fundamentals of National Policy”, the Japanese government approved south-bound expansion as its official national policy. However, it is wrong to consider that these policies led Japan directly to the Malaya Campaign in 1941/42. South-bound expansion stipulated in the “Fundamentals of National 280 Policy” was south-bound expansion by economic means. Since Britain was first regarded as a hypothetical enemy in the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin of 1936, the Operations Sections of the two General Staffs started studying to make operational plans against Britain. However, it took more than two years for the Operations Sections to prepare their first operational plans. They could not draw up substantial operational plans until 1939. The Operational plans against Britain in the Annual Operational Plans for 1937 and 1938 were “Operational Plans” without any substantial operational plan. There was no description of how to attack and how many forces would be required. This also shows the important fact that the Operations Sections did not examine any plan against Britain before 1936. Otherwise, they could have made their operational plan against Britain earlier. The origins of Japanese plans for attacking British Malaya and Singapore were operational plans included in the “Annual Army’s Operational Plan for 1939” and the “Annual Navy’s Operational Plan for 1939”. The Imperial Japanese Army examined the possibility of attacking Singapore more seriously than did the Imperial Japanese Navy. Basically, the attacking plan against British Malaya and Singapore was designed by the Operations Section of the Army General Staff as the army’s operational plan. In its plan, the navy took only a supportive role by convoying army landing forces to the landing sites. This came from the sectionalism of the two armed forces. The Operations Section of the Army General Staff designed the plan as an army operational plan. For the army, which could not rely on the fire power of naval ships, to land on Singapore from the sea side was out of question. Considered 281 with the coastal defence of Singapore, it was impossible. From the very beginning, the Operations Section of the Army General Staff considered attacking Singapore from the land side. To attack British Malaya and Singapore, it chose Singora in southern Thailand as its landing site. It was safer to land in neutral territory. After landing in Singora, Japanese forces would advance down the Malay Peninsula to attack Singapore from the land side. To draw up its operational plan, the Army General Staff sent its officers to Southeast Asia to gather information. In 1936, it sent Arisue Yadoru to Singapore and Hong Kong. From August to November 1939, Imoto Kumao travelled to Southeast Asia, French Indochina, Thailand, British Malaya, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies and Hong Kong. In the summer of 1940, Tanigawa Kazuo travelled to British Malaya. From January to March 1941, Kunitake Teruto travelled to British Malaya. Operational plans to attack British Malaya and Singapore were drawn up by them. What is important is that the army officers who actually drew up operational plans observed these places at first hand. To this, they relied on other intelligence sources far less than Westerners have believed. The Operations Sections added plans to capture airfields in southern French Indochina as advanced bases to attack British Malaya and Singapore in the “Annual Army’s Operational Plan for 1940” and the “Annual Navy’s Operational Plan for 1940”. Since Germany dominated the European Continent in May and June 1940 by defeating the Low Countries and France, both the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy advocated south-bound military 282 advancement. But there was no consensus between them. The army advocated war against Britain and the Netherlands while the navy emphasised the inseparability between Britain and the United States. The army advocated that war against the United States should be avoided as far as possible. It was reasonable for the army to limit the number of enemies as much as possible. For the army, the purpose of south-bound advancement was to cut down supply routes to the Chinese Nationalists and capture natural resources in Southeast Asia, which it required for settling the war in China. Therefore, south-bound military advancement meant advancement to Dutch East Indies and British Malaya: natural resources areas in Southeast Asia. Singapore became the most important military target because it was the most important base of Anglo-Dutch powers in South East Asia. Without attacking Singapore, the army supposed, Japan could not capture natural resources in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the Imperial Japanese Navy emphasised the inseparability between Britain and the United States, and did not regard Singapore as so important. For the navy, the only naval power which had the capability to engage naval battles with the Japanese Combined Fleet was the American Pacific Fleet. Also, there were American air bases in the Philippines, from which American bombers could reach Japan. Compared with American threats, the British China Fleet was negligible. It had no capital ship and Japan was too distant for an aerial bombardment from Singapore. It was reasonable for the navy to focus its attention on the United States. Furthermore, the United States was strengthening its navy. To counter the American naval 283 expansion programmes, the Imperial Japanese Navy had to strengthen its naval armaments. Otherwise it would become impossible to wage war against it. Unless it built up its armaments enough to engage in naval battles with the American fleet, the navy wanted to avoid war as far as possible. However, it could not unequivocally express this. It was afraid that the army would say, “If the navy can’t fight, give us your matériel and budget”. The navy required war matériel and a larger budget to strengthen its armaments. Preparations for war to the south became a convenient excuse for the navy to demand war matériel and budget to strengthen its armaments. Consequently, it advocated the necessity for war preparations and the inseparability between Britain and the United States. It could be said that the navy’s belligerent stance towards the United States was no more than a verbal show of strength without determination for war. For the navy, preparations for war and policies for avoiding war were compatible. The outbreak of the German-Soviet War on 22 June changed the situation drastically. The Imperial Japanese Army started re-advocating Hokushin Ron (North-bound Policy). Some in the Imperial Japanese Army advocated advancing to both the north and the south－war against the Soviet Union and south-bound military advances to Southeast Asia－because a supposed war against the Soviet Union needed natural resources areas in Southeast Asia so as to secure a continued supply of war matériel needed for conducting the war. To counter the army’s north-bound policy, the navy advocated a south-bound policy stronger than before, because it feared that, unless it stressed the necessity to advance to the south, the army would snatch 284 its budget and war matériel. Under this confused situation, the two armed forces agreed that Japan should advance its forces to southern French Indochina without seriously considering how it would affect Japanese-American relations. At that time, they did not yet decide for war against Anglo-American powers. Meanwhile, the army ordered mobilisation of its force to Manchuria as a preparation for war against the Soviet Union on July but came to realise it would be impossible to finish war against the Soviet Union before the coming winter. The Army General Staff decided on August 1941 to postpone the decision whether it would wage war against the Soviet Union to the next spring. It also considered that the coming winter would be the best time to acquire the natural resources in the south it needed to engage war against the Soviet Union. In Washington, facing Japanese south-bound advancement to southern French Indochina, President Roosevelt signed an executive order freezing Japanese assets in the United States on 25 July. Britain followed on 26 July and the Netherlands on 27 July. The United States imposed a de facto oil embargo on August. Facing this oil embargo, most middle-echelon officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy realised war against the United States and Britain was inevitable. In this way, Japan drifted into the war without a clear determination for it. Since Germany occupied the European Continent in June 1940, the Imperial Japanese Army promoted preparations to attack British Malaya and Singapore. It established the Taiwan Army Intelligence Unit to study how to fit its forces for combat in a tropical zone. Until then, the Imperial Japanese Army had fitted its forces for war in China or Siberia. Therefore it had to change its 285 equipment to be suitable for combat in a tropical zone. The Army Department of the Imperial General Headquarters (the Army General Staff) formally ordered preparation for war on 18 September 1941. By the end of September, the Operations Section of the Army General Staff completed its operational plan to attack British Malaya and Singapore by refining the “Annual Army’s Operational Plan for 1941”. As for the Imperial Japanese Navy, there was another reason why it did not consider war against Britain seriously. Even though the Imperial Japanese Navy emphasised the inseparability between Britain and the United States, it focused all its attention on the United States and its officers, especially senior officers, did not considered war against Britain seriously enough. Even after the enactment of the Tripartite Pact in 1940 and events in 1941, they did not change their attitudes. The reason was the Imperial Japanese Navy’s traditional Anglophilic sentiments. Historically, the Imperial Japanese Navy was under heavy influence of Britain and its Royal Navy, especially during the time of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902-1921. By 1941, Anglophilic sentiments in the Imperial Japanese Navy became weaker but a residue of it remained. A British naval historian, Arthur Marder, described: “There was right up until the commencement of hostilities a residue of strong feelings of friendship, respect, and even affection for the Royal Navy in the Imperial Navy－among senior officers, anyway”.1 Arthur J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy Strategic Illusions 1936-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p.340. 286 For Western people, the inter-war period was the period between the two world wars and most Japanese accept this periodisation without questioning it. But when considering Japanese defence policies, it is more suitable to suppose that the inter-war period for Japan was the period between the Russo-Japanese War and the Second World War. The last major war the Japanese fought before the Second World War was not the First World War, but the Russo-Japanese War in 1904/05. Unlike Western countries, Japanese participation in the First World War was limited. In the period from the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 to the German Blitzkrieg to the Low Countries and France in May and June 1940, defence policies of the two armed forces were not greatly changed. The principal defence policy of the Imperial Japanese Army was to secure Japanese interests in Manchuria from Russia (the Soviet Union) while the principal defence policy of the Imperial Japanese Navy was to prepare naval armaments enough to engage naval battles with the United States Navy in order to secure the Japanese Islands from the United States. The First World War, the Russian Revolution, Washington Treaties and the construction of the Singapore Naval Base did not affect Japan enough to change its fundamental defence policies. In the period between the two world wars, the navy’s concern for the Singapore Naval Base was always related to how the Singapore Naval Base affected the Imperial Japanese Navy’s defence policies against the United States. From the Washington Conference to the abrogation of the Washington Treaty in 1936, the navy had substantially approved the naval base as a way to preventing the United States from establishing naval bases in Guam and the 287 Philippines. In 1936, Britain was included in the hypothetical enemy list of the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin, because the Imperial Japanese Navy could no longer expect strict neutrality of Britain in case of American-Japanese war. But the Imperial Japanese Navy did not examine the possibility of war against Britain seriously. During the critical years from the commencement of the German Blitzkrieg in May 1940 to the outbreak of the Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region in December 1941, the priority of Singapore in the Imperial Japanese Navy’s strategic considerations was not high. The navy focused its attention on the United States Navy and American air fields in the Philippines. Because, it did not consider Singapore would greatly affect the outcome of an American-Japanese War. The Philippines and Hawaii were far more important than Singapore. Consequently, the navy left the army to make preparations for attacking British Malaya and Singapore. On the other hand, in the period from the Washington Conference to the Manchuria Incident, the army was critical of the navy’s policy which substantially accepted the Singapore Naval Base. But it did not criticise the navy’s policy strongly, because whether the Imperial Japanese Navy accepted the base or not did not affect the army’s defence policies to secure Japanese interests in Manchuria. After the Manchuria Incident and the establishment of Manchukuo, the army first came to accept Article 19 which allowed the naval bases in Singapore and Hawaii, because it assumed that Japan had insufficient resources to wage war simultaneously against the Soviet Union in the north and Anglo-American powers in the south. To focus Japan’s national resources on Manchuria, the army considered, it was better to secure the south by 288 accepting the naval bases in Singapore and Hawaii. But the Singapore Naval Base did not occupy the interests of the Imperial Japanese Army. In 1939, the Operations Section of the Army General Staff drew up its first substantial operational plan to attack British Malaya and Singapore. However, it is doubtful whether the Army General Staff considered the possibility of executing of it seriously at that time. It was not until Germany dominated the European continent in May and June 1940 that the Imperial Japanese Army examined the possibility of attacking British Malaya and Singapore seriously. Mesmerised by the German Blitzkrieg, the army turned its eyes to the south as far as to consider reconciling relations with the Soviet Union. For the army, it was a complete turnabout in its policy. It supposed that it could capture natural resource areas in Southeast Asia concurrent with the German attack on Britain. But Britain drove the Germans back in the Battle of Britain in the summer and autumn of 1940. Consequently, the army’s expectation to the south waned. The Germans launched Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 changed the situation drastically. The traditional policy of the Imperial Japanese Army against the Soviet Union was quickly revived. Suddenly, a great chance to attack the Soviet Union came. Accordingly, the Imperial Japanese Army mobilised its force to Manchuria to prepare for war against the Soviet Union. But on August, the Army General Staff judged that it would be impossible to finish war against the Soviet Union before the coming winter. Rather, it would be better to use the coming winter to capture natural resources in the south to prepare for war against the Soviet Union 289 which might happen in the spring of 1942. The primary reason why the Imperial Japanese Army considered it would be necessary to attack British Malaya and Singapore was not to establish the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, but to capture natural resources it needed to prosecute war against the Soviet Union. The Imperial Japanese Army considered that, to capture natural resources in the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya, it would be necessary to attack Singapore. In a broader sense, attacking Singapore was a means to solidify the security of Japanese interests in Manchuria against the Soviet Union. This was the reason why the Imperial Japanese Army used only one fifth of its available forces, eleven divisions out of fifty-one divisions (excluding eleven divisions in Japanese Islands), in its southern war. Most of its forces were in China and Manchuria when Japan plunged into war in December 1941: approximately 730, 000 in Manchuria and Korea, 620,000 in China, 380,000 in Japanese Islands, Taiwan and Sakhalin, and 390,000 in Southeast Asia (Total: 2,120,000).2 For the Imperial Japanese Army, the war in the south was a war in sub-theatre it needed for conducting wars in main-theatres: northern Manchuria border zones with the Soviet Union and China. Establishing the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” was not the reason why Japan provoked the war against Anglo-American powers, although it became the Japan’s official cause for the war after the opening of BBKS, Senshi Sōsho: Daihon’ei Rikugun-bu, 3. (Imperial General Headquartes The Army Department, Vol. 3) (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1970), p.80. 290 hostilities. Matsuoka Yōsuke used the term “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” for the first time in a press interview on August 1940. On 10 December 1941, two days after Japan declared war against the United States and Britain, the Supreme Command Government Liaison Conference formally named the Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region, including the Sino-Japanese War, as the “Greater East Asia War”. During the war, the term was widely publicised to rationalise the Japanese cause.3 However, during the time Japan was drifting into the war, from May 1940 to December 1941, the army’s primal concern for Southeast Asia was how to capture natural resources there. On the other hand, the navy’s decision-makers focused their attention on how to strengthen their armaments enough to engage in naval battles with the United States Navy. It is wrong to consider that Japan declared the war to establish the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”. In reality, as Chapter of this thesis shows, there was neither unified war purpose nor unified strategy between the two armed forces. The final war plan was a political compromise between them. In other words, Japan provoked war against Anglo-American powers without a grand strategy. The lack of a unified war purpose or a grand strategy made easier for military and naval officers to accept the “Great East Asia” ideology to rationalise their causes. Because it was in itself a very idealistic idea but the meaning of it was not crystal clear. It was enough vague to be acceptable to both the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese As a result, not a small number of Japanese, including many soldiers and officers who fought the war in fronts, truly believed it as the cause of Japan for the war. 291 Navy. Japan conquered Singapore in 70 days. But for the Imperial Japanese Army, the fall of Singapore was not the purpose, but a means to wage war against the Soviet Union. When Japan plunged into the war, the army had a sound operational plan to attack British Malaya and Singapore. But the Malaya Campaign was a part of the world war. We tend to suppose that Japan attributed great importance to Singapore and the naval base in there before the Second World War. However, as the author shows in this thesis, it was not true. The navy did not consider attacking Singapore seriously because Singapore was not included in the navy’s war plan against the United States. As for the army, after the Germans launched Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, Singapore acquired great importance in view of the fact that Singapore became included in its war plan against the Soviet Union. After the Army General Staff postponed the decision on August whether Japan would open hostilities against the Soviet Union until the next spring, it became necessary for it to attack Singapore during the coming winter so as to capture natural resources in Southeast Asia. Finally, this Army General Staff’s judgement dragged Japan into provoking war against Britain, the Netherlands and the United States. Fragmentation of political powers, not a military dictatorship, gave the Army General Staff power to this. The primal reason why the Imperial Japanese Army attacked British Malaya and Singapore was to capture natural resources in Southeast Asia which it needed principally to conduct war against the Soviet Union and secondly to settle the war in China. 292 [...]... But for the Imperial Japanese Army, the fall of Singapore was not the purpose, but a means to wage war against the Soviet Union When Japan plunged into the war, the army had a sound operational plan to attack British Malaya and Singapore But the Malaya Campaign was a part of the world war We tend to suppose that Japan attributed great importance to Singapore and the naval base in there before the Second... States The First World War, the Russian Revolution, Washington Treaties and the construction of the Singapore Naval Base did not affect Japan enough to change its fundamental defence policies In the period between the two world wars, the navy’s concern for the Singapore Naval Base was always related to how the Singapore Naval Base affected the Imperial Japanese Navy’s defence policies against the United... From the Washington Conference to the abrogation of the Washington Treaty in 1936, the navy had substantially approved the naval base as a way to preventing the United States from establishing naval bases in Guam and the 287 Philippines In 1936, Britain was included in the hypothetical enemy list of the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin, because the Imperial Japanese Navy could no longer expect strict neutrality of. .. in case of American -Japanese war But the Imperial Japanese Navy did not examine the possibility of war against Britain seriously During the critical years from the commencement of the German Blitzkrieg in May 1940 to the outbreak of the Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region in December 1 941, the priority of Singapore in the Imperial Japanese Navy’s strategic considerations was not high The navy... policies of the two armed forces were not greatly changed The principal defence policy of the Imperial Japanese Army was to secure Japanese interests in Manchuria from Russia (the Soviet Union) while the principal defence policy of the Imperial Japanese Navy was to prepare naval armaments enough to engage naval battles with the United States Navy in order to secure the Japanese Islands from the United... was the period between the Russo -Japanese War and the Second World War The last major war the Japanese fought before the Second World War was not the First World War, but the Russo -Japanese War in 1904/05 Unlike Western countries, Japanese participation in the First World War was limited In the period from the end of the Russo -Japanese War in 1905 to the German Blitzkrieg to the Low Countries and France... drifting into the war, from May 1940 to December 1 941, the army’s primal concern for Southeast Asia was how to capture natural resources there On the other hand, the navy’s decision-makers focused their attention on how to strengthen their armaments enough to engage in naval battles with the United States Navy It is wrong to consider that Japan declared the war to establish the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity... the United States Navy and American air fields in the Philippines Because, it did not consider Singapore would greatly affect the outcome of an American -Japanese War The Philippines and Hawaii were far more important than Singapore Consequently, the navy left the army to make preparations for attacking British Malaya and Singapore On the other hand, in the period from the Washington Conference to the. .. Incident, the army was critical of the navy’s policy which substantially accepted the Singapore Naval Base But it did not criticise the navy’s policy strongly, because whether the Imperial Japanese Navy accepted the base or not did not affect the army’s defence policies to secure Japanese interests in Manchuria After the Manchuria Incident and the establishment of Manchukuo, the army first came to accept... which allowed the naval bases in Singapore and Hawaii, because it assumed that Japan had insufficient resources to wage war simultaneously against the Soviet Union in the north and Anglo-American powers in the south To focus Japan’s national resources on Manchuria, the army considered, it was better to secure the south by 288 accepting the naval bases in Singapore and Hawaii But the Singapore Naval Base . This thesis examined Japanese perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base in the period between the two world wars, by analysing how the Japanese perceived the Singapore Naval Base, how the Japanese. hostile to the Singapore Naval Base than the Imperial Japanese Navy, and even more than the Imperial Japanese Army. The Japanese government the Imperial Japanese Navy－ accepted the naval base at the. the plans to establish the Singapore Naval Base, the construction of the base hardly progressed during this period. This dilatory construction contributed to the non-exercise of the Japanese