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Introduction: The Relation between Thought, Language, and Culture Language and cultural theory, as developed in pre–cognitive linguistics and an- thropology, has a long tradition, beginning with Humboldt and drastically reshaped by Saussure. In the nineteenth-century Humboldtian tradition, language, thought/ Geist, and culture form an inseparable unity. Humboldt assumes the relationship between thought and language to be bidirectional rather than unidirectional. In language, thought/Geist is articulated; yet language at the same time gives shape to thought. Likewise, the Humboldtian view assumes mutual correspondences be- tween culture and language: to Humboldt, language is characteristic of the cultural will of a people and reincorporates the ‘‘real world’’ into the property of thought/ Geist. In strong contrast to this unified view of cognition, language, and culture, Saussure, the father of modern linguistics, sees language not as a mere form of thought, but as a self-contained system with its own organization and classification of ‘‘content.’’ In other words, for Saussure, semantics is an autonomous realm at the interface between phonological/grammatical/cultural form, on the one hand, and cognition, on the other. In fact, this view meant the beginning of a split between semantics as part of the language faculty and other cognitive faculties. Saussure’s view became known as structural semantics, with its complete separation of lan- guage and thought. The opposition between the Humboldtian and the Saussurean views of semantics can be summarized as in figure 46.1—which is based, in strongly adapted form, on Bickel (2000: 162)—emphasizing the holistic nature of Hum- boldt’s approach. In the 1940s and later, Humboldt’s ideas received a new impetus in Whorf’s relativity hypothesis (see, e.g., Joseph 1996; Lee 1996; Koerner 2000), which sets up links between ‘‘habitual thought’’ in a given society, the cultural form of aspects of behavior, and semantics. This cognitive reorientation in linguistic anthropology led to a shift from the then dominant Saussurean paradigm toward a more so- phisticated reinterpretation of the Humboldtian model, as represented in figure 46.1a. Although Cognitive Linguistics generally does not subscribe to linguistic relativity, it clearly sticks with the Humboldtian conception of the relation between thought, language, and culture, which is laid down in a number of cognitive models, or rather cultural models, as we will see. This chapter is organized as follows: section 2 discusses various cultural models and their mental locus; section 3 opposes universal and culture-specific aspects in cultural models; section 4 opposes two models of deixis: corporeal deixis and en- vironmental deixis; and finally, section 5 focuses on cultural variation and exem- plifies how radically different cultural models can be created in one language, that is, English as a world language. 2. Various Cultural Models 2.1. Cultural Models and Their Mental Locus A culture’s collective wisdom and experience is laid down in knowledge structures, variously called cognitive models, cultural models, folk models, or folk theories. The study of cultural models as ‘‘cognitive schemas that are intersubjectively shared by a social group’’ (D’Andrade 1987: 112) is the predestined meeting ground of cognitive anthropologists and (cognitive) linguists. For the former, language data are among the best available clues for the reconstruction of patterns of cultural knowledge; for the latter, these models promise to provide an explanatory basis of linguistic usage (see Quinn and Holland 1987: 24). This common interest has guided a rich interdisciplinary exchange. An early manifestation thereof is Holland 1204 rene ´ dirven, hans-georg wolf, and frank polzenhagen and Quinn’s (1987) influential volume Cultural Models in Language and Thought. The articles collected in this book readily reflect the various approaches to the field and some of the major theoretical controversies. One such controversy concerns the locus of culture. Significantly, the book’s original title was to be ‘‘Folk Models,’’ a term which expresses the assumption that a community’s cultural wisdom resides in the community’s collective mind rather than in the minds of the individual members (see Keesing 1987: 370 for criticism of this label and Gibbs 1999 for further discussion). The cognitivist position, by contrast, holds that ‘‘individual minds are the primary locus of linguistic and cultural knowledge’’ (Langacker 1994: 26), and from this perspective cultural patterns are largely subsumed under the general notion of ‘‘cognitive models.’’ The term ‘‘cultural model’’ intends to transcend this problem in that it embraces the notion of ‘‘distributed representation,’’ which allows for the explanation of uneven and partially shared distribution of cultural schemas in individuals and across members of a given group (see Sharifian 2003). A second controversy concerns the composition of cultural models and the con- nection to closely related terms developed in Cognitive Linguistics, such as schema, frame, scenario, and script (see Palmer 1996: chapter 5 for a review of these notions; see also Palmer, this volume, chapter 39). Here, a particularly debatable issue is the role of conceptual metaphors within a cultural model. For some authors (e.g., Quinn 1987, 1991, 1997), they are merely culture-based means to explain aspects of experience; for others (e.g., Lakoff and Ko ¨ vecses 1987), they constitute these models. Both controversies are instantiated in the following sections. 2.2. Americans’ Cultural Model of Marriage For the reconstruction of a cultural model, cognitive anthropologists set up a pro- cedure of interviewing and language data analysis, strongly based on metaphor. For her cultural model of marriage, Quinn (1987) interviewed husbands and wives in eleven marriages (fifteen hours of tape recording) and applied the techniques of key words, metaphor grouping, and reasoning analysis. The most frequent key words were commitment, love, and fulfillment. She identified the following eight templates, in her terminology ‘‘proposition-schemas,’’ around which the meta- phors used to explicate these schemas are grouped: Figure 46.1. Humboldtian compared to Saussurean semantics cognitive linguistics and cultural studies 1205 1. marriage is enduring 2. marriage is mutually beneficial 3. marriage is unknown at the outset 4. marriage is difficult 5. marriage is effortful 6. marriage is joint 7. marriage may succeed or fail 8. marriage is risky Some of these metaphor clusters, or their entailments, are reflected in the following interview fragment (numbers refer to one of the corresponding items in the above list): That we have changed so much (3) and that we have been able to work (5) through so many basic struggles (4) in our marriage and be at a place now where we trust each other (6), we love each other (6), we like each other (6), we appreci- ate each other (2), and feel pretty confident (2) about being able to continue that way (1) and to continue (1) working (5) any other stuff that comes up (3). Just seems pretty amazing to me. It could have gone in so many different directions and that it didn’t is incredible (8). But I think both of us take a whole lot of credit (5) for the direction it went (2), that we worked at it (5) really hard (4). (Quinn 1987: 176) The model of marriage emerging is that marriage is on the positive side a joint en- terprise, enduring, and mutually beneficial, but on the negative side, an unknown affair at the outset, difficult to cope with, requiring lots of efforts to make it go, hence risky, and bound either to succeed or to fail. Importantly, Quinn (1987, 1991, 1997) regards the above proposition-schemas as primary and the various conceptual metaphors (like marriage is a journey, marriage is a joint enterprise) grouped around them as derived. She thus assumes that cultural models are constituted by nonmetaphorical ‘‘cultural pos- tulates,’’ a view which is at odds with Lakoff and Ko ¨ vecses’s (1987) claim that con- ceptual metaphors hold the constitutive role. This issue has received much atten- tion in subsequent discussions of cultural models. In a critical review of Quinn’s findings, Gibbs (1994: 197–207), for instance, holds that the marriage model may well be structured by a set of frequently occurring metaphorical models alone, based on salient source domains like journey and product.Ko ¨ vecses (1999) proposes a further reanalysis of the marriage model in terms of the constitutive metaphor view. He argues that the model of marriage cannot be detached from the concept of love, a point also observed by Quinn but not pursued in her analysis. Crucially, according to Ko ¨ vecses, the concept of love is centered around the metaphorically conceptu- alized notion ‘unity of two persons’, and this structure is mapped to the model of marriage. Many of Quinn’s data are indeed expressions of the metaphor marriage is the physical unity of two complementary parts, which is but a special instance of the nonphysical unity is physical unity metaphor underlying the 1206 rene ´ dirven, hans-georg wolf, and frank polzenhagen conceptualization of various social, legal, psychological, political, and other unities, and the concept of love in particular. It is against the background of the unity metaphor that marriage is expected to be shared, beneficial, lasting, and so on. Ko ¨ vecses thus concludes that the proposition-schemas identified by Quinn are, in fact, themselves derived from basic conceptual metaphors (but see Ko ¨ vecses 2005). He provides this treatment of the marriage model in a general discussion of the relation between conceptual metaphors and cultural models. Many descriptions of other cultural models have become available now. For example, Ko ¨ vecses (1995a) developed the cultural model of American friendship. The Holland and Quinn (1987) volume itself contains a range of cultural models, for instance, Sweetser (1987)onlie, Kay (1987) on language, Holland and Skinner (1987) on gender types, D’Andrade (1987) on the mind, Lakoff and Ko ¨ vecses (1987) on the emotion of anger, and, working from different assumptions and a different theoretical background, Lutz ( 1987) on Ifaluk emotion theory. The latter will be discussed now in more detail. 2.3. Ifaluk Emotion Theory: Action Schema for Fago ‘Love’ Seemingly in line with D’Andrade or Quinn, Lutz (1987) understands the term emotion theory as a folk theory reflecting the cultural knowledge or wisdom that underlies the behavior in the domain of emotional experiences of a given cultural group, here the people on the Ifaluk atoll in the Micronesian islands. But instead of following a one-way route from language to underlying cognitive models, as D’Andrade or Quinn do, Lutz engages upon fieldwork to study these people’s emotional behavior as well as their use of emotional terms. Their linguistic use is thus seen as part of an action schema triggering other emotion events in order to reach certain goals—this ‘‘action’’ aspect is not totally absent from Quinn’s analysis (see section 2.2). It is worth mentioning that Lutz represents the tradition of ‘‘social construc- tionism,’’ which claims that all emotions are cultural constructs built up by a given social group (for further discussion, see Ko ¨ vecses and Palmer 1999: 247–49). This entails that emotions, like many other cognitive categories, are not universal, and certainly not innate, but that they are learned by the members of a social group in their interaction with their caregivers. Thus, for example, the Ifaluk people share with other cultures the category love (small capitals here designate a concept which is the abstract summary of the meanings of partly overlapping terms in various cultures). Their concept fago covers the emotional range of ‘compassion/love/ sadness’, but is not comparable to any of these three English concepts, neither sep- arately nor in combination. The English terms are not a paraphrase of fago but only vague glosses for it. Living on a coral island measuring half a square mile, at most fifteen feet above sea level, often threatened by typhoons, the 400-odd Ifaluk people have developed a cooperative and nonaggressive life pattern, partly in response to cognitive linguistics and cultural studies 1207 these natural conditions (Lutz 1988: 83). Situations that trigger the feeling of fago are, first of all, minor catastrophes such as illness, departure from an island, or lack of food. The hidden goal or action schema is then ‘‘Change the situation by filling the need of the unfortunate party’’ (Lutz 1987: 301). Possible actions inspired by fago are as diverse as giving food, crying, talking politely, or, in the negative case, not speaking (Lutz 1987: 295). The latter reaction seems to be associated with major disasters like death. In such events, a report says, ‘‘We really felt bad inside. It was like our insides were being torn. We beat our chest and scratched our faces because a fago was so strong’’ (Lutz 1988: 125). But fago is also felt by a woman who ‘‘hears her younger brother singing from his canoe in the lagoon’’ (Lutz 1988: 121). Along- side this feeling for a close person who is potentially in danger, fago may also be appealed to by parents in order to promote gentle and generous behavior in their children (Lutz 1988: 136). In Wierzbicka’s (1992: 143) interpretation of such findings, fago is claimed to be a polysemous term, but this interpretation may well be an instance of ethnocentrism, which means that we project or even impose our West- ern categories on those of other cultures. Lutz (1987: 296) sees another important difference with Western patterns: ‘‘In talking about the emotions, the Ifaluk treat them as fundamentally social phe- nomena rather than, as in the case of American ethno-theory, as predominantly internal psycho-physiological events that are simply correlated with social events.’’ As the subtitle of Lutz’s (1988) study indicates, she therefore sees Ifaluk emotion theory as a basic challenge to established Western thought, which centers on the individual and is individualistic in its orientation. 3. Universal and Culture-Specific Aspects in Cultural Models 3.1. The Universal Bodily Basis of Language and Thought Apart from the social versus the individualistic, psychophysiological conceptions in the cultural models of emotions, there is another fundamental contrast, that between culture-specific and universal dimensions of experience. Obviously, Lutz’s ‘‘social construct’’ view of emotions entails a culture-specific emphasis, whereas Lakoff and Ko ¨ vecses’s ‘‘individual and psychophysiological’’ view creates room for an outspoken universalist conception. Indeed, since all humans have the same bodies and hence the same fundamental bodily experiences, we may expect there to be a strong universal basis for our conceptualization of emotions. In his 1992 paper ‘‘Anthropology and Linguistics,’’ Keesing welcomes Cogni- tive Linguistics as a new evolution in linguistics in an experientialist direction: 1208 rene ´ dirven, hans-georg wolf, and frank polzenhagen A crucial element in the new linguistics is the importance of experience, partic- ularly bodily experience—the subjectivities of being embodied as a human in our kind of world—in shaping language. Consistently, across languages, we find a kind of embodied subjectivity in which experience-rich (especially visual) do- mains are used in characterising more abstract domains. (603) It is to be expected, then, that universal bodily experience is fertile soil for universal conceptualizations of emotions and abstract thought in general. In order to avoid any circularity in our argument, we will first, in section 3.2, apply the notions of bodily experience and universalism to an entirely different domain than emotions, that of language acquisition; in particular, we will apply it to the acquisition of sound systems in languages—the first domain for which the reality of ‘‘bodily experience’’ holds. While generative theories of language acqui- sition saw an unexplained link between the biological body and the functioning of a mental ‘‘Language Acquisition Device’’ (LAD), recent language acquisition re- search has emphasized that it is especially the perceptual apparatus and the factor of attention that have a strong impact on the evolution of language acquisition and learning. As will be shown in section 3.2, we are born as universal beings, but gradually narrow down our perceptual apparatus to the linguistic and cultural en- vironment we live in. Things may be fundamentally different in the area of emo- tions and thought: since our bodily experience is very much the same all over the world, we possess the same pre–conceptual image schemas, such as containment, verticality, balance, and so on. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 508–9), these image schemas form the experiential basis from which we develop spatial conceptualizations and, on the basis of these, by metonymic and metaphorical ex- tensions, abstract conceptualizations. The rise of conceptual metaphors based on pre–conceptual image schemas may well be a universal phenomenon, as will be discussed in section 3.3. 3.2. Born as Universal Hearers, Socialized as Culture-Specific Sound Perceivers One of the areas of our world that are most easily accessible to nonspeculative research is language itself, especially the perceptual or auditive aspects of the sound system of language. The predominating Western cultural model or—given its naive character—folk theory of people’s language capacities is reflected in the ‘‘expert’’ model of Lenneberg’s (1967) hypothesis of the biological foundation of language. This theory holds that the LAD stops playing a role around the period of pu- berty and enters a postcritical phase in which it loses its flexibility so that all later language learning is believed to be highly cumbersome and ineffective. But recent language perception research, as summarized in Bohn (2000), suggests that already at the age of twelve months babies have narrowed down their attention for all possible nonnative language sounds and only discriminate the sounds of their cognitive linguistics and cultural studies 1209 . Lauri. 2002. The theology of the lyric tradition in African American spirituals. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 70: 347–63. Ramey, Martin. 1997. The problem of the body: The conflict between. naive character—folk theory of people’s language capacities is reflected in the ‘‘expert’’ model of Lenneberg’s (1967) hypothesis of the biological foundation of language. This theory holds that the LAD stops. (1999) proposes a further reanalysis of the marriage model in terms of the constitutive metaphor view. He argues that the model of marriage cannot be detached from the concept of love, a point also