The japanese road to singapore japanese perceptions of the singapore naval base, 1921 41 3

Introduction On December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Army landed in Singora, Patani and Kota Bahru in the Malay Peninsula. Two days later, HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse were sunk by Japanese bombers in the South China Sea. On 15 February 1942, Singapore fell into Japanese hands. The Malaya Campaign ended in tremendous disaster for Britain. But why did the Japanese attack British Malaya and Singapore? How did the Japanese plan and prepare for attacking British Malaya and Singapore? And, how did the Japanese perceive the Singapore Base before the Second World War? This study deals with Japanese perceptions of the British Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy” in the period between the two world wars. In this period, relations between Japan and Britain turned from allies to enemies. There are a large number of studies on the British side history of the Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy”. These studies have searched for reasons as to how the fall of Singapore and the sinking of HMS Price of Wales and HMS Repulse happened primarily by using western sources. Nevertheless, as yet, there has been no study of how the Japanese perceived the British Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy” during the period from the Washington Conference 1921/22 to the outbreak of the Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region in December 1941, with the exception of Ikeda Kiyoshi’s short article, “The Road to Singapore: Japan’s View of Britain 1922-41”.1 Consequently, there are serious gaps in studies of the history of these areas between the British side and the Japanese side. As a result, we not know the full story of how the Japanese perceived the naval base, how Japan prepared and made plans to attack British Malaya and Singapore, and why Japan attacked British Malaya and Singapore. The purpose of this study is to fill these gaps by studying the history from Japanese side primarily using Japanese sources. There are four reasons explaining why there are these gaps. The first reason is that, for most Japanese, the Second World War was principally a war against the United States and China. Even the fall of Singapore and the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, which inflicted tremendous impacts on the British Empire, were minor events, compared with the impact of the Pearl Harbour attack, the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Japan’s final defeat in August 1945. Japanese historians who study Japanese history have explained the origin of the Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region by giving domestic reasons: how militarism came to control the government and its policies. Historians who study international history have explained the origin(s) by examining American-Japanese relations or Sino-Japanese relations . Japanese historians tend to neglect Kiyoshi Ikeda. “The Road to Singapore: Japan’s View of Britain, 1922-41”, in T.G. Fraser and Peter Lowe (eds.), Conflict and Amity in East Asia: Essays in Honour of Ian Nish (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1992), pp.30-46. Akira Iriye, After Imperialism (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1965), etc. Iriye Akira’s work contributed tremendously to the history of American-Japanese relations. Katusmi Usui, Nitchū Gaikō Shi: Hokubatsu no Jidai (Diplomatic History between Japan and China: The Era of Northern Expedition) (Tokyo: Hanawa Shōbō, 1971); Motoei Satō, Shōwa Shoki tai Chūgoku Seisaku no Kenkyū: British factors. The second reason is that historians who study Anglo-Japanese relations have focused their interests on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance or conflict between the two Empires in China.5 The third reason is that those who study the history of the Singapore Naval Base and the “Singapore Strategy” tend to limit their scope to the British side history by using Western sources, searching for the reason(s) why and how Britain was easily defeated by Japan in Malaya and Singapore.6 The fourth reason is that there were a great number of conflicts or reasons of conflicts between Japan and other countries in the period between the two world wars: Japanese militarism, Chinese nationalism, internal wars between warlords in China, discrimination against Japanese Americans in California, the spread of Communism in China, the clash of interests among powers in China, the changing political situation on the European Continent and the Soviet Union’s Revolutionary Diplomacy. Compared with these, so far, the Singapore Naval Base has not acquired the Japanese historian’s interest. Tanaka Naikaku no Tai Manmō Seisaku (Study of Policies against China in Early Shōwa Period: Policies of the Tanaka Cabinet to Manchuria and Mongolia) (Tokyo: Hara Shōbō, 1992);Seiichi Koike, Manshū Jihen to tai Chūgoku Seisaku (Manchuria Incident and Japanese Policies toward China) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2003). Ian Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-23 (London: Athlone Press, 1972), etc. Ian Nish’s work illuminated the history of Anglo-Japanese relations greatly. Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995); Antony Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914-1941 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). James Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain’s Eastern Empire, 1919-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); W. David McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 19191-1942 (London: Macmillan Press, 1979); Ian Hamill, The Strategic Illusion: The Singapore Strategy and the Defence of Australia and New Zealand, 1919-1942 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981). This study is the first approach to examine the history of the Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy” from the Japanese point of view. In English speaking countries, some believe that Japan had prepared to attack British Malaya and Singapore for many years. Others suppose that Japan made the plan to attack Singapore from scratch just before the war. However, so far, Japanese perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy” have been unexplored. More specifically, this study examines the following questions. First: how did the Japanese government, especially the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Imperial Japanese Army, perceive the Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy”? Second: how did the Japanese commercial mass media － newspapers, magazines and books － perceive and discuss the Singapore Naval Base? Third: when and how did the Navy General Staff and the Army General Staff make operational plans to attack British Malaya and Singapore? And, fourth: why did the Japanese attack British Malaya and Singapore? This introduction is followed by four chapters and a conclusion. Chapter examines policies of the Japanese government － the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Imperial Japanese Army－towards the Singapore Naval Base from the Washington Conference in 1921/22 to 1936. Chapter considers the views of the Singapore Naval Base as expressed in the Japanese commercial publishing media. Chapter examines the Japanese south-bound policies from 1936 to 1940. In particular, it analyses the history of two different but related aspects. First, why the Imperial Japanese Navy proposed the south-bound policy and how it became the national policy? Second, when and how the Army General Staff and the Navy General Staff made operational plans to attack British Malaya and Singapore? Chapter deals with the period from the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe in September 1939 to the outbreak of the war in the Asia-Pacific region in December 1941 and examines the following aspects. First, why Japan attacked British Malaya and Singapore? Second, how the Japanese conducted final preparations to attack British Malaya and Singapore? Historical Background The history of Anglo-Japanese relations in the Modern period could be traced back to the Anglo-Japanese Convention of 1854. When Japan ended its seclusion and opened its doors to the rest of the world, it was the height of the Victorian Age. The Japanese looked upon Britain as the symbol of modernisation and the Western civilisation. To become a country like Britain and gain equality with Western powers became Japan’s national objectives. The Imperial Japanese Navy was constructed on the example and teaching of the Royal Navy while the Imperial Japanese Army was constructed on the example and teaching of the German Army. When the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was ratified in 1902, the Japanese rejoiced over the news. They considered their dreams had come true. Japan became a country which could associate with Britain on equal terms. From 1902 to the Washington Conference in 1921/22, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the pillar of Japanese diplomatic and military policies. After Japan checked Russian south-bound advancement by winning the Russo-Japanese War in 1904/05, Japan became the leading naval power in the western Pacific. Consequently, the two rising Pacific naval powers, Japan and the United States, faced each other over the Pacific. As a result, the American fears of Japan heightened. Both the Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States Navy started regarding each other as their future hypothetical enemies. At that time there was also a racial issue between them. Japanese immigrants in California faced racial discrimination. In 1906, Japanese children were segregated in special schools in San Francisco. The Japanese at home were disappointed by the discrimination against their fellows in California. As a result, the seeds of Japanese-American antagonism were planted. The Americans also began to look at the Anglo-Japanese Alliance suspiciously because they found the United States stood between Japan and Britain. From Russia, Japan took over Lushun, Dalian and the South Manchuria Railway by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. To defend the South Manchuria Railway, Japan gained the right to station its forces. Accordingly, the Imperial Japanese Army deployed its force to protect Japanese interests in Manchuria. From then onwards, defending Japanese interests in Manchuria against Russia became the most important objective of the Imperial Japanese Army. Its force stationed in Manchuria was named as the Kwangtun Army in 1919. To formalise its post-Russo-Japanese War defence policies, Japan enacted its national defence policy, the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin (Imperial National Defence Policy), for the first time in 1907. In the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin, Russia was singled out as Japan’s principal hypothetical enemy. The United States, Germany, and France were also included in the hypothetical enemies list. The Imperial Japanese Army would make defence preparations against Russia while the Imperial Japanese Navy would make defence preparations against the United States. Britain was the ally. The opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 greatly facilitated the transfer of the American fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific. That year, the First World War broke out. Japan entered the First World War on the Allies side, in which it attacked and occupied German leased territory in the Shandong Peninsula. In 1915, Japan expressed its ambition to China by addressing Twenty-One Demands, which raised suspicion of the United States and Britain against Japan. After the First World War, Japan participated in the Versailles Conference as one of five great powers. At the Versailles Conference, the League of Nations was established. The Japanese delegates to the conference proposed a racial equality clause to be inserted into the League of Nations Charter. However, it was rejected by the United States and delegates from the British Empire. The Japanese were disillusioned by this. They realised it was not easy to be accepted by Western powers as an equal partner. On the other hand, Japanese support for Indian independence movements further aggravated Anglo-Japanese relations. Japanese nationalists, such as Tōyama Mitsuru, Ucida Ryōhei and Ōkawa Shūmei, sheltered and encouraged Indian seditionists, such as Rashbehari Bose. Britain was dissatisfied with this.7 The efficacy of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance declined as a result of these events. Mutual suspicions between Japan and the Western powers were growing during the First World War. However, in Japan, affection for Britain still remained, especially within the Imperial Japanese Navy, even though it became weaker. For the British, the external powers in the Asia-Pacific region which had the capability to impose threats on the British Empire were Japan and the United States. An Anglo-American war was an unlikely possibility. But the Japanese intention was unclear. The British Dominions in the Pacific－Australia and New Zealand－wanted a security policy because they anticipated the possibility that Japan would invade them. The British government had to present a plan to reassure its Dominions. The British government decided to build a new naval base in Singapore on 16 June 1921. The British strategic intention was that, if any conflict should break out in the Asia-Pacific region, Britain would send its fleet from Europe－home waters or the Mediterranean－to the Asia-Pacific region to defend its Empire there. This fleet required a naval base in the Asia-Pacific region, otherwise it could not operate there. Singapore, which stood between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, was chosen as a place to build the naval base for this fleet. This British plan to send a fleet from Europe to Singapore to defend its Empire from the Japanese threat has been called the “Singapore Strategy”. Until 1924, however, the British government did not set Nish, Alliance in Decline, pp.184-185, p.241; Harumi Goto-Shibata, “Internationalism and nationalism: Anti-Western sentiments in Japanese foreign policy debates, 1918-22”, in Naoko Shimazu (ed.), Nationalisms in Japan (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 70. about constructing the base. Since the end of the First World War, all defence spending of Britain, including the construction plan of the Singapore Naval Base, was controlled by the “Ten Year Rule”. It stated that the services should base their plans on the assumption there would be no major war for ten years.8 From 12 November 1921 to February 1922, the Washington Conference took place among countries which had interests in the Asia-Pacific region to discuss naval disarmament and bring stability to East Asia. In the Washington Conference, three major treaties were enacted. The Washington Treaty commonly known as the Five-Power Treaty determined capital ships9 ratio between the United States, Britain, Japan, France and Italy as 10:10:6:3.5:3.5. Article 19 of the Washington Treaty prohibited the United States from strengthening fortifications in Guam and the Philippines, Britain in Hong Kong but allowed strengthening fortifications and establishing new bases in Hawaii and Singapore. The Four-Power Treaty was a treaty for mutual agreement of territorial rights in the Pacific between the United States, Britain, Japan and France. The Nine-Power Treaty affirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China between all participants in the Washington Conference: the United States, Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands Portugal and China. The Washington Conference cleared mutual suspicion between Japan and the United States to some degree. But the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abrogated at the Washington Conference. Japan Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain’s Eastern Empire, 1919-1941, p.35. Capital ships are battle ships, battle cruisers and aircraft-carriers larger than 10, 000 tons. and Britain were no longer allies. Generally, the Japanese government attempted to keep good relations with Britain and the United States in the 1920s by the Shidehara Gaikō (Shidehara Diplomacy). Shidehara Kijūrō served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs twice: from June 1924 to April 1927 and from July 1929 to December 1931. His policies, known as the Shidehara Gaikō, emphasised cooperation with Britain, the United States and China rather than military means to further Japan’s economic interest. However, in 1924, the Japanese American issue re-erupted with the Alien Immigration Act. It substantially excluded Japanese immigrants from American citizenship. The Japanese public were infuriated by the American treatment of their fellows in California. In China in the 1920s, as Chinese nationalism gained support from the Chinese people, relations between Chinese people and Japanese residents in China became strained. As American-Japanese relations and Sino-Japanese relations became strained, the Shidehara Gaikō was losing the support of the Japanese people. However, compared with Sino-Japanese relations and American-Japanese relations, Anglo-Japanese relations in the 1920s were stable. Even though there were several seeds of conflict between the two countries, they did not develop into buds. They were the white Australia policy, export of Japanese cotton goods to India, and economic competition in China. The Japanese public was first informed of the British plan to establish a new naval base in Singapore in May 1923 when the British Parliament discussed the budget for the base. In March 1924, soon after site preparation began in Sembawang in Singapore, the Labour Government announced the 10 wrote the same things in an article “The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the First World War”.17 However, his description of the Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy” is limited. A British naval historian, Arthur Marder, analysed relations between the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy from 1936 to the outbreak of the Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region in Old Friends, New Enemies. 18 Since the 1870s, the Imperial Japanese Navy was strongly influenced by the Royal Navy. Even after Anglo-Japanese relations deteriorated after 1936, affection for the Royal Navy remained in the Imperial Japanese Navy, especially among senior officers. But, his book did not cover how the Imperial Japanese Navy perceived the Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy” before 1936. Compilations of studies on Anglo-Japanese relations have been published twice in the past. Both were edited by Ian Nish and Hosoya Chihiro, which were published in bilingual, English and Japanese: Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919-1952 in 1982 and the five volumes The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000 from 2000 to 2003. Almost all historians who study Anglo-Japanese relations or related fields contributed their papers to either or both. Compared with these two studies, Ikeda Kiyoshi mentioned to Japanese perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base as a reason Yoichi Hirama, “The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the First World War”, in Yoichi Hirama, Ian Gow and John Chapmen (eds.), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Vol.3, the Military Dimension , (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2003), p.67. 18 Arthur J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy Strategic Illusions 1936-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). 17 19 for deteriorating Anglo-Japanese relations in Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919-1952. But in The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, there were only very brief mentions of those perceptions by Ian Nish and Hirama Yoichi. Ikeda, Nish and Hirama were born before the Second World War. Compared with them, Japanese younger generation historians born after the war have little interest in how the Japanese perceived the Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy”. It looks as if, for Japanese born in the post-war era, the fall of Singapore was a forgotten history even for historians. Kuramatu Tadashi contributed an article “Britain, Japan and Inter-War Naval Limitation, 1921-1936” and Aizawa Kiyoshi an article “The Path Towards an Anti-British’ Strategy by the Japanese Navy between the Wars”. But neither of them took Japanese perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base into consideration. Kuramatu mentioned the British Cabinet’s decision to build the base and wrote: “In contrast to Japanese naval planning, which did not at this time regard Britain as a hypothetical enemy, in the mind of the Royal Navy Japan was the prime enemy in their war plans”, but no more than that.19 Aizawa wrote about south-bound advancement policies of the Imperial Japanese Navy from 1935 and how Britain became a hypothetical enemy of Japan in 1936. Withdrawal from naval treaties, and furthermore, rivalry against the army’s north-bound advance policy urged the Imperial Japanese Navy to take the south-bound advancement policy which inevitably provoked Tadashi Kuramatu, “Britain, Japan and Inter-War Naval Limitation, 1921-1936”, in The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Vol.3, the Military Dimension, p.130. 19 20 confrontation with Britain. For the south-bound advancement policy before 1935, he just briefly mentioned the general background and did not mention the Singapore Naval Base. For the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, he pointed out: “Neither the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) nor the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), responsible for Japan’s national defence, raised strong objections to this loss of an ally. This may be taken as evidence of the reduced military significance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance since the end of its important mission in the Russo-Japanese War.”20 “However, the breaking up of the alliance was originally more important in that it was the decisive action in the breaking away from the British by the IJN, which had seen the Royal Navy hitherto as both model and mentor.”21 In his book, Kaigun no Sentaku (The Navy’s Choice), he cast a doubt upon the conventional view that three Admirals－Yamamoto Isoroku, Yonai Mitsumasa and Inoue Shigeyoshi－ were pro-Anglo-American Admirals. What Aizawa claimed is that if these Admirals had opposed the war to the end, Japan could not have waged war against the United States in view of the fact that Japan could not fight without the Combined Fleet. As is well known in Japan, when Konoe Fumimaro asked Yamamoto Isoroku whether the Imperial Japanese Navy could wage war, Yamamoto replied that the Imperial Japanese Navy could fight one year or one Kiyoshi Aizawa, “The Path Towards an Anti-British’ Strategy by the Japanese Navy between the Wars”, in The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Vol.3, the Military Dimension, p.139. For the detail of his argument, see Kiyoshi Aizawa, Kaigun no Sentaku: Saiko Shinjuwan eno Michi (The Navy’s Choice: The Road to Pearl Harbour Reconsidered) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 2002). 21 Kiyoshi Aizawa, “The Path Towards an Anti-British’ Strategy by the Japanese Navy between the Wars”, p.140. 20 21 and a half years but he could not guarantee after that. Although he did not advocate war, he agreed to the war in the end. Aizawa argued that the main reason why they opposed the Triple Alliance vehemently was not the pro-Anglo-American feeling but rivalry against the Imperial Japanese Army. They opposed the army’s war but not the navy’s war. Yamamoto wanted to test aviation supremacy over the traditional fleet. Aizawa studied how the Imperial Japanese Navy came to recognise Britain as a hypothetical enemy in 1936 and how the Imperial Japanese Navy decided to occupy Hainan Island in 1939: the prime reason was rivalry with the Imperial Japanese Army. In other words, Aizawa studied the Imperial Japanese Navy’s south-bound advancement policies without referring to the Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy”. This approach is totally acceptable in Japan, but inconceivable to the British. When considering the outbreak of the Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region, why Japan plunged into the losing war is the most important theme for Japanese historians, while for British historians, why Singapore fell is the most important theme. There is a gap between Japanese historians’ interest and British historians’ interest. The 102 volume official Japanese war history series: Senshi Sōsho. Senshi Sōsho was compiled by the Military History Department of the Agency of Defence－the former institution of the current Military History Department, the National Institute of Defence Studies, the Ministry of Defence－from 1966 to 1980, primarily as teaching and research materials for the Self Defence Forces using remaining documents and extensive interviews of surviving officers who participated in making operational plans and actual operations. 22 Unlike in Britain and the United States, authors of Senshi Sōsho are former military or naval officers who participated in the war as junior or middle echelon officers. One of them, Nomura Minoru was a former naval officer who became a naval historian. His numerous books including volumes of Senshi Sōsho set a standard for naval history in Japan.22 The navy’s volumes and the army’s volumes of Senshi Sōsho were written separately. In Japan, great numbers of official documents were burnt during American bombardments in 1945. Furthermore, at the end of the Second World War, not a small number of documents were burnt intentionally. The biggest obstacle to studying Japanese military history is the lack of primary sources. Therefore, historians use Senshi Sōsho in lieu of primary sources in Japan. This thesis also uses them as one of its most important sources. Nomura Minoru wrote a Senshi Sōsho volume which deals with the history of naval policies until the outbreak of the war. 23 In this volume, Nomura mentioned interesting points regarding relations between the non-fortifications agreement in the Washington Treaty and the Singapore Naval Base. At the Washington Conference, Japan proposed maintaining the status quo of naval fortifications in the Pacific and it was enacted as Article 19 of the Washington Treaty. Chief of the Japanese delegates, Katō Tomosaburō, intended to maintain the status quo of Guam and the Philippines in exchange for Taiwan, the Pescadoles, Amami-Oshima and the Bonin Islands. From the 22 23 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p.302. BBKS, Senshi Sōsho, Daihon’ei Kaigunbu, Rengō Kantai, 1: Kaisen Made (The Imperial Headquarters, Navy Combined Fleet, Vol. 1, Up to the Outbreak of Hostility), (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1975). 23 outset, the Imperial Japanese Navy considered that if the United States and Britain had not strengthened fortifications and dockyards in the western Pacific, it would become advantageous for Japan. When American or British battleships had been damaged in the Far East, they would have to sail to Hawaii or Singapore to be docked. These were severe blows in time of war. If ships were holed below the waterline by bombs, torpedoes, or naval mines, sailing the heaving seas of the Pacific with only temporary repairs was fairly risky. Therefore it would become reckless for them to conduct a sea battle in the Far East. 24 Before the London Naval Conference in 1930, the Army General Staff proposed to add Singapore, Hawaii and Alaska to the non-fortification agreement enacted at Washington, but at the time the Navy General Staff considered that the existing non-fortification agreement, which prohibited fortification of the Philippines and Guam, was “comparatively advantageous” to Japan. Therefore, the Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff, Suetsugu Nobumasa, explained to the Imperial Japanese Army that Japan would not propose anything relating to the non-fortification agreement.25 For analysing the evolution of operation plans from 1936 to 1941, this volume is greatly useful. Although all existing operational plans are held in the Library of the National Institute of Defence Studies, the Ministry of Defence, almost full sentences－except repetition－of these plans are printed in this volume. Together with the army’s volumes, we can analyse the evolution of plans for attacking Singapore from 1936 to 1941. 24 25 Ibid., pp.188-190. Ibid., pp.221-222. 24 In an article “Military Policy-Makers Behind Japanese Strategy Against Britain”26, Nomura pointed out: “During February-March 1941, Adolf Hitler vigorously urged Japan to humiliate Britain by attacking Singapore as early as possible, but Japan did not follow his advice. The fundamental reason for this was the fear that an attack on Singapore would, in the end, lead to war with the United States. It was not because there would be any tactical difficulty for Japan in attacking Singapore due to lack of bases in the southern part of French Indo-China.” Authors of the army’s volumes of Senshi Sōsho not agree with this view. They consider that Nomura’s view is correct as the view of the Imperial Japanese Navy, but the Imperial Japanese Army did not share it. The Imperial Japanese Army considered it was impossible to attack Singapore without bases in the southern part of Indochina. In the army’s volume of Senshi Sōsho, there is a reference to Tōjō’s expression on 25 April that “Direct attack of Singapore is definitely impossible. It will require preparation: that is to secure bases in southern French Indochina and in southern Thailand.”27 As this typically shows, there is some disagreement between authors of the navy’s volumes of Senshi Sōsho and those of the army, but what is good for us is that, from these disagreements, we can know the disagreements between the two services. In 1940 and 1941, there was disagreement over war strategy between 26 Minoru Nomura, “Military Policy-Makers Behind Japanese Strategy Against Britain”, in Ian Nish (ed.), Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919-1952, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1982), pp.147-155. 27 BBKS, Senshi Sōsho, Daihon’ei Rikugunbu, (Imperial Headquarters, Army, Vol.2, Up to December 1941)’(Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1968), p.265. 25 the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy. The army recognised the coming war was a war against Britain while the navy considered it would be a war against the United States. Ikeda mentioned it by citing from the Nomura’s volume: “The navy, contemplating primarily American-Japanese naval warfare, advocated advancing in a clockwise arc from the Philippines to Borneo, Java, Sumatra and on to Malaya. The army, on the contrary, argued in favour of starting with Malaya and then advancing the other way round. This was because the army thought it indispensable, if it was to carry out its original task, to remove first the British threat, especially the one posed by the Singapore naval base. This shows that some of the army leaders still cherished the hope that it would be possible to prevent the United States from making common cause with Britain and Holland when war was declared on Japan. On the other hand, the navy anticipated that ‘the US would declare war against Japan immediately if Japan attacked Britain’. Accordingly, it became a common belief in the navy that, above anything else, it would have to drive the American Navy away before the Japanese forces advanced to the south, and so the capture of the Philippines was an absolute necessity. In the end the army’s leaders accepted the navy’s view that ‘the United States and Britain are one’, but this did not necessarily mean that they gave up completely their own aim of ‘keeping the United States apart from Britain’. In fact, this debate had a considerable influence on decision over priorities of advance, causing some hesitation and confusion within IHQ [Imperial General 26 Headquarters]”.28 There are a great number of works which deal with Japanese south-bound policies in general. But for operational plans and preparations for attacking British Malaya and Singapore, only related volumes of Senshi Sōsho cover it. The navy’s volume written by Nomura covers naval operation plans before 1941. The two army volumes written by Shimanuki Takeharu, a former staff officer, cover army operational plans before 1941.29 The volume of the Malaya Campaign, written by Fuwa Hiroshi, covers army preparations for attacking Malaya and Singapore.30 The volume of Imperial Japanese Navy’s Southern Force written by several former naval officers covers its preparations for attacking the Philippines and Malaya.31 Among numerous works on Japanese domestic political history, Yoshizawa Minami took a new approach in his study, Sensō Kakudai no Kōzu (The Structure of War Escalation), on Japanese advancement into northern French Indochina. 32 He wrote this study on the understanding that the Japanese government had no unified policy towards French Indochina. Each governmental organisation in the Japanese government － the Imperial 28 Ikeda, “Japanese Strategy and the Pacific War, 1941-5”, pp.129-130, BBKS, Senshi Sōsho, Daihon’ei Kaigunbu, Rengō Kantai, 1, pp.139-141. 29 BBKS, Senshi Sōsho, Daihon’ei Rikugunbu, (Imperial Headquarters, Army, Vol.1, Up to May 1940)’(Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1967); BBKS, Senshi Sōsho, Daihon’ei Rikugunbu, Vol. 2. 30 BBKS, Senshi Sōsho, Marei Shinkō Sakusen (The Malaya Campaign) (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1966). 31 BBKS, Senshi Sōsho, Hitō Marei Hōmen Kaigun Shinkō Sakusen (Naval Operations in the Philippines and Malayan Seas) (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1969). 32 Minami Yoshizawa, Sensō Kakudai no Kōzu: Nihongun no Futsu-in Shinchū (The Structure of War Escalation: The Japanese Troop’ Advance into French Indochina) (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1986). 27 Japanese Army, the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs－pursued different policies on northern French Indochina and there was no agreement among them. Furthermore, there was no unified policy even within the Imperial Japanese Army. The Japanese government enacted several policies on northern French Indochina. But it is wrong to regard them as agreements. Actually, they were no more than political compromises between governmental organisations and disagreements between them appeared in the texts of these policies. These contained policies which were contradictory with each other, because each governmental organisation inserted its policy without conducting adjustments between them. As a result, the Operations Division of the Army General Staff and the South China Army advanced military forces into northern French Indochina without a governmental agreement. Moriyama Atsushi took a similar approach in his study, Nichi-Bei Kaisen no Seiji Katei (The Political Process Leading to the War Against the United States), to examine the history to the outbreak of the Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region.33 He pointed out that all policies enacted in 1940 and 1941 were political compromises between actors (governmental organisations) and it is wrong to treat them as agreements. Among them, the Imperial Japanese Army, the Imperial Japanese Navy and Matsuoka Yōsuke, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were the most important actors. In 1940 and 1941, each the Imperial Japanese Army, the Imperial Japanese Navy and Matsuoka Atsushi Moriyama, Nichi-Bei Kaisen no Seiji Katei (The Political Process Leading to the War against the United States) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 33 1998). 28 pursued its own policy without an agreement between them. Consequently, Japan drifted into the war without a unified national policy. Japanese Military Organisations This section explains Japanese military organisations before the war because they were different from those of other countries. The notable differences were the system of distribution of the state power among military and political organisations, rather than the structures of military organisations themselves. The supreme command (Tōsuiken) of the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy in peacetime administration and wartime operations was with the Emperor. The Meiji Constitution of 1889 stipulated in Article 11, “The Emperor has the supreme command (Tōsuiken) of the Army and Navy”; in Article 12, “The Emperor determines the organisation and peace standing of the Army and Navy”; and in Article 13, “The Emperor declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties”. However, even though all actions were taken in the Emperor’s name, in practice, Chief of the Army General Staff and Chief of the Navy General Staff wielded the Emperor’s prerogative of the Tōsuiken and the Minister of War and the Minister of the Navy wielded his prerogative of military administration. The highest organs of the Tōsuiken in peacetime were the Navy General Staff and the Army General Staff. In wartime, these two General Staffs composed Imperial General Headquarters (Daihon’ei). The Minister of 29 the Navy, the Minister of War, and several senior officers of the Ministry of the Navy and the Ministry of War were also members of Imperial General Headquarters. But the main bodies of Imperial General Headquarters were the two General Staffs. Heads of Imperial General Headquarters were Chief of the Navy General Staff and Chief of the Army General Staff. Imperial General Headquarters was first established in 1894 to oversee the Sino-Japanese War 1894/95. In 1904, it was re-established for the Russo-Japanese War. Again in November 1937, it was re-established for the Sino-Japanese War 1937-45 and was continued throughout the Second World War. But it is wrong to consider that Imperial General Headquarters bore a resemblance to the British Chiefs of Staff in view of the fact that there was no true Chiefs of Staff committee.34 In practice, the Navy Department of Imperial General Headquarters (the Navy General Staff) and the Army Department of Imperial General Headquarters (the Army General Staff) acted independently in strategic planning and operations. If they failed to agree, there was a stalemate. Therefore, this thesis does not use the term, Imperial General Headquarters, unless necessary, to clearly distinguish the policies of the two General Staffs. For co-ordination of policy between Imperial General Headquarters and the government, the Supreme Command Government Liaison Conference (Daihon’ei Seifu Renraku Kaigi) was established in November 1937 by Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, and was continued throughout the Konoe Governments. Other Prime Ministers between the First Konoe Government, 34 Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, p.90. 30 from June 1937 to January 1939 and the Second and Third Konoe Government, from 22 July to 18 October 1941, Hiranima Kiichirō, Abe Nobuyuki and Yonai Mitsumasa did not hold the Supreme Command Government Liaison Conference. But, Tōjō Hideki, who became the Prime Minister on 18 October 1941, inherited the system. In this meeting, Chiefs (and Vice-Chiefs) of the two General Staffs represented Imperial General Headquarters while the Prime Minister, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Navy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other ministers as deemed necessary by the Prime Minister represented the government. The meeting place was moved from the Prime Minister’s official residence to the Imperial Palace in July 1941. It is wrong to consider that the Supreme Command Government Liaison Conference bore a resemblance to the British Committee of Imperial Defence in view of the fact that the government did not have the prerogative of commanding Imperial General Headquarters. The government participated in the Supreme Command Government Liaison Conference on an equal footing with Imperial General Headquarters. When the Emperor attended the Supreme Command Government Liaison Conference to ratify important decisions, it assumed a different name, the Imperial Conference (Gozen Kaigi). The attendance of the Emperor gave it a sacrosanct aura, but usually the Emperor did not say anything. The central organs of the Imperial Japanese Navy were the Ministry of the Navy (Kaigunshō) and the Navy General Staff (Gunreibu). The Ministry of the Navy dealt with the administration of naval affairs: the budget, ship construction, weapons procurement, personnel, the Diet and politics. The 31 Navy General Staff dealt with operational plans and operational movements of the navy. Both the Minister of the Navy and Chief of the Navy General Staff had the right of direct access to the Emperor. The Minister of the Navy was a member of the cabinet but Chief of the Navy General Staff was not. The Meiji Constitution of 1889 could be interpreted that the Tōsuiken (the supreme command) was not restricted by the government or the Diet. This became a big political issue in 1930 (to be discussed in Chapter 1). The most important bureau (kyoku) in the Ministry of the Navy was the Naval Affairs Bureau. It was in charge of naval administration, naval armaments, national defence policy and public relations. The Navy General Staff had four divisions (bu): Operations (1st Division), Armaments and Mobilisation (2nd Division), Intelligence (3rd Division), and Communication (4th Division). The most important division was the Operations Division (Sakusenbu). The Operations Division had several sections. But the most important section in the Operations Division was the Operations Section (Sakusenka). The central organs of the Imperial Japanese Army were the Ministry of War (Rikugunshō) and the Army General Staff (Sanbōhonbu). The Ministry of War and the Army General Staff had similar but different structures from their naval counterparts. The most important bureau (kyoku) in the Ministry of War was the Army Affairs Bureau. It was in charge of Army administration, armaments, national defence policy and public relations. The Army General Staff had four divisions: Operations (1st Division), Intelligence (2nd Division), Transportation and Communication (3rd Division), and Tactics and Military History (4th Division). The Operations Division had three sections, but the 32 Operations Section was the most important. Under the Meiji Constitution, the Prime Minister was on an equal footing with Chief of the Army General Staff and Chief of the Navy General Staff. The Minister of War, the Minister of the Navy and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were also on equal footings. The powers of the state were dispersed among them, but scope of their authority was not crystal clear. As we saw above, nominally, the Emperor had the Tōsuitaiken (prerogative of the Tōsuiken). But, in practice, Chief of the Army General Staff and Chief of the Navy General Staff wielded the Emperor’s Tōsuitaiken. Similarly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs wielded the Emperor’s Gaikōtaiken (prerogative of diplomacy). But, the Prime Minister did not have the prerogative to command them. The crucial defect of this system was difficulty of producing the unification of national policy among power holders. In other words, the system contained a possibility that each of the power holders pursued their own policies without an agreement among them. Perhaps one of the most commonly held views with respect to Japan before the war is that the Japanese government was a dictatorial military regime and this dictatorial regime commenced the war to conquer Asia. However, this view simplified the reality too much. The reality was far more complex than that. In fact, as the author will show in Chapter of this thesis, fragmentation of political power within the Japanese government, not a military dictatorship, led Japan to provoke war against Anglo-American powers. 33 Finally, there are points to be noted regarding this study. This is a study of the period between the two world wars and does not cover the Malaya Campaign and the fall of Singapore after the outbreak of the Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region on December 1941. Therefore, it describes the process of making operational plans but does not cover execution of operational plans. In this study, Japanese names are presented with the family name preceding the given name in the main text. When citing from English translated Japanese texts, sometimes the author amends English texts to fit original Japanese texts more closely without mentioning it. 34 [...]... 13 their leaders For instance, the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun wrote on 23 May 19 23, The establishment of the naval base is therefore, as explained in the House of Commons by Mr Amery, First Lord of the Admiralty, does not conflict with the Treaty in legal point of view But is the establishment of powerful base in the Pacific only one year after the Naval Treaty was signed in accordance with the spirit of. .. between the non-fortifications agreement in the Washington Treaty and the Singapore Naval Base At the Washington Conference, Japan proposed maintaining the status quo of naval fortifications in the Pacific and it was enacted as Article 19 of the Washington Treaty Chief of the Japanese delegates, Katō Tomosaburō, intended to maintain the status quo of Guam and the Philippines in exchange for Taiwan, the. .. and operational movements of the navy Both the Minister of the Navy and Chief of the Navy General Staff had the right of direct access to the Emperor The Minister of the Navy was a member of the cabinet but Chief of the Navy General Staff was not The Meiji Constitution of 1889 could be interpreted that the Tōsuiken (the supreme command) was not restricted by the government or the Diet This became a big... British historians, why Singapore fell is the most important theme There is a gap between Japanese historians’ interest and British historians’ interest The 102 volume official Japanese war history series: Senshi Sōsho Senshi Sōsho was compiled by the Military History Department of the Agency of Defence the former institution of the current Military History Department, the National Institute of Defence... studies on naval disarmaments and the origin of the Pacific War from the viewpoint of naval history In these works, Asada has focused on the Imperial Japanese Navy’s perceptions of naval disarmaments treaties and the relations between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States He pointed out that the internal conflict between the “treaty faction” and the “fleet faction” within the Imperial Japanese. .. history even for historians Kuramatu Tadashi contributed an article “Britain, Japan and Inter-War Naval Limitation, 1921- 1 936 ” and Aizawa Kiyoshi an article The Path Towards an Anti-British’ Strategy by the Japanese Navy between the Wars” But neither of them took Japanese perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base into consideration Kuramatu mentioned the British Cabinet’s decision to build the base and wrote:... resentment against the rejection of the racial equality proposal at the Versailles Conference and the treaties enacted at the Washington Conference What offended radical young officers in the Imperial Japanese Navy most was the fact that, right after the abrogation of the Anglo -Japanese Alliance, Britain started constructing the Singapore Naval Base The Japanese who did not have a long experience of association... from 2000 to 20 03 Almost all historians who study Anglo -Japanese relations or related fields contributed their papers to either or both Compared with these two studies, Ikeda Kiyoshi mentioned to Japanese perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base as a reason Yoichi Hirama, The Anglo -Japanese Alliance and the First World War”, in Yoichi Hirama, Ian Gow and John Chapmen (eds.), The History of Anglo -Japanese. .. Tōsuiken and the Minister of War and the Minister of the Navy wielded his prerogative of military administration The highest organs of the Tōsuiken in peacetime were the Navy General Staff and the Army General Staff In wartime, these two General Staffs composed Imperial General Headquarters (Daihon’ei) The Minister of 29 the Navy, the Minister of War, and several senior officers of the Ministry of the Navy... spirit of the Treaty?” in a leader titled “Ayaururu Kafu Jōyaku No Seishin (The Spirit of the Washington Treaty is in Danger)” All other newspapers expressed similar opinions With regard to Japanese naval history and naval disarmament conferences in the period between the two world wars, Asada Sadao made great contributions to the history of the Imperial Japanese Navy and American -Japanese naval history . and the Imperial Japanese Army－towards the Singapore Naval Base from the Washington Conference in 1921/ 22 to 1 936 . Chapter 2 considers the views of the Singapore Naval Base as expressed in the. side history of the Singapore Naval Base and the British Singapore Strategy”. These studies have searched for reasons as to how the fall of Singapore and the sinking of HMS Price of Wales. Empires in China. 5 The third reason is that those who study the history of the Singapore Naval Base and the Singapore Strategy” tend to limit their scope to the British side history by using Western