In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 3 pps

96 chapter two lives of many people in jeopardy. Regan’s discussion of “innocent threats” deals with situations where moral patients harm moral agents, but he offers no indication that dangerous but innocent moral agents might not also be killed to protect moral agents and moral patients. People are often ignorant of the damage they do, but humans, more than any other animal, endanger life. To eliminate every other species when they pose an innocent threat, but not to eliminate humans in comparable situations, would be inconsistent and speciesist. The vast majority of Western hunters kill for recreation. They kill because they consider hunting a worthwhile and enjoyable way to spend time and because they (or someone they know) eats dead any- mals. Few acknowledge (or even consider) that killing anymals for food is completely unnecessary for their survival, and that such “sport” causes tremendous hardship and harm to other living beings. (In fact, hunters usually assert that they do their victims a favor !) Thus hunters needlessly endanger and destroy thousands of anymals every year, and may be said to do so innocently (out of ignorance). Regan’s “innocent threats” clause justifies the killing of rabid foxes that might bite (out of fear or in self-defense). Consistency requires that his the- ory also permit the killing of ignorant—and therefore “innocent”— human beings who habitually and unnecessarily slaughter innocent anymals. To eliminate other species when they pose an innocent threat, but not to eliminate humans in comparable situations, is inconsistent. b. Loss of Innocence Regan asserts that those who have lost innocence through unjust actions “have no grounds to complain if we override their right not to be harmed and spare the victims of their past injustice” (Case 323). Injustices borne by some grant these beleaguered individuals privi- leges above those who perpetrate such injustices. He asserts, “Those who forge, as well as those who perpetuate injustice are not on the same moral footing as their innocent victims” (Case 323). Morality requires us to take into consideration “past injus- tices some have had to bear” (Case 323). “Those who are parties to such injustice lose the protection the miniride and worse-off principles provide and have no just grounds to complain if we override their right not to be harmed and spare the victims of their past injustice” (Case 323). This assertion has yet more counterintuitive implications. As noted, Regan posits a lifeboat with four humans and one dog tom regan: the rights view 97 vying for space. If one being must go overboard, Regan concludes that the dog ought always and perpetually to go overboard. This assertion is not consistent with Regan’s Rights View with regard to loss of innocence. If consistently applied, how would Regan’s view on “loss of innocence” affect these hapless sea-bound citizens? Regan notes that “animal agriculture, as we know it, is unjust” (Case 394). He writes, “Those who support current animal agriculture by purchasing meat have a moral obligation to stop doing so” (Case 394). He also notes that any hardship the anymal industries suffer due to a lack of economic support from conscientious objectors is irrelevant because “their voluntary participation in that business sig- nals that they waive the right not to be made worse off if the busi- ness fails” (Case 394). In other words, the injustice of their acts toward cattle and pigs, chickens and turkeys, removes them from equal moral footing with others who are comparatively innocent. Similarly, those who continue to buy the bodies of slaughtered anymals in prefer- ence to eating rice with vegetables lose their equal moral footing by willfully choosing to exploit and destroy others. It is reasonable to assume that Regan would make a similar asser- tion about any common yet unnecessary human exploitation of any- mals, from attending circuses to buying cosmetics tested on anymals. All human beings engaged in these practices, who support these mar- kets, harm innocent victims exploited by these markets. People who engage in such acts have a moral obligation to change behavior that does not respect these subjects-of-a-life. Such consumers jeopardize their innocence. Determining “loss of innocence” in Regan’s Rights View requires scrutiny to discover whether or not individuals have willfully exploited others and gained through such choices. Indeed, according to Regan, those who capitalize on anymal agriculture have gained from harm- ful exploitation (Case 394). Those who support these industries and perpetuate such injustices are also guilty. Flesh and dairy–eaters, leather and fur–wearers, and those who have used other subjects-of- a-life for science projects—as well as any and all individuals who support these actions—have jeopardized their otherwise equal right not to be harmed. If even one of the humans on the lifeboat has been eating bits of bodies, bodies that once shared equal inherent value and the equal right not to be harmed in Regan’s Rights View, then the dog will certainly not be first overboard. On the contrary, 98 chapter two loss of innocence for at least one of the four lifeboat-clinging humans is almost certain. As it turns out, the dog is the least likely to be thrown overboard. Furthermore, Regan clearly asserts that anymals are always innocent moral patients. Consequently, dogs (birds, cats, snakes, and any other anymal) cannot ever jeopardize their chance for a spot on the lifeboat by loss of innocence. Meanwhile, powerful, exploitative humans are almost always guilty of treating anymals as if they did not have equal inherent value—thereby forfeiting a place on the raft to their inno- cent victims—other animals. In any and all scenarios, humans are likely to have jeopardized their innocence in relation to—and with regard to—other species, while anymals always remain inherently innocent. Contrary to Regan’s conclusion, if those on a lifeboat are chucked overboard one by one, preserving those who have not suffered a “loss of innocence,” the survivor will almost surely be the dog. c. Obligation to Defend Regan states that moral agents have an obligation to defend a sub- ject-of-a-life when such an individual’s equal right not to be harmed is violated. He writes that the onus of justification for harm done is always on one who brings about that harm. Unless or until we are shown how such harm is justified, we are rationally entitled to believe, and morally required to act, against such actions. Regan asserts that those who violate the rights of others are liable to sanction, and we are all morally obligated to participate in this process. Though Regan does not discuss where this duty begins or ends, or the difficulty of determining exactly when such rights are vio- lated, he offers clear guidelines for action: A slave-trader does not do what is right by supplying his client with a promised slave, and he has no valid moral duty to do so, despite his promising [P]romises made in the name of the perpetuation of this institution are morally null and void. The same is true regarding society’s ‘contract’ with science and the supposed duty of scientists to carry out their end of the agreement by harming some animals so that others, both humans and animals, might benefit. This “contract” has no moral validity, according to the Rights View, because it fails to treat lab animals with the respect they are due [S]cience that routinely harms animals in pursuit of its goals is morally corrupt, because unjust at its core, something that no appeal to the “contract” between society and science can alter. (Case 390) tom regan: the rights view 99 Regan’s obligation to defend is clear on two counts: • Every moral agent is obligated to liberate subjects-of-a-life. • Moral agents are justified in breaching accepted moral standards and laws in the process of liberating subjects-of-a-life from unjust practices. According to Regan a moral agent is obligated to break contracts and ignore laws in order to fight against the meat industry, or to thwart the use of anymals in science. Regan also indicates that people are justified in forcing change on those who harm others: “If Heather violates the rights of those she cooks and eats when she cooks and eats them, then she has no grounds to complain that we violate her rights by stopping her” (Case 334). We are permitted to violate Heather’s rights in order to prevent her from eating the flesh of other subjects-of-a-life. Regan is unclear where these moral obligations begin and end, or how far they might carry one along the path of civil disobedi- ence. Consequently, the possibilities are somewhat daunting. Are we obligated to unchain our neighbor’s dog? Must we forcefully liberate battery hens . . . or free-range hens? Does morality require us to engage in guerrilla tactics to set loose laboratory and zoo anymals? Beyond major lifestyle changes, is political activism enough, or must we step in on behalf of every black Angus bull and Barbary ape, every pink river dolphin and rock wallaby, every buff-faced pigmy parrot and tabby cat whose rights are violated? Perhaps Regan accepts all of these obligations. If he does not, he risks inconsistency; if he does, he invites chaos. The latter is philo- sophically acceptable; the former is not. d. Special Considerations Regan asserts that “the moral bonds between family members and friends [are] a special consideration that justifiably can override the otherwise binding application of the miniride and worse-off principles” (Case 316). Through these “special considerations,” Regan justifies protecting a familiar and preferred human at the greater expense of a stranger simply because “it is those closest to us whom we stand to help or harm most, and they, us” (Case 316). Regan argues that “the relationships between friends and loved ones are special” (Case 317) and therefore impartiality cannot be expected—impartiality is 100 chapter two not preferred. Without this “special considerations” clause, Regan writes, one might be required to “spare the stranger at the expense of our loved one. And that is counterintuitive” (Case 315). Regan specifically protects basic rights from being toppled for “spe- cial considerations.” While no subject-of-a-life can be denied a right to life, based on Regan’s special considerations clause, they can be denied access to goods or opportunities due to personal relations. Consequently, Regan’s special interest clause threatens impartial appli- cation of the Rights View. Yet Regan’s special consideration clause seems to feed into the hand of self-interest: [L]ove relations are relations of self-interest, though deep ones. It is important to you that you choose that man or that woman, as friend, lover, spouse; that you are the parent of that child; and so for many other such cases . . .—you care for them more. If moral relations are generated essentially by rational agents promoting their own well- considered, long-run interests, these cases make sense. (Narveson, “On a Case” 36) Self-interest is often at odds with morality. Clauses providing for spe- cial considerations have frequently been used in just such a self-inter- ested manner—most infamously to defend racism, sexism, and speciesism. Feelings of attachment are often stronger between fam- ily members—and between human beings—than they are between strangers—or between species (Orlans 20). If we allow special con- siderations, as Regan does, human beings are apt to be granted spe- cial considerations over and above anymals (Rollin 43) and perhaps certain powerful individuals will gain special moral status over other human beings: If it is permissible to have special regard for family or neighbours, why not one’s fellow species-members? The problem with this way of think- ing is that there are lots of groups to which one naturally belongs, and these group-memberships are not always (if they are ever) morally significant. The progression from family to neighbour to species passes through other boundaries on the way—through the boundary of race, for example. (Rachels, Created 184) How will Regan define “friend” and “family” in order to prevent racists and bigots from seeking advantages for those nearest and dearest? It does not logically follow that natural feelings, just because we have them, ought to be the basis of moral obligation. Regan’s tom regan: the rights view 101 special interests clause can be used to legitimize any and all special interests: speciesism, racism, and sexism. Regan seems to include this protective clause to prevent unsavory possibilities such as fathers neglecting their children to help more needy street urchins, or soldiers at war who might abandon com- rades to help the wounded from across the lines. Regan states that such actions are counterintuitive because they deny fundamental bonds. His point is worth considering. It is impor- tant to remember that philosophers most often seek ideals, even if these ideals are considered extreme, and that utopian visions of philosophers have had a tremendous impact on our present world. To explore Regan’s special considerations clause, it seems useful to visualize a utopian world with no special considerations. In a completely egalitarian world each of us would deal with every- one else in the same manner. We would impartially help whoever was in the greatest danger—as we would do with our own loved ones. In times of crises we would make decisions via “moral triage,” helping those most in need rather than tending our loved ones first and foremost. Yes, fathers would leave their children temporarily, when necessary, in order to help other children who were more needy. And soldiers would cross the lines to help more seriously wounded on the other side—in fact there would be no “sides,” and no “soldiers.” Whoever was most in need would gain aid regardless of gender, race, family membership, or species. While we could all continue to have special people in our individual lives, we would not favor these peo- ple in ways that allowed others to suffer greater harms. Such an arrangement would end the very possibility of war and famine in a world of plenty. Is such a state of affairs really so bad? This vision seems neither counterintuitive nor negative, but in many ways eth- ically ideal. Conclusion Regan’s Rights View, especially as revealed in his lifeboat scenario, is sometimes inconsistent with his overall intent. Theoretical problems experienced in the extremes of lifeboat scenarios cannot harm the solid core of Regan’s work: His Rights View effectively exposes the moral inconsistency of offering rights exclusively to human beings while denying even the most basic rights to anymals. If one accepts 102 chapter two human rights, in the absence of a morally relevant distinction between certain other mammals and human beings, Regan convincingly argues for a broader category of rights holders. Regan’s Rights View is detailed and far reaching. He provides a thorough and solid ground on which to base anymal rights, and he includes detailed criteria to offer guidance in diverse situations. Regan’s groundbreaking theory is a monumental philosophical achievement. The Rights View remains the most systematic and comprehensive anymal rights theory to date. CHAPTER THREE PETER SINGER: UTILITARIAN PROTECTIONISM A. Singer’s Utilitarian Theory Peter Singer’s philosophy on which lives should be sustained and protected has been one of the most controversial topics in recent decades. He is perhaps the best known contemporary philosopher and has found an audience for his controversial work even among those who do not study philosophy. But Singer is not an advocate of animal rights, nor does he qualify as a bunny hugger—his first love was not Fluffy or Spot, but philosophy. Singer’s studies led him to utilitarianism, and this is where his protectionist work began. Singer realized the implications of utilitarian theory for animals— philosophical consistency required him to include anymals in his util- itarian moral theory. He was not interested in “pets,” but first and foremost in philosophical consistency, which called his attention to anymals. His work began to focus on ending oppression and exploita- tion, on reducing suffering in the world—all oppression and exploita- tion, all suffering (Singer, Writings 22). Toward this end, he wrote Animal Liberation, which extends utilitarianism to include anymals based on equal consideration of interests and sentience. 1. Utilitarianism Consequentialist moral theories claim that the morality of an action is determined by the consequences of that act. One ought to act in such a way as to bring about the greatest utility, to produce the greatest good. Consequentialists start not with moral rules but with goals. They assess actions by the extent to which they further these goals. The best- known, though not the only, consequentialist theory is utilitarianism. The classical utilitarian regards an action as right if it produces as much or more of an increase in the happiness of all affected by it than any alternative action, and wrong if it does not. (Singer, Practical 3) 104 chapter three Utilitarianism does not necessarily require that an action produce the greatest good for the greatest number, as is commonly assumed. Utilitarians generally agree that to achieve the greatest good it is sometimes necessary to harm the greatest number. For instance, this might be done in order to avoid more severe harm to a minority: If there are ten cannibals salivating over a small child, most utili- tarians would agree that the greatest number (the ten cannibals) ought to suffer the unhappiness of thwarted desire, so that the small child might live. There are a handful of utilitarian theories, such as classical, rule, and preference utilitarianism, each of which uses a different method for assessing what acts yield the best consequences. Classical utili- tarians, sometimes called hedonistic utilitarians (such as John Stuart Mill), measure utility in terms of maximizing pleasure and mini- mizing pain. Rather than weigh pleasures over pains on a case-by- case basis, rule utilitarians assert that rules can be established and then applied in a host of similar situations. Peter Singer is a preference utilitarian. Preference utilitarianism “judges actions, not by their tendency to maximize pleasure or min- imize pain, but by the extent to which they accord with the pref- erences of any beings affected by the action or its consequences” (Singer, Writings 133). Singer determines preferences through inter- ests. In his view a person’s interests are “what, on balance and after reflection of all the relevant facts, a person prefers” (Singer, Writings 133). His moral theory determines the best consequences of an action via the satisfaction of preferences rooted in interests. Like utilitarian philosophers before him, Singer asserts that we are interested in our own personal welfare; we have a “natural concern that [our] own interests be looked after” (Practical 12). Some moral theorists contend that it is “unreasonable to expect people to follow rules that have no basis in their interests, their reasons” (Narveson, Moral 16). Preference utilitarianism capitalizes on the basic fact that each of us has desires; we wish to satisfy our own personal prefer- ences. Universalizing this interest, and applying reason, leads to a preference utilitarian theory by recognizing that my own interests cannot count for more, simply because they are my own, than the interests of others. In place of my own interests, I now have to take account of the interests of all those affected by my decision. This requires me to weigh up all these interests and adopt the course of action most likely to maximize the interests of peter singer: utilitarian protectionism 105 those affected. Thus I must choose the course of action which has the best consequences, on balance, for all affected. This is a form of util- itarianism. It differs from classical utilitarianism in that ‘best conse- quences’ is understood as meaning what, on balance, furthers the interests of those affected, rather than merely what increases pleasure and reduces pain. (Singer, Practical 12–13) While a utilitarian position may be reached by universalizing self- interest, Singer is clear that self-interest should not guide morality. Singer asserts that reason is compatible with preference utilitarian- ism and that reason ought to guide morality; “reason is not subor- dinate to self-interest” (Practical 69). Morality requires us to determine a moral course of action through reason; we ought to “assess the moral claims of those affected by our actions independently of our feelings for them” (Singer, Practical 67). Rational thought and uni- versalizing self-interest lead naturally to utilitarianism: self-interested actions become group oriented in order to achieve the greatest good for all those affected. 2. Sentience “At least since Epicurus in the fourth century BC, philosophers have suggested that all creatures seek pleasure and avoid pain” (Ryder, Animal 324). Singer’s work stems from the work of a handful of famous utilitarian philosophers, most notably Jeremy Bentham, who is often quoted by protectionists: “The question is not, Can they rea- son? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (Bentham Ch. XVIII, Sec. 1). Bentham argued that because anymals have the capacity to feel pain, they ought to be morally considerable. While we cannot with legitimate reason discount interests or preferences based on one’s hair color, IQ , or length of toes, we need not be concerned with those who have no interests, no preferences whatsoever. Any being that can suffer will almost always have an interest in not suffering, Singer notes, and if we are to bring about the greatest utility, the best consequences for all concerned, we must take this preference, this personal interest into account. Consequently, Singer’s utilitarian scales weigh suffering and need— interests and preferences. Singer asserts that the ability to suffer is essential to having preferences, which stem from sentience (Practical 50). A piece of coal cannot have interests or preferences because it cannot suffer. An armadillo, on the other hand, has a central nervous [...]... embedded in Singer’s replaceability argument These surprising outcomes appear to stem from errors in Singer’s reasoning In “Killing Humans and Killing Animals Singer examines two utilitarian outlooks: The “total view” indicates that ethical actions will always “increase the total surplus of pleasure over pain, irrespective of whether this is done by increasing the pleasure of existing beings, or increasing... category, while individuals from other species qualify and ought to be offered due protection 4 Death and Killing While similar in many other respects, Singer differs radically from Regan on the issue of death and suffering Singer asserts that the ethics involved in killing are “much more complicated” than the morality of in icting suffering (Singer, Animal 228) For Singer, pain is pain, but the harm of death... plainly stated intent and the whole point of utilitarianism Singer does not wish to increase but to decrease suffering by maximizing the satisfaction of interests “Singer is in favor of increasing protections for vulnerable animals and humans” (Orlans 24) He even stresses the importance of mental capacities, which cannot help but provide yet more protection to the vast majority of human beings over and. .. irrelevant when pain and suffering are involved He maintains that like interests ought to be treated in a like manner and asserts that all sentient creatures have an interest in avoiding harm He offers a utilitarian moral theory intent on maximizing the satisfaction of preferences of sentient creatures Singer’s work has helped bring protectionist philosophy—particularly speciesism—to the forefront of classrooms,... hard also in his treatment of men (Kant 240) Indeed, recent research indicates that a lack of respect for any living being is associated with a lack of respect for life in general In peter singer: utilitarian protectionism 127 19 83 a study linked anymal abuse to child abuse, revealing that “88% of the families in which physical abuse took place also had animals that were abused” (DeViney 31 1) Those... percent of living things by species and only a tiny fraction of a percent by numbers of individuals Really, it is mostly for the mammals, and declines with decreasing complexity in the central nervous system (Rolston, “Respect” 246) In Singer’s utilitarian theory, those who cannot be harmed through suffering have no interests to be considered But Singer’s ethic, while offering no moral standing to trees... hunters, and other ruthless exploiters of sentient beings ought to be eliminated in order to raise overall happiness or pleasure, in order to satisfy more interests (namely those of exploited anymals) When does an individual cause so much pain and suffering to others that the utilitarian scales vote against her or his existence? In Singer’s view killing is acceptable so long as death is painless, the individual... several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number of similar interests; but they take no account of whose interests they are weighing” (Singer, Practical 19) Singer insists that each individual carry no more weight than any other; each individual counts for one and nobody counts for more than one The interests of any one individual are no more or less important than the interests of any other (Singer,... McDonald’s restaurant in San Ysidro, California, had been accused of shooting his neighbor’s dog with an airgun Earl Shriner sexually mutilating a seven-year-old boy in Tacoma, Washington, had a juvenile history of stringing up cats, sticking firecrackers up the anuses of dogs, and slaughtering chickens In 1975, neighbors photographed the skulls of animals impaled in the yard of Jeffrey Dahmer, imprisoned... behavior of pollinating insects and the responses of other plants; they emit allelopathic agents to suppress invaders; they make thorns, trap insects, and so on They can reject genetically incompatible grafts peter singer: utilitarian protectionism 129 A plant, like any other organism, sentient or not, is a spontaneous, self-maintaining system, sustaining and reproducing itself, executing its program, . of death and suffering. Singer asserts that the ethics involved in killing are “much more complicated” than the morality of in icting suffering (Singer, Animal 228). For Singer, pain is pain, but. plainly stated intent and the whole point of utilitari- anism. Singer does not wish to increase but to decrease suffering by maximizing the satisfaction of interests. “Singer is in favor of increas- ing. Singer, moral standing is rooted in having interests; interests are the basis of individual preferences. He rejects actual equality in favor of equal consideration of interests. Singer states that