formats must play a crucial part in linguistic conceptualization. The recent turn to an embodied cognitive science (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) requires us, in the spirit of Ko ¨ hler, to ‘‘abandon the idea of neat dividing lines between perception, cognition and action’’ (Clark 1997: xiii). Bu ¨ hler would still, however, have maintained that embodied action and perception is not the whole story of symbolization and that in order to understand this, we need to move beyond the individual organism. 2.9. Representation and Symbolization Representation is perhaps the most important, and most contested, foundational concept in modern cognitive science. Cognitive Linguistics takes the view that lin- guistic structure is motivated by conceptual representation and communicative function, thereby placing the representational function of language at the center of its concerns. As a usage-based theory of language, Cognitive Linguistics rejects the strict dichotomy in traditional, Saussurean linguistics between langue and parole,aswellas the generative linguistic postulate of the autonomy of syntax. Cognitive Linguistics, though distinctive, new, and unparalleled in earlier linguistic theories in terms of its detailed working-out of the cognitive-functional perspective, has many precursors in linguistic theory (Nerlich and Clarke, this volume, chapter 22), one of which in particular—the Sprachtheorie (language theory) of Bu ¨ hler ([1934] 1990)—deserves special attention as a full-fledged, linguistically sophisticated psychology of language. Bu ¨ hler rejected langue as the basis for psychology of language, though not as a basis for linguistic description, which he considered to be a necessary precondition for a psychology of language. He viewed speaking as representational action and language as the mediating vehicle of such action, elaborating this general perspective in the ‘‘Organon’’ (Tool/Vehicle) model of linguistic communication. 13 His best- known contribution to linguistic theory was the formulation of a theory of deixis of person and place, which remains to this day a standard model from which most current theories of deixis take off. I will focus here, however, on the general features of Bu ¨ hler’s language theory, beginning with the foundations in phonology of his attempt to integrate sign-theory into the psychology of language and speech. Bu ¨ hler was an active participant in the discussions of the Prague Linguistic Circle, and, as Innis (1982) points out, he was probably the first psychologist to recognize the profound implications of Trubetzkoy’s and Jakobson’s analyses of the phoneme and phonological representation, for a theory of perception. Bu ¨ hler’s Gestalt psychological background undoubtedly played an important role in his realization that in perceiving speech sounds, we perceive linguistic material, not untransformed ‘‘sensations.’’ In modern terminology, he understood that speech sound perception is categorical. Categorical perception has been extensively studied in visual as well as in auditory modalities (Harnad 1987), and we now know it to be characteristic of human perception at all ages. Perceptual categories also have internal structure: they are organized around typicality (Rosch 1977). Infants’ 1280 chris sinha early speech sound perception is categorical in nature (Eimas et al. 1971); infants learn to apply words to typical category members before atypical ones (Meints, Plunkett, and Harris 1999); and they display preferences for typical over atypical members of lexical categories (Southgate and Meints 2000). Bu ¨ hler, however, was primarily interested in working out the consequences of the lesson that the ‘‘sign character’’ of language has a psychological reality which goes, as Bruner (1974) would later put it, ‘‘beyond the information given’’: what is ‘‘there to be perceived’’ is, at a physical level of description, just sound, but what we actually perceive is meaningful speech. His question was then: how does language operate, as a symbol system? Bu ¨ hler focused his answer on two properties which he considered to be unique to human natural languages and which distinguished symbol systems from signals. First, symbol systems have a ‘‘two class’’ character: every language has both a lexicon and morphosyntactic rules, and this two class character underlies the productivity of natural language. 14 Bu ¨ hler was aware that historical language change involved the recruitment of lexical items to grammatical constructions (Heine 1997), but he insisted that these ‘‘two classes of posits’’ needed to be distinguished in linguistic theory. The distinction between lexicon and syntax is fundamental to both Generative Grammar and Classical Cognitive Science, in which the lexicon consists of a set of symbols, and the grammar of a set of non-meaningful rules for generating legal symbol strings. Cognitive Linguistics rejects the absolute distinc- tion between lexicon and grammar, but I would argue nevertheless that Bu ¨ hler was closer to a Cognitive Linguistics position than a Generative one, since he considered grammatical constructions, as well as lexical items, to be symbolically meaningful (see the discussion above of ‘‘syntactic schemas’’). Both the lexical and the com- binatorial aspects of ‘‘two class’’ symbol organization were thus, for Bu ¨ hler, con- tributory to sentence or utterance meaning. Bu ¨ hler argued, furthermore, that ‘‘one class’’ systems of signals can be consid- ered as ‘‘codes,’’ but that language, as a symbolic system, is not a code. There is not the space here to explore this issue in depth, but it is plausible to argue that this aspect of Bu ¨ hler’s language theory points toward a deep theoretical inadequacy of generative linguistic theories: they are ‘‘code’’ theories, not theories of genuinely symbolic systems. Bu ¨ hler was also aware of the role played by imagistic or iconic ‘‘relational faithfulness’’ (structural likeness) in motivating constructions. [Language employs] not a materially faithful but a relationally faithful ren- dering (through intermediate constructions) what physicists nowadays natu- rally count as ‘mapping’. The set of case forms [function linguistically] only because [the represented states of affairs] are understood and perceived according to the schema of human or animal action. The schema is projected image- like. It is traced out by the [construction]. ([1934] 1990: 213, 219) 15 Second, Bu ¨ hler argued that conventional symbol systems are grounded in an intersubjective meaning-field in which speakers represent, through symbolic action, some segment or aspect of reality for hearers. This representational function is cognitive linguistics, psychology, and cognitive science 1281 unique to symbolization and is precisely what distinguishes a symbol from a signal. A signal can be regarded as a (coded) instruction to behave in a certain way. A symbol, on the other hand (and using a deliberately updated terminology), directs and guides, not the behavior of the organism receiving the signal, but their inten- tional stance or (minimally) their attention. This, in a nutshell, is Bu ¨ hler’s Organon theory of language, diagrammed in figure 49.2. Figure 49.2 modifies Bu ¨ hler’s own diagram in two main ways. First, it makes explicit that the relationship of Representation is one obtaining between the Symbol (or linguistic expression) and a Referential Situation (which is linguistically conceptualized by the linguistic expression). 16 This representational relationship exists within a sign-field which is coconstituted with the other two sign-functions: Expression (obtaining between the Speaker and the symbolic sign) and Appeal (obtaining between the symbolic sign and the Hearer). The symbol expresses the speaker’s communicative intention and appeals to the hearer to direct their own intentional processes toward the referential situation represented by the symbolic sign. 17 Functionally, these three metafunctions of the symbolic sign find structural realization in the person-deixis system of natural languages: I (expression), You (appeal), and He/She/It (representation). The second modification introduced into Bu ¨ hler’s original diagram is the depiction by means of dotted lines of the way in which the symbol coordinates the ‘‘joint attention’’ of the speaker and hearer, directed toward the symbolically represented referential situation. In linguistic symbolization proper, this joint at- Figure 49.2. A modified variant of Bu ¨ hler’s Organon Model (broken lines represent joint attention) 1282 chris sinha tention is expanded and developed into the symbolized communicative intention of the speaker and the intentional reading of speaker’s meaning by hearer. However, in the prelinguistic coordination of joint attention by gesture or gaze, occurring productively from about 9-to-10 months of age, we can substitute for the symbolic sign an indexical communicative sign (e.g., pointing), while preserving the same general sign-field structure. This modification helps us to see how Bu ¨ hler’s Or- ganon model can illuminate the process of early language acquisition, as well as mature language use (see Tomasello, this volume, chapter 41). To conclude this brief discussion of Bu ¨ hler’s psychology of language, two significant advantages it possesses over other well-known sign theories can be highlighted. First, unlike other versions of the ‘‘semiotic triangle’’ (e.g., Ogden and Richards 1923), Bu ¨ hler’s model places symbolic representation in the context of communication: the Organon model is both cognitive and functional. Second, al- though Bu ¨ hler’s binary distinction between ‘‘signal’’ and ‘‘symbol’’ does not in- validate Peirce’s better-known triadic classification of index, icon, and symbol, it is in many ways more psychologically and functionally illuminating. The essential difference between Bu ¨ hler’s signal and symbol is that the symbol combines in- tentionality, conventionalization, and structural elaboration, and these aspects of human symbolic communication emerge ontogenetically (and probably evolved phylogenetically) in just this order of development. By contrast, communication by signals involves none of these properties. Nonhuman communication systems have either only a signal character or employ symbols unsystematically (Sinha 2004; Tomasello, this volume, chapter 41). Bu ¨ hler was far from being the only psychologist of language to underline the significance of symbolization as fundamental to higher mental processes. The Rus- sian psychologist Vygotsky (e.g., Vygotsky [1930] 1978,[1934] 1986), for example, developed an account of the developmental transformation of individual cognitive processes via the internalization of culturally established forms of ‘‘semiotically mediated’’ social interaction, a view with clear affinities to Bu ¨ hler’s view of lan- guage as a mediating instrument of representation. 18 The sociogenetic theories of Vygotsky, and of his American pragmatist contemporary Mead (1934), lend a de- velopmental counterpoint to Bu ¨ hler’s functional-cognitive analysis of linguistic representation and are key resources for researching and understanding the social interactional grounding of language and cognition. Bu ¨ hler’s language theory, less well known than Vygotsky’s cultural-historical psychology, deserves the central place accorded to it in this brief historical survey because of the remarkably prescient manner in which he anticipated numerous themes in Cognitive Linguistics. In acquainting ourselves with this work, we are not engaging in a mere antiquarian exercise, but in a dialogic exploration of the in- tellectual foundations of what Tomasello (1998) justly calls The New Psychology of Language. This dialogue is productive, not merely reproductive, because Bu ¨ hler’s writings invite us, across the gulf of a world war and more than a half century of cognitive science, to rethink the concept of representation. cognitive linguistics, psychology, and cognitive science 1283 3. Representation and the Developing, Situated, Embodied Mind What is representation? The standard answer, in Classical Cognitive Science, was that representations are internal states of a cognitive mechanism. Given the as- sumption that the cognitive mechanism is computational, it follows that repre- sentations are computational states (or, if we define computation in terms of pro- cedures, then perhaps representations are the inputs and outputs of procedures). The totality of such internal representations at any time constitutes the current knowledge of the cognitive mechanism. Knowledge is therefore a kind of internal code, which stands in a ‘‘representational’’ relation to the world outside the cog- nitive mechanism. Such internal representations can be communicated from one cognitive mechanism to another, by ‘‘recoding’’ them in natural language. On such an account, the semantic relationship between language and the world is derivative from the relationship between internal (mental) representations and the external world. The particular instantiation or implementation of the cognitive mecha- nism (in a biological organism, or in a computer, or in any other device capable of functionally realizing the computational states and transitions called for by the theory) is irrelevant to the goal of formalizing the theory. This classical, ‘‘re- presentationalist’’ theory of mind has been challenged by a number of currents of thinking, most of which emerged in the mid-1980s and whose confluence makes up Second Generation Cognitive Science. 3.1. Back to the Body and Brain Classical Cognitive Science was relatively unconcerned with the biological foun- dations of human cognition. Insofar as it did concern itself with the biological interface between the cognitive system and the real world, it conceived these in terms of the manipulation of symbolically rendered ‘‘inputs.’’ The body was sub- ordinated to the computational mind. The turn to an embodied cognitive science has involved, first, a growing understanding of the constitutive role played in human cognition and language by the human body itself (Johnson 1987); second, a (connectionist) computational research program which consciously seeks to con- strain its hypotheses in ways which are compatible with what is known about the microstructure and functioning of the human brain; and third, the rise of cogni- tive neuroscience in the last decade of the twentieth century, which promises to become as foundational for Second Generation Cognitive Science as Artificial In- telligence was for Classical Cognitive Science. 1284 chris sinha Connectionist computational models do not directly ‘‘map’’ the structure of external reality. Rather, they map the input-output regularities that constitute the cognitive model’s adaptive (internal and/or external) environment. Representation ceases to be itself a model; it becomes a property of the functional coupling of the model (or system) with its environment. Furthermore, in ‘‘dynamic systems’’ ap- proaches, this coupling itself becomes to a large extent nonrepresentational. Ap- parently intelligent behavioral strategies can emerge from morphology in dynamic functional interaction with environment (Clark 1997). It is clear that the reformu- lation of the notion of representation is squarely on the cognitive science agenda (Sinha 1988; Gibbs and Matlock 1999). 3.2. Return to Reality Classical Cognitive Science was formalist in method and mentalist in theory, hav- ing as its goal the formal description of internal cognitive states and processes. Second Generation Cognitive Science does not deny the existence of internal states, nor rule them (as behaviorism did) out of bounds for scientific inquiry. However, the boundary between ‘‘external’’ and ‘‘internal’’ is more permeable in Second Generation Cognitive Science than it was in Classical Cognitive Science—the mind is now viewed as being no more separable from the world than it is from the body. The philosophical basis of Classical Cognitive Science was objectivist (Lakoff 1987), based upon the idea of a correspondence mapping between external world and internal mental representation. Classical Cognitive Science, even though it claimed to be realist, was in fact hopelessly enmeshed in the insoluble antinomies of Car- tesian dualism. Second Generation Cognitive Science is realist, but not objectivist. It seeks its grounding of the mind not in ‘‘mental representation,’’ but in the activity, movement, and engagement of the organism with its environment: a point of view which clearly resonates with the pragmatist tradition (Putnam 1999; Rohrer 2001; this volume, chapter 2). 3.3. The Developmental Perspective Classical Cognitive Science was not much concerned with development, some of its most famous proponents even arguing that it does not really exist (Piatelli- Palmarini 1980). Chomsky’s ‘‘argument from the poverty of the stimulus’’ was generalized from language to cover all aspects of cognition, resulting in the mod- ular nativism which dominated theories of cognition in the recent past. 19 In con- trast, there is a natural affinity between Cognitive Linguistics and developmental, constructivist approaches to language acquisition (see Fauconnier, this volume, cognitive linguistics, psychology, and cognitive science 1285 chapter 14). A main aim of future research will be to clarify the developmental relationship between conceptual and preconceptual aspects of cognition, by ex- ploring the developmental relationship in human cognition between the emergence of intentional, representational communication, the capacity to employ schematic cognitive representations, and the development of full-fledged linguistic concep- tualization. More generally, development and emergence are set to become central themes of Second Generation Cognitive Science, at all levels from neural plasticity to the sociocultural context of human cognition and communication. The new cognitive science is biologically based in the new epigeneticism. 3.4. Socially Situating the Self The formalism and mentalism of Classical Cognitive Science were congenial to the epistemological individualism that it inherited from the Cartesian philosophical tradition. Questions of knowledge (and representation) are posed in this tradition exclusively in relation to the individual knower (or speaker/hearer). For most of its history, psychology too has had a predominant focus on the individual organism and the individual mind. We have also seen, however, that there have been repeated efforts, by psychologists such as Bartlett, Bu ¨ hler, Mead, and Vygotsky, to locate cognition and language in their social context of situation. In reaction against the individualism and mentalism of Classical Cognitive Science, some contemporary social constructionists have argued that the aim of explaining human action with reference to inner mental states is wholly misguided (sometimes appealing in support of this stance to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, e.g., Coulter 1989). Anticognitivism is also often antinaturalist, implicitly or explicitly arguing that there is a fundamental and unbridgeable gulf between neuroscience and the explanation of socially intelligible action and interaction. 20 The cognitive anthropologist Edward Hutchins (1999: 1) argues that such antic- ognitivism merely mirrors the inadequacies of traditional cognitivism: For much of cognitive science, cognition is exclusively something that hap- pens inside people’s heads. The social and physical environments of thinking are what thought operates on, but have no part in thought itself. On the other hand, for some proponents of situated action and situated cognition mental models are figments of analysts’ imagination. In a reaction against the excesses of early artificial intelligence, these authors deny the relevance of mental mod- els to human action. Both of these views seem wrong to me. Hutchins here articulates a conviction, shared by an increasing number of re- searchers in Cognitive Linguistics and cognitive science, that human cognition is best viewed as dually grounded in organismic properties adapted to the ecology of human life and in the socio-communicative processes which construct that ecology (see also Sinha 1988, 1999a; Hutchins 1995; Shore 1996; Itkonen 1997; Harder 1999; Tomasello 1999). Such a cognitive science, grounded in ‘‘situated embodiment’’ 1286 chris sinha (Zlatev 1997), requires the methodological ‘‘recognition of the complementarity, not opposition, of the objectivizing stance of naturalism, and the reflexive stance of the sciences of meaning. This bi-perspectivism, or perspectival complementarity, [can be] called a ‘socionaturalistic’ approach’’ (Sinha 1999b: 34). Representation, because embodiment of culture extends beyond the individual human body (Sinha and Jensen de Lo ´ pez 2000), is not something existing in a different, ‘‘mental’’ sphere from the physical world. Rather, it is both consequence of and part of the shaping of the world by human agency and the signifying of the world in acts of human, intersubjective communication. 4. Implications for Cognitive Linguistics In tracing the historical debts owed by Cognitive Linguistics to psychology and its affinities with the ensemble of other currents making up Second Generation Cog- nitive Science, I hope to have reinforced the basic proposition which unites all subscribers to the scientific program of Cognitive Linguistics: that language can best be made sense of by recognizing that it is structurally and functionally continuous with, motivated by, and emergent from nonlinguistic cognitive processes. It would be mistaken, however, to conclude from this that the future of Cognitive Linguistics in the emerging landscape of the ‘‘new’’ cognitive science is likely to be uncontested. I wish to highlight, in conclusion, two especially problematic issues. The first concerns the status of linguistics in the interdisciplinary context of cognitive sci- ence. Generative Linguistics was constitutively influential in Classical Cognitive Science, and I have argued that this was, in part, a consequence of the marginali- zation and ‘‘forgetting’’ of important currents in prebehaviorist psychology which, in turn, have been deeply influential upon Cognitive Linguistics. It follows from this that Cognitive Linguistics does not in and of itself constitute the sought-for new paradigm in cognitive science. Rather, it is a major contributory current to an emergent new interdisciplinary science of mind. The second issue concerns the re- lations between the biological and the historical, sociocultural grounding of lan- guage and mind. Language, from a psychological perspective, is not simply an expression of human organismic capacity; rather, it is the most important symbolic mediator between developing organism, psychological subjectivity, and culturally evolving surround. It is, in my view, the adequacy with which Cognitive Linguistics addresses this dynamic, processual, relational complex that will be decisive for its lasting disciplinary contribution to the science of the embodied mind in society. cognitive linguistics, psychology, and cognitive science 1287 NOTES I am grateful to the following for their help with references: Dorthe Berntsen (autobio- graphical memory; e.g., Berntsen 1998); Ocke-Schwen Bohn (infant speech perception; e.g., Bohn 2000); Brigitte Nerlich (history of psychology and linguistics; e.g., Nerlich and Clarke 1998). I also wish to thank the editors for their extensive and helpful comments. This chapter is dedicated to the memory of George Butterworth and Steen Folke Larsen, with whose shades I continue to converse about psychology. 1. Gardner (1985), in his now-classic history of cognitive science, dates the emergence of the interdiscipline to the Hoxon Symposium of 1955, which is close to another widely cited landmark date, that of Chomsky’s famously devastating review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (Chomsky 1959). 2. It is important to note that not all cognitive psychologists endorsed the Classical Cognitive Science program, or indeed viewed themselves as working in cognitive sci- ence. Nevertheless, the grounding assumptions of this program deeply permeated the discipline, and to an extent still do so. One problem in establishing interdisciplinary dialogue is the way in which this has led to different appropriations of the terms ‘‘cog- nitive,’’ and especially ‘‘cognitivist,’’ by linguists and psychologists. For the former, this designates an adherence to the Cognitive Linguistics paradigm; for the latter, an adherence to Information Processing and related ‘‘classical’’ paradigms. I will be using the latter. There were always, of course, psychological dissenters from cognitivism, but these tended to counterpose an ecological or social constructionist vision, leaving the heartland of cognition to the classical cognitivists. 3. In a way, we can say that Cognitive Linguistics has restored to psychology the status of ‘‘propaedeutic science’’ accorded it by Wundt (Blumenthal 1985), which it forfeited in a Classical Cognitive Science dominated by linguistics and computer science. 4. A bust of Wundt, along, among others, with one of Karl Bu ¨ hler, can be viewed at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen. Wundt was skeptical about the application of experimental methods to language, because he considered naturalis- tic observation and linguistic analysis more appropriate methodologies. Bu ¨ hler (who de- bated with Wundt over the appropriateness of experimental methods for studying higher mental processes in general) can be credited with founding modern experimen- tal psycholinguistics: ‘‘He moved psycholinguistics into the laboratory, something George Miller had to accomplish again half a century later’’ (Levelt 1981: 190). 5. Brigitte Nehrlich (p.c.) points out that ‘‘Kant ([1781] 1929) saw the schema as a procedure (Verfahren) of the productive imagination’’ and that ‘‘Kant’s distinction be- tween an image and a procedure of imagination, i.e., a schema, is similar to Wittgenstein’s (1953) conception of static and dynamic meaning in Philosophical Investigations.’’ 6. PDP stands for ‘Parallel Distributed Processing’, a strongly connectionist approach to cognition and learning. 7. Head was by no means the first to employ the term ‘‘schema’’ after Kant. Herbart employed it in his early-nineteenth-century associationistic psychology and also coined the terms ‘‘assimilation’’ and ‘‘accommodation,’’ but this can safely be considered prehistory. 8. Bartlett’s reference to the Boas source is to the Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin (26: 184–85). There is a text of at least one story, narrated by the Chinook Charles Cultee, and translated by Franz Boas, in the Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 26 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901). This reference 1288 chris sinha is from Elliott (2003), who discusses a story about the familiar Native American trickster character Coyote on a salmon fishing expedition, which bears little resemblance to ‘‘The War of the Ghosts.’’ 9. Piaget was a biologist by training and did not designate himself as a psychologist; for his interdisciplinary science of cognitive development he used the term (coined by James Mark Baldwin) genetic epistemology. 10. We have already noted Bartlett’s use of the term ‘‘organized setting’’ as synony- mous with ‘‘schema,’’ and it is interesting in this light that he clearly identifies, with reference to Rubin’s Figure/Ground experiments, schema with Ground, entitling one of his subsec- tions ‘‘The Scheme, or Setting, which makes Perceiving possible’’ (Bartlett 1932: 32). 11. Gestalt psychology was much weakened by the fact that many of its founders were victims of the Nazification of the German (and later, Austrian) universities and compelled to emigrate to the United States. Wertheimer was a Jew, closely associated with Marxist and socialist philosophers, and a friend of Einstein. He was among the first professors dismissed by the Hitler regime. Ko ¨ hler was one the few German professors to publicly protest at the Nazi purges of the universities and to try to defend his assistants accused of ‘‘communist activities.’’ Karl Bu ¨ hler was associated with progressive educational circles, and his wife, Charlotte, was Jewish. Charlotte Bu ¨ hler was a developmental psychologist and psycholinguist who founded Gestalt therapy. Karl Bu ¨ hler ‘‘spent the last 23 years of his life in total oblivion in America’’ (Levelt 1981), his psychology of language neglected; the work of the other Gestalt psychologists mentioned here was received with interest and respect in the United States, but lacked the institutional strength of behaviorist psychology. 12. This criticism was also to be leveled, decades later, against Gibson’s ecological psychology. 13. The name of the model is taken from Plato’s Cratylus. 14. This discussion of productivity was not original to Bu ¨ hler and can also be found in Wundt, but Bu ¨ hler developed it particularly clearly. 15. The symbolic field of language, according to Bu ¨ hler, is both an intermediary and an organizer (‘‘an ordering and coordinating implement,’’ Bu ¨ hler [1934] 1990: 217); in the quotation in the main text the term ‘‘construction,’’ employed by Bu ¨ hler in designating one kind of such ‘‘implement’’ is accordingly substituted for the now unfamiliar expression ‘‘field implement.’’ 16.Bu ¨ hler employed the designation ‘‘objects and states of affairs’’ for what I name referential situation, and ‘‘sender’’ and ‘‘receiver’’ for what I designate as, respectively, Speaker and Hearer. 17. The symbolic sign-field thus also functionally incorporates the pre- or subsym- bolic aspects of meaning or signification: ‘‘[The complex linguistic sign] is a symbol by virtue of its coordination to objects and states of affairs, a symptom (index) by vir- tue of its dependence on the sender, whose inner states it expresses, and a signal by virtue of its appeal to the hearer, whose inner or outer behavior it directs as do other com- municative signs’’ (Bu ¨ hler [1934] 1990: 35). Note that in Bu ¨ hler’s theory representation is a relationship between symbol and world, not synonymous with or reducible to speakers’ ‘‘inner states.’’ 18. There is a tragic parallel between Bu ¨ hler’s expulsion by the National Socialists and the condemnation in the Soviet Union of Vygotsky’s psychology as a ‘‘bourgeois devia- tion’’ during the Stalin era. 19. The argument from the poverty of the stimulus, as developed by Chomsky with respect to language, whether its premises were really correct or not, at least had the virtues of originality, relevance, and intellectual substance. The same cannot be said for arguments cognitive linguistics, psychology, and cognitive science 1289 . consequence of and part of the shaping of the world by human agency and the signifying of the world in acts of human, intersubjective communication. 4. Implications for Cognitive Linguistics . irrelevant to the goal of formalizing the theory. This classical, ‘‘re- presentationalist’’ theory of mind has been challenged by a number of currents of thinking, most of which emerged in the mid-1980s. the biological interface between the cognitive system and the real world, it conceived these in terms of the manipulation of symbolically rendered ‘‘inputs.’’ The body was sub- ordinated to the