may stand for an institution or people located at that place. The ICM provides the framework for allowing one to make metonymic reference, in that it provides a limited search domain which the addressee can use to identify the metonymic ref- erent. Social stereotypes are one example of how certain salient members of a cat- egory can be used to represent the entire category (part stands for whole), with the inherent danger that inferences can be made about the entire category of people based on the characteristics associated with the one subgroup. 3.5. Symbolic ICMs The association of symbolic units, such as linguistic forms, with the conceptual elements in ICMs is the criterion for identifying an ICM as symbolic (Lakoff 1987: 289–92). In terms of linguistic form, our understanding of what constitutes a lexi- cal item, a grammatical category, and a grammatical construction is claimed to be structured by ICMs. So the concept of ‘noun’ is a radial category based on the central (prototypical) subcategory of names for physical entities. But ICMs are also relevant in terms of the connection between symbol (linguistic form) and meaning. Lakoff also draws on the Figure/Ground distinction and recasts the findings of Fillmore’s work on frame semantics to say that the meaning of each lexical item is represented as an element in an ICM, or conversely, an ICM provides the back- ground against which a word is defined. 3.6. ICMs: Closing Points ICMs have been used as analytic tools in research on lexical and morphological semantics, polysemy (particularly of prepositions, verb particles, and verbal pre- fixes), and the syntax and semantics of grammatical constructions. The three case studies in Lakoff (1987) give a sense of this work. One is a semantic analysis of over as a preposition and verb particle (developing on Brugman 1981); one provides a coherent account of English constructions with there, which sometimes refer to relative location and sometimes to existence (and this analysis invokes the work on frame semantics); and one explicates the ICM of ‘anger’ (drawing on work with Ko ¨ vecses). The cross-linguistic studies on cognitive models of emotions that use ICMs as a basis (such as Lakoff and Ko ¨ vecses 1987;Ko ¨ vecses 1995) take us into research on cultural models (e.g., Holland and Quinn 1987; Quinn 1991; D’Andrade and Strauss 1992). Implied, but not mentioned in the explications above, is a relation between ICMs and ‘‘mental spaces’’ (Fauconnier 1985). Mental spaces have been described as ‘‘small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action’’ (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 40; see also Fauconnier, this volume, chapter 14). Thus, ‘‘any fixed or ongoing state of affairs as we con- ceptualize it is represented by a mental space’’ (Lakoff 1987: 281). ICMs provide 180 alan cienki ready-made ways of structuring mental spaces. If one encounters a situation in which several salient elements evoke a known ICM, that model can provide a framework for filling in potentially relevant details. For example, hearing verbal formulas which introduce a story can invoke the ‘‘storytelling ICM,’’ which can help one construct relevant mental spaces more easily to understand the story (Lakoff 1987: 281–82). One of the critiques of research promoting ICMs as an analytic tool has been that it does not take account of the central role of culture in cognition (e.g., Quinn 1991). While the research on cognitive models and cultural models does not present them as two names for the same thing, the relation between the two sides cannot be ignored (Gibbs 1999). In this regard, Shore (1996) provides a detailed analysis of the many types of models which go into making up what we call ‘‘a culture.’’ Shore points out that while some ICMs are really mental models, others are models con- structed in the world in terms of social institutions and/or practices (334). Also note that the focus in this chapter, as in the extant literature on the subject, has been on linguistic instantiations of ICMs. But since such models are meant to be part of our general cognitive abilities, we can also find nonlinguistic versions of the various types of ICMs (e.g., various kinds of symbolic models, models employing meto- nymic reference via iconic images, etc.). 4. Domains Two main contexts in which the notion of ‘‘domains’’ has been used as a theoretical construct in cognitive linguistic research include conceptual metaphor theory and Cognitive Grammar. Though the term appears to have developed independently in these two lines of inquiry, an exploration into use of the term reveals that it can most profitably be understood by consideration of both contexts. Lakoff (1993) makes it clear that the mappings in conceptual metaphors are between two ‘‘domains of experience,’’ such that a target domain (of experience) is understood in terms of a source domain (of experience). What exactly constitutes a domain remained implicitly understood for some time by many who used the the- oretical framework beginning with Lakoff and Johnson (1980), since the term was not yet used in that work. But even initially it was apparent that domains, as em- ployed in conceptual metaphor theory, are something broader than mental spaces, as mentioned earlier. Whereas mental spaces involve conceptualizations enlisted by the individual in a specific context for a specific purpose, domains encompass many aspects of an experience that are conceptualized as associated. A more explicit treatment of domains appears with the application of the notion in Cognitive Grammar. Langacker (1987: 488) defines ‘‘domain’’ within this framework as ‘‘a coherent area of conceptualization relative to which semantic frames, idealized cognitive models, and domains 181 units may be characterized.’’ This use of ‘‘domain’’ covers a range of types of cog- nitive entities, from mental experiences, to representational spaces, concepts, or conceptual complexes (147). The notion is at the heart of the encyclopedic view of linguistic semantics in Cognitive Grammar; if knowledge is encyclopedic, rather than dictionary-like, domains provide a way of carving out the scope of concepts relevant for characterizing the meanings of linguistic units. The following is a brief summary of properties of different kinds of domains (based on Langacker 1987: chapter 4). Domains, as understood in Cognitive Grammar, may be basic or abstract. ‘‘Basic domains’’ cannot be fully reduced to any other domains, and in this way they can be thought of as primitive dimensions of cognitive representation. Our sensory capacities are examples of several different basic domains. A domain which is not basic, ‘‘any concept or conceptual complex that functions as a domain for the def- inition of a higher-order concept’’ (Langacker 1987: 150), is called an abstract do- main. For example, an understanding of what an elbow is requires knowledge about the domain of ‘arm’, but ‘arm’ is itself clearly not a basic domain, and so in this framework it qualifies as an abstract domain. In a footnote, Langacker (1987: 150) says that an abstract domain is essentially equivalent to an ICM, a frame, scene, schema, or possibly a script. However, given the various ways in which the terms listed have been understood, as described in the previous sections of this chapter, it might be best to understand ‘‘abstract domain’’ based on Langacker’s own descrip- tion of it. In Cognitive Grammar, basic domains are recognized as having one or more dimensions. Thus, while time, pitch, and temperature are understood as one- dimensional, since each entails a single, consistent ordering, domains like kinship relations and color involve multiple dimensions (for kinship relations: intra- versus intergenerational relations; and for color: brightness, saturation, and hue). In ad- dition, a domain can be described as locational or configurational. Examples of locational domains include temperature and color, since each is defined by a loca- tion on one or more scales. A configurational domain is one which can ‘‘accom- modate a number of distinct values as part of a single gestalt’’ (Langacker 1987: 153). For example, we can have a two-dimensional or a three-dimensional conceptual- ization of the domain of space, and so it is a configurational domain. Domain should also be distinguished from what is called a dominion in Cog- nitive Grammar. This is something specific to discussions about ‘‘reference points,’’ which can be any entities that are used to establish mental contact with another (see Langacker 1993). In this context, the dominion is the conceptual region or set of entities to which a particular reference point affords direct access (Langacker 1991: 170). A dominion is therefore a concept localized to a specific type of context, and rather different from the broader notion of domains. Croft (1993) reflects on the understanding of domains in the analysis of con- ceptual metaphors and metonymies in light of Langacker’s work. He begins with Langacker’s distinction between a profile and a base. If a profile is the entity des- ignated by a semantic structure, then a base is the ground with respect to which that 182 alan cienki entity is profiled. He recalls Langacker’s (1987: 183–84) example of an arc of a circle: not every curved line is an arc, as an arc presupposes the concept of a circle for its definition. Thus, a circle serves as the base, the background, against which we understand what an arc is (and in this case an arc is the relevant profile). Given this, ‘‘we can now define a domain as a semantic structure that functions as the base for at least one concept profile’’ (Croft 1993: 339 ). Croft (1993) moves on to relate domain, as defined in this way, to the study of metaphor and metonymy. First, many concepts presuppose several different do- mains. So a human being is defined relative to domains such as physical objects, living things, volitional agents, and others. ‘‘The combination of domains simu- lateously presupposed by a concept such as [human being] is called a domain matrix’’ (340). Metaphor, then, is a mapping between two domains that are not part of the same matrix (348). Croft notes, ‘‘If you say She’s feeling down, there is no spatial orientation domain in the matrix of the metaphorical concept of emotion being expressed; happy is up involves two different concepts with their own do- main structures underlying them’’ (348). However, metonymy normally involves mapping within a domain matrix (see also Panther and Thornburg, this volume, chapter 10). This construal of metonymy helps make sense of previous analyses which claim that metonymy involves a relation of ‘contiguity’, and explains how metonymy is often used for purposes of reference to something which is related in a contextually salient way. Thus, the notion of domain, though applied in different ways in different avenues of Cognitive Linguistics, is important in several respects to linguistic analysis because it is such a basic cognitive construct. 5. Concluding Issues One criticism that might be leveled against these notions is that in any specific analysis, it is not necessarily clear how to demarcate what is or is not part of a given frame, ICM, or domain. Because they are cognitive constructs, their scope is going to be determined in any instance by contextual factors as well as the subjective nature of construal. So, while they provide useful ways of thinking about the cog- nitive bases of linguistic structures and the relations of form to meaning, their inherent nature can make them tricky to use as analytic tools in a reliable, replicable fashion. Whether, and if so, how, these notions can be better operationalized for applied research remains to be seen. In addition, because each of the terms ‘‘frame,’’ ‘‘ICM,’’ or ‘‘domain’’ can refer to a kind of knowledge structure which can serve as a background for interpreting the meaning of linguistic forms, there is sometimes overlap in how they are used by different researchers. However, each term seems to find its best functional home within one or two specific theoretical frameworks. In this regard, we saw above that frames, idealized cognitive models, and domains 183 frame theory paved the way for particular theories of grammar (such as Con- struction Grammar). ICMs have been a useful way of capturing the role of back- ground knowledge for certain kinds of semantic analyses, particularly as they relate to questions of categorization (as espoused by Lakoff 1987). Domains play an es- pecially prominent role in conceptual metaphor theory and in Cognitive Grammar. The different theoretical contexts in which frames, ICMs, and domains are used accentuate the nuances of the differences between them. The development of all of the basic notions outlined in this chapter helped lay the groundwork for what has come to be known as Cognitive Linguistics. They reflect a common view of the study of language which Lakoff (1990: 40) charac- terizes in terms of ‘‘a commitment to make one’s account of human language accord with what is generally known about the mind and the brain, from other disciplines as well as our own.’’ The research on frames, ICMs, and domains reflects this commitment in how it has both drawn on and influenced work in various branches of cognitive science, such as psychology, anthropology, and philosophy. Because of the fundamental roles these basic concepts have in cognitive linguistic theory, the original research on them will continue to remain influential in future work in the field. NOTES 1. 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Chicago Linguistic Society 13: 459–71. frames, idealized cognitive models, and domains 187 chapter 8 METAPHOR joseph e. grady 1. Introduction Metaphor has been a central topic within Cognitive Linguistics since the field was born and the term coined in the 1970s. This is partly a historical consequence of George Lakoff’s dominant role and major contributions—metaphor was his focus at the time he and a number of colleagues were defining the field of Cognitive Linguistics, and continues to be today. But the importance of metaphor studies within the discipline is also a reflection of the nature of Cognitive Linguistics as it is understood by its practitioners. If Cognitive Linguistics is the study of ways in which features of language reflect other aspects of human cognition, then meta- phors provide one of the clearest illustrations of this relationship. Since the 1950s, Chomskyan linguists have been devising theories of syntax which largely exclude references to the meanings of linguistic structures; it is nearly impossible, though, to conceive of metaphor without taking into account the connections between lexical semantics, usage, and our understanding and perceptions of the world. Metaphors provide rich evidence about the ways in which some aspects of our lived experience are associated with others, for reasons that reflect basic aspects of per- ception, thought, and possibly neurological organization. Within Cognitive Linguistics the term metaphor is understood to refer to a pat- tern of conceptual association, rather than to an individual metaphorical usage or a linguistic convention. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 5) describe metaphor as follows: ‘‘The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.’’ When Robert Frost refers to the ‘‘road less traveled,’’ he uses the words road and traveled in metaphorical ways; in conventional usage, this phrase is ‘‘the metaphor,’’ but for cognitive linguists the more important object of study (and, according to typical usage within the discipline, ‘‘the metaphor’’) is the underlying pattern of thought which allows the phrase to have the meaning it does. Since this pattern involves associations at the conceptual level, it can be expressed by many different lexical means—metaphorical uses of path, fork in the road, di- rection, and numerous other terms reflect the same basic set of associations, be- tween traveling and making life choices. The emphasis within Cognitive Linguistics on this conceptual dimension sug- gests a view in which metaphor is not inherently a linguistic phenomenon. In fact, cognitive linguists do conceive of metaphors as patterns of thought which can be expressed on nonverbal ways, such as pictures and gestures. Diagrams, for example, generally follow the convention that ‘‘higher’’ numbers and quantities should be represented higher on a physical surface (e.g., linguistic usages such as Crime has risen dramatically). In the artistic realm, M. Johnson (1987: 83) considers the notion of pictorial ‘‘balance’’ and observes that ‘‘in Kandinsky’s Accompanied Contrast , there is an exquisite balance in the work that can be made sense of only by inter- preting ‘weight,’ ‘force,’ ‘location,’ and ‘value’ metaphorically, based on a schema whose structure specifies forces or weights distributed relative to some point or ax- is.’’ Johnson is suggesting that visual images may stand metaphorically for physical masses and forces. Cognitive Linguistics is hardly the first area of scholarship to treat metaphor as a serious object of study. Aristotle (1996) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1947) wrote on the subject, as did Vico ([1744] 1961) (see M. Johnson 1981, for a summary of philosoph- ical scholarship on metaphor). More immediate and direct predecessors included Anderson (1971), who explored ways in which understandings of spatial relationships are extended to other kinds of relations expressed in grammar, and Reddy (1993), whose discussion of metaphors for communication Lakoff and Johnson cite as a catalyst for their own interest in the subject. Reddy’s paper, in fact, appeared in an important volume of papers treating metaphor from a variety of scholarly perspec- tives (Ortony 1979). Cognitive Linguistics’ unique contribution has been to treat met- aphorical language as data to be examined systematically and to be considered in connection with other basic aspects of mental activity. Even more importantly, schol- ars in the field have recognized the thorough pervasiveness of metaphor even in ‘‘ordinary’’ language and thought. The starting point for a discussion of metaphor within the field of Cogni- tive Linguistics must be the approach initiated in Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) sem- inal Metaphors We Live By and elaborated by cognitive linguists since that time (Paprotte ´ and Dirven 1985; 1 M. Johnson 1987, 1993; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Sweetser 1990; Turner 1991; Lakoff and Johnson 1999;Ko ¨ vecses 2002; etc.). metaphor 189 . and in Cognitive Grammar. The different theoretical contexts in which frames, ICMs, and domains are used accentuate the nuances of the differences between them. The development of all of the basic. defining the field of Cognitive Linguistics, and continues to be today. But the importance of metaphor studies within the discipline is also a reflection of the nature of Cognitive Linguistics as. practitioners. If Cognitive Linguistics is the study of ways in which features of language reflect other aspects of human cognition, then meta- phors provide one of the clearest illustrations of this relationship.