Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 10 P43 pdf

defeating the testator’s testamentary plan. If, however, the witness also would inherit under the laws of descent and distribu tion should the will be invalidated, he will forfeit only the interest in excess of the amount he would receive if the will were voided. Acknowledgment A testator is usually re- quired to publish the will—that is, to declare to the witnesses that the instrument is his will. This declaration is called an ACKNOWLEDGMENT. No state requires, however, that the witnesses know the contents of the will. Although some states require a testator to sign the will in the presence of witnesses, the majority require only an acknowledgment of the signature. If a testator shows the signature on a will that he has already signed to a witness and acknowledges that it is his signature, the will is thereby acknowledged. Attestation An attestation clause is a certificate signed by the witnesses to a will reciting per- formance of the formalities of execution that the witnesses observed. It usually is not required for a will to be valid, but in some states it is evidence that the statements made in the attestation are true. Testator’s Intent For a will to be admitted to probate, it must be clear that the testator acted freely in expressing his testamentary intention. A will executed as a result of undue influence, fraud, or mistake can be declared completely or partially void in a probate proceeding. Howard Hughes and the Mormon Will W B hen billionaire recluse Ho ward Hughes died in 1976, it appeared that he had not left a will. Attorneys and executives of Hughes’s corporations began an intensive search to find a will, while speculation grew that Hugh es might have left a holographic (ha ndwritten) will. One attorney pub- licly stated that Hughes had asked him about the legality of a holographic will. Soon after the attorney made the statement, a holographic will allegedly written by Hughes appeared on a desk i n the Salt Lake City headquar- ters of the Church of Jesus Christ of L atter-day Saints, more commonly known as the Mormon Church. After a preliminary review, a document examiner concluded that the will might have been written by Hughes. The Mormon Church then filed the will in the county court in Las Vegas, Nevada, where Hughes’s estate was being settled. The will, which became known as the Mormon Will, drew national attention for a provision that gave one-sixteenth of the estate, valued at $156 million, to Melvin Dummar, the owner of a small gas station in Willard, Utah. Dummar told reporters that in 1975 he had picked up a man who claimed to be Howard Hughes and had dropped him off in Las Vegas. Though Dummar f irst said he had no prior knowledge of the will or how it appeared at the church headquarters, he later claimed that a man drove to his service station and gave him the will with instructions to deliver it to Salt Lake City. Dummar said he had destroyed the instructions. Investigators discovered that Dummar had checked out a library copy of a book called The Hoax, which recounted the story of Clifford Irving’s forgery of an “autobiography” of Hughes. The book contained examples of Hughes’s handwriting. Document examiners demonstrated that Hughes’s handwriting had changed before the time the Mormon Will suppo sedly was written. In addition, the examiners concluded that the will was a crude forgery. Nevertheless, it took a seven-month trial and millions of dollars from the Hughes estate to prove that the will was a fake. In the end, the court ruled that the will was a forgery. No valid will was ever f ound. Dummar’sstory later became the subject of the 1980 motion picture Melvin and Howard. FURTHER READINGS Freese, Paul L. 1986. “Howard Hughes and Melvin Dummar: Forensic Science Fact Versus Film Fiction.” Journal of Forensic Sciences 31 (January). Marks, Marlene Adler. 1981. “Where There’s a Will Rhoden Recoups after Howard Hughes Fiasco.” National Law Journal (January 5). GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 408 WILL Undue Influence Undue influence is pressure that takes away a person’s free will to make decisions, substituting the will of the influencer. A court will find undue influence if the testator was capable of being influenced, improper influence was exerted on the testator, and the testamentary provisions reflect the effect of such influence. Mere advice, persuasion, affection, or kindness does not alone constitute undue influence. Questions of undue influence typically arise when a will deals unjustly with persons believed to be the natural objects of the testator ’s bounty. However, undue influence is not established by inequality of the provisions of the will, because this would interfere with the testator’s ability to dispose of the property as he pleases. Examples of undue influence include threats of violence or criminal prosecution of the testator, or the threat to abandon a sick testator. Fraud Fraud differs from undue influence in that the former involves MISREPRESENTATION of essential facts to another to persuade him to make and sign a will that will benefit the person who misrepresents the facts. The testator still acts freely in making and signing the will. The two types of fraud are fraud in the execution and fraud in the inducement. When a person is deceived by ano ther as to the character or contents of the documen t he is signing, he is the victim of fraud in the execution. Fraud in the execution includes a situation where the contents of the will are knowingly misrepre- sented to the testator by someone who will benefit from the misrepresentation. Fraud in the inducement occurs when a person knowingly makes a will but its terms are based on material misrepresentations of facts made to the testator by someone who will ultimately benefit. Persons deprived of benefiting under a will because of fraud or undue influence can obtain relief only by contesting the will. If a court finds fraud or undue influence, it may prevent the wrongdoer from receiving any benefit from the will and may distribute the property to those who contested the will. Mistake When a testator intended to execute his will but by mistake signed the wrong document, that document will not be enforced. Such mistakes often occur when a HUSBAND AND WIFE draft mutual wills. The document that bears the testator’s signature does not represent his testamentary intent, and therefore his property cannot be distributed according to its terms. Special Types of Wills Some states have statutes that recognize certain kinds of wills that are executed with less formality than ordinary wills, but only when the wills are made under circumstances that reduce the possibility of fraud. Holographic Wills A holographic will is completely written and signed in the handwriting of the testator, such as a letter that specifically discusses his intended distribution of the estate after his death. Many states do not recognize the validity of holographic wills, and those that do require that the formalities of execution be followed. Nuncupative Wills A nuncupative will is an oral will. Most states do not recognize the validity of such wills because of the greater likelihood of fraud, but those that do impose certain requirements. The will must be made during the testator’s last sickness or in expecta- tion of imminent death. The testator must indicate to the witnesses that he wants them to witness his oral will. Such a will can dispose of only personal, not real, property. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Wills Several states have laws that relax the execution requirements for wills made by soldiers and sailors while on active military dut y or at sea. In these situations a testator’s oral or handwritten will is capable of passing personal property. Where such wills are recognized, statutes often stipulate that they are valid for only a certain period of time afte r the testator has left the service. In other instances, however, the will remains valid. Revocation of a Will A will is ambulatory, which means that a competent testator may change or revoke it at any time before his death. Revocation of a will occurs when a person who has made a will takes some action to indicate that he no longer wants its provisions to be binding and the law abides by his decision. For revocation to be effective, the intent of the testator, whether express or implied, must be clear, and an act of revocation consistent with this intent must occur. Persons who wish to revoke a will may use a codicil, which is a GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WILL 409 document that changes, revokes, or amends part or all of a validly executed will. When a person executes a co dicil that revokes some provisions of a previous will, the courts will recognize this as a valid revocation. Likewise, a new will that completely revokes an earlier will indicates the testator’s intent to revoke the will. Statements made by a person at or near the time that he intentionally destroys his will by burning, mutilating, or tearing it clearly dem- onstrate his intent to revoke. Sometimes revocation occurs by operation of law, as in the case of a marriage, DIVORCE, birth of a child, or the sale of property devised in the will, which automatically changes the legal duties of the testator. Many states provide that when a testator and spouse have been divorced but the testator’s will has not been revised since the change in marital status, any disposition to the former spouse is revoked. Protection of the Family The desire of society to protect the spouse and children of a decedent is a major reason both for allowing testamentary dispo sition of prop- erty and for placing limitations upon the freedom of testators. Surviving Spouse Three statutory approaches have developed to protect the surviving spouse against disinheritance: DOWER or curtesy, the elective share, and COMMUNITY PROPERTY. Dower or curtesy At common law, a wife was entitled to dower, a life interest in one-third of the land owned by her husband during the marriage. Curtesy was the right of a husband to a life interest in all of his wife’s lands. Most states have abolished common-law dower and curtesy and have enacted laws that treat husband and wife identically. Some statutes subject dower and curtesy to payment of debts, and others extend rights to personal property as well as land. Some states allow dower or curtesy in addition to testamentary provisions, though in other states dower and curtesy are in lieu of testamentary provisions. Elective share Although a testator can dispose of his property as he wishes, the law recognizes that the surviving spouse, who has usually contributed to the accumulation of property during the marriage, is entitled to a share in the property. Otherwise, that spouse might ultimately become dependent on the state. For this reason, the elective share was created by statute in states that do not have community property. Most states have statutes allowing a surviv- ing spouse to elect either a statutory share (usually one-third of the estate if children survive, one-half otherwise), which is the share that the spouse would have received if the decedent had died intestate, or the provision made in the spouse’s will. As a general rule, surviving spouses are prohibited from taking their elective share if they unjustly engaged in desertion or committed bigamy. A spouse can usually waive, release, or contract away his statutory rights to an elective share or to dower or curtesy by either an antenuptial (also called prenuptial) or postnup- tial agreement, if it is fair and made with knowledge of all relevant facts. Such agreements must be in writing. Community property A community prop- erty system generally treats the husband and wife as co-owners of property acquired by either of them during the marriage. On the death of one, the survivor is entitled to one-half the property, and the remainder passes according to the will of the decedent. Children Generally parents can completely disinherit their children. A court will uphold such provisions if the testator specifically men- tions in the will that he is intentionally dis- inheriting certain named children. Many states, however, have pretermitted heir provisions, which give children born or adopted after the execution of the will and not mentioned in it an intestate share, unless the omission appears to be intentional. Other Limitations on Will Provisions The law has made other exceptions to the general rule that a testator has the unqualified right to dispose of his estate in any way that he sees fit. Charitable Gifts Many state statutes protect a testator’s family from disinheritance by limiting the testator’s power to make charitable gifts. Such limitations are usually operative only where close relatives, such as children, grand- children, parents, and spou se, survive. Charitable gifts are limited in certain ways. For example, the amount of the gift can be limited to a certain proportion of the estate, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 410 WILL usually 50 percent. Some states prohibit death- bed gifts to charity by invalidating gifts that a testator makes within a specified period before death. Ademption and Abatement ADEMPTION is where a person makes a declaration in his will to leave some property to another and then reneges on the declaration, either by changing the property or removing it from the estate. Abatement is the process of determining the order in which property in the estate will be applied to the payment of debts, taxes, and expenses. The gifts that a person is to receive under a will are usually classified according to their nature for purposes of ademption and abate- ment. A specific bequest is a gift of a particular identifiable item of personal property, such as an antique violin, whereas a specific devise is an identifiable gift of real property, such as a specifically designated farm. A demonstrative bequest is a gift of a certain amount of property—$2,000, for example—out of a certain fund or identifiable source of property, such as a savings account at a particular bank. A general bequest is a gift of property payable from the general assets of the testator’s estate, such as a gift of $5,000. A residuary gift is a gift of the remaining portion of the estate after the satisfaction of other dispositions . When specific devises and bequests are no longer in the estate or have been substantially changed in character at the time of the testator’s death, this is called ademption by extinction, and it occurs irrespective of the testator’s intent. If a testator specifically provides in his will that the beneficiary will receive his gold watch, but the watch is stolen prior to his death, the gift adeems and the beneficiary is not entitled to anything, including any insurance payments made to the estate as reimbursement for the loss of the watch. Ademption by satisfaction occurs when the testator, during his lifetime, gives to his intended beneficiary all or part of a gift that he had intended to give the beneficiary in her will. The intention of the testator is an essential element. Ademption by satisfaction applies to general as well as specific legacies. If the subject matter of a gift made during the lifetime of a testator is the same as that specified in a testamentary provision, it is presumed that the gift is in lieu of the testamentary gift where there is a parent-child or grandparent-parent relationship. In the abatement process, the intention of the testator, if expressed in the will, governs the order in which property will abate to pay taxes, debts, and expenses. Where the will is silent, the following order is usually applied: residuary gifts, general bequests, demonstrative be quests, and specific bequests and devises. RESOURCES Beyer. 2007. Wills, Trusts and Estates Examples & Explana- tions. Frederick, MD: Aspen. Brown, Gordon W., and Scott Myers. 2008. Administration of Wills, Trusts, and Estates. 4th ed. Clifton Park, NY: Delmar/Cengage Learning. CROSS REFERENCES Estate and Gift Taxes; Executors and Administrators; Husband and Wife; Illegitimacy; Living Will; Parent and Child; Postmarital Agreement; Premarital Agreement; Trust. v WILL, HUBERT LOUIS Hubert Louis Will was appointed U.S. district judge for the Northern District of Illinois on October 27, 1961, by President JOHN F. KENNEDY. Like Kennedy, Will has been called an idealist and a pragmatist. His challenge to other federal judges is famous: produce the highest quality justice in the shortest time and at the lowest cost, consistent with that quality. To meet his own challenge, Will developed innovative case- management techniques over the years—and he willingly shared them, through judicial semi- nars, with many of the nation’s leading jurists. Will was among the first to use pretrial scheduling conferences, pretrial orders, and standardized pretrial order forms to organize and supervise the course of a trial from the outset. His aversion to lengthy and costly trials caused him to be, at times, an outspoken critic of the U.S. trial lawyers. He was a longtime crusader for higher professional stan dards and better practice skills within the trial bar. Lawyers seldom took issue with Will’s position on the issue. He was a respected trial lawyer for almost 20 years before coming to the federal bench. Will was born April 23, 1914, in Milwaukee. As a law student at the University of Chicago he was among a select group of students chosen to JUDGES FOR CENTURIES HAVE THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE JUST SUPPOSED TO BE SKILLED REFEREES WHO WOULD STEP INTO THE RING WHEN THE LAWYER COMBATANTS SAID THEY WERE READY TO FIGHT . —HUBERT LOUIS WILL GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WILL, HUBERT LOUIS 411 meet with attorney CLARENCE DARROW for infor- mal Sunday afternoon discussions on legal topics. One of Darrow’s favorites was VOIR DIRE , which is the preliminary examination of prospective jurors or witnesses to inquire into their competence. As a judge, Will enjoyed the dynamics of the jury selection process. In 1937 Will earned a doctor of jurispru- dence degree from the University of Chicago. That same year, he accepted a position with the general counsel’s staff of the U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION . In 1939, he went to work as special secretary to U.S. senator ROBERT F. WAGNER, of New York. During his tenure as special secretary, Will also served as clerk of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency. In 1940 Will joined the Tax Division of the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT as a special assistant to the U.S. attorney general. It was in the Tax Division that Will got his first real courtroom experience. There he briefed and argued cases in the U.S. Court of Claims and various district courts. He also tried cases in all the circuit courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. Later, Will served as general counsel for the Office of Price Administration and as tax counsel to the U.S. alien property custodian. By 1943, he was active in the military as a member of the Office of Strategic Services. He later served as acting chief of the Counter Espionage Branch in the European theater of operations. Before WORLD WAR II ended, he earned a promotion to captain and a citation for bravery. Thereafter he remained active in veterans’ affairs. At the close of the war, Will and his wife and four children returned to Chicago, where he joined the law firm of Pope and Ballard. A year later, he became a partner in the firm of Nelson, Boodell, and Will. From 1946 to 1961 Will made his name as a tough—and winning—trial attorney. As a consequence of his work and reputation, Will was well known in Chicago circles of the DEMOCRATIC PARTY. His name was soon added to a short list of possible appointees to the federal bench. In October 1961 President Kennedy named Will U.S. district judge for the Northern District of Illinois. In 1965 Will called on his tax litigation background when he presided over the trial and acquittal of former Illinois governor William G. Stratton on charges of TAX EVASION (Stratton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 54 T.C. 255 [T.C. 1970 ]). As a new judge, Will faced a staggering number of cases, and he was often frustrated when valuable courtroom time was devoted to issues he would not have bothered to handle as an attorney. Recognizing the need to better manage the volume and disposition of his cases, Will turned to colleagues for advice and assistance. Seasoned federal judges had practical suggestions for the newest among them, but no forum for sharing that expertise. To address this problem, Will was asked to join senior judges on a planning committee charged with devel- oping training seminars for new district judges. His contrib ution and insight proved valuable. By 1963 Will was part of a permanent faculty responsible for training new judges. He remained on the faculty for the next 25 years. Throughout the 1960s Will experimented with methods to improve court procedures. The first standard forms for prisoners’ HABEAS CORPUS petitions and CIVIL RIGHTS complaints were drafted in his chambers. Will acknowledged Hubert Louis Will 1914–1995 ❖ ▼▼ 19001900 19501950 19751975 20002000 19251925 ▼▼ 1914 Born, Milwaukee, Wisc. 1938 Joined Securities and Exchange Commission as a general counsel 1939–45 World War II 1914–18 World War I ❖ 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆◆◆◆ 1965 Presided over Stratton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 1963 Helped to train new district judges; joined Judicial Conference Committee on Bankruptcy Administration 1995 Died, Chicago, Ill. 1946 Became a partner in the Chicago firm of Nelson, Boodell and Will 1961 Appointed U.S. district judge for Northern District of Ill. ◆◆ ◆ 1971 Appointed to Commission on the Bankruptcy Law of the United States 1940 Joined Tax Division of Department of Justice 1944–45 Served as chief of Counter Espionage Branch of European theater GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 412 WILL, HUBERT LOUIS that the forms were a simple solution but saw them as essential to sorting valid prisoner pleas from those that were “recreation for people with time on their hands.” In the area of civil litigation, Will was a vocal advocate of bifurcated trials, or trials in which certain issues are considered separately, for example, guilt and punishment, liability and damages. He was among the first to use pretrial scheduling conferences, pretrial orders, and standardized pretrial order forms to control the course of a trial from the outset. An amendment to rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure covering pretrial scheduling conferences is often called the Will rule. He was also known for the 20 questions rule, which limits the number of interrogatories without court approval, and the straight face test, cautioning attorneys against taking a “position on any issue in any case that he or she cannot take with a straight face.” Throughout the 1960s Will traveled to other districts to demonstrate case management techniques. His most famous bit of grand- standing took place when he set out to prove that the use of individual calendaring systems could improve judicial efficiency and clear courtroom backlogs. While carrying a full caseload in the Northern District of Illinois, Will served for just three days a month on the district court in Philadelphia, where he dispo sed of more than 100 cases in under ten months. In addition to experimenting with general courtroom efficiency, Will gave special attention to the administration of BANKRUPTCY cases in the federal system. He joined the Judicial Conference Committee on Bankruptcy Administration in 1963. In the decade that followed, he developed criteria for adding bankruptcy judgeships, pro- posed limits on bankruptcy administration costs, and revised bankruptcy rules in his own jurisdic- tion. In recognition of his expertise, Will was appointed to the Commission on the Bankruptcy Law of the United States in 1971 by Chief Justice WARREN E. BURGER. Many of the commission’s recommendations became the law of the land. Starting in the mid-1970s, Will served the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Seventh, District of Columbia, and Federal Circuits. He also took temporary assignments in the district courts of Milwaukee and Madison, Wisconsin; South Bend, Indiana; Phoenix, Arizona; and Springfield, Illinois. Will assumed senior status with the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in 1979. He died from cancer on December 9, 1995, in Oconomowoc, Wisconsin. RESOURCES Cole, Jeffrey N., and Robert E. Shapiro. 1993. “Interview with Judge Herbert L. Will.” Litigation 20. Federal Judicial Center. Available online at http://www.fjc. gov (accessed August 27, 2009). Goulden, Joseph C. 1974. The Benchwarmers. New York: Weybright and Talley. Schmidhauser, John R. 1979. Judges and Justices: The Federal Appellate Judiciary. Boston: Little, Brown. CROSS REFERENCES Bankruptcy; Burger, Warren Earl; Wagner, Robert Ferdinand. WILLFUL Intentional; not accidental; voluntary; designed. In General There is no precise definition of the term willful because its meaning largely depends on the context in which it appears. It generally signifies a sense of the intentional as opposed to the inadvertent; the deliberate as opposed to the unplanned; and the voluntary as opposed to the compelled. After centuries of court cases, it has no single meaning, whether as an adjective (willful) or an adverb (willfully). Statutes and CASE LAW have adapted the term willful to the particular circumstances of action and inaction peculiar to specific areas of the law, including TORT LAW, CRIMINAL LAW, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, and UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION. A willful violation, for example, may mean a deliberate intent to violate the law, an intent to perform an act that the law forbids, an intent to refrain from performing an act that the law requires, an indifference to whether or not action or inaction violates the law, or some other variant. In Criminal Law In criminal law, willfully ordinarily means with a bad purpose or criminal intent, particularly if the proscribed act is “malum in se” (an evil in itself, intrinsically wrong) or involves MORAL TURPITUDE . For example, willful MURDER is the unlawful killing of another individual without any excuse or MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. If the forbidden act is not wrong in itself, such as driving over the speed limit, willfully is used to mean intentionally, purposefully, or knowingly. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WILLFUL 413 In Workers’ Compensation Under workers’ compensation laws, willful mis- conduct by an employee means that he inten- tionally performed an act with the knowledge that it was likely to result in serious injuries or with reckless disregard of its probable con- sequences. A finding of “willful misconduct” prevents the employee from being awarded compensation for his injuries. Under unemployment compensation laws, an employee who is fired on willful misconduct grounds is not entitled to recover unemployment compensation benefits. Common examples of such willful misconduct include excessive absenteeism, habitual lateness, deliberate viola- tions of an employer’s rules and regulations, reporting for work in an intoxicated condition, and drinking alcoholic beverages while on the job. WILLIAMS ACT The Williams Act of 1968 amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq.) to require mandatory disclosure of infor- mation regarding cash tender offers. When an individual, group, or corporation seeks to acquire control of another corporation, it may make a TENDER OFFER,whichisaproposaltobuy shares of stock from the stockholders for cash or some type of corporate security of the acquiring company. Since the mid-1960s, cash tender offers for corporate takeovers have become favored over the traditional alternative, the PROXY campaign. A proxy campaign is an attempt to obtain the votes of enough shareholders to gain control of the corporation’s board of directors. Because of abuses with cash tender offers, Congress passed the Williams Act in 1968, whose purpose is to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders, while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to present their cases fairly. The Williams Act requires any person who makes a cash tender offer (which is usually 15 to 20 percent in excess of the current market price) for a corporation that is required to be registered under federal law to disclose to the federal SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) the source of the funds used in the offer, the purpose for which the offer is made, the plans the purchaser might have if successf ul, and any contracts or understandings concerning the target corporation. The act also requires that the tender offer be kept open for at least 20 business days. Shareholders who agree to tender their shares are given specific withdrawal rights. There are also rules that govern situations w hen the tender offer price is increased. Filing and public disclosures with the SEC are also required of anyone who acquires more than 5 percent of the outstanding shares of any class of a corporation subject to federal registration requirements. Copies of these dis- closure statements must also be sent to each national securities exchange where the securities are traded, making the information available to shareholders and investors. The law also imposes miscellaneous sub- stantive restrictions on the mechanics of a cash tender offer, and it imposes a broad prohibition against the use of false, misleading, or incom- plete statements in connection with a tender offer. The Williams Act gives the SEC the authority to institute enforcement lawsuits. FURTHER READINGS Fleming, Rusty A. 2003. “A Case of ‘When’ Rather Than ‘What’: Tender Offers under the Williams Act and the All Holders and Best Price Rules.” Southern Illinois University Law Journal 27 (winter). Tyson, William C., and Andrew A. August. 1983. “The Williams Act after RICO: Has the Balance Tipped in Favor of Incumbent Management?” Hastings Law Journal 35 (September). CROSS REFERENCES Mergers and Acquisitions; Securities and Exchange Com- mission. v WILLIAMS, FRANKLIN HALL Franklin H. Williams was a lawyer, government administrator, and ambassador who played an important role in the modern CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT . As an attorney with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ( NAACP), Williams worked to desegregate public schools, public housing, and workplaces. Franklin Hall Williams was born on Octo- ber 22, 1917, in Flushing, New York. He graduated from Lincoln University in Penns yl- vania in 1941 and served in a racially segregated unit of the U.S. Army during WORLD WAR II.He graduated from Fordham University School of Law in 1945. After receivi ng his law degree, Williams accepted a position with the NAACP. From THE MASS MEDIA CONSTANTLY TAUNT THE GHETTO WITH THE AFFLUENCE OF MODERN SOCIETY . —FRANKLIN H. W ILLIAMS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 414 WILLIAMS ACT 1945 to 1950, Williams was an assistant special counsel for the NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND and a special assistant to THURGOOD MARSHALL, the head of the fund who later became an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Williams worked with Marshall during the NAACP’s efforts to desegregate public education, which were significantly aided by the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision in BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, KANSAS, 347 U.S. 483. Brown overruled the 1896 decision of PLESSY V. FERGUSON, 163 U.S . 537, which had allowed racially segregated facilities on trains and, by implication, in public schools. In 1950 Williams became the NAACP’s regional director of the western states. Under his leadership, the office pushed for legislation on minority employment, open housing, and other CIVIL RIGHTS issues. In 1959 Williams left the organization to become an assistant attorney general of California, where he was instrumental in setting up the state’s constitutional rights section. In 1961 Williams became special assistant to Sargent Shriver, who helped to establish the Peace Corps. In 1963 Williams served as director of the African regional division. In the same year, Williams became the first African-American to serve as U.S. representative to the United Nations Economic and Social Council. In 1965 President LYNDON B. JOHNSON appointed Williams to be the U.S. ambassador to Ghana. Williams held the post until 1968 and is credited with improving what had been strained relations between the U.S. and Ghana. Williams returned to New York City after leaving his diplomatic post. He headed the Urban Center at Columbia University and served as vice chairperson of the New York Board of Higher Education. In 1987 Williams chaired the New York State Judicial Commis- sion on Minorities, which examined the treat- ment of minorities in the state’s courts. Williams also served as president of the Phelps-Stokes Fund from 1970 to 1990. This foundation was established in 1911 to improve educational opportunities for African-Americans, Native Americans, and Africans. One of Williams’s first moves as president was to persuade the foundation’s board to divest itself of holdings in corporations that did business in South Africa, which at that time was governed by a white minority employing the racially segregated practices of apartheid. Williams’s divestiture action was later adopted by other foundations and institutions. Williams died on May 20, 1990, in New York City. v WILLIAMS, GEORGE HENRY George Henry Williams served as U.S. attorney general from 1871 to 1875. A state and territorial judge, as well as a U.S. senator, Williams was nominated to be chief justice of the United States by President ULYSSES S. GRANT in 1873, but he was never confirmed. According to the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’s publi- cation, Attorneys General of the United States, Williams was born on March 23, 1823, in New Lebanon, New York, the son of Taber Williams and Lydia Goodrich Williams. He received an academic education, studied law, and was admitted to the New York bar in 1844. Williams moved to Fort Madison, Iowa, and established a law practice, but in 1847 he was elected as a state district judge. In 1853 he moved Franklin Hall Williams 1917–1990 ❖ ▼▼ 1900 1950 1975 2000 1925 ▼▼ 1917 Born, Flushing, N.Y. 1945–50 Served as assistant special counsel for NAACP's Legal Defense and Educational Fund 1939–45 World War II 1914–18 World War I ❖ 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆◆◆◆ 1961 Became special assistant to Sargent Shriver 1959 Became assistant attorney general of California 1990 Died, New York City 1950–59 Served as NAACP's regional director of the western states ◆ 1965–68 Served as U.S. ambassador to Ghana 1970–90 Served as president of the Phelps- Stokes Fund 1954 U.S. Supreme Court outlawed "separate but equal" education in Brown v. Board of Education 1963 Served as director of the African regional division of the Peace Corps 1987 Chaired the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities I BELIEVE I HAVE LIVED LONGER AND HAPPIER THAN IF I HAD BEEN RAISED TO [THE] EXALTED OFFICE [OF CHIEF JUSTICE]. —GEORGE HENRY WILLIAMS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WILLIAMS, GEORGE HENRY 415 west again, becoming chief justice of Oregon Territory. In 1865 Williams was elected to represent Oregon in the U.S. Senate. He aligned himself with the Radical Republicans, who opposed President ANDREW JOHNSON’sprogramsforthe South during RECONSTRUCTION following the end of the U.S. CIVIL WAR.Theanimositybetween Congress and Johnson led to ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT against Johnson. Williams supported the IMPEACHMENT of Johnson, but the Senate attempt to convict Johnson failed by one vote. After Williams lost his Senate seat, President Grant appointed Williams attorney general in 1871. His term as attorney general was unre- markable, but his reputation was damaged by the events surrounding his failed nomination as chief justice in 1873. There were allegations that Williams had participated in fraudulent activities involving voting in Oregon, but the organized bar on the East Coast also feared that as a frontier lawyer from Oregon, Williams was ill-prepared to preside over a Court that decided many complex commercial cases. A man of little formal educa- tion, Williams appeared too undistinguished to serve on the Court. It is likely, however, that the many political scandals involving corruption in the Grant administration unfairly tarnished Williams’s nomination. When it became clear that his nomination was doomed, Williams asked President Grant to withdraw his name from consideration. He continued as attorney general for two more years, resigning in 1875. Williams abandoned national politics after his resignation and returned to Oregon, where he practiced law for many years in Portland. His last public position was as mayor of Portland from 1902 to 1905. He died on April 4, 1910, in Portland, Oregon. FURTHER READINGS Kaltman, Al. 2000. Cigars, Whiskey, and Winning: Leadership Lessons from Ulysses S. Grant. Paramus, N.J.: Prentice Hall. Justice Department. 1985. Attorneys General of the United States, 1789–1985. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. CROSS REFERENCE Grant, Ulysses Simpson. v WILLISTON, SAMUEL Samuel Williston was a noted law professor and the PRIMARY AUTHORITY on contract law in the United States during the early twentieth cen- tury. A professor of law at Harvard Law School from 1890 to 1938, his works The Law Governing Sales of Goods at Common Law and Under the Uniform Sales Act (1909) and The Law on Contracts (1920) are recognized as leading treatises. Williston was born on September 24, 1861, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He earned a bachelors degree from Harvard University in 1882 and then worked for three years to earn the money needed to attend Harvard Law School. In 1888 Williston graduated from law school and established successful law practices in Boston and Cambridge. In 1890 Williston accepted a professorship at Harvard Law School. As an assistant profes- sor, Williston turned down many promising career opportunities, including offers of dean- ships at three other law schools and a position as reporter to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, which might have led to a judicial George Henry Williams 1823–1910 ▼▼ ▼▼ 18251825 18751875 19001900 19251925 18501850 ❖ ❖ 1910 Died, Portland, Ore. ◆◆ ◆ ◆◆ ◆ 1823 Born, New Lebanon, N.Y. 1844 Admitted to New York bar 1853 Moved to Oregon Territory 1865–71 Served in U.S. Senate 1853–57 Served as chief justice of Oregon Territory 1914–18 World War I 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1858 Moved to Portland and opened private practice 1859 Oregon admitted to Union as 33rd state 1871–75 Served as U.S. attorney general 1873 Nominated by President Grant for chief justice of U.S. Supreme Court, but withdrew his name 1902–05 Served as mayor of Portland, Oregon 1847 Elected state district judge in Ft. Madison, Iowa THE MODERN LAW RIGHTLY CONSTRUES BOTH ACTS AND WORDS AS HAVING THE MEANING WHICH A REASONABLE PERSON PRESENT WOULD PUT UPON THEM IN VIEW OF THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES . —SAMUEL WILLISTON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 416 WILLISTON, SAMUEL appointment on the state’s highest court. Will- iston unsuccessfully argued for the defense in the case of Boston & Maine Railroad v. Hooker before the U.S. Supreme Court on December 10 and 11, 1913. During his career at Harvard, Williston aligned himself with legal formalism, which in the early twentieth century dominated legal thought in the United States. Legal formalism views the law as a body of scientific rules from which legal decisions may be readily deduced. Existing rules are elevated into the category of self-evident truths. In practice, this meant that the law was unconcerned with social and economic forces . The desire for form and structure permeates Williston’s writings. According to Williston, the law must be stated as simply as possible, and it must be certain. If the law is simple and certain, he argued, parties can use it to resolve their disputes without LITIGATION, as a sign of a sound legal system. Therefore, Williston believed, the ideal course for the law was the construction of broad, general rules. Williston was able to apply his legal philosophy to the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Contracts. The purpose of the Restatement was to set forth the basic principles of contract law by means of a coherent series of “black letter” principles, drafted with precision, that were consistent with the best traditions of the COMMON LAW, rooted in precedent, yet flexible enough to accommodate growth and development in the law. Williston explained each principle with commentary and concrete examples of its application. Williston died on February 18, 1963, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. FURTHER READINGS Boyer, Allen D. 1994. “Samuel Williston’s Struggle with Depression.” Buffalo Law Review 42 (winter). Williston, Samuel. 1940. Life and Law: An Autobiography. Boston: Little, Brown. Republished by Gaunt (Holmes Beach, Fla.), 1998. v WILMOT, DAVID David Wilmot was a lawyer, judge, U.S. senator, and member of the U.S. House of Representa- tives. From 1845 to 1851 the Pennsylvania Democrat served in the House where he drew national attention for his 1846 proposal. The WILMOT PROVISO banned the expansion of SLAVERY into the territories newly acquired from Mexico. Wilmot’s disenchantment with slavery and the DEMOCRATIC PARTY’s support of it eventually led him to help form the REPUBLICAN PARTY. Wilmot was born on January 20, 1814, in Bethany, Pennsylvania. He studied the law with an attorney and became a member of the Pennsylvania bar in 1834. He established a law practice in Towanda and was soon recognized as an able lawyer. However, politics drew Wilmot’s interest. He became active in the Democratic Party and in 1845 he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. Wilmot strongly supported Pres- ident JAMES K. POLK and the Mexican War that began in 1845. When President Polk requested a congressional appropriation of $2 million to purchase land from Mexico, however, Wilmot vehemently objected to suggestions that slavery could be established in the newly acquired areas. He introduced the Wilmot Proviso to ban the spread of slavery but could not secure passage by both houses of Congress. Wilmot left Congress in 1851, disenchanted with the COMPROMISE OF 1850, which admitted Samuel Williston 1861–1963 ▼▼ ▼▼ 18501850 19001900 19251925 19501950 19751975 18751875 1861 Born, Cambridge, Mass. ❖ ❖ ◆◆ 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1914–18 World War I 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆◆◆◆◆ 1882 Earned A.B. from Harvard University 1890–1938 Served as professor of law at Harvard Law School 1903 Appointed to Weld professorship at Harvard 1909 The Law of Sales published 1919 Appointed to Dane professorship at Harvard 1920 The Law of Contracts published 1933 The first Restatement of Contracts published 1940 Life and Law, An Autobiography published 1963 Died, Cambridge, Mass. DEMOCRACY IS A PRINCIPLE OF ETERNAL JUSTICE . —DAVID WILMOT GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WILMOT, DAVID 417 . States 1940 Joined Tax Division of Department of Justice 1944–45 Served as chief of Counter Espionage Branch of European theater GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 412 WILL, HUBERT. Served as professor of law at Harvard Law School 1903 Appointed to Weld professorship at Harvard 1909 The Law of Sales published 1919 Appointed to Dane professorship at Harvard 1920 The Law of Contracts. TO [THE] EXALTED OFFICE [OF CHIEF JUSTICE]. —GEORGE HENRY WILLIAMS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WILLIAMS, GEORGE HENRY 415 west again, becoming chief justice of Oregon Territory. In