In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 10 pptx

488 chapter nine For this reason, triage is not representative of contemporary Western morality regarding the protection and preservation of innocent human life. We must look elsewhere. Perhaps sentience will be helpful in determining who will live and who will die in our particular lifeboat scenario. To explore this pos- sibility, we must alter our constituency: we will replace the naked mole rat with a daisy. Is the life of this newcomer equally precious? Must it be preserved and protected along with the life of the needle- clawed bush baby and the naked mole rat? Sentience is a morally relevant criterion in Western law—causing serious unnecessary physical suffering to innocent human beings is illegal. One is not allowed to starve or beat up dependents, whether children, the elderly, or “pets.” But pain and suffering are not rele- vant with regard to the preservation and protection of human life. The case of Matthew Donnelly (the physicist with cancer) provides an apt example. He suffered terribly, to the point where he did not wish to live any longer, yet he was kept alive against his wishes. In contrast, Baby Theresa could not feel anything. She suffered not one twinge, not one moment of anxiety, not one second of hunger. She was not capable of suffering. Yet medical professionals maintained Baby Theresa even at the expense of other children who might have lived if they had the organs of this failing, anencephalic infant, organs that her parents wished to donate so that other families might pre- serve their beloved children. Many individuals are kept alive in Western hospitals who can feel nothing, anencephalic infants and innumerable brain-dead patients, while each day, for want of food and medicine, human beings who can feel and think and function, suffer and die. In fact Western nations do not choose to allocate resources in order to protect against suffering. Nor do we make choices in order to pre- serve the lives of those who can suffer in favor of those who can- not feel anything. The Minimize Harm Maxim is an extension of morality regard- ing the preservation and protection of innocent human life. Human life is preserved even if such medical efforts increase suffering. Life is sustained even if that life suffers terribly in the process, even if preserving that life causes others to suffer and die as a result. As it turns out, the daisy will stay on board just as surely as any other passenger. Western medical practice, rooted in Western morality that pro- tects and preserves the life of every innocent human being, does not contemporary moral dilemmas 489 allow any human being to die so that others might live. While many innocent human beings die of simple neglect—malnutrition, infec- tion, diseases for which there are cures—because funds and efforts are focused elsewhere, medical practice does not permit the loss of any innocent human life that might be preserved. Our responsibility for those that die of want, of neglect, is no less because they do not lie in a hospital bed, but exploring such cases is beyond the scope of this work. Western law protects innocent human life. The legal system and medical practice reflect a Western morality that holds human life to be precious to a degree that seems beyond calculation. The Minimize Harm Maxim, rooted in morality with regard to protecting and pre- serving human life, also provides no means by which to make dis- tinctions between one life and another. As anencephalic infants aptly demonstrate, no innocent human life is allowed to die or be killed— even for the sake of other innocent human lives—if they might go on living. While there are many cases in which individual doctors permit patients to die, or even help them to do so, such cases remain off the books. Law requires that each innocent human life be allowed to persist for as long as possible. For the sake of consistency and impartiality, in light of casuistry, the life of each living entity on our unique lifeboat is as precious as every other. The harm of exterminating any one of these five enti- ties is equal inasmuch as the life of Baby Theresa is no more or less morally considerable than the life of any other patient in the hos- pital where she lived and died. The Minimize Harm Maxim, an extension of contemporary Western morality with regard to the preser- vation and protection of human life, does not discriminate between the lives of a naked mole rat, a spectacled elephant shrew, a hyrax, and a needle-clawed bush baby . . . even that of a daisy. Contemporary Western ethics provide no means by which to decide who will live and who will die on our bobbing lifeboat. Conclusion Western morality, as evidenced by medical practice and law, protects every innocent human life. In the absence of any morally relevant distinction between all human beings and all other living entities, consistency and impartiality require the application of this same strin- gent morality to all life forms. 490 chapter nine The Minimize Harm Maxim is a utopian moral theory, rooted in consistency, extending morality between human beings to all other living beings that have not been shown to be different in morally relevant ways. Idealistic theories often seem extreme and unlikely, but the Minimize Harm Maxim stands as a model of what we ought to do if we are to be consistent and impartial. If the Minimize Harm Maxim seems unreasonable, then our only recourse, if we are to maintain consistency, is to reconsider our current moral ideals with regard to protecting and preserving innocent human life. CHAPTER TEN REVIEW AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS We have explored the work of four prominent scholars. Although a critical analysis is offered for the best-known and most respected pro- tectionist theories available, this work attests to and affirms the value of the contribution that each of these scholars has made to the ongo- ing process of seeking and establishing a more consistent, compas- sionate morality. We have also explored an idealistic protectionist theory based on consistency and impartiality, the Minimize Harm Maxim. In this final chapter, we look back to the previous chapters, and forward to what might lie ahead in the field of anymals and ethics. What fundamental concepts have been further explored and developed? What possible directions might be beneficial for future work in protectionist ethics? A. Overview 1. A Conspicuous Problem Protectionism is an “idea that is easy to ridicule but hard to refute” (Ryder, Animal 332). In the West, both civil law and accepted morality protect human conatus, the urge “to preserve our existence as persons” (P. Taylor “Inherent” 25). Predominant Western morality holds the strong conviction that there is no legitimate reason to deny moral standing to any human being; ideally, each human being is maintained even at tremendous expense to society. But we do not extend this protection to anymals, and there is a conspicuous absence of any morally legitimate reason for treating human life differently from how we treat all other life- forms. Moral philosophers have as yet been unable to establish any satisfactory morally relevant difference between anymals and human beings—one that would justify denying basic protection to other species while maintaining such stringent protection for human life. Yet Western ethics, as revealed in the actions of most people, per- sist with this flagrant inconsistency. The lives of anymals remain 492 chapter ten almost completely unprotected. “Current legal consensus seems to be that nearly any human interest can in principle qualify as an acceptable justification for animal use Whether there is a moral consensus in society to this effect is more doubtful” (Orlans 317). As a result, in the United States, “given the quantity of non-human ani- mals suffering, the extent to which they are suffering, and the rea- son they are intentionally made to suffer animal liberation is the moral imperative of our time. Our focus should be on ending the suffering as efficiently and quickly as possible” (Ball 4). We are living in a time of great moral reckoning, a time of moral reflection leading to eye-opening moral imperatives previously overlooked. We are, slowly, bit by bit, coming to see that our treatment of anymals in relation to our treatment of human animals constitutes an unjustified, flagrant inconsistency. Some have come to see that those who cling to the maximum moral significance of human beings while denying such significance to anymals have no philosophical leg to stand on. We can either accept anymals into the fold or deny full moral significance to certain human beings. Tom Regan writes: [T]he moral beliefs we accept cannot all be true if they include two or more inconsistent beliefs. This much, too, seems clear: our com- mitment to search for and, when we find them, to address such incon- sistencies offers a fair indication of the seriousness with which we respond to the challenge to develop an informed, thoughtful moral outlook. (Defending 101) Western morality is currently inconsistent; we are inconsistent in our treatment of life and in our expressed “respect for life.” Peter Singer notes: People often say that life is sacred. They almost never mean what they say. They do not mean, as their words seem to imply, that life itself is sacred. If they did, killing a pig or pulling up a cabbage would be as abhorrent to them as the murder of a human being. When people say that life is sacred, it is human life they have in mind. But why should human life have special value? (Writings 125) Indeed, what is so important about us in a universe of such beauty and diversity? Why do we persist with—and even defend—this flagrantly immoral status quo? The cases of Baby Theresa, Tracy Latimer, Matthew Donnelly, and Samuel Linares (let alone jellyfish babies) make a startling contrast with the indifference we show toward the lives of stray pets, anymals exploited for science and the farming review and future directions 493 industry, or any variety of anymals left alongside the roadway. “What justifies the difference?” (Singer, Writings 126). In the first century, the Greek philosopher Plutarch wrote, “For what sort of dinner is not costly for which a living creature loses its life? Do we hold a life cheap?” (“On” 997). Sound ethics do not entail flagrant inconsistencies. For those with a critical eye, “it is hard to see a long and beneficial future for an ethic as paradoxical, incoherent, and dependent on pretense as our conventional ethic of life and death has become” (Singer, Writings 210). 2. A Cooperative Enterprise It is the task of moral philosophers to either rectify moral inconsis- tencies or justify them; the works of Regan, Singer, Linzey, and Taylor are central contributions to this ongoing effort. Only by exploring diverse options might we find possible solutions to our ongoing moral dilemma—our flagrant inconsistency. Each theory offers insights that “tend to lead us in the right direction” (L. Johnson 197). Each moral theory offers valuable insights and worthy possi- bilities. As an environmental activist colleague noted, “We must lis- ten to many voices, especially to those issuing from lived realities—even if what is said challenges us”—indeed, especially if what is said chal- lenges us (Gloege, Unpublished communication). Protectionist philosophy benefits from a diversity of theories, and so do the diverse populations to which these theories speak. For instance, Linzey’s theory will be irrelevant to an atheist, but is likely to be of considerable interest, and compelling, for a concerned Christian. In contrast, theories rooted in scientific understandings of the natural world and animals, such as the works of Singer and Regan, are less apt to reach a conservative Christian (Finsen 193). Meanwhile, if an individual feels strongly about human rights, she or he will probably find moral concordance in Regan’s work. Each theory might help someone to recognize, acknowledge, and rectify this current terrible inconsistency in our morality. For this reason, each theory is of value—the diversity itself is of value—and we ought to strive for “more cooperative work, and less competitive philoso- phizing” (Regan, Animal 61). This variety of theories in the protectionist movement also reveals the seriousness with which these ideas are now being taken, and the strength of the work being published by scholars in this growing 494 chapter ten field. Each of the philosophers explored in this text objects to the moral discrepancy between our overarching respect for human life and our general disregard for all other life-forms. “When taken together, these arguments pose a fundamental challenge to tradi- tional morality and its assumption of the superiority of humans and the primacy of human interests” (Finsen 233). Protectionism can never again be dismissed as a side issue; change is inevitable, how- ever slowly it might come to pass. 3. The Minimize Harm Maxim The Minimize Harm Maxim is part of this ongoing philosophical exploration and is likely to resonate with those who are interested in strict philosophical consistency, and perhaps with those who are invested in the sanctity of life. Consider a person who does not accept the notion of human rights, does not care about minimizing suffering, and who is not moved by religious teachings; what is the most fundamental common ground with regard to life that one might reach with such an individual? The answer seems to be conatus: such a person is alive and strives to persist biologically. Most people will readily acknowledge that they personally endeavor to survive, and that they wish to protect their personal endeavor to survive. Common sense tells us that all other life-forms share this biological urge to persist, and a common ground is reached not just for all people, but for all life. With this basic recognition it is easy to establish that all living beings ought to be protected from harm if human beings are protected on the grounds that they wish to persist. In the absence of any morally relevant dis- tinction between all human beings and all anymals, the Minimize Harm Maxim asserts that ethics ought to protect all life-forms that share this basic urge to persist if this urge is to be protected among human beings. For those who assert that only they (or only human beings) have an interest in persisting biologically, empirical evidence stands against them, and the burden of proof is theirs. Philosophic consistency indicates that those who wish to exploit anymals must justify such actions; in contrast, those who fight for protectionism are consistent with accepted morality regarding the protection and preservation of life (in the absence of a morally rel- evant distinction between all human beings and all anymals) and need not justify their stance. review and future directions 495 Summary of Overview • Predominant Western moral standards and practices are inconsis- tent and partial with regard to the moral standing of human beings as opposed to the moral standing of all other life-forms. • A diversity of protectionist theories is beneficial to the ongoing search for a more consistent ethic with regard to anymals. • The Minimize Harm Maxim, developed from a consistent application of extreme respect for human life in Western ethics, as exemplified by Western laws and Western medical practice, is part of this ongoing effort in protectionist moral philosophy, and is based on the most fundamental common ground with regard to life. B. Philosophical Standards and the Minimize Harm Maxim 1. Ethical Theories What is right will not always be apparent, and the temptation will always exist to rationalize as necessary what we desire or find conve- nient. (A. Taylor, Animal 262) Human actions affect the land and every living being. Maintaining moral standards is linked to a smooth-running, satisfied society (Horsburgh, Non-Violence 47). Human ethics that guide behavior are therefore extremely important to each of us and to the larger world. The practical application of philosophy, determining what one ought to do in a given situation, is the task of applied philosophy. One philosophical tool for this enterprise is casuistry, examining situations on a case-by-case basis and consistently applying ethical standards in diverse situations that are similar in morally relevant ways. Ethics entail many ideals that are not only difficult, but perhaps impossible to realize. Even a saint must at times be lustful, disin- genuous, or gluttonous; it does not seem feasible to be completely honest at all times. Yet self-control and honesty remain ethical ideals to which most of us readily attest. Utopian visions present ideals that offer moral guidance in real-life situations. The role of moral philoso- phy is to establish “claims on our consideration or respect which we acknowledge as in some sense ideally determinative” (Goodpaster, “On Being” 313). Making concessions for human shortcomings is not a legitimate approach to moral philosophy. Stringent expectations, and the need 496 chapter ten for diligence and sacrifice, should not sway us from pursuing moral ideals. Ethics distinguish ideal ways and preferable actions from both undesirable behavior and common practice. Morality is about what one ought to do. While human actions may fall short of moral ideals, the task of moral philosophy is to stand strong against conventional practices and moral assertions that fall short of the mark. An ethic limited to what an individual can reasonably be expected to achieve is a degra- dation of moral theory. Moral philosophers are not called upon to justify the way indi- viduals prefer to live, to appease the masses, or to gratify powerful individuals benefiting from the status quo. Down through history the masses and the elite have often claimed freedoms for themselves, in particular freeing themselves from morality at the expense of others. But freedom from morality does not equate to actual freedom. [S]uppose that we had quite different rules, and that more people were free to hit others in the nose, and correspondingly fewer were free to enjoy the full beauty and utility of their own unbloodied proboscises. Would this new arrangement have a greater or smaller “amount” of freedom in it, on balance . . .? . . . [T]here would be not “less” free- dom but freedom of a morally inferior kind. (Feinberg, Social 24) For centuries humans have been freely swinging their fists, while other species have suffered bruised and broken lives due to a short- coming that persists in Western morality as practiced by most citizens. A “major role of morality should be to enjoin the protection of the vulnerable from the powerful” (Miller 333); establishing moral codes that respect and protect the comparatively weak from the strong is one of the definitive duties of moral philosophy. The weak and silent have interests; morality requires the powerful to respect the less powerful. Who would condone a moral theory allowing the strongest and most powerful their preferences at the expense of the weak, the silent, or the poor? Yet, where other species are con- cerned, commonly accepted morality permits exactly this. Common Western ethics and practice fail to protect weak and vulnerable anymals from powerful, exploitative human beings. This breach of moral responsibility stands in stark contrast with our moral standards regarding the protection and preservation of human lives and is unjust and immoral because we have been unable to put for- ward a broadly accepted morally relevant distinction between humans and other life-forms. Down through history and up to the present moment prominent moral practices have been biased, favoring cer- review and future directions 497 tain interests. Favored interests “tend to be characteristically human,” and the “grounds for discrimination are inadequate” (L. Johnson 198). We have failed to establish an ethic that consistently protects the myriad vulnerable living beings from greedy, powerful, prosper- ous, exploitative human beings. It is the task of moral philosophers to offer a more viable (consistent) alternative. 2. Examining the Minimize Harm Maxim The Minimize Harm Maxim, an idealistic moral theory based on consistency and impartiality, strives to actualize widely accepted con- temporary moral ideals. The Minimize Harm Maxim does not make concessions for priv- ileged or powerful minorities (human beings as opposed to all other living entities). It protects all who are powerless. The Minimize Harm Maxim offers an ideal, consistent with norms of moral philosophy. For most of us in our daily lives, the ease or difficulty of enact- ing a moral theory does not add to or detract from the strength or desirability of that moral theory. (Even though we all lie sometimes, we generally agree that lying is not morally preferable. Even though we agree that gluttony is no virtue, most of us eat more than we ought to at least on occasion.) In the conspicuous absence of any morally relevant distinction between all people who are morally con- siderable and other living beings, the Minimize Harm Maxim indi- cates how we can maintain consistency and persist with our current ethical standard with regard to human life. The Minimize Harm Maxim carries current ethical standards with regard to human life to their logical conclusion—not to suggest what one might prefer to do, nor what it is “reasonable” to expect, but in order to indicate what one ought to do. 3. Comparison The Minimize Harm Maxim entails a number of important philo- sophical strengths in comparison with other protectionist theories. The Minimize Harm Maxim • maintains consistency and impartiality; • avoids the dubious metaphysical concept of moral rights; • avoids the epistemological difficulties of assessing consciousness across species; [...]... “Opening Pandora’s Box: Imagination’s Role in Environmental Ethics. ” Environmental Ethics 18 (1996): 3–18 Eck, Diana Darsan: Seeing the Divine Image in India Chambersburg: Anima, 1981 Eiselen, Frederick Carl, Lewis Edwin, and David G Downey The Abingdon Bible Commentary New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1929 Eisnitz, Gail A Slaughterhouse: The Shocking Story of Greed, Neglect, and Inhumane Treatment Inside... 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In fact Western nations. species. Expanding review and future directions 503 moral standing to include other life-forms is inevitable. Even if we exclude certain human beings, and even if we fail to protect human beings in certain. seemingly bizarre) realization that everything must be given moral consideration. (Birch 318) In light of a comparatively inclusive dominant ethic concerning human life and moral standing, and in