Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 9 P42 potx

children they would ultimately have. In order to support their rapidly expanding family, she began writing magazine articles, essays, and other works. In 1843 Stowe published a collection of short stories called The Mayflower. During the 18 years she lived in Cincinnati, Stowe became an observer of the conflicting worlds of abolitionism and SLAVERY. Across the Ohio River was the slave state of Kentucky. Stowe’s family helped to hide runaway slaves. Her husband and brother aided one runaway by transporting her to the next station on the Underground Railroad, the name given to the system of guides and safe houses that enabled escaped Southern slaves to reach freedom and safety in Northern states and Canada. Stowe was engrossed by firsthand accounts and newspaper and magazine articles detailing the horrors of the slave trade and the terrifying incidents that took place as slaves tried to escape. In 1850 Calvin Stowe got a teaching position at Bowdoin College and the Stowe family moved to Brunswick, Maine. It was there that Stowe penned most of her soon-to- be classic. In 1851–1852, The National Era,an antislavery paper based in Washington, D.C., published in serial form, Stowe’s moving account of several members of a slave family and their desperate attempt to flee from a system that rendered them the property of white owners. Stowe’s narrative struck an immediate chord. Despite the newspaper’s small circulation, word of mouth and the passing of issues among neighbors immediately gave Stowe’s tale a larg er audience. In March 1852 her story was published as Uncle Tom’s Cabin, or, Life among the Lowly. The book became an immediate best-seller with sales reaching 500,000 copies by 1857. With its dramatic narrative and heart-rending scenes of the slave Eliza fleeing across a frozen river with her small son in her arms to prevent him from being sold away from her, Stowe’s book helped sway mu ch of the public to support, or at least sympathize with, the abolitionist cause. While many Southerners criticized the book, Stowe’s harrowing tale gained an increasingly wider audience. Stowe used her newfound renown to speak and write against slavery. In particular, she urged women to become active and to use their powers of persuasion to influence others on the subject. Although none of her later writings had the impact of Uncle Tom’ s Cabin, Stowe continued to write numerous stories, essays, and articles. Between 1862 and 1884 she published almost one book per year. Stowe died on July 1, 1896, in Hartford, Connecticut. RESOURCES Crane, Gregg D. 2002. Race, Citizenship, and Law in American Literature. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. Hedrick, Joan D. 1995. Harriet Beecher Stowe: A Life. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Johnston, Norma. 1996. Harriet: The Life and World of Harriet Beecher Stowe. New York: HarperTrophy. CROSS REFEREN CES Abolition; Slavery. STRADDLE In the stock and commodity markets, a strategy in options contracts consisting of an equal number of put options and call options on the same underlying share, index, or commodity future. A straddle is a type of option contract that gives the holder of the contract the option to either buy or sell or not buy or sell the SECURITIES or commodities specified in the contract. To understand how a straddle works, a basic understanding of options is required. An option is a type of contract used in the stock and commodity mar kets, in the leasing and sale of real estate, and in other areas where one party wants to acq uire the legal right to buy or sell something from another party within a fixed period of time. In the stock and commodity markets, options come in two primary forms, known as “calls” and “puts.” A call gives the holder the option to buy stock or a commodities futures contract at a fixed price for a fixed period of time. A put gives the holder the option to sell stock or a commodities futures contract at a fixed price for a fixed period of time. An option has four components: the underlying security, the type of option (put or call), the strike price, and the expiration date. Take, for example, a “National Widge t Novem- ber 100 call.” National Widget stock is the underlying security, November is the expiration month of the option, 100 is the strike pric e (sometimes referred to as the exercise price), and the option is a call, giving the holder of the call the right, not the obligation, to buy 100 shares of National Widget at a price of 100 (any number of shares can be involved, but WOMEN ARE THE REAL ARCHITECTS OF SOCIETY . —HARRIET BEECHER STOWE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 398 STRADDLE usually options are sold for 100 shares or multiples of 100). A straddle is the purchase of a call and a put with the same strike price, the same expiration date, and the same underlying security. For example, the purchase of a National Widgets November 95 call and the simultaneous pur- chase of a National Widgets November 95 put while the stock price is about 95 would be a straddle. With highly volatile stocks or commodities that are likely to make big moves, investors may want to hedge because they do not know which way the investment will move. The use of a straddle allows the investor to spread the risk, preventing a total loss but also precluding the maximum profit that comes with a favorable put or call. The investor knows that either the put or the call option will not be exercised in a straddle, so a key factor in assessing poten- tial profit is the cost of purchasing the put versus the cost of the call. CROSS REFER ENCE Stock Market. STRAIGHT-LINE DEPRECIATION A method employed to calculate the decline in the value of income-producing property for the purposes of federal taxation. Under this method, the annual depreciation deduction that is used to offset the annual income generated by the property is determined by dividing the cost of the property minus its expected salvage value by the number of years of anticipated useful life. STRANGER A third person; anyone who is not a party to a particular legal action or agreement. For example, all those who are not parties to a particular contract are considered strangers to the contract. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT) See ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START) See START TREATIES. STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Retaliatory lawsuits intended to silence, intimi- date, or punish those who have used public forums to speak, petition, or otherwise move for govern- ment action on an issue. The term strategic lawsuits against public participation, known by the acronym SLAPPs, applies to a variety of different types of lawsuits, including those claiming libel, defamation, business interference, or CONSPIRACY. The term was coined by Professors George W. Pring and Penelope Canan of the Univ ersity of Denver, who began to study this form of LITIGATION in 1984. Pring and Canan define SLAPPs using four criteria: “[SLAPPs] (1) involve commu- nications made to influence a government action or outcome, (2) which result in civil lawsuits (complaints, counterclaims, or cross- claims), (3) filed against non-governmental individuals or groups, (4) on a substantive issue of some PUBLIC INTEREST or social significance.” In a typical SLAPP, an individual or citizens’ group—the target (using Pring and Canan’s terminology), or defendant—is sued by the filer, or PLAINTIFF, for alleged wrongdoing simply because that individual or group has used constitutionally protected rights to persuade the government to take a particular course of action. SLAPPs have been directed against individuals and groups that have spoken in public forums on a wide variety of issues, particularly against REAL ESTATE development, the actions of public officials, environmental dam- age or pollution, and unwanted land use. They have also been used against those who have worked publicly for the rights of consumers, workers, women, minorities, and others. SLAPP defendants have been sued for apparently lawful actions such as circulating a petition, writing to a local newspaper, speaking at a public meeting, reporting violations of the law, or participating in a peaceful demonstration. For example, a Colorado environmental protection group opposed a commercial devel- opment and was eventually sued by the developer for $40 million. The lawsuit claimed that the environmental group was guilty of “conspiracy” and “abuse of process” (Lockport Corporation v. Protect Ou r Mountain Envir on- ment, No. 81CV973 [Dist. Ct., Jefferson County, Colo. 1981]). The suit dragged on for several years, cost the environmental group much time GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 399 and money, and eventually resulted in its demise. Although the development did not go forward, many group members vowed that they would refrain from future community involve- ment out of fear of legal retribution. A number of real estate developers have tried to prevent subdivision residents from opposing zoning changes by attaching restric- tive covenants to sales contracts. A typical COVENANT might stipulate that the purchaser signs the contract on the condition that he or she will not oppose any re-zoning plans for adjacent properties acquired by the developer. Such a RESTRICTIVE COVENANT was successfully challenged in the case of Providence Construction Company v. Bauer, 494 S.E. 2d 527 [Ga. App.1997]. Providence owned a subdivision in Cobb County, Georgia, and its deeds included a restrictive covenant to keep residents from opposing zoning changes. When Providence sought to have land next to the subdivision re-zoned, several residents protested to govern- ment officials and circulated petitions. Provi- dence sued for breach of contract and tortious interference of contractual relations. It later dropped the suit against all but one resident, who continued to protest the re-zoning. The resident, Dave Bauer, moved for SUMMARY JUDGMENT at trial, and the court granted his request. Providence went to the Georgia Court of Appeals, which upheld the lower court’s ruling. Under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP law, plain- tiffs must show that their suit is not being filed to suppress the right to free speech. The co urt said that Providence’s covenant was too vague in its limitation of speech, because it prohibited residents from opposing actio ns that could affect the subdivision’s character and property values. Others who have been targeted by SLAPPs include a group of parents who voiced concern over unsafe school buses at a school board meeting, only to become defendants in a $680,000 suit for libel filed by the bus company, and neighbors who protested renewal of a bar’s liquor license and were then faced with an $8 million libel suit i nitiated by the bar owner. Judges dismiss the majority of SLAPPs as a violation of constitutional rights, generally on the grounds that the defendant’s activities are protected by the Petition Clause of the FIRST AMENDMENT to the Constitution. That clause establishes “the right of the people to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” However, in those cases where a SLAPP is not quickly dismissed, the expense of the litigation for SLAPP defendants, both in time and money, often serves as punishmen t itself and dissuades individuals from speaking out in the future. Individuals who have been hit with a SLAPP—or “SLAPPed”—often report a feeling of having been sued into sil ence and feel dissuaded from participating in public life again—quite often the very effect intended by the SLAPP filer. Although a SLAPP filer usually loses in court, he or she may achieve the goal of silencing future political opposition. For these reasons, the legal system has widely viewed SLAPPs as an example of the use of law for the purpose of intimidat ion and as a threat to citizen involvement and public participation. SLAPPs, critics contend, attempt to privatize public debate and have a chilling effect on public speech and involvement. Those who favor SLAPPs claim that SLAPP plaintiffs have as much right to fight for their rights as SLAPP defendants. It is equally wrong, they say, to conclude that all SLAPP plaintiffs are malicious as it is to conclude that all SLAPP defendants have honorable intentions. More- over, the First Amendment protects free speech but no t slander or libel. Most SLAPP propo- nents dislike the term “SLAPP” because they feel it can unfairly taint legitimate defamation actions. SLAPPs date back to the earliest years of the United States, when citizens occasionally were sued for speaking out against corruption in government. Courts generally dismissed such lawsuits, however, and SLAPPs fell into general disuse until the 1960s and 1970s. During those decades, a wave of political activism concerning many issue s—from the environment to minor- ity rights—sparked suits claiming defamation, libel, and business interference from affected parties, particularly corporations and business interests. By the 1980s and 1990s, many observers claimed that SLAPPs were seriously hampering participation in the U.S. political system. Individuals and governments reacted to the growth of SLAPPs in a number of different ways. Targets of SLAPP cases sometimes have countersued—a process known as a SLAPP- back—often making many of the same claims as the SLAPP filer: MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, ABUSE OF GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 400 STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROCESS, defamation, and business interference. Those who have filed SLAPPbacks generally have been successful in court and have won large cash settlements from juries. Advocates of SLAPPbacks say that they are a necessary deterrent to SLAPP filers. Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court have increasingly supported the rapid JUDICIAL REVIEW and dismissal of SLAPPs. Using standards developed in earlier cases (Eastern Railroad Presidents’ Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S. Ct. 523, 5 L. Ed. 2d 464 [1961], and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S. Ct. 1585, 14 L. Ed. 2d 626 [1965]), the Court ruled in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 111 S. Ct. 1344, 113 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1991), that the First Amendm ent’s Petition Clause protects “a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose.” The Court held that SLAPPs should be dismissed in all cases except those in which the target’s activities are not genuinely directed at gaining favorable government action. A number of states have passed laws intended to prevent SLAPPs and protect the right to participate in public activism. Washing- ton became the first state to pass an anti-SLAPP law in 1989. By 2009, over 20 states had enacted similar legislation, and still more states were debating anti-SLAPP bills. In 2003, well-known singer and actress Barbara Streisand lost i n op p osing an anti-SLAPP motion fi led after she s ued an entity kno w n as the California Coastal Records Project. The California Coastal Records Project o p erated an online database of photographs of the California coast, and a pho tograph it posted online included an image of Streisand’sestate.Streisandlostthe lawsuit captioned Streisand v. Adelman, et al., Case No. 077 257, in which she alleged that the use of the photograph invaded her privacy, violated the anti-paparazzi statute, sought to profit from her name, and threatened her security. FURTHER READINGS Delfino, Michelangelo and Mary E. Day. 2002. Be Careful Who You SLAPP. Los Altos, CA: Mobeta Pub. Hillberry, Rhonda. 1995. “Warning: Signing That Petition Could Get You Sued!” Law and Politics (July). Pring, George W., 1996. SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. CROSS REFER ENCES Environmental Law. STRAW MAN An individual who acts as a front for others who actually incur the expense and obtain the profit of a transaction. Also, in legal argument, a rhetorical technique. In the terminology employed by REAL ESTATE dealers, a straw man is an individual who acts as a conduit for convenience in holding and transfer- ring title to the property involved. For example, such a person might act as an agent for another in order to take title to real property and execute whatever documents and instruments the princi- pal directs with respect to the transaction. A straw man argument describes a position that superficially resembles an opponent’s actual view, yet is easier to refute. Then, one attributes that position to the opponent. While a straw man argument may work as a rhetorical technique–and succeed in persuading people–it carries little or no real evidential weight, since the opponent ’s actual argument has not been refuted. STREET RAILROAD A railway that is constructed upon a thoroughfare or highway to aid in the transportation of people or property along the roadway. Street railroads run at moderate rates of speed and make frequent stops at particular points within a town or city. Subways and elevated railroads that are built above the surface of the roadway are two common examples of street railroads. Municipal corporations have the authority to regulate the operation of street railroads within their boundaries. This power is generally vested in a board of commission, which sets regulations for the protection of individuals and property. Common requirements mandate street railroads to (1) restrict the speed at which the cars operate; (2) provide the cars with reliable brakes; (3) furnish the cars with signal lights and sound devices; and (4) keep all tracks clear of ice and snow during periods of inclement weather. STRICT CONSTRUCTION A close or narrow reading and interpretation of a statute or written document. Judges are often called upon to make a construction, or interpretation, of an unclear GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION STRICT CONSTRUCTION 401 term in cases that involve a dispute over the term’s legal significance. The COMMON LAW tra- dition has produced various precepts, maxims, and rules that guide judges in construing statutes or private written agreements such as contracts. Strict construction occurs when ambiguous language is given its exact and technical meaning, and no other equitable considerations or reason- able implications are made. A judge may make a construction only if the language is ambiguous or unclear. If the language is plain and clear, a judge must apply the plain meaning of the language and cannot consider other evidenc e that would change the meaning. If, however, the judge finds that the words produce absurdity, ambiguity, or a literalness never intended, the plain meaning does not apply, and a construction may be made. In CRIMINAL LAW, strict construction must be applied to criminal statutes. This means that a criminal statute may not be enlarged by implication or intent beyond the fair meaning of the language used or the meaning that is reasonably justified by its terms. Criminal statutes, therefore, will not be held to encom- pass offenses and individuals other than those clearly described and provided for in their language. The strict construction of criminal statutes complements the rule of lenity, which holds that ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of the DEFENDANT. Strict construction is the opposite of liberal (or loose) construction, which permits a term to be reasonably and fairly evaluated so as to implement the object and purpose of the document. An ongoing debate in U.S. law concerns how strictly judges should interpret the law. Advocates of strict construction believe that judges must exercise restraint by refusing to expand the law through implication. Critics of strict construction contend that this approach does not always produce a just or reasonable result. This debate typically surfaces during the confirmation hearings for persons nominated by the president to serve as justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. During these hearings, Street railroads, such as this elevated transit line in Chicago, provide an alternative to automobile or bus transportation. BETTMANN/CORBIS. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 402 STRICT CONSTRUCTION nominees are asked to explain their judicial philosophy. A strict constructionist in CONSTITU- TIONAL LAW is someone who narrowly interprets a constitutional provision according to the text. When the text is vague, many strict construc- tionists resort to the theory of ORIGINAL INTENT to aid their interpretation and understanding. According to this theory, the meaning of any constitutional provision must be understood in light of those who drafted and ratified it. Justice ANTONIN SCALIA is the leading originalist on the current Court. CROSS REFER ENCES Canons of Construction; Plain-Meaning Rule. STRICT FORECLOSURE A decree that orders the payment of a mortgage of real property. A strict foreclosure decree sets out the amount due under the mortgage, orders it to be paid within a particular time limit, and provides that if payment is not made, the mortgagor’s right and equity of redemption are forever barred and foreclosed. If the mortgagor does not pay within the time designated, then title to the property vests in the mortgagee without any sale thereof. STRICT LIABILITY Strict liability is absolute legal responsibility for an injury that can be imposed on the wrongdoer without proof of carelessness or fault. Strict liability, sometimes called absolute liability, is the legal responsibility for damages, or injury, even if the perso n found strictly liable was not at fault or negligent. Strict liability has been applied to certain activ ities in tort, such as holding an employer absolutely liable for the torts of her employees, but in the early 2000s it is most commonly associated with defectively manufactured products. In addition, for reasons of PUBLIC POLICY, certain activities may be conducted only if the person conducting them is willing to insure others against the harm that results from the risks the activities create. Critics of strict liability allege that it is a superfluous legal doctrine and that claims brought for strict liability would be more appropriately pursued under a NEGLIGENCE theory. In PRODUCT LIABILITY cases involving injuries caused by manufactured goods, strict liability has had a major impact on LITIGATION since the 1960s. In 1963, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products (59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897) , the California SUPREME COURT becam e the first court to adopt strict tort liability for defective pro- ducts. Injured plaintiffs have to prove the product caused the harm but do not have to prove exactly how the manufacturer was careless. Purchasers of the product, as well as injured guests, bystanders, and others with no direct relationship with the product, may sue for damages caused by the product. An injured party must prove that the item was defective, that the defect proximately caused the injury, and that the defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous. A plaintiff may recover damages even if the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product. In 2006 Joseph Birdsong filed an action on his own behalf and on behalf of a putative class against Apple Computer, Inc., seeking damages for hearing loss allegedly attributable to the high volume levels of the iPod, the company’s portable media player. The lawsuit was note- worthy given that its allegations were based on strict liability for the product’s embedded software. To the extent that such software was improperly designed, the company could have faced liability for all damages, even absent any negligence. In the modern technology age, embedded software is commonplace, and a holding imposing strict liability for such software co uld have wide-ranging ramifications on product liability litigation. However, the case was dismissed by a California federal district court and this decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2009. The appeals court stated that “The plaintiffs simply do not plead facts showing that hearing loss from iPod use is actual or imminent.” The court found that even if the iPod produces dangerous audio levels, users were responsible for taking the risk of turning up the volume. In addition, Apple issues a warning with each iPod which states that “permanent hearing loss may occur if earphones or headphones are used at high volume”. In TORT LAW, strict liability has traditionally been applied for damages caused by animals. Because animals are not governed by a con- science and possess great capacity to do mischief if not restrained, those who keep animals have a GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION STRICT LIABILITY 403 duty to restrain them. In most jurisdictions the general rule is that keepers of all animals, including domesticated ones, are strictly liable for damage resulting from the TRESPASS of their animals on the property of another. Owners of dogs and cats, however, are not liable for their pets’ trespasses, unless the owners have been negligent or unless strict liability is imposed by statute or ordinance. For purposes of liability for harm other than trespass, the law distinguishes between domes- ticated and wild animals. The keeper of domesticated animals, which include dogs, cats, cattle, sheep, and horses, is strictly liable for the harm they cause only if the keeper had actual knowledge that the animal had the particular trait or propensity that caused the harm. The trait must be a potentially harmful one, and the harm must correspond to the knowledge. In the case of dogs, however, some jurisdictions have enacted statutes that impose absolute liability for dog bites without requiring knowl- edge of the dog ’s viciousness. Keepers of species that are normally consid- ered wild in that region are strictly liable for the harm these pets cause if they escape, whether or not the animal in question is known to be dangerous. Because such animals are known to revert to their natural tendencies, they are considered to be wild no matter how well trained or domesticated. Strict liability for harm resulting from abnormally dangerous conditions and activities developed in the late nineteenth century. It will be imposed if the harm resu lts from the miscarriage of an activ ity that, though lawful, is unusual, extraordinary, exceptional, or inap- propriate in light of the place and manner in which the activity is conducted. Common hazardous activities that could result in strict liability include storing explosives or flammable liquids, blasting, accumulating sewage, and emitting toxic fumes. Although these activities may be hazardous, they may be appropriate or normal in one location but not another. For example, storing explosives in quantity will create an unusual and unacceptable risk in the midst of a large city but not in a rem ote rural area. If an explosion occurs in the remote area, strict liability will be imposed only if the explosives were stored in an unusual or abnormal way. FURTHER READINGS Eades, Ronald W. 2008. Mastering Products Liability. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press. Gerhart, Peter M. “The Death of Strict Liability.” March 2007. Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 7-12. Available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976405 (accessed September 23, 2009). Johnson, Vincent R., and Alan Gunn. 2009. Studies in American Tort Law. 4th ed. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press. Lees, Gail, et al. “Year-End Update on Class Actions.” February 14, 2009. The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. Avail- able online at //blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/ 02/14/year-end-update-on-class-actions/ (accessed Sep- tember 23, 2009). Owen, David G. 2008. Products Liability in a Nutshell. Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books. Vandall, Frank J. 1989. Strict Liability: Legal and Economic Analysis. 8th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson/West. CROSS REFEREN CES Explosives; Negligence; Product Liability; Proximate Cause; Rylands v. Fletcher. STRICT SCRUTINY A standard of JUDICIAL REVIEW for a challenged policy in which the court presumes the policy to be invalid unless the government can demonstrate a compelling interest to justify the policy. The strict scrutiny standard of judicial review is based on the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE of the Fourteenth Amendment. Federal courts use strict scrutiny to determine whether certain types of government polici es are constitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court has applied this standard to laws or policies that impinge on a right explicitly protected by the U.S. Constitu- tion, such as the right to vote. The Court has also identified certain rights that it deems to be fundamental rights, even though they are not enumerated in the Constitution. The strict scru tiny standard is one of three employed by the courts in reviewing laws and government policies. The rational basis test is the lowest form of judicial scrutiny. It is used in cases where a plaintiff alleges that the legislature has made an ARBITRARY or irrational decision. When employed, the RATIONAL BASIS TEST usually results in a court upholding the constitutional- ity of the law, because the test gives great deference to the legislative branch. The height- ened scrutiny test is used in cases involving matters of discrimination based on sex. As articulated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451, 50 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1976), “classifications by gender must serve important governmental GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 404 STRICT SCRUTINY objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Strict scrutiny is the most rigorous form of judicial review. The Supreme Court has identi- fied the right to vote, the right to travel, and the right to privacy as fundamental rights worthy of protection by strict scrutiny. In addition, laws and policies that discriminate on the basis of race are categorized as suspect classifications that are presumptively impermissible and subject to strict scrutiny. Once a court determines that strict scrutiny must be applied, it is presumed that the law or policy is unconstitutional. The government has the burden of proving that its challenged policy is constitutional. To withstand strict scrutiny, the government must show that its policy is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. If this is proved, the state must then demon- strate that the legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve the intended result. The case of ROE V. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973 ), which invalidated state laws that prohibited ABORTION, illustrates the application of strict scrutiny. The Court held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right and that this right “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Based on these grounds, the Court applied strict scrutiny. The state of Texas sought to proscribe all abortions and claimed a compelling STATE INTEREST in protecting unborn human life. Though the Court acknowledged that this was a legitimate interest, it held that the interest does not become compelling until that point in pregnancy when the fetus becomes “viable” (capable of “meaningful life outside the mother’s womb”). The Court held that a state may prohibit abortion after the point of viability, except in cases where abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother, but the Texas law was not narrowly tailored to achieve this objective. Therefore, the state did not meet its BURDEN OF PROOF and the law was held unconstitutional. CROSS REFER ENCES Civil Rights; Equal Protection; Sex Discrimination; Voting. STRIKE A work stoppage; the concerted refusal of employees to perform work that their employer has assigned to them in order to force the employer to grant certain demanded concessions, such as increased wages or improved employment conditions. A work stoppage is generally the last step in a labor-ma nagement dispute over wages and working conditions. Because employees are not paid when they go on strike and employers lose productivity, both sides usually seek to avoid it. When negotiations have reached an impasse, however, a strike may be the only bargaining tool left for employees. Employees can strike for economic reasons, for improvement of their working conditions, or for the mutual aid and protection of employees in another union. In addition, even if they do not have a union, employees can properly agree to stop working as a group; in that case they are entitled to all the protections that organized strikers are afforded. LABOR UNIONS do not have the right to use a strike to interfere with management preroga- tives or with policies that the employer is entitled to make that do not directly concern the employment relationship. A strike must be conducted in an orderly manner and cannot be used as a shield for violence or crime. Intimidation and coercion during the course of a strike are unlawful. Federal Labor Law The development of labor unions in the nineteenth century was met by employer hostility. The concept of COLLECTIVE BARGAINING between employer and employee was viewed as antithetical to the right of individual workers and their employers to negotiate wages and working conditions—a concept known as liberty of contract. When unions did strike, they were left to deal with management without legal protec- tions. Employers fired strikers and obtained injunctions from courts that ordered unions to end the strike or risk CONTEMPT of court. The unequal bargaining power of unions was remedied in the 1930s with the passage of two important federal LABOR LAWS. In 1932 Congress passed the NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 et seq.), which severely limited the power of federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes. The act imposed strict procedural limitations and safeguards to pre- vent abuses by the courts. The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of 1935 (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et seq.) clearly established the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION STRIKE 405 right of employees to form, join, or aid labor unions. The act authorized collective bargaining by unions and gave employees the right to participate in “concerted actions” to bargain collectively. The major concerted action was the right to strike. Federal labor laws require a 60-day waiting period before workers can strike to force termination or modification of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The terms of the agreement remain in full force and effect during this period, and any employee who strikes can be fired. The 60-day “cooling-off period” begins when the union serves notice on the employer or when the existing contract ends. This provision does not affect the right of employees to strike in protest of some UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE of their employer. It does help to prevent premature strikes, however. Status Strikes can be divided into two basic types: economic and unfair labor practice. An eco- nomic strike seeks to obtain some type of economic benefit for the workers, such as improved wages and hours, or to force recognition of their union. An unfair labor practice strike is called to protest some act of the employer that the employees regard as unfair. When employees strike, the employer may continue operating the business and can hire replacement workers. Upon settlement of an unfair labor practice strike, the strikers must be reinstated as soon as they offer unconditionally to return to work, even if the replacement workers must be fired. In economic strikes, however, the employer is not required to take back the strikers immediately upon the settlement of the dispute. Economic strikers are still categorized as employees and are entitled to reinstatement in the event vacancies occur, but the employer does not have to reinstate any worker who has found substantially equivalent work elsewhere or who has given the employer a legitimate and substantial reason for not reinstating that worker. The hiring of permanent replacement workers has become an important manage- ment weapon against economic strikes, giving the employer the ability to hire a nonunion workforce and to threaten the local union with destruction. U.S. labor unions have been unsuccessful in persuading Congress to amend the National Labor Relations Act to provide immediate job reinstatement to economic strikers. An emplo yee has no right to be paid while on strike, nor does the employee have a right to claim UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION benefits, unless state law provides the benefit. Employees who refuse to cross a picket line on principle are treated in the same way as strikers, but those who are kept from their jobs through fear of violence are entitled to collect unemployment compensation. Employees forfeit their right to maintain the employment relationship if their strike is illegal. For example, public employees are generally forbidden to strike. If they do, they risk dismissal. In 1981, President RONALD REAGAN responded to an illegal strike by federal air traffic controllers by dismissing more than ten thousand employees. Ordinarily, however, a strike is leg al if employees are using it to exert economic pressure upon their employer in order to improve the conditions of their employment. A strike is unlawful if it is directed at someone other than the employer or if it is used for some other purpose. Federal law prohibits most boycotts or picketing directed at a party not involved in the primary dispute. These tactics are known as secondary boycotts or secondary picketing, and they are strictly limited so that businesses that are innocent bystanders will not become victims in a la bor dispute that they cannot resolve. Unlawful Tactics Picketing can be regulated by statute because of the potential for violence inherent in this activity. Mass picketing is unlawful under federal law because large unruly crowds could be used for the purpose of intimidation. Employees are entitled to picket in small numbers outside the employer’s facilities, but they cannot block entrances or demonstrate in front of an employer’s home. Picketing is lawful when it is used to inform the public, the employer, or other workers about the dispute. However, it cannot be used to threaten people or to provoke violence. A strike is generally lawful if it is peaceful. A strike is never a legal excuse for violence, and acts of physical violence and damage to property will be viewed as criminal acts. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 406 STRIKE Employers who use violence against strikers are subject to the same penalties. A union or an employer can be fined or adjudged guilty of an unfair labor practice and ordered to cease and desist when violent actions occur. An INJUNCTION from a state court can stop the strike or picketing. Because no labor disputes can proceed without minor problems, an isolated minor incident, such as name-calling or a shove, does not end the right to strike. Union Members Labor unions can fine or expel members who cross picket lines, fail to honor a lawful strike, or indulge in violence during a strike. In addition, they can discipline members for conduct antagonistic to the union, such as spying for the employer or participating in an unauthorized strike. A union member is entitled to a written notice of specific charges against him and a full and fair hearing before he can be expelled. Settlement Strikes are ordinarily settled by negotiation between the employer and the employees or the union that represents them. An employer who does not want to engage in negotiations can cease operations entirely. However, an employer cannot avoid bargaining by relocating or by A Lexicon of Labor Strikes O B ver the years different types of labor strikes have acquired distinctive labels. The following are the most common types of strikes, some of which are illegal: n Wildcat strike A strike that is not authorized by the union that represents the employees. Although not illegal under law, wi ldcat strikes ordinarily constitute a violation of an existing collective bargaining agree ment. n Walkout An unannounced refusal to perform work. A walkout may be spontaneous or planned in advance and k ept secret. If the employees' conduct is an irresponsible or indefensible method of accompli shing their goals, a walkout is il legal. In other situations courts may rule that the employees have a good reason to strike. n Slowdown An intermittent work stoppage by employees who remain on the job. Slowdowns are illegal because they give the employees an unfair bargaining advantage by making it impossiblefortheemployertoplanforproduc- tion by the workforce. An employer may dischargeanemployeeforaworkslowdown. n Sitdown strike A strike in which employees stop working and refuse to leave the employer's premises. Sitdown strikes helped unions orga- nize workers in the automobile industry in the 1930s but are now rare. They are il legal under most circumstances. n Whipsaw strike A work stoppage against a single member of a bargaining unit composed of several employers. Whipsaw strikes are legal and are used by unions to bring added pressure against the employer who experiences not only the strike but also competition from the employers who have not been struck. Employers may respond by locking out employees of all facilities that belong to members of the bargaining unit. Whipsaw strikes have commonly been used in the automo- bile industry. n Sympathy strike A work stoppage designed to provide aid and comfort to a related union engaged in an employment dispute. Although sympathy strikes are not illegal, unions can relinquish the right to use this tactic in a collective bargaining agre ement. n Jurisdictional strike A strike that arises from a dispute over which labor union i s entitled to represent the employees. Jurisdictional strikes are unlawful under federal labor l aws because the argument is between unions and not betweenaunionandtheemployer. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION STRIKE 407 . in Craig v. Boren, 4 29 U.S. 190 , 97 S. Ct. 451, 50 L. Ed. 2d 397 ( 197 6), “classifications by gender must serve important governmental GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 404 STRICT. County, Colo. 198 1]). The suit dragged on for several years, cost the environmental group much time GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 399 and. shares of National Widget at a price of 100 (any number of shares can be involved, but WOMEN ARE THE REAL ARCHITECTS OF SOCIETY . —HARRIET BEECHER STOWE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E