Encyclopedia of Global Resources part 40 pps

smaller vehicles, another crucial ad - vantage of liquid hydrocarbons is that they can be simply and easily pumped into an engine. The complexity of feeding coal to a boiler adds to the cost of running a steam railroad lo- comotive and is prohibitively expensive for automobiles and trucks. When hydrocarbon fuels from petroleum eventually become very expensive because of diminishing reserves, there will undoubtedly be replacement fuels, but all potential replacements currently known have expensive disadvantages. Synthetic fuels produced from coal have proved economically unfeasible ex- cept in emergencies. Production of ethyl alcohol from agriculturalprod- ucts involves energy losses from farming, from energy used by yeasts to make alcohol, and from the energy required to concentrate the alcohol. Electric automobiles involve the two-thirds waste from electrical generating plants plus the cost of buying and moving massive batteries. A revolution in battery technology is changing those economics. Energy Resource Bell Curves and Energy Crises Geologist Marion King Hubbert noted a bell-shaped curve in the use of resources, now commonly called the “Hubbert curve” and often used in estimates of resource use and reserves. (Hubbert first applied his curve to petroleum in the late 1940’s and subsequently reviewed and amended his prediction a number of times.) According to the Hubbert curve, a resource is used experimentally at first. Then, use increases rapidly until the resource begins nearing a point of halfexhaustion.Atthatpoint,difficultyinob- taining the diminishing supplies begins driving up costs, so demand growth begins to slow. As prices continue rising, competing energy sources emerge, and production of them increases. Use of the first resource declines in a mirror image of its earlier rise, and it gradually fades away. Hubbert noticed this pat- tern in the production of onshore petroleum in the forty-eight contiguous states of the United States. In 1948, he correctly predicted that production in this region would peak in the early 1970’s. He noted that such energy curves had already occurred for other major energy sources in the United States, including firewood, whale oil, anthracite coal, and bituminous coal. Extension of such analyses to world energy production suggested that there would be a worldwide energy crisis after production of oil and gas peaked. Worries about such a crisis encouraged price increases, stockpiling, and government actions that helped create the energy crises of the 1970’s. The discovery of new reserves and the development of new energy sources can cause different kinds of crises that are as damaging economically as short- ages are. In the 1930’s, a Texas oil boom combined with the Great Depression to reduce petroleumprices to ten cents a barrel, nearly bankrupting the industry. The response was a group of state oil regulatory com- missions that limited petroleum production. Energy economics can have a wide range of ramifi- cations. A by-product of the cheap energy of the mid- twentieth century was the growing problem of waste materials, from junked automobiles to tin cans and, later, aluminum and plastic containers. The serious- ness of the problem was recognized in the 1960’s, but not until the rise in energy prices of the 1970’s was re - cycling of materials widely adopted, slowly reducing 360 • Energy economics Global Resources An electric car charges its battery in Essen, Germany. By 2020, Germany hopes to have one millionelectriccars onthe road, adevelopment that wasmade possible byan economic stimulus package that stressed the need for alternative forms of energy. (AP/Wide World Photos) the volume of waste. Perhaps most notably, energy- intensive aluminum was recycled, and waste cans grew more scarce. The 1970’s energy crises resulted in two major economic reforms that will help ameliorate future crises. First, as noted, price increases led to increased effi- ciency. Second, a major energy source was reborn when the price of natural gas was released from government price controls. At twenty cents per 5.7 cubic meters, gas had been so cheap that it was often not even reported in drilling logs, so supplies were vastly underrated. The possibility exists that in the twenty- first century more energy will come from gas than from petroleum. In addition, those crises spurred research that may eventually yield viable new energy solutions. In the 1970’s, some observers saw the energy crises as an indication that petroleum reserves would be im- minently sliding down the diminishing side of Hubbert’s bell-shaped curve. Such predictions were premature, but his analyses nevertheless show that energy production must continue evolving. As noted earlier, combustion processes will probably be cheaper than other energy sources for some time, at least in the United States. Nonetheless, if history is an indication, fossil fuels may eventually be supplanted. In 1850, “rock oil” (petroleum) was used only in small amounts, natural gaswas a curiosity,and nuclear reac- tions and the electronic interactions that make solar cells work were entirely unknown. Nonetheless, all these have become important energy sources. Roger V. Carlson Further Reading Banks, Ferdinand E. The Political Economy of World En- ergy: An Introductory Textbook. Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific, 2007. Craddock, David. Renewable Energy Made Easy: Free En- ergy from Solar, Wind, Hydropower, and Other Alterna- tive Energy Sources. Ocala, Fla.: Atlantic, 2008. Dumaine, Brian. The Plot to Save the Planet: How Vision- ary Entrepreneurs and Corporate Titans Are Creating Real Solutions to Global Warming. New York: Crown Business, 2008. Flavin, Christopher, and Nicholas Lenssen. Power Surge: Guide to the Coming Energy Revolution. New York: W. W. Norton, 1994. Lovins, Amory B., et al. The Energy Controversy: Soft Path Questions and Answers. Edited by Hugh Nash. San Francisco: Friends of the Earth, 1979. Pernick, Ron, and Clint Wilder. The Clean Tech Revolu - tion: The Next Big Growth and Investment Opportunity. New York: Collins, 2007. Ridgeway,James. Powering Civilization: The Complete En- ergy Reader. New York: Pantheon Books, 1982. Shojai, Siamack, ed. The New Global Oil Market: Under- standing Energy Issues in the World Economy.Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995. Stobaugh, Robert, and Daniel Yergin, eds. Energy Fu- ture: Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School. New York: Vintage Books, 1980. Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York: The Free Press, 2008. See also: Animal power; Biofuels; Buildings and appliances, energy-efficient; Coal gasification and liquefaction; Cogeneration; Department of Energy, U.S.; Energy Policy Act; Energy politics; Energy storage; Ford, Henry; Fuel cells; Manufacturing, energy use in; Oil embargo and energy crises of 1973 and 1979; Oil industry; Peak oil; Photovoltaic cells; Synthetic Fuels Corporation; Transportation, energy use in. Energy Policy Act Categories: Laws and conventions; government and resources Date: Final passage July 29, 2005; signed into law August 8, 2005 The U.S. Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized government subsidies, loan guarantees, and tax breaks for producers of both conventional and alternative energy as well as a variety of conservation measures. Al- though its true impact upon resource use has been a source of debate, the act has resulted in changes in U.S. energy policy and raised numerous issues regarding its future. Background Introduced as the debate over future U.S. energy policy was escalating, in light of supply disruptions and price fluctuations, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was intended to address concerns about scarcity of energy resources by encouraging increased production of both conventional and unconventional energy re - sources. Provisions calling for revision of auto emis - sions standards and permitting drilling for oil in the Global Resources Energy Policy Act • 361 Arctic National Wildlife Refuge were stricken from the bill prior to passage. It was introduced in the House of Representatives on April 18, 2005, and passed the final vote of both houses on July 28 and 29. President George W. Bush signed the bill into law on August 8, 2005. Provisions The act authorized loan guarantees for energy production methods that minimize or avoid creation of greenhouse gases, such as nuclear energy, “clean coal” technology, and renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, geothermal, and tidal power. The act also increased the amount of ethanol required in gasoline sold in the United States, provided tax breaks for property owners installing energy-efficient fea- tures to homes and commercial buildings, offered tax incentives to purchasers of hybrid automobiles, and extended the duration of daylight savings time. Some provisions of the act—such as tax breaks for producers of fossilfuels, emphasis upon expanding coalmin- ing, tax incentives for oil companies drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, research into the potential effects of shale oil extraction on public lands, and making gas and oil companies exempt from portions of the Safe Drinking Water Act—sparked controversy and prompted accusations that the act favored fossil-fuel producers and failed to provide sufficient environ- mental protections. Impact on Resource Use Despite the broad scope of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, many of its provisions had not been implemented as of fiscal year 2008-2009, as Congress had not appropriated much of the money required to im- plement the provisions. Other provisionswere rapidly implemented but produced lukewarm or unintended results; the mandated increase in the ethanol content of gasoline created short-term disruptions in gasoline supplies as refineries struggled to accommodate the changes and contributed to sharp global increases in the price of corn and other cereal grains, exacerbating problems with hunger in some developing countries. Other provisions, such as incentives for purchases of hybrid automobiles, realized modest short-term success as purchases of these automobiles increased and escalating competition among automobile manufac- turers resulted in a wider variety of hybrid automo - biles entering the marketplace. Still other provisions, such as incentives to make homes and commercial buildings more energy-efficient, appeared to incen - tivize changes in behavioral patterns. Michael H. Burchett Web Site U.S. Department of Energy Energy Policy Act http://www.energy.gov/about/EPAct.htm See also: Biofuels; Buildings and appliances, energy- efficient; Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Act; Department of Energy, U.S.; Electrical power; Energy economics; Energy politics; Ethanol; Hydro- energy; United States; Wind energy. Energy politics Category: Social, economic, and political issues Energy systems affect politics, social mobility, and economic performance. Although wood and human labor continue to be important sources of energy in many countries, modern industrial civilizations have been shaped by access to fossil fuels—principally coal and, more recently, petroleum and natural gas—and they depend on these fuels to function. Energy resources thus are inevitably a concern of governments and a subject of fundamental importance in the making of both domestic and foreign policy. Sometimes those decisions involve issues of war or peace. Background Historically, civilizations have rested on their energy base. Those that controlled slaves when human labor was the principal source of energy erected pyramids and temples thousands of years ago. Civilizations that did not possess that energy source are buried in the past, often surfacing only as footnotes in ancient history texts. Modern history can be similarly written. In 1800, nearly a score of countries—including Spain, Portu- gal, Austria, and Holland—of roughly equal power contended for influence. A century later, those capable of significantly influencing world affairs num- bered approximately one-half dozen, some of which were not included in the earlier listing. The winnow - ing process revolved around coal, the essential fuel for full participation in the Industrial Revolution. 362 • Energy politics Global Resources Among the Northern Hemisphere powers, only the United States, Britain, the newly formed Germany, Russia, and Japan possessed it in abundance. Fifty years later, this number had been reduced to the two superpowers of the postwarera: the United States and the Soviet Union. These weretwoindustrializedcoun- tries with large indigenous sources of oil: the most efficient, utilized, and strategically important source of energy in the twentieth century. Lacking it, Adolf Hit- ler planned Germany’s World War II strategy around an early acquisition of the oil fields of western Russia and North Africa. Similarly, to maintain access to oil, the United States and a grand alliance composed pre- dominantly of industrialized, oil-importing states fought a war in 1991 to eliminate the threat Iraq posed to the vastly important Saudi Arabian fields in the Persian Gulf, the Earth’s late twentieth century geopolitical heartland. Pre-1973 Energy Politics in United States Perhaps because of its vast energy resources, the United States did not have a definitive domestic energy policy priorto the oil crisis of1973. It did have, as David Howard Davisnotes in his Energy Politics (1982), fuel policies for each of the three fossil fuels it held in abundance (coal, gas, and oil) as well as for the nuclear power industry, whose development the government encouraged after World War II. These policies often differed widely from one another, reflecting the different physical properties and periods of origin of each of the four fuels. An overall energy policy did not exist. Moreover, much of the time, the individual fuel policies were by-products of other policy concerns; for example, the attention given to oil in the United States in the postwar era was related to the importance of oil to postwar economic growth, whereas en- vironmental considerations led to a 1970 freeze on the construction of the Alaska oil pipeline. Energy in general and oil in particular were much more direct concerns of the makers of American foreign policy, especially after the U.S. Navy converted from coal to oil in the early twentieth century. To secure a supply of oil for refueling the fleet, the government encouraged American oil companies to go abroad. Although the U.S. government never created its own public oil company to seek a secure oil supply, it frequently used its political, economic, and diplo- matic power to assist the American-based multina - tional corporations that developed that oil. Thus, af - ter World War I, antitrust laws were never applied to the cooperative activities of the principal U.S. oil firms, much less to the international activities of the five great, American-based multinational oil companies (Exxon, Texaco, Gulf, Mobil, and Standard Oilof California) that collaborated with Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum in the “Seven Sisters” cartel that effectively controlled the world oil market between 1926 and 1966. To the contrary, Congress re- wrote U.S. tax codes after World War II to benefit those American oil companies in the Arabian Penin- sula that suddenly had to share their profits with Per- sian Gulf governments. Likewise, President Dwight Eisenhower pressured Britain into including Ameri- can firms when it reopened the British Petroleum venture in Iran after covert American operatives top- pled the Iranian government, which had nationalized Iran’s oil industry, in 1954. Prior to 1973, foreign policy required attention to energy far more than domestic policy did, and in the international arena, energy politics was oil politics. Oil Crises of the 1970’s and Energy Politics in the Energy Importing World Events beginning with the 1973 Arab embargo on the United States and other countries friendly to Israel during the October, 1973, Yom Kippur War vastly intensified the importance of energy as a policy issue. To be sure, Arab embargoes had been threatened during both the 1956 and 1967Arab-Israeliwars;however, onthoseoccasions the threat had little meaning. Most Western countries either were still producing most of the energy they consumed or were abletopro- cure ample imported oil in an international buyer’s market where supply often exceeded demand. By 1973, imported oil had become essential to the economy of much of the developed world. Even the United States, although still one of the world’s major petroleum producers, was importing nearly 30 percent of the oil it required to maintain the high liv- ing standard of American consumers. In Japan and Western Europe, where postwar economic recovery had been based on oil rather than on indigenous coal supplies, and where imported petroleum accounted for 60 to 80 percent of all energy being used, petroleum imports had become essential to life itself. The oil embargo thus came as a terrifying shock to the industrialized world. Western civilization, or at least the materially rich lifestyle associated with it, had become dependent on an energy source that the Western, oil-importing countries did not control Global Resources Energy politics • 363 and for which there was no immediately available en - ergy substitute. Vulnerability of this nature isnormally exploited in the amoral world of international politics, and so it was in 1973. In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, the U.S. allies were pressured—by the threat of losing their shipments of Arab oil—into endorsing the United Nations resolution calling for Israel to return the Arab landit acquired during the 1967Arab-Israeli war. The same states also bid, almost hysterically, against one another for available oil supplies. By the end of October of that year, the Organization of Pe- troleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had exploited this situation, taken over the control of oilproduction from the Seven Sisters, and established the official price of OPEC oil at four times its prior cost. In its turn, this sudden jump in the price of oil to nearly twelve dollars per barrel ignited a global recession. The recession had barely ended before the fall of the shah of Iran in January, 1979. The outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran in the fall of that year significantly reduced the supply ofexportable oil, producing a second oil crisis in which the price of OPEC oil cata- pulted to more than thirty-six dollars per barrel. The oil crises of 1973 and 1979 made energy the key policy issue throughout the developed, energy- importing world for several years. The crises triggered double-digit inflation and unemploy- ment figures in most Western countries and collectively cost the West- ern world as much as $1 trillion in lost gross national product. Lest OPEC oil again become available only in limited amounts and/or at prohibitive costs, countries sought a mix of energy sources capable of minimizing their dependency on imported petroleum. Toward that end, most states without domestic oil or natural gas options gravitated toward a “co-co-nuk” strategy of enhanced conservation efforts, a greater use of coal, and more reliance on nuclear power in their national energy systems. As a result of these efforts, and of economies reshaping around the service sector and less energy- intensive industries, Japan and most industrialized states in Western Eu - rope subsequently reduced the pro - portion of imported energy in their overall energy profiles—even after recovering from their oil-crises- induced recessions. However, in most instances they also still remained dependent on oil imports for one- half or more than one-halfoftheir total energy needs. Like the United States, these countries have had diffi- culty reconciling their continued dependency on oil and use of coal with the commitments that they have made to reducing fossil fuel emissions under the environment-related agreements negotiated during the 1990’s. Energy Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy from 1979 to September 11, 2001 The United States has had less success than other industrialized states in lowering oil imports. A number of factors have combined to preclude an easy shift from petroleum to other energy sources. Among these causes are the declining productivity of U.S. domestic oil fields,political opposition to nuclear power following the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, and the high economic and en- vironmental costs of suchalternatives to imported oil, such as coal liquefaction. Lifestyle decisions made during the era of cheap energy (such as single-family suburban homes remote from work sites and a reliance on the automobile for transportation) also 364 • Energy politics Global Resources Anticipating the gas and oil shortage that would result from the energy crisis of 1973, Austrian motoristswait inline to fillup theirgas tanks. Issuesrelated tooil and gasdomi - nated energy politics in the latter half of the twentieth century. (Rue des Archives/The Granger Collection, New York) have made the shift difficult. Consequently, oil im - ports have accounted for one-half or more of the oil that the United States consumes each year. Mean- while, even with imports at this level, the country’s domestic oil reserves have steadily declined, from more than 45 billion barrels of oil in 1973 to fewer than 25 billion by the mid-1990’s, and to fewer than 10 billion in 2009. For the United States, securing oil at a stable price for itself and its import-dependent allies became a central foreign policy objective following the oil crises of the 1970’s. The focus has been on the Persian Gulf, where three factors have shaped U.S. policies: long- standing U.S. relationships with the oil-exporting states in the region, the geopolitical importance of this oil-rich area, and the special relationship the United States has with Israel. The U.S. government has supported and culti- vated the friendship of governments in the Persian Gulf area for a long time. A little-noted feature of the U.S. lend-leasedealwithBritain before U.S.entry into World War II involved London paying millions of dollars to the king of Saudi Arabia to assure continued access to Saudi oil. More publicized was the successful U.S. effort to restore the shah ofIrantopower in 1954 and its extensive arming of the shahduring the 1970’s to enable Iran to serve as America’s “policeman” in the Persian Gulf. Most visible of all were the deploy- ment of U.S. warships to the Persian Gulf during the latter stages of the 1980-1988 war between Iraq and Iran in order to protect oil shipments and U.S. efforts to organize an international force to restore the Ku- waiti monarchy after Iraq’s 1990 occupation of that country. Both ventures dramatized the growing importance, in both U.S. foreign policy and the world energy market, of the oil-rich states alongthe Arabian Peninsula’s Persian Gulf. The overthrow of pro-Western governments in the oil-producing states of Iraq, Algeria,andLibya during the 1950’s and 1960’sandthe fall of theshahofIran in 1979 intensified the importance of the oil-rich states of the Arabian Peninsula: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. The vast majority of all known petroleum reserves is located in a very small percentage of the known pools of oil, and the richest of these pools lie under the lands of Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the smaller Arabian states in the area. In fact, approxi - mately three-quarters of the total proven oil reserves of petroleum-exporting states and more than 60 per - cent of the known oil reserves in the world lie in this region. Saudi Arabia is the linchpin, with not only the larg- est reserves (conservatively estimated at more than 200 billion barrels in the mid-1990’s) but also theabil- ity to produce more than one-third of the oil imported by the Western world during the 1990’s and early twenty-first century. Maintaining the stability of Saudi Arabia’s government and access to its oil have thus become central objectives of U.S. foreign policy. The protection of Saudi Arabia was the first goal for the United States in deploying its troops to the Per- sian Gulf following Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in Au- gust, 1990. Energy concerns similarly explainwhy, following the war against Iraq and the liberation of Kuwait, the United States chose to retain a large military presence in the area in order to keep Iraq in check and better defend the Saudi fields should the need arise to do so. United States as Mediator Petroleum politics after the Yom Kippur War also ex- plain in part the mediator role that the United States assumed following that war in trying to negotiate an overall settlement of the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Keeping friendly governments in power and maintaining access to Middle East oil for itself and its allies have been two of the enduring goals of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Ensuring the survival of Israel has been a third. Prior to 1973, support of Israel was arguably the highest priority of the three goals. This was true despite the fact that pursuing it frequently handicapped U.S. pursuit of the other two goals, because Arab states found it difficult to be publicly close to the strongest ally (the United States) of their worst enemy (Israel). The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OAPEC’s) oil embargo during the Yom Kippur War effectively linked accessto oil to the Arab- Israeli conflict. After the war, the United States adopted a more evenhanded approach to the Arab- Israeli conflict and acceptedthe long-term role asme- diator. The 1978 Camp David Accords—in which Egypt recognized Israel in exchange for Israel return- ing the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt—and the 1990’s agreements between Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab leaders—which led to Palestinian home rule zones in Gaza and the West Bank being created—were more than just significant U.S. foreign policy accomplish - ments. To the extent that they helped avert future Global Resources Energy politics • 365 Arab-Israeli wars, they also represented successes in U.S. international energy policy. Energy Politics in the Early Years of the New Millennium During both the era of low oil prices in the 1990’s and the era of high oil prices between 2005 and 2008, Western governments struggled to reconcile their de- sire to create a cleaner environment with their continued dependency on fossil fuels. During the first of these two periods, the low cost of imported energy si- multaneously deflected their attention away from developing alternatives to imported sources of energy and encouraged consideration of environmentally friendly legislation, even if it increased energy costs. Not surprisingly the latter proposals were invariably opposed, frequently successfully so, by lobbyists for the energy industries in those societies. The environmentalists, however, also scored their victories. In the United States, for example, the efforts of the oil companies to acquire exploration and drilling rights in the Arcticreserve were consistentlybeatenbackby environmentalists, and European environmentalists have had some success in getting major European oil companies to endorse, verbally at least, environmen - tally friendly energy plans. The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, reshaped the energy debate, and subsequent de- velopments quickly made energy politics a mainstay of international relations between 2001 and 2008. In a world with a tightening oil market resulting from the increased demand for oil by India and China, both of whom accelerated development projects ofrelatively inexpensive imported oil, pursuing policies deemed offensive by oil-exporting states suddenly became more difficult for the United States. Thus, U.S. efforts after 9/11 to track down and cut off the funding of terrorist groups supported by Saudi reli- gious organizations floundered when the U.S. government was, under the changed economic and political conditions, unwilling or unable to lean heavily on the Saudi government to crack down of such bodies. Similarly, U.S. efforts to isolate Iraq, a country seemingly bent on acquir- ing nuclear weapons, came to little when Western U.S. allies proved to be unwilling to antag- onize Iran, Iraq’s eastern neighbor, in a time when Iranian oil exports were important to the world’s economic health. Perhaps most important, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 radically altered the world oil market and produced both a series of foreign policy problems for theUnited States and aggressive foreign policy actors on the world stage. A collateral consequenceof the U.S. decisionto remove Iraqi president Saddam Hussein from power was that it eliminated a central element that had encouraged OPEC to keep its prices in the moderate range throughout the 1990’s. Iraq was operating under U.N. sanctionsand was only permitted to export a small amount of its production capacity; however, it was within the power of the U.N. to remove those sanctions at any time. The threat of substantial Iraqi oil exports suddenly being unleashed on the world market in response to irresponsible OPEC pricing action influenced OPEC’s decision makers for more than a decade, encouraging them to keep their price increases modest. The disruption of Iraq’s oil production capacity as a result of the U.S. invasion, and the subsequent turmoil in Iraq, removed that factor. When the growing demand for oil subsequently coin - cided with the political uncertainties surrounding its 366 • Energy politics Global Resources Top Energy-Consuming Countries, 2005 Total (quadrillion Btus) Per Capita (million Btus) Canada 14.3 436.2 China 67.1 51.4 France 11.4 181.5 Germany 14.5 176.0 India 16.2 14.8 Japan 22.6 177.0 Russia 30.3 212.2 United Kingdom 10.0 165.7 United States 100.7 340.0 World 462.8 71.8 Source: Data from U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual, 2005. Note: Values are in British thermal units (Btus). Totals are in quadrillions; hence U.S. consumption of 100.7 is 100,700,000,000,000,000. Per capita consumption is in millions; hence U.S. per capita consumption of 340.0 is 340,000,000. availability from other suppliers such as Iran and Ni - geria (whose oil-producing region is hotly contested by several tribal groups), the result was a stratospheric rise in the price of oil from the $35-per-barrel range that existed prior totheinvasion to $150-per-barrel by 2008. By thatpoint the governments of the developed oil-importing world had already begun reconsidering energy alternatives—this time of a “green” variety— and the global demand for oil was contracting. Be- tween 2003 and 2008, however, the high prices made the leaders of oil-exporting countries such as Iran, Venezuela, and Russia aggressive in the realm of foreign policy. Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr. Further Reading Anderson, Irvine H. Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study in the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy, 1933-1950. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1981. Baev, Pavel. Russian Energy Policy and Military Power: Putin’s Quest for Greatness. New York: Routledge, 2008. Beaubouef, Bruce Andre. The Strategic Petroleum Re- serve: U.S. Energy Security and Oil Politics, 1975-2005. College Station: TexasA&MUniversity Press, 2007. Campbell, Kurt M., and Jonathon Price, eds. The Global Politics of Energy. Washington, D.C.: The As- pen Institute, 2008. Davis, David Howard.Energy Politics. 4th ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. Deece, David A., and Joseph S. Nye, eds. Energy and Se- curity. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1981. Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. ThePolitics of the Global Oil Industry: An Introduction. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2005. Gallagher, Kelly Sims, ed. Acting in Time on Energy Pol- icy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009. Goldman, Marshall I. Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Klare, Michael T. Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Conse- quences of America’s Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum. New York: Henry Holt, 2005. _______. Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geo- politics of Energy. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008. Mattson, Kevin. “What the Heck Are You up to, Mr. Presi - dent?” Jimmy Carter, America’s “Malaise,” and the Speech That Should Have Changed the Country. New York: Bloomsbury, 2009. Morris, Paul M., ed. National Energy Policy: Major Fed- eral Energy Programs and Status. New York: Novinka Books, 2006. Roberts, Paul. The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005. Rosenbaum, Walter A.EnvironmentalPoliticsand Policy. 7th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2008. Shaffer, Brenda. Energy Politics. Philadelphia: Univer- sity of Pennsylvania Press, 2009. Standlea, David M.Oil, Globalization, and theWar for the Arctic Refuge. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Stoff, Michael B. Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941-1947. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980. Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power.New ed. New York: TheFree Press,2008. See also: Alaska pipeline; Coal; Coal gasification and liquefaction; Department of Energy,U.S.; Energy economics; Energy Policy Act; Iran; Oil and natural gas distribution; Oil embargo and energy crises of 1973 and 1979; Oil industry; Resources as a source of international conflict; Russia; Saudi Arabia; United States; Venezuela. Energy storage Categories: Energy resources; obtaining and using resources When more energy is available than is needed at a given time, the excess energy can be stored for later use in a number of ways, including electrochemical cells, pumped storage, and solar heat storage. Background Energy storage is important for utility load leveling, electrical vehicles, solar energy systems, uninter- rupted power supply,and energy systems at remote lo- cations. Two important parameters to consider when discussing energy storage are the duration of storage and the amount of energy stored per unit weight or volume. Duration of energy storage may vary from a fraction of one second to many years. In a nuclear Global Resources Energy storage • 367 power plant, nuclear fuel is stored within a reactor for a year. Coal piles, gas and oil storage tanks, and pumped hydro (hydroelectric power) are maintained by power utilities for several days’ use, depending on the need. Similarly, for a solar energy system, energy storage may be required on an hourly, daily, or weekly basis. The amounts of energy stored per unit weight (specific energy) and per unit volume (energy density) are critical in determining the size of a storage system. Other factors of importance in the design of a storage system include the time rates at which energy can be stored (charging) or removed (discharging) and the number of useful cycles of charging and discharging. Depending on the nature of available energy, it can be stored as mechanical, thermal, chemical, electrical, or magnetic energy. Electrical energy can be either stored as chemical energy in batteries, called electrochemical cells, or stored as mechanical energy by pumping water from a lower elevation to a higher elevation (pumped hydro). Electrical energy can also be converted to thermal energy and then stored as thermal energy. Electrochemical Cells An electrochemical cell consists of an anode, a cathode, and an electrolyte. When a cell is connected to a load, electrons flow from the anodetothe cathode. In this operation, oxidation (loss of electrons) takes place at the anode, and reduction (gain of electrons) occurs at the cathode. The cell chemistry of the well- known lead-acid battery is as follows: The anode is lead (Pb), the cathode is lead oxide (PbO 2 ), and the electrolyte is sulfuric acid(H 2 SO 4 ). The overall cell reaction is as follows: The forward reaction represents the change during discharge when the cell is connected to a load, and the backward reaction represents the change that occurs when electric energy is stored. The theoreticalvoltage and capacity of a cell are functions of the anode and cathode materials. The theoretical voltage can be cal- culated from the standard electrode potentials of the materials. The capacity of a cell is expressed as the total quantity of electricity involved in the electrochemical reaction and is defined in terms of coulombs or ampere-hours. Theoretically, one gram-equivalent weight of a material will deliver 96,487 coulombs or 26.8 ampere-hours. A battery consists of one or more cells connected in series, parallel, or both depending on the desired output voltage and capacity. Electrochemical energy storage ismore commonly known as battery storage. Batteries are classified as primary and secondary batteries. Onlysecondary bat - 368 • Energy storage Global Resources Discharge Cathode Anode Cathode Anode PbO 2 + 2 H 2 SO 4 + Pb PbSO 4 + 2H 2 O + PbSO 4 Charge Specific Energy Storage Capacities of Various Materials Uranium-235 (fission reaction) 7.0 × 10 10 Glauber’s salt (at 32.4°C) 251 Reactor fuel (2.5% enriched Calcium chloride hexahydrate UO 2 ) 1.5 × 10 9 (at 29.6°C) 191 Natural uranium 5.0 × 10 8 Water (temperature change = 40°C) 167 Hydrogen (LHV) 1.2 × 10 5 Sodium acetate trihydrate (at 58°C) 180 Methane (LHV) 5.0 × 10 4 Cross-linked high density poly- Gasoline (LHV) 4.4 × 10 4 ethylene (at 126°C) 180 Lithium hydride (at 700°C) 3.8 × 10 3 Lead-acid battery 119 Falling water (altitude change = Flywheel (uniformly stressed disc) 79 100m) 9.8 × 10 2 Coil spring 0.16 Draw salt (220-540°C) 4.9 × 10 2 Capacitor 0.016 Note: All values are in kilojoules per kilogram. LHV stands for “lower heating value,” indicating that the nonuseful energy given off in steam has been subtracted from the figure. teries are rechargeable and are therefore suitable for energy storage applications. Lead-acid and nickel- cadmium are well-known rechargeable batteries and are the most commonly used. Lead-acid batteries have been used for more than a century and are still the most popular batteries. An example is the automobile battery. Large numbers of electrochemical cells have been identified that can be used for storing electricity; a few of these are nickel-cadmium, nickel metal hydride, and lithium-iron sulfide. Electric storage in batteries has shown great potential in applications such as cell phones, laptop computers, tools, and electric vehicles and as a means of storing electricity for load-leveling purposes in power plants. The growing interest in electric vehicles is driving innova- tion in the battery industry. The automobile industry is looking for a better-performing, lower-cost battery. The current favorite, the lithium-ion battery, has led to research into lithium-air and lithium-sulfur batteries, which have much higher energy capacity and lower weight. Pumped Storage Another means of storing electricity is to pump water from a lower reservoir (which can be a lake or a river) to a higher reservoir. The potential energy stored in water by virtue of its elevation can be used later to gen- erate electricity when needed by using hydraulic turbines. The motors that drive the pumps are reversible and act as electrical generators when water falls from the upper reservoir to drive the turbines. The main components of a pumped storage plant are the upper reservoir, waterway passage, power house, and lower reservoir. Global Resources Energy storage • 369 Water flow (pumping) Water flow (generating) Penstock Pump-turbine Upper reservoir Lower reservoir Pump-Turbine The development ofthe reversible pump-turbine, whichacts as amotor and pump whenrotating in one directionand as a turbineand genera - tor when rotating in the other, has made pumped storage more practical. . the duration of storage and the amount of energy stored per unit weight or volume. Duration of energy storage may vary from a fraction of one second to many years. In a nuclear Global Resources. light of supply disruptions and price fluctuations, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was intended to address concerns about scarcity of energy resources by encouraging increased production of both. buildings, offered tax incentives to purchasers of hybrid automobiles, and extended the duration of daylight savings time. Some provisions of the act—such as tax breaks for producers of fossilfuels,

Định dạng
Số trang	10
Dung lượng	148,89 KB