The japanese road to singapore japanese perceptions of the singapore naval base, 1921 41 4

Chapter Japan, Britain, the Singapore Naval Base and Naval Disarmament 1921-36 The Washington Conference took place among countries which had interests in the Asia-Pacific region from 12 November 1921 to February 1922 to discuss naval disarmaments and to bring stability to East Asia. At this conference, three major treaties were enacted: the Washington Treaty, the Four Power Treaty and the Nine Power Treaty. The Washington Treaty commonly known as the Five-Power Treaty determined capital ships1 ratio between the United States, Britain, Japan, France and Italy as 10:10:6:3.5:3.5. The Four-Power Treaty was a treaty for mutual agreement of territorial rights in the Pacific between the United States, Britain, Japan and France. The Nine-Power Treaty was a treaty to affirm the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of China between all participants in the Washington Conference: the United States, Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and China. Japanese plenipotentiaries to the Washington Conference were Katō Tomosaburō, the Minister of the Navy, Tokugawa Iesato, Chairman of the House of Peers and a descendant of Tokugawa Shōgun, Shidehara Kijūrō, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, and Hanihara Masanao, the Capital ships are battle ships, battle cruisers and aircraft-carriers larger than 10, 000 tons. 35 Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. Chief plenipotentiary was Katō Tomosaburō. At the conference, the Japanese delegates proposed the maintenance of the status quo of naval fortifications in the Pacific and this was enacted as Article 19 of the Washington Treaty. The Japanese delegates demanded 70 per cent capital ships ratio against the United States, but accepted 60 per cent ratio in exchange for maintenance of the status quo of naval fortifications in the Pacific. However, Article 19 did not restrict Britain establishing a new naval base in Singapore. Article 19 imposed on Britain maintenance of the status quo of the fortifications in Hong Kong, on the United States in Guam, the Philippines and Aleutians, and on Japan in Amami-Oshima, the Bonin Islands, Taiwan, the Kurile, the Ryukyu (Okinawa) Islands, and the Pescadores. The Japanese delegates did not include Singapore and Hawaii in the proposed restricted area. Consequently, Article 19 did not restrict establishing a British base in Singapore and an American base in Hawaii. But, why did the Japanese delegates not include Singapore in its proposal? Did Japan intentionally not include Singapore? Did Japan regard the Singapore Naval Base as a threat in the period from the Washington Conference in 1921/22 to the expiration of the Washington Treaty in 1936? This chapter examines relations between Japan and Britain regarding the Singapore Naval Base and Article 19 of the Washington Treaty. Preparation for the Washington Conference Two years before the British decision to build a new naval base in 36 Singapore, a former First Sea Load, Viscount Jellicoe toured the Dominion countries－India, Australia, New Zealand and Canada－from 1919 to 1920 and submitted a report known as the Jellicoe Report in which he proposed a Pacific Fleet composed of eight battleships and eight battle-cruisers, to confront the Imperial Japanese Navy’s eight-eight fleet. He supposed the base and the headquarters of this fleet would be in Singapore. In order to maintain the British naval presence in the Asia-Pacific region, he worried about the vulnerability of the Pacific Dominions－especially Australia－to Japan. He recognised that the only external threat to the British Empire in the Far East was from Japan. But for the British government at that time which confronted financial difficulties, the Jellicoe report, which would necessitate immense cost, was unacceptable. In addition, the content of the Jellicoe Report was too hostile to the ally: Japan. Even though the efficacy of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been declining, the British government at the time did not yet finally decide whether or not the alliance would be renewed. The Japanese Consul General Office in Sydney obtained a full copy of the Jellicoe Report and sent it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 1919.2 In Japan, the Jellicoe Report was also reported in news reports.3 But, whether or not the Imperial Japanese Navy studied it closely is unclear. Some naval documents made in the period between the two world wars mentioned the Jellicoe Report DRO, 1-6-3, “Kakkoku Naisei Kankei Zappen, Eikoku-no-bu (Domestic Policies of Foreign Countries Files, Britain) Vol. 6”. This file includes a full copy of “Naval Defence Report of Admiral of the Fleet, Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa on Naval Mission to the Commonwealth of Australia (May-August, 1919)” submitted to the Australian government during the tour. Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, 29 October, 1919, p.2. 37 as the first proposal of the plan to construct a new naval base in Singapore. Since the arrival of the American invitation to the Washington Conference on 11 July 1921, the Imperial Japanese Army had been preparing for it. The Imperial Japanese Army’s preparation committee discussed fortifications in the Pacific on 10 August 1921. Although it considered naval fortification in the Pacific was basically a naval issue, it adopted the army’s standpoint: Japan should request the removal of the fortifications from Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Tongking, Singapore and Java. If each country removed fortifications from these places, Japan could remove their fortifications from Lushun, Dalian, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima and the Taiwan Islands in exchange. In accordance with this standpoint, the committee proposed three plans. The first plan was that, if the United States and Britain removed fortifications from Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, Singapore and Hong Kong, Japan would remove them from the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, Keelung and the Pescadores. The second plan excluded Hawaii and Singapore from the first plan. In this plan, the committee considered that Japan could remove fortifications from the Bonin Islands or Amami-Oshima, but not from both. The third plan excluded the Philippines and Hong Kong from the first plan. In this plan, Japan could remove fortifications from Taiwan, Keelung and the Pescadores. If removing fortifications was impossible, the second-best plan was to demand maintenance of the status quo of fortifications in these areas.4 According to NIDS, Army Documents, Rikugun-shō Kafu-Kaigi, T10-1-61. “Kafu-Kaigi Junbi-Syorui (Preparation Documents for the Washington Conference)”, 38 the first and third of these proposed plans, Britain could not build a new naval base in Singapore. If the second plan of their proposal was adopted, Britain could build a new naval base there, but in this case, Japan would have removed fortifications from, or maintained the status quo of fortifications in, either the Bonin Islands or Amami-Oshima, but not both.5 The Imperial Japanese Navy began its preparation for the Washington Conference from June 1919 in a special research committee in anticipation that a conference to discuss naval disarmament would take place in the near future.6 In this committee chaired by Real-Admiral Abo Kiyokazu, Chief of the Operations Division of the Navy General Staff, naval officers who would play important roles in policy-making within the navy in the period between the two world wars participated; namely, Yamanashi Katsunoshin, Nomura Kichisaburō, Kabayashi Seizō and Suetsugu Nobumasa, who were all Captains at that time. After the invitation came from the United States, this committee submitted a report as a resolution embodying the consensus of the navy on 21 July 1921 to Katō Tomosaburō, the Minister of the Navy. He would also be Chief of the Japanese delegates to the Washington Conference. This report stipulated two important things. First, Japan did not insist upon in building the eight-eight fleet as long as it could keep a balance with the Anglo-American powers. Second, Japan absolutely required a naval ratio of 70 per cent or 0023-0024, 0060-0061, 0454-0459. MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai (Washington Conference: The Problem of Naval Limitation). (Tokyo: MOFA, 1974), p.239. BBKS, Senshi Sōsho, Daihon’ei Kaigunbu, Rengō Kantai, 1: Kaisen Made (The Imperial Headquarters, Navy Combined Fleet, Vol. 1, Up to the Outbreak of Hostility), (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1975), p.182. 39 above vis-à-vis the United States Navy reconfirming the navy’s long-standing consensus. The origin of the concept of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s requirement of 70 per cent of the United States Navy and its eight-eight fleet dated back to 1907 when the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin (Imperial National Defence Policy) was first sanctioned. This policy consisted of three fundamental guidelines: (1) the need for a 70 per cent naval fleet ratio as a strategic imperative against a hypothetical enemy; (2) a building plan for an eight battleships and eight battle cruisers fleet; and (3) the United States was the navy’s hypothetical enemy.8 The Imperial Japanese Navy was imbued with this policy when the invitation arrived from the United States. It is extremely difficult to abandon deeply imbued considerations. The 70 per cent ratio against the United States Navy became the Imperial Japanese Navy’s fundamental policy for the Washington Conference. But what is important for our purpose is that this 70 per cent ratio was a ratio against the United States. The navy had no particular policy against Britain. Far more interesting and relevant to our argument is that the demand for a 70 per cent ratio against the United States required a prerequisite: the prohibition of further fortifications in Guam and the Philippines. The research committee report stated that any build-up of American bases on these islands would eliminate Japan’s geographic and strategic advantage. At that time, American bases in Guam and the Philippines were not yet adequately Sadao Asada, Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations: Historical Essays. (Colimbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2007), p.112; Asada Sadao, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), pp.60-61. Asada, Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations, p.107. 40 equipped to repair and maintain ships, much less to accommodate a large fleet. It stipulated: “Should this problem fail to be satisfactorily resolved, naval arms limitation would not only be meaningless but may conceivably prove suicidal to Japan”9. But if the United States could not build up bases in Guam and the Philippines, badly damaged ships would have to return to Hawaii to be docked and sailing such a long distance for damaged ships would be highly risky. Katō Tomosaburō agreed with this conclusion.10 Shidehara Kijūrō recalled in his memoir: “Katō Tomosaburō took much more importance on fortifications of the Pacific－maintenance of the status quo of naval fortifications in the Pacific－than the warships ratio. That is to say, if the United States had constructed well fortified bases in Guam and other places in the Pacific as impregnable as Heligoland in Germany, it would have become impossible for Japan to wage any war. But if the status quo was agreed on Pacific fortifications, it would not be impossible to wage war with the 5:5:3 ratio.”11 A historian, Asada Sadao, points out: “Apparently he [Katō Tomosaburō] regarded the fortification problem as more crucial to Japan than hair-splitting bargains over fleet ratios. If the United States built impregnable fortresses in the Philippines or Guam and obtained footholds in the western Pacific, Japan’s fleet ratio would become meaningless.”12 Although both the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy considered that de-fortification or maintenance of the status quo of Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p. 61. Ibid. 11 Kijūrō Shidehara, Shidehara Kijūrō: Gaikō 50-nen (Shidehara Kijūrō: 50 years in Diplomacy) (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Center, 1998), p.76. 12 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor., p.61. 10 41 fortifications in the Pacific was necessary, there was disparity between their policies. For the army, general de-fortification, or at least maintenance of the status quo of fortifications in a large area in the Pacific, was desirable. On the other hand, for the navy, to prohibit strengthening of fortifications in Guam and the Philippines was a strategic imperative to prevent the construction of American advanced bases there. It did not care much about other places. With regard to Singapore, the army considered that de-fortification or the maintenance of the status quo of fortifications in Singapore was desirable, while for the navy, which regarded only the United States as its hypothetical enemy, de-fortification or maintaining the status quo of fortifications in Singapore was not an urgent need. As a compromise agreement, the instruction for the Japanese delegates to the Washington Conference stipulated: “Whenever the opportunity shall arise, the Japanese Empire, in the light of maintaining the peace, will make a proposal that fortifications of the Pacific area should be removed or at least maintain the status quo and will endeavour to conclude it as a treaty of Pacific fortifications.” 13 But there was no complete understanding between the two armed forces. Britain prepared for the Washington Naval Conference in the Committee of Imperial Defence meetings. It also understood the interlocking nature of fortifications in the Pacific and naval disarmaments. The Royal Navy hoped that Japan would accept no naval base further south than Taiwan.14 But MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, p.239. Eric Goldstein, “The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Washington Conference,” in Eric Goldstein and John Maurer (eds.), The Washington Conference, 1921-22 (Ilford; Frank Cass, 1994), p.23. 13 14 42 what was imperative for Britain and its navy, which decided to construct a new naval base in Singapore on 16 June that year, was to exclude Singapore from any agreement. British documents stipulated: “That no agreement should be reached at the Conference which will in any way interfere with the development of Singapore as a British Naval Base, since such development is purely defensive in character and is already overdue”.15 The Washington Conference and the Article 19 of the Washington Treaty The Washington Conference began with American Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes’s bombshell proposals which broke all diplomatic protocol. His proposals were: (1) a ten-year “naval holiday” during which each power would cease construction; (2) limitation of the fleets of the great powers by tonnage according to the naval forces ratio of 10:10:6 between the United States, Britain and Japan; and (3) an itemised plan for scrapping ships in accord with a “stop now” formula.16 Hughes’s proposals were a shock for the Japanese delegates which did not and could not anticipate such bold proposals. But Katō Tomosaburō, deeply moved to see the audiences excited by Hughes’s proposals, considered: “It is simply impossible to oppose the American plan. If we oppose it, we’ll have to pay a heavy price. World public opinion would not TNA, CAB 5/5; CO 537/1045, 197-C, “Establishment of Naval Base at Singapore and its Effect upon the Foreign and Naval Policy of the Empire”, 6-8. 16 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor., p.73. 15 43 allow it”17. On 23 November, Katō Tomosaburō sent a telegram to the government in which he proposed four options he could take: 1. Persist in the Japanese demands of the 10:7 ratio and the retention of the Mutsu18; 2. Accept the 10:6.5 ratio in return for retention of the Mutsu; 3. Accept the 10:6 ratio in return for retention of the Mutsu; 4. Accept the 10.6 ratio and the scrapping of the Mutsu.19 Katō Tomosaburō wrote: “Taking a larger view of the conference, if Japan should clash with the United States on naval limitation and thus cause its miscarriage, it will be as clear as day the onus will fall on us” and urged that he be authorised to opt for Plans or and, if absolutely necessary, Plan 4. 20 The government reply came on 28 November to Kato Tomosaburō directing him to make a final effort to carry through Plan 1. But if it failed, he was to negotiate on the basis of Plan 2. If further concession became necessary, the delegates must take a broad consideration of Japan’s interests and accept the 10:6 ratio, provided the Anglo-American powers agree to reduce or at least maintain the status quo with respect to fortifications in their Pacific island Ibid. The Mutsu was a post-Jutland battleship mounting eight 16-inch guns with good armour protection, which had earmarked for scrapping in the American plan. 19 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai., p.239; Asada. From Mahan to Pearl Harbor., p.79. 20 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p.79. 17 18 44 connected to the throne so that it was not necessary for them to be subordinate to the government. From then onwards, the broad interpretation that the Tōsuiken was not restricted by the government or the Diet became a fait accompli. From then onwards, it became difficult for the government to control the two armed forces. Between the two armed forces, it became hard to coordinate their policies. Furthermore, it became difficult for the Minister of War and the Minister of the Navy to rein the Army General Staff and the Navy General Staff respectively. 81 The Tōsuiken Kanpan Commotion opened a Pandora’s box. In September 1931, the Manchuria Incident broke out, in which the Kwantung Army and the Chosen Army of Japan moved their forces without the governmental authorisation. 82 It was truly a breach of the Emperor’s prerogative of supreme command. Officers of the two Armies moved their forces without the Emperor’s order. But, unlike the Tōsuiken Kanpan Commotion of the previous year, in which the enactment of the London Naval Treaty by the government without a complete agreement of Chief of the Navy General Staff became a problem, officers of the Kwantung Army and the Chosen Army of Japan were not punished. On the contrary, they were promoted for their military exploits. This led to the decadence of military Atsushi Kōketsu, “Tōsuiken Kanpan to Gunrei Kikan no Taiō: London Kaigun Jōyaku (1930 nen) wo Megutte (the Tōsuiken Kanpan Commotion and General Staffs: A Study on the Enactment of the London Naval Treaty (1930)”, Gunji-Shigaku (The Journal of Military History) , Vol. 15(3) (Dec, 1979), pp.8-21. 82 The Tōsuiken Kanpan Commotion was not the direct reason of why the Manchuria Incident broke out, but it gave grounds to officers of the Kwantung Army to mobilise its force without the government authorisation. 81 74 discipline of military officers. They learned that, if they would accomplish military exploits, even though they would act against the military order, their acts would be approved later. Afterwards, various incidents happen by arbitrary acts of middle-echelon army officers. In January 1932, there was the First Shanghai Incident. In Shanghai, as the Kuomintang received support from the Chinese people, relations between the Chinese people and the Japanese residents there had already become strained in the late 1920s. 83 The Shanghai Incident was a clash between Japanese and Chinese forces in Shanghai sparked by a conspiracy of officers of the Kwantung Army and the Military Attaché to Shanghai, Major-General Tanaka Ryūkichi, to turn international eyes away from Manchuria in order to establish Manchukuo. To this end, Tanaka Ryūkichi instigated Chinese mobs to attack Japanese Buddhist monks. Accordingly, five Japanese, including two Buddhist monks, were attacked by a mob of 50 to 60 Chinese on 18 January. Two of them were murdered. As a result, there was a clash between the Chinese people and the Japanese residents in Shanghai. To rescue the Japanese residents, the Imperial Japanese Navy in Shanghai, unaware of the conspiracy of the army officers, put a landing party ashore. Consequently, the civilian conflict escalated into military clashes between the Japanese naval landing party and the Chinese Army (the 19th Route Army in Chapei) on 28 January. But the Chinese Army overwhelmed the landing party, because the naval landing party was not trained and equipped to fight against Harumi, Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1995). 83 75 army forces. In order to rescue the landing party, the Japanese government, by the strong demand of the navy, decided to send the army from Japan on February. Finally, there was a truce on March.84 What is important for our purposes is how the incident affected Anglo-Japanese relations and the construction plans for the Singapore Naval Base. What aggravated British feelings against Japan was the fact that Japan had mobilised a large military force in an area which Britain regarded as its sphere of interest in China. As a result, the British government decided to abolish the “Ten Year Rule” in March 1932 and accelerated the construction plans for the Singapore Naval Base.85 Although Katō Kanji was forced to step down as Chief of the Navy General Staff, taking responsibility for the disorder caused by the Tōsuiken Kanpan Commotion, this commotion expanded the influence of the “fleet faction” within the Imperial Japanese Navy with the backing of the “Nelson of Japan”, Fleet Admiral Tōgo Heihachirō and his protégé, Ogasawara Naganari. It has been said that Katō Kanji and Suetsugu succeeded in cajoling them to support the “fleet faction”. After stepping down as Chief of the Navy General Staff, Katō Kanji became a member of the Supreme Military Council. In February 1932, Fleet Admiral, Prince Fushimi, a German educated Prince Admiral, was appointed Chief, and Takahashi Sankichi, a protégé of Katō Kanji and Suetsugu, was appointed Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff. In 1933, Admiral Ōsumi Mineo, a hawkish opponent of naval limitation, was Ibid., pp.133-142. W. David McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 1919-1942 (London: Macmillan Press, 1979), pp.103-107; James Neidpath, 84 85 The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain’s Eastern Empire, 1919-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp.123-126. 76 appointed the Minister of the Navy with the backing of Katō Kanji and his protégés. In November that year, Suetsugu became the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. In addition, during 1933-34, most senior officers of the “treaty faction” who supported the acceptance of the Washington and London Naval Treaties were retired or placed in the reserve list systemically. This was called the “Ōsumi Purge”. Among these officers, was Admiral Yamanashi Katsunoshin, a successsor of Katō Tomosaburō.86 After the “fleet faction” officers expelled most of the “treaty faction” officers, they decided not to retain the Washington and London Naval Treaties. However they considered that Article 19 of the Washington Treaty was still advantageous for them. The abrogation of Article 19 From May 1933, the Imperial Japanese Navy prepared for the Second London Naval Conference. After ousting supporters of the naval disarmament treaties from the policy-making process of the Imperial Japanese Navy by the “Ōsumi Purge”, there was no voice in the navy which supported the acceptance of an inferior ships ratio. A staff officer in charge of armaments, Commander Ishikawa Shingo, prepared a memoranda in October 1933 in which he advocated parity of ships ratio against the United States Navy. He considered that armaments of sovereign states should be equal. Japan had enacted naval disarmament treaties in the past because it considered it could 86 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, pp.169-172. 77 not compete against the United States in a ship construction race. However, he advocated, if Japan would construct mammoth battleships which could not pass through the Panama Canal, Japan should not afraid of the United States in view of the fact that all American battleships were designed to pass through the Panama Canal. The United States should put mobility between the Pacific and the Atlantic into consideration but Japan should not. Katō Kanji, Suetsugu and Ōsumi accepted Ishikawa’s opinion. This decision would lead Japan to break away from naval disarmament treaties. 87 It was impossible for the United States and Britain to accept a parity ships ratio. Ishikawa’s idea for mammoth battleships would be incarnated in the Yamato Class battleships in later days. The official naval historian, Nomura Minoru, wrote, “There was no document which indicated preservation of naval treaties” in this period.88 The London Naval Treaty would automatically expire at the end of 1936. The government, bowing to strong demands from the navy, decided on September 1934 that it would give notice of the abrogation of the Washington Treaty by the end of that year.89 Ōsumi considered that if the Japanese parity demand was not met, “rupture of the conference could not be helped.”90 As the expiration of both Washington and London Naval Treaties approached, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s positive evaluation of the Singapore Naval Base and Article 19 of the Washington Treaty began to falter. In a navy report analysing international relations in May 1934, there was a statement BBKS, Senshi Sōsho: Daihon’ei Kaigun-bu: Rengō Kantai. Vol. 1. , pp.279-280; Asada, Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations, p.147. 88 BBKS Senshi Sōsho: Daihon’ei Kaigun-bu: Rengō Kantai. Vol. 1. , p.282. 89 Asada, Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations, p.149. 90 Ibid., p.147. 87 78 that: “Britain was not pleased with Japanese advancement, and was enlarging the Singapore Naval Base as well as its land facilities” 91 . But this consideration would not lead the navy to the abrogation of Article 19 straight away. On the contrary, the navy examined the possibility that it would preserve Article 19 as an agreement separate from the Washington Treaty.92 Although the navy considered that the capital ships ratio and the auxiliary ships ratio enacted at Washington and London respectively were highly disadvantageous to Japan, it still considered that Article 19 was advantageous. A study of Article 19 by the navy acknowledged that the current Article 19 had a defect that it did not cover Singapore and Hawaii. However, considering the fact that naval bases in Hawaii and Singapore had been almost completed, the effectiveness of enlarging the maintenance of the status quo area to Hawaii and Singapore was doubtful. Practically, it would not change the situation. On the other hand, to demand the destruction of naval bases in Hawaii and Singapore was advantageous to Japan, but there would be no possibility that the United States and Britain would agree. This demand would just end in aggravating the image of Japan. The navy concluded that it would be tactless to bring this issue to the next London Conference before discussion of the ships ratio.93 “Kokusai Jōsei Kaigun Gawa I-in (International Relations, Naval Members) May, 1934”, in Institute of Oriental Studies, Daito Bunka University (ed.), 91 Shōwa Shakai Keizai Shiryo Shūsei: Dai kan, Kaigun Shō Shiryō (1) (Documents of Society and Economy in Shōwa Period, Vol.1, Documents on the Ministry of the Navy (1)), (Tokyo: Institute of Oriental Studies, Daito Bunka University, 1978), pp.9-15. 92 Gendaishi Shiryō (Documents on Modern History), Vol. 12, Nitchū Sensō (Sino-Japanese War 4) , pp.22-23. 93 Ibid., pp.99-102. 79 This time, contrary to in the past, the Imperial Japanese Army was more eager than the Imperial Japanese Navy to preserve Article 19. Since the Washington Conference, the policies of the two armed forces had reached a broad consensus on Article 19 for the first time. But why had the army changed its standpoint and become more eager than the navy to preserve Article 19? In this period, after the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932, the army wanted to focus its resources on the development of Manchukuo and on preparation for war against the Soviet Union, which the army considered would became unavoidable in the near future.94 To prepare for war against the Soviet Union, it was necessary for the army to avoid any conflicts with the United State and Britain in view of the fact that it was impossible for Japan to wage a two front war. This army policy was called Hokushin Nanshu Ron (Advance in the North, Hold in the South Policy). The army considered that, even though the abrogation of the Washington Treaty was unavoidable, because the navy strongly advocated it, preserving Article 19 contributed to keeping good relations with the United Sates and Britain; and securing a defence against the United States. The army documents for the first time clearly stipulated that Article 19 was advantageous for Japan. If Article 19 was abrogated, even though Japan could strengthen the fortifications in the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands and Taiwan, the fortifications in Guam and the Philippines would become formidable threats to Japan. The army also considered it was better to add some restriction on air forces facilities in the 94 BBKS, Senshi sōsho: Daihon’ei Rikugunbu, 1., pp.345-392. 80 restricted area and that the naval fortification issue should be discussed at the next naval conference.95 For this army opinion, the Imperial Japanese Navy doubted the effectiveness of restriction on air forces facilities. Furthermore, to add restrictions of air forces facilities in the Japanese Islands within the restricted area hampered the defence capabilities of Japan. The navy also considered that it was unavoidable to discuss naval fortifications at the London Conference because the navy planned to give notice of the abrogation of the Washington Treaty by the end of 1934; Article 19 was included in the Treaty.96 However it was tactless to propose naval fortification issues from Japan. Rather, it was better to accept the agreement which would enforce maintenance of the status quo of the fortifications after some other country raised the issue. If other countries saw that Japan wanted it, they would take advantage of it to negotiate the ships ratio. The navy considered that there was the possibility that the United States would force Japan to accept an inferior ships ratio in exchange for the preservation of non-fortification agreements. Even though Article 19 was advantageous for Japan, it was not advantageous enough to cover the loss caused by accepting an inferior ships ratio. Although the Gendaishi Shiryō (Documents on Modern History), Vol. 12, Nitchū Sensō (Sino-Japanese War 4), p.3, 12, pp.22-23; Toshikazu Inouye, Kiki no Nakano Kyōcyō Gaikō: Nitchū Sensō ni Itaru Taigai Seisaku no Keisei to Tenkai (Co-operative Diplomacy in the Crisis: Making and Execution of Diplomatic Policies in History to the Sino-Japanese War) (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 95 1994), pp.147-148. “Hon-Kaigi Gidai ni Bōbi Seigen o Kuwauru o Yō-suru Rikugun no Iken ni Taisuru Kaigun no Ikō (The Navy’s Opinion for the Army which considered that it would be necessary to discuss naval fortification at the Conference)”, in Shōwa Shakai Keizai Shiryo Shūsei: Dai 1, pp.27-28; Gendaishi Shiryō, Vol. 12, Nitchū Sensō 4, pp.22-23, 99-101. 96 81 Imperial Japanese Navy would still wish for the preservation of Article 19, it was no longer an imperative.97 At the Washington Conference, preventing the building of American bases in Guam and the Philippines had been more important than the capital ships ratio, but now the parity of ships ratio was more important than fortifications in Guam and the Philippines. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s concern about the Singapore Naval Base was growing around that time. What concerned the navy was a possibility that, in the event of war against the United States, Britain would join the United States or would take a friendly stance towards the United States. As the construction of the base was progressing, the capability of Britain to deploy naval forces in eastern waters was increasing. Because of the Manchuria Incident, the Japanese secession from the League of Nations and economic competition with Britain, the Imperial Japanese Navy considered it could no longer expect strict British neutrality in the event of a Japanese-American war.98 In the summer of 1934, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s confidence in Article 19 began to wane. Although it still considered it was advantageous for Japan, compared with the time of the Washington Conference, it became less advantageous. There were three reasons which explained the change of evaluation. The first was the progress of construction of naval bases in Singapore and Hawaii. The second was technological advancements. “Hon-Kaigi Gidai ni Bōbi Seigen o Kuwauru o Yō-suru Rikugun no Iken ni Taisuru Kaigun no Ikō”, in Shōwa Shakai Keizai Shiryo Shūsei: Dai 1, 27-28; Gendaishi Shiryō, Vol. 12, Nitchū Sensō 4, pp.28-29. 98 “Gunshuku Kankei Setumei Shiryō (Documents for Explaining Naval Disarmaments)”, dated in June 1934 in Shōwa Shakai Keizai Shiryo Shūsei: Dai 1, pp.100-106; Gendaishi Shiryō, Nitchū Sensō , p.60. 97 82 Aeronautical technologies advanced rapidly; and speed, firepower and cruising radius of ships were increasing. The cruising radius of ships in most ship categories had more than doubled since the time of the Washington Conference. The third was deterioration of American-Japanese relations and Anglo-Japanese relations: as a result of the Manchuria incident, Japanese secession from the League of Nations and the intensifying of Anglo-Japanese economic competition.99 Naval documents for explaining naval policies made in September 1934 stipulated that Japan “approved” naval bases in Singapore and Hawaii at the Washington Conference but, as a result of technological advancements which diminished geographical distance, the distances to Singapore and Hawaii were no longer safe.100 However, it did not abandon the judgement that Article 19 was advantageous for Japan.101 Article 19 still prevented the United States from constructing naval bases in Guam and the Philippines. The preliminary conversations of the Second London Naval Conference began in October 1934. The Japanese policy of auxiliary ships ratio for this conference was no longer 10:7. While Japan demanded parity with the United States and Britain, the United States and Britain were 99 “Konji no Kaigun Gunshuku Kōshō to Teikoku Syuchou no Konpon (The Fundamental Policy of the Empire and Naval Disarmament’s Negotiations at the Next Conference)”, in Shōwa Shakai Keizai Shiryo Shūsei: Dai 1, pp.158-172. 100 “Teikoku no Syuchō ni Taisuru Setumei Narabini Ou-shū Shiryō (Gunsyuku Mondai)・Gunmu-kyoku Dai 1-ka Be-shitu (Explanation Documents on the Empire’s Policies regarding Naval Disarmaments by the Naval Affairs Bureau)”, in Shōwa Shakai Keizai Shiryo Shūsei: Dai 1, pp.173-190. 101 Gendaishi Shiryō, Nitchū Sensō 4, p.28, 37, 46. 83 determined to preserve the Washington and London system. Soon the talks reached an impasse. On 29 December 1934, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Saitō Hiroshi, handed the notice of abrogation of the Washington Treaty to the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. 102 The main conference of the Second London Naval Conference began in December 1935. As expected, the United States and Britain could not accept the Japanese demand for parity. As a result, Chief of the Japanese delegates, Nagano Osami, gave notice of secession from the Second London Naval Conference on 15 January 1936. By this notification, Japan put a period to naval disarmaments, which had continued since the Washington Conference in 1921/22. After all, the Japanese delegates missed the opportunity to propose the preservation of Article 19 as a separate treaty before it gave notice. However, Japan did not abandon the intention to preserve Article 19 of the Washington Treaty straight away. On 18 February, Japanese Chargé d’ Affaires in London, Fujii Keishirō, on instructions from Tokyo, visited Robert Craigie, a member of the British delegates to the London Naval Conference, informing him of the Japanese desire to preserve Article 19 of the Washington Treaty as a separate treaty. In addition, Fujii asked Craigie to inform the American delegates to the Second London Naval Conference of the Japanese desire.103 In September that year, the British government decided that Britain also desired the renewal of Article 19 as a separate treaty and asked the United States to join. But the answer from Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor., p.198. TNA, FO 371/19803, Record of Meeting between Mr. R.L. Craigie of the United Kingdom Delegation and Mr. K. Fujii of the Japanese Embassy, 157. 102 103 84 the United States was negative.104 Britain, after getting the American answer, suggested a bilateral agreement with Japan. But it was not attractive to Japan. Japan proposed the maintenance of the status quo of naval fortifications at the Washington Conference to prevent building of American advanced naval bases in Guam and the Philippines. Article 19 without the United States was meaningless for Japan. The United States accepted Article 19 in exchange for Japanese acceptance of the 10:6 capital ships ratio. For the United States, Article 19 without the naval ships ratio was meaningless. Therefore, with the expiration of the Washington Treaty at the end of 1936, the termination of Article 19 came about. The Japanese government did not reply to the British proposal to enact a bilateral agreement on the maintenance of the status quo of fortifications in the Pacific. Conclusion From the Washington Conference in 1921/22 to 1936, the Imperial Japanese Navy had a unifying policy on the British Singapore Naval Base. It was not desirable but acceptable on condition that Britain supported Article 19 which prevented the United States from establishing bases in Guam and the Philippines. Within the navy, there was complete agreement between Katō Kanji’s group, and Katō Tomosaburō and his successors on this point. What was important for the naval delegates to the Washington 104 TNA, FO 371/19819, 23-25. 85 Conference was to reach some agreements in naval disarmaments with Anglo-American powers as well as securing Japanese naval supremacy in the western Pacific. If the United States would establish new naval bases in Guam and the Philippines, Japan could not secure naval supremacy in the western Pacific. This was totally unacceptable to the Imperial Japanese Navy. To prevent the United States from establishing bases in Guam and the Philippines, the Japanese delegates proposed maintaining the status quo of naval fortifications in the Pacific. Before formally proposing this, Real-Admiral Yamanashi Katsunoshin approached Real-Admiral Ernle Chatfield to sound out the British standpoint on naval fortifications in the Pacific. The Japanese delegates knew from the meeting that, if Japan did not include Singapore in the restricted area of the Japanese proposal, Japan could secure British support for the Japanese proposal. To preserve the British agreement to the Japanese proposal, the Japanese delegates intentionally did not mention Singapore in any formal meeting and did not refer to Singapore in its proposal. Contrary to Britain which started regarding Japan as its future hypothetical enemy, the Imperial Japanese Navy did not regard Britain as its hypothetical enemy. To confront the United States diplomatically, the Imperial Japanese Navy needed British support. As a result, Article 19 of the Washington Treaty excluded Singapore from the area which prevented strengthening naval fortifications and establishing naval base without referring to Singapore. But there was complete understanding between the Japanese and British delegates that Singapore was excluded from the restricted area of Article 19. Some previous studies suggested that Katō Kanji’s group had been 86 the “anti-Anglo-American faction” since the time of the Washington Conference.105 But the Katō Kanji’s group was not necessarily an anti-British faction. Katō Kanji and Suetsugu Nobumasa were too preoccupied with how to wage naval battles against the American fleet to take Britain into consideration. There is no clear evidence that Katō Kanji and Suetsugu had any particular policy towards Britain. For Katō Kanji’s group, Article 19, which prevented the building of American bases in Guam and the Philippines, was advantageous for conducting naval battles against the United States. They considered that war against the United States was imminent because the United States had both the intention and the capability to attack Japan. Because of incompatible clashes of interests over the domination of China and American racial prejudice against Japanese, a Japanese-American war in the near future would be unavoidable. On the other hand, Britain had neither intention nor capability to attack Japan. Even though small conflicts of interests existed locally between Japan and Britain, there was no insoluble clash of interests between the two countries. Clashes of interests between Japan and Britain were adjustable. Britain had a plan to build a naval base in Singapore but the construction of it hardly progressed until at least 1932. There was no naval base in the Asia-Pacific region which could accommodate the British fleet during this period. Without a base, it was impossible for Britain to attack Japan. What was more, confronting an imminent threat from the United States, they did not have the scope to take Singapore into serious Ikeda, “The Road to Singapore: Japan’s View of Britain, 1922-41”, pp.31-32. 105 87 consideration. There was no evidence that Katō Kanji and Suetsugu examined a possibility of a war between Japan and Britain. On the other hand, for successors of Katō Tomosaburō, to avoid war against the United States and Britain was necessary and naval treaties contributed greatly to saving Japan from both financial bankruptcy and war against the United States. It was impossible for Japan to conduct a ship constructing race against the United States. In addition, Article 19, which secured Japanese naval supremacy in the western Pacific, contributed greatly to the defence of Japan. The combination of the naval forces ratio and the restriction on naval fortifications gave Japan security against the United States. Britain succeeded in keeping the loyalty of Dominion countries without harming Anglo-Japanese relations in this period by the construction plan of the Singapore Naval Base. Historians of the English-speaking world tend to study the history of the Singapore Naval Base or the British “Singapore Strategy” from the perspective that it ended in total disaster in 1941/42. But the “Singapore Strategy” worked reasonably well as a peacetime naval strategy from 1921 to 1936. During this period, Britain maintained the prestige of the overstretched British Empire by promising to provide for the security of Dominion countries－Australia and New Zealand－under scarce resources while keeping a good relationship with Japan. What was important was that the Royal Navy succeeded in getting the Imperial Japanese Navy’s substantial approval for the Singapore Naval Base at the Washington Conference. As was recorded in the Nomura committee report in 1928, the Imperial Japanese Navy accepted the British explanation that Britain needed the Singapore Naval Base 88 as a promise to provide security for the globally stretched British Empire. Furthermore, even though Britain had the plan to establish the Singapore Naval Base, its construction hardly progressed during this period. It was no more than a construction site during this period. The dilatory construction resulted in the Japanese Navy not exercising sufficient caution towards it. However, the situation was totally changed in the mid 1930s. After ousting members of the “treaty faction” from the decision-making process of the Imperial Japanese Navy by the “Ōsumi Purge” in 1933, there was no voice in the Imperial Japanese Navy to support the acceptance of the inferior naval ratio against the United States. The Imperial Japanese Navy decided not to renew the Washington Treaty by the end of 1934. They tried to preserve Article 19 as a separate treaty, but the maintenance of the status quo of naval fortifications in the Pacific without restricting naval forces ratio was meaningless to the United States. Consequently, by the termination of the Washington Treaty and its Article 19, the Imperial Japanese Navy lost its reason to accept the Singapore Naval Base. The termination of the Washington and London Naval Treaties completely destroyed the multilateral balance of power between Japan, Britain and the United States which had been preserved by combination of the naval forces ratio and the restriction of naval fortifications. 89 [...]... intention to include Singapore into the non-fortification agreement After that, the Japanese MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, p. 247 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, pp. 245 - 248 ; “Telegram from Katō Tomosaburō to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uchida Kōsai”, dated on 27 December 1921, in MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Jō, pp .40 3 -40 5 33 Telegram from the Minister of Foreign... Affairs, Uchida Kōsai, to Katō Tomosaburō dated on 22 December 1921 in MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Jō, pp .40 2 -40 3 34 Telegram from Katō Tomosaburō to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uchida Kōsai, dated on 27 December 1921, in MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Jō, pp .40 3 -40 5 31 32 50 delegates did not bring Singapore into discussions, but they had the unified view that Singapore was excluded from the non-fortification... dated on 12 Dec 1921 (sent on 10 Dec) in MOFA NGB, Washinton Kaigi Jō, pp.396-397 48 United States and Britain would agree to maintain the status quo of naval fortifications in the Pacific Katō Tomosaburō told them: “I would like to obtain from you a clear understanding in regard to the principle of maintaining the status quo of the fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific If the Pacific Islands... fortifications area to Hawaii and Singapore was advantageous to Japan or not It considered that, to enlarge it to Hawaii and Singapore was desirable, but Japan did not wish to enlarge it to any Japanese island If Japan proposed to enlarge maintenance of the status quo of the fortifications area to Hawaii and Singapore, Japan would have compensated anything, to accept the maintenance of the status quo of naval fortifications... multilateral balance of power in combination of naval forces ratio and naval fortifications between Japan, Britain and the United States For these three Pacific powers, naval forces ratio and naval fortifications were inseparably linked to each other The Aftermath of the Washington Conference In the spring of 1923, the British government revealed its scheme to build a new naval base in Singapore 48 This news... to Tokyo on 9 December, Kato Kanji just reported the gist of the Yamanashi-Chatfield Cited from the Article 19 of the Washington Treaty MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, p.263 37 TNA, CAB 5/5; CO 537/1 045 , 197-C, “Establishment of Naval Base at Singapore and its Effect upon the Foreign and Naval Policy of the Empire, 6-8 35 36 51 meeting.38 In addition, Katō Kanji bitterly discussed the. .. concurrently as the Minister of the Navy What he had to do was to reform the Imperial Japanese Navy and revise the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin (The Imperial National Defence Policy) to accommodate to the treaties he enacted at the Washington Conference But unfortunately for him and Japan, Before that, the plan to build a new naval base in Singapore was a secret plan 48 56 his health did not allow him to conduct... was promoted to Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff in May 1922 Ever since the Washington Conference, the United States had become an immense threat rather than a hypothetical enemy for hard line naval officers like Katō Kanji and Suetsugu .49 Katō Tomosaburō accepted the Washington treaties to avoid war against the United States Ironically, however, the revision of naval policies in the Teikoku Kokubō... Essays in Honour of Ian Nish (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1992), pp.31-32 41 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p.87 42 Kanji Katō, Zoku Gendaishi Shiryō Dai 5 Kan: Kato Kanji Nikki (Second Series of Documents of Modern History, Vol 5: Kato Kanji Diary) (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 19 94) , p.51 38 52 of the telegram he reported the gist of the Yamanashi-Chatfield meeting, “Do Not Reveal This to the United States... prepared to break up the conference as the result of our strong position”.69 The Imperial Japanese Army, which was not satisfied with the navy’s conclusion regarding naval fortifications in the Pacific at the Washington Conference, also prepared for the London Naval Conference of 1930 from early July 1929 The Army General Staff’s acknowledgement of Article 19 of the Washington Conference was totally . were Katō Tomosaburō, the Minister of the Navy, Tokugawa Iesato, Chairman of the House of Peers and a descendant of Tokugawa Shōgun, Shidehara Kijūrō, the Japanese Ambassador to the United. At the conference, the Japanese delegates proposed the maintenance of the status quo of naval fortifications in the Pacific and this was enacted as Article 19 of the Washington Treaty. The Japanese. Report of Admiral of the Fleet, Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa on Naval Mission to the Commonwealth of Australia (May-August, 1919)” submitted to the Australian government during the tour. 3 Tokyo