Cable operators negotiated system requirements and pricing with local governments, but federal law imposed some restrictions on rates to consumers. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 deregulated cable television rates, in part because of increased interest by telephone companies in entering the cable market by sending program- ming through existing phon e lines. The act permits phone companies to provide video programming directly to subscribers in their service areas. Even prior to deregulation in 1996, compa- nies in the telecommuni cations industry had been involved in major mergers. In 1985 Capital Cities acquired the ABC network, and one year later, General Electric acquired NBC. In 1995 two major mergers occurred, as Westinghouse bought CBS for a reported $5.4 billion, and the Walt Disney Company purchased Capital Cities/ ABC for a reported $19 billion. Disney went on to purchase or otherwise acquire a wide range of cable networks as well, including ESPN, Fox Family Worldwide, the History Channel, and E! Entertainment Television. Since deregulation, companies have merged to create even larger media conglomerates. A number of commentators have questioned whether the presence of a few enormous entities would stifle competition in the industry. Others questioned whether federal antitrust policy would need to be adapted to address concerns about such large corporations owning multiple media entities. Many of these questions have gone unanswered, and in many ways consumers have benefited from the products that these conglomerates offer. For instance, since the late 1990s the ABC network has enhanced its sports coverage through its association w ith ESPN by offering dual coverage of certain sporting events, such as professional football. For customers who cannot obtain cable television programming, the transmission of television signals by satellite has been a practical solution. In the 1990s, however, direct broadcast satellite (DBS) systems began to compete with cable television systems by going after a broader consumer base. The DBS systems offer high- quality video and audio signals and access to a wide range of programming. The development of digital high-definition television (HDTV) was the broadcast television industry’s top priority in the 1990s and into the 2000s. HDTV, which has a significantly finer picture resolution than an ordinary television screen, requires additional broadcast frequen- cies, which the FCC must license to broadcasters. Broadcast television, which saw its viewership steadily drop as cable and DBS became popu- lar, saw HDTV as a way to reclaim its market share. In the early 2000s, when cable companies began gaining telephone customers with new telephone services, telephone companies began to push for access to the cable television market. AT&T was the first telephone company to offer Internet protocol television (IPTV) technology, which it referred to as U-Verse, that offers broadcasting using existing telephone lines. Proponents of the entry of telephone compa- nies into the televi sion arena urge that the move will increase competition and may lead to lower prices for television service over time. In June 2009, as a mandated by the Digital Television and Public Safety Act of 2005, all full power television stations nationwide stopped broadcasting in analog, making broadcast in the U.S. exclusively digital. In connection with this change, consumers were able to request coupons to be used in the purchase of digital- analog converter boxes. The change allowed additional frequencies to be used for public safety communications and advanced commer- cial wireless services. Digital broadcasting wais said to be a more efficient technology, allowing for improved picture and sound quality and offering more programming options through multicasting. FURTHER READINGS Balint, Kathryn. 2006. “Competing with Cable Comes with Hurdles,” January 23. www.SignOnSanDiego.com. Avai- lable online at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/ metro/20060123-9999-1n23telcotv.html (accessed Octo- ber 7, 2009). Compaine, Benjamin M., and Douglas Gomery. 2000. Who Owns the Media? Competition and Concentration in the Mass Media. 3d ed. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. Creech, Kenneth. 2007. Electronic Media Law and Regula- tion. 5th ed. Boston: Focal Press. “What You Need to Know about the Digital TV Transition.” DTV.gov. Available online at http://www.dtv.gov/need toknow.html (accessed October 7, 2009). CROSS REFERENCES Cable Television; Fairness Doctrine; Mass Communications Law. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 498 TELEVISION TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT A temperance movement is a social crusade against the use or abuse of alcohol. The tem- perance movement in the United States led to the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, which began the Prohibition period in the United States. The movement first became a national crusade in the early nineteenth century and was spurred by a groundswell of popular religion that focused on abstention from alco- hol. Evangelical preachers of various Christian denominations denounced drinking alcohol as a sin. People who drank, they claimed, lost their faith in God and ceased to observe the teachings of Jesus. Other supporters of the first temperance movement objected to alcohol’s destructive effects on individuals, communities, and the nation as a whole. According to these activists, the consumption of alcohol was responsible for many personal and societal problems, including unemployment, absenteeism in the workplace, and physical violence. Scores of short stories and books published in the mid-nineteenth century described in dramatic detail the abuse suffered by the families of alcoholics. Alcoholics were characterized as dangerous to themselves, their families, and even their nation’s security. In the words of tem perance advocate Lyman Beecher, a drunk electorate would “dig the grave of our liberties and entomb our glory.” The temperance movement was marked by an undercurrent of ethnic and religious hostil- ity. Some of the first advocates were people of Anglo-Saxon heritage who associated alcohol with the growing number of Catholic immi- grants from Ireland and the European conti- nent. Supposedly, the Catholics were loud and boisterous as a result of too much drinking. Most of the first temperance advocates were sincerely concerned for the welfare of others, however, and were not motivated by such faulty perceptions. The public’s rate of alcohol con- sumption was, in fact, increasing steadily during the nineteenth century, and the reformers saw the banishment of alcohol not as a punishment but as necessary to an orderly, safe, and pros- perous society. Despite its good intentions, the first movement splintered. The largest rift oc- curred between a minority of abolitionists, who favored the promotion of total abstinence from alcohol, and the majority of reformers, who favored abstinence from only hard liquor. Although it lacked cohesion, the first tem- perance movem ent yielded some legislative reforms. In 1846 Maine became the first state to enact a law prohibiting liquor consumption. Twelve other states followed suit, but the laws were difficult to enforce, and public support for the laws quickly waned. By 1868 Maine was the only state left with a liquor PROHIBITION law, and the t emperance movement appeared to have come and gone. Groups such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) and the Anti- Saloon League were at the forefront of the onslaught against alcohol. Members of these groups spoke publicly in favor of prohibition and lobbied elected of ficials for laws banning the consumption of alcohol. Some of the more active members disrupted business at salo ons and liquor stores. One of the most visible prohibitionists, Carry Nation, used a hatchet to smash liquor bottles and break furniture in saloons. In the 1870s, some prohibitionists began to form political parties and nominate candi- dates for public office. Leaders in the so-called Carry Nation, a well- known prohibitionist, holds a Bible and a hatchet. Nation often used a hatchet to smash liquor bottles and furniture in saloons. BETTMANN/CORBIS. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 499 Progressive movement were instrumental in the resurgence of the temperance movement. The Progressives called for sweeping governmental controls in response to perceived social crises, and they began to promote the abolition of alcohol as part of a plan to clean up cities and eliminate poverty. By the time WORLD WAR I began in 1914, an in creasing number of politicians were advocating a ban on alcohol, and the conservation efforts for the war gave the temperance movement additional momentum. Congress enacted the Lever Act of 1917 (40 Stat. 276) to outlaw the use of grain in the manufacture of alcoholic beverages, and many state and local governments passed laws prohi- biting the distribution and consumption of alcohol. Two years later, the states ratified the EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Const itution, which proh ibited the manufacture, transporta- tion, and sale of alcoholic beverages in the United States. The complete ban on alcohol was put into effect by the VOLSTEAD ACT (41 Stat. 305). President WOODROW WILSON vetoed the act, but Congress overrode the VETO, and the United States became officially dry in January 1920. The effect of Prohibition was to drive drinking underground. Saloons were replaced by speakeasies, hidden drinking places that, in some areas, were tolerated by local police. The more enterprising individuals set up homemade stills to produce alcohol for their own con- sumption. Others turned to bootlegging, or the illegal sale of alcohol. Prices on the black market were markedly higher than they had been prior to Prohibition, and gangsters used violence to acquire and maintain control over the highly profitable bootlegging busine ss. Bootlegging was so profitable because so many people wanted to drink alcohol. Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials found them- selves at war not only with gangsters, but with the general public as well. Popular support for Prohibition quickly waned after the Eighteenth Amendment was passed, but it took nearly 14 years to end it. HERBERT HOOVER, who served as president from 1929 to 1933, supported Prohibition, calling it “an experiment noble in purpose.” Hoover was defeated in his bid for reelection, however, and in 1933 President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT called for an amendment to the Volstead Act that would legalize light wine and beer consumption. Thebillpassedquicklyandreceivedwidespread public support, and Congress set about the task of repealing Prohibition. On December 5, 1933, the TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT to the U.S. Consti- tution was ratified, and the “noble experiment” was dismantled. FURTHER READINGS Blocker, Jack S. 1989. American Temperance Movements: Cycles of Reform. Boston: Twayne. Pegram, Thomas R. 1998. Battling Demon Rum: The Struggle for a Dry America, 1800–1933. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. Szymanski, Ann-Marie E. 2003. Pathways to Prohibition: Radicals, Moderates, and Social Movement Outcomes. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. CROSS REFERENCES Capone, Alphonse; Constitutional Amendment; Organized Crime. TEMPORARY EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS Congress established the Temporary Emergency Court of App eals (TECA) in December 1971 (85 Stat. 743) and granted it exclusive juris- diction to hear appeals from the decisions of U.S. district courts in cases arising under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 799). The idea for TECA grew out of the Emergency Court of Appeals (1942–61), which had adjudicated price control measures passed during WORLD WAR II. TECA had nine judges and its own set of rules and procedures for its first case in February 1972. The act that created TECA expired in 1972, but Congress enacted the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 (82 Stat. 627), which granted it authority over controversies arising under the new law. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (89 Stat. 871) and the Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977 (91 Stat. 4) further elongated TECA’s existence and expanded its oversight. In 1992, however, TECA ceased to exist when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit assumed its duties and abolished it by an act of October 29, 1992, effective April 30, 1993. CROSS REFERENCES Federal Courts. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER A temporary restraining order is a court order that lasts only until the court can hear further evidence. A temporary restraining order (TRO) is a court order of limited duration. A TRO is an EQUITABLE REMEDY, which commands the parties in the case to maintain a certain status until the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 500 TEMPORARY EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS court can hear further evidence and decide whether to issue a PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. Under federal and state rules of CIVIL PROCEDURE , a person may obtain a TRO by visiting a judge or magistrate without notice to, or the presence of, the adverse party. A TRO may be issued by a court only if (1) it appears from specific facts shown in a signed, sworn AFFIDAVIT or complaint that immediate IRREPARA- BLE INJURY , loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or the adverse party’s attorney can be heard in opposition; and (2) the applicant’s attorney describes to the court in writing the efforts, if any, that have been made to give notice to the adverse party and gives reasons to support the claim that notice should not be required. Temporary restraining orders are extraordi- nary measures because they are court orders issued against a party without notice to that party and without giving the party an opportu- nity to argue against the order. A TRO usually lasts only two or thre e days, until the court can hear both sides of the issue and decide whether to issue a preliminary INJUNCTION. A court gene- rally hears arguments on the preliminary injunc- tion as soon as possible after the TRO is issued. On the federal level, rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that a TRO should not last longer than ten days and that a TRO may be renewed only for an additional ten days. STATE COURTS have similar provisions in their rules of civil procedure. The immediate potential for irreparable harm is the GRAVAMEN of the TRO. If an applicant is unable to prove that the harm suffered will be irreparable or that the irrepara- ble harm is imminent, a court will not approve a TRO. Assume that a person purchases a car with financing from the dealership. The buyer then becomes embroiled in a dispute with the dealership over the car and stops making payments; the dealership responds by threaten- ing to repossess the car. If the buyer applies for a TRO preventing the dealership from taking the car, a court would likely refuse the request, Temporary Restraining Order [Title of Court] TRIAL COURT a. ______________________________________________ County d. Name of Court ____________________________________ b. ______________________________________________ Plaintiff(s) - Tenant(s) e. Civil Docket No. ___________________________________ c. ______________________________________________ Defendant(s) - Landlord(s) GRANT OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS(S), NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HEARING AND SUMMONS vs. It appears from the specific facts set out in the Verified Complaint filed with the clerk of this Court that immediate or irreparable loss or damage will result to the Plaintiff(s). Accordingly, at _____ o’clock ____. M., this _____________ day of ________________, 20___, Defendant(s) and his/her/their employees and agents are ordered to desist and refrain from: For good cause shown, I order that no security be given by the Plaintiff(s) for the issuance of these Orders. This Temporary Restraining Order EXPIRES 10 days from the date and time it was granted, BUT IT MAY BE RENEWED in the form of a preliminary injunction. At the Plaintiff’s request, a hearing to decide if a preliminary injunction should be issued has been scheduled for the _______ day of ________________, 20_____, at _____ o’clock ___.M. Upon two days’ notice to the Plaintiff(s), the Defendant(s) may apply to the Court to dissolve or modify the Temporary Restraining Order. Further, the Defendant(s) must answer (respond to) the Plaintiff’s Complaint within 20 days of the date on which this Summons and a copy of the Complaint are received. The Answer must be in writing and must be filed with this Court and delivered to the Plaintiff(s). Failure to do so shall result in the entry of a default judgment against the Defendant(s) for the relief requested in the Complaint. Judge’s Signature A sample temporary restraining order. ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 501 because the loss of the car is not imminent. Moreover, the loss of a car is not an irreparable injury; a court would likely expect the buyer to carry on with other modes of transportation. Now assume that the purchased vehicle is a large utility van that the buyer has customized to use in her catering business. The loss of the van for a few days would be disast rous to the business and could eventually lead to BANKRUPTCY, so the buyer would likely be able to obtain a TRO, provided the harm was sufficiently imminent. The adverse party cannot appeal the issu- ance of a TRO to a higher court. The best remedy for an adverse party is to obtain a court hearing as soon as possible on the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Preliminary injunctions may be appealed to higher courts. TROs are commonly issued in situations involving STALKING and harassment or damage to property. Other common TRO situations in- clude UNFAIR COMPETITION and trademark, COPY- RIGHT , or patent INFRINGEMENT, all of which involve potentially irreparable damage to a party’s economic livelihood. FURTHER READINGS Buzawa, Eve S., and Carl G. Buzawa, eds. 1996. Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage. Dempsey, Nancy L., and Kirstin L. Stoll-DeBell. 2009. Injunc- tive Relief: Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions.Chicago: American Bar Association. Shoben, Elaine W., and William Murray Tabb. 1989. Remedies: Cases and Problems. Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation Press. CROSS REFERENCES Injunction; Restraining Order. TENANCY A situation that arises when one individual conveys real property to another individual by way of a lease. The relation of an individual to the land he or she holds that designates the extent of that person’s estate in real property. A tenancy is the occupancy or possession of land or premises by lease. The occupant, known as the tenant, must acquire control and posses- sion of the property for the duration of the lawful occupancy. A tenancy can be created by any words that indicate the owner’sintentto convey a property interest on another individual. CROSS REFERENCE Landlord and Tenant. TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY A type of concurrent estate in real property held by a HUSBAND AND WIFE whereby each owns the undivided whole of the property, coupled with the RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP, so that upon the death of one, the survivor is entitled to the decedent’s share. A TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY allows spouses to own property together as a single legal entity. Under a tenancy by the entirety, creditors of an individual spou se may not attach and sell the interest of a debtor spouse: Only creditors of the couple may attach and sell the interest in the property owned by tenancy by the entirety. There are three types of concurrent owner- ship, or ownership of property by two or more persons: tenancy by the entirety, JOINT TENANCY, and TENANCY IN COMMON.Atenancybytheentirety can be created only by married persons. A married couple may choose to create a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common. In most states a married couple is presumed to take title to property as tenants by t he entirety, unless the deed or conveyancing document states otherwise. The most important difference between a tenancy by the entirety and a joint tenancy or tenancy in common is that a tenant by the entirety may not sell or give away his interest in the property without the consent of the other tenant. Upon the death of one of the spouses, the deceased spouse’s interest in the property devolves to the surviving spouse, and not to other heirs of the deceased spouse. This is called the right of survivorship. Tenants in common do not have a right of survivorship. In a tenancy in common, persons may sell or give away their ownership interest. Joint tenants do have a right of survivorship, but a joint tenant may sell or give away her interest in the property. If a joint tenant sells her interest in a joint tenancy, the tenancy becomes a tenancy in common, and no tenant has a right of survivorship. A tenancy by the entirety cannot be reduced to a joint tenancy or tenancy in common by a conveyance of property. Generally, the couple must DIVORCE, obtain an ANNULMENT, or agree to amend the title to the property to extinguish a tenancy by the entirety. FURTHER READINGS Kurtz, Sheldon F., and Herbert Hovenkamp. 2007. Cases and Materials on American Property Law. 5th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson/West. Orth, John V. 2009. “The Perils of Joint Tenancies.” Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 (fall). GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 502 TENANCY TENANCY IN COMMON A form of concurrent ownership of real property in which two or more persons possess the property simultaneously; it can be created by deed, will, or operation of law. TENANCY IN COMMON is a specific type of concurrent, or simu ltaneous, ownership of real property by two or more parties. Generally, concurrent ownership can take three forms: JOINT TENANCY, TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY, and tenancy in common. These forms of concurrent ownership give individuals a choice in the way that co-ownership of property will be carried out. Each type of tenancy is distinguishable from the others by the rights of the co-owners. Usually, the term tenant is understood to describe a person who rents or leases a piece of property. In the context of concurrent estates, however, a tenant is a co-owner of real property. All tenants in common hold an individual, undivided ownership interest i n the property. This means that each party has the right to alienate, or transfer the ownership of, her ownership interest. This can be done by deed, will, or other conveyance. In a tenancy by the entirety (a concurrent estate between married persons), neither tenant has the right of alien- ation without the consent of the other. When a tenant by the entirety dies, the surviving spouse receives the deceased spouse’s interest, thus acquiring full ownership of the property. This is called a RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP. Joint tenants also have a right of sur vivorship. A joint tenant may alienate his property, but if that occurs, the tenancy is changed to a tenancy in common and no tenant has a right of survivorship. Another difference between tenants in common and joint tenants or tenants by the entirety is that tenants in common may hold unequal interests. By co ntrast, joint tenants and tenants by the entirety own equal shares of the property. Furthermore, tenants in common may acquire their interests from different instruments: Joint tenants and tenants by the entirety must obtain their interests at the same time and in the same document. FURTHER READINGS Kurtz, Sheldon F., and Herbert Hovenkamp. 2007. Cases and Materials on American Property Law. 5th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson/West. Orth, John V. 2009. “The Perils of Joint Tenancies.” Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 (fall). TENANCY IN COPARCENARY A type of concurrent estate in real property by which property rights were acquired only through intestacy by the female heirs when there were no surviving male heirs. This type of estate, which has only historical value today, occurred when an ancestor left no son who could take property by primogeniture. TENANT An individual who occupies or possesses land or premises by way of a grant of an estate of some type, such as in fee, for life, for years, or at will. A person who has the right to temporary use and possession of particular real property, which has been conveyed to that person by a landlord. CROSS REFERENCES Landlord and Tenant. TENDER An offer of money; the act by which one individual offers someone who is holding a claim or demand against him or her the amount of money that the offeror regards and admits is due, in order to satisfy the claim or demand, in the absence of any contingency or stipulation attached to the offer. The two essential characteristics of tender are an uncondi tional offer to perform, together with manifested ability to do so, and the production of the subject matter of tender. The term is generally used in reference to an offer to pay money; however, it may properly be used in reference to an offer of other kinds of property. CROSS REFERENCE Tender Offer. TENDER OFFER A proposal to buy shares of stock from the stockholders of a corporation, made by a group or company that desires to obtain control of the corporation. A tender offer to purchase may be for cash or some type of corporate security of the acquir- ing company—for example, stock, warrants, or debentures. Such an offer is sometimes subject to either a minimum or maximum that the offeror will accept and is communicated to the stockholders through newspaper advertise- ments or a general mailing to the complete list GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TENDER OFFER 503 of stockholders. Tender offers are subject to regulations by state and federal SECURITIES laws, such as the WILLIAMS ACT (15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq.). CROSS REFERENCES Mergers and Acquisitions; Stock Warrant. TENDER YEARS DOCTRINE A doctrine rarely employed in CHILD CUSTODY disputes that provides that, when all other factors are equal, custody of a child of tender years— generally under the age of 13 years—should be awarded to the mother. The TENDER YEARS DOCTRINE is a judicial presumption that operates in DIVORCE cases to give custody of a young child to the mother. Most states have eliminated this presumption, and some courts have held that the tender years doctrine violates the EQUAL PROTECTION Clause of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitu- tion because it discriminates on the basis of sex. Early English COMMON LAW originally gave custody of the children of divorcing parents to the father. Women had few individual rights until the nineteenth century; most of their rights were derived through their fathers and husbands. Under these conditions women had no right to raise their children after a divorce. In the early nineteenth century, Mrs. Caroline Norton, a prominent London hostess, author, and journalist, began to campaign for the right of women to have custody of their children. Norton, who had undergone a divorce and been deprived of her children, was able to convince the British Parliament to enact legis- lation to protect mothers’ rights. The result was the Custody of Infants Act of 1839, which gave some discretion to the judge in a child custody case and established a presumption of maternal custody for children under the age of seven years. In 1873 Parliament extended the presumption of maternal custody until a child reached 16 years of age. Courts made exceptions in cases in which the father established that the mother had committed ADULTERY. Many courts and legislatures in the United States adopted the tender years presumption. To grant custody of a child to a father was “to hold nature in CONTEMPT, and snatch helpless, puling infancy from the bosom of an affection- ate mother, and place it in the coarse hands of the father.” The mother was “the softest and safest nurse of infancy” (Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 [Ala. 1981] , quoting Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bland Ch. [Md.] 544 [1830]). The tender years presumption in child custody cases persisted for more than 100 years, with the majority of states recognizing the presumption. In the latter half of the twentieth century, courts and legislatures began to reverse decisions and repeal laws that recognized the tender years presumption in favor of gender- neutral considerations. In most states the best interests of the child are now the primary consideration in child custody cases, and the primary caretaker is pre sumed to be the best parent to handle primary custody of a small child. Some state courts have gone so far as to hold that the tender years doctrine violates the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitu- tion. (See, e.g., King v. Vancil, 34 Ill. App. 3d 831, 341 N.E.2d 65 [Ill. 1975].) A small number of states still recognize the tender years presumption, but only in certain cases. In Pennington v. Pennington, 711 P.2d 254 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court of Utah stated that it had “long expressed a preference for placing very young children in the mother’s custody.” The court noted, however, that “the preference operates only when all other things are equal.” The Pennington court held that the best interests of the child were to be given primary consideration, and it went on to affirm the award of child custody to the father in the case. In other areas of the law, the term tender years may refer to a law that creates special rules for small children. For example, some states enact special laws governing HEARSAY evidence in child SEX ABUSE cases. These tender years laws create exceptions to evidentiary rules by al low- ing the introduction of hearsay statements and videotaped testimony of children under a certain age. FURTHER READINGS Bookspan, Phyllis T. 1993. “From a Tender Years Presump- tion to a Primary Parent Presumption: Has Anything Really Changed? . Should It?” Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 8 (January). Katz, Sanford N. 1992. “‘That They May Thrive’ Goal of Chi ld Custody: Reflections on the Apparent Erosion of the Tender Years Presumption and the Emergence of the Primary Caretaker Presumption.” Journal of Contempo- rary Health Law and Policy, Catholic University 8(spring). McLain, Lynn. 1997. “Children Are Losing Maryland’s ‘Tender Years’ War.” University of Baltimore Law Review 27 (fall). GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 504 TENDER YEARS DOCTRINE Pica, Derek A. 1999. “The Tender Years Doctrine: Is It Still the Law?” Advocate (Idaho) 38 (January). Radke, Lynn E. 1993. “Michigan’s New Hearsay Exception: The ‘Reinstatement’ of the Common Law Tender Years Rule.” Univ. of Detroit Mercy Law Review 70 (winter). Rinella, Lori. 1995. “Children of Tender Years and Contribu- tory Negligence.” UMKC Law Review 63 (spring). CROSS REFERENCES Child Abuse; Chil dren’s Rights; Family Law; Sexual Abuse. TENEMENT A comprehensive legal term for any type of property of a permanent nature—including land, houses, and other buildings as well as rights attaching thereto, such as the right to collect rent. In the law of EASEMENTS, a dominant tene- ment or estate is that for which the advantage or benefit of an easement exists; a servient tenement or estate is a tenement that is subject to the burden of an easement. The term tenement is also used in refer ence to a building with rooms or apartments that are leased for residential purposes. It is frequently defined by statute, and its meaning therefore varies from one jurisdiction to another. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY In 1933 U.S. President FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSE- VELT approved the passage of the TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ACT (16 U.S.C.A. § 831 et seq.). The act provided for a source of hydroelectric power, control of a troublesome flood situation, revitalization of forest areas, and navigation and economic benefits for the region. These goals, announced during a devastating nationwide depression, made the Tennessee Valley Author- ity (TVA) an ambitious project of the era. The idea for the project was originally developed in 1918, when two nitrate facilities and a dam were constructed at Mu scle Shoals, Alabama, on the Tennessee River. Previously the area had been prone to severe floods, and water travel was impeded by sandbanks. The area had abundant natural resources, but the surrounding basin was depleted, and the region had experienced a depressed economy even before the hard times suffered throughout the nation in the Depression of the 1930s. Politicians and developers of the project envisioned a growth of industry and water power in the Tennessee Valley, as w ell as the manufacture of low-priced fertilizer and public control of the valuable resources. Debates over whether the project area should be rented to private parties or be controlled by the govern- ment continued throughout the 1920s. Senator GEORGE W. NORRIS of Nebraska was instrumental in the passage of measures by Congress advo- cating government control, but these bills did not receive presidential approval until 1933, when Roosevelt based his Tennessee Valley plan on the Norris proposals. Roosevelt’s Tennessee Valley Act authorized the establishment of a corporation owned by the federal government and directed by Arthur E. Morgan, the chairman, and Harcourt A. Morgan, and David Lilienthal. The early years of TVA were fraught with adversity, particu- larly when its constitutionality was questioned. Disputes between the directors and an investi- gation conducted by Congress hampered its initial achievements, but the TVA continued its work despite these difficulties. The Norris Dam was one of the first major projects of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1942. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 505 The TVA succeeded in its projected goals. Since the development of its dams and reser- voirs, the region has not been subjected to serious floods. The electrical system developed by the TVA afforded the region power at a low cost, and throughout the decades, power development has been extended to include coal and nuclear systems. The TVA also benefited agrarian interests by encouraging conservation, replenishment of forests, and ag ricultural and fertilizer research. Although the power program of the TVA is financially self-supporting today, other programs conducted by the authority are financed primarily by appropriations from Congress. FURTHER READINGS Colignon, Richard A. 1997. Power Plays: Critical Events in the Institutionalization of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press. Creese, Walter L. 1990. TVA’s Public Planning: The Vision, the Reality. Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ACT The Tennessee Valley Authority Act was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1933 to establish the TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (TVA), an autono- mous federal corporate agency responsible for the integrated development of the Tennessee River basin. The concept of the TVA Act (16 U.S.C.A. § 831 et seq.) initially appeared in the early 1920s, when Senator GEORGE W. NORRIS introduced a plan to have the government assume the operation of the Wilson Dam and other installations the government had con- structed at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, for national security reasons during WORLD WAR I. President CALVIN COOLIDGE and President HERBERT HOOVER, in 1928 and 1931, respectively, vetoed the legislation. In 1933 President Roosevelt re- worked the legislation, and Congress passed the TVA Act. This version significantly ex- panded the scope of the previous legislation in that it propelled the federal government into a comprehensive scheme of regional planning and development. This marked the first time one agency was directed to coordinate the entire resource development of a major region, and the endeavor served as the prototype for similar river projects. The TVA serves to provide navigation, flood control, electricity generation, fertilizer manu- facturing, and economic development in the Tennessee Valley, a region particularly impacted by the Great Depression. The TVA’s jurisdiction covers most of Tennessee, parts of Alabama, Mississippi, and Kentucky, and small slices of Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia. The TVA is a political entity with a territory the size of a major state, and with some state powers (such as eminent domain), but unlike a state, it has no citizenry or elected officials. Through the TVA, the TVA Act has been responsible for revitalizing the economy of the Tennessee River basin, particularly by the con- struction of reservoirs and multipurpose dams. Other noteworthy projects of the TVA, executed in conjunction with local authorities, have included malaria control; tree planting; the development of mineral, fish, and wildlife re- sources; land conservation; educational and social programs; and the construction of recre- ational facilities adjacent to reservoir banks. FURTHER READINGS Colignon, Richard A. 1997. Power Plays: Critical Events in the Institutionalization of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press. Creese, Walter L. 1990. TVA’s Public Planning: The Vision, the Reality. Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press. CROSS REFERENCES Endangered Species Act; Environmental Law. TENOR An exact replica of a legal document in words and figures. For example, the tenor of a check would be the exact amount payable, as indicated on its face. TENTH AMENDMENT The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people. Ratified in 1791, the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution embodies the general princi- ples of FEDERALISM in a republican form of government. The Constitution specifies the parameters of authority that may be exercised by the three branches of the federal government: executive, legislative, and judicial. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states all powers that are not granted to the federal government GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 506 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ACT by the Constitution, except for those powers that states are constitut ionally forbidden from exercising. For example, nowhere in the federal Con- stitution is Congress given authority to regulate local matters concerning the health, safety, and morality of state residents. Known as police powers, such authority is reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. Conversely, no state may enter into a treaty with a foreign government because such agreements are pro- hibited by the plain language of Article I to the Constitution. At the time the states adopted the Tenth Amendment, two primary conceptions of gov- ernment were under consideration. Many feder- alists supported a centralized national authority, with power concentrated in a single entity. This type of government was exemplified by the English constitutional system, which vested absolute authority in the monarchy during the seventeenth century and in Parliament during the eighteenth century. At the same time, many anti-federalists supported a more republican form of govern- ment consisting of a loose confederation of sovereign states that would form an alliance only for the purpose of mutual defense. The ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION , which governed the 13 states in national matters until 1787, when the Con- stitution was ratified, epitomized this form of government. Under the Articles of Confedera- tion, the national government was unable to levy and collect taxes on its own behalf. Many federalists, such as JAMES MADISON , argued that the Tenth Amendment was unnec- essary because the powers of the federal govern- ment are carefully enumerated and limited in the Constitution. Because the Constitution does not give Congress, the president, or the federal judiciary the prerogative to regulate wholly local matters, Madison concluded that no such power existed and no such power would ev er be exercised. However, British oppression had made the Founding Fathers fearful of unchecked centralized power. The Tenth Amendment was enacted to limit federal power. Although it appears clear on its face, the Tenth Amendment has not been consistently applied. Before the CIVIL WAR, nearly every state urged a broad read ing of the Tenth Amendment. No state wanted a federal government that was impotent against internal enemies or foreign aggressors, but many state politicians challenged the authority of the federal government to regulate any matter that could otherwise be handled by local authorities. For example, immediately after the U.S. Revolution, all 13 states resisted federal efforts to force local governments to return the property of British loyalists taken during the war. During the first half of the nineteenth century, Southern states objected to federal legislation that attempted to limit SLAVERY. State sovereignty reached its height when 11 states seceded from the Union to form the CONFEDERACY. Following the Civil War, the Tenth Amend- ment was virtually suspended. For a number of years during the RECONSTRUCTION era, the federal government occupied the former Confederate states with military troops and required each occupied state to ratify the Civil War Amend- ments, which outlawed slavery, gave African Americans the right vote, and declared the equality of all races. To a large extent the federal government ran local matters in Southern states during this period. In 1883 the Tenth Amendment regained some of its force. In that year the SUPREME COURT invalidated the federal CIVIL RIGHTS Act of 1875 (18 Stat. 335), which criminalized racial In this 1789 draft of the Bill of Rights, the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution appears as Article the Twelfth, reserving to the states or to the people powers not delegated to the federal government. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION TENTH AMENDMENT 507 . BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 501 because the loss of the car is not imminent. Moreover, the loss of a. the complete list GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TENDER OFFER 503 of stockholders. Tender offers are subject to regulations by state and federal SECURITIES laws, such as the. Baltimore Law Review 27 (fall). GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 504 TENDER YEARS DOCTRINE Pica, Derek A. 199 9. “The Tender Years Doctrine: Is It Still the Law? ” Advocate (Idaho) 38