Searching for new security paradigms israel and south koreas defense transformation

SEARCHING FOR NEW SECURITY PARADIGMS: ISRAEL AND SOUTH KOREA’S DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION (1990-2011) BY MICHAEL RASKA A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHTY LEE KUAN YEW SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE OCTOBER, 2011 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: This dissertation has evolved throughout my studies, research, and experiences in South Korea, Israel, and Singapore. In all three states, strategic and defense studies in the context of public policy have been of crucial importance, given the many critical factors that have historically shaped their military and security situation. Accordingly, understanding the complexity in the continuity and change of their security paradigms, defense strategies, operational concepts, and evolving security challenges cannot be accomplished without the close consultation of selected policy practitioners, military officers and soldiers, defense analysts, leading academics, and journalists that have devoted their professional lives to ensure the continued existence and security of their nation-states. This dissertation thus inevitably treads along signposts and paths mapped out by others, who have provided me with insightful comments, thoughts, and observations that sharpened my ideas, concepts, and widened my intellectual horizons. While any errors in this dissertation are mine, and mine alone, the following lines are dedicated to a number of special individuals; for their undivided support, encouragement, expertise and trusted advice. First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my three mentors, who have guided me at various stages on my dissertation journey: Chung Min Lee, Darryl S. Jarvis, and Richard Bitzinger. Long established in their respective fields and areas, each has had a profound influence on this project. Prof. Lee, Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University in Seoul has been at the conceptual genesis of this thesis, suggesting the idea for a comparative study of Israeli and South Korean Air Power strategies, as a way to enhance the emerging air power studies in Korea. Moreover, Prof. Lee has defined my historical, theoretical, and policy-oriented foundations in security studies, and served as my intellectual beacon for more than a decade. Prof. Jarvis at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, has been my main thesis advisor, reading every chapter draft, and providing critical advice on the organizational structure, research methodology, and nearly all other aspects of the dissertation. In doing so, Prof. Jarvis has taught me the tools for survival in the world of publishing and academia. Last but not least, Richard Bitzinger, Senior Fellow at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore has redefined my conceptions of the RMA debates, substantially deepened my knowledge of the field. In the process of my fieldwork in both Israel and South Korea, I have interviewed many unique individuals, who provided me at least some access to primary and authentic information on security/defense related issues, and honored me with their confidence and trust. In Israel, I owe a great debt of gratitude to Ilan Mizrahi, former Head of Israel’s National Security Council; Prof. Isaac Ben-Israel, Head of the Security Studies Program, Tel Aviv University; Brig. Gen. Itai Brun, former Head of the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Research at IDF’s Command and Staff College; Maj. Gen. (ret.) Giora Eiland, Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies; Prof. Uri Bar-Joseph, Chair of the Division of International Relations, School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa; Dr. Dima Adamsky, Research Fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya; Dr. Deganit Paikowsky, Research Fellow at the School of Government and Policy, Tel-Aviv University; Prof. Efraim Inbar, Director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University; Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Asaf Agmon, Head of the Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies; Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Uzi Dayan, former IDF Deputy Chief of Staff and National Security Council Chairman; Dr. Yoram Evron at the University of Haifa; Dr. Amir Horkin, research director at Maagar Mochot, , Zivi Berman at the IDF, and the librarians at the Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. ii At the same time, my journey in Israel wouldn’t be the same without the special and life-long friendship of Arnon Eshel, who has always encouraged me to believe in my ideas and find the courage to go beyond my limits; Adriana Cooper – my former classmate at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and experienced journalist, sharing some incredible “adventure” assignments with me; and Meytal Nasie and Iris Nasie – for their undivided love, support, and inspirational audacity that can’t be described in words. In my interviews in South Korea, I have benefited greatly from the insights, thoughts, and observations of Prof. Jae Chang Kim, former Deputy Commander in Chief of U.S.-Korea Combined Forces Command; Prof. Chung-in Moon at the Political Science Department at Yonsei University; Prof. Lee Jung-Hoon at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University; Prof. Sung-Pyo Hong, Head of the Department of Military Strategy Studies at the Korean National Defense University; Dr. Taewoo Kim, Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses; Maj. Lee, Jin-Young, ROK Air Force; and Dr. Kim, Min Seok, Senior Writer at the JoongAng Ilbo. My studies and experiences in South Korea also wouldn’t be same without the support and encouragement of my dear friends: JaeSang Koo, CEO and President of Mirae Asset; Dr. Yoo-Dongi; Yeon-Kyung Jeon, Hye-Jin Park; Richard Marusyk, Veronika and Lukas Vildman, and many others who went through the gates of Yonsei University. Last but not least, I have written this dissertation at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, which I am proud of have been in the first Ph.D. cohort. The School has provided me not only with a generous research support, state-of-theart facilities, but most importantly, an amazingly diverse body of faculty and students from around the world, who in many ways shaped my worldview and intellectual curiosity. Indeed, the LKY School has been my home for nearly five years, and I have had the honor to study under many inspiring professors. I would like to thank LKYSPP faculty members, particularly Prof. Kishore Mahbubani; Prof. M Ramesh; Prof. Wu Xun; Prof. Suzaina Kadir; Prof. Scott Fritzen; Prof. Mukul Asher; Prof. Dodo J. Thampapillai; Prof. Caroline Brassard; Prof. Gopi Rethinaraj for providing their unique perspectives in teaching public policy; research methods; and policy analysis. In the same token, I am grateful to Ruth Choe for facilitating my path in the School’s administration; Sung Lee and Kirsten Trott at the Research Support Unit; and James Dorsey for placing my articles on editorial pages of major newspapers. Ultimately, I am grateful for all my fellow classmates, colleagues, and friends; in particular, Jean-Marc Rickli, Tim Junio, and Anthony D’Agostino for reading my thesis and providing insightful comments and suggestions. Alex He Jingwei, Amarendu Nandy, Allen Lai, Aneliya Nazirova, Azad Bali Singh, Beat Habegger, Bernard Loo Fook Weng, Cris and Terri Mora, Chris Bronk, Daniel Jassem, Daria Makarova, Denni Cawley, Eva Pejsova, Friedemann Schreiter, Gary Schaub, Gloria Pagliari, Henriette Litta, Iftikhar Lodhi, Ishani Mukherjee, Jan Seifert, Jitka and Petr Cirkl, Kaajal Wallia, Kei Koga, Leong Ching Ching, Luisa Gaspani, Luluk Nur Hamidah, Lyn Toh, Martin Duda, May-May Pichamon, Mikio Kumada, Najwa Fathimath, Petra Wodecka, Priyanka Bhalla, Reuben Hintz, Sandra Egger, Savita Shankar, Shabnam Siddiqui, Schuyler House, Shigeru Togashi, Shilpi Banerjee, Simon Lacey, Sonja Moraz, Sun and Alan Tan, Tamara Anne Lynch, Tan Teck Boon, Toby Carroll, Vikas Kharbanda, and many others around the world for their encouragement and sharing a part of the journey with me. In closing, my greatest debt – and one impossible to specify – is to my family (Christine, Jiri, Christian), and to Anita (PonPon) – for their patience, love, and faith in my long, and often winding, endeavors around the world. Thank You! iii TABLE OF CONTENTS: Acknowledgements . ii Summary .vi List of Tables . viii List of Figures .ix Abbreviations . x Chapter 1. Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 Global Diffusion of RMA Theory, Process, and Debate Research Objectives . Defining Small States: Absolute vs. Relational Definitions . 14 Rationale and Policy Significance 17 Why Israel and South Korea? Initial Observations 23 Chapter Themes & Arguments . 26 Chapter . Diffusion of RMA Theory, Process, and Debate: “Five Waves” 2.1 Missing Links in the RMA Debate . 31 2.2 Conceptual Diffusion of the RMA . 33 2.2.1 First Wave: Soviet MTR . 34 2.2.2 Second Wave: RMA and its Early Adaptation in the West 38 2.2.3 Third Wave: RMA “Technophilia” . 47 2.2.4 Shift to Defense Transformation . 53 2.2.5 Second and Third Thoughts: Modernization Plus . 67 2.3 Organizational Interpretations and Contending Schools of Thought . 71 2.3.1 Scope of the RMA Debate 71 2.3.2 Between RMA Proponents and Skeptics – Is there an RMA? 72 2.3.3 Five RMA Images – What constitutes an RMA? . 75 2.3.4 RMA Diffusion and Adaptation: When, Why, and How RMAs Diffuse? . 78 2.4 Toward a Sixth RMA Wave? . 82 Chapter . Research Methodology and Analytical Framework 3.1 Methodological Approaches to RMA Diffusion, Adaptation, and Innovation 84 3.2 Research Strategy, Map, and Analytical Framework . 93 3.2.1 Patterns of RMA Military Innovation . 96 3.2.2 RMA Drivers: Opportunities and Threats . 98 3.2.3 RMA Limitations & Constraints 100 3.3 Case Selection Criteria . 101 3.3.1 Geostrategic Predicaments 101 3.3.2 Defense Management Capacity 104 3.3.3 Defense-Industrial Base 106 3.3.4 Combat Proficiency 108 3.4 Data Collection: Sites and Sources . 109 3.4.1 Data Triangulation 109 3.4.2 Interview Process 111 3.5 Research Limitations & Threats to Validity . 113 iv Chapter . Israel’s Strategy, Security Debates, and Conceptual Innovation: Continuity and Change 4.1 The RMA Debate in Israel: Opposing Viewpoints 115 4.2 Understanding Israel’s Traditional Security Paradigm 120 4.2.1 Conditions of “Geostrategic Challenge” 121 4.2.2 Three Elements of Israel’s Defense Strategy . 125 4.2.3 Patterns in IDF’s Operational Conduct 131 4.3 Israel’s RMA-Oriented Conceptual Adaptation Trajectory 138 4.3.1 Conceptual Roots: The Yom Kippur War 139 4.3.2 1980’s: The Offense-Defense Debate and Early RMA Tactics 143 4.3.3 1990’s: Future Battlefield Concepts and Systemic Operational Design 150 4.3.4 2000’s: The Rise and Fall of the SOD Debate and Concept of Operations . 159 Chapter 5. South Korea's Evolving Strategy and RMA Debates: From Emulation to Adaptation 5.1 South Korea's Progressive Security Dilemmas 168 5.2 Revisiting South Korea’s Traditional Security Conceptions . 174 5.2.1 Conditions of Geostrategic Inferiority . 176 5.2.2 Three Pillars of South Korea’s Defense Strategy 181 5.3 Toward a Korean RMA? 187 5.3.1 Understanding RMA Diffusion Path in South Korea 187 5.3.2 1990s: ROK's Future Battlefield Concepts 191 5.3.3 2000s: U.S.-ROK Defense Transformation . 204 Chapter 6. Assessing the Impact of the RMA Diffusion on Israel and South Korea’s Military Modernization: Paths, Patterns, Drivers and Constraints 6.1 Path Divergence . 216 6.2 Metrics Revisited 219 6.3 Israel . 222 6.3.1 Israel’s Force Modernization: Toward a Smaller and Smarter IDF? 222 6.3.2 Israel’s RMA Diffusion Paths, Patterns, and Drivers 230 6.3.3 Limitations & Constraints . 236 6.4 South Korea 240 6.4.1 ROK’s Force Modernization: Toward a Smaller, Advanced Elite Force? 240 6.4.2 South Korean RMA Diffusion Paths,Patterns, and Drivers 246 6.4.3 Limitations & Constraints . 252 6.5 Explaining the Variance: Contending Theories . 256 6.5.1 Neorealist Perspectives . 258 6.5.2 Organizational / Societal Perspectives 260 6.5.3 Cultural Perspectives . 262 Conclusion: Theoretical and Policy Implications 7.1 Summary 265 7.2 Theoretical Implications: RMA Diffusion and Small States . 266 7.3 Policy Implications . 271 Bibliography 275 Biographical Note 296 v SUMMARY: Notwithstanding the perennial body of literature covering the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) debate over the last two decades, the vast majority of writings have been silent or ignored the implications of the RMA diffusion on military modernization and innovation trajectories of advanced small states and middle powers. The intellectual thrust in exploring the RMA over the last two decades has focused primarily on the U.S.-centered RMA debate that has evolved in concert with shifts in the U.S. military strategy and use of force. In particular, there have been at least five progressive stages or “RMA waves” in the ongoing debate: (1) initial intellectual discovery by the Soviet military thinkers in the early 1980s, (2) conceptual adaptation, modification, and integration by in the U.S. strategic thought during the early 1990s, (3) climax of the RMA debate during the mid-to-late 1990s, (4) a shift to the broader “defense transformation” and its partial empirical investigation in the early 2000s, and (5) a shift to “modernization-plus” in conjunction with second and third thoughts questioning the RMA paradigm from 2005 onwards. With the persisting focus on the American RMA debate however, there is a significant deficit in the existing literature, particularly in the conceptual, technological, and operational dynamics surrounding the RMA diffusion - the international transmission and strategic interaction of RMA-oriented concepts and technologies in divergent geostrategic settings and environments. This dissertation attempts to fill-in the void, investigating the paths, patterns, and impact of RMA diffusion in military modernization trajectories of selected advanced small states Israel and South Korea. Both states have historically faced an array of persistent security challenges and uncertainties brought by the realities of their external and internal security conditions, asymmetries of their location, size, and geopolitical constraints. With the end of the Cold War and subsequent shifts in the international and regional strategic environment, the sources and characteristics of threats have been changing. Their security environment has been increasingly characterized by the convergence of even more complex “hybrid” security threats, which combine conventional, asymmetrical, low-intensity, and non-linear threat dimensions. With the changing strategic realities, both Israel and South Korea have been searching for a new strategic paradigm and operational concepts that would allow greater flexibility, adaptability, and autonomy under conditions of strategic uncertainty. In doing so, both Israel and South Korea have studied, benchmarked, and debated selected RMA concepts, while attempting to leverage and exploit emerging RMA technologies. Israeli and South Korean RMA trajectories, however, show considerable variation in the pace, direction, and character of their diffusion and adaptation. Israel’s RMA path reflects a unique pattern of early adoption/implementation, speculation, and experimentation in the context of multiple operational adaptations to changing strategic realities. Israel has been one of the first countries to apply RMA-related technologies in combat in the early 1980s under the conceptual umbrella of “integrated battle.” IDF’s experiences have partly shaped American, Soviet, and European strategic perspectives and debates on the future of warfare. However, until the late 1990s, the IDF has not viewed the emergence of the RMA as a relevant paradigm shift, nor has initiated a comprehensive and disruptive defense transformation drive. Rather, Israel’s RMA discourse has reflected a continuous debate between the proponents of traditional concepts and reformers - those arguing for new military thinking within the IDF. The changing threat spectrum and operational experience over the last two decades forced the IDF to rethink its traditional concepts, and experiment with innovative combat tactics at different levels of warfare. Israel’s combat experiences concomitant with action-oriented lessons-learned from high-low intensity conflicts have arguably accelerated IDF’s ‘bottomup’ user-oriented military innovation by increasing the pressure to find practical solutions rather than focus on theoretical conceptualizations. RMA diffusion in Israel should be thus conceptualized in the context of continuity and change in Israel’s security conceptions and the need to retain IDF’s “qualitative edge” in its operational capabilities. vi In contrast, the RMA diffusion trajectory in South Korea’s military modernization shows patterns of speculation and experimentation in terms of selected concepts and technologies, but relatively limited implementation in the organizational force structure and the use of force. Since the early 1990s, South Korea has been attempting to undertake a comprehensive military modernization in order to respond to the widening spectrum of threats, mitigate technological and interoperability gaps with the U.S. forces, and eventually attain self-reliant defense posture. In the process, South Korea attempted to emulate and adapt selected U.S RMA-oriented defense transformation concepts, which have gradually permeated into the U.S.-ROK combined training and operations, and subsequently shaped the character and direction of South Korea’s military modernization. However, the compelling and relatively ambitious character of Korean RMA-oriented defense reform plans have been in sharp contrast to the prevailing structural and political realities, including contrasting calibrations of defense requirements, structural dependence on the U.S.-ROK Alliance, static, defensive force posture, and asymmetric organizational force structure that have sustained the relevance of traditional security paradigm. Moreover, South Korea’s military has lacked diverse operational combat experiences that would encourage military innovation. Accordingly, there has not been a distinct Korean RMA-oriented conceptual innovation toward a new theory of war. Taken together, Israel and South Korea’s varying RMA trajectories reflect evolutionary, rather than revolutionary process of change over the past two decades. Both states have faced a number of organizational, institutional, and resource impediments, anchored primarily in their traditional security paradigms, which have precluded a major defense transformation and inhibited military innovation. In particular, both the IDF and ROKA had to cope with complexities of defense planning under uncertainty: (1) identifying and prioritizing between current and future-oriented defense requirements; (2) ascertaining the feasibility, costs, and performance of selected advanced weapons technologies, and (3) adopting and adapting largely unproven conceptual, organizational, and technological innovations in the use of force. Paradoxically, by improving their defense capabilities through high-value weapons systems, niche technologies, and innovative organizational and operational concepts, both states have experienced limitations in their use of force by raising the destructive potential and cost of conflict. Their adversaries, state and non-state, have adapted by finding strategies and exploiting capabilities of asymmetric negation. The empirical cases of Israel and South Korea confirm that RMA diffusion trajectories can take multiple facets and rarely proceed in a synchronized rate, path, or pattern. Given the range of external and internal variables - enablers and constraints that shape the receptivity of states to absorb military innovation, RMA-oriented diffusion is not sequential nor does it follow a particular model. Technological innovation may precede conceptual and organizational adaptation, or conceptual speculation may lead to exploration and experimentation, but not implementation. Only if military innovation meets implementation in both policy and strategy, one can theorize about ‘disruptive’ RMA-oriented defense transformation. While existing literature may explain the varying RMA trajectories through neorealist, organizational/societal, and cultural theories, this thesis suggests that changes in strategy resulting from operational lessons-learned in diverse combat experiences may increase the adaptability of military organizations to implement military innovation. The findings of this study therefore challenge traditional “hierarchical” schools of thought as well as “spatial” models explaining military innovation and its diffusion in linear perspectives. Ultimately, Israel and South Korea’s RMA trajectories project important theoretical as well as policy-oriented implications particularly in terms of small state’s ability to recognize, anticipate, exploit, and sustain military innovation. Arguably, selected small states may translate military innovation into a relative strategic advantage or usable strategic opportunity at least until it will be offset by countervailing responses by opposing forces or new military innovations. The analytical framework used in this study should help policy-makers to make more accurate assessments in this direction. vii LIST OF TABLES: Table 3.1 Primary Sources by Expertise 111 Table 5.1 North-South Korea Conventional Balance of Forces (2010) . 178 Table 6.1 ROK’s Force Structure (1980-2010) . 246 viii LIST OF FIGURES: Figure 1.1 RMA as a Theory, Process, and Debate . Figure 1.2 Conceptualizing RMA Diffusion Trajectories: Paths, Patterns, and Levels . 13 Figure 1.3 Policy Challenges of RMA-oriented Military Modernization 21 Figure 1.4 Asymmetric Responses & Limitations to the RMA . 22 Figure 2.1 Overview: Five “RMA Waves” 34 Figure 2.2 RMA Elements (1992) . 40 Figure 2.3 Patterns of Military Revolutions (1994) . 44 Figure 2.4 Owen’s System-of-Systems Concept . 50 Figure 2.5 Network-Centric Warfare Concept . 62 Figure 3.1 RMA Diffusion Diagnostics Model . 87 Figure 3.2 Assessing Military Capabilities 91 Figure 3.3 Overview of Conceptual Lenses to the Study of RMA 92 Figure 3.4 Analytical Framework: RMA Patterns, Drivers, and Constraints 96 Figure 3.5 Patterns of RMA-Oriented Military Innovation – Main Indicators 98 Figure 3.6 RMA Drivers: Opportunities and Threats 99 Figure 3.7 RMA Adaptation Constraints . 100 Figure 3.8 Taxonomy of Defense-Industrial Innovation 107 Figure 3.9 Assessing Defense-Industrial Innovation based on Arms Exports . 108 Figure 3.10 Overview of Case-Selection Criteria 109 Figure 5.1 South Korea’s Post-Cold War Conflict Spectrum 188 Figure 6.1 Israel and South Korea’s RMA Diffusion Paths and Patterns 222 Figure 6.2 Israel’s RMA Concepts, Paths and Patterns . 233 Figure 6.3 Israel’s Military Innovation Drivers: Opportunities and Threats . 235 Figure 6.4 Limitations and Constraints to Israeli RMA . 240 Figure 6.5 South Korea’s RMA Concepts, Paths and Patterns 248 Figure 6.6 South Korea’s Military Innovation Drivers: Opportunities and Threats 251 Figure 6.7 Limitations and Constraints to South Korean Defense Reforms 255 Figure 7.1 Future Studies: Conceptualizing R&D Trajectories of Global Defense Industries 273 ix ABBREVIATIONS: ALB APS ATGM AWACS BCT BMS BVR C4I CCRP CENTCOM CFC COG DAP DBK DIB DMZ DOD DRP EBO FAD FCS FEBA FOFA GCC GFC GS JFCOM IAF IAS IDF IED IN ISR KPA MBT MCZ MND MTR MPR MR MWS NCW NDP NIE OFT ONA OPG OSD OTS OTRI AirLand Battle Active Protection System Anti-Tank Guided Missile Airborne Warning and Control System Brigade Combat Team Battlefield Management System Beyond-Visual-Range Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information Command and Control Research Program Central Command Combined Forces Command Center of Gravity Digital Army Program Dominant Battlespace Knowledge Defense Industrial Base Demilitarized Zone Department of Defense Defense Reform Plan Effects-Based Operations Forward Active Defense Future Combat System Forward Edge of Battle Area Follow-on Forces Attack Ground Corps Command General Forces Command General Staff Joint Forces Command Israel Air Force Integrated Advanced Soldier Israel Defense Forces Improvised Explosive Device Israel Navy Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Korean People’s Army Main Battle Tank Military Control Zone Ministry of National Defense Military-Technical Revolution Military Participation Ratio Military Revolution Major Weapon Systems Network-Centric Warfare National Defense Panel National Intelligence Estimate Office of Force Transformation Office of Net Assessment Operational Maneuver Groups Office of Secretary of Defense Off-the-Shelve Operational Theory Research Institute x Dorschner, J. 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(ed.), Mechanicsburg, Stackpole Books. 295 BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE Michael Raska holds a M.A. degree in International Studies from the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University (2002), B.A. in International Communications and International Studies (summa cum laude) from the Missouri Southern State University (2000). He has written on various aspects of international security, including strategic developments on the Korean peninsula, Israel‘s defense strategies, U.S. defense transformation, and WMD proliferation. He has diverse research experiences as a visiting research fellow at several institutions, including the Hebrew University of Jerusalem – Rothberg International School, Pacific Forum CSIS, and Delegation of the European Commission to the ROK. In 2012, he has joined the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (NTU) in Singapore. 296 [...]... strategic and policy communities regarding the relevance of their traditional security paradigms, direction and scope of their particular force modernization programs, defense requirements, and overall strategic choices Indeed, facing new strategic realities, both Israel and South Korea have been rethinking their traditional security conceptions, defense planning and management processes, and force postures... Washington D.C., Office of Force Transformation 17 Ross, A (2004) Transformation: What is it? What does it mean for Industry?‖ Defense Transformation in the Asia-Pacific: Meeting the Challenge Honolulu, Hawaii 5 desirability of a comprehensive defense transformation 18 Some of the most pressing questions included: is there an RMA, and if so, what does it mean – what is new or revolutionary? Is it... defense policies, military doctrines, defense technology management processes, organizational force structures, and force employment These in turn require changes in strategy, which amplifies the policy relevance and implication of the RMA diffusion and adaptation by selected small states 1.5 Why Israel and South Korea – Initial Observations Notwithstanding the conventional wisdom suggesting that Israel. .. destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles, limited incursions and border skirmishes by both state and nonstate actors, information warfare and cyber attacks, as well as traditional security threats posed by conventional power projection aspirations and force developments by neighboring hostile states The increasing amalgamation of security threats have in turn created greater security uncertainties and defense. .. systems and technologies The implementation phase is evident in a range of indicators: i.e the establishment of new military formations; doctrinal revision to accommodate new ways of war; resource allocation supporting new concepts; development of formal transformation strategy; establishment of innovative military units; new branches and career paths; and ultimately, field training exercises with new. .. an array of persistent security challenges and uncertainties brought by the realities of their external and internal security conditions, asymmetries of their location, size, and geopolitical constraints [See Chapter 3] During the Cold War, both Israel and South Korea‘s security environment has been shaped primarily by traditional conventional threats and linear threat-based defense planning However,... acquisition and procurement of systems and platforms that characterize the ―hardware‖ side of the RMA At the same time, however, enhancing military effectiveness cannot be achieved by simply buying new hardware alone.65 According to Goldman and Mahnken, implementation requires a formal transformation strategy; new units to exploit and counter innovative mission areas; revising doctrine to include new missions;... suggesting that Israel and South Korea reflect fundamentally divergent historical experiences, security environments, political and economic development models, varying strategic and military cultures, and thus their RMA trajectories cannot be compared, this study argues that both states represent relevant cases for a comparative study of RMA diffusion and adaptation To begin with, Israel and South Korea can... cost-effective defense industrial base capable of developing innovative defense technologies, niche products, and services; and (3) combat proficiency to engage in a range of military operations, and having the potential to integrate and exploit selected RMA concepts and technologies at the operational level 1.4 Rationale & Policy Significance Throughout the Cold War, the range of viable foreign and defense. .. gradually permeated into U.S defense planning and management processes Under the umbrella of a broader defense transformation , broadly defined by the U.S Department of Defense (DOD) as ―the process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation‘s advantages and protect against our . SEARCHING FOR NEW SECURITY PARADIGMS: ISRAEL AND SOUTH KOREA’S DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION (1990-2011) BY MICHAEL RASKA A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF. Elements of Defense Transformation. Washington D.C., Office of Force Transformation. 17 Ross, A. (2004). Transformation: What is it? What does it mean for Industry?‖ Defense Transformation. Follow-on Forces Attack GCC Ground Corps Command GFC General Forces Command GS General Staff JFCOM Joint Forces Command IAF Israel Air Force IAS Integrated Advanced Soldier IDF Israel Defense Forces