language, philosophy of logic, philosophical psychology, philosophy of mathematics, and the clarification of the nature and limits of philosophy itself. In each of these his views are revolutionary and virtually without precedent. On every subject he tackled, he eschewed received pos- itions and rejected traditional alternatives, believing that where philosophy was caught between apparently unavoidable poles, e.g. realism and idealism, Cartesianism and behaviourism, Platonism and formalism, it was the common presuppositions of both that need to be rejected. The Tractatus is a mere seventy-five pages long, written in sybilline, marmoreal sentences. It ranges over meta- physics, logic, and logical truth, the nature of representa- tion in general and of propositional representation in particular, the status of mathematics and of scientific the- ory, solipsism and the self, ethics and the mystical. According to the Tractatus, the world is the totality of *facts, not *things. The substance of all possible worlds consists of the totality of sempiternal simple objects (e.g. spatio-temporal points, unanalysable properties, and rela- tions). The form of a simple object consists in its combina- torial possibilities with other objects. The possible concatenation of objects constitutes a state of affairs. The obtaining of a state of affairs is a fact. A representation of a state of affairs is a model or picture. It must possess the same logical multiplicity as, and be isomorphic with, what it represents. Propositions are logical pictures. They are essentially bipolar, i.e. capable of being true and also capa- ble of being false. In this their nature reflects the nature of what they represent, since it is of the essence of a state of affairs that it either obtains or does not obtain. An elemen- tary proposition depicts an (atomic) state of affairs. Its con- stituent names (unanalysable, logically simple names) go proxy for the objects in reality which are what they mean. The logico-syntactical form of a simple name must mirror the metaphysical form of the object that is its meaning. Hence the combinatorial possibilities of names mirror the combinatorial possibilities of objects. It is the fact that the names in a proposition are arranged as they are, in accord with the rules of logical syntax, that says that things are thus-and-so in reality. The sense of a proposition is a func- tion of the meanings of its constituent names. Sense must be absolutely determinate; so any vagueness betokens analysability, and will disappear on analysis. The essence of the proposition is given by the general propositional form, which is: ‘This is how things are’, i.e. the general form of a description of how things stand in reality. A proposition is true if things in reality are as it depicts them as being. The logical analysis of propositions must yield propos- itions which are logically independent of each other, i.e. elementary propositions whose truth depends only on the existence or non-existence of (atomic) states of affairs. Elem- entary propositions can be combined to form molecular propositions by means of truth-functional operators—the logical connectives. These, contrary to Frege and Russell, are not names of anything (logical objects, functions). They are merely truth-functional combinatorial devices, which generate truth-dependencies between propos- itions. All possible forms of truth-functional combination can be generated by the operation of joint-negation on a set of elementary propositions. All logical relations between propositions turn on the inner complexity (the truth-functional combination) of molecular propositions. The only (expressible) form of necessity is *logical neces- sity. Two limiting cases of combination are senseless (not nonsense): tautologies, which are unconditionally true, and contradictions, which are unconditionally false. In an ideal notation their truth-value would be perspicuous from mere inspection of the symbolism. The necessary truths of logic are not, as Russell thought, descriptions of the most general features of the world; nor are they descriptions of relations between logical objects, as Frege thought. They are *tautologies, molecular propositions which are so combined that bipolarity, and hence all con- tent, cancels out; they all say the same thing, namely noth- ing. They are ‘degenerate’ propositions in the sense in which a point is a degenerate conic section. So the truths of logic are not a domain for pure reason alone to attain knowledge about reality, since to know a tautology is to know nothing. Metaphysical utterances, by contrast, are nonsense— violations of the bounds of sense. For the apparent cat- egorial concepts that occur in them, e.g. ‘proposition’, ‘fact’, ‘object’, ‘colour’, are not genuine concepts at all, but unbound variables that cannot occur in a well-formed proposition. But what one tries to say by means of the pseudo-propositions of metaphysics (e.g. that red is a colour) is shown by features (forms) of genuine propos- itions containing substitution-instances of these formal concepts (e.g. ‘A is red’). What is shown by a notation can- not be said. Truths of metaphysics are ineffable; and so too are truths of ethics, aesthetics, and religion. Hence there are no philosophical propositions, i.e. propositions describing the essential natures of things or the metaphysical structure of the world. So the very propositions of the Tractatus itself are finally condemned as nonsense—attempts to say what can only be shown. The task of the Tractatus was to lead one to a correct logical point of view. Once that is achieved, one can throw away the ladder up which one has climbed. Philosophy is not a science; nor is it in competition with the sciences. It is not the accumulation of knowledge about a subject- matter. Its sole function is to monitor the bounds of sense, to elucidate philosophically problematic sentences, and to show that attempts to traverse the bounds of sense are futile. The achievement of the Tractatus is manifold. (a) It brought to full fruition the atomist and foundationalist traditions, the conception of philosophy as analysis of hid- den logical structures, the venerable quest for an ideal lan- guage or notation, the logico-metaphysical picture of language and logical form as a mirror of the logical struc- ture of the world. Thenceforth these were ripe for demo- lition—a task that was carried out in the Investigations. (b) 960 Wittgenstein, Ludwig Its numerous criticisms of Frege and Russell were defini- tive. (c) The radical conception of philosophy it pro- pounded initiated the so-called *‘linguistic turn’ characteristic of modern analytical philosophy, and paved the way for the similar, but immeasurably richer, concep- tion of philosophy delineated in the Investigations. (d) Its elucidation of the nature of logical necessity and logical truth, though still to be modified and elaborated in the later Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, was its crowning achievement. Although the Philosophical Investigations was meant to be seen against the backcloth of the Tractatus, it is the whole tradition of which the Tractatus was the culmination that is being criticized. The criticisms are often indirect, con- fronting not doctrines and theses, but the presuppositions that inform them. In his philosophy of language, Wittgenstein now rejected the assumption that the meaning of a word is the thing it stands for. That involves a misuse of the word ‘meaning’. There is no such thing as the name-relation, and it is confused to suppose that words are connected with reality by semantic links. That supposition rests on a misconstrual of ostensive definition. Not all words are or need to be sharply defined, analysable by specification of necessary and sufficient conditions of application. The demand for determinacy of sense was incoherent. Vague- ness is not always a defect, and there is no absolute stand- ard of exactness. The very ideal of analysis (inherited from the Cartesians and Empiricists, and developed afresh by Moore and Russell) was misconceived. The terms ‘sim- ple’ and ‘complex’, which are relative, were misused. Many concepts, in particular philosophically crucial ones such as ‘proposition’, ‘language’, ‘number’, are united by family resemblance rather than by common characteristic marks. The thought that all propositions share a common essence, a general propositional form, was misguided. Not all propositions are descriptions, and, even among those that are, there are many different logical kinds of description. It was an error to suppose that the fundamen- tal role of the proposition is to describe a state of affairs. It was a mistake to think that the meaning of a sentence is composed of the meanings of its constituents, and con- fused to think that truth consists in correspondence between proposition and fact. The institution of language can only be elucidated by attending to the use of words and sentences in the stream of life. In opposition to the conception that makes truth piv- otal to the elucidation of meaning, letting understanding take care of itself, Wittgenstein argued that *meaning is what is given by explanations of meaning, which are rules for the use of words. It is what is understood when one understands what an utterance means. Understanding is an ability, the mastery of the technique of using an expres- sion. It is exhibited in using an expression correctly, in explaining what it means, and in responding appropriately to its use—which are severally criteria of understanding. Forms of explanation are diverse, formal definition being only one among many, e.g. ostension, paraphrase, con- trastive paraphrase, exemplification, explanation by examples, etc. Ostensive definition, which looks as if it links word and world, in fact introduces a sample provid- ing a standard for the correct application of the definien- dum. The sample belongs to the method of representation, not to what is represented; hence no link with reality, i.e. with what is represented, is thereby forged. Consequently the central thought of the Tractatus, that any form of *representation is answerable to reality, that it must, in its formal structure, mirror the metaphysical form of the world, is misconceived. Concepts are not cor- rect or incorrect, only more or less useful. Rules for the use of words are not true or false. They are not answerable to reality, nor to antecedently given meanings. Rather they determine the meanings of words, are constitutive of their meanings. Grammar is autonomous. Hence what appear to be necessary metaphysical truths (e.g. that red is a colour), which the Tractatus held to be ineffably shown by any symbolism (e.g. any language for the description of coloured things), are actually no more than rules for the use of words in the guise of descriptions (e.g. that if anything can be said to be red, it can also be said to be coloured). What seemed to be a metaphysical co-ordination between language and reality, e.g. between the proposition that p and the fact that p which makes it true, is merely an intragrammatical articulation, namely that ‘the proposition that p’ = ‘the proposition which is true if it is a fact that p’. The apparent harmony between language and reality is merely the shadow cast upon the world by grammar. Hence too, puzzles about the inten- tionality of thought and language are not to be resolved by means of relations between word and world, or thought and reality, but by clarifying intragrammatical connec- tions within language. Running through the mainstream tradition of Euro- pean philosophy is the thought that what is given is sub- jective experience, that a person knows how things are with him (that he is in pain, is experiencing this or that), but must problematically infer how things are ‘outside’ him. So the private is better known than the public, mind is better known than matter. Subjective experience was conceived not only as the foundations of empirical know- ledge, but also as the foundations of language, i.e. that the meanings of words are fixed by naming subjective impressions (e.g. ‘pain’ means this, which I now have). Wittgenstein’s *‘private language arguments’ mount a comprehensive assault on the presuppositions of this conception. Conceiving of one’s current experience as an object of subjective knowledge is misleading, since the ability, for example, to avow one’s pain does not rest on evidence, and one does not find out or verify that one is in pain. Being ignorant of or doubting one’s own pain makes no sense, nor therefore does knowing or being certain that one is in pain. To say ‘I know I’m in pain’ is either an emphatic avowal of pain or a philosopher’s nonsense. The Wittgenstein, Ludwig 961 thought that no one else can have what I have when I am in pain, hence that I enjoy an epistemically privileged pos- ition, is confused. For it rests on the assumption that the pains of different people are at best qualitatively, but not numerically, identical. But that is a distinction applicable to substances, not to impressions. Two people have the same pain if their pains tally in intensity, phenomeno- logical features, and occur in corresponding locations of their bodies. The whole traditional picture is a distortion of the ‘inner’, under the pressure of misleading pictures embedded in our language and of misconstruals of gram- matical asymmetries between first- and third-person psychological sentences. Hence we misconstrue the ‘outer’ likewise. We do often know that others are in pain on the basis of their behaviour, but this is not inductive or analogical evidence. It is a logical criterion for their pain. Although such criteria are defeasible, in the absence of defeating conditions, it is senseless to doubt whether the sufferer is in pain. The behavioural criteria for the applica- tion of a psychological predicate are partly constitutive of its meaning. For expressions signifying the ‘inner’ are not given their meaning by a private ostensive definition in which a subjective impression functions as a sample. There can be no such thing as a logically private sample, and a sen- sation cannot fulfil the role of a sample. The elaborate argu- ment to establish this negative conclusion undermines the conception of the ‘inner’ as a private domain to which its subject enjoys privileged access by means of a faculty of introspection construed on the model of perception. Contrary to the dominant tradition, Wittgenstein argued that *language is misrepresented as a vehicle for the communication of language-independent thoughts. Speaking is not a matter of translating wordless thoughts into language, and understanding is not a matter of inter- preting—transforming dead signs into living thoughts. The limits of thought are determined by the limits of the expression of thoughts. The possession of a language not only expands the intellect, but also extends the will. A dog can want a bone, but only a language-user can now want something next week. It is not thought that breathes life into the signs of a language, but the use of signs in the stream of human life. Wittgenstein also worked extensively on the philosophy of mathematics. His Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics is as original and revolutionary as everything else he wrote. He developed further his earlier account of logical truth, cutting it free from the metaphysical apparatus of the Tractatus. He rejected *logicism, *formalism, and *intu- itionism alike. In their place he delineated a normative con- ception of mathematics. Arithmetic is a system of rules (in the form of descriptions) for the transformation of empiri- cal propositions about the numbers or quantities of things. The propositions of geometry are not descriptions of the properties of space, but are rather constitutive rules for the description of spatial relations. A mathematical proof is misconceived as a demonstration of truths about the nature of numbers or geometrical forms. It determines concepts and so too forms of inference. It is a matter of invention (concept-formation), rather than discovery. To truth in mathematics corresponds sense in inferences among empirical propositions about numbers and magni- tudes of things. Wittgenstein’s views here, however, have proved to be too radical and difficult for the age, and have met largely with incomprehension and misinterpretation. The revolutionary conception of philosophy propounded in the Tractatus finds its counterpart in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Philosophy, he continued to argue, is not a cognitive discipline. There are no philosophical propositions and no philosophical knowledge. If there were theses in philosophy, everyone would agree with them, for they would be mere grammatical truisms (e.g. that we know that someone is in pain by his behaviour). The task of philosophy is to clear away the conceptual confusions that stand in the way of accepting these rule- governed articulations in our language. There is no room for theories in philosophy, for in philosophy we are mov- ing around within our own grammar, dissolving philo- sophical questions by examining the rules for the use of words with which we are familiar. For there are no such things as hidden rules which are followed, or discoveries about the real meanings of expressions in use which are unknown to all users. Philosophical problems stem from entanglement in linguistic rules, e.g. projecting the *grammar of one kind of expression upon another (the grammar of ‘pin’ on to ‘pain’), or projecting norms of rep- resentation on to reality and thinking that we are con- fronting metaphysical necessities in the world (e.g. ‘Nothing can be red and green all over’), or placing demands upon certain concepts, e.g. that they lend them- selves to certain kinds of explanation, which are only appropriate for concepts of a different category. The methods of philosophy are purely descriptive. The task of philosophy is conceptual clarification and the dissolution of philosophical problems. The goal of philosophy is not knowledge but understanding. p.m.s.h. *quietism, philosophical; Wittgenstein, the new; Wittgensteinians. L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (first pub. 1921; London, 1961). ——Philosophical Investigations (first pub. 1953; Oxford, 1958). introductions and commentaries G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, i: Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, 2nd rev. edn., (Oxford, 2005); ii: Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity (Oxford, 1985). P. M. S. Hacker, An Ana- lytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, iii: Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind (Oxford, 1990); iv: Wittgenstein: Mind and Will (Oxford, 1995). M. Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Cambridge, 1964). P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, rev. edn. (Oxford, 1986). A. J. P. Kenny, Wittgenstein (London, 1973). M. McGinn, Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations (London, 1997). 962 Wittgenstein, Ludwig H. Sluga and D. Stern (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgen- stein (Cambridge, 1996). Wittgenstein, the new. In recent years a revisionary view of Wittgenstein’s thought has emerged, championed by Cora Diamond, Stanley Cavell, Hilary Putnam, and others. Its two central tenets are that the early and late work of Wittgenstein (respectively and chiefly the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations) are continuous with each other, and share a fundamental purpose in common, which is a ‘therapeutic’ one, aimed at curing the philo- sophical disease of creating problems where none exist by misunderstandings about the way language works. The standard view repudiated by proponents of the ‘new Wittgenstein’ is a familiar one. It says that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein set out a view of the relation between language and the world in which the structure of each mirrors the other, as a result of a denoting relation between the simplest elements of language (‘names’) and the world (‘objects’). His later philosophy is premissed on an emphatic rejection of this view in favour of the idea that meaning is a function of use within ‘language-games’ embedded in ‘forms of life’. In the earlier philosophy, accordingly, his account can be described as truth- conditional and realist, while in the latter it is closer to an assertibility-conditions account, and is anti-realist. The ‘new Wittgenstein’ advocates reject this story completely. They argue instead that Wittgenstein’s aims were the same throughout his earlier and later work, and that its basis is the rejection of the idea that language can be understood from an external point of view. Grasping this cures one (hence the invocation of the idea of ‘therapy’) of the temptation to undertake traditional philosophical inquiry. The principal concerns of the Investigations are thus to be found in the Tractatus, and vice versa, and this—so these advocates urge—requires a radical new view of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. a.c.g. Cora Diamond, The Realistic Spirit (Cambridge, Mass., 1991). Wittgensteinians. Wittgenstein’s impact upon analytical philosophy is second to none. Although he did not, nor indeed did he wish to, found a philosophical school of thinkers, the evolution of twentieth-century philosophy would be as unintelligible without his work as would that of twentieth-century art without Picasso’s. His influence is marked by two waves and their aftermath. The Tractatus (1921) was the leading text of *logical atomism and the main inspiration of the *Vienna Circle (and acknowledged as such in their Manifesto). The positivists’ conception of philosophy as analysis, of logical truths as vacuous tau- tologies, and of metaphysical assertions as nonsense, was derived from the Tractatus. The *principle of verification was derived from discussions with Wittgenstein, and so too, with considerable misunderstanding, was their con- ventionalism in logic and mathematics. Although Carnap could not be called ‘a Wittgensteinian’, he acknowledged Wittgenstein’s formative influence, and his Logical Syntax of Language is heavily indebted to the Tractatus. Logical Positivism developed its own momentum in the 1930s, and, through A. J. Ayer in Britain and Carnap in the USA, became extremely influential. M. Schlick and F. Waismann, however, were more influenced by the second phase of Wittgenstein’s thought, and their work, from the early 1930s onwards, bears its hallmark. While the Circle was developing their Wissenschaftliches Weltauffassung, a research programme for a ‘scientific world-outlook’, Wittgenstein, then teaching in Cam- bridge, was moving off in fresh directions, which led to the Philosophical Investigations. He repudiated much of his ear- lier philosophy, replacing it with a very different view- point. His main work in this second phase of his career focused upon philosophy of language and logic, philoso- phy of mind, and philosophy of mathematics. In each of these he adopted revolutionary and wholly original pos- itions. His primary influence was exerted through his teaching. Among his pupils in the 1930s were A. Ambrose, M. Black, D. A. T. Gasking, M. MacDonald, N. Malcolm, G. A. Paul, R. Rhees, C. L. Stevenson, G. H. von Wright, and J. Wisdom. During the post-war years, G. E. M. Anscombe, P. Geach, N. Malcolm, I. Murdoch, and S. Toulmin attended his classes. Through these and others, and through the circulation of unpublished dictations, the influence of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy spread. The scene was transformed by the publication of the Investigations (1953), which was followed by further unfin- ished works and lectures. This made his thought available to a wider philosophical public. From the 1960s a fresh generation of philosophers followed Wittgenstein’s footsteps. They, together with Wittgenstein’s pupils, contributed to the elucidation and extension of Wittgenstein’s ideas. The clarification and interpretation of his thought has been a major task occupying numerous writers. More than 7,000 books and articles have been published on his work. The extension and further applica- tion of his ideas has borne a rich harvest. Important work was done in the philosophy of mind, repudiating empiri- cist conceptions of the mental as well as behaviourist and materialist ones, and developing teleological, anti- causalist, accounts of action and its explanation: on inten- tion, action, and the will, Anscombe, A. J. P. Kenny, F. Stoutland, and von Wright; on consciousness and memory, Malcolm; on psychoanalysis, F. Cioffi, I. Dilman, and Wisdom; on sensation and perception, P. M. S. Hacker and B. Rundle; on aspect-perception, S. Mulhall; on per- sonal identity and the first-person pronoun, Anscombe, Kenny, S. Shoemaker, and P. F. Strawson. Noteworthy applications of Wittgenstein’s ideas to anthropology and the social sciences were made by Cioffi and P. Winch, to philosophy of religion by D. Z. Phillips. In philosophy of language, Wittgenstein’s views were very influential during the 1950s and 1960s, emphasis being placed upon use rather than on logical form, on description rather than on theory-construction. Anscombe’s and Geach’s work here was broadly Wittgensteinian (though also Fregean). Other extensions of his philosophy of language were made by J. Hunter and Rundle. It was applied in criticism Wittgensteinians 963 of contemporary linguistic theory and philosophical theories of meaning by G. P. Baker and Hacker. Wittgen- stein’s philosophy of mathematics received least atten- tion, but important attempts to come to grips with it were made by Waismann, Ambrose, and S. Shanker, who has also applied Wittgenstein’s ideas in criticism of cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Although Wittgenstein wrote little on ethics, attempts to elaborate his ideas were made by P. Johnston, and to apply them by Winch. A highly original application of Wittgensteinian method- ology to general value-theory was made by von Wright. Disagreements among Wittgensteinians, over both the interpretation and application of his ideas, has been almost as extensive as the disagreements between Wittgensteinians and other philosophers. Some main areas of controversy among his followers have been: (a) the interpretation of the private-language arguments, in particular whether they commit one to the view that the concept of a language and hence of a language-user is internally related to that of a linguistic community; (b) the interpretation of his discussion of following a rule, in par- ticular whether his purpose was to resolve a paradox about rule-following by reference to community agree- ment in acting on a given rule, or to show that the paradox itself rests on a philosophical confusion; (c) the elucidation of his concept of a *criterion, which has been variously interpreted as a necessary condition, necessary and suffi- cient condition, or as necessarily, but defeasible, good evi- dence for that for which it is a criterion; (d) whether his discussion of ostensive definition is intended to show that it is a defective form of explanation of word-meaning, or rather to show that it is not a privileged form of explan- ation which links language to reality; (e) how much conti- nuity there is between his early and later philosophy; (f ) whether his later philosophy consists of systematic argu- ment which purports to demonstrate the incoherence of opposing positions, or whether it consists of unsystematic aperçus designed to effect a Gestalt-switch. Critics of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy have argued that he must, in the private language arguments, rely on a principle of verification, that he is a crypto-behaviourist, that he is committed to a form of linguistic idealism or anti-realism, that his philosophy of mathematics involves a ‘full-blooded’ or ‘existentialist’ form of conventionalism, or that he is propounding a use-theory of meaning. These criticisms demonstrably rest on misunderstandings and misinterpretations. More serious criticisms, still currently debated, turn on whether his general conception of phil- osophy justifiably excludes theory-construction in philoso- phy, whether his philosophy of mathematics does not neglect the extent to which mathematical proof is predetermined by antecedent commitments of axioms and proven theorems, and whether his animadversion to the construction of a theory of meaning and his elucidations of meaning in terms of use are defensible. p.m.s.h. A more comprehensive delineation of his impact can be found in P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Position in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy (Oxford, 1996), the fifth and final vol. of his Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. Wolff, Christian (1679–1750). German philosopher who presented much of Leibniz’s philosophy in the format of Protestant scholasticism. The dominant doctrine and ideol- ogy of the German Enlightenment before Kant was the so-called Leibniz–Wolffian philosophy; but both Leibniz and Wolff objected to this name, rightly, because Wolff was ignorant of, or rejected, some of Leibniz’s main teach- ings, and besides was closer to Descartes than to Leibniz. Wolff was banished from the University of Halle (1723) for denying the necessity of a Christian foundation for ethics and for allegedly teaching a fatalistic ethics. He then had a successful career at Marburg until recalled to Prussia by Frederick the Great (1740). He was a prolific and ver- bose (and ruthlessly boring) writer in both Latin and Ger- man, and his most lasting contribution was in establishing German as a language for philosophy. His many disciples were among Kant’s foremost critics. l.w.b. L. W. Beck, Early German Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), ch. xi. ——‘From Leibniz to Kant’, in Routledge History of Philosophy (London, 1993), vol. vi, ch. 1. Wollheim, Richard (1923–2003). English philosopher (at University College London and at Berkeley) who wrote on philosophy of mind, ethics, aesthetics, political philoso- phy, and history of philosophy. Wollheim worked on, inter alia, the ontology of art and the nature of painting. He was a sympathetic interpreter of Freudian ideas, especially as developed by Melanie Klein. Wollheim’s interest in *psychoanalysis is basic to much of his philosophy, includ- ing his ethics. He described his attraction to ‘moral philosophy . . . pursued as moral psychology’, both ‘the study of those mental processes which are involved in moral deliberation, moral decision, and moral action . . . moral reasoning, its nature and the defects to which it is susceptible’, and especially the study of ‘the growth of the moral sense’. e.t.s. Richard Wollheim, Art and its Objectives (1968; 2nd edn. Cam- bridge, 1980). —— On the Emotions (New Haven, Conn., 1999). Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–97). Political writer and nov- elist, sometimes (inaccurately) called the first feminist. A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) expresses the lib- eral longing for, and belief in the possibility of, a social order in which every individual is free from the shackles of superstition and false authority. Wollstonecraft believed that the moral and intellectual capacities essential to such an order are latent in humanity, their actual presence thwarted by male power. Reason has been involved in error, having been confined to partial, male experience; the truth of which men pretend to judge in relation to women has been shaped to their convenience. Women, deprived of education, taught to defer to men, and appraised according to the double standard of morality, 964 Wittgensteinians have been prevented from exercising genuine judgement or attaining genuine virtue. j.horn. *feminism. Claire Tomalin, The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft (Harmondsworth, 1985). women in philosophy. Women philosophers seem to be largely absent from the history of philosophy, according to many philosophy department syllabuses. In fact, women have been practising philosophers for many cen- turies, but a great deal of research has had to be dedicated to recovering their work in order to be able to evaluate it; see e.g. Mary Ellen Waithe (ed.), A History of Women Philosophers, 4 vols. (Dordrecht, 1984). The apparent invisibility of women in philosophy or lack of ‘great’ women philosophers has been attributed to many causes. One reason is the selection process which has been used to construct the canon of philosophy, a framework which has used certain criteria to determine which topics, individuals, or texts can be defined as philo- sophical and included in the canon. Women have tended to fare badly in this selection process in the past because social perceptions of their basic abilities have affected assessment of their philosophical achievements. Such perceptions of women’s abilities are also to be found within philosophy. Many philosophers have writ- ten about women; much of what has been said has been largely derogatory or dismissive. For example, Plato, Aris- totle, Kant, Rousseau, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche all discuss the topic of women, often with regard to women’s capacity for philosophical rationality, and frequently find them inferior in this respect. Although it is easy to document examples of misogy- nistic remarks, it is only comparatively recently that their implications have been considered, in the context of femi- nist reappraisals of philosophy and attempts to explain women’s invisibility in philosophical history. Because such remarks may be seen as embarrassing, irrelevant, or outdated historical prejudice, they have often been disre- garded in the overall assessment of a philosopher’s work. Such remarks may have been discounted because it is assumed that liberal intellectuals no longer hold such views. Or it may be that such passages are seen as irrele- vant to real philosophical matter and can be easily dis- carded. But this position assumes (i) that we can clearly identify first-order philosophical problems and (ii) that such passages are independent of what the philosopher says elsewhere (for example, about human nature in gen- eral), and can be removed without affecting the overall framework. If the exclusion of women from philosophy is merely a social–historical accident and due to lack of opportunity, then it may be corrected with time. But the problem may run much deeper. The association of philosophy with a professional, public practice of rationality may mean women have tended to avoid such a ‘masculine’ role and have chosen more characteristically ‘feminine’ interests. Within philosophy, the identification of certain dominant topics or interests with ‘masculine’ values may have implicitly or explicitly excluded women: ways of looking at knowledge, the self, reason, and ethics which seem to reinforce ‘masculine’ values may discourage or exclude women, either by implying that they are less able practi- tioners, or by valuing their work on alternative topics as ‘less’ philosophical. But despite such discouragement, and as a result of social and economic changes, many more women were professional philosophers in the last century than in previ- ous centuries. Well-known examples of recent women philosophers include Philippa Foot, Iris Murdoch, Eliza- beth Anscombe, and Luce Irigaray, and earlier thinkers include Hannah Arendt, Simone Weil, Simone de Beau- voir, and Mary Wollstonecraft. Not all of these philoso- phers would necessarily describe themselves as feminists, but it may be as a result of feminist arguments in favour of their worth that they are given more prominence. Debates are continuing over whether there are specific- ally female, feminine, or feminist viewpoints within phil- osophy, what characteristics they might display, and whether they help or hinder women philosophers in their work. a.c.a. *feminism; feminist philosophy. Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus (eds.), Women in Western Polit- ical Philosophy: Kant to Nietzsche (Brighton, 1987). Michèle Le Dœuff, Hipparchia’s Choice: An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, etc. (Oxford, 1991). Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Prince- ton, NJ, 1981). worker control. An economic system that is character- ized by (1) each individual business enterprise being man- aged democratically by its workers, and (2) the economy as a whole relying upon the market—that is, upon supply and demand rather than central planning—for determin- ing the prices of all goods and services and the incomes people get for producing them. Democratic management by the workers may take the form of direct democracy, but, for larger enterprises, it will usually take the form of representative democracy where the workers, period- ically, elect a management team, and the management team will then control the everyday affairs of the enter- prise. Worker-control systems can be classified as either worker-control *socialism or worker-control *capitalism. Worker-control socialism (sometimes referred to as market socialism) is characterized by public ownership of the means of production and government planning of most new investment throughout the economy. Worker- control capitalism is characterized by the means of production for each business enterprise being owned privately by the workers of that enterprise themselves, and by the absence of any government planning of invest- ment, which is to be left to the market. Among the advantages that advocates of worker con- trol claim for this system are greater worker autonomy and a more equal distribution of income. With worker worker control 965 966 worker control control, income, being market-determined, will not be distributed equally. Since, however, investment income will no longer be concentrated largely in the hands of just a relatively few wealthy individuals, and since control of each business enterprise will be in the hands of its workers, incomes will, so it is argued, be distributed more equally than in traditional capitalism. But perhaps the greatest alleged advantage is that worker-controlled enterprises are structured so that management, having to face work- ers in periodic elections, will thus be motivated primarily to please them, which will lead to safer, more pleasant working conditions, less tedious, more challenging work, a more favourable balance between work and leisure, and any number of other benefits for workers. d.w.has. David Miller, Market, State and Community (Oxford, 1989). David Schweickart, Capitalism or Worker Control? (New York, 1980). world philosophy. The first important European philoso- pher seriously to consider the philosophical traditions of other civilizations, Hegel, viewed them as episodes in a development that culminated in his own metaphysics. While some recent books on world philosophy share Hegel’s comparative concerns, their authors eschew his teleological predilections and reject his disdainful attitude to non-Western traditions. Instead, they write from the conviction that these traditions, especially *Chinese, *Japanese, and *Indian, are sophisticated ones that have been wrongly ignored by Western philosophers. (Some- times the expression ‘world philosophy’ is confined to non-Western thought.) At a minimum, examination of these traditions acquaints us with thinkers of genius and challenging ideas, and may, in addition, contribute fruitful perspectives on live philosophical issues that know no geographical or cultural boundaries. A matter which divides advocates of world philosophy is whether the belief systems of non-literate civilizations, such as some African ones, should be included in its purview. d.e.c. D. E. Cooper, World Philosophies: An Historical Introduction, 2nd rev. edn. (Oxford, 2002). E. Deutsch and R. Bontekoe (eds.), A Companion to World Philoso- phies (Oxford, 1997). world-soul. Hegel was living in Jena in 1806 when Napoleon crushed the Prussian army at the battle named after that city. He wrote in a letter: ‘The Emperor—this world-soul—I saw riding through the city to review his troops. It is indeed a wonderful feeling to see such an indi- vidual who, here concentrated into a single point, reaches out over the world and dominates it’. Since history has, for Hegel, a goal, the world-soul is the instrument of a larger destiny. p.s. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, tr. J. Sibree (New York, 1956). Wright, Chauncey (1830–75). American pragmatist and enthusiast for *evolution, Wright so impressed Darwin that the Englishman had his writings on the subject reprinted and published in book form as a refutation of critics. Wright was nevertheless a stern critic of Spencer, especially the way in which the latter was trying to make a world philosophy from an amalgam of progressivist evo- lution, Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characters, and a misunderstanding of the second law of thermo- dynamics. Never a prolific writer, and better in tutorial than lecture theatre, Wright nevertheless influenced many of the better-known pragmatists, especially James. His own most original contribution was in an analysis of *causality, distinguishing between those causes which entirely explain their effects and those where something new appears. In this second category, Wright was clearly hinting at doctrines of *emergence (like that of Alexander) that were to become so popular fifty years after his death. Whether so clear-headed a thinker would have welcomed so fuzzy a philosophy is another matter. m.r. E. H. Madden, Chauncy Wright (New York, 1964). C. Wright, Philosophical Discussions (New York, 1877). Wright, Crispin (1942– ). British philosopher who has written extensively on the work of the later Wittgenstein, Frege, the debate between realists and anti-realists, vague- ness, and scepticism. The most notable aspect of Wright’s work has been his attempt to develop and defend his anti-realist position, according to which whatever is true must be in some sense knowable. In this area Wright is deeply influenced by Dummett, who has been engaged in the same enter- prise. However, the views of the two philosophers are not identical, and there are definite disagreements concern- ing, for example, the revisionary consequences of an anti- realist theory of meaning for logic. In his work on Wittgenstein, Wright has been centrally concerned with the rule-following considerations and has developed a sophisticated interpretation not identical with, but in many ways similar to, that of Kripke. h.w.n. *realism and anti-realism. Crispin Wright, Realism, Meaning and Truth, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1993). Wyclif, John (before 1330–after 1380). A student at Oxford, and Master of Balliol (1360), he wrote widely on philosophy and theology, and made a major contribution to the first English translation of the Bible. His writings contain strong criticisms of Church teachings and prac- tice, and those criticisms plus his contribution to the trans- lation of the Bible led to his being termed, with some justice, ‘the Morning Star of the Reformation’. His chief philosophical work, the Summa de Ente, contains a treatise on the problem of *universals, in which he presents and defends a strongly realist position, maintaining that the common nature in virtue of which something is a member of its species must have an existence entirely independent of any mind. a.bro. A. Kenny (ed.), Wyclif in his Times (Oxford, 1986). Xenocrates (396–314bc). Successor to Speusippus as head of Plato’s *Academy. Xenocrates wrote treatises in which he attempted to systematize Platonism. These treatises are lost, but the range of his work may be guessed at from a list of titles contained in the brief biography by Diogenes Laertius. Xenocrates was the first of the school of Plato to attempt to respond to Aristotle’s criticisms. His formula- tion of *Platonism was to become highly influential in the later tradition. In particular, Xenocrates’ division of philosophy into three branches, physics, ethics, and logic, helped shape *Hellenistic philosophy and its understand- ing of its fourth-century predecessors. l.p.g. John Dillon, The Middle Platonists 80 BC toAD220 (Ithaca, NY, 1977). Xenophanes of Colophon (c.560–c.470 bc). Pre-Socratic philosopher, cosmologist, and theologian; author of the first known discussion of epistemology. He made the fun- damental point that, to claim knowledge, it is not suffi- cient to ‘speak what is completely true’, and seems have to have thought that there was no possibility of *knowledge outside the realm of direct experience. In its place he pro- posed to put ‘opinions resembling the things which are true’, which must mean that they are straightforwardly extrapolated from the world of direct experience. What is known of his cosmology seems to show that he practised what he preached. In theology he satirized traditional anthropomorph- ism, remarking that each race represented its gods in its own image, and concluding that, if horses could draw, they would draw their gods looking like horses. He also attacked the traditional stories about the Greek gods as immoral. In its place he proposed a transcendent monotheism. He seems to have deduced the properties of his god from an overall principle of what is ‘fitting’; the first known attempt at philosophical theology. e.l.h. J. H. Lesher, Xenophanes of Colophon (Toronto, 1992). X yin and yang: see Chinese philosophy. Yoga: see Aurobindo; Hindu philosophy. Yugoslav philosophy: see Croat philosophy; Serbian philosophy; Slovene philosophy. Y Zeitgeist. In retrospect, ages seem to have spirits, which historians identify. But is it possible to identify the spirit of a present age, and, if so, what if anything should we do as a result? Talk of the spirit of the age in the twentieth century was often used by tyrants and bureaucrats to suppress criti- cism from those who objected to their vision of the age. We should remember that individuals create their ages, and that individuals of *genius transform them. a.o’h. K. R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London, 1957). Zen. A form of Buddhism that developed in China and spread to Japan which gives central importance to medita- tion and to the idea that the world, seen through eyes unclouded by desire, is beautiful. It is like a philosophical iceberg: almost all of the philosophy is beneath the sur- face. Buddhism in general is dedicated to the proposition that desires (i.e. strong preferences that involve attach- ment) are the primary cause of suffering, and that liber- ation will be the result of shedding the illusion of a substantial self and losing one’s desires; this is generally implicit rather than explicit in Zen texts. They also take from the Ma¯dhyamika school of Buddhist philosophy the anti-realist claim that there is no objectively correct and definitive perspective on anything. This is dramatized in the Zen literature, rather than argued for, by use of puz- zles (Koans) for which there could be no literally correct solution and by amusing exchanges intended to undercut any tendency to believe in, or take seriously, the literal truth of anything. j.j.k. *Buddhist philosophy. An examination of Zen that is more philosophically probing than most is to be found in D. T. Suzuki, The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind (York Beach, Me., 1972). Zeno of Citium. This Zeno (334–262 bc) must be distin- guished from the earlier (fifth century) Pre-Socratic Zeno of Elea. Zeno of Citium was the founder of the Hellenistic school of Stoic philosophy. The main features of early Stoic thought were a corporealist and dynamic philoso- phy of nature, an empiricist epistemology, an absolutist conception of moral duty, and an internationalist theory of social organization. Zeno’s writings are all lost; but his contribution to this complex system seems to have been particularly in the areas of epistemology and political phi- losophy. He wrote a widely admired Republic, which expounded such key Stoic themes as the importance of the rule of law and the universality of human political institu- tions. In epistemology and ethics he is explicitly associated with the absolutist view, according to which a person either completely attains or totally misses scientific knowledge and virtue. j.d.g.e. *Stoicism. For a judicious assessment of the distinctly Zenonian features of early Stoicism, see A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1987). Zeno of Elea (c.470 bc). Fellow citizen and associate of Parmenides; admired by Plato as ‘the Eleatic Palamedes’ and by Aristotle as the inventor of philosophical dialectic. Zeno is not known to have advanced any positive views. He devised an arsenal of destructive arguments, directed against opponents of Parmenides. (Some seem to be ad hominem.) These exploit properties of the infinite, and use (perhaps for the first time) *infinite regress as an argumen- tative device. Those for which there is evidence may be grouped as: (1) arguments against plurality (against the thesis ‘There are many things’); (2) arguments against the possibility of motion; (3) others. 1. The arguments against plurality systematically deduced contradictions from the premiss that ‘There are many things’. Three survive in whole or in part. (a) ‘If there are many things, they must be both great and small: so small as to have no size, so great as to be infinite.’ The second limb of the argument employs the ‘dichotomy’ principle: anything with size can be divided into two things each with size; hence there is a process which never terminates. (b) If there is plurality, the total of things must be both finite and infinite in number: finite because a plurality implies a definite and therefore a finite number; infinite because two or more things require boundaries or more generally distinguishing marks, and here again a progression to infinity sets in. (c) ‘If there are many things they must be both like and unlike.’ The supporting argu- ments are not recorded. (2). The famous *‘paradoxes of motion’, recorded by Aristotle, use assumptions about the spatial and temporal Z . representation in particular, the status of mathematics and of scientific the- ory, solipsism and the self, ethics and the mystical. According to the Tractatus, the world is the totality of *facts,. contained in the brief biography by Diogenes Laertius. Xenocrates was the first of the school of Plato to attempt to respond to Aristotle’s criticisms. His formula- tion of *Platonism was to become. that breathes life into the signs of a language, but the use of signs in the stream of human life. Wittgenstein also worked extensively on the philosophy of mathematics. His Remarks on the Foundations